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1
EN
ANNEX 1
of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2019 for
Nuclear Safety Cooperation
Action Document for Promotion of nuclear safety culture
ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2019
This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the
Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of
Regulation N° 236/2014.
1. Title/basic act/
CRIS number
Action document for nuclear safety cooperation
CRIS number: INSC/2019/041-951, 042-202 & 042-203
financed under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
2. Zone benefiting
from the
action/location
Middle East/Gulf, European Neighbourhood East, South East Asia
The action shall be carried out at the following locations: Tehran (Iran),
Yerevan (Armenia) and South East Asia
3. Programming
document Commission implementing decision of 6.11.2017 on the Instrument for
Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multiannual Indicative Programme (2018-
2020) – C(2017)7254 final
4. SDGs Main SDG: 16 (strong institutions)
5. Sector of
intervention/
thematic area
Nuclear safety DEV. Assistance: YES
6. Amounts
concerned Total estimated cost: EUR 8.400.000
Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 8.400.000
7. Aid
modality(ies)
and
implementation
modality(ies)
Project Modality
Direct management through:
- Procurement
2
8 a) DAC code(s) 23510
b) Main Delivery
Channel
10000 – Public Sector Institutions
9. Markers
(from CRIS DAC
form)
General policy objective Not
targeted
Significant
objective
Principal
objective
Participation development/good
governance ☐ ☐ X
Aid to environment ☐ X ☐
Gender equality and Women’s and
Girl’s Empowerment
☐ X ☐
Trade Development X ☐ ☐
Reproductive, Maternal, New born
and child health X ☐ ☐
RIO Convention markers Not
targeted
Significant
objective
Principal
objective
Biological diversity X ☐ ☐
Combat desertification X ☐ ☐
Climate change mitigation X ☐ ☐
Climate change adaptation X ☐ ☐
10. Global Public
Goods and
Challenges (GPGC)
thematic flagships
N/A
SUMMARY In accordance with the Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2018-2020
1, the overall objective
of the Action is the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the
highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards, and continuous improvement of
nuclear safety.
1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS
1.1 Context Description
The promotion of radiation protection and nuclear safety is a key priority for the EU since the
early days of the European Economic Community and EURATOM. The Instrument for
Nuclear Safety Cooperation2 is the only specific tool of the European Union addressing
nuclear safety issues in partner countries, complementing other external financing
instruments.
The international recognition of the added value of the Instrument was acknowledged in 2017
during the 7th
IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting, where "the
1 C(2017) 7254 of 06.11.2017
2 OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 109
3
implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation Program for assisting non-
EU countries" was officially recognised world-wide as “good practice”. The evaluation under
the completed Mid Term Review (MTR) on the external financing instruments of the EU
recognises the positive contribution of the Instrument, noticing its capability to respond
swiftly to new needs. The MTR acknowledged INSC's unique value added due to the
institutional framework that allows the Commission to act at a global level; the instrument is
supporting complementarities, coordination and synergies and is effective in leveraging
financial resources for nuclear safety.
1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)
The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) participates to the objective of safety,
which is anchored in the EU's development and aid effectiveness commitments, and the 2030
Agenda. It also contributes to President Juncker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor),
responding to fast evolving challenges, although in a much specialised policy area. It is also
aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals 16 (Strong Institutions) and to a lesser extent
5 (Gender equality).
It exports the "acquis communautaire" worldwide thus participating to the implementation of
the EU policy promoting nuclear safety, transparency and public information worldwide3.
The action in Iran is the EU contribution to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The action in Armenia is part of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
signed by the country and the EU in November 2017.
The Action in South East Asia is part of the ASEAN strategy for regional cooperation on
radiological and nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) and the
corresponding Action Plan for its implementation by ASEANTOM, which is supported by the
EU.
1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the partner country/region
The objectives of the actions proposed to promote nuclear safety in the partner countries
contribute to President Junker's priority 9 (EU as a stronger global actor) as well as to the
Sustainable Development Goals 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) SDG 5 quoted in 1.2 and 16
(Strong Institutions).
