ending public space as we know it.pdf

8/9/2019 Ending Public Space as We Know It.pdf

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Ending Public Space as We Know It 13

Social Justice Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2 13

Ending Public Space as We Know It

Bernd Belina*

THE RIGHT TO USE AND APPROPRIATE URBAN SPACES SUCH AS SIDEWALKS, STREETS,

squares, and parks is permanently contested in capitalist cities. In this essay

I argue that the notion of “public space” is not useful for describing these

conicts, but is a strategy used within them. My starting point for making this pointis a conict related by Homer in Ulysses. I then discuss the idealistic pitfalls in

Jürgen Habermas’ twofold “bourgeois public sphere,” followed by a sketch of howthe weaker point of this concept usually structures the current use of the notion of“public space.” From this theoretical basis, I argue that given recent changes in

the hegemonic meaning attributed to the notion of “public space” in the United

States and Germany, it might be better to refrain from using it when striving forsocial justice and radical change. This claim is grounded in a discussion of urban

debates and practices concerning the treatment of racialized bodies, the poor, and

other undesirables whose exclusion and expulsion from urban spaces are legiti-mized with reference to the quality of “public spaces” in the context of “broken

windows” policing.1. Public as Strategy

In Ithaca, around 800 BCE, Telemachos is very dissatised. His father, Odysseus,has been missing for 20 years, and for the last three years suitors for the hand of his

mother Penelope have been besieging his house. The uninvited guests are threatening

to eat him out of house and home—his own private space! The suitors’ behaviorcan only be described as blackmail. Their spokesman, Antinous, declares: “But

we are not going back to our own lands / or some place else, not until she marries

/ an Achaean [Greek] man of her own choosing” (2, 171–173).1In this situation, Telemachos convenes the rst people’s assembly in Ithaca in

20 years. In this agora, a term that originally referred solely to the assembly of themale freemen of the polity and only later described the location of this assembly

in the polis (Kenzler, 1999: 31), he is faced with a problem: the assembly can onlyconfer on issues of public interest. For this reason, he is asked at the start of the

assembly if it is “public business / he will introduce and talk about” (2, 38–39)?This he must answer in the negative:

The issue hereis my own need, for on my household

*BERND BELINA is professor at Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, Institute for Human Geography(e-mail: [email protected]).


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troubles have fallen in a double sense.First, my noble father’s perished, the manwho was once your king and my kind father. And then there’s an even greater problem,which will quickly and completely shatterthis entire house, and my whole livelihood will be destroyed (2, 57–65).

All modern knowledge about the early Greek agora before the middle ofthe seventh century B.C.E. is drawn from Homer’s epics, from the Iliad and theOdyssey. Their suitability as historical sources is the subject of a long, drawn-outdispute (van Wees, 1992: 5 –23). The dating of the action, the political structure of

the polities described in these works, and the role of their agorai as “public spaces”are also contentious (Hölkeskamp, 1997; Hölscher, 1998; Kenzler, 1999: 22 –30).However, researchers generally agree on one issue: with the one exception describedhere, it is true that in the Homerian agora “the themes discussed … are always ofgeneral interest” (Kenzler, 1999: 34). This is obviously not the case here. It is onlyby means of his speech in the agora that “the private plight of Telemachus hasbecome a public injustice” (Thornton, 1970: 69). He thereby offends the establishedgovernment ideology, whereby a “distinction between public and private affairs”is recognized (van Wees, 1992: 36). He makes his private problems public in order

to pursue his private interests.However, it can also be argued with good reason that Telemachos’ private

interests already had a public dimension before they were discussed in the agora,and that Homer depoliticizes the issue when “the threat to Odysseus’ house … bythe suitors is treated as a purely private problem” (Heubeck et al., 1988: 59–60).For in the case of Telemachos’ death, or a crisis that reveals the young prince tobe weak, the issue at stake is the governance of Ithaca ( Ibid .). In this case, thesuccessful suitor would succeed Odysseus as the owner of great riches and as ruler.The suitors openly stated this interest. As Homer tells us, after “evil death, his ownblack fate” (22, 17) has overtaken Antinous as the rst of the suitors through thearrow of the returned Odysseus, the suitors’ second spokesman, Eurymachos, triesto save his skin by revealing the dead man’s true motivation:

But the man responsible for all thisnow lies dead—I mean Antinous, the onewho started all this business, not becausehe was all that eager to get married—that’s not what he desired. No. For he had

another plan in mind, which Cronos’ sondid not bring to fulllment. He wanted to become the king of fertile Ithaca (22, 59–66).


