ARTICLE

Emerging technologies and strategic stability inpeacetime, crisis, and warTodd S. Sechsera, Neil Narangb and Caitlin Talmadgec

aDepartment of Politics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA; bDepartment of PoliticalScience, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, USA; cSchool of ForeignService, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

ABSTRACTRecent commentary has sounded the alarm about the effects of emerging tech-nologies on strategic stability, yet the topic has received relatively little systematicscholarly attention. Will emerging technologies such as cyber, autonomous weap-ons, additive manufacturing, hypersonic vehicles, and remote sensing make theworld more dangerous? Or is pessimism unwarranted? In this volume, we leverageinternational relations scholarship, historical data, and a variety of methodologicalapproaches to discern the future implications of new technologies for internationalsecurity. The findings suggest that new technologies can have multiple, condi-tional, and even contradictory effects on different aspects of strategic stability, andraise a host of important questions for future research.

KEYWORDS Emerging technologies; strategic stability; crisis stability; war initiation; escalation

Technology has always played a central role in international politics. Theinvention of tanks, jet engines, ballistic missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers,nuclear weapons, and other technologies changed the way states competedin peacetime, maneuvered during crises, and fought during wartime.1 Today,

CONTACT Caitlin Talmadge ct782@georgetown.edu Georgetown University, Washington, DC,USAThis special issue is the product of three workshops on emerging technologies and internationalsecurity, held at the University of Virginia, George Washington University, and Stanford University in2016 and 2017. Special thanks to Carl Robichaud, Karim Kamel, and the Carnegie Corporation ofNew York for their dedicated support of this project. For valuable contributions to these workshops, wethank James Acton, Dima Adamsky, Krista Auchenbach, Tarun Chaudhary, Anne Choi, Allan Dafoe,Catherine Dill, Karl Eikenberry, James Fearon, Erik Gartzke, Ari Gesher, Charles Glaser, Richard Grabb,Brendan Green, Andrew Grotto, Martin Helman, Melissa Henriksen, Michael Horowitz, Jenna Jordan,Tim Junio, Margaret Kosal, Sarah Kreps, Matthew Kroenig, Brian Lim, Jon Lindsay, Austin Long, DanLopez, Julia Macdonald, Vince Manzo, Christopher McDermott, Rupal Mehta, Jim Mitre, EvanMontgomery, Vipin Narang, William Perry, John Poreba, Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, Jaganath Sankaran,Kelley Sayler, Paul Scharre, Grant Schneider, Jacquelyn Schneider, Kenneth Schultz, Raj Shah, DavidSnyder, Wes Spain, Megan Stewart, Adam Stulberg, Jane Vaynman, Tristan Volpe, Russell Wald,Stephen Watts, Laura White, Heather Williams, John Villasenor, and Tong Zhao.1For example, Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb; Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons andWarfare; Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, 37–54; Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer’, 30–42;Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War; Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power.

JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES2019, VOL. 42, NO. 6, 727–735https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626725

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

significant advancements in autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence,remote sensing, cyber technology, hypersonic vehicles, additive manufactur-ing, stealth, precision guidance, and other areas have contributed toa widespread sense that the world is again on the precipice of a new tech-nological era.

There is growing consensus that emerging technologies have the poten-tial to be ‘game-changers’ in military and strategic affairs.2 As a result, manydefence experts view these coming technological disruptions with deepconcern. In particular, it is widely believed that the proliferation of newtechnologies poses a threat to the long-term foundations of US militarydominance. Weaker powers, according to this view, will be able to harnessnew technologies to make sudden and dramatic improvements to theircapabilities, ultimately challenging US military superiority. A recent Centerfor Strategic and International Studies report, for example, forecasts ‘thegradual erosion of significant military advantages that the United States haslong enjoyed.’3

This pessimism is broadly shared within the US defence establishment aswell. During his term as Secretary of Defense, former US Senator ChuckHagel warned that the diffusion of new technologies posed ‘a clear andgrowing challenge to our military power.’4 Fears about the effects of emer-ging technologies have driven significant changes in US defence planning,particularly the Obama administration’s so-called Third Offset Strategy,which aimed to harness advanced technologies to gain an edge over USadversaries. More recently, the Trump administration’s 2018 NationalDefense Strategy pointed to rapid technological change as one of thedefining challenges of the future security environment.5

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism.Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, bothbecause technologies often do not live up to their promise, and becausetechnologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can tem-per their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologieswill necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to internationalpolitics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons tobe circumspect.