On 14 July 2015, the international community and Iran reached an agreement on the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), the full implementation of which will ensure the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Annex III of this deal provides a
detailed description of the future cooperation on civil nuclear matters which largely is covered
by activities funded by the EU under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. Due to
the previous sanction regime, the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority lacks international
exchange and networking ability that would strengthen its position in particular by capacity
3 The EU provisions for radiation protection and nuclear safety have been substantially enhanced in recent years,
notably through Directive 2013/59/Euratom (Basic Safety Standards Directive) and Directive 2014/87/Euratom
(Nuclear Safety Directive).
4
building and peer review. The present Action will continue the on-going programme, which
started in AAP2016, in line with the provisions of Annex III of the JCPoA.
In Armenia, the “National programme on public exposure control and dose reduction due to
naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORMs4), including radon gas and their progeny”
was reviewed in the frame of a recent INSC project (A3.01/10&12), taking into account
international recommendations and best practice. The work also included the review of
national radon reference levels and the revision of the national policy, strategy and action plan
to manage long term risks caused by radon exposure in existing dwellings, buildings with
public access, as well as new buildings and workplaces. All possible sources of radon ingress
were analysed, including soil, building materials and water. The development of appropriate
radiation monitoring methodologies and procedures was started, as well.
One of the main conclusions of this project was the identification of the need to establish,
maintain and develop state-of-the-art environmental radiation monitoring capabilities in
Armenia, as the most important condition for the proper implementation of the National
Radon Programme (NRP).
Within ASEAN, a broad consensus emerged following the Fukushima accident that a regional
approach to radiological and nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) in
South East Asia would be beneficial as a complement to national capacities and capabilities.
Nuclear power plants are already in operation or under construction in the ASEAN
neighbourhood (i.e., Chinese NPP are in operation within a few tens and a few hundreds of
km of the Vietnam border and others are under construction; Taiwanese NPP are in operation
within about 200 km of the Philippines; Bangladeshi NPP are under construction within a few
hundred km of the Myanmar border; the possible installation of NPP on artificial islands
constructed by China in the South China Sea in the vicinity of ASEAN territory in or near the
Spratly and Paracel Islands). Nuclear powered vessels also operate in the region and
occasionally make use of berthing facilities in ASEAN.
1.4 Stakeholder analysis
Component A: Support to the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The main stakeholder in this component is the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, INRA,
which is part of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran AEOI.
Component B: Support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The Beneficiary is the Government of the Republic of Armenia, represented by the Armenian
Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ANRA. The End-users are ANRA and NRSC, which is the
technical support organisation of ANRA.
Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in the Association of South East
Asian Nations, ASEAN
The main stakeholder in this project is ASEANTOM, a network of regulatory authorities for
radiation and nuclear safety in ASEAN comprising: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
4 NORM = Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material
5
Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand,
Singapore and Vietnam.
1.5 Problem analysis/priority areas for support
Iran
The 2015 agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action provides in its Annex III the
detailed description of the future cooperation on civil nuclear matters. The present Action will
continue the on-going activities funded by the EU under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation to contribute to the implementation of the JCPoA.
Armenia
In Armenia, an indoor radon survey was carried out between 2010 and 20125. The results of
the survey have shown that local radon concentrations in Armenia require further attention in
the related national regulation and further development of the monitoring capabilities to
obtain a solid experimental base for adequate protective and corrective actions. The need for
improving radon measurement and monitoring capabilities was identified as the next step to
effectively deal with the related public health protection issues. The establishment of an
appropriate national radon laboratory (NRL) is an important step in this process.
The need to establish, maintain and develop state-of-the-art environmental radiation
monitoring capabilities in Armenia is the most important condition for the proper
implementation of the National Radon Programme (NRP).
