em swedenborg ontology or the signification of philosophical terms annotations 1742 translated and...

8/14/2019 Em Swedenborg ONTOLOGY or the Signification of Philosophical Terms Annotations 1742 Translated and Edited by Alfred Acton 1901 Rep Swedenborg Scientific Association 1964

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ONTOLOGYOR

The Signification of Philosophical Terms

Annotations byEMANUEL SWEDENBORG

Translated and Edited byALFRED ACTON

Late Professor of Theology in theAcademy of the New Church

Swedenborg Scientific Associa t ion Bryn Athyn. Pennsylvania

1964


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Pub1ished byMassachuset t s New-Church Union

Boston, Mas s . , 1901

Reproduced in 1964 bySwedenborg Scientific As sociat ion

100 copies

Photo Offset Printing byUniversity Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan


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PREFACE.IN the first catalogue of Sweden borg's manuscripts,

which was that prepared by his heirs in 1772 at thetime they consigned the manuscripts to th e RoyalAcademy of Sciences of Stockholm, we find, underthe heading "Philosophical Works," the following en-try: "Several larger and smaller fragments written invarious styles of handwriting, yet apparently by Swe-den borg himself; they seem to belong to his Oeconomz'aNaturalis (sz"c) and to his Regnum Animale.*' In alater catalogue, prepared by Chastanier, in 1785, aftera great number of the manuscripts had been bound,these "larger and smaller fragments" with the additionof one or two other manuscripts are described as "pre-cious fragments of the Oeconomia Regni Animalis andthe Regnum Animale." t Two years later, at the in-stance of the Exegetic and Philanthropie Society, ofStockholm, the Swedenborg manuscripts were, for thefirst time, catalogued separately, each being classifiedaccording to the size of the manuscript page. In thatcatalogue we find one of these "fragments," a manu-script of 256 pages, entered under the class of smalloblong folios, as Codex 54, Pltysiologz'ca et Metaphysica.{Th e same entry is found in the official catalogue ofSwedenborg's writings in the library of the RoyalAcademy of Sciences, made sorne years later, andalso in the official manuscript catalogue of the same

Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. II., p. 784. t Ibid.,p. 793. t Ibid., p. 796. Ibid., p. 799


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IV PREFACElibrary.* Dntil the year 1845, there is no record ofany endeavor having been made to ascertain and de-scribe the exact contents of this Codex, and for up-wards of fifty years it was known only as Codex 54,Physz'ologica et Metaphysica. It was under this vaguetitle that the treatise on the" Soul," and the Ontologia,were so long neglected and unknown.

Th e first indication of the existence of these works,was given in 1845 by Dr. Svedbom, th e Librarian ofthe Royal Academy of Sciences. in a memoir communi-cated to the London Swedenborg Society. In this me-moir, which is published as an appendix to th e Englishtranslation of the" Economy of the Animal Kingdom,"Dr. Svedbom says: "Among these [unpublished phys-iological and philosophical manuscripts of Swedenborgpreserved in the Library of the Royal Academy] th efirst place appears to me to belong to a volume which1 will now endeavor to describe a little particularly.This book, which is in Swedenborg's own handwriting,contains 130 leavesjol. max. On the back it has th etitle, printed by the binder, Pflysiologica et Metaphys-z'ca, and it bears the same title also in the old manuscript catalogue of our library. On the first page,without any title preceding it, we have th e word prae-jatmcula . . . . " Then follows a very complete de-scription of the work now known as " Th e Soul," whichfills jols. t 1-1 17; Dr. Svedbom then continues: "Theremainder of this book, from jol. 118-127 (pp. xx.),is occupied by a dissertation which has the title Onto-

,. Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Appendix.t It must be noted that the manuscript is counted by ieaves, not by

pages.


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vREFACElogia prefixed to it at the head of fol. 118." Afterdescribing this work, the memoir continues: "Likemany other things contained in Swedenborg's manu-scripts, this 'Ontology' is not complete, being onlya sketch which the author proposed to develop after-wards. The whole book is closely written, and insorne parts in a cramped hand, and will be difficult toread and decipher."

Thus, more than a hundred years after they werewritten (1742), the work on the "Soul" and the On-tologia were at last discovered un der the binder's am-biguous title, Physiologica et Metaphysica, and theirexistence publicly announced.

But th e discovery did not lead to any immediatepractical result so fa r as the latter work was concerned.Th e Swedenborg Association, founded in 1845, obtainecl from th e Academy of Sciences the loan of themanuscript which had been so fully described by Dr.Svedbom; and, under the auspices of the Association,Dr. Immanuel Tafel published fols. 1-117, under thetitle, De Anima (Tubingen, (849). In his preface tothis work, Dr. Tafel, after quoting from Dr. Svedbom'sdescription of fols. (18-127, arJds: "According to thewishes of th e Swedenborg Association, I have for thepresent omitted the treatise inscribed Ontologz'a, fols.II8-127, which is contained at the end of the manu-script. Th e titles of th e chapters of this work are," etc.

We hear no more about the" Ontology" for twentyyears after the publication of the first part of Codex 54.But in 1869 th e last twenty pages of the Codex, beingthe oft-mentionedfols. 118-127, were photolithographedby Dr. R. L. Tafel, and published in Vol. VI. of the


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VI PREFACEPhotolithographed Manuscripts, where they may befound on pages 323-342.

From this copy, the Rev. Philip B. Cabell, at thattime Professor of Ancient Languages in Urbana University, prepared both a Latin transcription and anEnglish translation. In 188o, the translation was published by Messrs. J. B. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia,Pa., this publication being the first appearance of th e" Ontology" in print - 138 years after it had beenwritten by the author.When th e limited edition of ML Cabell's translationwas exhausted, an offer was made by the MassachusettsNew-Church Union to republish the work. Acceptingthis offer, Mr. CabeH after carefully revising his transcription of the Latin text, prepared an emended translation which he submitted to the Union with the request that independent criticism be invited for thesake of further revision. Upon the receipt of this request, Dr. Whiston, the Manager of the Union, invitedthe present translator to undertake the work.

In accepting the invitation, I had proposed to donothing more than to suggest to ML Cabell suchchanges in his translation as seemed necessary or desirable; but as the work proceeded, it became apparentthat this plan would not be productive of th e best results. Especially was this found to be the case inrespect to th e quotations made by our author, manyof which are so elliptical as to be hardly intelligible.When he made his translation, and also his revision,Mr. Cabell did not have th e opportunity of comparingthese quotations with the original passages, as theworks in which these occur are quite rare. After Sorne


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PREFACE Vllenquiry, 1 was fortunate enough ta secure access tothese works. Reference to them showed the neces-sity of making very material alterations in the quota-tions, not only as translated, but also as originally madeby our author; moreover, in several cases, light wasthrown on Swedenborg's own remarks. The work ofrevision was, therefore, gradually abandoned, and withMr. Cabell's concurrence, an entirely new translationwas undertaken. Th e result of this undertaking isnow laid before the reader.Th e Latin transcription prepared by Mr. Cabell hasbeen carefully compared with th e photolithographedcopy of the original manuscript, and a few slightchanges have been made. The handwriting of theoriginal is very difficult to read, being in some placesalmost illegible, and it is with pleasure that 1 take thisopportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to Mr.Cabell for his careful and painstaking transcription. 1am also indebted to him for various suggestions andcriticisms, and for his assistance in reading th e proofs.

Nor must 1 omit to mention the valuable suggestionscontained in Dr. R. L. Tafel's review of th e first edi-tion of the "Ontology."t These suggestions have,for the most part, been adopted in the present trans-lation.

In editing th e work, 1 have endeavored to confinemyself to such changes as will, 1 hope, make the"Ontology" more easy for reading and study; a few

Wolff's Ontologia and Cosmologja are preserved in the Library ofthe Academy of the New Church, Huntingdon Valley, Pa.; Dupleix'sCorps de Philosophie, at the Columbia University Library, New York,N. Y. ; and Baron's Metaphysica Generalis, at the Ridgway Library,Philadelphia, Pa.

t Words for the New Church, Vol. II., p. 352.


