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Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies THE CONSTITUTIONAL FARCE Generational Rifts within the Muslim Brotherhood March 2007 Vol. 13 No. 147 Plus: Unity Governments in Lebanon and Palestine Amendments Pose Huge Setback for Political Reform Opposition MPs Denouncing the Constitutional Amendments

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Civil Societyand Democratization in the Arab World

Ibn Khaldun Center forDevelopment Studies

THE CONSTITUTIONALFARCE

Generational Rifts withinthe Muslim BrotherhoodMarch 2007 Vol. 13 No. 147

Plus: Unity Governmentsin Lebanon and Palestine

Amendments Pose Huge Setback for Political Reform

Opposition MPs Denouncing the Constitutional Amendments

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March 2007Vol. 13 No. 147

Senior ConsultantMoheb Zaki

Arabic-language EditorMokhtar Qassem

English-language EditorNeil Durnan

Contributing EditorsAlexander Bruce, Amanda Craig, MariaDayton, Matthew Devlin, Hussein Gaafar,Brent Giannotta, Matthew Hall, Bryce

Loildolt, Rachel Sekinger

ICDS Board of TrusteesDr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Chairman of the ICDS Board of Trustees andProfessor of Political Sociology at the American

University in CairoMr. Gamal El-Banna

Chairman, the International Islamic Federationfor Labor

Dr. Barbara IbrahimDirector, the Gerhart Center at the American

University in CairoMr. Bahie El-Din El-Ebrashi

LawyerAmb. Hassan Eissa

President, the Egyptian Diplomatic ClubDr. Mohtak Halouda

Former Chairman, the Central Agency forPublic Mobilization and StatisticsMohamed Farid HassaneinBusinessman and former MPMr. Hisham Kassem

Chairman, the Egyptian Organization forHuman Rights

Dr. Medhat KhafagyProfessor of Surgical Oncology, NationalCancer Institute at Cairo UniversityMr. Mohamed NouhArtist and MusicianDr. Ayman Nour

Chairman of El Ghad Party and former MPAmb. Mohmoud Qassem

Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, WafdParty

Eng. Ahmed RezkBusinessman

Hassan ElsawafBusinessman

Morsy El SheikhCounsellor

Eng. Youssef SidhomChief Editor, Watani Newspaper

Contents

Regional NewsCivil Society News From Around the Region ................. 1A round-up of important developments in democratization andhuman rights in the Arab World.

Ibn Khaldun Center NewsAl-Rewaq .................................................................................... 2Ahmed Shaaban summarizes hot debates at the Ibn Khaldun Center’sOpen Forum.Ibn Khaldun Center Opens New Wing ............................. 3ICDS inaugurates new facilities with conference on constitutionalreform and reception attended by US Ambassador Ricciardone.Grassroots Democratization Program to Begin ThisSpring .......................................................................................... 3The Ibn Khaldun Center’s new initiative to increase democraticawareness in rural Egypt gets underway.

Egypt News and ViewsA Plea to the Egyptian People ............................................. 4Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim on the constitutional amendment farce.A Setback for Democracy ............................................................... 5Neil Durnan and Bryce Loidolt discuss the constitutionalamendments and the referendum.Not Your Father’s Brotherhood ........................................... 6Matthew Devlin explores generational rifts within the MuslimBrotherhood.

FeaturesStreet Politics and the Battle for a “New” Lebanon ..... 8Hebah Farrag examines the complexities of political advertising inLebanon.

ViewpointsRegional Cooperation Perspectives ................................... 12Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem on Mediterranean partnerships.A Story of Fraud ...................................................................... 14Hassan Elsawaf on misdealings in Egypt’s business community.In the Arabic Issue ........................................................................... 14Keep Your Eye on These Arab Unity Governments ............... 16Rami G. Khouri on political compromises in Lebanon andPalestine.

In MemoriamIliya F. Harik, July 20, 1934 - February 24, 2007 ............. 17

Civil Societyand Democratization in the Arab World

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i BahrainThe vice-president and president ofthe Bahrain Center for Human Rights(BCHR) have become the latest victimsof a government campaign to suppressdissent.

On 14 March, BCHR vice-presidentNabeel Rajab was called beforecriminal investigators looking into acase filed against him by a healthministry employee. BCHR believes thisinvestigation and any resulting criminalcharges are part of a governmentattempt to silence activists whopublicized the so-called "Bandargate"report. The report, released last fall,named the health ministry employeeas having been paid by a seniorgovernment official to set up anti-Shiainternet forums.

The report, by Salah Al Bandar of theLondon-based Gulf Centre forDemocratic Development, citedgovernment documents purportedlyshowing a network of high-levelgovernment officials working tomaintain the economic and politicaloppression and disenfranchisement ofBahrain's Shia majority. Al Bandar wasdeported from Bahrain last fall aftergiving his report to the media, and theHigher Criminal Court banned all newsand discussion of it.

In a related case, BCHR presidentAbdulhadi Al-Khawaja and twoactivists who continue to highlight theBandargate scandal face criminalcharges that carry prison terms of upto 15 years. Websites that havediscussed the scandal, includingBCHR's, have been blocked insideBahrain. The BCHR itself wasdissolved by the government in 2004,but continues to operate as a humanrights NGO.

After the BCHR president and AlBandar participated in an AmericanEnterprise Institute seminar inWashington, DC in February, aneditorial in the Gulf Daily Newssuggested the meeting was an act ofconspiracy and treason.

i EgyptOn March 26, a referendum was heldto approve controversial amendmentsto 34 articles of the Egyptian

Constitution passed by parliament onMarch 21. The amendments passedwith 75.9 percent of the vote. Officialsput voter turnout at 27 percent, whileindependent monitors, including theIbn Khaldun Center, have assertedthat actual turnout was much lower,at about four percent nationwide.

The referendum was boycotted by thepolitical opposition, who walked outof parliament in protest on March 19.The nation’s judges also boycottedoversight of the referendum; AhmedSabr, a spokesman for the judiciarywas quoted by Qatari satellite newschannel Al-Jazeera, “The judges washtheir hands of the referendum results...We will no longer be a fig leaf to coversomething shameful.”

Amendments eliminating judicialoversight of elections, banningreligiously based parties, andenshrining draconian “anti-terrorism”powers in the Constitution itself, havedrawn the most criticism withinEgypt and abroad.

On February 27, Ibrahim Eissa,editor of the independent weekly Al-Dustoor, had his one-year jail sentencefor insulting President HosniMubarak overturned, though he wasstill fined 22,000 Egyptian pounds($4,000).

The case stemmed from a story thatwas printed in Al-Dustoor about acourt case filed against the President. The suit against Eissa was brought bya private citizen on behalf of thePresident, a tactic that Eissa claims thegovernment is increasingly employingin order to curtail freedom of the press.

See pages 4,5, and 15 for more informationon the constitutional amendments.

i JordanOn March 4, the Jordanian parliamentpassed controversial amendments tothe nation’s press laws that containclauses allowing imprisonment ofjournalists for violations relating todefaming religion, offending religiousprophets, inciting sectarian strife orracism, slandering individuals, andspreading false information or rumors.Journalists convicted of such offenses

face fines of up to 10,000 dinars ($14,114) and prison terms ranging fromone day up to three years. Theamendment also places the licensingof new publications under thejurisdiction of the Ministry of Industryand Trade. The Jordan PressAssociation deplored the adoption ofthe draft amendments and urged theupper house of parliament, where thedraft now goes for further discussion,to amend the legislation.

In other news, on March 2, KingA b d u l l a h anno un c e d t h a tparliamentary elections will take placeby the end of 2007, ending speculationthat he would delay elections until nextyear. Parliament's four-year term endsin April.

h MauritaniaMauritanians went to the polls onMarch 11 for their country’s first freepresidential election since Mauritania’sindependence from France in 1960.

After the votes had been tallied, itbecame clear that no candidate hadbeen able to achieve 50% of the vote,necessitating a runoff. Sidi MohamedOuld Cheikh Abdallahi, who issupported by the largest political blocin the Parliament, was the front-runnerafter the first round, winning 25percent of ballots cast, with AhmedOuld Daddah of the Rally ofDemocratic Forces (RFD) Partygarnishing a close second with 21percent.

When Civil Society went to press it wasstill unclear who had won the runoff,

Civil Society News From Around the RegionRegional news

March 2007 1

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Civil Society2

held on March 25. Preliminary resultsshow Mr. Abdallahi ahead with 52percent of the vote to Mr. Daddah’s48 percent. A former cabinet minister,Mr. Abdallahi is supported by acoalition of 18 parties previously loyalto former Pres ident MaaoyaSid’Ahmed Ould Taya, who wasoverthrown in 2005. Mr. Daddah, onthe other hand, is a well knownopposition figure who unsuccessfullyran against former President Taya in1992 and 2003.

Voter turnout in the first round of thepresidential election was approximately70 percent, with turnout decreasing to60 percent of eligible voters for thesecond round. Elections were deemedfree and fair by domestic andinternational observers.