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Telemachos’ private problem is simultaneously one of political leadership inIthaca. A clear distinction between private and public spheres is not possible here.Telemachos’ behavior is an attempt to benet from this ambivalent situation byredrawing the line between private and public. Thus he utilizes the dichotomybetween private and public in a strategic manner.

According to Clausewitz (2003: 27; 157), strategy is “the employment of thebattle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War” and war “an actof violence intended to compel our opponent to fulll our will.” This is exactly whatTelemachos attempts to do: he tries to impose his will on Antinous and the othersuitors by transforming what many see as a private matter into a public problem,although he does not do this directly or by violent means but indirectly, in andthrough the public sphere. This strategic readjustment of the boundary betweenpublic and private is designed to achieve his aims by changing the frameworkin which the problem is treated, thereby also altering the prevailing rules andrelations to established values and normative ideals associated with “private” and“public” spheres. Different rules and values obtain in the agora for issues that arerecognized as public ones. The public/private differentiation emerges as a socialproduct, in which are inscribed power relations and meanings that actors canexploit by themselves by exerting strategic inuence on this differentiation. Inthis sense, the public/private differentiation represents a strategy that can be usedin socio-spatial conicts.

This is the order of the day in urban conicts concerning what is public andwhat is private in urban spaces as well as in the consequences of this differentiation.These struggles are about the placement of individuals and groups within socio-spatial power relations that are produced by structuring categories of class, race,gender, sexuality, and age (cf . Hausen, 1989; Wucherpfennig, 2010). In this essay,I am particularly interested in what “public” or “public space” stands for in suchconicts and to what purposes and for what politics the adjective is used. To dothis with regard to debates and practices in U.S. and German cities, I will discussthe dual meaning of the “bourgeois public,” which makes possible the existence oftwo variants of reference to public space in urban politics and debates.

2. The Dual Meaning of the Bourgeois “Public”

The bourgeoisie of the early nineteenth century became highly dissatised.The absolutist state guaranteed private property, the most important political and

economic precondition for capitalist accumulation, by force while denying that classany active inuence in state affairs. In this situation, the term “the public”—rstrecorded in the German language in 1765 (Öffentlichkeit , meaning both “public”

and “publicity”)—became a liberal catchword, “directed primarily against thearcane practice of absolutist cabinet policy and administration” (Hölscher, 1984:1138). The emerging bourgeoisie countered its exclusion from political decisionswith a demand for making affairs “more public.”


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Jürgen Habermas studied this process in The Structural Transformation of thePublic Sphere (1991).2 In the rst half of the book, he analyses the bourgeois publicas a product of social conict and the object of ideological struggles, emerging withthe establishment of capitalist social conditions in the seventeenth and eighteenth

century. He explains the advent of the sphere of the bourgeois public and its ideologyas resulting from the transformation of social relations to exchange relations in thecontext of emerging capitalism that “has left remaining no other nexus betweenman and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’” (Marx andEngels, 1969: 464). Since anyone who engages in commodity exchange must“mutually recognize in each other the rights of private proprietors” (Marx, 1962:99), a private sphere is constituted: “With the expansion and liberation of thissphere of the market, commodity owners gained private autonomy; the positivemeaning of ‘private’ emerged precisely in reference to the concept of free power ofcontrol over property that functioned in capitalist fashion” (Habermas, 1991: 74).

For Habermas ( Ibid .: 27), the bourgeois public is “the sphere of private peoplecome together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from aboveagainst the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general

rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere

of commodity exchange and social labor.” Thus, the public sphere is constitutedbetween the private sphere and state power. In the public sphere, private individualsgrapple with state power in order to further their own interests. This sphere, whichis initially necessary for the interests of the bourgeois, becomes a good and valuable institution from their perspective. “The public sphere as a functional element in the

political realm was given the normative status of an organ for the self-articulation ofcivil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs” ( Ibid .: 74; emphasisadded). The “contradiction between public and private life” (Pashukanis, 2007:136) that emanated from economic relations is ideologized as something good and“assumes, over time, an ‘eternal’ and ‘natural’ character.”