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Vlll PREFACEexplanatory footnotes have been added to the text, bu tof these l have been very sparing. To the simpletitle "Ontology," which is the only title given in theoriginal manuscript, has been added a descriptive sub-title taken from one of the prospectuses mentionedbelow. Th e paragraphs have been numbered, severalof the original paragraphs having been subdivided forthe purpose of facilitating reference to the work. Ref-erences have been supplied to t h quotations and sub-quotations, and ail the former and many of the latterhave been verified. These changes will be found notedin the appendix to the translation. In the appendixl have also added critical notes on the Latin text.These, though somewhat unusual in a translation, seemdesirable in the present case, both because of the manychangs which have been made, and because the Latin,being accessible only in th e original manuscript or thephotolithographed copy, is not easy of reference to themajority of readers. An index to the work has beenprepared, which, it is hoped, will be found useful inenabling the reader to ge t a more extended view ofSwedenborg's philosophy than can be obtained by amere perusal of a work professing to be nothing morethan a definition of philosophical terms.

The" Ontology," which was written by Swedenborgin the year 1742, is one of those numerous small trea-tises which marked his progress in the search for thesoul. These separate treatises or studies were sub-sequently to be inc1uded, according to a definite plan,in one grand work of several volumes, in which, as theend of the labor, "the crown of all human wisdom,"*the soul was to be discovered in the body.

.. Photolithographed Manu'scripts, Vol. VI., p. 351, P r a ~ . l a t i o .


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ixREFACESwedenborg made seven prospectuses or outlines of

this great work. The seventh, or final prospectus, wasprefixed to th e first volume of the" Animal Kingdom,"published in 1744; the remaining six may be found inthe Photolithographed Manuscripts, Vol. VI., pp. 349-353. In the published prospectus, the projected work,of which the" Animal Kingdom" constituted the beginning, is divided into seventeen "Par ts" which areenumerated; in four of the six manuscript prospectuses - which differ bu t slightly from each other - itis divided into four" Tomes" or volumes, the proposedcontents of which are given in detail; while in th eremaining two manuscript prospectuses, which likewisesubstantially agree with each other, it is divided intosix "Transactions," of which th e last four only areenumerated and their proposed contents given.

According to these two "transaction" prospectuses,it appears to have been Swedenborg's first intentionto continue the series of the" Economy of th e AnimalKingdom." Neither of th e prospectuses makes anymention of Transactions I. and II., and since the term" transaction" is used by Swedenborg to refer to th e"Economy of the Animal Kingdom," it is evidentthat the two published volumes of that work constitu te the first two transactions of the proposed largerwork. Th e subjects to be treated in the four transactions that were to complete th e work, are. given in theprospectuses referred to, as follows : -

Trans. III. The cerebrum. Trans. IV. Th e cerebellum, etc.; diseases of the head. Trans. V. Introduction to rational psychology. Trans. V 1. Rationalpsychology.


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x PREFACE

Instead, however, of fol1owing this plan, Swedenborgprepared a new plan, in which he proposes to beginhis investigations, not from the blood, as in the" Econ-orny of the Animal Kingdom," but from the organs ofthe body. This new plan wasl sketched in the four" tome" prospectuses. According to these prospec-tuses, the work was to be contained in four" Tomes,"or volumes, the proposed contents of which are: -

Tome l. The anatomy of the body; the generativeorgans; the organs of the senses. Tome Il. Theanatomyof the brain; diseases of th e head. Tome Ill.Introduction to rationa l psychology. Tome IV. Rationalpsychology.

The position assigned to the "Ontology," in boththe" transaction" and the" tome" prospectuses, is asthe concJuding part or chapter of the" Introductionto rational psychology," which constitutes TransactionV. of the first plan and Tome Ill. of the second. Theplan of this Introduction, as given in one of the twoprospectuses of Transaction V., is as follows : -

INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. 1. Thecortex. 2. The medul1ary and nerve fibre. 3. Thearachnoid tunic. 4. The doctrine of order, degrees,and society. S. The doctrine of forms. 6. The doc-trine of correspondences and representations. 7. On-tology or First philosophy." 8. (Added at a latertime) The doctrine of modifications.

The other prospectus of this transaction omits parts3 and 8, and gives part 7 as simply "Ontology."

In the four "fome" prospectuses, the Introduction This is the complete title of Wolff's " Ontology," which was written

as a preparation to his " Cosmology," and" Rational Psychology."


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XIREFACEto rational psychology is planned somewhat differently.The most complete of these prospectuses is as fol-lows : -

INTRODUCTION TO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. I . Thedoctrine of forms and modifications. 2. The doctrineof order, degrees, and society. 3. The doctrine ofrepresentations. 4. The cortex. 5. Th e medullaryand nerve fibre. 6. Th e arachnoid tunic. 7. Th emotor fibre. 8. (Added at a later time.) Th e signifi-cation of philosophical terms, or Ontology.The three other " tome" prospectuses omit severalof these parts, and none of them mentions" Ontology."They are not, however, put in the form of prospectuses,but are rather general statements in narrative form, ofthe author's intentions. That which we have quotedseems to be the last written of the "tome" prospec-tuses.

From what has been sai d, it will be seen that ourauthor first designed the" Ontology" to be a treatiseon First Philosophy, that is, to contain th e primaryprinciples and notions which enter into our reasoning,for so "First Philosophy" is defined by Wolff. Later,however, he narrowed th e ground to be covered by theOntology," for in the later prospectus he gives as itsdesign, "the definition of philosophical terms."t Whenthis prospectus was written Swedenborg evidently in-tended, before proceeding to the rational psychologyitself, to clearly define, both to himself and to his

Ontologia, 1.tAs this is the latest prospectus in which " Ontology" is mentioned,

this title has been adopted in the present translation. It fullYdescribesth e nature of the treatise.


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Xli PREFACEreaders, the terms and hence the phiJosophical ideaswhich would enter into the crowning work of theseries. But when he wrote the final prospectus (thatpublished in the "Animal Kingdom") in which th ewhole work is divded into seventeen "Parts," he hadgiven up the idea of writing a separate treatise on th edefinition of philosophical te rms, deeming, perhaps, thatthe In troduction to rational psychology would of itselfsufficiently define his terms. According to this pro-spectus, that Introduction, which is to constitute Part12 , was to treat of the doctrines of forms, order anddegrees, series and society, influx, correspondences, andmodification. There is no mention of "Ontology."

When, in 1743, Swedenborg began the "AnimalKingdom," he had already written smaU or large treat-ises on almost every subject that was to be incorpo-rated in that work. His plan was to write on whateversubject had been occupying his thought, and on whichhe had reached some definite conclusion. For we readin an address to the reader prefixed to one of thesepreliminary treatises: " I have long been in doubtwhether to comprise aU that l have meditated aboutthe soul and the body . . . in one volume, or to dividethem into numbers and parts, and publish each sepa-rately. . . . To exhibit the soul and its state . .. is alabor of some years, and must extend over severalvolumes. An d since l suspected and foresaw that sovast a work could never be accomplished at one time,and as it were with one effort and intention of themind .. . therefore, after deliberation, l have decidedto distribute the work into treatises and tracts, and totJ.ke up my pen at short intervals." The author then


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PREFACE Xlllstates that he will publish these treatises probably"not less than five or six times a year." *

Either at the time he wrote these works, or subse-quently, our author intended to rewrite them, bringingto bear on each the knowledge th e study of the wholehad brought him. In one case he actually did this,for in 1744 he wrote, apparently for publication, atreatise on the senses, which he subsequently rewrote,and published as Volume III. of the" Animal King-dom" ; and in the preliminary work he plainly impliesan intention of rewriting a treatise on the blood, al-though this had already been treated of in the" Econ-omy of the Animal Kingdom," published three yearspreviouslyt

As was said before, among these preliminary workswritten as a preparation for the great work, is to beinc1uded the" Ontology." And though none of themwas published by Swedenborg. it is c1ear from the ad-dress to the reader prefixed to one, from the preface toanother (The Soul), and from an index added to athird (Hieroglyphic Key), that sorne, if not ail of them,were written with a view to publication. Indeed, sev-eral were public1y announced by the author, as aboutto be published.:j:

Whether this was th e case with t he" Ontology" isno t c1ear. I t is c1ear, however, that the manuscript ofthat work which we have, is little more than a sketchand was written more or less hurriedly. This is evi-dent both from the handwriting, which is perhaps th e.. De anima d ejus et corporis ha,.monia, in Opuscula Philosophica, p. 91.

t Regnum Animale, Pars IV., 3.t Documents Concerning Swedenborg, Vol. L, p. 585.


