elements of mental philosophy - a textbook for academies and high schools 1858

8/6/2019 Elements of Mental Philosophy - A Textbook for Academies and High Schools 1858

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E L EfeMr'tf NTS

CENTAL PHILOSOPHYABRIDGED AND DESIGNED AS 1

TEXT-BOOK

ACADEMIES AND HIGH SCHOOLS.

BY THOMAS C. UPHAM,PHOFE8SOR OF MENTAL 1ND MORAL PFULOSOPH,Jtf '*

' - ' "

NEW YORK:UARPER & BROTHERS, PUB LI

1858.


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Jilntered, according to Act of Congress, in the yeai 1840, by

HARPER & BROTHERS,In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New York.


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PREFACETHE Philosophy of the Mind has grown up, like other

sciences, from small beginnings. Many propositions,coming too, in many instances, from able writers, have

brown aside ; truth has been sifted out from themass oflirroiT"^^ number of importantprinciples is ascertained. BuTwhtteJi,js exceedinglynecessary that our youth should be"'made acquaintedwith these principles, it is impossible that they should gothrough with all the complicated discussions which havebeen held in respect to them. Many of the books inwhich these discussions are contained have become ex-ceedingly rare ; and, if they were not so, no small num-ber of students, who are now in the course of as thoroughan education as our country affords, would not be ablo-tcpurchase

them. And besides, by placing before the stu-dent a mass of crude and conflicting statements, his mindbecomes perplexed. To be able to resolve such a massinto its elements, and to separate truth from error, impliesutraiquamiauie with UiB laws uf Ll'ieTStellect, and a cte- 1gree of mental discipline, which he is not yet supposed tohate acquired \ and hence, instead of obtaining much im-portant knowledge, he becomes distrustful of everythingNow these evils, saying nothing of the loss of time at-tendant on such a course, are to be remedied in the sameway as in other sciences. In other departments of learn-ing, ingenious men discuss points of difficulty $ conflictingarguments are accumulated, until the preponderance onone side is such that the fyuestion ia debate is considered


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IV VUEFAUE.settled Others employ themselves in collecting facts, inclassifying them, and in deducing general piinciples; andwhen all this is done, the important truths of the science,collected from such a variety of sources, and suitably ar-ranged and expressed, are laid before the student, in or-der that he may become acquainted with them. And thisis what is attempted, to some extent, to be done in thepresent work, which is an abridgment of a larger workon the same

subject. In the larger work, the principles ofEclecticism and Induction, which have just been referredto, are applied on a more extensive scale than in thepresent I have been obliged necessarily to excludefrom the abridgment many interesting and striking illus-trations and facts, and some general philosophical views,which would have had a place if our limits had permit-ted. I indulge the hope, nevertheless, as the abridgmenthas been made with no small degree of care, that it willanswer the purpose for which it is particularly designed ;viz., the assistance of those youth who need some knowl-edge of Mental Philosophy, but are not in a situation toprosecute the subject to any great extent.THOMAS U UPHAM

fhwdnn College, May, 18t)


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C O N T E N T S.DIVISION I

THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING.7T SELECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATFS OF THE VZT^B

PARTI.INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN.

CHAPTER I.ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERU,

tion Pigt1 The mind susceptible of a threefold drusion 172 The Intellect susceptible of a subordinate division . ;b3 Of the connexion of the mind with the material woi Id . . 184 Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin . 195 Shown further from what we notice in children . , . .206 Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external cause* 217. The same subject further illustrated . . 228 Illustration from the case of James Mitchell . . .23

CHAPTER II.SENSATION" AND PERCEPTION

9 Sensation a simple mental state 01 iginatinor in the senses . . 24-" 25ib.

10 All sensation is properly and truly in the mind1 1. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objects .12. The connexion between the mental and phy&ical change not capable of explanation13 Of the meaning and nature of perception 262727

2829

14. Perception makes us acquainted with a material vvorld15 Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter16 Of the secondary qualities ofmatter ....CHAPTER III.

