vii

Contents

List of Maps, Figures and Tables xiii

Acknowledgements xiv

List of Abbreviations xvi

1 Introduction 1 A Few Generalisations 1A Brief History of the Conflict 2 Nationalist and Unionist Views of the Conflict 6

Nationalist and Republican Views 7The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 9Sinn Féin/IRA 11Unionist and Loyalist Views 12The Ulster Unionist Party 14The Democratic Unionist Party 15The Loyalist paramilitaries 15The Alliance Party (APNI) 16

History and the Current Conflict 17Segregation and Sharing 19

Education 21Residence 21Employment 21Social 22Population 22

Violence and the Conflict: Who Did What to Whom 23

2 The Approach and Argument: Power, Ideologyand ‘Reality’ 26The Argument Stated Briefly 26Defining Power: Structure and Agency 27

Agency-Oriented Explanations 27Structural Explanations 28The Strategic-Relational Approach 29

The Ideological or Propaganda War 32The War of Words 37

viii Contents

Ideology: Power Creates ‘Reality’? 39Winding Down the Propaganda War 41The Hall of Mirrors: What is ‘Reality’? 43

3 The Inevitability of Irish Unity? Northern Ireland1921–68 47Partition and Irish Unity 48Ireland: Years of Polarisation 1921–58 50‘A Nation Once Again’? 52Autonomy under Threat: Northern Ireland

and the UK 53The growth of the state 54The Unemployment Crisis 55Northern Ireland, the EEC and the World 56Prospect of Labour 57O’Neill, Modernisation and modernisation 58

North–South Co-operation and Wilson’s ‘SurrogateNationalism’ 60

Conclusion 64

4 The Civil Rights Movement 67How Much Discrimination was there? 67The 1960s: Polarisation or Reconciliation? 70The Campaign for Civil Rights 71

The Northern Ireland Labour Party 72The Nationalist Party 73The Connolly Association and the Republican Movement 74The Campaign for Social Justice 76

The Labour Government 1964–66 and theCampaign for Democracy in Ulster 77

O’Neill: Bridging the Gap? 78Politics in the Streets 82Debating the Origins of the Civil Rights Movement 88

A Republican/Communist Conspiracy? 88The New Catholic Middle-Class Thesis (Top-Down) 90Growth of State Explanation (Bottom-Up) 93

Conclusion 96

5 The Crisis of British Policy over Northern Ireland1968–73 98Bipartisanship 99British Nationalism and Irish Unity 100

Contents ix

British Influence, Unionist Disaffection 102Indirect Rule 103The Army: In and Out? 105Reform: Modern British Standards 107Ulsterisation 110The False Dawn and ‘Sinister Forces’ 112Security Policy and British Counter-Insurgency

Strategy 114Northern Ireland: ‘Minimum Force’ and Escalation 117Political Will? The Protestant Backlash and Army

Discontent 120The Security Dilemma 124Conclusion 127

6 The First Peace Process 1972–74: The Power-SharingExperiment and its Failure 129British Colonial Policy: Building up the

Moderates 130The Moderate Silent Majority? 131The Settlement: Power-Sharing and an Irish Dimension 135The Failure of Moderates 138Bipartisanship and Agreement over Northern Ireland 140Sunningdale: The Deal 142The Unionists pushed too far? 144Selling Sunningdale 147The Ulster Workers’ Council Strike: Politics in

the Streets 150Blaming ‘Them’ not ‘Us’ 153Lessons? 154

‘Power-Sharing Collapsed because Unionists Opposed Power-Sharing and the Irish Dimension’ 154

‘Power-Sharing Collapsed because of the Irish Dimension’ 155‘Power-Sharing and the Irish Dimension Collapsed due to

the Weakness of the Labour Government’ 155‘Power-Sharing Failed because the Political Environment

was too Polarised to Sustain it’ 156Conclusion 156

7 The Limits of British Policy 1974–81: FromWithdrawal to Integration 158The Withdrawal Option 158Stalemate: The Constitutional Convention 162

x Contents

The IRA Ceasefire 1975–76 and the Fear of BritishWithdrawal 165

The British Parties and the Ulster Unionists 171Constitutional Irish Nationalism: the SDLP and

the Republic 172The US Dimension 175Back on Track: The Atkins Talks 1979 and the Dublin Summit 1980 178The Propaganda War and the Hunger Strikes 1980–81 180Conclusion 187

8 The Anglo–Irish Agreement: Origins and Impact 190Negotiating the Anglo–Irish Agreement 1981–85 190Moderating Unionists? 195Explaining the Anglo–Irish Agreement 1985 196

Fear of Sinn Féin 197Security Policy 198External Pressure 199Bureaucratic Conflict 199British Withdrawal 200Coercive Power-Sharing 200

Thatcher: English Unionist, English Nationalist? 201Why was the AIA signed? 202The Reaction to the Anglo–Irish Agreement 204The Unionists Revolt: Violence and the Union 204Unionist Politicians: Leading or Following? 208Security, Polarisation and Reform 210Conclusion: Balancing a Settlement? 213

9 Endgame? The Origins of the Second Peace Process1988–94 215Two Perspectives on the Peace Process 216

A Nationalist View 216A Unionist View 217

‘Balancing’ Unionism and Nationalism 218Rethinking the ‘Armed Struggle’? 221The Secularisation of the Republic 224A Departure in British Policy? 225All-Party Talks versus ‘Irish Peace Initiative’? 227The Brooke–Mayhew Talks: Worth a

‘Penny Candle’? 229Loyalists and Republicans: Striking a Balance? 231

Contents xi

Hume–Adams 233Talking to Terrorists 235The Downing Street Declaration 239‘Pan-Nationalism’ and the ‘Tactical Use of the Unarmed

Struggle’ 241Conclusion 243

10 Bridging the Gap? The Peace Process 1994–2000 244Introduction 244Ceasefire Reactions 244Permanence and Decommissioning 245Decommissioning and Demilitarisation 248The Framework Documents: Overbalancing? 251The US Charade: Adams’ Visa and ‘Washington 3’ 254Explaining the Decommissioning Deadlock 256The Mitchell Report and the End of the

IRA Ceasefire 259Reviving the Peace Process 261Drumcree and the Security Dilemma 262New Labour, New Peace Process? 266The Good Friday Agreement 269

A Northern Ireland Assembly 269An Executive 270The North–South Ministerial Council 270The ‘British–Irish Council and Intergovernmental’

Conference 270Equality, Human Rights, Victims 270RUC Reform 270Decommissioning and Prisoners 271

A Balanced Settlement? 271The Referendum 272Stretching and Bridging? 274Conclusion: A Critique of a Nationalist and a Unionist

View of the Peace Process 277

11 Conclusion: The Politics of War and Peace 281Introduction 281Explaining Northern Ireland: Power, Ideology

and ‘Reality’ 281Analysing the Peace Process 288

xii Contents

Power and Interests 292British Interests and Power 292Economics 293Strategic 293Politics 293Stability 293Unionist Interests and Power 294Nationalist Interests and Power 296

Power and the Propaganda War 298The Power and Limits of British Propaganda 298

A Democratic Path to Peace in Northern Ireland? 304

Bibliography 308

Index 318

1

1

Introduction

This chapter aims to give a brief background and introduction to theconflict in Northern Ireland, by presenting a brief history, intro-ducing nationalist and unionist perspectives on the conflict, and con-sidering also the extent of violence and segregation. The popularhistorical accounts given by nationalists and unionists of the historyof the conflict in Northern Ireland tend to be very different. Theseaccounts are not merely of historical interest but are deployed bypoliticians to win advantage in the propaganda war over the futureof Northern Ireland. Past grievances are used to justify currentclaims to justice. Although these highly ‘propagandistic’ accounts ofhistory are often undermined by historical research, these ‘myths’continue to persist. Do these very different accounts of the historyNorthern Ireland, including the recent period of conflict since the1960s, contribute to the continuation of the conflict?

The following chapter presents ‘The Approach and Argument’ ofthe book and will pick up on the concepts of ‘power’, ‘ideology’ (andthe propaganda war) and ‘reality’ which are the key, inter-relatedthemes. Power, it is argued, is deployed in the two, inter-connectedwars being fought over Northern Ireland, the ‘real war’ and thepropaganda war. The ‘real war’ is aimed at winning advantage throughphysical means, violence, demonstrations and repression. But theseare also deployed in the propaganda war to shift the politicalagenda. The ideological, public rhetoric of the propaganda war bythe various parties to the conflict can be contrasted with the ‘realities’of the conflict which are often only privately acknowledged.

A Few Generalisations

In trying to understand the conflict in Northern Ireland a few roughgeneralisations can be helpful. The conflict in Northern Ireland canbe most easily and quickly understood as being between two main

2 Northern Ireland

groups. First, there are unionists, who comprise about 60 per centof the population of Northern Ireland, and tend to see themselves asBritish and want Northern Ireland to continue to remain part ofthe UK. These unionists are mostly Protestant, but there are someCatholic unionists. Second, there are nationalists, who make up anincreasing proportion of the Northern Ireland population, currentlyabout 40 per cent, and who tend to see themselves as Irish and aspireto be part of a united Ireland. These nationalists are overwhelminglyCatholic. There is a much smaller third group, perhaps a few percent of people in Northern Ireland, who reject the domination ofnationalism and unionism and see themselves as occupying the‘moderate’ centre ground between the two dominant unionist andnationalist communities. While the labels ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’are used to describe the principal contending communities, the con-flict is not to any great extent about religion or religious dogma. Theterms ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ are usually used to indicate some-one who is either unionist or nationalist. Northern Ireland can beseen as a place where the British and Irish nations overlap and theirco-nationals, British unionists and Irish nationalists, aspire to be partof two different states. This is not such an unusual state of affairs,particularly in Eastern Europe, where borders have shifted back andforward down the centuries; minorities have frequently been caughton the ‘wrong side’ of a border, under the sovereignty of a statewhich is not run by their co-nationals.

A Brief History of the Conflict

In the historical debate between nationalists and unionists there issome dispute over which group has first claim to Northern Ireland.Nationalists can point to their Celtic ‘forefathers’ while some unionistshave claimed that their ancestors, the Cruthin, were in the territorynow called Northern Ireland even before the Celts. This is not aunique debate: where there is conflict over territory there is oftenhistorical debate over ‘who was here first’ since this can be used inpolitical argument to justify one or other group’s legitimate claim toa territory.

Nationalists usually date Ireland’s woes to the Anglo–Normaninvasion of 1169 and England’s domination of Ireland ever since.When Henry VIII broke with Rome in the sixteenth centuryEngland became Protestant while Ireland remained Catholic and

Introduction 3

rebellious. In 1603 the conquest of Ireland was completed. In 1609the plantation of Ulster began, the Catholic Irish were dispossessedand (mainly Scottish) Protestant settlers were established in presentday Northern Ireland. Some Catholics can still point out the landswhich were taken over by the settlers. During the seventeenthcentury Protestant landownership in Ireland rose from 5 per cent toover 80 per cent at the expense of the Catholics. In 1641 the Irishrose up against the Protestants and massacred some of them.Cromwell triumphed bloodily over the Irish in 1649–52. In 1690King William of Orange defeated James II, the Catholic King ofEngland and Scotland, at the Battle of the Boyne, ensuringProtestant dominance. At the end of the seventeenth century andthe beginning of the eighteenth, ‘penal laws’ were passed whichfurther established Protestant domination in Ireland. AnglicanProtestants enjoyed privileges over both Catholics and non-conformist Protestants. In 1798 the Protestant Wolfe Tone led theUnited Irishmen, combining Catholics and Presbyterians, in arepublican uprising, to establish Ireland’s independence fromEngland. Again this was defeated and in 1801 the Act of Unionwas passed integrating the Irish Parliament into the Parliament ofGreat Britain and Ireland.