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XIV PREFACEmost difficult to read of ail th e specimens of Sweden-borg's writing which we have, and by the frequentellipses not only in the quotations, but also in thesubject matter, especially towards the end of themanuscript.

Th e work appears to have been suddenly dropped,the last chapter containing only quotations withoutany remarks by the author. In view of the fact thatthese quotations end at the bottom of the manuscriptpage, it may be that investigation will bring to lightthe continuation of the work, though if this be thecase, the missing page or pages must have been lostprior to r845, as our manuscript contains ail the pagesmentioned by Dr. Svedbom in that year. It is not im-probable, however, that Swedenborg purposely stoppedat the doctrine of modification because that doctrinewas to form the subject of a separate work.

The" Ontology" was written immediately after thework on the "Soul," the two works being written inthe same manuscript volume in that order. It is thelast of Swedenborg's purely philosophical works settingforth his final views respecting the soul and the rela-tion of spirit to matter. In this work he went as fa ras philosophy unaided by revelation could take him,and he failed to reach his goal. By pursuing his meta-physical studies he could have obtained no furtherlight, and might, perchance, have come into greaterobscurity. He himself seems to have seen lhis, forimmediately after writing the "Ontology" he girdedup his loins afresh, and entered upon a new journeyin search of the soul. He began this time from thelips, the outermost gate to the body, intending to pur-


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PREFACE xvsue the course through the viscera to the blood andth e brain and thence to th e soul itself. But he was notpermitted to go far on this new journey. After publishing (1744-1745) three "parts" of th e "AnimalKingdom," in which he treats of th e viscera and ofthe senses, his ripened mind was turned to th e consideration of other subjects. In 1745 he wrote the "Wor-ship and Love of God"; this was followed by theAdversaria, the Index Biblicus, and these, after his illumination, by the Arcana C!estia.

In the "Ontology," th e last of th e philosophicalworks, we may, therefore, expect to find much lightthrown on the development of Swedenborg's mind,ever soaring to the causes of things, by which he wasprepared to enter into the world of causes, and rationally receive the truths of revelation. And this indicates one of the uses which the New-Church readerwill derive from a perusal and study of this work.With our author's theological writings before us, wecannot go to his philosophical works for instruction inspiritual subjects, but we can in those works follow thedevelopment of his mind, and see th e graduaI growthof those natural ideas which prepared him for his mission. Though before his illumination, Swedenborg didnot see th e truth respecting spiritual causes, ye t it isevident that he had clear basic philosophical ideas whichbrought him to an. obscure perception of higher things,and prepared him to receive them later. An d we maysurely take it for granted that that which thus preparedSwedenborg, when studied by us in the light of revelation, will establish spiritual truth more clearly in ourminds, by affording us invaluable illustrative and confirmatory ideas.


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XVI PREFACE

But what is, doubtless, a more obvious use of the"Ontology," is indicated in the subtitle. It is a Definition of Philosophical Terms - terms which occur notonly in the scientific bu t also in the theological v/orks,particularly in the" Divine Love and Wisdom," and astudy of th e definitions here given cannot bu t contribute to a clearer understanding of the passages, eventhose in the theological writings, in which the termsdefined occur. To quote from the preface to th e formeredition of this work: "Although it was written ata period prior to the author's illumination, it seemsreasonable to infer that the meaning of those termsremained essentially the same in his theological works."

ALFRED ACTON.HUNTINGDON VALLEY, PA.

AUGUST, 1901.


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ONTOLOGY.CHAPTER 1.

FRM. FRMAL CAUSE.1. ROBERT BARON. Form is divided into external and in-

tu'nal. External or extrinsz"c form is not 1. that which is out-side the essence of a substance, for then every accidentaI formmight be called an external form; but by extrinsic form we un-derstand the exemplary cause or idea, according to the likenessof which the effect is formed. hztrinsic form is that whichconstitutes the thing formed, whether that thing be substantialor accidenta!. Accidentai z'ntrz'nsz'c form is that which exists insubstance, whether the substance be spiritual or material, andwhich, together with that substance in which it exists, constitutesan accidentaI compound. Substantz"al z'ntrz'nsic form is eitherform z'nforming or form assistz"ng. Form iformzg is regardedeither as the other of the two parts of a physical compound,when it is called the form of a part; or as the whole quiddity ofany substance, when it is called the form of the whole. In thelatter sense, the whole essence of the natural body is called form.Form z'nformz'ng, regarded as the other of the two parts of aphysical compound, is divided into form sejJarable and form in-sejJarable.' There is only one form sejJarable from matter,namely, the rational sou!. Form z'nsejJarable is that which is sobound to matter, that it cannot exist or operate outside of matter.(Baron also divides form informing 3 into generz"c and sjJecijicforms.) Form assistz"ng is that which does not actuate or informits matter, bu t only assists it, contributing motion and operationto it. Form, in the general acceptation of the term, is dividedinto metajJhysz'cal and jJhysz'cal. MetajJhysz"cal form, regardedas essence, is the whole essence of a substantial thing, or, accord-ing to others, its entire nature. (MetajJhysz'ca, Sect. X.)

Figures indicate references to the Appendix.


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3RM. FRMAL CAUSE.and hence the figures of its organic parts and the manner inwhich they are interjoined, bu t also the combination of the similarparts whence the organic parts are composed. In like manner,he clearly sees the form of a stone who knows how the particlesare produced by combinations, and how these again are inter-joined so as to produce the mass of the stone. That an ens isof a given genus or species and that it is distinguishd framothers, is from its form. That it can act in a given manner, isalso from its form. Form must be classed among the causes ofthings; for by means of its form, we understand why an ens iswhat it is, rather than something else, and why it is fitted to actin a given manner. Consequently in its form is contained thereason for these things. Form, therefore, is the beginning ofthe ens upon which depends the existence of such an ens; henceit is a cause of the ens. 1n this respect essential determinationsare called form. Form is, therefore, the beginning of the actualityof the ens, upon which the existence of such an ens certainlydepends. Thus form and essence, although they are b oth con-stituted by essential determinations, are yet distinguished fromeach other by the diverse respect which they have to the ens.(Ontologia, Pars. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

S, Form is the entire construction of a body;namely, the composition, coordination, subordination,and determination of the parts, both integral and in-dividual, in a compound, whence that compound de-rives, not only its essence, but also th e quality of thatessence; for it is from its form that an ens is what itis taken to be. Therefore, from a knowledge of theform, there follows a knowledge of the quality and es-sence of any given body, as also of its dependence andrelation; since a knowledge of the form involves aknowledge of the connection, the position, th e order,the fluxion, and many other things which cause thebody to be what it is rather than something else.

6. In compounds and bodies, matters, or things


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4 !'TLGY.which flow from matters, are what determine the form;for, in corporeal things, form without matter is an ensratio1lis, or an idea which does not reallyexist. Hence,by sorne, ail that is called matter, by which form is de-termined, so that where form is, there is matter; forthe existence of form must be drawn from matter.Therefore three beginnings are established, namely,matter, form, and th e privation of form. Ali that ismatter, from which is form. But the material, as op-posed to the spiritual, is another thing.7. Spiritual form, on the other hand, cannot becalled a construction, composition, and ,determinationof parts; for ail these terms are such as apply to formspure!y material and corporeal. But in spiritual forms acertain determination must be understood, yea also, anordination of cntia and of forces flowing therefrom,which bear an analogy and a certain correspondence tothose which exist in bodies. Fo r spiritual forms, andtheir operations, exceed al! ideas that are mate rial orthat are joined to material things, consequently, th every words by which such ideas are expressed ; for theyare most eminent analogies, which are too unlimitedand too indefinite [to be expressed by such words].\Vith spiritual forms it is the same as with other forms,namely, tha: spirits derive from their form, that theyare what they are taken to be. An d this is the reaSOnwhy there is so great a variety of spirits, or of spiritualforms.

8. Further, simple forms, or forms considered simply,are superior and inferior. Sorne or ail of th.ese mayoccur in a compound form ; as in the animal body, inwhich are contained ail forms considered simply. And,


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5ORM. FORMAL CAUSE.because we cannot understand what corporcal formcan be, without an understanding of simple forms,therefore these latter must be explained.