THE SENSES OF SMELL AAD TA&TE.17 Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowjcd^ . 3018. Connexion of the brain with sensation and perception 3119. Order in which the senses are to be considered . . , .3220. Of the sense and sensations of smell ... , ib21. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations . . . 33'


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vi CONTENTS.CHAPTER V

1HK SENSE OF TOUCH*acton "*26 Of the sense of touch in general and its sensations . 3827 Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the toush ib33 Origin of the notion ol extension, and of form or figaie 4029 On the sensations of heat and cold . . 4130. Of the sensations of hardness and softness . 4231 Of certain indefinite feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch 44"}2 Relation between the sensation and what is outwardly signified 4,>

CHAPTER VITHE SENSE OF SIGHT

33 Of the organ of sight, and the uses or benefits of that sen? 4634. Statement of the mode or process in visual perceplion 4735 Of the original and acquired perceptions of sight . 4836 The idea of extension not originally from sight . 4937. Of the knowledge of the figure of bodies by the sight . 5038 Illustration of the subject from the blind . 5139 Measurements of magnitude by the eye 5240. Of objects seen in a mist .5341. Of the sun and moon when seen m the horizon . . ib42. Of the estimation of distances by sight ... .5443 Signs by means of which we estimate distance by sight . . 5,344 Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects . 5645 Of objects seen on the ocean, &c . ... 57

CHAPTER VIIII \BITb OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION

46 Geneial view of the law of habit and of its applications . . 5547. The law of habit applicable to the mind as well as the body . ib48 Of habit m relation to the smell . 5949 Of habit m relation to the taste . . 6050 Of habit in relation to the hearing . 6251. Application of habit to the touch ' 6452. Other striking instances of habits of touch . . C553. Habits consideied in relation to the sight . . GO54 Sensations may possess a relative, a& well as positive increase ofpower . .... 0955 Of habits as modified by particular callings and arts fi56. The law of habit considered in r*?f lence to the perception of theoutlines and forms of objects , 7057. Notice of some facts which favour the above doctrine 71fS Additional illustiahons of Mr Stewart's doctrine , , ?'9 Meaning and characteustics of conceptions , ^300. Of conceptions of objects of sight . . . 7461 Of the influence of habit on our cojic eptiuns , 7662 Influence of habit on conceptions of sight ... 7763 Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description ib64 Of conceptions attended with a momentaiy belief , 7805 Conceptions which are joined with perceptions . 81fiG Conceptions, as conr-ected vvith fictitious IPpresentations . 82


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CONTENTS. VIICHAPTER IX

SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OP MENTAL STATL&.3cctiC3 Pig*67. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex . . 8368 Nature and characteristics of simple mental states . . ib69. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition . . 8470. Simple mental states representative of a reality ... 8571. Ongm of complex notions, and their relation to simple . 8672. Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple feelings 8773. The precise sense in which complexness is to be understood74 Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind

8889

75 Complex notions of external origin ... . 9076. Of objects contemplated as wholes ..... 91

CHAPTER X.ABSTRACTION

77. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas . 9278. Instances of particular abstract ideas .... 9S79 Mental process in separating and abstracting them . . 9480 General abstract notions the same with genera and species 9581. Process in classification, or the forming of genera and species . 9682 Early classifications sometimes incorrect . 9783 Illustrations of our earliest classifications ... ib84 Of the nature of general abstract ideas 9885 The power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers, &c 9986. Of general abstract truths or principles ... . ib87. Of the speculations of philosophers and others . . . 100

CHAPTER XI.OP ATTENTION

88 Of the general nature of attention ... . 10189 Of different degrees of attention ... . 10290 Dependence of memory on attention '10391, Of exercising attention in reading $0492. Alleged inability to command the attention 105

CHAPTER XII.DKEAMING,

93 Definition of dreams and the prevalence of them . 10794. Connexion of dreams with our waking thoughts 108no

ID.