The current interim President, Col.Ely Ould Muhammad Vall, hadcontinuously pledged to not seekelection to the presidency in order fora new government to have increasedlegitimacy. He also barred membersof his junta from seeking elected office.

h PalestineOn March 17, the PalestinianPar l iament approved a unitygovernment aimed at halting factionalfighting and easing a crippling Westernfinancial embargo. Eighty-seven ofthe 132 Palestinian Legislative Council'smembers gathered in Gaza andRamallah in a video-linked session,voting 83 to three in favor of the newunity government. For ty-one

lawmakers, including 37 from Hamas,could not attend because they are inIsraeli jails. "This national unitywedding has received an Arab andinternational welcome, which we hopewill be transformed into practical stepsto end the siege," Palestinian PresidentMahmoud Abbas told lawmakers. Headded the Palestinian people "rejectviolence in all its forms" and seek acomprehensive peace "based onnegotiations." Prime Minister IsmailHaniya contradicted Abbas, however,stating that Palestinians had a right to“all forms of resistance,” but that helooked forward to expanding the trucebetween Hamas and the Israeli securityforces.

While Israel has already announcedit won't deal with the new Palestiniangovernment, the unity government hasachieved one of its goals, namely theeasing of the Western embargo.France, Norway, and Russia haveexpressed interest in working with thenew government.

iSudanOn March 18, Sudan’s Justice Minister,Mohammed Ali Al-Mardi, and a pro-government newspaper said, Sudanhas decided to suspend all cooperationwith the International Criminal Court(ICC) in response to its accusationsthat Sudanese officials were involvedin war crimes in Darfur. Al-Mardireiterated his government's stance thatthe Hague-based ICC has no

jurisdiction over Sudanese citizensbecause Sudan hasn't ratified theconvention creating the internationalcourt. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had chaired a meeting ofCabinet ministers and high-rankingjudicial officials before, that decidedto cancel cooperation with the court.Thereon, a senior UN official lamentedon Monday a lack of understandingbetween the government of Sudanand the international community overwhat to do in the case of Darfur. "Westill have unfortunately a long way togo,“ said UN Under Secretary-Generalfor Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno. He went on to addthat there had been an improvementin the security situation, but that"fundamentally the situation remainsextremely bad in Darfur."

Al-Rewaq

The Ibn Khaldun Center hosts a dicussion forum, open to the public, each Tuesday evening. The following is Mokhtar Qassem’ssummary, translated by Civil Society Staff, of the topics covered in March.

The month’s first lecture was delivered by ICDS board member Hassan Elsawwaf. It focused on the politicalconflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government. Mr. Elsawwaf examined the role of the constitutionalamendments in this conflict, particularly the proposed amendment to Article Five banning religiously influencedparties. He also stressed that liberals should show solidarity with the Brotherhood when it faces government attacks,as to do otherwise is to support the regime.

March’s second lecture, delivered by Dr. Moaheb Moelhy was entitled “Sexual Education,” and focused on a numberof women’s issues in Egypt today, such as the political role of women under the current system and various socialconcerns.

Omar al-Bashir

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ICDS News

n March 18, the Egypt ianDemocracy Support Network(EDSN) hosted a conference on the

proposed constitutional amendments, as wellas Articles 76 and 77, which President HosniMubarak has refused to discuss, in the IbnKhaldun Center’s new conference facilities. The new wing includes a number of meetingrooms as well as a 100-seat conference hallequipped with the latest multimediatechnology.

Following the day’s debates, there was a paneldiscussion on the importance of substantiveconstitutional reform. The speakers includedDemocratic Front Party co-founder OsamaEl-Ghazali Harb, prominent judge and activistHisham Bastawisi, and Ibn Khaldun CenterChairman Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim.

The evening ended with a reception attendedby United States Ambassador to EgyptFrancis Ricciardone and his wife, Dr. MarieRicciardone, that featured a performance byEgyptian vocalist Azza Balba.

O

March 2007 3

et to begin this spring in three carefully chosengovernorates outside the capital, the GrassrootsDemocratization Project has grown from the

realization that, while the current efforts to promote liberaldemocratic values and increase the demand for democraticreform among the Egyptian elite are important, these effortswill remain largely ineffective unless a simultaneous, seriouseffort is made to propagate these values among the ruraland urban poor who make up more than 80 percent of theEgyptian population.

Funded by USAID, the Grassroots Democratization Projectaims to increase demand for democratic reform amongstthe Egyptian poor through the utilization of all availablechannels, both religious and secular. In this way, the projectwill increase understanding about how core Egyptian valuesare compatible with democracy. This approach is modeledin large part on the successes of the Muslim Brotherhoodin disseminating its message among the popular masses,though our ideological platform is very different.

In order to accomplish this goal, the Ibn Khaldun Centerwill work with religious leaders and NGOs in these areasto further local knowledge of democratic values and toincrease citizen mobilization and participation in opendebates regarding democracy and freedom. Reputable and

enlightened local clerics will help to explain that the essenceof freedom and human rights are already firmly groundedin Egyptian cultural and religious tradit ions.

The program will begin with the distribution of literatureexplaining fundamental liberal democratic concepts fordiscussion at home and in the community context. Afterthe introduction of the literature into the community, theIbn Khaldun Center and affiliated NGOs will conduct bi-monthly meetings open to the public to discuss liberaldemocratic ideals, as well as the compatibility of these ideaswith moderate religious interpretations espoused by thestate and supported by the teachings of Egypt’s prestigiousreligious institutions. The project will also convene quarterlyworkshops in each governorate to assess the project’sprogress, as well as annual conferences to discuss the projectwith beneficiaries, donors, and local government officials.

Though the project seeks to effect a large-scale change incultural mores at the grassroots level, an undertaking thatwill take years if not decades, the initial timeframe for thispilot project is two years. This will serve as a trial period,both to evaluate the overall viability of the project and toperfect the program’s structure before expanding beyondthe three initial governorates.

S

By Civil Society Staff

Grassroots Democratization Program to BeginThis Spring

By Civil Society Staff

Ibn Khaldun Center Opens New Wing

From left: Eng. Ahmed Rizk, Amb. Francis Ricciardone, and Dr. SaadEddin Ibrahim

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he National Democratic Party (NDP) parliamentarymajority passed the constitutional amendmentsrequested by President Hosni Mubarak without

changing a single word. Indeed the only change made tothe amendments submitted by the executive branch was a“grammatical correction” in Article One that changed acomma to a period.

This means that four months of effort, since the Presidentproposed amending 34 articles of the Constitution inDecember, 2006, including dozens of proposals andhundreds of seminars and conferences that consumedEgypt’s political parties, civil society, and academia, did notaffect decision of the ruling party (or rather the Mubarakfamily) one iota.

The President’s request that civil society organizations andopposition parties contribute to the dialogue regarding theamendments was merely a diversion, accomplished by theslightest suggestion that there would be popular participationin the constitutional amendment process. He emphizedthis by stating that these amendments were the realizationof the promises made during his reelection campaign twoyears ago. The people wholly trusted their president, andhe betrayed their trust with equal vigor.

What happened in the two chambers of parliament waspure theater, with the opposition parties and civil societyorganizations as “extras,” in a production by acclaimedwriter, producer, and star, President Hosni Mubarak, withsupporting roles by Dr. Fathi Suror (in the People’s Assembly)and Mr. Safwat Al-Sharif (in the Shura Council and theparty itself), and a chorus made up of NDP MPs in bothchambers. True to theatrical and cinematic form, thedirector remained out of sight, where he pulled all thestrings with the help of his assistants. The director in thiscase is the President’s son, assisted by members of the NDPPolicy Committee, who kept quiet about his role in thedecision making process.

Despite the demands, shouts, and protests of a quarter ofthe Parliament, who went so far as to withdraw themselvescompletely from the chamber, the will of the majority wasnot shaken; they continued to play out the scenario preparedfor them in advance. In addition, the majority paid no heedto the proposals of Egypt’s top constitutional scholars:Salama Ahmed Salama, Salah Montassir, MakramMuhammad Ahmed, Abd al-Moneim Said, Muhammad al-Sayyid Said, Osama Ghazali Harb, Magdi al-Jalad, MagdiMahna, and the great constitutional thinker Dr. Yehya al-Gamal. The efforts of these great men were simply throwinto the trash.

Many doubted the President’s request for constitutionalamendments from the beginning, claiming that it was nothingbut deceptive nonsense. However, some of us put these

doubts aside, reasoning that we had much more to lose ifthe President was indeed genuine and we abstained fromtaking part than if we took him at his word and weredeceived. I was part of the group that decided to act,organizing four conferences and publishing five articles (inAl-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dustoor, Al-Hayat, and other Arabicnewspapers) on the constitutional amendments.

But after the scene we witness in the People’s Assemblylast week, that was recorded in the Egyptian press on March19, it was clear to me that the “doubters” were right. Whatbegan with the President’s speech to the People’s Assemblyon December 26, 2006 and ended with a meeting of thesame chamber on March 18, 2007, was nothing more thantheater, closer to comedy than tragedy.

It became clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt that theconstitutional amendments serve three unmentionedpurposes, which a viewer of average intelligence could haveeasily determined.

Firstly, the amendments to the constitution can be employedto prevent prominent public figures from running for thepresidency, but at the same time they can be manipulatedto allow for rather innocuous individuals to run for office. This can be used to give future contests a semblance ofcompetitiveness, though none of these paper candidateswould actually stand a chance against the NDP candidate,who, most observers agree, will be Gamal Mubarak.

Secondly, the constitutional amendments allow the NDPto rig elections whenever and wherever they like, withoutany oversight or accountability. The government had beenhaving an increasingly difficult time interfering in electionssince the Supreme Constitutional Court’s July 2000 decision,in which it ruled that judicial supervision was a necessarycondition for the legitimacy of any election. Although thisdid not prevent the NDP from rigging elections, judicialoversight made counterfeiting more difficult, especially withregards to figures on voter turnout. Low figures cast doubton the legitimacy of any elected president, especially whenthey are below 10 percent, as was the case in the lastpresidential election.