9. The term external form is regarded in two ways.First: As denoting inferior form. Second: As theexternal construction an d determination of a body.61. As denoting z"nferior form. For the inferior is al-ways exterior, and the superior is always interior.Thus the rational mind is an internai form, while thebody is an external form. Or, the cause is the internaiform, and the effect is the external form; that is, solong as the effect reproduces in an image its cause.II. Tite externat construction and determinati01l of abody, from which is comeliness, deformity, a bcautifulform, a lovely form, and so forth, is also called externalform. This external form is likewise an image of theinternai form; for, as form has its determinations, soalso it must have its terminatiolls, namely, such as correspond to the internai determination. For example:Every circular form must consist of perpetuai circlesas its parts, while the common circle itself by its owndetermination indicates the quality of its internai form.Thus internai form and external form must correspondto each other.

10 . On the other hand, the angular form may ex-trinsically assume the circular, and even the spiralform; not, however, from itself and its own nature, bu tartificially; for, from its very hardness, coldnes!>, andresistance, it is evident that the form itself is angular.I t must therefore be seen whether the internai formproduces the external naturally, thus whether they cor-respond to each other; or whether a more perfect form


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6 ONTOLOGY.has been superinduced, as in the case of th e humanform impressed upon wax or engraved on marble orbrass. That the form may be truly human, the human,or the human soul, must be inspired in every least partof it.

l 1. Ali things must have their own form in orderthat there may be anything. From form is derivedactuality or essence, the quiddity of the ancients, qual-ity, causality, and th e faculty itself of acting and beingacted upon. Thus a thing without form is an atomwithout a beginning, that is, nothing. Every thing,mode, sense, or force has its own form. Every body,viscus, or part, whether solid or liquid, as th e parts ofthe blood or of the animal spirit, has its own form;yea, the soul has its own form. Every society, leastand greatest, has its own form of government, its de-pendence and relation, its order, laws, and many otherthings which are determined simultaneously with it sform.


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7IGURE.

CHAPTER II.FIGURE.

12 . WOLFF. In a compound not continuous, the single partshave a determined position in respect to each other. Th e boundary of an extent is called figure. A terminated compound ensis endowed with a certain figure. A compound ens designates,in the imaginary space in which it is supposed to exist, a figurecorresponding to its own - plane if its own be plane, concave ifits own be convex, and convex if its own be concave. If, in acompound ens, sorne parts be added, or taken away, or transposed, and in the boundary of its extension anything occurswhich was before different, the figure of the ens is changed; butif nothing then occurs which was not apprehended in the samemanner in the former boundary, the figure of the ens is notchanged. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. l , Cap. iii.)

13. WOLFF. Figure is an accident, because it is not a modifiable ens. For, since figure is the boundary of an extent, we canconceive of no other change in it than that it be taken away andsorne other figure succeed in its place. We can by no meansconceive of it as possessing intrinsic determinations, of whichsorne are changed into others, while others remain the same; nor,consequently, as being a subject capable of diverse determinations, for such a subject is the extent which is bounded, butnot the boundary of the extent. Figure, therefore, is an accident.(Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

14. It appears as if figure meant externai form, bu tthere is a difference between them. Externai formrefers itself ta internaI form as ta its continuum; asthe expression of the face, actions, and speech ta themind. Thus the face itself, sa far as it is regarded asthe externat form of the human head, and r e f ~ r s itse!f


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8 ONTOLOGY.to the internaI form thereof, cannot be called a figure.But when it is regarded separately from that form, andindeed as a surface which belongs to planometry, itcan be so called. Therefore we have the figure of theface, the figure of the mou th, the figure of the nose,the figure of the eye; bu t the form [of the face] in-volves ail these figures together.

15. Figure differs from form, as, in geometry, aplane differs from a cube; and the property of figurein respect to the property of form, is like the propertyof figure, geometrically considered, in respect to th eentire construction, and hence resulting nature, of acompound.'" Thus we recede from figure the more weelevate our attention to the higher powers, as to th ecubes of the square of a cube,t and so forth; for theseare more removed from planometry.

16. So also with superior forms. These at last can-not be called figured forms, because they are not termi-nated by space within themselves, but only by imaginaryspace outside themselves. For, that they may includespace within themselves, there must be reference ta acentre, a surface, a diameter, and many other things;these perish when there are such determinations, andwith them perishes also th e idea of space, of whichthere is none in th e form itself, but which can be con-ceived of as being outside the form. Such form isalso void of figure, because void of space and extent.

Figura a .forma in geometricis diffat sicuti planum a cubo,. et jig'l4rproprietas sicuti ji/l'ur geometria considerata ad integram construc-tionem et inde resultantem naturam compositi.

t Th e cube of the square of a cube can be expressed algebraically,thus : ( (X 3)2)3; but neither planometry nor geometry affords any figurecorresponding to this higher power.


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9IGURE.Hence it is without any limitation. Thus superiorforms always recede from th e idea of space and figure,the more highly they are elevated. Therefore, as de-terminations regarded in space, constitute form, so ter11li-?lations to be regarded as l f outside tllat space, constitutefigure. But in a form of which there are no termina-tions, except such as are to be regarded as continuousforms, figure itself must be ideally conceiveo of asbeing outside the form, and not as adjoined to it. Fora form which occupies no space, regarded as such initself, cannot be said to be terminated; but the termi-nus, or ail that termination, must be conceived of asoccupying space outside the form.


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10 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER III.ORGAN. STRUCTURE.

17 . WOLFF. An organic body, by virtue of its composition,is suited to a peculiar action. A simple organic body is one thatis composed of no other organic parts; the reverse is true of acompound organic body. Th e essence of an organic body con-sists in its structure. Th e reason for those things which apper-tain to an organic body, in that it is organic, whether they arein it actually, or only as to possibility, is contained in its struc-ture. In its structure must also be contained the sufficient reasonwhy the organic body is suited to action of a peculiar kind. I fthe parts of an organic body consist of mixed matter, and themixture of that matter be in any manner dissolved, the organicbody perishes. (Cosmologz"a, Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)

18. Structure is the same as form; bu t only incompounds considered physically and mechanically,and to which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass,size, matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like.Form, however, is something more universal thanstructure, and is in more simple things, yea, in th emost simple. Still structure corresponds to it. Forwe must conceive that such things, as those mentionedjust above, are within every single form, although theythemselves are not in the form, bu t only their ana-106"ues and eminents, which cannot be called by thesame name, or, to which such predicates do not apply.

19. An organ is an instrument, and supposes sornebeginning, or sorne primitive cause, by which it is ac-tuated. Thus it does not possess of itself the begin-ning of acting, except as it derives this from a cause


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IIRGAN. STRUCTURE.holding the place of beginning. Our body is purelyorganic; the sou l - the beginning - is its active.Thus the body consists of perpetuaI organs or instruments of the active sou!.

20. The term organic is properly used when speaking of parts of the animal kingdom; the term instrument, when speaking of inanimate things.


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12 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER IV.STATE. CHANGES OF STATE.

2 r. W OLF F . From the determination of the mutable proper-ties of a thing, arises its state; so that state is the coexistenceof mutable properties with always the same fixed properties. I fthe state of a thing is constituted by intrinsic mutable properties,namely by modes, it is called internai; but if by extrinsic mutable properties, su ch as the relations of the thing to other things,it is called external. If, in two things , A and B, the mutableproperties are the same, the state of those things is the same;if the mutable properties are diverse, the state is diverse. If themutable properties that are predicated of a thing do not remainthe same, the state of that thing is changed. Th e internai stateof a thing is changed, if its modes do not remain the same; it sexternal state is changed, if its relations to other things do notremain the same. (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2. , Cap. ii.)

22 . W OLF F . A finite ens can have different states succssively,bu t not ail at the same time. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)23. State is the coexistence of the determinations zn

any given form,o as, in the circ1e, of the determinationsof the diameters from the circumference towards th ecentre. The state of a circ1e is not changed so longas the circle remains a circle. When th e circle isexpanded or contracted, its state is not then changed,bu t its forces are varied and modified; or, there is avariation and modification of its forces, from whichvariation and modification new forms and new statesare wont to be formed, the essence of th e circle re-maining always the same. From su ch variation, inthe animal body, vital actions are produced; and in


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STATE. CHANGES OF STATE. 13the atmospheric world, modifications, which, in thesensory organ s, become sensations.