D5 Dreams are often caused by our sensations96 Explanation of the mcoherency of dreams. (1st cause)97. Second cause of the mcoherency of dreams .98. Apparent reality of dreams (1st cause)99 Apparent reality of dreams (2d cause)100 Of our estimate of time in dreaming101 Explanation of the preceding statements

111112113114

PART II.INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN*

CHAPTER iINTERNAL ORIGIN OP KNOWLEDGE,102. Ttie soul has fountains of knowledge within . 119103 Declaration of Locke, that the soul has know't-dge in itself 120


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Vlll CONTENTS.Section foga104 The beginning of knowledge is m the senses . . 120105 There may also be internal accessions to knowledge 121106 Instances of notions which have an internal origin . 122107 Other instances of ideas which ha\e an internal origin ib

CHAPTER II.ORIGINAL SUGGESTION.

108. Import of suggestion, and its application in Reid and Stewart 123109. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity 124110 Of the nature of 'mity, and the ongm of that notion . . 126III. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession 127112 Origin of the notion of duration ... 123113. Illustrations of the nature of duration . . ib114. Of time and its measurements, and of eternity , 129115. The idea of space not of external origin . 130116. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion . 131117. Of the origin of the idea of power . . 132T18, Occasions of the origin of the idea of power . . ib.119 Of the ideas of right and wrong 133120 Origin of the ideas of moral merit and demerit . . . 131121. Of other elements of knowledge developed in suggestion . 135122 Suggestion a source of principles as well as of ideas . ib

CHAPTER III.CONSCIOUSNESS

123. Consciousness the 2d source of internal knowledge, its nature . 136124. Further remarks on the proper objects of consciousness 137125 Consciousnes aground or law of belief . 138126 Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness . ib

CHAPTER IV.RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT.

127 Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling relations . . 140128 Occasions on which feelings of relation may arise . .141129. Of the use of correlative terms 142130. Of relations of identity and diversity . . . ib131 (n ) Relations of degree, and names expressive of them . 143132 (HI.) Of relations of proportion . . . 144133. (iv ) Of relations of place or position . ... 145134 (v ) Of relations of time .146135. (vi.) Of ideas of possession . 147136. (vn.) Of relations of cause and effect 148137. Of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect . 14i>138. Connexion of relative suggestion with reasoning , . . Iw

CHAPTER V.ASSOCIATION. (I ) PRIMARY LAWS

139 Reasons for considering this subject here . . . 151140. Meaning of association and illustrations ... . ib141. Of the general laws of association 152142. Resemblance the first general law of association , . 153143. Of resemblance in the effects produced 154144. Contrast the second general or primary law . . 155145 Contiguity the third general or primary law . . 157*46 Cause and effect the fourth primary law . 158


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CONTENTS 13CHAPTER Vi.

ASSOCIATION (II ) SECONDARY LAWS,section Pogu147. Secondary laws, and their connexion with the primary . 159148. Of the influence of lapse of time .... 160149. Secondary law of repetition or habit 161150. Of the secondary law of co-existent emotion ... 162151. Onginal difference in the mental constitution . . . 163!52 The foregoing as applicable to the sensibilities . . . 164

CHAPTER VIIMEMORY.

153 Remarks on the general nature of memory .... 106154. Of memory as a ground or law of belief 167155 Of differences in the strength of memory 168156 Of circumstantial memory, or that species of memory which isbased on the relations of contiguity m time and place . . 169157. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial memory . .170158. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory which is basedon other relations than those of contiguity . . . .171159. Illustrations of philosophic memory . ... 172160. Ot that species of memory called intentional recollection . . 173161. Nature of intentional recollection 174162 Instance illustrative of the preceding statements . . . . ib.163 Marks of a good memory 175164 Directions or rules for the improvement of the memory . .177165 Further directions for the improvement of the memory . .179"66. Of observance of the truth m connexion with memory . .180

CHAPTER VIII.DURATION OF MEMORY.

167 Restoration of thoughts and feelings supposed to be forgotten . 18J168. Mental action quickened by influence on the physical system . 183169. Other instances ofquickened mental action, and of a restorationof thoughts 184170 Effect on the memory of a severe attack of fever . . . . ib.171. Approval and illustrations of these views from Coleridge . 185172 Application of the principles of this chapter to education . .187173. Connexion of this doctrine with the final judgment and a future

life 189

CHAPTER IX.REASONING.