First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics ofinternational conflict. Historically, most technological innovations haveamounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into

2For example, Brimley, et al., Game Changers; Haffa and Dalta, Hypersonic Weapons.3Ellman et al., Assessing the Third Offset Strategy, 1.4Hagel, ‘Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense’, https://www.scribd.com/document/246766701/SecDef-Hagel-Innovation-Memo-2014–11-15-OSD013411-14.

5US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

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irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, theintroduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediatelychange the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army firstused poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weap-ons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and lesseffective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and dis-rupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become importantonly after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their fullpotential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms,for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. Andeven when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, theyoften take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanksillustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascenttechnologies.7

Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive importantchanges in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and evencontradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some condi-tions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediatethe effects of new technologies on the international system, including geogra-phy, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organi-sational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8

Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simpleclassification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged asa new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

The articles in this issue

The articles in this special issue aim to evaluate the effects of emergingtechnologies on the strategic dynamics of the international system. Thefield of international relations offers an extensive toolbox for this task, withwell-developed literatures on deterrence and coercion,10 crisisbargaining,11 arms races,12 signalling,13 and the escalation and termination

6For example, see Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 195–96; and Dupuy, The Evolution ofWeapons and Warfare, especially chapter 23.

7See Biddle, ‘The Past as Prologue’, 1–74.8For example, Biddle and Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the DevelopingWorld’, 171–212; Stulberg, ‘Managing Military Transformations’, 489–528.

9For example, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Narang, Gartzke, and Kroenig, (eds.),Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture; Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and CoerciveDiplomacy.

10Schelling, Arms and Influence; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.11See Powell, ‘Bargaining Theory and International Conflict’, 1–30.12Brito and Intriligator. ‘Arms Races and Proliferation’, 109–164; Glaser, ‘The Causes and Consequencesof Arms Races’, 251–276.

13Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations; Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests’,68–90; Fuhrmann and Sechser, ‘Signaling Alliance Commitments’, pp. 919–35.

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of conflict.14 Building on these foundations, each of the articles examinesone or more of these components of strategic stability, drawing on exist-ing theories to explore how emerging technologies might reshape peace-time, crises, and war.15

Peacetime stability: Arms races, proliferation, and arms control

An initial set of questions addresses the arms race dynamics of new weaponstechnologies. Will new technologies create incentives for arms racing in peace-time? Or will they quell pressures for states to closely monitor and match thecapabilities of their rivals?16 Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe address these ques-tions in the context of the offence-defence balance, using mathematical modelsto explore how increasing investments in technologies such as cyber weapons ordrone swarms might shift the balance between attacker and defender.17

Some new weapons may be amenable to arms control, while others mayprove resistant. Which new weapons technologies will be easier to contain,and which will not? Michael Horowitz’s article in this issue argues that thespeed and uncertain capabilities of lethal autonomous weapons systemscould lead to arms races.18 By contrast, as Heather Williams argues in herarticle, the more quantifiable and observable nature of hypersonic glidevehicles may facilitate regimes to manage and control them.19

Non-weapons technologies could affect the dynamics of arms control aswell. In his article titled ‘Dual-Use Distinguishability,’ Tristan Volpe considersthe impact of additive manufacturing technologies on nuclear proliferationdynamics, arguing that while such technologies may lower barriers to thespread of nuclear weapons, they also enable states to more easily reveal non-military motives, thereby dampening pressures to engage in arms racing.20

Crisis stability: Deterrence, coercion, and conflict initiation

Because military technology shapes how states fight and win wars, it is alsoinextricably linked to the prevention of crises and conflict. How will emer-ging technologies shape the overall likelihood of military conflict in the

14Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation; Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process.15The international security literature offers multiple, sometimes competing, definitions of strategicstability. Recognising that there is no consensus on the meaning of the term, the articles in this issueadopt an expansive view of strategic stability, including both conventional and nuclear weapons andcovering a wide variety of phenomena along the continuum between peace and war. For usefuldiscussions of the varied meanings of strategic stability, see Colby and Gerson, (eds.), StrategicStability; and Rubin and Stulberg, (eds.), The End of Strategic Stability?

16On the implications for alliances, see also Mehta, ‘Assurance in an Emerging Technology Environment’.17Garfinkel and Dafoe, ‘How Does the Offense-Defense Balance Scale?’, 736–763.18Horowitz, ‘When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability’, 764–788.19Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability’, 789–813.20Volpe, ‘Dual-Use Distinguishability’, 814–840.

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international system? Will new technologies enable new and different typesof coercion? Which types of conflict may be more or less likely to occur inthe new technological era? The articles in this issue consider several waysnew technologies might alter pathways to conflict.