In Mubarak’s first four elections (1981, 1987, 1993, and1999), which were not supervised by the judiciary or civilsociety organizations, it was declared that participation wasabove 70 percent and that President Mubarak had garnered99 percent of the vote. In the absence of any independentoversight, such fabrications were easy. On the contrary, inthe 2005 election, which benefited from judicial and civilsociety oversight, voter turnout figures ranged betweenthree and 10 percent, and therefore the president receivedno more than three million votes from a pool of 35 millionregistered voters.

The constitutional amendments’ third purpose is theelimination of the last remaining fundamental freedomsunder the pretext of new anti-terrorism legislation toutedas an alternative to the Emergency Law. (Cont’d page 15)

T

By Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim; trans. Neil Durnan

A Plea to the Egyptian People

Civil Society4

This article was originally written in Arabic and translated intoEnglish. It was refused publication in Al-Masry Al-Youm on March24, 2007, and was printed instead in Al-Dustoor on March 28.

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By Neil Durnan and Bryce Loidolt

A Setback for Democracy

Egypt News and Views

March 2007 5

n December 2006, President Hosni Mubarak proposedthat the People’s Assembly amend 34 articles of theEgyptian Constitution, a move characterized by the

government as a positive step towards democracy. Thisimmediately sparked debate among various members ofEgyptian civil society, as well as foreign observers, whoexpressed a sincere hope that these amendments, the mostcomprehensive constitutional reforms since 1971, wouldenact desperately needed improvements to Egypt’s politicalsystem.

The proposed amendments addressed a number ofconstitutional issues. On the one hand, the amendmentsaltered the Nasser era socialist language of the constitution,maintaining, “The Arab Republic of Egypt adopts ademocratic system based on citizenship,” rather than asystem based on an “alliance of the people's working forces.”Similar changes were made throughout the constitution,synchronizing its articles with the contemporary politicaland economic realities facing Egypt. Such amendmentshave of course been necessary for decades, given Sadat’sdeparture from Nasser’s socialist agenda.

However, such superficial changes could not hide thecontroversial amendments made to a number of articles ofthe constitution, all of which were heavily criticized byEgyptian opposition parties, civil society organizations, andforeign analysts as being an assault on Egyptian rights. Theamendment made to Article Five solidified the government’sban on parties based on religious identity, further specifyingthat political parties with a mere religious reference orsymbol will be barred from undertaking any “politicalactivity.” This clarification is largely being analyzed as anattempt to end the participation of the Muslim Brotherhoodin Egyptian political life, coming in the wake of thelegalization of a number of Islamist parties in the Arabworld who managed to gain legal status by claiming thattheir party uses Islamic values as a reference, rather than abasis for party ideology.

Furthermore, the suggested amendment to Article 88nullified judicial supervision of elections, instead grantingthis power to a “supreme commission.” This is also beingcriticized as a government attempt to close the door onpolitical dissent, by giving the executive the power to createand control these commissions. Additionally, the executivewas permitted by amendment 136 to dissolve the People’sAssembly without a popular referendum.

Perhaps the most egregious consolidation of executivepower was the amendment made to article 179 of theConstitution. The amendment states that the government’sauthority to maintain security and public order should notbe hampered by Articles 41, 44, and 45 of the constitution,which guarantee basic individual freedoms, including thehumane treatment of prisoners and the right to privacy.This sweeping power essentially institutionalizes the most

controversial measures that were set forth by the EmergencyLaw in 1981.

It was therefore no surprise, when on March 19 membersof the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition partieswalked out of parliament, calling on Egyptian citizens todemonstrate against the proposed amendments, which werepassed by parliament soon after the walkout. The governmentdrew further criticism when it advanced the referendumdate by a week, causing the opposition bloc to call onEgyptian citizens to boycott the vote. The Kifaya movementechoed this call, organizing various sit-ins and demonstrationsagainst what they perceived to be an assault on Egyptianrights. As a result, the days prior to the referendum weremarred by a number of clashes between demonstrators andEgyptian authorities, often ending in the arrest of oppositionactivists.

Despite the efforts of the opposition, the amendmentswere approved with 75.9 percent of the vote in a plebisciteon March 26. While Justice Minister Mamdouh Mareiclaimed that voter turnout was 27 percent, the IndependentCommittee for Democracy Support (ICDS), a coalition ofNGOs led by the Ibn Khaldun Center, put the figure ataround four percent nationwide. According to theCommittee’s findings, turnout did not even reach onepercent in some areas, such as the North Sinai governorate,where the first voters did not show up until well into theafternoon.

In the face of such overwhelming public apathy, as well asan opposition boycott of the referendum, the governmentwas forced to take a number of measures in order toencourage participation. These ranged from the relativelymundane, such as the mobilization of government employeesto vote en masse, to the bizarre; in Dakhiliya government,for example, there were numerous reports of cars drivenby members of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)driving through the streets broadcasting messages thatcitizens who abstained from voting would be fined LE 200($ 35).

Unlike previous voting exercises, judicial oversight wasconspicuously absent during the March 26 referendum.While the judiciary’s involvement did not prevent widespreadtampering in past elections, the lack of judicial oversightduring this referendum provided a grim preview of the newsystem enshrined by the amendment to Article 88. In thejudges’ place, committees made up of government employeesloyal to the ruling NDP oversaw referendum operationsand the tallying of votes.

This lack of judicial oversight, coupled with tight NDPcontrol over the polling stations, allowed for massive votingirregularities. Some polling stations opened late or closedearly, while others allowed some citizens to vote multipletimes or without ID cards. In a similar (Cont’d page 17)

I

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The Muslim Brotherhood is widely hailed as themost powerful opposition group in Egypt, both byits supporters and detractors. Yet as the Brotherhoodapproaches its 80th anniversary, it is also facing its

second generational transformation. The results of thisshift must not be taken for granted; such moments oftransition can prove pivotal in the history of even the mostdeeply entrenched ideologies. For all its missile silos andarmored divisions, the simple act of procreation famouslyshook the Soviet Union to the core as the state failed toadequately meet the rising expectations of second-generationcomrades in the decades preceding its fall. From Stettin inthe Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, the iron curtain billowedin the winds of generational change.

T h e M u s l i mBrotherhood is noexception. Thoughsome commentatorsa s c r ibe a nea rimmutability to theBrotherhood, thisassumption stems inlarge part from thei d e a t h a t t h emovement’s religiousc o h e s i o n w i l li n e v i t a b l y b ereflected in a unifiedpolitical program.Brothers in Islamthey may be, but themembers of Egypt’sBrotherhood aremore often than notfathers and sons,uncles and nephews,grandfathers andgrandsons. As withall social and politicalmovements, the Brotherhood will evolve. The question ishow.

When analyzing differences of age within the Brotherhood,it makes sense to speak in terms of a loose framework ofthree generations. Mohamed Fahrid Abd el-Kahlik hailsfrom the first generation and was a close confidant of theBrotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna. In a longconversation at his Cairo apartment, the aging Abd el-Khalikvividly recalled the Brotherhood’s militant resistance to theBritish occupation, the role its volunteer units played in the1948 war against the nascent Israeli state, and its weatheringof President Gamal Abd el-Nasser’s fierce 1954 crackdown.These tumultuous events fashioned the hardened politicalidentity of the Brotherhood’s founding generation and stillreverberate through their lingering hold on the movement’sleadership.

The formative experiences of the Brotherhood’s secondgeneration crucially diverged from the environment of

intense repression in which their elders had come of age.A result of President Anwar Sadat’s bid to court alliesagainst his leftist critics, Islamists were allowed greaterlatitude on university campuses across the country andreaped a period of flourishing growth throughout the 1970s.Islamist university leaders began to engage in an opendialogue with other student groups and so cultivated anever-increasing respect for the value of debate and theconstructive potential of an open exchange of ideas. Amongthese students was Abd el-Moniem Abou el-Futouh, headof the student union at Cairo University from 1974 to 1977and subsequently a chief strategist of the Brotherhood’sultimately successful bid to capture the powerful professionalsyndicates during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Abou el-Futouh would go on to rise within the movement and

currently sits on theexecutive GuidanceCouncil. Like Abouel-Futouh, many ofhis generation havealso risen to theupper reaches ofthe Brotherhood’shierarchy and aresimilarly hailed asp r o m o t i n g amode r a t e andtolerant currentw i t h i n t h emovement.

O n e m i g h ttherefore ask justwhat experiencesare shaping the thirdgeneration of theE g y p t i a nBrotherhood andhow this bodes fort h e f u t u r e

development of the group. Ibrahim Houdaiby can offer aunique insight into the mindset of these young Brothers.His great-grandfather and grandfather lead the Brotherhoodfor a combined total of more than 25 years and while only23, Ibrahim has been an active member of the Brotherhoodfor some time and is currently a board member ofikhwanweb.com, the movement’s website. It is amongstIbrahim’s peers that the broad outlines of a generationaltrend are materializing. To see this, we must return oncemore to Egypt’s universities.