ASEAN
Within ASEAN, a broad consensus emerged following the Fukushima accident that a regional
approach to radiological and nuclear EP&R in South East Asia would be beneficial as a
complement to national capacities and capabilities. The benefits include: enabling more rapid
and informed response from the exchange, in real time, of information from national radiation
monitoring/early warning networks; reduced costs from sharing expertise, methods, training,
equipment and facilities at a regional level, thereby avoiding needless duplication; and
ensuring the more consistent application of protective measures in neighbouring countries that
would enhance trust and confidence among those potentially affected. With support from the
EU (via its INSC programme) and the IAEA (via its Technical Cooperation (TC)
programme), ASEANTOM has developed a strategy for regional cooperation on radiological
and nuclear EP&R and an Action Plan for its implementation6. The strategy aims at bringing
EP&R arrangements in ASEAN broadly in accord with best international practice within the
next five to ten years. The action plan is being implemented by ASEANTOM with support,
inter alia, from the EU’s INSC and IAEA’s TC programmes.
The EU has considerable experience in the development of early warning radiation
monitoring networks and in the exchange of monitoring data between them. Networks have
5 Status of radon related activities in Member States participating in Technical Cooperation projects in Europe,
TECDOC-1810, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 2017 6 ASEAN strategy for regional cooperation on radiological and nuclear EP&R and an action plan for its
implementation, December 2017 that has been distributed to the Member States through CIRCABC
6
been installed in most EU Member States and the data are exchanged and shared via the
EURDEP (EUropean Radiological Data Exchange Platform) platform and used by decision
support systems to provide important inputs to the effective and timely management of any
radiological or nuclear emergency. This European experience will be shared with
ASEANTOM in this action.
2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Risks Risk
level
(H/M/L)
Mitigating measures
Termination of the nuclear deal
with Iran
M Leading role of the EU in supporting the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Lack of political and administrative
support in the beneficiary countries
L
Close monitoring of project
implementation and establishment of
efficient communication channels at
appropriate level by the Commission.
No relevant international peer
review mission in the relevant time
frame
M Reporting requirements at contracting
level will include the obligation to report
the relevant information for the indicators.
If no review mission is available, they will
be reviewed by independent experts, e.g.
from JRC
Complexity of implementation due
to the involvement of ten ASEAN
Member States (MS)
M Effective administrative and organisational
arrangements in place within
ASEANTOM before project start
One or other ASEAN MS chooses
not to participate actively, or
withdraws
L Establish regional network without one or
other ASEAN Member State
Failure to agree on location of
regional centre/s for exchanging
and integrating monitoring data
from national networks
L Location/s for regional centre/s to be
agreed within ASEANTOM, ideally
before project start
Assumptions
- Independent missions, such as INIR and IRRS are best suited for many of the
performance indicators concerning good governance. It is assumed that the relevant
information will be included in those reviews.
- Independent expert support, e.g. by JRC will be available to further define
measurable indicators during implementation
7
3 LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY
3.1 Lessons learnt
Extensive and broad experience has been gained in successfully implementing similar
activities in other third countries, both in the framework of the TACIS7 Nuclear Safety
Programme and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). This experience will
be used in optimising the design and implementation of this action.
Communication and support from the beneficiary and end-users will still be a key element for
successful implementation.
3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination
A close working relationship will be maintained between the Commission services and the
EEAS and also with the EU Delegations in the beneficiary countries, in order to help ensure a
coherent approach, taking the latest relevant developments into account.
Component A: Support to the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The Commission will coordinate its activities with the other international donors through the
Joint Commission established under the JCPoA and the IAEA Technical Cooperation
Department.
The proposed project is linked and complementary to the INSC projects in Iran supporting the
Iranian Regulatory Authority (IRN3.01/16 Lot 1, IRN3.01/17 and IRN3.01/18). Concerning
Iran, the Commission will coordinate its activities through the EEAS Iran Task Force with the
other international donors and the Joint Commission established under the JCPOA, as well as
with the IAEA Technical Cooperation Department.