24. Changes of state are changes of the determina-tions in any given form, with respect to their coexist-ence; as, in circular forms, with respect to th e co-existence of the determinations, that is, of the radii,to the centre. Thus, when the determination of thecentre is changed, the state of the circle is changed;as when it is raised to an ellipse, a cycloid, a conoid,a parabola, and other figures. So also in ail otherforms ; except the angular, where no change of formcan occur without destruction and privation thereof,change of figure alone being possible.

25. These changes of state are called changes ofmodes; for the very changes produce among them-selves new forms, which are properly called modifica-tions, and, in the animal body, sensations. By meansof such changes, imaginations are effected, these beingso many ideas which are reproduced by similar changesof state. For this reason, modifications correspond tosensations, since changes are either changes of forces,or changes of modes.

26. The perfection of superior forms consists in themutability of their state or states. For the soul, fromevery change of any organic form in its body, under-stands the state, and what it signifies, since withoutsorne change, there is no sensation nor perception, stillless any action.

27. From changes of state or variation of modes,new forms exist. Thus they exist successively beforethey exist simultaneously, or before they coexist. Forthere can be common states uner which are contained


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OKTOLOGY.!4many particular states; universal states under whichare singular states; and general states under whichare specifie and individual states. The common anduniversal state is formed from the particular and singu-lar states. They are like equations which are builtup successively from ratios and analogies. Thus, infinite entia there can be many states simultaneously,not, however, from themselves; bu t in superior formsthere are infinitely more.


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15UBSTANCE.

CHAPTER V.SUBSTANCE.

28 . WOLFF. Substance is a subject, durable and modifiable;or, Substance is the subject of intrinsic determinations, bothconstant and variable; or, Substance is a subject in which essentials and attributes are the same, while the modes are successivelyvaried. According to the Aristotelico-scholastic philosophy,7 itis an ens which subsists jJer se, and sustains accidents. Leibnitz,for a notion of substance, requires action as its genuine characteristic j- so that he agrees that substance is distinguished fromaccidents by the power of acting. Descartes defines substanceas being that which so exists that it has need of nothing else forits existence; thus by substance, he understands God.t Claubergdefines it as being that which so exists that it has no need of anysubject for its existence; and ils opposite, accident, he definesas being that which exists in something el se as its subject , or,whose esse is zesse.t Thus, according to the Schoolmen, Godis not in predicates, bu t above predicates. Locke adheres to thecornmon notion of substance, nor does he advance beyond it,since he calls it the substratum or support of such qualities asare capable of producing simple ideas in us, and which are commonly called accidents. l (01/1., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

29. WOLFF. Th e common notion of substance is an imaginary one. The state of substance can be changed; and thereforesubstances are endowed with force. In substances whose stateis actually changed, there is a continuai conatus to action. Accidents cannot subsist without substances. In a compound ensthere is nothing substantial except the simple entia. There areno substances except simple substances; and compound entiaare the aggregates of these. Therefore simple substance is thatwhich is properly called substance; and compound substance is

- A da E rudi/orum, A 11. 1694, p. Il 1. t Principia Philosophi, Pars.1., SI. tll1etaph)'sica de Ente, 44. Il Human {/nderstanding, Bk.11., ch. xxiii., 2.


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16 ONTOLOGY.that which is the aggregate of simple substances, or, that which,on account of the simple substances entering into a compoundens, is called substance; 8 for it is according ta usage ta cali com-pound entia in the material world, substances. Robert Green,an Englishman, defends the notion of Leibnitz,9 that substancediffers from accident by its active force.- If there is force ina compound s u b s ~ ~ n c e , it must result from the forces of simplesubstances. (Ont., P. IL , Sect. 2, Cap. H.)

30 . WOLFF. In the modifications of things, nothing substantial is either destroyed or produced. (Ont., P. Ir., Sect. 2, Cap.iii.)

3 1 . DUPLEIX. Substance is that which subsists and has itsbeing by means of itself. Primary substances are individualthings and singular substances, t called primarily, properly, andprincipaHy substance, because they are as the foundation of ailthings that are in them, or are predicated of them. D Secondarysubstances are universal substances, as are the genera and spe-cies.t Fo r example: Socrates, Rome, this book, this cane, areprimary substances; and man, city, book, cane, are secondarysubstances." (Dupleix divides substances into most universal,universal, generic, specifie, and individual. He maintains thatail accidents are in primary substances.)" There are spiritualand incorporeal substances, as angels and souls. (De la Logique,Liv. 111., Ch. 6.)

32 . WOLFF. That subject in which are ail those propertiesthat we observe ta belong ta a thing, we cali substance i andwhen we reflect as ta its quality, we are able ta attribute nothingta it, since, in fact, we remove ail qualities from it, and refer themto accidents. (Wolff adds, that therefore the substantial of thingsis unknown.) Thus the notion of substance is an imaginary one;and consequently, substance itself, as we commonly imagine it,is an imaginary ens. Descartes has weil observed that we can-na t conceive of substance except by a certain primary determination to which ail other determinations are referred.t But he has

- p,..incipia Phi/osophi de vi etc., Lib. V., Cap. 8. t Cf. 84, Du-pleix on the predicables. t Principia PI"Josoplli, Pars. L, 53.


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17UBSTANCE.not progressed so far as to discover i ~ since he holds extensionto be that which constitutes corporeal substance, and thoughtthat which constitutes incorporeal substance; for there is something more universal than these. I f the sta te of substances ischanged, it necessarily fol1ows that they are endowed with force.For, let us suppose that only one substance exists, and that itsstate is changed. There must be in that substance, a sufficientreason for such change j and thus there must be action. Where-fore, since it must be admitted that there is something in theagent which contains in itself the sufficient reason for the actuality of the action, and therefore a certain force, it fol1ows thatthat substance must be endowed with force. (Ont., P. IL,Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

33. Substances, like forms, are simple and compound, prior and posterior, superior and inferior. Butprimarily and properly, there are no substances exceptthe simple, first, and supreme, which at the same timeare the most perfecto Ye t posterior and compoundsubstances cannot be called non-substances, seeing thatforms, attributes, forces, modes, accidents, and qualitiesbel9ng to them. Therefore, every form distinct fromanother is a substance, since it is a subject in whichis form together with it s adjuncts and predicates.Thus substance remains substance even though thestate of it s form is changed; for nothing substantialis either destroyed or produced by variation of formor modification. In this way, ail the definitions canbe made to agree. But to give a single definitionwhich shaH exhaust the subject, 1 scarcely believepossible. That ail the definitions agree, can be demonstrated. In superior substances, predicates, accidents, and qualities have no place; for superior substances are above every notion belonging to predicates.

Principia Pki/osophi, Pars. L, 53.


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18 ONTOLOGY.34. That substances be substances, they must be

modifiable and able to change their state. Thus theymust be endowed with force. The modifications them-selves, which are changes of state or variations offorces, although they are forms, still cannot be calledsubstances, but only the operations of substance. Fo rthese modifications, regarded in themselves, are notmodifiable nor can they change "their state, and the re-fore they are only the operations of substances, whichdo change their state. Thus thought cannot be calledsubstance, nor can sensation; for it is th e sensoryorgans that are the very substance of the sensations.That is to say, the eye is the organic substance of th esensation of sight; the ear, of hearing; the tongue,of taste; the brain, of all the sensations; the corticalglands are the organic substances of the imagination,and, together with the pure intellectories, * of th ethought.

Th e sensories, therefore, and not the sensations, ar esubstances, because they are organic forms. The

As the term sensory is used to signify the seat of the sensations,so our author uses the term intellectory or pure intellectory to signifythe seat or organ of the pure intellect. In his work De Anima, heteaches that the intellectory is composed of the pure cortex within th ecortical glands j this is barn of the soul and is the origin of the simplefibre. Th e cortical glands themselves from which proceed the com-pound or medullary fibres, constitute what he calls the internal unso-rio/um which is the organ of the imagination. Thought or the humanintellect is intermediate between the pure intellect and the imagination,being the result of the operation of the one upon the other. Thought,therefore, draws its essence from bath the pure intellect and th e im-agination, or, as it is stated.in the present work, the organ of thoughtis " the corticJ.1 glands . . . together with the pure intellectories," thatis, the pure cortex. (See De Anima, pp. 57 seq. English translation,n. 12 3 seq.)