To appreciate the difference between the universityexperience of the 1970s and today, a visit to Abou el-Futouh’s alma mater is truly instructive. These days CairoUniversity is perpetually ringed by hundreds of riot police,equipped with shields, truncheons, and shotguns. Plainclothesstate security agents hover at the entrances, vetting all whoattempt to enter the gated grounds. As Ahmed Zaghloul,a member of the Brotherhood and a fifth year medicalstudent at the university, told the weekly Al-Ahram, “it is

By Matthew Devlin

Not Your Father’s Brotherhood

Civil Society6

F

Dr. Abdel-Moniem Abu el-Fatouh

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Mahdi Akef, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt News and Views

March 2007 7

state security that has theupper hand on campus, notthe university authorities.”Emad Mubarak, a leftist lawyerand executive director of theAssociation for Freedom ofThought and Expression,concurred that “what goes onoutside the university ismirrored inside. The securityand administration havecreated a vacuum on campusesand students are frightenedaway from politics.”At the end of last yearhundreds of candidates,mostly from the MuslimBrotherhood, were barredfrom contesting StudentUnion elections on campuses across the country. In response,those declared ineligible established the Free Student Union(FSU), an un-official organization to run parallel to theheavily vetted Student Union. November elections for theFSU turned bloody when armed thugs attacked studentsafter having been allowed through the otherwise impermeablestate security cordon around campuses such as Ain ShamsUniversity in Cairo.

Speaking shortly after these events, Houdaiby acknowledgedcertain differences between his opinion and that of theolder Brotherhood leadership: “I would be moreconfrontational with the government. [We need] moreappearances on the street because you’re not speaking abouta democratic government that would respond to the peopleif only it realized what they wanted. You’re speaking abouta tyrannical, oppressive regime that has to be faced. Rightshave to be earned.” Since its success in the 2005 election,the Brotherhood has abstained from any significant showof force, preferring to focus its opposition throughparliamentary channels. Less than a week before the studentelections, for example, the Brotherhood’s parliamentarybloc became the first group to challenge Speaker FathiSurour for the position he has held for the last 17 years.Garnering 79 votes to Surour’s 319, several BrotherhoodMPs hailed this as an indicator of a newly invigoratedprogram of confrontation. This seems a world away fromwhat Houdaiby was advocating in the wake of theclampdown his peers had just been subjected to: “Whenpeople are arrested there will be mass demonstrations untilthey are released, when there are political prisoners we willdefend them. We would escalate it and continue to escalateit until the demands are met. Of course we would like todo that in a gradual, peaceful way but you have to havetools to pressure the government because they are notwilling to give you anything unless you pressure them forit.”

On 10 December, Muslim Brotherhood students at Al-Azhar University faced off against riot police and statesecurity agents. Dressed in uniforms reminiscent of the

Palestinian Hamas movement, their faces shrouded in skimasks, the students performed various martial arts exercises.The Brotherhood would later insist that the students hadbeen conducting a peaceful sit-in only to be told by securityforces that, just as happened at Ain Shams, armed thugswould be allowed in to disperse them, should they refuseto remove themselves from university property. The martialexercises were supposedly a show of defiance against thisattempted intimidation.

One of the few things the Al-Azhar incident actually clarifiedis that Houdaiby’s frustration at the lack of confrontationis shared by other young Brothers. During a mid-Januaryinterview, Houdaiby went to great lengths, however, tostress that the events at Al-Azhar had overstepped theboundaries of what he was calling for. “What the Al-Azharstudents did was wrong,” said Houdaiby who believes “theyshould have protested but in a proper civil way.” He remainsconvinced that “we need escalation, but not this type.”

Justified or not, the Egyptian new media was awash inphotos of the demonstration’s balaclava-clad students bythe next morning. Al-Watani Al-Youm, the mouthpiece ofthe ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) ran a full pageinterview with a former head of state security, Major GeneralFouad Allam, who claimed the Brotherhood still maintainedits military wing. The last proven operation of the armed“special section” (al-nizam al-khass), known outside theBrotherhood as the “secret apparatus” (al-jihaz al-sirri), wasin the 1950s. Nevertheless, the pro-government Al-Ahram,for its part, claimed that Deputy Supreme Guide Khayratel-Shatir was behind the alleged reconstitution of themovement’s military capabilities.

By the end of December, security forces had arrestedhundreds of Muslim Brotherhood students and leaders,including el-Shater and five of the movement’s mostprominent financiers, thus kicking off what political analystAmr Shobaki described to the Los Angeles Times as “themost brutal campaign against the Brotherhood since[Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak came to power.” (Cont’d

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hat is so alluring about street propaganda? Maybeit is the guerilla feel of the art form, or theindividuality of expression it allows; maybe it is

the creative use of public space or the accessibility of themedium to the masses. Whatever it is, street propagandacaptures the imagination, and in the Middle East there arefew places where this fascination is more apparent than inLebanon.

Despite the tanks and barbed wire, bombed out buildingsand broken bridges that dominate public space and thevisual scene in Lebanon, people find a way to express theirvoice. From the most conventional to the most radical,every voice finds its way into the artistry that is streetpropaganda - turning the freeways, avenues, bridges, andstreets themselves into a sort of canvas for political gamesto play out.

What remains unique about the political situation in Lebanonis the way that political tensions translate into the visuallandscape as expressions of many and varied political actors;whether through PR campaigns, graffiti, posters, flags, orsit-ins, the streets of Beirut are, beyond a doubt, part andparcel of the political scene.

Rami Khoury, the Director of the Issam Fares Center forPublic Policy and International Affairs at the AmericanUniversity of Beirut, a journalist and long-time observerof the political scene in the region has aided many in

understanding the unique and innovative power that identitypolitics carry in Lebanon today. To him, what he labels 'theiconography of identity' is one of the fastest growing andnewest components to power not only in Lebanon but inthe region as a whole. It is the symbols that move peopleand incite them to action that are increasingly being foughtover and renegotiated in public space.

The questions, “Which symbols move people,” and, “Howdo people see themselves?” are slowly becoming the mostimportant questions in the political game, and it is oftenthrough street propaganda that you glimpse not only howthe powerful view their populations but how they in turnview themselves.

In Lebanon, what allows for such an open arena is the widemargin of freedom given to expression in the public space.Lebanon, probably the freest in this respect in the region,does not impinge on the right of the people to expressthemselves, whether through independent media channels,broadcast or print, or even on the highways. The Lebanesestate affords its public and political participants theopportunity to express freely without fear of repercussion.This right has evolved with Lebanon’s democraticdevelopment, and over time the government has concededits control over the avenues of information and coercionto more and more players. In fact, the public space has beenopened so much that it seems as though the state no longercontrols the use of mobilizing symbols.

Civil Society8

Opposition (left) and government “I Love Life” billboards. The opposition sign reads:“We Want to Live... In Lebanon,” in reference to Lebanon’s high rate of emigration.

By Hebah Farrag

Street Politics and the Battle for a “New” Lebanon

W

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March 2007 9

A potent example of this phenomenon is the cooptationof the Lebanese flag. Once called the ‘Maronite flag’ andrarely used by Islamic opposition parties, today the flag hasnever sold as quickly and covers the streets in neighborhoodsall over the city, flying at protests for every side of thepolitical spectrum, representing the government, theopposition, and the one’s caught in the middle, all at once.The Lebanese flag, the nation’s anthem, the colors andsymbols of the Republic are no longer a monopoly of thestate for its exclusive use. Now these symbols are imbuedwith various meanings by various different actors. As Mr.Khoury commented, “the fear barrier has dissipated” andas such more voices must be included on the political scene.

"I Love Life"

The “I Love Life” campaign and counter-campaign, dubbed‘Poster Politics’ by Time magazine, is a clear and vivide x amp l e th a t imag e r y,p r o p a g a n d a , a n d t h eiconography of identity are beingtaken seriously by key players inLebanon.

After the assassination of formerPrime Minister Rafik Hariri in2005, stark black billboardposters appeared demanding"The Truth" about who killedhim. Still to this day posters,billboards, signs, and count-'ups'recording the time passed sincethe assissination, are devoted tothe memory of Hariri, using hisimage as the ‘ultimate martyr,’evoking feelings of forgottenjustice, unity and, of course,retribution.

On March 14, 2005, a largepercentage of the Lebanesepopulation hit the streets ofBeirut, protest ing Syriandomination of its political andeconomic infrastructures. Thedemonstrations, which aroseafter the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri,coincided with the almost immediate emergence of"Independence '05" banners, stickers and other merchandiselike flags and hats. Designed collectively by some of Beirut'stop ad agency talents, the red, white and green logo soonappeared everywhere. Not missing a beat, the U.S. StateDepartment renamed the locally known Intifada ofIndependence as the Cedar Revolution, and the ad campaignsreflected the hope that Lebanon was soon to go down theroad paved by other "branded" revolutions, such as thosein Georgia and Ukraine, also underwritten by AmericanNGOs.

For the past two years, however, a series of bombings,assassinations and all-out warfare has redefined those originalideas of "Independence" and has led to the surreal situationwhere the absence of dialogue on the governmental levelis contrasted by an endless stream of unmediated messages.

Dialogue through Rebuttal

‘I Love Life’ has followed this string of government/FutureMovement-sponsored ad campaigns and has devoted itselfto the same cause, yet this most recent campaign broughtwith it not only interest but controversy.