The detailed implementation will be based (i) on the results of the feasibility study which was
performed in the cooperation project IRN3.01/16, and (ii) on the results of the analysis of
equipment needed for typical laboratory functions of the NSC as (to be) performed in the
cooperation project IRN3.01/18.
Component B: Support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The on-going EU assistance projects in Armenia under the INSC are as follows:
A3.01/16A: Enhancing the capabilities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
and its technical support organization in reviewing documents demonstrating the
long-term safety of Unit 2 of Metsamor NPP. This project provides support –
including on-site assistance – to the ANRA and NRSC during the licensing of safety
improvements decided after the stress-tests, as well as during the licensing of the
service time extension of ANPP Unit 2.
A3.01/15A: Supply of an Early Warning Radiation Monitoring System (EWRMS) and
computer hardware equipment for the implementation of JRODOS software in
Armenia. Currently this project is in the implementation phase.
7 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
8
A3.01/15B: Enhancing the capabilities of the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
in preparedness for and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. This project
aims to install the JRODOS decision support system in the emergency response centre
of ANRA. Currently this project is in the implementation phase.
In addition to the above regulatory assistance and technical support projects INSC currently
provides technical assistance to the Nuclear Operator of Armenia in the following project:
A1.01/16B: Support to the Nuclear Operator of Armenia. This project provides on-site
assistance to the ANPP during the implementation of the safety improvement
measures resulting from the ANPP Unit 2 stress-tests.
Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in ASEAN
This project complements the previous INSC project “REG3.01/16: ‘Enhancing emergency
preparedness and response (EP&R) in ASEAN for radiological and nuclear emergencies
through regional cooperation: Technical support for decision making (project start: Nov.
2017, duration: 3 years), building the necessary technical capacity for data processing.
Coordination in this area will be maintained with the IAEA, in particular with its Technical
Cooperation Department. The Commission, together with IAEA, supported ASEANTOM in
the development of a strategy for enhancing, and more closely integrating, radiological and
nuclear EP&R within ASEAN and an Action Plan for implementing the strategy was also
developed. This action is one of a number of inter-linked activities within the Action Plan.
Other activities have been, or are in the process of being implemented with coordinated
support from the EU’s INSC and the IAEA.
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION
4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities
The overall objective of all components, in accordance with the INSC Multi Annual
Indicative programme 2018-2020, is to achieve effective nuclear safety culture and
implementation of the highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards.
Component A: Support to the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The objective of this Component is the supply of equipment (according to the technical
specifications) needed for typical laboratory functions of the Nuclear Safety Centre in line
with recommendations provided by the experts in project IRN3.01/16.
The objectives of this task are, in line with the results of the NSC feasibility study (performed
in AAP2016) and with the detailed analysis of equipment needed for typical laboratory
functions of the Nuclear Safety Centre (performed in AAP2018, component A, task 6), to
supply the measuring, data acquisition, processing, storage and visualisation equipment
necessary to establish laboratory functions and data processing systems supporting expert
activities in the Emergency Response, Radiation Protection or Radiation Monitoring Centres
9
of Iran. The work consists of supplying the listed equipment, according to the associated
technical specifications for procurement.
Component B: Support to the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
In June 2018 the Government of Armenia adopted decree No621-A, allocating 500 m
2 office
space to the ANRA for accommodating the National Radon Laboratory. The office space is
located in a 3-storeyed building earlier utilized as a computer centre. The present condition of
the building is such that it requires a complete re-design and structural renovation before it
can be used for the intended purposes. Only after these works are carried out the NRL can be
installed in the building. It is planned that the NRL – within its premises – will also host the
Emergency Response Centre of ANRA and the JRODOS decision support system base station
configuration.