374. Reasoning a source of ideas and knowledge . . . 190175. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions 1Q1176. Process of the mind m all cases of reasoning . . 192177 Illustration of the preceding statement , 193MS. Grounds of the selection of propositions , 194179 Reasoning implies the existence of antecedent or assumed pi( p*>

sitions 195180 Further considerations on this subject...... 196181. Of differences m the power of reasoning 197182. Of habits of reasoning . . . 198183 Of reasoning m connexion wjth language or expression , .199134 lllu-trafion of the foregoing section 200


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CONTENTS.CHAPTER X.

DEMONSTRATIVE REASONINGfcctioci Page185 Of the subjects of demonstrative reasoning . . . 201180 Use of definitions arid axioms in demonstrative re? sorting 202187. The opposites of demonstrative reasonings absurd , 203188 Domonstrati


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CONTENTS. XISecboa Pa#>221. Second cau^e of permanently excited conceptions or ap{ antions.Neglect of periodical blood-letting . . 23?222. Methods of relief adopted in this case 239223. Third cause of excited conceptions Attacks of fever . .240224. Fourth cause of apparitions and other excited conceptions. In-flammation of the brain 241225 Facts having relation to the fourth cause of excited conceptions 212236, Fifth cause of appantions Hystena 243

CHAPTER XV.DISORDERED INTELLECTUAL ACTION.

(II ) INSANITY.227 Meaning of the teim insanity .... . 244228 Of disordered or alienated sensations .... . 245229. Of disordered or alienated external perception .... 246230 Disordered state or insanity of original suggestion . , .217231 Unsoundness or insanity of consciousness 248232. Insanity cf the judgment or relative suggestion . . , .249233. Disordered or alienated association. Light-headedness . . 250234 Illustrations of this mental disorder 251235 Of partial insanity or alienation of the memory . . . . ib,236, Of the power ol reasoning in the partially insane . . 253237 Instance of the above ioim of insanity ot reasoning . 254238 Partial mental alienation by means oi the imagination . 255239 Insanity oi alienation of the power of belief . 256

DIVISION II.THE SENSIBILITIES. , t

SENTIENT OR SENSITIVE STATES OU1 THE SflND SENTIM ENT3INTRODUCTION

CLASSIFICATION OP THE SENSIBILITIES240 Reference to the general division of the whole mind . 261241 The action of the sensibilities implies that of the intellect . . ib,242 Division of the sensibilities into natuial or pathematic, and-moral 262243 The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects . . 263244 The moral sensibilities higher in rank than the natural . . 264245 The moral sensibilities wanting in brutes ib.246 Classification oi the natural sensibilities . . . 265247 ( justification of the rnoial sensibilities . . . 2GG

PART INATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NVTURAL, OR PATHEMATIC SFNTIME.NTSCLASS JEMOTIONS OK EMOTIVE STATES OF THE MIND

CHAPTER I.NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

248 We have a knowledge of emotions by consciousness . . .269249. The place of emotions, considered in reference to other mental

acts 270250 The character of emotions changes so as to comform to that of

perceptions . .... ... 271251 Emotnns characteiized by rapidity ard variety . . ,272


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XJ1 CONTENTS.CHAPTER 11

LMOTION& OF BE1UTVSection P*9252 Characteristics of emotions of beauty . . 273253. Of what is meant by beautiful objects . , 374254 Of the distinction between beautiful and other objects 275255. Grounds or occasions ofemotions of beauty various . .270256 All objects not equally fitted to cause these emotions . . .27?257. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ultimate puncnle of ourmental constitution .... . *78258 Remarks on the beauty of forms The circle , 279239. Original or intrinsic beauty '1 he circle . - 290280. Of the beauty of straight and angular forms {J>261 Of square, pyramidal, and triangular forms . 2dl262. Of the original or intrinsic beauty of colours . . 283263 Further illustrations of the original beauty of colours 284264 Of sounds considered as a source of beauty . . 286265. Illustrations of the original beauty of sounds . . . .287266 Further instances of the original beauty of sounds . . .290267. The permanency of musical power dependent on its being intrinsic ib268 Of motion as an element of beauty 291269 Explanation of the beauty of motion from Kannes . . .292

CHAPTER IIIASSOCIATED BEAUTY.