During the 1820s and 1830s Daniel O’Connell led a successfulmovement for Catholic representation in Parliament and an unsuc-cessful one for the ‘Repeal of the Union’. The Irish famine (1845–51)resulted in the deaths of over a million Irish, and the emigration ofanother million within a decade. This diaspora has continued toplay a role in Irish politics ever since, particularly Irish-Americans.Nationalists continued to agitate against English domination. TheFenians turned to violence and bombings to oust the English.A constitutional movement for Irish Home Rule developed at theend of the nineteenth century which succeeded in winning consider-able land reforms for the Irish, but by the outbreak of the FirstWorld War it had failed to achieve the implementation of HomeRule for Ireland. Throughout Ireland the unionists, mainly theProtestant descendants of the plantation, led resistance to homerule, fearing Catholic domination in an all-Ireland assembly.Unionists were particularly concentrated in Ulster and between1912 and 1914 they mobilised, declaring their willingness to fightagainst Home Rule. In this they were supported by the Conservat-ive Party and had the sympathy of important sections of the BritishArmy. By 1914 England faced civil war over the ‘Irish Question’

4 Northern Ireland

between the Conservatives and their unionist allies in Ireland, andthe Liberals (and Labour) who were sympathetic to the home ruledemand of nationalists.

The First World War drastically changed the political landscape.Both Irish nationalists and unionists went off to fight for Britainin the War, with the Ulster Division taking heavy casualties on theSomme. At Easter 1916 a small group of republicans entered the Gen-eral Post Office in Dublin and declared an Irish republic. The‘Easter Rising’ was defeated by the British but when its leaders wereexecuted there followed a wave of public sympathy for the repub-licans. Public opinion shifted away from the Irish Parliamentary Partyand Home Rule and towards the republicans and their demand forindependence. In 1918 the republican party, Sinn Féin, decisivelywon the last all-Ireland election. The ‘War of Independence’, 1919–21,was fought by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to drive the Britishstate out of Ireland. On the other hand the unionists continued toresist incorporation into a united independent Ireland. In 1920 theBritish Government partitioned Ireland. Northern Ireland, whichhad its Parliament at Stormont in Belfast, consisted of six of the ninecounties of Ulster. Unionists comprised a majority in just four of thesix counties but held a clear majority in Northern Ireland. The IrishFree State (as the South of Ireland was known after partition untilthe declaration of the republic in 1948), with a Parliament in Dublin,was to rule the other 26 counties of Ireland. The treaty signed betweenthe British Government and Sinn Féin in December 1921 gavethe Irish Free State Dominion status within the British Empire andset up a boundary commission to consider redrawing the border withNorthern Ireland.

The partition of Ireland was widely seen as a temporary measureand provision was made for its voluntary reunification (see Chapter 3).However, the division between the majority Protestant NorthernIreland state and the overwhelmingly Catholic state in the Southgrew after partition. In 1937 the new Constitution of the Irish Freestate recognised the special position of the Catholic Church and inArticles 2 and 3 claimed as the national territory the whole island ofIreland. The Catholic minority within Northern Ireland was discrim-inated against by a unionist regime concerned to establish its controlin the face of an IRA threat from the South. British politics had beendominated by the ‘Irish Question’ for much of the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. British politicians now handed overresponsibility for the North to the subordinate Stormont Parliament,

Introduction 5

ignored abuses of Catholics’ civil rights and minimised its involve-ment in Irish politics (see Chapter 4). By the 1960s unionists wereconcerned that their position within the Union was becoming under-mined. In 1964 there was rioting during the Westminster GeneralElection campaign and in 1966 the loyalist paramilitary UlsterVolunteer Force (UVF) reformed and murdered two Catholics. Thecivil rights movement drew attention to abuses occurring under theStormont Government but, when that failed to bring about change,it took politics into the streets. The result was escalating conflict andviolence which finally forced the British Government to intervenemore directly. First the British put pressure on the Stormont Gov-ernment to reform and then troops were deployed on the streets ascommunal rioting spiralled beyond the control of the local police,the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC: see Chapter 5). Republicanstook to the streets to defend Catholic areas from attack by unionistsbut also went on the offensive, seizing their opportunity to drive theBritish out of Ireland. Unionist paramilitaries mobilised to strikeback against the IRA by killing Catholics. In 1972, after a furtherescalation in violence, the British Government suspended the NorthernIreland Parliament and introduced direct rule (Chapter 6). From1972 to 1974 a serious attempt was made by the British Governmentto introduce power-sharing between unionists and nationalistsalongside an all-Ireland body. Unionist opinion turned againstthis first ‘peace process’ and it ended in failure (see Chapter 5).Opinion in Northern Ireland was polarised and the prospects forresucitating an accommodation between unionists and nationalistsreceded.

The British Government and the IRA settled down for a ‘LongWar’. The British attempted to criminalise republican prisoners whoresisted, resulting in the deaths of ten republicans during the HungerStrikes of 1980–81. The IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin, contestedelections after the Hunger Strikes and performed well (Chapter 7).The British and Irish Governments embarked on an initiative whichMargaret Thatcher intended would reap security benefits for Britainin the battle against the IRA (Chapter 8). In 1985 the Anglo–IrishAgreement was signed by the two governments, giving the Irish aninput into the governance of Northern Ireland. Unionists were alien-ated by this development and a polarisation of public and politicalopinion followed the Agreement. However, this Agreement mayhave accelerated a rethink within the republican movement which,while the IRA continued its ‘armed struggle’, adjusted its ideological

6 Northern Ireland

stance and entered into secret contacts with the British Governmentfrom 1990 to 1993 (Chapter 9). In 1994 the IRA announced a ceasefireand negotiations began about the conditions on which Sinn Féinwould be admitted into all-party negotiations with unionists. Union-ists and the British Government insisted that some decommissioningof IRA weapons must take place before Sinn Féin could be allowedto sit at the negotiating table. This condition was abandoned inreturn for elections to a Northern Ireland Forum. The republicansrejected this and the IRA ended its ceasefire in February 1996.Following the election of a Labour Government in 1997 the IRArenewed its ceasefire and entered negotiations with unionists inSeptember 1997. In April 1998 the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ wasreached between unionists and nationalists on new power-sharinginstitutions for Northern Ireland and a programme of reform (Chap-ter 10). The Agreement continues to be dogged by controversy,particularly over the issue of decommissioning IRA weapons. InDecember 1999 power was finally devolved to the Northern IrelandAssembly, only to be suspended in February 2000. Power was againdevolved to the Assembly in May 2000.

Nationalist and Unionist Views of the Conflict

In Northern Ireland Irish nationalists and British unionists have verydifferent perspectives on the conflict and its history. History andcontemporary events are used to apportion blame and justify con-trasting analyses and ‘solutions’ to the conflict. Yet while unionistsand nationalists are divided, there are also divisions within bothunionism and nationalism in their analysis of the conflict andprescriptions for settling it. Within nationalism the term ‘nationalist’is often used to describe someone who aspires to a united Irelandbut is opposed to the use of violence to achieve it, while a ‘repub-lican’ often shares much of the analysis of the ‘nationalist’ but isprepared to use violence; so all republicans are nationalists, but notall nationalists are republicans. Similarly, within unionism the term‘unionist’ describes a supporter of the Union who is opposed to theuse of violence and uses more constitutional means to defend theUnion, while a ‘loyalist’ is used to describe a unionist who tends toemploy or advocate more militant methods to defend the Union,sometimes including violence. Loyalists and republicans tend to bedrawn disproportionately from the working class.

Introduction 7

Nationalist and Republican Views

Nationalists argue that 800 years of English oppression have followedthe Anglo–Norman invasion of 1169, during which a succession ofnationalist heroes have striven to drive out the English invaderwho has brought nothing but trouble to Ireland. However, somenationalists go even further back and draw inspiration from an idyllicCeltic past.

A consistent theme of nationalist/republican history is the brutal-ity of the invading English/British. The propensity of the Englishbrutally to oppress the Irish is established, from Cromwell’s mas-sacres of the Irish during the 1640s, through the execution of theEaster Rising martyrs in 1916 and the atrocities perpetrated bythe British ‘Blacks’n’ Tans’ during the War of Independence, to theBloody Sunday ‘massacre’ in 1972. The responsibility of the Englishfor the Irish famine, or genocide as some call it, is used to establishthe guilt of the English then and, by implication and analogy, nowboth for the events of the 1840s and Ireland’s stunted developmentever since (Ireland’s population was 25 per cent of that of the UK in1845 but just 10 per cent by 1914). A story is told which emphasisesthe continuity of English/British oppression in Ireland and thereforeits inevitability: ‘Nothing but the same old story’, according to thetitle of one book.

Irish history becomes a morality tale in which the brave, prin-cipally male, heroes of nationalist history take up the struggle ofcenturies against the English/British oppressor (the O’Neills ofTyrone, Wolfe Tone, the Fenians, Daniel O’Connell, MichaelDavitt, Charles Stewart Parnell, James Connolly, Patrick Pearse,Michael Collins, Bobby Sands). As the struggle against the Englishcontinues, new events and heroes are added to the pantheon. During‘the Troubles’ republicans and nationalists have commemoratedBloody Sunday and the introduction of internment. Bobby Sandsand the 1981 hunger strikers are placed in the tradition of the men of1916.

The role of Irish Protestants in the nationalist tradition is oftenhighlighted, from Tone to Parnell, to show the way for contemporaryunionists. From this perspective, unionists are seen as Irish peoplewho have been duped by the English/British into believing they areBritish. Once the British leave Ireland the unionists will reassesstheir position and realise that they are Irish after all. Alternatively,unionists are seen as illegitimate settlers with no right to remain in

8 Northern Ireland

Ireland. They should be encouraged to leave when the British colo-nial power withdraws.

For nationalists and republicans the partition of Ireland was reallyan undemocratic imposition by the British to maintain their dom-ination, rather than a compromise between the competing forcesof nationalism and unionism. The 1918 all-Ireland election demon-strated the desire of the Irish people for unity and independence.Partition is undemocratic and artificial, since the border was notdrawn with respect to the will of the people but as a result of powerand the threat of force. Had the British imposed a united Irelandthe unionists would not have resisted because they had no particularplace to go. It is the British prop which has sustained unionistresistance.

Republicans view developments during ‘the Troubles’ in adifferent way to nationalists. The IRA justifies its lack of popularsupport for its ‘armed struggle’ among nationalists by reference tothe Easter Rising in 1916. The Rising did not have popular supportat the time (many nationalists had relatives serving in the BritishArmy in France) but subsequently won widespread sympathy.Republicans emphasise loyalist or unionist responsibility for therecent outbreak of the conflict, pointing to the emergence of theloyalist UVF in 1966 or the brutality of the Stormont regime againstthe civil rights protesters. The British rather than the unionists thenbecome the primary focus of the enmity of republican ideology. TheBritish are held responsible for the establishment of an oppressivesecurity regime including abuses of human rights, torture, BloodySunday, internment without trial, ‘shoot to kill’, and the suspensionof civil liberties. Republicans, on the other hand, were forced torespond to British oppression and defend the Catholic community.Republicans reject the nationalist view that the British are ‘neutral’and have argued that the British have economic, strategic andpolitical reasons for retaining Northern Ireland within the Union.