When investigating the meaning of the simple slogan,written in Arabic, French and English, one only has to lookto their impeccable website to learn that this "I Love Life"slogan-driven campaign is a private sector campaign incooperation with USAID driven by the specific aim ofindoctrinating the population with a political message. The"I Love Life" mission statement reads:

"We believe that Lebanon stood up to all angst because ithas always embraced the Culture of Life. We understandthe Culture of Life, as opposed to the Culture of Death,

as a deep, well-developed sensecapable of discerning true valuesand interpreting authentic needsin our communities and society."

This campaign seeks to pit thosethat understand a ‘culture of life’against those trying to spread ‘aculture of death,’ in very specificterms. With this PR campaign,Cedar Revolution activists areattempting to counter what theysee as the defining feature of thecurrent political crisis in Lebanon.As the ad executive and campaignleader has said "We want to tellthe world that, regardless ofwhatever they see on their TVscreens, the Lebanese want to liveand move ahead."

"What the world sees on the TVscreens" in this context seems tomean the ongoing demonstrationsagainst the Lebanese government.

Now the country is awash in dueling "I Love Life" campaignsas the controversy surrounding the slogan has peaked. Theslogan, created by pro-government groups to raise awarenessabout the risks of sectarianism in Lebanon, has beeninterpreted by the Hizbullah-led opposition as blamingthem for the destruction caused by the past summer's warwith Israel; the implication being that Hizbullah loves deathand martyrdom. In response, the opposition decided tocopy the theme and launch its own version but this timewith a rainbow of colors representing the opposition groups,and slogans like "I Love Life Undictated."

This ‘new’ campaign has been funded by the oppositionwith the expressed aim of the government supporters’ US-funded ad campaign, which, in their view, attempts to portrayanyone who resists the government as a lover of death andits allies as lovers of life.

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Civil Society10

“We Want To Live... In Tents”

"The campaign is a response to those who are accusingus that we do not want to live and that we do not love life,"say representatives of Hezbollah and Aoun Parties on aNTV television broadcast in defense of their rebuttalcampaign. "Unlike the 'private sector' we are saying we wantto live all together, opposition as well as the pro-governmentparties in a Lebanon for all of us," says the Hezbollahrepresentative, "We love life too, but we want to definewhat kind of life we love to live.”

The counter-campaign features a few additional featuresto the original “I Love Life” symbol, including a rainbow,representative of all colors used by political participants,including the colors of pro-government parties. Writtenunder the original “I Love Life” slogan is the addition ofanother catchphrase, or set of catchphrases, written as ifgraffiti, an effacement of the original Ad, saying anythingfrom “I love life, with dignity (bi karama)” to “I love life,in all its colors (bi kul alwanha)”. These additions refer tothe oppositions program describing the type of life theyhope to live; with dignity, equality, justice, religious diversityand economic stability.

"We are not exclusive;” claims a Hizbullah representative,“we want to live all together; and rather than what theprivate sector campaign suggests, we love life, what is neededis to sit and define what kind of life we want to live -- a lifewith dignity, security, economic prosperity; a life that willprovide Lebanese youth with work and allow them to livein Lebanon and not emigrate; a life with no debts, a life fora l l o f u s t o g e t h e r . "

The rebuttal campaign seeks to define concepts and openup debate by creating dialogue. No longer is it simply, ‘welove life’ - this campaign takes a step further by definingexactly what it is the opposition is looking for. Bothcampaigns have created binary divisions and exclusions butalso they have opened the debate and helped to define thedialogue. Everybody seems to love life in Lebanon, buthow and what they expect from that life is the question.

The Marketing of a National Resistance

Aside from dueling ‘poster politics,’ each voice in Lebanonalso has independent campaigns, ranging from the extremelywell planned and organized, to guerilla art work. Hizbullahitself runs a huge public relations wing and the evidenceof that is everywhere.

It was not too soon after the fighting stopped betweenHizbullah and Israel over the summer, that bright redbanners began appearing amid the rubble of southernBeirut's devastated Shi’a suburbs.

"Made in USA," proclaims one. "Extremely accurateweapons," states another sarcastically.

Other banners superimpose, over Lebanon's national colors,photographs of injured civilians, or Hizbullah soldierstargeting an Israeli settlement with Katyusha rockets; sloganswhich employ irony and accusation to convey a message ofdefiance toward Israel and the US.

The main slogan of this postwar Hizbullah public-relationscampaign, 'The Divine Victory,' was lifted from a verse inthe Quran. The rhetoric has also used by Iran's supremeleader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently in describingHizbullah's performance.

Hizbullah is getting across those messages through printingthe slogans onto pins, hats, stickers, banners, flags, lighters,t-shirts, and pretty much anything they can get made andinto the streets.

‘Culture of Death'

What has dominated more than any other force in theiconography of identity today in Lebanon is the use ofmartyrs as symbols of mobilization. The Shi’a districts ofBeirut are awash in posters memorializing Hizbullah fighterskilled during last summer’s war with Israel. That said, theopposition does not have a monopoly on this weightysymbolic image; government supporters have been equallyenthusiastic in putting the memory of their fallen comradesto political use. The significance of such symbols is readilyapparent to anyone walking the streets of Beirut. In thisrespect, the culture of death is transformed from a slur tocast at your enemies into the ultimate form of devotionand firmest call to action.

On the pro-government side, it is images of Hariri thatdominate their display of death and martyrdom. Cars,sometimes mini-vans, plastered with posters of Hariri andthe Lebanese flag drive around Hariri-friendly parts of thecity with loudspeakers mounted on the roof playing aconstant stream of speeches, songs, and other Hariri-relatedauditory memorabilia.

Another advertising project reminiscent of the"Independence '05" campaign has appeared as well, featuring"martyr" Christmas trees. These Christmas trees, lining thestreets downtown in the very same district made famousby Hariri’s Solidére and now the infamous sit-in, stood outas symbols not only of death and re-birth, but also of amovement aimed at transforming cultural and religioussymbols, such as the Christmas tree, into political ones.

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The Many Histories

Aside from the big players, activist of all sorts get to havetheir fun with images and iconography and spin off thesevery public campaigns to reflect more individualized voices.Many activists have added their own messages to the mixof visual propaganda with such slogans as "I [heart] Aishti"(both a reference to the local chain fashion outlet, the Arabicword for cream and a play on aish, the Arabic root for "tolive") and "I [heart] Capitalism," both references to the pro-governemnt camps social status, expressing their oppositionthrough a focus on economic and social differences. The‘other side’ has of course invented their own opposition-like slogans, circulating caricatures of the billboards thatread anything from "We want to live ... in tents" to "Theyhate life," again focusing on the values they find intrinsicallyincompatible with their vision of ‘life’..Circulating these copycat caricatures on the internet, throughemail, or stickers on the streets, independent people get to

in turn react and reflect their own meaning of mainstreampolitical messages. In this way, and largely due to theaccessibility, acceptability, and availability of technology andinformation, the popular speaks to the powerful.

It is in this reinvented use of political messages that webegin to see the invested interests of not only politicalactors, but the masses themselves in these message battles,and more importantly, the meanings that lie behind themfor the population.

On the streets of Beirut, a vernacular of graffiti, politicalposters, cloth banners and stenciled portraits of leaders andmartyrs – as well as the effacement thereof, whetherintentionally or through natural causes - produces a livelydebate. Various individuals and groups effectively claimexistence, label their territories, as well as write and re-writetheir histories, through art, slogans, effacement and more,making clear to any observer that Lebanon has not onehistory, but many.

page 11) The crackdown continues apace with manydenouncing it as too conveniently timed, taking the windout of opposition sails as the NDP pushes through its 34controversial amendments to the constitution.

The reaction to the current crackdown seems to have beenrelatively calm amongst the two older generations of theBrotherhood. Hisham el-Hamami, a member in his fifties,wastes no time in decrying the regime’s exploitation of whathe sees as a rather trivial youthful blunder. Nevertheless,he promptly dismisses the current bout of repression as“ordinary, not too difficult,” and simply part and parcel ofthe periodic cycles of persecution the Brotherhood mustendure. Though quick to condemn the numerous arrestsand detentions, older Brotherhood members seem moreconcerned with refuting the charges of militancy thancondemning the regime’s reactions. Abd el-Khalik, jailedfor six years between 1965 and 1971, was also the head ofthe Brotherhood’s Student Department. When asked aboutthe current crackdown on young members he chose insteadto speak at great length about the Brotherhood’s disavowalof violence, repeatedly insisting that “there is no [militarywing], no, it is finished.” Osama Fahrid, an active memberof the middle generation, likewise concentrated on distancingthe Brotherhood from its historical ties to militancy.

Houdaiby’s take on things proved somewhat different.Unlike his elders, Houdaiby apparently does not harbor anyinsecurity about being a member of an organization laboringunder the stigma of a once-violent past. When asked, hecertainly and unequivocally renounces all violence, yet thisdisavowal was not at the top of his concerns. Rather,Houdaiby focuses on the abuses of the regime and the tollthey were inflicting on the Brotherhood. Additionally, hisimpression that the crackdown brings up memories of whatlife was like under Nasser for the oldest generation did notseem to ring true with the elderly Abd el-Khalik.

Interpretations of the crackdown also diverged on the pointof potential radicalization. When asked what the legacy ofthe current repression will be, Houdaiby asserted that “this

will cause another wave of terrorism that will last 30 or 40years,” although he was quick to add that while this ishappening apace in wider Islamic circles, he is only “seeingthe seeds of it” amongst his fellow young Brothers and isfully confident that the Brotherhood, as an organization,“will stay true to its message of peaceful opposition.” Incontrast, Fahrid, whose generation of Islamists includedthe infamous radical groups of al-Jihad and al-Takfir wal-Hijra, would only say that the current crackdown “couldlead to radicalization” but that he bases this conjecture onpast experiences of state repression and not on any concretedevelopment he is seeing today.