The objectives of this Component are the following:
(a) To improve environmental radiation monitoring capabilities of Armenia by contributing to
the establishment of the national environmental radiation monitoring infrastructure;
(b) To strengthen the capabilities of ANRA and NRSC in conducting environmental radiation
monitoring activities according to the state-of-the-art international practice;
(c) To enhance the knowledge and expertise of the staff of ANRA and NRSC in this area by
transferring relevant measurement techniques / methodologies and by providing advanced
professional training;
The project implementation will enable ANRA and NRSC to carry out their environmental
radiation monitoring activities according to the best European practice and recognized
international standards.
It is also expected that ANRA and NRSC will improve their capabilities and skills in the area
of environmental radiation monitoring by receiving advanced professional training and tuition
to acquire high level competence in relevant measurement techniques and methodologies.
In order to take into account the various phases of establishing a fully-functional NRL and to
reach the above stated objectives, the proposed Component is composed of two distinct parts:
Part 1 is to be covered by a supply contract and comprises procurement of equipment
(special laboratory furniture, appliances, computers and various measuring equipment,
as appropriate);
Part 2 is to be covered by a service contract and it includes tasks dealing with the
following activities:
Reviewing the proposed design of the new laboratory and equipment technical
specifications prepared by the Partner country, in order to ensure full-
compliance with international standards and EU best practice. This review will
also ensure that the equipment to be purchased can fit in the new laboratory
and will be technically compatible with all the required measurement
functions;
Adaptation of appropriate laboratory measurement methodologies, techniques
and quality assurance procedures;
10
Provision of training to Armenian specialists, including long-term fellowships
in accredited EU organizations (laboratories) having appropriate experience in
the related laboratory measurement practice.
Note that Part 1 or 2 does not provide financing for any construction works or renovation
activities. These will be fully covered and implemented by the Partner country. In this respect,
the action will only include the thorough review and assessment of the conceptual and
detailed design plans prepared by the Partner country for the implementation of the new
laboratory. The work also includes the review and assessment of the equipment technical
specifications.
Component C: Support to Emergency Preparedness in the ASEAN
The objective of this Component is to establish a regional early warning radiation monitoring
system capable of providing a high level of assurance that any significant increase in the level
or levels of radiation or radioactive material in ASEAN would be detected promptly. This
would enable ASEAN Member States to take timely, informed and effective measures to
protect their populations and the wider environment in the event of any future radiological or
nuclear emergency that may affect ASEAN.
This will be achieved by: enhancing (or in a few cases establishing) early warning radiation
monitoring networks in each ASEAN Member State in a cost effective manner (i.e., optimised
within a wider regional/ASEAN, as opposed to a narrower national, context); and establishing
a regional centre with which the monitoring data from national networks would be exchanged,
integrated and made available, inter alia, for use in systems used to support decision making
in an emergency.
The Component will comprise two main tasks: firstly, enhancing, where necessary, existing
early warning radiation monitoring networks in some ASEAN Member States, and
establishing networks in others where none currently exists, within an integrated ASEAN-
wide concept; and, secondly: the establishment of a regional centre with which monitoring
data from national networks will be exchanged and used to inform and support decision
makers in responding to and managing any future emergency that may affect ASEAN. A
decision on the location of this regional centre is expected to be taken shortly, in the frame of
the ongoing project REG3.01/16i.