Both republicans and nationalists argue that Irish unity is inevit-able (Chapter 3). Since partition, British neglect of Northern Irelandhas allowed the perpetration of civil rights abuses by the UnionistGovernment at Stormont. Republicans stress the repressive natureof the Stormont era and subsequent British policy in order to justifythe IRA’s ‘armed struggle’ after 1969. Nationalists and republicanswould tend to argue that during the 1960s there was a shift towardsparticipation in the Northern Ireland state, with Catholics emphas-ising ‘British rights for British citizens’ rather than an end to the

Introduction 9

border. When this conciliatory stance was rebuffed by the unionists,Catholics took to the streets to secure their civil rights and were metwith unionist brutality (Chapter 4). Communal violence and the viol-ence of the British Army polarised the situation in Northern Ireland.Nationalists supported power-sharing in 1974 but this was ‘sold out’by the British Labour Government which did not take strong actionto defend it against unionist opposition or subsequently push theunionists hard enough towards reviving power-sharing. Unlikerepublicans, however, nationalists have tended to accept that Britainis ‘neutral’ in its attitude towards Northern Ireland, meaning that ithas no overriding interest in retaining the Union. Nationalists arguethat the Anglo–Irish Agreement of 1985 which gave the Republic asay in the affairs of Northern Ireland was further evidence of Britishneutrality. The key problem in Northern Ireland for nationalists isnot so much the British Government as a division among the peopleof Northern Ireland themselves, between unionists and nationalists.Unionists are not simply, as republicans claim, the puppets of theBritish; they have a considerable degree of independence or auto-nomy. The republican leadership presents the peace process andthe Good Friday Agreement as further steps towards the inevitableunity of Ireland.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) The SDLP wasfounded in 1970 and has been the main exponent of the nationalistview of the conflict. It is overwhelmingly Catholic in membershipand support. A centre-left party with working-class support it nonethe less tends to do better among middle-class Catholics. In itsfounding constitution the SDLP supported the proposition that theunity of Ireland could only come about with the consent of themajority within Northern Ireland. The SDLP has long supportedjoint authority of the British and Irish Governments over NorthernIreland; but it has also supported power-sharing between national-ists and unionists, along with an ‘Irish dimension’ to express theIrishness and national aspiration of the minority community. In themid-1970s factions within the SDLP supported a declaration ofBritish intent to withdraw and independence for Northern Ireland,some as a transition stage before Irish unity, others in order toreach accommodation with unionists. The principal divide within theSDLP has been between those around John Hume who have emphas-ised the importance of the Irish dimension (North/South bodiesand an increased role for the Republic of Ireland in the North), and

10 Northern Ireland

others who have prioritised power-sharing and accommodation withunionists within Northern Ireland. On security, the SDLP has beencritical of the security forces, the police and the army and they refuseto ‘support’ the police or encourage Catholics to join the RUC.However, the SDLP has also been very strong in its condemnationsof all republican and loyalist violence. The SDLP’s principal elect-oral rivals have been firstly the moderate Alliance Party, secondly inthe late 1970s and early 1980s the small, ‘more nationalist’ Irish

Table 1.1 Election results 1973–99 (principal parties, percentage shares)

Notes: (i) Type of election is indicated by letter:

A = Assembly, W = Westminster Parliament, C = Convention, E = EuropeanParliament, F = Forum, L = Local Council Elections.

(ii) The symbol (–) indicates the party did not exist or did not contest the election. (iii) Figures do not add up to 100 per cent, as assorted minor parties and indepen-

dents also contested elections.

Political Parties

Election DemocraticUnionist

VanguardUnionist

Ulster Unionist

Alliance SocialDemocratic

&Labour Party

ProvisionalSinn Féin

May 1973 L 4.3 2.1 41.4 13.7 13.4 – Jun 1973 A 10.8 10.5 29.3 9.2 22.1 – Feb 1974 W 8.2 10.6 32.3 3.2 22.4 – Oct 1974 W 8.5 13.1 36.5 6.4 22.0 – May 1975 C 14.7 12.7 25.8 9.8 23.7 – May 1977 L 12.7 1.5 29.6 14.4 20.6 – May 1979 W 10.2 – 36.6 11.9 18.2 – Jun 1979 E 29.8 – 21.9 6.8 24.6 – May 1981 L 26.6 – 26.5 8.9 17.5 – Oct 1982 A 23.0 – 29.7 9.3 18.8 10.1Jun 1983 W 20.0 – 34.0 8.0 17.9 13.4Jun 1984 E 33.6 – 21.5 5.0 22.1 13.3May 1985 L 24.3 – 29.5 7.1 17.8 11.8Jun 1987 W 11.7 – 37.8 10.0 21.1 11.4May 1989 L 17.7 – 31.3 6.9 21.0 11.2Jun 1989 E 29.9 – 22.2 5.2 25.5 9.1Apr 1992 W 13.1 – 34.5 8.7 23.5 10.0Jun 1993 L 17.3 – 29.3 7.6 22.0 12.4Jun 1994 E 29.2 – 23.8 4.1 28.9 9.9May 1996 F 18.8 – 24.2 6.5 21.4 15.5May 1997 W 13.6 – 32.7 8.0 24.1 16.1May 1997 L 15.9 – 27.8 6.6 20.7 16.9Jun 1998 A 18.1 – 21.3 6.5 22.0 17.6Jun 1999 E 28.4 – 17.6 2.1 28.1 17.3

Introduction 11

Independence Party, and thirdly throughout the 1980s and 1990sSinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA. Although the republicansdid not contest elections in the 1970s, they nevertheless representeda challenge to the SDLP for the support of the nationalist community.The SDLP has been led by Gerry Fitt (1970–79) and John Hume(1979–). The party’s electoral support 1973–98 has ranged between13.4 per cent and 28.9 per cent but has averaged around 22 per cent(see Table 1.1). Its deputy leader, Seamus Mallon, is Deputy FirstMinister in the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Sinn Féin/IRA Since 1969 the republican movement has split intovarious factions. In 1969 the IRA split into the Official IRA and theProvisional IRA (which is the full name of today’s IRA). TheOfficial IRA (OIRA) was more left-wing than the Provisionals,emphasised the unity of the Protestant and Catholic working classand took a more defensive military stance. It declared a ceasefire in1972. In 1975 the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) split awayfrom the OIRA and mounted a terrorist campaign against the secur-ity forces. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) was more Catholic, right-wing and militaristic in its outlook. It took the offensive against theBritish Army in 1969–70 and emerged as the dominant group withinthe republican movement. Republican Sinn Féin broke away fromthe Provisionals in 1986 over the latter’s decision that their success-fully elected candidates would take their seats in the Irish Dáil(assembly) in break of the traditional republican boycott. RepublicanSinn Féin’s military wing is the Continuity IRA. The ‘Real IRA’(RIRA) split from the Provisionals in the autumn of 1997 over growingdisatisfaction with Sinn Féin’s involvement in the ‘peace process’.The RIRA were responsible for the Omagh bombing in the summerof 1998 which killed 29 and injured 310.

The evidence points overwhelmingly towards an inextricable linkbetween the IRA and Sinn Féin, in spite of the attempts in recentyears, for propaganda reasons, for Sinn Féin to claim a distancebetween itself and the IRA. Sinn Féin had long been subordinate tothe military wing but during the 1980s began to play a more promin-ent role in the partnership, contesting elections and taking its seatson local councils. The republican movement does not accept parti-tion and argues for British withdrawal and a democratic socialistIrish republic. The IRA opposed power-sharing during 1972–74 andescalated its campaign to topple that experiment. In 1975–76 itannounced a ceasefire in the expectation that the British were about

12 Northern Ireland

to withdraw. ‘Hardline’ elements within the republican movementopposed this development and, when the British did not withdraw,the IRA leadership were discredited; subsequently a new leadershipfrom Northern Ireland emerged as dominant within the IRA. Theysettled down for the ‘Long War’ and attempted to mobilise a polit-ical campaign alongside the military struggle. Following the HungerStrikes in 1981 this emerged as the ‘bullet and ballot box’ strategy:the PIRA continued its military campaign while the political wing,Sinn Féin, fought elections. The Provisionals continued to opposeany ‘internal settlement’ in Northern Ireland on the grounds that itrepresented a return to the bad old days of the ‘Stormont regime’.Republican paramilitaries have been responsible for approximately2139 (58.8 per cent) (PIRA 1771) out of the 3636 ‘troubles’ relateddeaths in Northern Ireland (McKittrick et al. 1999). They have killedpolicemen, prison officers, workers working for the security forces,soldiers and both Protestant and Catholic civilians. Reviewing thestatistics of violence, Fay et al. argue that the IRA has ‘Essentially . . .been an offensive rather than defensive organisation, with little evid-ence that it was able to protect the Nationalist population fromeither the security forces or sectarian attack’ (Fay et al. 1999, p. 178).Ruairí Ó Brádaigh was President of Sinn Féin (1970–83), whileGerry Adams was Vice-President of Sinn Féin (1978–83) and hasbeen President since 1983. Sinn Féin’s electoral support 1982–99 hasvaried between 10.1 per cent and 17.6 per cent and averages about13 per cent, although it has increased during the ‘peace process’.

Unionist and Loyalist Views

In recent years loyalist historians have argued that the Cruthin werethe original inhabitants of Northern Ireland and when the Scottishsettlers settled in Ulster during the seventeenth century this wassimply a return of the Cruthin to their original homeland. Unionisthistory highlights the plantation of the seventeenth century andsuggests that the Protestant settlers brought with them ‘progressive’ways to a backward land. The Irish rebellion of 1641 against thesettlers is remembered as a warning to Protestants of the hostilityof Catholics and the consequences of not being vigilant. At the Siege ofDerry in 1689 the Protestant Apprentice Boys slammed the gates ofDerry shut when the Protestant leader, Governor Lundy, proposedto surrender to the forces of the Catholic King James II. The siegewas subsequently lifted and in 1690 the Protestant King William of

Introduction 13

Orange defeated James at the Battle of the Boyne. Both of theseevents are highlights of the unionist marching season commem-orated annually on 14 August and 12 July. The Siege of Derry is usedto remind unionists that a defiant ‘no surrender’ posture can bringvictory. Those who are perceived to be selling out the unionist causeare called ‘Lundies’. Another key date in unionist history is the mobil-isation of unionism, under the leadership of William Carson, duringthe Ulster Crisis 1912–14 when unionists rallied to demonstratetheir opposition to home rule for Ireland and willingness to resort toarms to avoid it. During the Battle of the Somme in 1916 the UlsterDivision took heavy casualties, demonstrating ‘Ulster’s’ commitmentto the Union in blood and consequently Britain’s debt to NorthernIreland. The loyalty of Northern Ireland was again demonstratedduring the Second World War when Britain ‘stood alone’ againstthe Nazis, in contrast to the neutrality of the South. During ‘theTroubles’ unionists have also moved to preserve its heritage, celeb-rate new heroes and commemorate new events. For example,following the Drumcree stand-off in 1995, a commemorative medalwas struck.

Unionists see the partition of Ireland as democratic and resultingfrom the South’s decision to secede from the Union. The border ofNorthern Ireland is formed in a similar way to most others, being theresult of conflicts of power rather than just following natural geo-graphical features. The threat to the new Northern Ireland statefrom the IRA is emphasised to justify discrimination against Cath-olics, or else that discrimination is denied or its impact minimised (seeChapter 4). The emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1960sis seen as a Communist/republican-inspired campaign to re-openthe border question, rather than a movement genuinely seekingreform. The growing involvement of the British Government pre-vented unionists from taking the necessary repressive measures todeal with the terrorist threat. British negotiation with the IRA, itssuspension of Stormont and the weakness of British politicians onthe constitutional position of Northern Ireland encouraged IRAviolence and resulted in a mobilisation of unionists to defend theUnion (Chapter 5). The Republic of Ireland, with a territorial claimon the North in its Constitution and its failure to suppress the IRA,encourages and legitimises the IRA campaign against NorthernIreland. The British-inspired power-sharing experiment of 1972–74,particularly its hated Irish dimension, was designed to manipulateNorthern Ireland out of the Union and only a popular revolt by

14 Northern Ireland

unionists prevented this. The Labour Government of 1974–79cracked down on terrorism and began to rule Northern Ireland likeany other part of the UK. This resulted in a decrease in violence.The Conservative governments during 1979–97 turned their backon unionists, beginning an Anglo–Irish process in 1980 which cul-minated in the great ‘sell-out’ of 1985 when the Anglo–Irish Agree-ment was signed, giving the Republic a role in the running ofNorthern Ireland. For some loyalists this represented yet anotherratchet in the expulsion of Northern Ireland from the Union. Fromthis perspective the ‘peace process’ represents a ‘surrender process’,with Northern Ireland pushed further and further to the edge ofthe Union. Unionists are more likely to see the agreement as a his-toric accommodation from which the Union benefits and emergesstronger, ending Northern Ireland’s slide from the Union.