270. Associated beauty implies an antecedent or intrinsic beauty . 29^271. Objects may become beautiful by association merely . . 294272. Further illustrations of associated feelings . . . .295273 Instances of national associations 297274. The sources of associated beauty coincident with those of human

happiness .... 298275. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful . . 29CHAPTER, IV

EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.276 Connexion between beauty and sublimity . . . 300277. The occasions of the emotions of sublimity various278 Great extent or expansion an occasion of sublimity279. Great height an element or occasion of sublimity280. Of depth in connexion with the sublime281. Of colours in connexion with the sublime282. Of sounds as furnishing an occasion of sublime emotions

302ib303304ib.

283. Of motion in connexion with the sublime . . . 3u5284. Indications ofpower accompanied by emotions of the sublime 30tf285 Of the original or primary sublimity of objects ... 307286 Considerations in proof of the original sublimity of objects . b.?87 Influence of association on emotions of sublimity . . 30S

CHAPTER V.EMOTIONS OF THE. LUDICROUS

288. General nature of emo* ons of the ludicrous . 308289. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous . .310290. Of what is understood by wit . . 311291/- Of wit as it consists in burlesque JT in debasing objects , ib.292. Of wit when employed m aggrandizing objects . .312293 Of the character and occasions of humour . . 313294 Of the practical utility of feelings of the ludicrous . 3)4


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CONTENTS. XlllCHAPTER VI

INSTANCES OF OTHER SIMPLE EMOTIONSBectiou

*Pag*295. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness . 314296 Emotions of melancholy, sorrow, and grief . . 315297. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder . . 310

98. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust . . ib.299. Emotions of diffidence, modesty, and shame 317300. Emotions of regard, reverence, and adoration . , ib

CLASS IITHE DESIRES.CHAPTER I

NATURE OF DESIRES.301. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind :&i302. The nature of desires known from consciousness . . ib30J Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states . . 322304. The desires characterized by comparative fixedness and peima-nency . .... ... 323305 Desires always imply an object desired . . 324306 The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment . . ib307. Of variations or degrees in the strength of the desires 325308 Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire . ib309 Classification of this part of the sensibilities . 320310 The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold op-eration 327

CHAPTER II.INSTINCTS.

311. Of instincts in man as compared with those o. inferior animals 328312. Illustrations of the instincts of brute animals . . . .ID.313. Instances of instincts in the human mind . . . .330314 Further instances of instincts m men .... . 331315. Of the final cause or use of instincts -, 332

CHAPTER III.* APPETITES.i316 Of the general nature and characteristics of the appetites . 333*317. The appetites necessary to our preservation, and not originally of^ a selfish character ib.(318. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs . 3341 1 9 Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites . . 335

CHAPTER IV.PROPENSITIES.

0*20. General remarks on the nature of the propensities . . .336321. Principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence 337322 Of the twofold action of the principle of self-preservation . , 338323 Of curiosity, or the desire of knowledge ib.324 Further illustrations of the principle ot curiosity.... 339325 Of the twofold operation and the morality of the principle of cun- *

osity 34032C Imitativeness, or the propensity to imitation , . . ,341327 Practical results of the principle of imitation ... 342B


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CONTENTS.Section Eafi8328 Of the natuial desire of esteem .... 341329 Of the desire of esteem as a rule of conduct . . 345330 Of the desire of possession .... B46331. Of the moral character of the possessory principle . , 347332 Of perversions of the possessory desire .... 348 .333 Of the desire of power 349234, Of the moral character of the desire of power . . 350u35 Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness . . 351136. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love . 352337 Reference to the opinions of philosophical writers . 353338. The principle of sociality ongmal in the human mind . 354329. E\idence of the existence of this principle of sociality 355340 Other illustrations of the existence of this principle . . .356X41. Relation of the social principle to crvil society . . 3??