Task 1: Enhancement or establishment of national early warning radiation monitoring
networks in ASEAN Member States
National early warning monitoring networks would be enhanced or established as follows
within an integrated concept for early warning within ASEAN as a whole:
early warning networks, capable of future expansion, would be established in
Cambodia and in Laos, comprising: a national monitoring and management centre
with real time communications with monitoring stations; and a few gamma dose rate
monitoring stations sited at major centres of population and/or at strategic locations in
the respective countries
11
an early warning network, capable of future expansion, would be established (in
accordance with national plans) in Myanmar, comprising: a national monitoring and
management centre with real time communications with monitoring stations; about ten
gamma dose rate monitoring stations located along the Myanmar border with
Bangladesh and along its northern coastline south of Bangladesh (i.e., priority 1
locations in the provisional national plan for an early warning radiation monitoring
system); and a coastal water monitoring station located south of the Bangladesh border
The early warning network in Vietnam would be enhanced (in accordance with
national plans) through the establishment of a regional network in the north of
Vietnam. This network would comprise: a regional monitoring and management
centre with real time communications with the monitoring stations and the National
Operation Centre; about forty gamma dose rate monitoring stations to be installed
along the Vietnamese border with China and along the Vietnamese coastline, with the
density decreasing from east to west and north to south as the distance from Chinese
NPP increases; and a coastal water monitoring station just south of the Chinese border
the early warning networks in Malaysia and Thailand would be enhanced as follows:
replacement of about twenty to thirty gamma dose rate monitors that will soon reach
the end of their design/operational lifetime; and enhancing the reliability of real time
communications between monitoring stations and the respective national monitoring
and management centres
the early warning network in the Philippines would be enhanced (in accordance with
national plans) as follows: enhancing the national monitoring and management centre
to accommodate additional monitoring stations; further increasing the spatial density
of currently installed or foreseen gamma dose rate monitoring stations and replacing a
few monitors that will soon reach the end of their design/operational lifetime (about
ten new monitors in total)
subject to further analysis and confirmation of the threat, a coastal monitoring station
would be located on the west coast of Northern Philippines and a limited network of
gamma dose rate monitoring stations would be installed in the vicinity of the Spratly
Islands to provide early warning of any accidental release of radioactive material from
nuclear reactors that may be installed on artificial islands constructed by China in the
South China Sea.
The design of each national early warning network would enable further (lower priority)
monitoring stations to be added subsequently to the networks, as need dictated or budgetary
resources allowed.
Overall, within ASEAN, three national early warning monitoring networks would be
established and four would be enhanced; about ninety new gamma dose rate monitors would
be installed along with a few coastal water monitoring stations.
Guidance would also be provided on particular aspects of operating and maintaining national
radiation monitoring networks (e.g., quality assurance, quality control, maintenance,
calibration of detectors, etc.) with a view to enhancing the reliability and ensuring the
coherence and quality of measurements made in different ASEAN Member States.
Task 2: ASEAN Radiation Data Exchange Platform (ASEAN-RDEP)
12
An ASEAN Radiation Data Exchange Platform (ASEAN-RDEP) will be developed and
installed at a regional monitoring and management centre in one or other ASEAN Member
State; a back-up or redundant platform will also be installed in a second Member State to
ensure high operational reliability. The ASEAN-RDEP will be based on (i.e., will be a
customised version of) the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP),
developed and used extensively in the EU and beyond to exchange radiation monitoring data
with national monitoring centres. Radiation monitoring data will be exchanged between the
ASEAN-RDEP and national early warning networks in each ASEAN Member State. The
ASEAN-wide monitoring data will be input to decision support systems installed at national
and/or regional levels in ASEAN (with support from a previous INSC cooperation project –
REG3.01/16) and will inform and support decision making on the management of any
radiological or nuclear emergency that may, in future, affect ASEAN.
The data exchanged with and assembled by ASEAN-RDEP will be strictly confidential to
ASEAN Member States. These data may, in due course, be exchanged with neighbouring
countries through bilateral arrangements and/or more widely (i.e., with IAEA’s International
Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS). But, any exchange of data beyond
ASEAN would be subject to prior approval by, and formal agreement with, ASEAN.