The Ulster Unionist Party This was the dominant party in theStormont era 1921–72. It is a centre-right party that draws supportfrom all classes but disproportionately from the middle class. Afterpartition the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) lacked a serious rivaluntil the Northern Ireland Labour Party in the late 1950s and early1960s. In the 1960s it was riven by conflict over reform and how todeal with the British Government’s interventionism. During the1970s the UUP began to fragment. The most serious division withinits ranks was over the power-sharing experiment of 1974. The leaderof the UUP, Brian Faulkner, signed up for power-sharing and anIrish dimension but this split his party and Faulkner resigned.Following the collapse of power-sharing, unionism shifted awayfrom any further power-sharing settlements. Subsequently, the prin-cipal division has been between the ‘devolutionists’ who favour astrong devolved assembly in Northern Ireland and the ‘integrationists’who (before the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales in 1999)prefered the region to be ruled like any other part of the UK, directlyfrom Westminster. The UUP favoured the restoration of the powersof local government and an improvement in the way NorthernIreland affairs were dealt with under direct rule as a step towardsintegration. The party has been united against any Irish dimensionbeyond ‘normal’ North–South co-operation. The Good FridayAgreement has split the UUP into those supporting the Agreementand David Trimble’s leadership and those against. During the recentconflict the party’s principal rival has been the hardline DemocraticUnionist Party (DUP) which has succeeded in making inroads into

Introduction 15

its support, most notably in the early 1980s when it almost becamethe leading unionist party. The UUP has been more conciliatory,more middle class and slightly less hardline on security than its DUPrival. The UUP’s most recent leaders have been Terence O’Neill(1963–69), James Chichester-Clark (1969–71), Brian Faulkner (1971–74), Harry West (1974–79), James Molyneaux (1979–95) and DavidTrimble (1995–). The UUP’s support 1969–99 has ranged from 54.3per cent to 16.9 per cent, averaging 28 per cent over 1974–99,although in recent years UUP support has dipped well below this.

The Democratic Unionist Party This loyalist party was foundedby the Reverend Ian Paisley in September 1971. During the 1960sPaisley had warned against the apparent softening in the UUP’sattitude towards Catholics and the Republic, and these warningsappeared to be vindicated by the turn of events (see Chapters 3 and4). The DUP, after initially supporting the integration of NorthernIreland into the UK, favoured the return of a majority-rule NorthernIreland Assembly, albeit with some safeguards for the nationalistminority. The DUP is more opposed to power-sharing and an Irishdimension than the UUP and there has been some sympathy forindependence. In the late 1970s it demolished its rival, the VanguardUnionist Party (VUP), which had a more open relationship with theloyalist paramilitaries. In the early 1980s its hardline stance threat-ened to make it the biggest unionist party. Ian Paisley regularly topsthe poll for the Northern Ireland-wide European elections, illustrat-ing that his popularity extends beyond his party. The DUP tends totake a more ‘repressive stance’ on security issues than the UUP,leaning towards conservatism on social issues (contraception, gayand women’s rights), but it is left of centre on economic issues,reflecting its more working-class support. There are two DUP votingconstituencies, rural evangelicals and urban, working-class loyalists.The DUP has been led by Dr Ian Paisley since 1971. Between 1973and 1999 the DUP has averaged 18 per cent of the vote.

The Loyalist paramilitaries The Ulster Defence Association (UDA)was formed in 1971 to co-ordinate working-class, loyalist vigilantegroups which had grown up to ‘defend’ loyalist areas. It has beeninvolved in violence against Catholics and its political wing hastended towards support for an independent Ulster. The UDA wasbanned in August 1992 and carries out paramilitary activities underthe name the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). The political wing of

16 Northern Ireland

the UDA is the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) which participatedin the all-party talks which led to the Good Friday Agreement but,with only 1.1 per cent of the vote, failed to win any Assembly seats in1998. This loyalist party – like the political wing of the paramilitaryUlster Volunteer Force, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) – hastaken a moderate, accommodating stance during the recent ‘peaceprocess’. The UVF was revived in 1966 and after it murdered twoCatholics was banned by the Northern Ireland Prime Minister. It isa smaller, more elite grouping than the mass membership UDAbut has been responsible for more deaths during the recent conflict.The PUP won 2.6 per cent of the vote in the 1998 Assembly elec-tions, securing two seats. The support of the UVF and UDA for the‘peace process’ resulted in a split in the UVF with Billy Wrightbreaking away to form the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in 1995.Wright was murdered in prison in December 1997. In 1998 theorganisation declared a ceasefire and in December of that year wasthe first paramilitary organisation to decommission any weapons.The leader of the UDP is Gary McMichael and the leading figures inthe PUP are Billy Hutchinson and David Ervine.

The Alliance Party (APNI) This is the only party in NorthernIreland which draws significant cross-community support, and it isdebatable whether it is a unionist party at all. The Alliance PartyAssembly members refused to designate themselves as either nation-alist or unionist. The party argues that there can be no constitutionalchange without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. It wasfounded in April 1970 among people with little previous politicalrecord, and drew support from liberals in the UUP and the NorthernIreland Labour Party. The party supported the power-sharingexperiment and after its collapse argued that there was no need fora Council of Ireland to achieve co-operation with the Republic. TheAlliance Party draws its support principally from the Greater Belfastarea but when it gave conditional support to the Anglo–Irish Agree-ment in 1985 it lost some Protestant support. The party has favouredpower-sharing and been more supportive than the UUP of the Irishdimension. It has more middle-class support and its electoral rivalshave been the nationalist SDLP, the unionist UUP, the ConservativeParty in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coali-tion. Alliance support over 1973–99 has ranged from 2.1 per cent to14.4 per cent and averaged about 8 per cent, but has been lower inmore recent years. The most recent leaders of the Alliance Party

Introduction 17

have been Oliver Napier (1972–84), John Cushnahan (1984–87),Lord John Alderdice (1987–98) and Sean Neeson (1998–).

History and the Current Conflict

Both nationalists and unionists have different views of history whichjustify current political positions. Contemporary debates over his-tory have political implications, and can imply both guilt and blame.History can be used to emphasise past injustices and patterns ofoppression which can be used to legitimise violence to redress thesegrievances. As the historian, Paul Bew, has commented, ‘The diffi-culty is that many people on “both sides” as a result of the “troubles”have an investment in a highly partisan reading of that history thatvalidates their suffering or indeed suffering they have inflicted onothers.’ Conflict over history is common across the world, butperhaps not with the intensity that accompanies an area which is inviolent conflict (Ignatieff 1996).

Historians have been conscious of the way history has been usedto justify violence. A so-called ‘Revisionist’ movement of profes-sional historians has developed to undermine the ‘myths’ of popularunionist and nationalist history. In the 1930s and 1940s a schoolof professional Irish historians believed that their ‘value free’approach to history could demythologise the dominant official andpopular histories. This was seen as even more necessary after therecent ‘troubles’ exploded in the late 1960s and history was used bythe protagonists on all sides to justify their violence. The revision-ists criticised history as a morality tale and emphasised the discon-tinuities and complexity of history; they rejected and sought toexplode the ‘simplistic hero cults’ of nationalism and unionism.Inevitably, these ‘revisionists’ revised the demonic, propagandisticportrayal of Britain in nationalist history and portrayed it in a moresympathetic light. Revisionists also took on unionist history andshowed the support of the Pope for William of Orange in 1690and the conciliatory character of Carson, in contrast with his ‘nosurrender’ unionist stereotype. A more accurate (and empathetic)understanding of history and contemporary history, it could beargued, promotes the kind of understanding which can underminethe crude ‘propagandistic’, ideological history which (some argue)sustains the conflict.

A traditionalist or nationalist school of history has criticisedrevisionists for using history to justify the partition of Ireland by

18 Northern Ireland

emphasising the historical divisions and sectarianism of unionistsand nationalists. They were also accused of playing down famine andmassacres in history in order to portray the British more favourably.‘Revisionists’ have been accused of ‘neo-colonialism’ or ‘anti-nation-alism’, and one historian has claimed they are part of British counter-insurgency strategy. Traditionalists argued that nationalism andits ‘myths’ could be a positive force in uniting and fortifying a com-munity in struggle against the British imperialistic enemy (Boyce1995).

‘Myths’ are used by the various parties to the conflict in NorthernIreland in the propaganda war to mobilise support and shift thepolitical agenda in their direction (for more on the propaganda war,see Chapter 2). In attempting to communicate with and mobilisea mass audience, politicians use versions of history which resonatewith popular ideologies rather than necessarily what is more ‘histor-ically accurate’ (which, of course, is debatable). These myths maynot reflect the latest historical findings but they may reflect certain‘truths’ experienced by the people and which the politician seeks toput across to an audience using historical ‘stories’. The imperativesof the propaganda war also override the need for historical accuracy,since ‘distortion’ can be more politically useful than ‘truth’. The his-torical account is not necessarily about, for example, the history ofpast English atrocities, but about English oppression now. MichaelIgnatieff argues that the ‘atrocity myth’ does not deny that atrocitieshappen:

What is mythic is that the atrocities are held to reveal the essentialidentity of the peoples in whose name they were committed. Theatrocity myth implies an idea of a people having some essentialgenocidal propensity toward the other side. All the members ofthe group are held to have such a propensity even though atrocitycan only be committed by specific individuals. The idea of collect-ive guilt depends on the idea of a national psyche or racial iden-tity. The fiction at work here is akin to the nationalist delusionthat the identities of individuals are or should be subsumed intotheir national identities. (Ignatieff 1996 p. 116)

Usually ‘myths’ must contain some portion of ‘truth’ in order tobe accepted and, depending on their intent, we may be sympatheticto the sentiment and ignore the historical inaccuracy. These oftencompeting ‘myths’ have been created by the protagonists during ‘the

Introduction 19

Troubles’ to reinforce their ideological positions and mobilise sup-porters in the propaganda war (O’Doherty 1998, chs 3 and 4). Thismeans that, as this book makes clear, there is considerable conflictover the interpretation of Northern Ireland’s recent history. In therun-up to and during the peace process the British Government hasattempted to address historical grievances in the hope that this willaid the process of reconciliation. The British Prime Minister hasapologised for Britain’s role in the famine of the 1840s, ministershave regretted England’s role in Irish history, an inquiry has been setup into the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’ 1972 and a commission hasbeen established on the victims of the conflict.

There are contrasting views on the impact of history and myth.To what extent does a ‘distorted’ view of Irish history motivate andexacerbate the conflict? Or is the debate over history more a symp-tom than a cause of ‘the Troubles’? If nationalist and unionistideologies have deeper, even primordial, cultural or ethnic roots,then revisionist history is less likely to be effective since it will not‘resonate’ with the ideologies of the national communities. On theother hand, if nationalism and unionism are modern and malleableideologies, then we can be optimistic that ‘revisionism’ may be ableto dent nationalist and unionist histories by promoting empathy anda less simplistic view of the conflict.

Segregation and Sharing

The strongly contrasting nationalist and unionist views of the rea-sons for the Northern Ireland conflict and the means by which it canbe resolved are probably related to the very different socialisationexperiences of nationalists and unionists. The thinking behind this isthat because Protestants and Catholics come into contact so little inNorthern Ireland their prejudices and ideological views about‘the other’ are reinforced instead of challenged. This creates anenvironment in which prejudice and violence against the other sideis tolerated. To promote the resolution of conflict, it is argued, cross-community contact should be promoted. Others have disputed thisand argued that unionist and nationalist identities are permanentand have to be managed and worked around rather than challengedor eroded. They argue that segregation reduces the opportunitiesfor contact and therefore for conflict (see Dixon 1997a, 1997c, 1997dfor a detailed review of these approaches).

20 Northern Ireland

RiverFoyle

CityCentre

BELFAST

DERRY/LONDONDERRY PREDOMINANTLYCATHOLIC

PREDOMINANTLYPROTESTANT

MIXED AREAS

COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIALAREAS

North Belfast

EastBelfast

Falls

Waterside

Bogside

Shankill

CityCentre

RIVER

Fountain area(Protestantenclave)

RiverFoyle

Map 1.2 Residential segregation in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry (a rough guide)

Introduction 21

Education

There is research which suggests that even pre-school childrendevelop sectarian attitudes. The overwhelming majority of bothCatholics and Protestants are educated in single denomination Cath-olic or state (i.e. Protestant) schools. This limits opportunities forcross-community contact. Some attempt has been made during theconflict to establish integrated schools but these have been met withopposition from both Protestant and Catholic churches. While pollsindicate many parents would like to have their children educated inintegrated schools, this has not been matched by demand.