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19UBSTANCE.whole body is a substance composed of aIl organicsubstances; the soul is a substance whose operationsare spiritual, for it is a form, and indeed a spiritualform; and so with other things.

35. We must conceive of active and motive force,and also of nature, after the manner of substance;bu t they are not substance, they only so appear.


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20 ONTOLOGY.

CHAPTER VI.MATTER. THE MATERIAL.

36. WOLFF. Ali matter is in continuai motion. I f matterdoes not change its place, its motion '3 is resisted by contiguousthings. The active force in a body must be conceived of afterthe manner of a durable thing, just as we conceive of matter.(Cosmol., Sect. Ir., Cap. I. )

37. WOLFF. Matter and active force are not substances. Inthe elements are contained the ultimate reasons for everythingthat is observed in material things. Consequently, in simple sub-stances is contained the ultimate reason why matter and activeforce appear like two substances diverse from eac h other. (Cos-mol., Sect. II., Cap. 2.)

38. WOLFF. That which is determined in a compound ens iscalled matter j whence a compound ens is said to consist ofmatter. The word matter is commonly taken in a wider sense,to mean the substantial which is made specifie by essential deter-minations so that this particular ens cornes forth, and no other.But from this loose signification we very proper ly abstain, lest,while attributing matter in a transcendental sense to simple sub-stances, we appear to attribute it in a physical sense j which lat-ter obtains in common speech and is involved in the definition.Matter is often called matter out of which [ex qua], to distinguishit from the subject, which is called matter in which [in qua], an dfrom the object which is called matter about which [circa quam].(Ont., P. II., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

39. DUPLEIX. Matter is considered in three ways: 1. Asthe subject an d seat of form and accidents. Thus the humanbody is the seat of the rational soul, which is its form, and alsoof manyaccidents. 2. In so far as anything is made out of it,as out of stone,14 wood, and so forth. 3. As the subject of anagent. Thus wood is the subject of fire. Thus we have matter


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MATTER. THE MATERIAL. 21

in which [ill qua), matter ou t of which [ex qua], and matterthrough which '5 [pel' quam). Primary matter is the first begin-ning of natural things, and th e first part which enters into theirbuilding and composition. N evertheless, it is considered as beingwithout form or accident;6 sa that it is a thing entirely mental.But, in nature, matter is never actually without form or accident;it is, as it were, before form, an d is the su bject of form an d acci-dent. Secondary matter is, in effect, the same as primary matter,but joined ta its form.'l I f we speak of matter as the beginningof natural things,18 we understand only primary matter. (De laPl/ys., Liv. 11., Ch. 3.)

40. DUPLEIX. Primary matter is abstruse and obscure ofconsideration. Many great philosophers '9 have said that it wasnot known, nor, in the nature of things, could be known; except,sa Plata teaches, by an indirect an d faulty conception; and, ac-cording ta Aristotle, by sorne analogyand similitude.t It mustbe considered as being without form or accidents, Iike the light bywhich we perceive the existence of things. zo Aristotle says thatmatter is the first subject out of which, because it endures, ailthings are barn, of themselves primitively an d not by means ofanother; t and that it is the last part into which things are dis-solved and terminated. I f we hold that there is an arder in thecreation of the world, we must of necessity conceive of the exist-ence of matter before form, as the subject and suppositum out ofwhich, by alternations and series, forms corne forth. This is whatthe Physicists teach, who sa y that form is derived from the po-tency of matter j that is, from th e faculty, potency, disposition,and natural aptitude which is in matter, for successively receiving

Timatus. tPhysica, Lib. L, Cap. 7.t Aristotties dieil, quod mate ria si t primum sub/utum, lX quo sub-sistant, omnlS res "' : st naseantur princi/Jalitlr l t non p lr mldium ahus.The original French is as follows: La matirl, di t It Philosophl, c'est prlmier sub/d, duquti, ln tant qu ' i l dlmeure, toutes chous naisuntdl soy,principaltm;nt l t no n par It mOYln d'autray. This is a para-phrase of the words of Aristotle (lac. cit.), which, literally translated,are: lIfateriam lnim voco primum cU/USqul r li sub/tctum, lX quo nas-citur ali'luid, non plr aeeidlnJ.

Physiea, Lib. L, Cap. 9.


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22 ONTOLOGY.diverse forms. Th e human form alone, they say, does not resultfrom rnatter,u Aristotle also recognized that the human formcornes from sorne other source than from matter.* (Dupleixadds, that primary matter is separate from ail Jorm, and thatfrom it results every form.) (De la Phys., Liv. 1L, Ch. 4.)

41. WOLFF. Matter is extent endowed with the force of in-ertia. Matter is modified by variation of figure. (Cosmol., Sect.1L, Cap. 1.)

42. WOLFF. A substantiated phenomenon t is a phenomenonwhich, in appearance, is like substance. Matter and motive forceare substantiated phenom ena. Motive force and matter must, inappearance, be diverse substances. (Cosmol., Sect. 1L, Cap. 3.)

43. WOLFF. Although the Schoolmen held that the multipleis a composition in things, yet in the opposition of material andimmaterial substance, they defined the simple as being thatwhich is not cornposed of quantitative parts; as when they sa idthat the soul was a simple." (Ont., P. IL, Sect. 2 , Cap. L)

44. DUPLEIX. A uni t is not a number; it is only the com-mencement of numbers. 23 (De la Log., Liv. IlL, Ch. 7.)

45. That is called matter, which is determined thatthere may be form, or, from which is form. For with-out matter there can be no determinations, and henceno form. So that if from form you take away matter,nothing remains, and substance falls into nothing; as,if from the body you take away the viscera, or froma building the stones, which are therefore caUed mate-rials. The word matter was used in this sense by theancients, and is also used in the same way by modernphilosophers, though they have no desire to confoundit with the substantial.

46. The material, however, according to aU modern De Animalium Generatione, Lib. II., Cap. 3. t See 52 ad Jin.


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23ATTER. TH E MATERIAL.usage of the word, is that which is heavy, endowedwith the force of inertia, and in space. I t is used inthis sense, from stones, marble, wood, and the like,which are called materials. And, inasmuch as theseare inanimate and gross, th e same word can neverapply to simples, such as spiritual and other substancesare. Therefore, philosophers, that they may avoid in-consistencies and confliction, distinguish between firstelements and substances. This is the reason whysuch substances are called immaterial, that is, notheavy or inert, nor partaking of motion, part, or extent.But that the confliction may be removed, it is abso-lutely necessary to define what matter is, and alsowhat the material is according to common understand-ing and received usage.

47. Matter, understood philosophically, may be at-tributed even to spiritual forms. For matter is thatout of which form is, whether you call it substance orelement. No form can ever exist, without matter outof which, just as there can be no sensation without anobject; for matter is the subject itself which is deter-mined. Yea, we also speak of a matter of dispute,but the matter of the dispute is not therefore any-thing material; thus we have philosophical matter,psychological matter, and theological matter. Matter,therefore, considered philosophically, is not taken tobe heavy, inert, or corporeal, but it is taken as thebeginning of existence,'" and as that without whichthere is no determination and no form ; for that some-thing which is determined, is called matter.

48. Physical matter, on the other hand, or the ma- See note to No. 77.


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24 ONTOLOGY.terial, is that which is found only in the lowest forms,especially in th e angular form, and on the earth. Thismaterial begins ta be put off by superior forms; forthe less a thing is finited, the less material does itbecome. Therefore the soul is not material, becauseit is void of part, extent, figure, and gravity. But itdoes not cease ta be matter, that is, th e Beginningfrom [ex] which is the body; nor does it cease ta existand subsist from [ex] its matter or beginning; since itis a form, and form without matter is a non-entity, athing undetermined and, still more, undeterminable.Bu t we must not conceive of that matter, accordingto the common acceptation of the term and in a grosslyphysical sense, as being material.

49. From these things it is evident, what confusionmere criticism and the signification of a word inevitably produce. All such things are puerile, insignificant, and trifling, nor are they becoming to men.


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25XTENT. EXTENSION.

CHAPTER VII.EXTENT. EXTENSION. THE CONTINUOUS.