4.2 Intervention Logic
The needs assessment has been carried out during expert missions, discussion with the
concerned stakeholders, and coordination with the main partners and in particular the
International Atomic Energy Agency, with whom this programme is strongly coordinated,
and/or arises from previous projects in the countries through a well-recorded experience and
exchange between the project teams and beneficiary institutions. Those assessments were
extensively reviewed by the JRC technical experts. The overall approach through the action is
to strengthen the role and capabilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities in order to reach
the overall objective of promoting nuclear safety as well as to develop Emergency
Preparedness and Response capabilities in the region of interest to integrate the concerned
regions into the International system of information exchange. In each country, the envisaged
upgrades, modernisations, studies/assessments and regulatory advancements are developed
and will be implemented jointly with the local counterparts, in a pre-defined schedule and
well-planned contributions. This will allow a further joint update on the needs and gaps, as
well as intensive exchange and learning both at a technical level and at the level of safety
culture through addressing the priority issues. The actions will be implemented by EU experts
and consortia that will transfer know-how to the beneficiary countries.
4.3 Mainstreaming
Strengthening nuclear safety in partner countries includes capacity building that is achieved in
particular by means of specific training. In all these activities, the European Commission
promotes the participation of women as part of the gender equality.
4. 4 Contribution to SDGs
This intervention is relevant for the 2030 Agenda. It contributes primarily to the progressive
achievement of SDG 16 on the promotion of strong institutions. Actions will mainly support
the achievement of SDG 16 by strengthening the authorities in charge of the nuclear safety
(regulatory authorities and their technical support organisations). (SDG 5 is quoted in 1.2 and
SDG 3 is quoted in 1.3)
13
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Financing agreement
In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the
partner country for components C.
It is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with Iran for component A.
It is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with Armenia for component B.
5.2 Indicative implementation period
The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities
described in section 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements
implemented, is 76 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing
Decision for components C and from the date of the entry into force of the financing
agreement for component A and B.
Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s responsible
authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.
5.3 Implementation modalities
The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing
financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and
compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures8.
5.3.1 Procurement (direct management)
Subject in generic terms, if possible Type (works, supplies,
services)
Indicative
trimester of
launch of the
procedure
Component A – Support to the Iranian
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Supplies, services Q3 2020
Component B – Support to the Armenian
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Supplies, services Q4 2020
Component C – Support to Emergency
Preparedness in the ASEAN
Supplies Q3 2019
5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants
The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in
procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as
established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.
8 www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes.
The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy
between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.
14
The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on
the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the
countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would
make the realization of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.
5.5 Indicative budget
EU
contribution
(EUR)
Indicative third party
contribution, in
currency identified
(EUR)
Component A – Support to the Iranian Nuclear
Regulatory Authority
5 000 000 0
Component B – Support to the Armenian
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
1 200 000 0
Component C – Support to Emergency
Preparedness in the ASEAN
2 200 000 0
Evaluation – Audit Will be
covered by
another
measure
constituting a
financing
decision
Communication and visibility Will be
covered by
another
measure
constituting a
financing
decision
Total 8 400 000
5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities
Component A: The implementation of the project will be done through one service and one
supply contract.
Component B: The implementation of this project will be done through a service and a supply
contract.
Component C: The implementation of this project will be done through a supply contract.
5.7 Performance and Results monitoring and reporting
The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be
a continuous process and part of the implementing partners’ responsibilities. To this aim, the
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implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring
system for the action and issue regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final
reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of the implementation of the action,
difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its
results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as
reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). SDGs indicators and, if applicable, any
jointly agreed indicators as for instance per Joint Programming document should be taken into
account.
The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and
employed, and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial,
will cover the entire period of the action implementation.
The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own
staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for
independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the
Commission for implementing such reviews).
5.8 Evaluation
Having regard to the nature of the action, an ex-post evaluation will not be carried out for this
action or its components. In case an evaluation is not foreseen, the Commission may, during
implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons, either on its
own decision or on the initiative of the partner.
The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders.
The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and
recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner
country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary,
including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.
The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing
decision.
Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract for component A and B.
5.9 Audit
Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation
of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent
audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.
The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing
decision.
It is foreseen that audit services may be contracted under a framework contract for component
A and B.