Residence

There has always been some degree of residential segregation inNorthern Ireland, particularly in working-class areas. The rioting ofthe late 1960s and early 1970s precipitated what was until then thelargest movement of population in Western Europe since SecondWorld War. Catholics fled from Protestant areas to find safety withtheir co-religionists and, to a lesser extent, Protestants fled Catholicareas. Since the early 1970s there has been a gradual trend towardsfurther residential segregation as a result of force (intimidation andfear of attack) and voluntary movement. Boyle and Hadden con-clude, ‘in urban areas the two communities are moving into whatthey regard as safe areas, while in rural areas they are staying put ontheir land’ (Boyle and Hadden 1994 p. 7). By 1991, ‘About half ofthe province’s 1.5 million population live in areas more than 90 percent Protestant or more than 90 per cent Catholic’, and ‘In the pasttwo decades, the number of predominantly Catholic wardsincreased from 43 to 120. Areas almost exclusively Protestant rosefrom 56 to 115’ (The Independent on Sunday, 21 March 1993). Map1.2 illustrates residential segregation in Derry/Londonderry andBelfast.

Employment

Following discrimination during the Stormont period (see Chapter 4)there have been attempts to correct the religious imbalance in theworkforce. Residential segregation has compounded the problems ofachieving this balance, and Protestants and Catholics are deterredfrom taking jobs in areas dominated by members of the opposite

22 Northern Ireland

religion for safety reasons. Also, particularly in smaller firms, employ-ment by social network, word of mouth or overt discrimination hasresulted in a high degree of segregation in employment (Boyle andHadden 1994 p. 46). Northern Ireland is one of the most deprivedregions of the UK and there has been increasing inequality (Coulter1999, ch. 2).

Social

The levels of church attendance in Northern Ireland are dispropor-tionately high for the UK. Social activities associated with the churchtend therefore to reproduce segregation. In addition sports are oftensegregated, with Catholics playing the ‘Gaelic sports’ (e.g., hurling,camogie, gaelic football) while Protestants play the more ‘Britishsports’ (hockey, rugby, cricket). Even sports which are ‘shared’, suchas soccer, are not necessarily played in a cross-community context.The Orange Order was founded in 1795 and now has approximately100000 members. One of its objectives was to defend the Protestantsuccession to the British throne, and it annually commemoratesProtestant victories in Irish history by parading. Catholics areexcluded from membership. Catholic organisations include theAncient Order of Hibernians and the Gaelic Athletic Association.These organisations are often associated with social or communityactivities: ‘It is highly unlikely that anyone who frequents any ofthese clubs or premises will ever meet anyone from the othercommunity there’ (Boyle and Hadden 1994 p. 39). This results ina low number, approximately 5 per cent, of mixed marriages.

Population

The population of Northern Ireland is approximately 1.7 million,with nearly 500000 living in the urban area around Belfast (thepopulation of the Republic is approximately 3.5 million). The higherCatholic birthrate in Northern Ireland did not lead to an increasingCatholic proportion of the population between 1926 and 1961 due toits higher emigration rate. But since 1971 the Catholic proportionof the population has increased from about 33 per cent to ‘at least’40 per cent in 1991 (Boyle and Hadden 1994 pp. 30–1). This has raisednationalist expectations that there will be a Catholic and thereforenationalist majority by about 2020 which could vote itself into aunited Ireland. However, such projections of population growth are

Introduction 23

notoriously inaccurate and, since some Catholics are unionists, aCatholic majority might not vote for Irish unity.

Violence and the Conflict: Who Did What to Whom

Interpretations of the violence in Northern Ireland are highlycontentious because they can be used to establish victimhood andlegitimise political violence. Unionists and nationalists have stronglycontrasting views as to who is responsible for the violence and whatis a legitimate response to it (Fay et al. 1999 pp. 156–7).

There are two contrasting academic perspectives on the impact ofviolence. The first emphasises the extent of the violence in NorthernIreland and sees this as an incentive for people and policy-makers toturn away from the abyss of all-out civil war and towards accom-modation. Nearly 2 per cent of the population of Northern Irelandhas been killed (0.22 per cent) or injured (1.78 per cent) during therecent conflict (see Figure 1.1) and comparative evidence is pro-duced to argue that the Northern Ireland conflict is ‘very intense’(O’Leary and McGarry 1996 pp. 13, 20). While over 3600 peoplehave been killed ‘around 100000 people in Northern Ireland live inhouseholds where someone has been injured in a Troubles-relatedincident’ (Fay et al. 1999 p. 204). Padraig O’Malley argues againstO’Leary’s and McGarry use of comparative data:

Scale alters the perception of the breadth of conflict: we do notthink in terms of proportionality but in terms of absolutes.A bomb that kills one person in a population of 1.5 million is notthe same thing, nor is it perceived as such, as a bomb that kills onehundred people in a country with a population of one hundred-fifty million people. (O’Malley 1994 p. 16)

He draws attention to the extent of the killing in Sri Lanka (50 000killed out of 17 million population in 10 years) and Angola (100 000killed during its civil war).

A second interpretation of the violence suggests that it is becausethe violence in Northern Ireland has been localised and containedthat many have been unaffected by the conflict and are thereforereluctant to become involved in resolving it (Boyle and Hadden 1994p. 107, O’Malley 1994). There is less risk of sudden death (due toterrorism/murder or road deaths) in Northern Ireland than in the

24

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Introduction 25

USA: ‘most people in Northern Ireland have less direct contact withdeath or injury from the conflict than from ordinary accidents’. Theyconclude, ‘The vast majority of people in Northern Ireland liveperfectly normal lives in the midst of the conflict’ (Boyle andHadden 1994 pp. 105–6). However, statistics on road deaths ignorethe terrifying impact that the threat of paramilitary or state violencecan have on the civilian population. Three areas saw most of the viol-ent incidents: Derry, Mid-Ulster and Belfast. North and West Bel-fast have seen approximately 40 per cent of all deaths, and therewere 600 deaths in North Belfast alone in 1969–93 (Irish News, 25January 1993). Fay et al. argue that there is not one conflict in North-ern Ireland but ‘a mosaic of different types of conflict. Accordingly,the “reality” of the Troubles is different for people in different loca-tions and in different occupations’ (Fay et al. 1999 p. 136).

Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who diedas a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles is a valuable contributionto the debate because it describes the story of each victim and bringshome the immense human tragedy of the conflict which risks beinglost in the discussion of statistics (McKittrick et al. 1999).

318

Index

Act of Union (1801) 3 Adams, Gerry 12, 35, 39, 121, 169,

186, 230 on Omagh bombing 275peace process (1988–2000)

and 30–1, 220, 223, 224, 241, 268, 276; ceasefire (1994) 246, 247, 248; decommissioning issue and 249, 257; Hume–Adams talks 216, 222, 232–5, 240

rethinking of armed struggle 222–3

visit to USA 254, 255 Aden 132agency 27–9 Alderdice, John 17, 232 Alliance Party (APNI) 10, 16–17,

138–9, 148, 185 Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

and 205, 206 power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 16, 133, 141, 146

Amnesty International 170Ancient Order of Hibernians 22,

70 Ancram, Michael 255, 258 Anderson, D. 150, 151 Andrew, Robert 200, 202 Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) 5–6,

187, 190–214, 287–8 explanations of 196–201;

bureaucratic conflict199–200, 203; coercive power-sharing 200–1; external pressure 199; fear of Sinn Féin 197–8, 202–3; security policy 198–9; withdrawal option and 200

nationalists and 9, 187, 194, 197–8, 202–3, 204, 213

negotiations 190–5

reaction to 204 reasons for signature 202–4 security issues and 191–2, 198–9,

210–13 Thatcher and 5, 158, 189–92,

197–9, 201–4, 206, 208, 212–14, 287

Unionists and 14, 16, 154, 155–6, 193, 195–6, 200–1, 204–13, 214

Anglo–Irish Free Trade Agreement (1965) 63–4

Anglo–Irish Intergovernmental Council 180

Annesley, Hugh 223 Anti-Partition League (APL) 71–2 Apprentice Boys of Derry 13 Arbuckle, Victor 111 Arlow, William 167 Armstrong, Robert 199, 200, 203 Army see British Army Arthur, P. 55 Ashe, F. 27, 31 Atkins, Humphrey 178, 190 Atkins Initiative 177, 178,

179, 180 atrocity myths 18 Attlee, Clement 53 Aughey, A. 195, 207, 208, 209

B Specials 86, 106, 107, 110–12 Ballymurphy riots 113, 114 Baltic Exchange bomb (1992) 230,

279 Barritt, D. P. 69 Bean, K. 222, 223, 242 Begley, Thomas 234 Belfast 22

residential segregation in 20 Sinn Féin boycott (1920–22) 50 violence in 25

Benn, Tony 108, 149 Bennett Report 170

Index 319

Best, William 132 Bew, Paul 17, 40, 54, 60, 63, 86,

92, 93, 95, 118, 119, 123, 124, 141, 145, 146, 149, 159, 166, 167, 168, 179, 213, 224, 229, 246, 249, 250, 253, 254, 256, 258, 275

Biggs-Davison, John 196 bipartisan approach 99–100, 101,

140–2, 171–2, 179, 266, 283 Birkenhead, Lord 49Birmingham bombings (1974) 164 Black’n’Tans 7 Blair, Tony 267, 268, 273, 274,

275 Bleakley, David 133Blood Friday (1972) 124, 135 Bloody Sunday (1972) 7, 8, 19, 33,

43, 118 Bloomfield, K. 103 Boal, Desmond 62 Boland case 146, 147 Bowman, J. 49, 51, 61 Boyce, D. G. 18 Boyle, K. 21, 22, 23, 25, 69, 203,

212, 213 Boyne, Battle of the 3, 13 Bradford, Robert 38, 190 Brett, Charles 72, 81 Briggs-Davison, John 171 British Army

anti-Home Rule movement and 3

army intelligence 119 ceasefire (1994) and 246–7 counter-insurgency strategy 35,

41, 114–7, 120, 127–8, 283

first deployment (1969) 87, 105–7, 110, 282

peace process (1988–2000) and 225

propaganda war and 34, 116, 169, 300

recruitment problems 126 rivalry with RUC 169 Ulsterisation strategy and 149,

169 British Government

contacts with IRA 165–7, 168, 181, 225–6, 235–8

interests and power 292–4 Northern Ireland policies:

constraints on 26, 98; crisis (1968–73) 98–128, 282; limits (1974–81)158–89; propaganda war 32–3, 34–5, 39, 116, 188, 287, 298–304; see also peace process (1988–2000); power-sharing approaches

partition of Ireland and 4, 48–9, 281

see also Conservative Party and Government; Labour Party and Government

British Guyana 130British–Irish Council and

Intergovernmental Conference 270

British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference 197, 206, 208, 211, 212

Bromley, M. 133, 148, 151 Brooke, Basil 51, 54 Brooke, Peter 225, 227, 248,

277Brooke Talks 208, 212, 227,

229–31 Brown, George 63 Bruce, S. 39, 81, 121, 207, 208,

210, 231 Bruton, John 250, 251, 257, 258,

261 Bulpitt, J. 55 Burton, F. 38 Butler, D. E. 298, 299, 300, 301,

302

Callaghan, James 102 bipartisanship and 100 deployment of Army and 105–6,

107 false dawn and 114independence option and 161indirect rule policy and 103–4,

105

320 Index

Callaghan, James – continuedpower-sharing and 149, 173 propaganda war and 42 reformism and 105, 107–9 RUC and 112 sympathy for Irish unity 120,