Emerging technologies could create first-mover incentives in crises,heightening the likelihood that crises turn into wars. Horowitz argues thatthe ‘machine speed’ of autonomous weapons could create first-strikeinstability during crises, tempting opponents to attack preemptively ratherthan risk suffering a rapid, disarming strike.

Technology could also reshape the nature of military vulnerabilities andincentives for conflict. Jacquelyn Schneider’s article argues that technologi-cal revolutions historically are more likely to lead to war when they intro-duce new vulnerabilities that opponents can exploit. If emergingtechnologies increase militaries’ reliance on centralised networks and digitalinformation, Schneider argues, they will increase incentives for adversariesto target those resources with preemptive strikes.21

Wartime stability: Conduct, escalation, and termination of wars

A final set of questions addresses the intra-war effects of new technologies.Will new technologies make wars more intense and violent, insulating statesfrom the costs of war and encouraging escalation, or will they encouragerestraint?22 Will the conduct of war itself be different?23

In this issue, Caitlin Talmadge considers whether wars might escalateinadvertently in a world of new technologies. Will emerging technologiescreate new pathways for unintentional escalation by creating first-moveradvantages during crises? Talmadge takes a sceptical view, arguing thattechnology historically has been more likely to create opportunities forintentional, not inadvertent, escalation. Drawing from several cases duringthe Cold War, she shows that wartime escalation is more often a consciousstrategic choice than an accidental consequence of technology.24

Conclusion

The articles in this special issue offer a variety of new and important insightsabout the strategic consequences of emerging technologies. While forecast-ing is necessarily an uncertain business, forecasting informed by theory andhistory can make a significant contribution to grasping the strategic

21Schneider, ‘The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox and Military Revolutions’, 841–863.22Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’, 50–92; Caverley and Sechser, ‘Military Technology and theDuration of Civil Conflict’, 704–720.

23Gartzke, ‘Blood and Robots’.24Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Intra-War Escalation Risks’, 864–887.

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dynamics of tomorrow’s technologies. Understanding the lessons of pre-vious technological revolutions can help scholars and policy makers preparefor the next one. In particular, the studies in this special issue makea convincing case that the effects of emerging technologies often are notstraightforward. New technologies may strengthen strategic stability insome ways, while undermining it in others.

Yet this issues leaves a variety of questions about emerging technologiesunanswered. For example, it does not investigate the signalling implicationsof emerging technologies. Will the versatility of new military technologiesmake it easier for states to communicate their willingness to defend impor-tant commitments, or will their opacity complicate the task of signallingpower and resolve? A related question involves extended deterrence: Howcan new technologies best be harnessed to bolster commitments to allies?Finally, an important actor left out of these analyses is the public: how willemerging technologies shape public opinion about military conflict and theuse of force in the coming decades? Further research can help illuminateanswers to these and many other critical questions.

One clear lesson arising from this special issue is that the conclusionsherein are only the beginning of a long conversation. As the contours ofnew technologies become increasingly clear over time, the questionsexplored in these articles will need to be continually revisited and reas-sessed in light of new developments. Moreover, this issue raises at least asmany questions about strategic stability as it answers. We hope that thesestudies will inspire further research to help illuminate the nature of thecoming technological age.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Notes on contributors

Todd S. Sechser is the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr.Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia andSenior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs. He is coauthor of the bookNuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2017). Hisresearch on nuclear security, coercive diplomacy, and military technology hasappeared in academic journals such as International Organization, the AmericanJournal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of ConflictResolution, and the Non-Proliferation Review, as well as media outlets such as the

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Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor. Dr. Sechser was previously aStanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a John M.Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in politicalscience from Stanford University.

Neil Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University ofCalifornia, Santa Barbara, and Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for GlobalConflict and Cooperation at the University of California. From 2015-2016, he servedas a Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Councilon Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. Previously, he held positions atthe Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, theUniversity of Pennsylvania, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He received hisBA in Molecular Cell Biology and Political Science from UC Berkeley, and his Ph.D. inPolitical Science from the University of California, San Diego.

Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign atGeorgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy atthe Brookings Institution. She is author of the award-winning book, The Dictator’sArmy: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell, 2015), as well as co-author of U.S. Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (Routledge, 2017). Herpublications include articles in International Security, Security Studies, The Journal ofConflict Resolution, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Quarterly, The Non-ProliferationReview, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Dr. Talmadge was previously aStanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a John M.Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University, as well as a consultant to theOffice of Net Assessment at the U.S. Department of Defense. She is a graduate ofHarvard (A.B., Government) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.,Political Science).

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