Only this ideologized version of the emerging bourgeois public includes the“principle of universal access. A public sphere from which specic groups wouldbe eo ipso excluded [is] less than merely incomplete; it [is] not a public sphere atall” (Habermas, 1991: 85). As Habermas notes ( Ibid .), this accessibility was neverrealized, with education and property being the criteria for admission. Feministauthors in particular—and rightly—criticized Habermas’ supercial discussionof the exclusion of women that “was a constitutive, not a marginal or accidentalfeature of the bourgeois public from the start” (Landes, 1998: 143; cf . Lang, 2003).This ideal does not engage with the fact that access to the bourgeois public isalways limited to the few and is permanently under siege (Gerstenberger, 1990:527). But as the real participants in the newly emerging public, the bourgeoisieacted as if the realization of their interests was the common good, and their “classinterest was the basis of public opinion” (Habermas, 1991: 87). The assumptionof an all-inclusive public sphere is and has always been an ideological tool for the


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the empirical and theoretical proof of the impossibility of realizing such an ideal in

contemporary social conditions, it still prevails in academic and political discourse

because of its normative attractiveness. The notion of “the public” understood as a

sphere in which everyone is included, no matter what their position within existingpower relations, makes possible a (purely idealistic) reasoning about paths towarda better world without having to analyze the existing world.

I have dealt with Habermas’ conception of a “public sphere” at some lengthbecause it is the most elaborate to be developed as a historical description, wastransformed into an idealized concept, and has lived a double life ever since. This

is important in debates about urban spaces because any idea of a “public space”

as open to everybody makes the same idealistic assumption. Before discussing

this point in concreto with reference to debates about the criminalization ofundesirables and the right to use and appropriate urban spaces, I will briey outlinesome conceptualizations of “public space” that share the more idealist aspects of

Habermas’ “public sphere.”

3. “Public Space” as Ideology

For many theorists, “public space” is the spatial, material form of the ideal

of the public sphere. For Marshall Berman, for example, public spaces are (orshould be) “environments open to everybody where, rst of all, a society’s inner

contradictions could emerge freely and openly and, second, where people couldbegin to deal with these contradictions” (1986: 477). For Sharon Zukin (1995:32), public space is dened by “two basic principles: public stewardship and openaccess.” These conceptions have at least three similarities with Habermas’ “publicsphere”: First, “open access for everyone” in these accounts is a constitutive element

of “public space.” Second, this ideal was never and can never be realized in “reallife”: “There are not and never have been truly open public spaces where all mayfreely gather, free from exclusionary violence” (Mitchell, 1996: 127; cf . Siebeland Wehrheim, 2003). Third, the empirical and theoretical impossibility of “open

access for everybody” notwithstanding, this idealism remains a strong ideologicalfeature that masks underlying struggles. Thus, the same criticism leveled againstHabermas’ idealist conception of the “public sphere” applies here too: it is anultimately afrmative position.

Some theorists have chosen a different path. Instead of searching for “true public

spaces,” they point to the intertwining of “the public” and “the private” in urbanspaces while emphasizing the necessity of adhering to these concepts (Kilian, 1998;Ruddick, 1996; Soja, 2000: 320). I would like to take this point one step furtherby arguing that the “public/private” distinction does not help at all as a descriptive

tool when the analysis of concrete processes in urban spaces is at stake. On thecontrary, measuring these processes against some ideal of “public space” and theircategorization within the framework of “the private” and “the public,” no matterhow intertwined, obscures them because of the idealistic character of the terms


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“public” and “private.” By looking at the phenomenon through the spectacles of the

“public/private” distinction, all one gets is a normative categorization of what isgoing on: phenomena are regarded as either “good” or bad, “justied” or not. Whatone does not get is an explanation of why they occur. Quite the contrary, once thephenomenon is framed as one in need of normative judgment, attention is diverted

from any explanation. Instead of choosing this necessarily afrmative approach, Iwould argue that the analysis should concentrate on the concrete interests involved,how they are pursued, and the ideologies used to legitimize them—for example,the ideology of “public space.”

4. Debates over “Public Space” and Urban Undesirables

Probably the most notorious document of recent urban policing is the “PoliceStrategy No. 5,” subtitled “Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York.” This paper,bearing the names of then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner WilliamBratton (Giuliani and Bratton, 1994), enumerates not only the types of behavior tobe fought (“quality of life offenses”), but also lists the types of people to be drivenout of the “Public Spaces of New York”: panhandlers, prostitutes, squeegee men,street artists, the mentally ill, and the homeless. Reacting to such developments,

since the mid-1990s a series of leftist activities adopted the slogan “Reclaim theStreets!” Here the “reclaiming of public space” is in the opposite sense, that is, as

a way to ght the criminalization and expulsion of “undesirables” (cf . Brünzels,2001). Both supporters and critics of “social cleansing” (Smith, 2001) à la NewYork use the concept of “public space” to support their claim. Critics claim thateverybody has a right to enter “public spaces,” while supporters state that “to betruly public, a space must be orderly enough to invite the entry of a large majority

of those who come to it” (Ellickson, 1996: 1174).In both versions, “public space” becomes a code word that stands for opposing

ideas concerning the treatment of a certain part of the population—the “costly

yet relatively harmless burden to society” that Spitzer (1975: 645) referred to as