161 Ulsterisation programme

and 110, 111–12 Cameron Report 91, 109 Campaign for Democracy In

Ulster (CDU) 58, 75, 77–8, 82, 89

Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) 76, 77, 92, 93

Campbell, J. 49 Canary Wharf bomb 260–1 Canning, P. 49 Caraher, Ben 173 Carey, Hugh 176 Carrington, Lord 120, 126 Carruthers, S. L. 181 Carson, William 13, 17 Carter, C. 69 Carter, Jimmy 176, 177 Carver, Michael 122, 123, 125 Casement, Roger 62 Cash, J. D. 32, 35, 80 Castle, Barbara 105, 108, 112 Catherwood proposals 195 Catholic Church see Roman

Catholic Church ceasefires and truces

1972 121, 132 1975 166–8, 188 1994 6, 216, 217, 223, 228,

244–5; end of 260–1 1997 267

Chamberlain, Neville 52 Chambers, G. 69 Chibnall, S. 299 Chichester-Clark, James 15, 105,

106, 110, 111, 112 escalation of troubles and 118

Churchill, Winston 49, 52, 53 Civic Forum 269 civil rights movement 5, 67–97,

112–13, 282 beginnings of 71–6

British Government and 57–8, 71, 72, 77–8, 79, 82

Campaign for Democracy In Ulster (CDU) 58, 75, 77–8, 82, 89

Campaign for Social Justice 76, 77, 92, 93

Connolly Association 72, 74–5, 77, 89

debate on origins of 88–96; growth of State explanation 93–6; new Catholic middle-class thesis 90–3; republican/communist conspiracy 88–90

direct action and 5, 9, 82–8, 92–3, 95–6

extent of discrimination 67–70 Irish Government and 87–8 Labour Party and 57–8, 71, 72,

77–8, 79, 82, 96 Nationalist Party 73–4, 83, 88,

90, 91, 96 Northern Ireland Civil Rights

Association (NICRA) 75, 82–4, 87, 89–93

Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 72–3, 78, 92

O’Neill and 65, 78–82, 85, 86, 96, 97, 113

republicans and 74–5, 88–90 Unionist community and 13,

72–3, 78, 83–4, 88–90, 92 Clarke, L. 169 class 40, 86–7, 132, 151, 305

growth of Catholic middle-class 76, 90–3

Clinton, Bill 255, 261 Cochrane, F. 209, 210,

240, 252 Cold War 226–7 Coleraine, university at 84 Collins, Michael 38 Commonwealth 52, 53, 63 Communist Party of Great

Britain 74 Concannon, Don 180 conflict in Northern Ireland

agency approach and 27–9

Index 321

British Army: deployment of 87, 105–7, 110, 282; discontent in 120–4

British nationalism and 100–2

ceasefires see ceasefires and truces

civil rights movement and 5, 9, 82–8, 92–3, 95–6

crisis of British Government policy on Northern Ireland (1968–73) 98–128, 282

differing views of 6–19; moderate 16–17; Nationalist 6, 7–12, 17–18; revisionism and 17–19; Unionist 6, 12–16

escalations 117–19, 122, 132–3, 150, 170, 222, 231, 233–4

generalisations on 1–2 history 2–6, 17–19 rethinking of armed

struggle 222–3 strategic-relational

approach 29–31 structuralist accounts 28–9 Unionist attitudes to 14,

102–3, 120–24 victims 23–5 see also peace process

(1988–2000); propaganda war; security issues

Connolly Association 72, 74–5, 77, 89

Conservative Party and Governments

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 5–6, 187, 190–214, 287

army discontent 120–4 bipartisan approach to Northern

Ireland and 99–100, 101, 140–2, 171–2, 179, 266, 283

civil rights movement and 97debate on policy

options 160–1, 189 direct rule and 5, 120–1, 160 escalation of troubles 117–19 Home Rule movement and 3, 4

hunger strikes (1980–81) and 5, 7, 33, 158, 168, 181–7, 188

interest in Northern Ireland (1966) 58

peace process (1988–2000) and 218–21, 225–31, 233, 234–41, 261–2, 277–80; Brooke/Mayhew Talks 208, 212, 227, 229–31; decommissioning issue and 6, 216–17, 240–1, 245–51, 255–61, 278, 290–1; Downing Street Declaration (1993) 235, 238–41, 291; Framework Documents 251–4

power-sharing approaches; after 1979 175, 178–80, 189, 191; experiment of 1972–74 5, 9, 129–57

propaganda war 32–5, 188 security dilemma 124–6 sympathy for Irish unity 120,

127, 295Unionists and 14, 120–4

Constitutional Convention 162–4, 166

Cosgrave, Liam 141, 147 Coughlan, A. 74 Coulter, C. 22, 40 Council of Europe 61, 63 Council of Ireland (1920s) 48, 50 Council of Ireland (1970s

power-sharing proposal) 136, 141, 143, 145–7, 149–50

counter-insurgency policies 98, 114–17, 124–6

Cox, M. 226 Craig, James 50, 51 Craig, William 57, 81, 103, 111,

124, 163–4, 300 Craigavon, Lord 52 Cromwell, Oliver 3, 7 Crossman, Richard 104–5 CS gas 106, 119 Cunningham, M. 102, 112, 113,

139 curfew 117, 119

322 Index

Curran, Frank 85 Currie, Austin 74, 82–3,

92, 147 Curtis, L. 34, 169, 299, 300 Cushnahan, John 17 Cyprus 225

Darby, J. 39, 152 Darlington Conference

(1972) 133, 135 Darwin, J. 130 de Brun, Bairbre 277 de Valera, Eamonn 51, 52,

60, 61 decommissioning of weapons 6,

216–17, 240–1, 245–51, 255–61, 278, 290–1

Good Friday Agreement and 6, 271, 272–7, 291–2

demilitarisation option 248–51, 257

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 14, 15, 138, 171, 185, 191, 274

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 209, 210

peace process (1988–2000) and 230, 240, 245, 262

Rolling Devolution initiative and 195

demographics 22–3 Derry Citizens Action Committee

(DCAC) 85, 86, 93 Derry Housing Action Committee

(DHAC) 84, 85, 89, 92 Derry/Londonderry

Army in 113, 118; Bloody Sunday (1972) 7, 8, 19, 33, 43, 118

civil rights movement in 83, 84–5 gerrymandering in 68, 84 housing problems 83, 84 local government 68, 84;

reform 85–6 police no-go areas 86 residential segregation in 20 siege of 12, 13

Devenney, Samuel 86Devenport, M. 224, 241

Devlin, Bernadette 69, 83, 84 Devlin, Paddy 145, 147, 149, 179 devolution approaches see

power-sharing approaches direct action, civil rights movement

and 5, 9, 82–8, 92–3, 95–6

direct rule 5, 14, 120–1, 160, 164–5

threat of 103, 106 dirty protest 182 discrimination 4–5, 13, 21, 42,

50–1, 55 against Unionist community 69 employment 68 extent of 67–70 gerrymandering 68, 69, 84 housing 68, 69, 76, 82, 83,

92–3, 94 in local government 68, 69 see also civil rights movement

Divis Street Riots (1964) 71, 78 Dixon, P. 19, 27, 33, 43, 56, 58,

61, 72, 73, 77, 78, 99, 100, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 123, 125, 126, 128, 131, 132, 149, 152, 153, 157, 169, 172, 178, 189, 219, 220, 223, 230, 234, 243, 262, 263, 294, 298, 299, 301

Donoghue, B. 126, 148, 152, 159, 161, 164, 177

Douglas-Home, Alec 61 Downey, J. 137, 145, 149 Downing Street Declaration

(1993) 235, 238–41, 291 Drumcree 13, 253, 262–6, 289 Duffy, Paddy 149 Duignan, S. 220, 227, 228, 234,

241, 249, 250 Dungannon 76 Durkan, Mark 265

Eames, Archbishop 40 Easter Rising (1916) 4, 7, 8, 71, 78 education

improvements in 90–1, 92 segregation in 21

Eldridge, J. 303

Index 323

elections discrimination and

(gerrymandering) 68, 69, 84; reforms of 79–80

proportional representation 49, 68, 107

Elliott, P. 299, 300, 302, 303Elliott, S. 134, 229emergency coalition

proposal 163–4 emigration 22 employment

discrimination in 68 segregation in 21–2 unemployment 27, 53, 55–6

Equality Commission 69, 270 Ervine, David 16 European Community

(EC/EEC) Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

and 199 Irish Republic and 60, 136 UK and 53–4, 56 withdrawal option and 166

European Convention on Human Rights 270

Evelegh, Robin 119extradition 144, 147

famine (1845–51) 3, 7, 19 Faulkner, Brian 14, 15, 79, 81,

103, 133 escalation of troubles and 118 power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 139–41, 144–6, 149, 150, 152, 154, 155, 218

resignation as leader of UUP 147–8, 153

Fay, M. 12, 23, 25, 40, 44, 168 Fenians 3 First World War 4, 49 Fisk, R. 52, 151, 152 Fitt, Gerry 77–8, 83, 179 Fitzgerald, Garret 126, 137

Anglo–Irish Agreement and 187, 192, 193–4, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 212

on power-sharing 144, 145, 149, 154, 174

on propaganda war 41–3 on withdrawal option 159, 161,

163, 165–6 Flackes, W. D. 229 Flanagan, Ronnie 265 Foot, P. 128, 169 foreign investment see investment,

foreign Forum elections (1996) 262 Forum for Peace and

Reconciliation 245 Freeland, General 107, 114 Friends of Ireland 72 Furedi, F. 130–1

Gaelic Athletic Association 22 Gailey, A. 80, 81 George V, King 48–9 gerrymandering 68, 69, 84 Gibbon, P. 40, 92, 93, 95, 118,

120, 123 Gillespie, G. 124, 141, 145, 146,

147–8, 150, 168, 224, 246, 249, 250, 254, 256, 258, 275

Glover, Brigadier 181 Good Friday Agreement (GFA

1998) 6, 14, 30–1, 69, 155, 157, 216, 217, 218, 269–74, 291

decommissioning of weapons and 6, 271, 272–7, 291–2

referendum 271, 272–4 Goodall, David 179, 191–2, 193,

198, 199, 200–1, 202, 203, 212, 213

Gordon, D. 103 Gordon-Walker, Patrick 63 Government of Ireland Act

(1920) 48, 62, 77, 89 Griffiths, Eldon 211Gudgin, G. 69Guelke, A. 176, 177, 199 Guyana 130

Hadden, T. 21, 22, 23, 25, 69, 203, 212, 213

Haines, J. 157, 159, 164

324 Index

Hamill, D. 115, 121, 122, 123, 126, 169, 202

Harkness, D. 52, 53, 54 Hattersley, Roy 114 Haughey, Charles 62, 109, 175,

180, 193, 204 Hay, C. 27, 28 Hazelkorn, E. 224 Healey, Denis 105, 108, 110 Heath, Edward 33, 59, 99, 115,

121, 203 escalation of troubles and 118 power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 134, 137, 140–1, 144, 287

sympathy for Irish unity 120, 145

Hendron, Joe 230 Henry VIII, King 2 Hermon, John 274Hewitt, Christopher 88Hillsborough Declaration

(1999) 275Hillyard, Paddy 119Hitler, Adolf 52Hogg, Quintin 100, 110, 114 Holland, J. 237Home Rule movement 3–4, 13 Homeless Citizens League