With little experience of such hardships, one might hopethat young Brothers would look to the older ranks of theBrotherhood, who have gone through such trials before,for guidance. Yet in response to questions about the al-Azhar demonstration, General Guide Mahdi Akef told theindependent Al-Masri Al-Youm that “we have no informationabout what the students at Al-Azhar do.” Contrary tocommon perceptions of the Brotherhood being rigidlystructured, its lower levels actually enjoy a relatively highdegree of autonomy, which Brotherhood members say isintentionally done to foster leadership skills. The events atAl-Azhar would suggest that this autonomy mayinadvertently be compounding the difficult situation onuniversity campuses by distancing young Brothers from thecounsel of their elders.

The convergence of the student union election disruptions,the Al-Azhar demonstration fallout, and the proposedamendment to effectively enshrine the oppressive EmergencyLaw within the Constitution represents a definitive momentin the development of the emerging generation of theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood. While the legacy of the1970s is being realized today in the increasingly moderateplatform pushed by second-generation Brothers as theytake over the reins of the movement, we would do well toask ourselves what lessons the young members of theBrotherhood are learning today, and how they will act onthem tomorrow.

March 2007 11

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(Brotherhood, continued from page 7)

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By Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem

Regional CooperationPerspectives

he Middle East is home to a number of local andinternational conflicts. In addition,there are numerous ethnic and religious differences

that have been used to contribute to social tension andoccasionally burst to the surface in acts of limited communalviolence. Political events across the region are intertwinedwith each other. A political ailment that develops in onepart of the region quickly metastasizes throughout the othercountries of the region. While the Middle East is not theworst or only region suffering from violent conflict, itsstrategic location often gives local conflicts greaterinternational impact.

The concept of security is hardly precise or self-evidentparticularly when used differently to refer to national,regional, international or global security, western securityand NATO’s security. The gaining and preserving of security– either against political, economic or military threats – isthe only important problem of international relations.However, we must not lose sight of the fact of the linkagebetween security and development. The developing countriesare viewed as different from the developed ones becauseof their particular status in the development equation. Itfollows that the developing quality of these states musthave its implications on their security policy structures andbehaviour.

From the above, one can understand the complexity ofsecurity concept when used differently to refer to regionaland global security, and the broad scope of the notion toinclude any aspect of life. Thus, the concept is an amalgamof political, economic and strategic factors that will havean impact on the way changes will, if ever, take place onthe Middle East region or any other region such as theEuropean continent.

Given such a theoretical description, it is important to tackleregional security in the Middle East from a differentperspective than only that of the Arab/Israeli conflict.Here, it might be relevant to examine ways and means ofsecurity and cooperation around the Mediterranean Sea,and to come to some conclusions about the future imageof the state of regional security in the Middle East andEurope.

By the end of the Cold War, bipolar spheres of influenceand alliances melted into US world hegemony including theMiddle East, with Israel as the chief US surrogate. The USinvasion of Iraq that is now foundering left Arab regimesin the Persian Gulf and the Middle East completely helpless,except for some political bleating here and there. LeadingArab countries were cowed by the overwhelming force ofinvasion and the much-mooted “New Middle East” initiativewhich, called for democratic reforms, implying regimechange. The recent lip service support by some leadingArab countries were of President Bush’s last-ditch endeavourto save the US from itself, named the New Way Forwardin Iraq, is more like a tacit recognition of US failure thanan effective show of solidarity.

Inevitable US withdrawal will leave Iraq worse off than itwas before the invasion, with continued sectarian violenceand political uncertainty. It will also leave behind adangerously unstable region. Hence, the region needs anew, home grown security regime.

When we turn to Europe, the northern flank of the MiddleEast including the whole Mediterranean basin, we find thatno sooner was the mantle of the Cold War lifted frominternational relations, than the extent of the problems ofthe Mediterranean became highlighted. With time, thepurpose of the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE) was to foster security through cooperationin Europe, is now recognizing that the security problemsof the Mediterranean appear somehow interlinked withthat of Europe. For better or worse, the future ofMediterranean security will continue to be intimately boundwith European security. The question of which securitystructure will prevail in Europe would seem to be centralto the future of Mediterranean and the whole of the MiddleEast security. Equally relevant is the nature of the relationshipthat will evolve between Europe and the United States –and perhaps also between China, India and Russia. Thequestion comes down to a simple one: will Europe formulateits security in collaboration with its southern neighbours,or will it formulate it in confrontation or disregard withthem?

In the face of globalization, the future of Europe dependson the ability of Europeans to define the other, the alien,or the stranger, and then to accept and integrate him, aswell as to transform themselves from ethnic states into civicand multicultural states. Within the framework ofglobalization, challenges and opportunities, European Unionenlargement will be shaped by Europe’s cultural andgeographical identity. This identity is the result of acombination of Europe’s geographical and historicalcharacteristics and people’s aspirations, constrained by thosecharacteristics. In recognition of this truth the E.U. decided

T

Civil Society12

Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem is a Former United Nations AssistantSecretary-General and a member of the Ibn Khaldun Center Boardof Trustees.

This article was originally presented at the Athens InternationalConference on Prospects for Stability and Prosperity in the MiddleEast, held from March 15 to 18, 2007.

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March 2007 13

to develop a neighbourhood policy. The choice or acceptanceof this neighbourhood whenever possible speaks in favorof the EU’s geopolitical ambitions and responsibilitieswhich is, to say, its global status.

With 27 European member states, more than 500 millioninhabitants and a contribution to world GDP of 26% theEU belongs among those actors which influence global-governance processes and can help to deal with globalproblems. The EU articulated its readiness to assume globalresponsibilities in the European Security Strategy ofDecember 2003. It initiated the European NeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP) action plan, which will be implemented overthe next five years promising to give momentum to longstanding ties between the Mediterranean and the EU. Thisinitiative followed partnership agreements with the EUwhich contained three tracks, the first of which was theestablishment of just and comprehensive peace in theMiddle East. The second track delineated the initiation ofa dialogue between different civilizations, cultures andreligions. The third was the economic cooperation. In reality,the economic track was the only functional track amongthe three. The reason is that European foreign policy is stillin the process of development. A common perspective oncentral global issues, as well as definition of pan-Europeaninterests which must go beyond the sum of the interestsof member states remain to be attained.

The EU is the most developed regional cooperation projectin the world, but still work in progress: no longer merelythe sum of nation states, more than an association of states,but still clearly not a federal state of Europe. Moreover,with the crisis of the European constitution the project ofa more effective common EU foreign policy remains blockedfor the time being. If the blockade and the loose cooperationbetween the foreign policies of the member states, as wellas of the Commission, remains in place the EU’s globalinfluence will ultimately remain very limited. Only a commonEuropean foreign policy would provide the opportunity toplay a major role in global politics.

There is a danger that Europe, in the transition from theUS-dominated western world order to a multi-polar powerconstellation, with China and India and others as new worldpowers, will be marginalized. At the same time, thetransformation also offers opportunities for Europe to bea leading player. As champion and catalyst of a fair andeffective multilateralism the EU could play an importantrole, on condition it understands that it must enter intovery close political cooperation with its neighbouringcountries in the Middle East and Africa and develop strategicpartnerships. These close partnerships or quasi-allianceswill serve as a strategic depth for the EU in an Asia-PacificCentury which is full of challenges not only for Europebut certainly for the United States.

The structure of the 21st century security challenges needto adapt to the new dangerous situations in the world,particularly, in the Middle East and Africa. The 21st centuryreally requires that Europe in general and EU in particularfigure out to get economic, diplomatic and political elementsof power synchronized and coordinated to solve, by peacefulmeans, specific dangerous problems wherever they exist.Iraq, Iran, Palestinian problem, Lebanese problem the

Sudan, Western Sahara, Somalia are on top of the agenda.

The US and China are not sitting idle. Both the US andChina have expressed growing interests to the region.Washington is drawing up plans to establish a regionalcommand centre for Africa, while China gathered in Beijing41 African leaders for a ground breaking summit lastNovember 2006.

Arab Middle Eastern and Gulf countries need a region-based new paradigm for collective security. It would befounded on the primary and collective interest of thesecountries and the EU in the new world order. This newparadigm should formulate a collective regional approachto all pending issues such as the non-functional first andsecond tracks mentioned above. This could be done throughsetting up:

a) A Strategic Partnership Plan with the Middle Easterncountries;

b) A Strategic Par tnership Plan with Africa.

These two plans could address problems that are badlyneeded to be solved for the benefit of all countries inEurope, the Middle East, and Africa. The most urgentproblems to be solved are accelerating sustainabledevelopment, growth and jobs, unemployment, regionaldemographic change, tackling the root causes of migration,counter-terrorism, climate change and sustainable energy.

Countries of the region with, temporarily, the exception ofIsrael, need to convene a conference that would negotiateand draft a blueprint for regional security. Israel could notbe associated with any such arrangement until it hasconcluded peace treaties with all Arab countries on thebasis of a satisfactory settlement of the Palestinian problem.The status of Turkey as a potential partner would bedetermined by the nature of its relations with NATO andthe European Union.