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5.10 Communication and visibility
Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by
the EU.
This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a
specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of
implementation.
In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be
implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or
entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the
financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.
The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any
succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the
Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
The financing of the communication and visibility activities shall be covered by another
measure constituting a financing decision.
Summaries of completed INSC projects can be consulted in a database managed by the JRC9.
9 https://nuclear.jrc.ec.europa.eu/tipins
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APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX
Results chain Indicators Sources of data Assumptions
Overall
objective:
Impact
Application of the highest nuclear
safety and radiation protection
standards
The level of alignment of the Partner's standards
with the EU and/or IAEA requirements
Project reporting, monitoring and
auditing.
IAEA review mission output
(INIR/IRRS)
Specific
objective(s):
Outcome(s)
(Iran)
Align the capabilities of INRA and
the Nuclear Safety Centre (NSC) to
EU best practice
The level of alignment of INRA and NSC
capabilities to EU best practice
IAEA missions to Iran and project
output
There might be relevant
IAEA missions which
can be used for
independent verification.
JCPOA is still
recognized and
implemented by all
parties
Outputs
(Iran) Procurement of equipment needed
for typical laboratory functions of
the Nuclear Safety Centre
Availability and performance of equipment Equipment supplied and operational
Specific
objectives:
Outcome(s)
(Armenia)
Strengthening ANRA and NRSC
capabilities in conducting
environmental radiation monitoring
activities
Quantity and quality of radon monitoring data
characterizing the level of radon exposure risk in
the various regions of Armenia
Project deliverables Full support from the
partner organisations
Specific
objectives:
Outcome(s)
(Armenia)
Establishing the basic radon
monitoring infrastructure with
appropriate equipment and
measurement protocols
Ability to perform radon monitoring
measurements according to the EU best practice
and recognised international standards
Project deliverables Full support from the
partner organisations
Outputs
(Armenia)
Part 1 / A1 – Furniture, computers
and equipment to outfit the new
radon laboratory
Quality and appropriateness of delivered
commodities
Commodities delivered in the frame
of the supply contract
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Results chain Indicators Sources of data Assumptions
Part 2 / B1 – Assistance to design
and equip the new laboratory
Quality of detailed design of the new laboratory
and quality of equipment technical specifications
Detailed design and equipment
technical specifications reviewed
by the EU experts and approved by
the ANRA
Part 2 / B2 – Assistance to adapt
measurement methods and QA
procedures
Number of adopted measurement methods and
QA procedures
Documented measurement
protocols and related QA
procedures
Part 2 / B3 – Provision of training
to Armenian specialists
B3.1 Number of training sessions delivered
B3.2 Number of trainees trained
Training materials
Training certificates
Results chain Indicators Sources and means of verification Assumptions
Specific
objective(s)
(ASEAN)
Establish a regional early warning
radiation monitoring system
(EWRMS) in ASEAN
Regional system is established in ASEAN and
monitoring data are exchanged between regional
centre and national monitoring networks
Project reporting, monitoring and
auditing
Outputs
(ASEAN)
National early warning radiation
monitoring network is established
in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
enhanced in Vietnam and the
Philippines
Enhanced or established national networks are
operational
Project reporting, monitoring and
auditing
Hardware/software installed and
operating
Monitoring data being exchanged
Regional ASEAN-RDEP is
established and monitoring data are
exchanged with national networks
in all ASEAN Member States
ASEAN-RDEP is installed in two regional centres
in ASEAN and operational
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Results chain Indicators Sources of data Assumptions
Monitoring data from ASEAN-
RDEP are communicated with
decision support systems (DSS)
installed in ASEAN (at national
and/or regional levels)
Monitoring data are communicated to DSS in
ASEAN
i REG3.01/16: INSC /2017/385-343 ‘Enhancing emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) in ASEAN for radiological and nuclear emergencies through
regional cooperation: Technical support for decision making (project start: Nov. 2017, duration: 3 years)