(HCL) 76, 92housing, discrimination in 68, 69,

76, 82, 83, 92–3, 94Howard, Michael 257 Howe, Geoffrey 192, 198, 199,

200, 202, 203, 204 Human Rights Commission

270Hume, John 9, 84, 89, 112, 143,

182, 204 peace process (1988–2000)

and 216, 222, 232–5, 242, 261

hunger strikes (1980–81) 5, 7, 33, 158, 168, 181–7, 188, 287

Hunt, Lord 108, 111, 112 Hurd, Douglas 194, 195, 196,

200, 201, 203 Hutchinson, Billy 16

ideology 26 power and creation of

reality 39–40, 281–92

propaganda war and 26, 32–7

Ignatieff, Michael 17, 18, 45 independence option 161–2, 173,

187, 213, 286 Independent Organisation 112 integration option 160, 178, 188–9,

196, 286 International Fund for

Ireland 197International Monetary Fund 61 international opinion, propaganda

and 34 internment 118, 119, 122, 133,

166 interrogation techniques 118,

119, 170 investment, foreign

Irish Republic 60Northern Ireland 54, 56–7, 93

Ireland English domination of 2–3, 7 famine (1845–51) 3, 7, 19 Home Rule movement 3–4, 13 partition 4–5, 8, 13, 47–50, 281secularisation in 224–5 troubles 5–6 unity 47–66, 174–5, 281; British

nationalism and 100–2; British politicians’ sympathy for 52–3, 100–2, 109, 120, 127, 136, 145, 161, 295; insecurity of Northern Ireland 53–60; North-South co-operation and 60–4; partition proposals on 48–50; polarisation into two states 50–2; Second World war and prospects for 52–3

see also conflict in Northern Ireland

Ireland Act (1949) 53Irish Government 296–7

civil rights movement and 87–8

Index 325

constitutional problems 142–3, 192, 224

co-operation from 36 North/South relations 50–2,

59, 60–4 peace process (1988–2000)

and 216, 221, 228, 230, 234–5, 239, 241, 244–5, 249–50, 261–2; decommissioning issue and 241, 249–50, 251, 256–9, 291; Framework Documents 251–4

power-sharing approaches and: after 1979 179, 180; experiment of 1972–74 137–8, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146

propaganda war and 36 US and 165–6, 175, 176, 189 withdrawal option and 159,

165–6, 174–5 see also Anglo–Irish Agreement

(1985) Irish Independence Party 10–11,

173Irish National Liberation Army

(INLA) 11, 247Irish Republican Army

(IRA) 11–12 army intelligence and 119Border Campaign (1956–62) 60,

70 British government contacts

with 165–7, 168, 181, 225–6, 235–8

ceasefires see ceasefires and truces

civil rights movement and 89decommissioning of weapons 6,

216–17, 240–1, 245–51, 255–61, 278, 290–1; Good Friday Agreement and 6, 271, 272–7, 291–2

escalations of campaign 117–19, 122, 132–3, 150, 170, 222

infiltration of 168 interrogation techniques against

members 118, 119, 170 justifications 8

military campaign 32–3 Official (OIRA) 11, 117, 132 peace process (1988–2000)

and 216, 235–8, 241–3 polarisation of communities

and 71propaganda war 32–5, 37–9,

180–7, 188, 301 Provisionals (PIRA) 11, 12, 88,

117, 133 Real 11, 247, 268, 275 reorganisation for ‘Long

War’ 169 rethinking ‘armed

struggle’ 221–4 splits 11 War of Independence (1919–21)

and 4

James II, King 3, 12 Jarman, N. 304 Jenkins, Roy 79, 80, 81

Kelley, K. J. 141, 170 Kennedy, D. 51 Kennedy, Edward 176Kennedy, John F. 70Kenny, A. 193Kenya 130King, Tom 200, 206, 208, 229 Kirkaldy, J. 101, 298Kissinger, Henry 165Kyle, K. 142, 144, 165

Labour Party and Governments Army deployment and 87,

105–7, 110 bipartisan approach to Northern

Ireland and 99–100, 101, 140–2, 171–2, 179, 266, 283

British nationalism and 100–2Constitutional Convention

and 162–4 direct rule and 14, 164–5; threat

of 103, 106 false dawn and 112–14 Home Rule movement and 4 hunger strikes and 186

326 Index

Labour Party and Governments – continued

independence option and 161–2

indirect rule policy 103–5 partition and 49 peace process (1988–2000)

and 217, 218, 266–9, 279; Good Friday Agreement (1998) 6, 269–74, 291–2

power-sharing experiment (1972–74) and 9, 148–50, 152–3, 155–6

reformism and 57–8, 71, 72, 76–80, 82, 96, 98, 102–5, 107–10, 131

reliance on Unionists (1976–79) 171–2

security and counter-insurgency policy 98, 114–17

sympathy for Irish unity 52–3, 100–2, 109, 120, 127, 295

Ulsterisation programme 107, 110–12, 127, 149, 169

Unionist attitudes to 54, 57–8, 102–3, 171–2

welfare state and 53, 54–5, 90–1, 94

withdrawal option 158–60, 165–7, 170, 187–8

Laver, M. 134Lawrence, R. 134Lawson, N. 198Lemass, Sean 60, 61–3, 81 Liberal Party, Home Rule

movement and 4 Lichbach, M. 27 local government 54–5

discrimination in 68, 69 reforms 85–6, 102

Logue, Hugh 147London, bombings in 230, 233,

260–1, 279 Londonderry, Lord 51Londonderry see Derry/

Londonderry Loughlin, J. 59, 80, 121, 170, 202 Loyalist paramilitaries 5, 8, 15–16

support for 38

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) 16

loyalists 6 Lundy, Governor 12 Lynch, Jack 63, 87–8, 174

power-sharing experiment (1972–74) and 137

Lynn, B. 74, 77, 82, 83

McAliskey, Bernadette 241McAllister, I. 122, 132, 141, 153 McAteer, Eddie 74, 83 McCabe, Jerry 262 McCann, Eamonn 84, 86, 87, 88,

93, 120 McCartney, Robert 253, 268Mac Cionnaith, Brendan 263McCluskey, Conn 76McCluskey, Patricia 76, 77MacCrory, Cardinal 51 McGarry, J. 23, 27, 91,

200, 216, 249 McGimpsey case 224McGoldrick, Michael 264McGovern, George 176McGuinness, Martin 169, 248,

258, 277McKeown, M. 92McKittrick, D. 12, 25, 28, 204,

214, 216, 221, 229, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 256, 258

McLaughlin, M. 238, 252 McMichael, Gary 16 McMichael, John 207McNair, B. 307 McNamara, Kevin 261Mair, P. 204, 224Major, John 230, 294

Anglo–Irish Agreement and 214

peace process (1988–2000) and 219, 220, 224, 228, 233, 234–5, 236, 239, 241, 248, 255, 266; decommissioning issue and 249, 256–60, 261; Framework Documents 250–4

Index 327

Malaya 130 Mallie, E. 28, 204, 214, 216,

221, 229, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 256, 258

Mallon, Seamus 206, 270, 285Manchester bombing 262marriages, mixed 22 Marsh, D. 27, 28 Mason, Roy 169, 170, 171, 172,

181, 182 Mates, Michael 157Maudling, Reginald 161Mayhew, Patrick 227, 232, 236,

248, 249, 252, 254 decommissioning issue and 255,

260 Drumcree marches and 265,

266Mayhew Talks 229–31

Miller, David 37, 238, 298, 300, 301, 302, 303

Mitchell, George 247, 259–61, 266, 291

moderates 2, 16–17 power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 16, 129, 131–4, 300; failure of131–4; government policy towards 130–1

modernisation theory 47–8, 49, 56, 58–60, 64–6, 127, 281–2

Moloney, E. 164, 170 Molyneaux, James 15, 195,

207–10, 230, 240, 245, 252, 253, 291

Morgan, M. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 Morrison, Danny 187Morrison, Herbert 53 Motorman operation 123–4 Movement for Colonial

Freedom 75Mowlam, Mo 261, 268 Moynihan, Daniel 176

Nally, Dermot 191Napier, Oliver 17 National Council for Civil

Liberties 75, 82

National Democratic Party 74National Unity 74Nationalist community 2

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 9, 187, 194, 197–8, 202–3, 204, 213

discrimination against see discrimination

divisions in 6 growth of Catholic middle-

class 76, 90–3 impact of army measures on 119interests and power 296–7peace process (1988–2000)

and 216–17; balancing with Unionist view 218–21, 231–2; critique of 277–80; Good Friday Agreement 271; rethinking of ‘armed struggle’ 221–4

republicans 6, 8–9, 88–90, 221–4 segregation 19–23 ‘state within a state’ 93, 94 view of conflict in Northern

Ireland 6, 7–12, 17–18 see also civil rights movement

Nationalist Party 73–4, 83, 88, 90, 91, 96

Neave, Airey 160, 171, 172, 178 Needham, Richard 169, 190, 202,

205, 211, 212, 213, 220 Neeson, Sean 17 Nelson, S. 154New Ireland Forum 193–4 New Ulster Political Research

Group 161–2 Newry 69no-go areas 86, 123–4 Noraid 176North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) 61North–South Ministerial

Council 270 Northern Ireland Assembly

Good Friday Agreement (1998) 269, 274, 276, 277; suspension 276

power-sharing experiment 1972–74 6, 136, 138–9, 145

328 Index

Northern Ireland Assembly – continued

Rolling Devolution initiative of 1980s 191, 195

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) 75, 82–4, 87, 89–93

Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 14, 55, 77, 110, 131–2

civil rights movement and 72–3, 78, 92

electoral defeat (1973) 138–9power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 133, 134

Ó Brádaigh, Ruairí 12, 166, 167, 168

O’Brien, B. 222, 223, 238 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 37, 145O’Clery, C. 93, 254, 261Ó Conaill, D. 168O’Connell, Daniel 3 O’Connor, F. 40, 212 Ó Dochartaigh, N. 84, 85, 86, 87,

88, 89, 113, 118 O’Doherty, M. 19, 264O’Farrell, J. 44 Official IRA 11, 117, 132 Ó Fiaich, Tomas 181O’Halloran, C. 49, 50O’Leary, Brendan 23, 27, 91, 179,

200, 203, 216, 249 Omagh bombing (1998) 11, 275 O’Malley, Padraig 23, 34, 184,

185, 186 O’Neill, Terence 15, 63, 73, 74

bipartisanship at Westminster and 99–100

civil rights movement and 65, 78–82, 85, 86, 96, 97, 113

EEC entry and 56meeting with Sean Lemass 62reformism 58–60, 65, 70–1,

78–82, 85, 86, 96, 97, 102–4, 282, 298

resignation as prime minister 105

O’Neill, Thomas ‘Tip’ 176Orange Order 22, 70, 87, 170

Drumcree marches 13, 253, 262–6, 289

Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 61

Owen, E. A. 211

Paisley, Ian 15, 38, 185, 191, 295, 300, 302

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 195, 207, 208, 209, 210

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and 180

B Specials and 111Drumcree marches and 263,

264election victory 113–14 emergency coalition proposal

and 163–4incitement to violence by 38opposition to O’Neill 62, 71, 79,

81, 104 peace process (1988–2000)

and 230, 268 United Unionist Action Council

and 171Palestine 126, 226, 227 parades 22, 87, 105

Drumcree 13, 253, 262–6, 289 Parkinson, A. F. 298, 302, 303 Parnell, Charles 7 partition 4–5, 8, 13, 47–50, 281 Patten, Chris 194, 196, 277 Patterson, H. 40, 60, 61, 63, 75,

86, 88, 92, 93, 95, 118, 120, 121, 123, 141, 145, 149, 159, 166, 167, 168, 169, 179, 204, 213, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 241, 243, 253, 257, 261

peace movements 132, 175peace process (1988–2000)

analysis of 288–92British government contact with

SF/IRA 235–8ceasefire of 1994 6, 216, 217,

223, 228, 244–5; end of 260–1

ceasefire of 1997 267decommissioning of weapons 6,

216–17, 240–1, 245–51,

Index 329

255–61, 278, 290–1; Good Friday Agreement and 6, 270–1, 272–7, 291–2

demilitarisation option 248–51, 257

democracy and 304–7 Downing Street Declaration

(1993) 235, 238–41, 291 Drumcree marches and 13, 253,

262–6, 289 Framework Documents 251–4,

290Good Friday Agreement (GFA

1998) 6, 14, 30–1, 69, 155, 157, 216, 217, 218, 269–74; decommissioning of weapons and 6, 271, 272–7, 291–2; referendum 271, 272–4

Hume-Adams talks 216, 222, 232–5, 240

Mitchell Report 247, 259–61, 266, 291

nationalist view 216–17; balancing with Unionist view 218–21, 231–2; critique of 277–80

origins 215–43rethinking of ‘armed

struggle’ 221–4 revival after end of

ceasefire 261–2 talks 227–31 Unionist view 217–18;

balancing with nationalist view 218–21, 231–2; critique of 277–80

United States of America and 216, 254–5

Peacocke, Inspector-General 106penal laws 3 People’s Democracy 86Phoenix, S. 237 political status for prisoners 122,