“social junk.” I prefer to use the term “undesirables.” Contesting views of theirpresence in “public space” is an inherent part of the debates on managing thesocial consequences of the recent restructuring of global capitalism (Belina, 2006;Herbert and Brown, 2006; Wacquant, 2009). As one of the more visible effects ofthis restructuring, the growing number of undesirables in the streets and parks ofcities in the global North is becoming a social problem as well as an eyesore. Inthis context, the “reclaiming of public space” can mean “law and order,” holdingthe poor, the homeless, and loitering jobless adolescents responsible for their ownmisery (i.e., blaming the victim), accusing them of “stealing the city” from the

“orderly people” (cf . Smith, 1998), and calling on the repressive state apparatus todeal with them. (See Beckett [1997] for a critical analysis of this “law and order”rhetoric.) Or it can mean “social justice,” claiming that the state bears responsibilityfor the welfare of all citizens and calling for more money for education, social


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welfare, and the like. In this second version, reference to “the public” can evenbecome “a code word for socialism” (Robbins, 1993: x).

A striking feature of these two antagonistic positions, though, is theircommonalities. Both versions of “public space” use the term as a strategy and

code word that stands for something else. Both parties also direct their claims atthe same address: the state. This comes as no surprise. When the treatment of the“reserve army of labor” (Marx, 1962: Chapter 23) is at stake in capitalist societies,it is and always has been the state that has to take care of them—not for altruisticreasons, of course, but to guarantee the existence of a functioning and peacefulworking class (Decker and Hecker, 2002; Piven and Cloward, 1993; Spitzer, 1975).This is precisely why it makes so much sense for both positions to rely on the sametheoretical underpinning—the idealization of “the public.” In capitalist society,

social antagonism and conict are to be transformed into the legal form, whichthe state will ultimately take care of (Pashukanis, 2007). Finally, both versions of“public space” share an implicit or explicit reference to the idealistic vision of apubic sphere and space that is open to everyone, with the huge difference being theform this ideal is supposed to assume. In one case, a socially just society should

include the undesirables—at least physically in urban spaces; in the other case,ideal openness necessitates their exclusion and expulsion.

Currently in Germany and the United States, the law-and-order version of“public space” has gained enormous support following what has been perceivedas the successful implementation of broken windows policing in New York in the1990s and the transfer of this “success story” to Germany (cf . Belina and Helms,2003). One achievement of the indirect way to promote law and order using “publicspace” as a code word is the way in which it helps to turn a moralistic judgment intoa claim compatible with the rule of law. In this version, the law-and-order positiondoes not openly refer to its exclusive social ideal according to which marginalgroups are to be excluded as morally inferior. Instead, it emphasizes the egalitarianvalue of “free access for all,” which is curtailed by the presence of “undesirables.”This strategic reference to “public space” ts well with the general policy pursuedby conservatives in the United States since the 1980s, justifying their demandsfor state intervention in everyday life, e.g., with regard to pornography, drugs, orhomosexuality, on the basis of abstract equality before the law rather on moralgrounds (Harcourt, 2001: 194–205; Hirsch, 2002: 10–11). Thus, they “poach” onthe ideological territory of their liberal opponents by constructing arguments in

which their own moral conception of the inferiority of certain groups is compatiblewith the abstract principle of equality. A crucial aspect is the reference to the harm principle, i.e., the idea that it is not an infringement of social morals, but rather socialharm that legitimates state intervention. John Stuart Mills’ axiomatic formulationof this principle in On Liberty (1974: 68) states: “That the only purpose for whichpower can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, againsthis will, is to prevent harm to others.” Liberals concluded from this principle that


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forms of behavior that may generally be considered immoral, but do not cause any

discernable social harm, may not be prosecuted by the state. The U.S. Supreme

Court increasingly tended to adopt this perspective from the 1950s on and used itto justify numerous decisions that prevented the police from intervening in forms

of behavior that diverge from commonly accepted morality. This had far-reaching

consequences for the treatment of undesirables in urban spaces, because the

discretionary scope of the police was limited by legal principles. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972: 171), the Supreme Court states:

A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll orfrequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wivesor who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too

precarious for a rule of law.... The rule of law, evenly applied to minoritiesas well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilagethat holds society together.