THE CONTIGUOUS. PART.50. WOLFF. I f we represent to ourselves several things di-

verse from each other, and therefore existing outside each other,as being in one, the notion of extension arises. Thus extensionis the coexistence in one, of many diverse things, or, if you pre-fer, of many things existing outside each other; and it is consti-tuted by the union of these. Therefore, for the notion of exten-sion, it is requisite, not only that there be many diverse things,but 24 also that these be united to each other, and thus makea one. Since in an extent there are many things which, takentogether, are the same as the extent regarded as a one, andwhich indeed constitute it, therefore every extent has parts, eachexisting outside the other; and these parts are united to eachother. That which has parts, each existing outside ,the other butmutually united, is an extent. Jung defint:s extension as that,on account of which corporeal substance has part outside part.-Clauberg defines body or extent, which with the Cartesians aresynonymous terms, as that which has part placed outside parqThey make no mention of the union of the parts; yet they tacitlysuppose it, since they conceive of extension as being in a body,where, surely, the parts are united to each other. The intermi-nate parts of an extent, regarded as an extent in the abstract,do not differ except in number. To a straight !ine we do notattribute extension, unless extension be regarded in the abstract;but the parts of the !ine do Ilot differ except in number. Th ecase is the same in solids or in mathematical bodies. But, inthe nature of things, there is no su ch exten t. A, B, and C, inwhatsoever way they be assumed in an extent which is regardedin the abstract, differ as to none of their qualities, nor are there

- Logica Hamburgensis, Lib. 1., Cap. 5, 5.t Physica Contracta, 34.


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26 ONTOLOGY.in them any diverse intrinsic determinations, except that each ha sit s own proper existence. (Ont., P. IL , Sect. l , Cap. ii.)

5r. WOLFF. Things contiguous are no t continuous. Continuity excludes the possibility of the existence of a diverse intermediate part between two given parts which are in proximity toeach other. Interruption or non-conti nuity 25 supposes the actualor possible existence of a diverse part between th e two givenparts. Two terminated extents are called contiguous. whose surfaces mutually touch each other so that they remain two, in noway making a single extent. Contiguity, therefore, excludes theactual existence of an intermediate third. N othing prevents theinterposition of a third extent between two contiguous ones.(Ont., P. IL, Sect. l , Cap. ii.)

52. WOLFF. The elements of material things exist outsideeach other j and are united among themselves. Aggregates ofelements are extended j they are also continuous. Every bodyarises from that which is no t extended; nevertheless, it itself isextended; for the elements themselves of material things are 110textended. We perceive extension and continuity in a body,onlyin a confused way. Extension and continuity are phenomena;for everything obvious to sense which we perceive confusedly, iscalled a phenomenon. (Cosmol., Sect. IL, Cap. 3.)

53. WOLFF. An actual part is one that is contained within itsown proper limits. A possible part is one to which limits maybe assigned at pleasure. In the continuum, regarded in the abstract, the parts are only possible, not actual. But in a continuous series of contiguous things the parts are actual. Contiguousparts do not 26 constitute the continuum. (Ont., P. l L, Sect. l ,Cap. ii.)

54. An extent is defined as that which has partsoutside parts, and which is thus a united whole.* Itis commonly believed that there can be no form whichdoes not consist of parts outside parts; for there must

,. Extensum definitur per id quod habet partes extra partes, ac sicunitum sit [est? J.


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27XTENT. EXTENSION.be something that shaH be determined, in order thatform may exist, and this something we conceive of asa part. But le t us see what that extent must be, ofwhich it must be said that it consists of parts; andwhat that, of which it must be said that it is void ofparts.

55. In every inferior and more imperfect form, isan extent that consists of parts, or a material extent;or, what amounts to the same thing, an extension ofmatter; hence bodies are such extents. But extensioncannot be denied to superior forms, so long as thereis form, and so long as there ar e essential determina-tions, and so long also as th e form is actual and notideal, in the con crete [and not in the abstract]. Tosay that such a farm is void of extent, would be sayingthat it is non-existent, or that it is an ens not possiblein nature. Su ch an extent cannot be said to consistof parts; nor of parts outside parts; nor can it besaid to be consistent with the idea of breadth, length,and thickness. Hence It is not corporeal. 1. 5uchan extent does no t consist of parts. For parts, if theyare contained within their own boundaries, are figured,elementary, heavy, inert, terres trial forms. Therefore,in an extent not material, there are no such parts;but there are either substances or forms, or, if youwould so express it, things which are determined.These things, forms, or substances have no figure orgravity, or, they have no material predicate. 2. No rdoes such an extent consist of parts outside parts. Forthat which is outside must be either above, below, orat the sides; and there, it must be given a positioneither towards the centre or towards the surface, or


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2R ONTOLOGY.somewhere. When in a form such a relation has per-ished, as for instance in th e circle [nothing can be saidto be above, or below, or at the sides]. Who shall saythat any point of a circle is above or below any other ? '"So it is in every superior form. 3. Hence tlze zdea ofbreadtll, lengtll, and thz'ckness jJerishes. Th e idea ofthese as being in th e form, perishes; thus also theidea of an extent such as has been described. Butth e idea of space, and thus of extent, outside the formdoes not perish; for whatever is in the form is voidof place within itself; it is Ilot, however, void of placein the universe, bu t outside itself.

56. Every [superior] form, therefore, is extended,even the supreme and spiritual. It does not, however,consist of parts such as terrestrial parts are, angular,heavy, and inert forms, and the elements of materialthings. But superior forms consist of substances orforms which are determined ; for there must be some-thing determinable and determined that shall be theanalogue of part.

57. Therefore, such an extent is not material, seeingthat a material extent is described as consisting ofparts which are heavy and inert. It is rather to becalled a pure or substantial extent, for bodies ar e aggre-gates of substances.

58. Th e substances themselves, considered as partsin such forms, are without any idea of place, or oftendency towards centre or circumference, upwards ordownwards. Thus the idea of breadth, length, [and

.. et ibi dabitur locus versus centrum vel superficiem, vel alicubi,quando in forma talis respectus perierit, uti in circulo, quis dicet punc-tu m aliquod circuli esse supra vel infra alterum.


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29XTENT. EXTENSION.thickness,] such as is proper to every [material] extent, perishes.

59. This non-material extent of which we are speaking, cannot be said to occupy space within itself, thoughthe extent outside it is said to occupy space. For,while within itself there is no respect of centre andplace, still it occupies space in the universe.

60. Part, signifies that which is of an angular, terrestrial, and figured form; thus the elements of material things are parts. And, because angular forms canput on a superior appearance, and, superficially, a superior form, such as the circular and spiral, therefore acircular [or spiral] part is aJso called part. But if itwere purely circular or spiral, it would at once cease tobe such part.

Our author here has occupasse which seems to be a mistake for oc-cuparc.

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CHAPTER VIII.BODY. CORPOREAL THINGS.

61. WOLFF. Primitive corpuscles are those in which thereason for the composition can be assigned only in the elements.Derivative corpuscles are those in which the reason for the com-position is in lesser corpuscles. Ali visible bodies consist ofderivative corpuscles. Th e reason for the things that belong tovisible bodies, is contained in the qualities of the derivative cor-puscles, and in the manner in which those corpuscles are joinedtogether. (Cosmo/., Sect. IL , Cap. 3.)

62. WOLFF. Bodies are compound substances. (Cosmo/.,Sect. II., Cap. 2.)

63. DUPLEIX. Th e word body has several meanings. (1) Itsignifies quantity; and in mathematics, it stands for the threedimensions of a natural body conjoined or united together, bu tconsidered as abstracted from ail solidity an d matter. 27 (2) 1tsignifies corporeal substance, as man, tree, stone, and so forth,which is its signification in physics. This is distinguished into 28artificial bodies, such as houses and statues, or ail works whichare of ar t and not of nature; and natural bodies. (3) When ap-plied to artificial bodies, it is matter joined to its form, and thusan entire body. (4) When applied to natural bodies, it is primarymatter, the subject of natural form, which, of itself, is withoutform, bu t is, nevertheless, susceptible of many and diverse formssuccessively.29 N atural bodies are sub-divided into simple andcompound or mixed. Th e simple are those which are not com-pounded or mixed with the matter of any other body. (De /aPitys. Liv. 1., Ch. 7-)

64. Material bodies are al! those that arise from theelements of material things; or, from so many mostminute triangular and square particles. Thus they areal! angular forms, whatsoever be their figure and com-

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position. For those triangular and square particles arethe primitive corpuscles, yea, the very elements, fromthe aggregates of which material bodies arise and arederived.