In light of the above, it is clear that the transition fromquasi-unilateral, US-dominated power constellation to amulti-polar one can lead to a creeping erosion of multilateralinstitutions. Neither the old world power the USA, nor therising global powers in Asia are investing in the stabilizationor even the further development of the multilateral order.At present the EU is the most important actor in worldpolitics which is firmly pursuing a multilateral concept ofthe world order. The EU could therefore, in thedevelopmental phase of the multi-polar power constellationbecome the central protagonist of an effective and fairmultilateralism.

However, this will require enormous efforts on Europe’spart because there is nothing resembling a senior partnerby whose side the European Union could stand as juniorpartner in the stabilization and modernization of the multi-lateral global governance architecture. The EU must begrownup about foreign policy and establish alliances for aworld order based on compromise, human rights, andcooperation – or it will become peripheral region in anAsia-Pacific century.

Viewpoints

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spicy story is currently catching the attention ofthe Egyptian public. It involves a well-known conartist, posing as a respectable businessman, selling

real estate to thousands of unsuspecting victims drawn inby the reputable name of a large foreign contractor. Thedeal is a masterpiece of fraud.

First, the contractor, having been skilfully wooed, is toldthat an investment in Egypt requires an Egyptian partner,a lie. Second, the customers’ down-payments mysteriouslyfind their way into the Egyptian partner’s bank account andare surreptitiously used to obtain a bank line of credit tofinance the operation. Third, the foreign partner fails togain access to his share of the funds deposited. Fourth, astrong dispute arises between the two sides and rumourscirculate about the local businessman being bought out bythe foreign side for an astronomical sum. Fifth, the localpartner appears on Egyptian television claiming all is fineand denying any collapse of the partnership, insisting thatthe whole thing is no more than a simple argument overpercentage share ownership. Sixth, uneasy investors beginto pull out their money, having been issued cheques. Seventh,bouncing cheques begin to emerge.

Amid all this brouhaha, the government takes no firmaction to reassure the market and confusion spreads likewildfire. It transpires that several top government officialsare protecting the Egyptian businessman for reasons fewwould have trouble guessing and the investment climatehas been dealt another severe blow, putting paid to anyprospects to attract more foreign investment for quite sometime.

The invariable comment one hears when discussing theincident is that the business community has reachedfrightening levels of corruption and that one wonders whythe eminent members of that thriving community do notshow more responsibility and integrity and how businesshas become cutthroat in Egypt. People talk about all thatas though the system would have worked just fine if thosewealthy businessmen had been endowed with more integrityand had done things the morally correct way, pretty muchthe way they talk about how appalling traffic has becomeand how it would have been much better if Egyptian driverswere more disciplined. Few point out the outrageousdeficiencies of the system and how easy it is to avoidpunishment even when committing the most flagranttransgressions. Even fewer have the courage to point outwhat everybody is fully aware of. High officials are usuallyon the payroll of the business moguls and offer many layersof protection and immunity. Life in Egypt is now all abouttesting new limits of wrongdoing and knowing you can getaway with it!

In dealing with the worrying phenomenon of high levelbusiness skulduggery in Egypt, as usual, blame is entirelymisplaced. The same applies to all other defects and everysingle complaint we all share about how difficult it is to live

in a country that seems to have lost the basic ingredientsneeded to define it as a country. Fact is we no longer havea country. It has become everyone for himself, with theregime interested in no more than fending off criticismand trying to appear to be doing something while solelyconcerned with remaining firmly entrenched. Any threat isdealt with efficiently and ruthlessly. Any action taken is toavoid problems not to make life better for the public. Anypromise made is a lie with the intention of buying time.What is left of Egypt is a shambles and we are all watchingpassively.

It probably sounds boring to keep ranting about the needto build a system that would send the businessman inquestion to prison or that would deal with traffic violatorsin a way that might deter imitators. Yet is it not time thatwe begin to deal with those devastating scourges destroyingthe name and reputation of this once proud nation in a lesssuperficial manner? Is it not time to tell our rulers that weare not happy with what they have done to us and that wedo not trust them to do any more? Is it not time to tell thiscorrupt regime to go away and give us a chance to rebuildEgypt and be able to call it a country once again?

Civil Society14

A

By Hassan Elsawaf

A Story of Fraud

In the Arabic Edition

1. Why are Sunni Muslims Behaving as if they are aPanicking Minority?

2. The Religious State and the Reasons behind itsExistence

3. Shalom Alekheim, Arabs

4. The Complete Text for the DocumentaryConcerning the Killing of the Egyptian Soldiers

5.The Activities of the Egyptian Democracy SupportNetwork

6.The Celebration of the 4th Anniversary IbnKhaldun’s Opening

7.Two Presidential Terms is Enough

8. The Ibn Khaldun Center Monitors theConstitutional Amendment Referendum

9 .Ibn Khaldun Forum (Full Summary)

If you would like a copy of the Arabic issue, pleaseemail [email protected].

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In fact, this change grants the security forces sweepingdiscretionary powers to eavesdrop, search houses, and arrestand detain individuals without any approval from a judgeor prosecutor. This has been achieved by amending Article179 to include a clause stating that the rights afforded byArticles 41, 44, and 45 of the Constitution - namely thatthe sanctity of a citizen’s home and private correspondencecan only be breached with a court order obtained inaccordance with strict guidelines - cannot be invoked tocurtail the powers of the security forces.

While the War on Terror has been used as justification forthe amendment to Article 179, most commentators believeotherwise. Rather, this amendment is widely viewed as aresponse to the political vitality and loud opposition thathas characterized the political scene in Egypt over the lastthree years, as embodied, for example, by Kifaya and theJudge’s Movement. The aim of the ruling party is to updatetheir system of control in order to clamp down on civilsociety, which has flourished of late, not only among themiddle class and elite, but among the urban and ruralworking classes as well.

This package of constitutional amendments, approved bythe ruling NDP at the behest of President Mubarak, isintended to wipe out the last of the very limited freedomsstill enjoyed by the Egyptian people. In short, they areintended to shackle generations of Egyptians. The onesbehind these amendments want to confer legitimacy uponthem, therefore they were approved by the Parliament andsubmitted to the public for a referendum. In the absenceof any judicial oversight, the government will inflate voterturnout statistics, in order to imply that the Egyptian peoplechose servitude for themselves, and their descendents, foras long as the Mubarak family reigns in Egypt.

Therefore, we warn every Egyptian man and woman againstparticipating in the “Farcical Referendum” so that we donot submit our children and grandchildren to slavery at thehands of the Mubarak dynasty. Egyptians, we ask rather,that you stand with Kifaya, our honorable judges, and the110 members of parliament who have called for a boycottof this travesty.

Viewpoints

March 2007 15

The following is a translation of the most contentious constitutional amendments, prepared by Bryce Loidolt. Added text appears initalics

Article 5: The political regime of the Arab Republic of Egypt is based on a multi-party system within the frameworkof the fundamental basics and principles of Egyptian society as stipulated by the constitution. Political parties shallbe regulated by law.

Citizens have the right to form political parties in accordance with the law. Any political activity or creation of political parties cannotinclude any reference to, or foundation on, religion; nor can it include any racial or gender discrimination.

Article 88: The necessary conditions stipulated for becoming a member of the People's Assembly shall be definedby law. The rules of election and referendum shall be determined by law. and the ballot shall be conducted underthe supervision of members of the judiciary authority.

The ballot shall be conducted in one day. A supreme commission characterized by independence and impartiality will supervise theelections as regulated by law. The law shall define the functions of the commission and the way it is formed and ensure its membersare either current or retired judges. The commission will take charge of forming the general committees to supervise the elections at thelevel of voting districts and committees, which will supervise polling and vote-counting. The general committees should be formed ofmembers of the judicial authorities in accordance with the rules and measures regulated by law.

Article 136: The president shall not dissolve the People's Assembly unless it is necessary after consulting with the primeminister. and after a referendum to be put to the public. The president shall issue a decision terminating the sessionsof the assembly and conducting a referendum within 30 days. If the total majority of voters approve the dissolutionof the assembly, the president shall issue the dissolution decision. If the assembly is dissolved for a specific reason, it cannotbe dissolved again for the same reason.

The decision dissolving the assembly shall include an invitation to voters to participate in new parliamentary electionswithin a period not exceeding 60 days from the date of the declaration of the dissolution decision.

Article 179: The socialist prosecutor-general shall be responsible for assuming the procedures necessary to securethe people’s rights, the safety of society and its political system, the preservation of socialist gains, and commitmentto socialist behavior. The law shall define his other functions. He shall be subject to the purview of the People’sAssembly in accordance with what is prescribed by law. The state will assume the responsibility of safeguarding security andpublic order in the face of the dangers of terrorism. Special rules of identification and investigation required for combating such dangersshall be regulated by the law under the supervision of the judiciary and in a way that cannot be hampered by the measures stated inarticles 41, 44 and the second paragraph of Article 45 of the constitution. The president of the republic is empowered to refer anyterrorist crime to any of the judicial authorities stated in the constitution or the law.

(Plea, continued from page 4)

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ark this third week of March 2007 as potentiallya historic moment of clarity on one of the mostimportant political questions in the contemporary

Arab world: How will this troubled, turbulent region makethe transition from dictatorships and autocracies to moredemocratic, accountable systems of government, while theIslamist parties are the most popular forces around?

The answer seems to be: through coalition governmentsand transitional governments of national unity in whichIslamists have a major but not the totally defining role.