168, 181hunger strikes and 182–7

Pollak, A. 164population 22–3 power 26

British interests and 292–4

creation of reality and 39–40 defining 27–31 propaganda war and 298–304 structure and agency 27–31 Unionist interests and 294–6

power-sharing approaches after 1979 175, 178–80; Rolling

Devolution initiative 191, 195, 201

after 1994 217experiment of 1972–74 5, 9,

129–57, 285, 300; bipartisanship and 140–2; failure of 5, 126, 138–40, 150–6, 158, 285–6; lessons from 154–6; moderate centre and 16, 129, 130–4, 138–40, 300; Northern Ireland Assembly 6, 136, 138–9; proposals 135–8; Sunningdale Agreement 142–4, 147–50, 177, 205, 219, 268, 300; Ulster Workers’ Council strike and 126, 150–3, 158, 284, 295; Unionists and 13, 14, 139–40, 144–55, 157

Good Friday Agreement (1998) 269–74

see also Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 164–5

Prior, James 176, 178, 179, 190 Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

and 193, 201hunger strikes and 183, 185 Rolling Devolution

initiative 191, 201 prisoners

hunger strikes (1980–81) 5, 7, 33, 158, 168, 181–7, 188, 287

political status 122, 168, 181, 182–7

release of 271, 274Progressive Unionist Party

(PUP) 16 propaganda war 1, 18, 26–7, 37–9,

116

330 Index

propaganda war – continuedBritish Army and 35, 116, 169,

300British governments 33–4,

35–6, 39, 116, 188, 287, 298–304

ideology and 26, 32–7Irish Republican Army

(IRA) 39, 180–7, 188, 301

power and 298–304reality and 43–5 winding down 41–3, 219

proportional representation 49, 68, 107

Protestantism dominance of 3 nationalism and 7 see also Unionist community

Provisional IRA 11, 12, 88, 117, 133

public employment, discrimination in 68

public housing, discrimination in 68, 69, 76, 82, 83, 92–3, 94

Purdie, B. 69, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 93, 95

Real IRA 11, 247, 268, 275 reality 26–7, 43–5

power and creation of 39–41, 281–92

Rees, Merlyn 107, 134, 148, 150, 152, 154, 172, 226

Army propaganda against 169 Constitutional Convention

and 162, 164 direct rule and 164 independence option and 161 IRA ceasefire (1975) and 166,

168 withdrawal option and 159–60

referendum on Good Friday Agreement (GFA 1998) 271, 272–4

repartition option 160, 192 republicans 6, 8–9

civil rights movement and 74–5, 88–90

rethinking ‘armed struggle’ 221–4

residential segregation 20, 21 revisionist history 17–19 Reynolds, Albert 216, 228, 234,

242, 250, 261 Rhodesia 104Robinson, Mary 224Robinson, Peter 230, 267 Rolling Devolution initiative of

1980s 191, 195, 201Roman Catholic Church

Catholic unionists 2, 80 discrimination against in

Northern Ireland see discrimination

growth of Catholic middle-class 76, 90–3

secularisation in Ireland and 224–5

special position in Irish Free State/Republic 4, 50, 51

‘state within a state’ and 94 Rose, Paul 77, 78 Rose, R. 150, 163, 174 Rowan, B. 231, 245, 247 Royal Ulster Constabulary

(RUC) 5 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985)

and 197; policing problems 210–11

B Specials 86, 106, 107, 110–12

Catholics in 111, 125 ceasefire (1994) and 247civil rights marches/riots and 83,

84, 85, 86, 87, 95 discrimination in 68 Drumcree marches and 264–5 exclusion from no-go areas 86 Labour government’s

Ulsterisation programme and 110–12, 149

reform proposals: Good Friday Agreement 270; power-sharing experiment (1972–74) 145, 146

rivalry with British Army 169successes (1977–1985) 170

Index 331

Ulster Workers’ Council strike and 152

Ruane, J. 29, 30, 40, 216 Ryder, C. 106, 125, 211

Sands, Bobby 7, 183–4, 185 Scarman, Lord 87, 88, 106, 108Schlesinger, P. 298, 299, 300, 303 Scott, Nick 201, 212Seawright, George 210Second World War 13, 52security issues 98, 114–17, 124–6,

171–2, 282–3, 305–6Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

and 191–2, 198–9, 210–13 Drumcree marches and 13, 253,

262–6, 289power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 145–6, 152 segregation 19–23

education 21 employment 21–2 residence 20, 21 social 22

Seldon, A. 44, 207, 219, 225, 234, 236, 241, 253, 261, 266

Shannon, William 176–7Sharrock, D. 224, 241Sinn Féin 4, 5–6, 11–12, 219

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 197–8, 202–3, 213

boycott of Belfast (1920–22) 50 British government contacts with

SF/IRA 165–7, 168, 181, 225–6, 235–8

electoral success after hunger strikes 185, 186–7, 192, 193, 301

IRA campaign and 38–9IRA truce of 1975 and 167legalisation of 132–3,

149, 166 peace process (1988–2000)

and 216–17, 218, 220, 221–3, 225, 226, 228, 271; decommissioning issue and 245, 246, 262; Hume-Adams talks 216, 222, 232–5, 240

reorganisation for ‘Long War’ 169

Rolling Devolution initiative and 191

Unionist view of 37 Smith, D. 69Smith, M. L. R. 117, 121, 124, 133,

166, 168, 169, 222, 227 Smyth, C. 164Social Democratic and Labour

Party (SDLP) 9–11, 132, 148, 187, 191, 227, 296

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 194, 204, 213

formation out of civil rights movement 88, 91, 110

hunger strikes and 184, 185 independence option and 162,

173 peace process (1988–2000)

and 216, 222, 228, 230, 240, 276

power-sharing approaches and 9–10; after 1979 179; experiment of 1972–74 133–4, 135, 137, 139, 141, 144, 145, 146–7, 152, 157

Rolling Devolution initiative and 191, 195

withdrawal option and 166, 172–5

social segregation 22 Soderberg, Nancy 254Somme, Battle of the 4, 13, 71, 78 Soskice, Frank 79South Africa 226, 227 Special Air Service (SAS) 172 sport, segregation in 22 Spring, Dick 241, 257, 258–9Stormont government 4–5, 8, 13,

48, 49bipartisanship at Westminster

and 99–100, 101civil rights protests against see

civil rights movement discrimination and see

discrimination European Community (EC/EEC)

membership and 53–4, 56

332 Index

Stormont government – continuedforeign investment and 54, 56–7 North/South relations 50–2,

59, 60–4 pressure to reform from

Westminster 57–8, 71, 72, 76–80, 82, 96, 98, 102–5, 107–10

relations with rest of UK 53–60 unemployment crisis and 53,

55–6 welfare state and 53, 54–5, 90,

94 strategic-relational approach

29–32 strikes 124

against Anglo–Irish Agreement 209

hunger strikes (1980–81) 5, 7, 33, 158, 168, 181–7, 188, 287

Ulster Workers’ Council strike 126, 150–3, 158, 284, 295

United Unionist Action Council and 171

structuralism 28–9, 127Stuart, M. 195, 200, 201, 203 Sunningdale Agreement 142–4,

147–50, 177, 205, 219, 268, 300

Sutton, M. 168

Taylor, John 43, 124, 155Taylor, P. 133, 166, 167, 226 Taylor, R. 44, 94, 95 Teague, P. 60, 63, 68, 213, 253 Thatcher, Margaret 158, 160,

195, 293 Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985)

and 5, 158, 189–92, 197–9, 201–4, 206, 208, 212–14, 287

bipartisanship and 179hunger strikes and 183, 184, 186 meeting with Haughey 180 New Ireland Forum and 194peace process (1988–2000)

and 225

Rolling Devolution initiative and 191, 201

Todd, J. 29, 30, 40, 216Tone, Wolfe 3, 7, 147torture 118, 119 trade 50, 51, 60, 64 trade unions 75, 132, 151, 152 Trimble, David 14, 15

Anglo–Irish Agreement and 207

Drumcree marches and 253, 263, 264

as First Minister 270peace process (1988–2000)

and 30–1, 155, 256, 260, 267–8, 272, 274, 275, 276

Tugwell, Maurice 115Tuzo, General 125

Ulster Clubs 207Ulster Committee for the

Defence of the Constitution 71

Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee 81

Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 15–16, 121, 122, 124–6, 161–2, 231, 240

Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) 111–12, 125–6, 149

Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) 16

Ulster Division 4, 13 Ulster Freedom Fighters

(UFF) 15 Ulster Protestant Volunteers 71,

81, 83 Ulster Resistance 209Ulster Special Constabulary

(USC) 68, 111Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

14–15, 77, 110, 170–1, 185, 191, 213, 274, 275–6

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 195–6

Labour Government (1974–79) and 171–2

peace process (1988–2000) and 14, 217, 218, 230–1,

Index 333

235, 240, 241, 253, 256, 260, 262, 267–9

power-sharing experiment (1972–74) and 139–40, 141, 144, 219

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 16, 105

banning of 79involvement in politics 154legalisation of 133, 149, 166peace process (1988–2000)

and 240reformation of (1966) 5, 8, 16,

71, 79Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC)

strike 126, 150–3, 158, 284, 295

unemployment 27, 53, 55–6 Unionist community 2

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 14, 16, 154, 155–6, 193, 195–6, 200–1, 204–13, 214

British attitudes to 302–3, 306 civil rights movement and 13,

83–4, 88–90; Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 72–3, 78, 92

discrimination against 69 divisions in 6 Drumcree marches 13, 253,

262–6, 289 hunger strikes and 184, 185–6 interests and power 294–6peace process (1988–2000)

and 217–18; balancing with nationalist view218–21, 231–2; critique of 277–80; Framework Documents 252–4; Good Friday Agreement 271–2

power-sharing experiment (1972–74) and 13, 14, 139–40, 144–55, 157

segregation 19–23 Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC)

strike 126, 150–3, 158, 284, 295

view of conflict in Northern Ireland 6, 12–16

United Irishmen 3 United Nations 61United States of America

Anglo–Irish Agreement (1985) and 199

changing attitudes in late 1970s 175–8

civil rights movement and 85Irish community in 3, 35–6,

176–7, 242, 297peace process (1988–2000)

and 216, 254–5 withdrawal option and 165–6,

189United Ulster Unionist Council

(UUUC) 147, 148, 163 United Unionist Action

Council 171Urban, M. 107, 123, 126, 169 Utley, T. E. 130, 196

Vanguard/Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUUP) 15, 121, 124, 138, 163–4, 170, 207, 295

Victims Commission 270Vietnam 299violence

atrocity myths 18 conflict in Northern Ireland

and 23–5 Volunteer Political Party 154

Walsh, Dick 263War of Independence

(1919–21) 4 Warrington bombing 224Welch, David 33, 40welfare state 53, 54–5, 90–1, 94 West, Harry 15, 81, 151White, B. 141, 142, 143, 145, 146,

147 White, Keith 209Whitelaw, Willie 121, 122, 124,

132, 133, 299Whyte, J. 27, 34, 51, 68, 69, 94,

139, 152

334 Index

William III (of Orange), King 3, 12–13, 17

Wilson, A. J. 176, 177, 199 Wilson, Harold 61, 73, 101,

105, 168 bipartisanship and 100, 172 direct rule and 164independence option and

161Irish unity and 62–3, 120 power-sharing experiment

(1972–74) and 134, 149, 157

reformism 57–8, 76, 79, 80, 102–3, 104

Ulster Workers’ Council strike and 152–3

Ulsterisation programme and 110–11

withdrawal option and 159Windlesham, D. 114withdrawal option 158–60,

165–7, 170, 172–5, 187–8, 200, 301

Wolfe Tone Society 82 World Bank 61Wright, Billy 16 Wright, Joanne 36, 38, 39

Young, Arthur 111Young, H. 192, 198 Yugoslavia 31, 227

Zuckerman, A. 27