Forbidding minorities, the poor, and other undesirables to loiter and stroll in

urban spaces while remaining compatible with the rule of law necessitates anideological association of their mere physical presence with social harm. In this way,the law-and-order version of “public space” makes undesirables responsible for thedecay of “public spaces” and the fact that “orderly people” feel uncomfortable due

to their presence. Their exclusion is legitimized by the social harm they representsimply by being in a particular place. To be even more persuasive, this harm wasaugmented by inextricably linking their presence to crime with what has becomefamous as the broken windows hypothesis. Its central ideological achievement isthat it criminalizes undesirables not for what they have done or for their supposedmoral deciencies, but for their mere physical presence in a place.

In Wilson and Kelling’s (1982: 30) original formulation, too many “disreputableor obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdyteenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed” in a certain space create a

perception of a lack of social control that in turn leads to an invasion of criminals.Thus, they conclude that “arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmedno identiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anythingabout a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire community”

( Ibid.: 35). Ellickson (1996: 1195) similarly emphasizes that “the harm caused bya single act of begging or lying on park benches is generally insignicant.” Yet,he sees genuine harm to incommoded and frightened passersby, retailing, race

relations, perceived social control, and a society’s work ethic in the permanentand widespread occurrence of such behavior, very much in the spirit of the harm

principle ( Ibid.: 1181–1183). Because of this harm, he views state interventionas necessary and justied. Thus, by claiming that the presence of undesirables incertain places causes social harm, the idea of a conservative order in which morallyinferior individuals have no place is transformed into an argument based on abstract


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equality before the law and thereby legitimates the same practical demand: theexpulsion of these undesirables. In this way, the ideological foundation is createdfor ejecting undesirables on the basis of the rule of law (Beckett and Herbert, 2008;Belina, 2006, 2007; Mitchell, 1997).

In a context where almost any policy that is presented as ghting or preventingcrime is applauded, e.g., in the United States from the 1980s on (Beckett, 1997;Chambliss, 1999) or Germany from the 1990s (Hirsch, 1998; Frehsee, 2000), thisconnection between the mere physical presence of undesirables in urban spaces andcrime sufces to turn undesirables into objects to be dealt with by the police. Onthe surface, it is a return to the kind of policing that was criticized and regulatedin the past on the basis of the rule of law (Harring and Ray, 1999; Walker, 1984).Today, however, it is based on the rule of law itself because of the successfulideological equation of the physical presence of undesirables and social harm.

A central explanation for the inability of the empirical and theoretical critiqueof broken windows (Harcourt, 2001; Taylor, 2001; Fagan and Davies, 2000) toseriously challenge the triumph of this social cleansing in the name of crime-

ghting was that it did not question the two ideological connections discussed here.My argument is that one reason for this was (and is) the adherence to an idealisticunderstanding of “the public” and “public space” as “open to everyone”—a belief

that was successfully turned against undesirables and advocates of social justiceprecisely because of its idealistic underpinnings.

5. Ending “Public Space”?

If positive references to “public space” therefore increasingly entail embracing

the ideology of law and order, if every argument in favor of social justice andagainst exclusion that is based on “public space” can readily be turned into itsopposite, and if one suddenly nds oneself in debates over one’s attitude to theworries and fears of the silent majority, is this then the moment to end positivereferences to “public space”? Instead of referring to “public space,” it would be

more appropriate to insistently point to the reasons why the “reserve army oflabor” as a socioeconomic reality and its feared visible presence in urban spacesas a moral problem exist in the rst place. The discussion should instead be aboutcapitalism, racism, and their neoliberal versions, which entail the punishment ofthe poor (Wacquant, 2009). Many groups and initiatives already do that, notablythose using Henri Lefebvre’s slogan of the “right to the city” in recent years in theUnited States and Germany (Lefebvre, 1968; Mayer, 2009; Mitchell and Heynen,2009). In this respect, “ending public space” refers to the abandonment of the termby radical politics due to its current contamination.

In some circumstances, of course, claiming open access to “public spaces” maybe a useful strategy for promoting social justice and radical change. Yet this must bewell thought out in relation to the (possibly multiple) publics (in the rst meaningof the term as expounded by Habermas) that one wishes to reach. It might be, for


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Illustration by Christoph Schäfer

The city is—inhabited world—appropriated space.

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ending public space as we know it.pdf

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