In recent months, Islamists and Arab governments in severallands have confronted one another politically and occasionallyfought it out in the streets. Now, having fought to a standstilland shown themselves to enjoy roughly equal power insociety and among foreign supporters, they are trying thedifferent approach of national unity or coalitiongovernments. Lebanon and Palestine are the most interestingexamples, and should be watched closely.

This may be the most important political test that Islamistmovements have experienced in the Arab world in theirmodern history: trial by the fire of incumbency andaccountability. We have had very few examples of Islamistgroups winning power democratically, and being given thechance to exercise power by freely governing. A few casesof Islamists at local or municipal level can be studied fromrecent years, and they show mixed results; other examplesinclude Islamist party cabinet ministers in governments inJordan, Lebanon, Yemen and other countries, and theirexperience is also mixed.

Nowhere in the Arab world have we had a comparableexperience to the ongoing incumbency of the Justice andDevelopment Party that heads the Turkish government.There, the party's Islamist credentials and rallying cry havebeen put to the test of actually governing, and respondingto national needs. The party continues to adjust to the realityof incumbency and national accountability, seems likely towin another election, and will probably see its leader becomepresident soon.

Arab Islamists will now be subjected to the same test andreality check. Hizbullah in Lebanon is on the verge ofagreeing with its political foes on a national unity governmentthat gives it and its allies (including some Christians) aroundone-third of all seats. In return for its ability to shape orblock decisions on major, strategic issues, it will also finditself pressured to deliver practical answers to daily life

issues that are high on the priority of ordinary citizens.Hamas in Palestine has just announced its national unitygovernment with Fateh. It hopes to unblock the foreignfinancial boycott, and thus have more money with whichto govern normally.

Both these major Islamist parties had gained power andrespect over the years essentially by catering to theirconstituencies, which form minorities of their countries'populations -- and by resisting Israeli occupation andaggression. Hamas and Hizbullah both have some experiencein local politics and service delivery, but not in nationaloffice beyond one or two narrow ministries that were alwaysconstrained by the majority will. They now must make twocrucial transitions that they had toyed with in recent years:from dabbling in politics to full national governance, andfrom externally directed military resistance to internallydirected social, political and economic services.

They have both met fierce opposition in making this change,from their three principal foes: domestic opponents amongtheir fellow citizens, the Israeli government and people, andthe United States with other leading Western governments.These are formidable odds to work against, but Hamas andHizbullah have made headway and are now moving intocoalition governments. They continue to succeed becausethey are credible at home, their domestic opponents areoften corrupt and incompetent, and their foreign foes aregrossly unfair and inconsistent.

Two aspects of the Islamist transition to mainstreamdemocratic governance are important to watch: First, it ismuch more important to assess the local verdict on theIslamists in government than to ask what Israel, the UnitedStates or Europe feel about all this. Second, at the domesticlevel, the Islamists will be judged primarily by their recordin formulating and implementing sensible policies andresponding to their constituents’ needs, rather than in merelyexpressing popular grievances and repeating the ills ofimperialism and the injustices of Zionism.

The weakness of Hamas, Hizbullah and other mainstreamIslamists is their lack of coherent, detailed policy programsand practical answers to the pressing national challenges ofLebanon, Palestine and other Arab societies. These includequality and relevant education, job creation, investmentpromotion, equitable and sustainable economic growth,environmental protection, human rights enforcement, andregional peace and stability, among other issues.

Rockets, rifles, resistance, and communal self-assertionbrought Hamas and Hizbullah to the point where they arenow entrusted with a major share of governance. Theymust quickly show that they have answers and policies forthe socio-economic and political issues that will improvethe well-being of all their citizens.

By Rami G. Khouri

Keep Your Eye On These Arab Unity Governments

M

Civil Society16

Rami G. Khouri is an internationally syndicated columnist, the directorof the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut,editor-at-large of the Beirut-based Daily Star, and co-laureate of the2006 Pax Christi International Peace Award.

This article was originally published on March 17, 2007 onwww.ramikhouri.com and has been reprinted with the author’s permission.

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March 2007 17

vein, some citizens complained that their names had beenleft off of voter lists, while others were included on a singlelist multiple times or appeared on a number of differentlists. In addition, bribery on the part of NDP officials waswidely reported. While cash bribes were apparentlydistributed throughout the capital, there were also outlandishreports of party members buying votes with candy.

During a press conference on the steps of the EgyptianPeople’s Assembly, the President of the Muslim BrotherhoodParliamentary Bloc declared these amendments to be “a

crime against democracy, freedom, and the Egyptian peoplewho now suffer under the rule of a corrupt government.”Despite this, the amendments are expected not to have animmediate impact on political life in Egypt. Indeed, theNDP controlled government has long enjoyed an enormousamount of autonomy from the constitution, in many caseshaving the luxury of ignoring it all together. However, theinstitutionalization of these amendments demonstrates theMubarak regime’s desire to once and for all solidify analready suffocating grip on political life in Egypt.

In Memoriam

liya Harik, professor emeritus of political science atIndiana University, died unexpectedly at his home onFebruary 24.

Born on July 20, 1934, in Lebanon, he grew up in a familyof modest means in the beautiful mountain village of DhourShwier. After graduation from Shewir Secondary School,he attended the American University of Beirut where heearned a B.A. in philosophy in 1956 and an M.A. in ArabStudies in 1958.

A British Council scholarship funded him for a year at theLondon School of Economics, after which he studied withthe Committee on Social Thought at the University ofChicago, receiving his Ph. D. in 1964. His dissertation (laterpublished by Princeton University Press) was on “Politicsand Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711-1845.” From 1964, until his retirement from teaching in 1998, hewas affiliated with Indiana University in Bloomington, withfrequent sojourns to the Middle East and North Africa forresearch, teaching, consultancies, and other projects.

Dr. Harik taught courses on Middle Eastern government,political theory, the politics of development, and comparativepolitics. A hallmark of his work was the creative explorationof new approaches to political theory and reality. He soughtto challenge conventional wisdom and to stimulate newthinking on contentious issues.

Along with his U.S.-based career, Dr. Harik felt called tocontribute to intellectual and political discourse in the MiddleEast, especially Lebanon. Towards this end, he publishedseveral books in Arabic, including “Who Rules Lebanon?”“Democratic Theory and Challenges of Modernity: Westernand Islamic Perspectives,” and “The Arabs and the NewInternational Economic Order”. He served as visitingprofessor at universities in Lebanon and Cairo, and was afrequent participant and speaker at conferences in theMiddle East, Europe, and the U.S. His poetry and fiction,published in Arabic, reveal a further dimension of hisengagement with the cultural life of his homeland.

In addition to his teaching, Dr. Harik helped establish anddirected I.U.’s Middle East Studies Center (1980-83). On

leaves of absence, he served as director of the AmericanResearch Center in Egypt (1990-92), was a visiting professorat Cornell University (1978-79), and directed the educationand social science program of the Ford Foundation inNorth Africa (1974-75). He served on the first board ofthe newly founded Middle East Studies Association (1973-76), the Middle East Journal, and Journal of Arab Affairs.

After retiring from academia, Dr. Harik continued a variedand vigorous program of writing, with a new book inprogress at the time of his death. He undertook occasionalteaching in Lebanon, lectured at the summer institute ofthe European University in Florence, Italy, and participatedin at least on conference every year. His most recentconsultancies focused on the establishment of a center ondemocracy at the American University in Beirut, and thefounding of Kuwait American University. A new projectjust getting started at I.U., of which he was one of theoriginal planners, is a series of lectures promoting dialogueand conflict resolution in the Middle East.

He is survived by his wife of 47 years, Elsa Martson Harik,and three sons: Ramsay, a teacher living in Boston; Amahl,a fitness studio proprietor in Providence, Rhode Island,and Raid, a software engineer in Austin, Texas. Other closefamily members are his granddaughter, Savannah Harik, ofWalpole, MA; his sister Fadia in Medford, MA, who holdsa Ph. D. from Indiana University, and several nephews andnieces in the U.S., most of whom studied at IndianaUniversity. In Lebanon, he is survived by his mother Saleemy,his sisters Linda, Laudy, Angel, Illham, and Laura, and hisnephew Kamal Abi-Saleh and niece Hala Abi-Saleh, alsoan I.U. graduate. His family losses are his father Farid, hisbrother Najib, and his sister Muna, a former I.U. student.

Dr. Harik’s family are exploring ways to commemorate hiscareer as teacher and scholar, probably by furtheringeducation in Lebanon - especially for students who, likeIliya Harik himself, would not have been able to pursuetheir education without substantial help. Those who wouldlike to make a gift in his memory for a project of this sortmay contact Elsa Harik (1926 Dexter St. Bloomington, IN47401; harik@ indiana.edu; 812-332-3881).

In Memoriam: Iliya F. HarikJuly 20, 1934 - February 24, 2007

I

(Setback , continued from page 5)

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Civil Society, founded in 1991, is published monthly by the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. The articles in Civil Society do notrepresent any consensus of beliefs. The editorial team does not expect that readers will agree with the arguments presented, but asks readers

to value the necessity of open debate. In order to further this objective, readers are invited to respond.Copyright 2006, all rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any form without prior written permission of the publisher. The Ibn KhaldunFoundation for Applied Research Limited is registered in Dublin, Ireland, under the Companies Act 1963-1990. Number: 192603.

Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies17, Street 12 Moqattam

Cairo, Egypt

http://www.eicds.orgTel: +2 (02) 508 1617

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