65. But aU animate bodies are compound substances,and forms derived and thus compounded in order, fromthe first to the ultimate natural. Onlyone substantial,however, reigns in the whole of an animate body,namely, the soul; and, except this substantial, there isnothing living in such body. Animate bodies, there-fore, are compound substances; or, it is mere simplesubstance which is their soul, that forms its body byway of derivation. What body is, has been indicatedabove.

66. Every body has it s own soul, which is whoUypresent in it s every part, and which has formed thebody after its own image. AU other things which areadjoined, are taken from the mineraI kingdom.

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CHAPTER IX.ESSEl\CE. ESSENTIALS.

67. WOLFF. Essence is distinguished from ail the other thingsthat are in an ens, by the fact that it has no intrinsic reason whyit should befong to the ens, bu t must be posited at first, while ailother things that are in or can be in the ens, have their reason inits essence. Essence, therefore, may be dcfined as that which isfirst conceived about an ens, and in which is contained the suffi-cient reason why the other things are in it, whether actually or asto possibility. Suarez says that the essence of a thing is thatwhich is first and radical, the inmost beginning of ail the actionsand properties that belong to the thing; and he adds, that it isthat which we conceive of as first belonging to a thing, and asbeing first constituted in the existence of the thing, and in it squality. He says further, that real essence is the beginning orroot of real operations or effects.* Descartes, defining essence,says: "In every substance there is one leading property whichconstitutes its nature and essence, and to which ail the otherproperties are referred."t And Clauberg: " Of aIl that we attrib-ute to any given thing, there is one which we are accustomed toconsider as the first, the chief, and the inmost of that thing, em-bracing in a manner ail the rest, or being as it were their veryroot and foundation. This one, we cali the essence of the thing;and, with respect to the properties and operations resulting fromit, we cali it also the nature of the thing." t But these philoso-phers confound the notions of essence and nature. (Ont., P. L,Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

68. WOLFF. Those things in an ens which are not mutuallyrepugnant, nor yet are determined by each other, are called it sessentials, and they constitute the essence of the ens. Fo r ex-

Disputationu Mdapl'ysicae, Tom. L, Dis. 2, Sect. 4, 5.t Principia Philosophiae, Pars 1., 53.

t Mdaphysica de Ente, 56.

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ample: The number three and equality of sides, are the essentialsof an equilateral triangle. In morals likewise, tbe essentials arenot mutually repugnant. For example: Action conformable tonaturallaw, proceeds from a habit of the will; but these two,namely, the conformity of the action with natural law, and thehabit of the will, are by no means determined by each other;consequently, they are the essentials of virtue an d constitute itsessence. 3 Essence is the first thing that is conceived about anens, and without it an ens cannot be. Anything that is deter-mined by the essentials of an ens, must be in the ens constantly.Anything that is not determined by the essentials of an ens an dye t is not repugnant to them, may be in the ens, even though itbe not actual ly in it. If, however, it is repugnant to the essen-tials, it cannot be in the ens. For example: Because a tri-angle has been constructed, it does not follow that there is astraight line drawn from its vertex to it s base, and yet such a linemay be so drawn; but it is repugnant to an obtuse-angled tri-angle that one of its angles be a right angle, and therefore it canhave no such angleY Again, it is not repugnant to a stone thatit become hot, but it is repugnant to it that it be lighter than air.(That which is not repugnant to essentials, and yet is in no waydetermined by essentials, is called by Wolff, mode; by theSchoolmen, predicable accident.) Whatever is in an ens cornesunder the head of essentials, attributes, or modes. Those thingswhich are constantly in an ens, and are not determined by otherthings which are in it at the same time, are essentials. But thosethings which are constantly in an ens, and are determined byother things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. Byreason of essence, ens is possible. We understand the essenceof an ens, as soon as we understand the mode by which it cancome into existence; consequently by a genetic definition. Tbereis no intrinsic reason why the essentials are in an ens. Fo r theyare the first thing that is posited in the ens, and, therefore, wecan conceive of nothing therein as being prior to them,32 fromwhich it can be understood why they are in it ; as, for instance,why an equilateral triangle has three sides. In the essence of anens is contained the reason for those things which, besides itself,are either constantly in the ens, or can be in h. (Ont., P. 1.,Sect. 2, Cap. iii.)

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69. WOLFF. Ali similar things have the same essence; andthe essentials are similar if the essence is similar. (Ont., P. L,Sect. 3, Cap. i.)

70 . WOLFF. Th e essences of things are like integral rational,or common numbers. Fo r every such number is a combinationof units, and these, while they may be so combined, still are notso necessarily: yet, despite this, no unit can be taken from oradded to a number without the loss of that number. ln likemanner, essences of things are immutable ; so that if one essen-tial be taken away, or if one be added, the essence is no longerthe essence of the same ens as before, but is changed into theessence of a different ens. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3, Cap. iv.)

71. WOLFF. Essences of things are immutable. A necessityt1:lat arises from the essence of an ens is an absolute necessity;while one that proceeds from any other source is only a hypothet-ical necessity. Essences of things are absolutely necessary.(Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. iii.)

72. WOLFF. Essentials are qualities; consequently, generaand species are determined by qualities. (Ont., P. L, Sect. 3,Cap. v.)

73. WOLFF. Singulars have the same essentials, in that theyare contained under the same species; and species and inferiorgenera likewise, in that the former are contained under the samegenus, and the latter under the same superior genus. Speciesand inferior genera differ by those essentials which can bediversely determined, the others always remaining the same.(Ont., P. 1., Sect. 3, Cap. ii.)

74. WOLFF. Essentials and attributes are constant intrinsicdeterminations; modes are variable intrinsic determinations.(Ollt., P. IL, Sect. 2, Cap. ii.)

75. Essence is in al! things as the most commonthing. For this reason, it can hardly be defined; forthat which ail men perceive in single cases, as it weremost clearly, becomes very obscure when defined, norcan it be presented in a single definition which shaH

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inc1ude the whole of it as it is in every particular case.We must, therefore, proceed by another way, and arrive at the understanding of essence and the like,sQlely by examples, that afterwards, we may be able toform distinct definitions which cau be brought togetherso as to be seen in one cornmon definition.

76. Th e most general definition of essence is, thatessence is essence, or, it is what it is. Nothing can bedefined by means of itself, except essence; for thereis nothing else in a subject, which properly is, and thusail else is nothing.

77. I t is seen that in every ens there is it s existence, *its essence and it s essential; also, that one proceedsfrom the other, or, one supposes th e other. 1. Th eexistence of form, considered universally, is matter;the essential of form is determination ; and the essenceis the forill' itself. 2. Th e things which constitute theessence of a circle are circumference, diameters, andcentre. Without these there is no circ1e, and, there-* Th e Latin ward thus translated is esse. This ward is used by

ou r author in the sense of actual being or existence. Fo r example:he defines matter as the" beginning of existence" (principium esse)ldi)(n. 47), and in this number, he calls it the" existence (esse) of form,"distinguishing it from th e essence of form, which, he says, is the formitself. This is the ordinary meaning of the ward esse as used by thephilosophers. Thus Baron says that "form ha s an actual existence(esse actualt) in matter before generation," alld that "b y generation itbegins ta be in matter as a perfect existence (esse.perfectum)" (n . 2,sup.); and he quotes the Peripatetic philosophers as teaching thatmaterial forms depend on matter "bath in their creation (jieri) andin their existence (esse)." I t is a formula of the Schoolmen, that formgives existence (esse) ta a thing and distinguishes it from other things(forma dat esse rei, dat distingui) (cfn. 3). Our author uses the wardesse in a very different sense in his theological writings, a sense which,in the present work, seems ta be included under the term essence,which he defines as the only thing in a subject, that properly is (n . 76).

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fore, if they are not in it actual!y, they are ta be as-sumed as being in it. 3. The essence of a triangleis, that it consists of three sides and three angles. 4.But the essence of a form is within the single formsas a universal, nor does it recede therefrom. Thusevery principal essence is deduced fram that which isfirst or supreme, or from that which is universal. 5.Animal essence is, that the animal enjoys a soul anda body. This essence remains present in all generaand species of animaIs. 6. The human essence, be-skIes what was said above, is, specifically, that manrejoices in a rational mincI; otherwise he is not a man.7. Th e uni