CHAPTER VTHE 11VLEVOLENT AFFECTIONS

342 Of the comparative rank of the affections . . .358343 Of the complex nature of the affections . 359- - - - 360

361, ib, 362, 363

344 Of resentment Granger ...345. Illustrations of instinctive resentment .S46. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment .347. Of voluntary m distinction from instinctive resentment348. Tendency of anger to excess, and the natural checks to it349. Other reasons for checking and subduing the angry passions 365350. Modifications of resentment Peevishness351. Modifications of resentment Envy .352. Modifications of resentment Jealousy353 Modifications of resentment Revenge354 Nature of the passion of fear

366, 367368369ib

CHAPTER VITHE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

355 Of the nature of love or benevolence m general ... 371356 Love, in its various forms, chaiactenzed by a twofold action 372357 Of the parental affection358 Illustrations of the stiength of the paiental affection359. Of the filial affection360 The filial affection original or implanted361, Illustrations of the filial affection .362 Of the nature of the fraternal affection363. On the utility of the domestic affections

374375376,37V379380

364 Of the moral character of the domestic affections, and of the be-nevolent affections generally 381 ,

365. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercises of the benevo-lent affections .... 3S2366. Of the connexion between benevolence and rectitude . 383

367* Of humanity, or the love of the human race 381365. Further proofs in support of the doctrine of an innate humanity,or love for the human race 380369. Proofs of a humane or philanthropic p inciple from the existence

of benevolent institutions 387370 Other remarks m proof of the same doctrine ... 388371. Oi patriotism or love of country 389372. Of the affection of friendship . ... 390373 Of the affection of pity or sympathy 391374 Of the moral character of pity ....... 392T75 Of the affection of gratitude 394


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CONTENTS.CHAPTER VLJ

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.LOVE TO THE SUPREME BEING.376 jlau created ougmally with the principle of love to God . .393377. That man was oiigmally created with a principle of love to God,

further shown from the Scriptures 396378 Further pioof that man was thus created 390379. Relation of the principle of supreme love to God to the other

principles of the pathematic sensibilities M380. The absence of this principle attended with an excessive and sin-ful action of other principles . . . . . 400

381. Further illustrations of the results of the absence of this principle 401CHAPTER VIII.HABITS OF TUB SENSIBILITIES.

382 Meaning of the term habit .... 404083 Of habits in connexion with the appetites >384 Of habits in connexion with the propensities . . . .405?85 Of habits in connexion with the affections 400'85 Of the oiigm of secondary active principles . . . 408

PART II.THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES OR CONSCIENCE.

,IORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS STATES OP THE MIND. MORAL SENTIMENTSCHAPTER I.

EMOTIONS OP MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.3S7. Reference to the geneial division 413388 Classification of the moral sensibilities 414389. Nature of the moral emotions of approval and disapproval . - ib390. Of the place or position, mentally considered, of the emotions of

approval or disapproval , 416391. Changes m the moral emotions take place in accordance with

changes in the antecedent perceptions ib392. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval . . 418

CHAPTER II.RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORVL NATURE

993 Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience . 419394. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning . . 420395 Illustration of the piecedmg section 421396 Of the training or education of the conscience . 422997 Of guilt, when a person acts conscientiously . . .423

CHAPTER III.FEEDINGS OP MORAL OBLIGATION.

j98 Feelings of moral obligation distinct from feelings of moral appro-val and disapproval . . 4*4

399. Proof of the existence of obligatory feelings from consciousness . ID400. Further proof from the conduct of men .... 425401. Further proof from language and literature . . * * 42C402 Further proof from the necessity of these feelings . . 4*'


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*V1 CONTENTS.Section ?*$*403 Feelings of obligation simple and not susceptible of definition 427404 They are susceptible of different degrees . . . .428405. Of their authoritative and enforcing nature ... . ib406. Feelings of obligation differ from those of mere approval and dis-

approval 429407 Feelings of obligation have particular reference to the future 430408. Feelings of obligation subsequent in time to the moral emotionsof approval and disapproval .431409 Feelings of obligation differ from desires . . . . .432410 t urther considerations on this subject ID

CHAPTER IVUNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

411. Of uniformity in tae decisions of the moral nature and the pnncipie on which it is regulated . . . 433

412. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of ac-tion, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circum-stances . ... - .434

413 Diversities in moral decisions dependent on differences in theamount of knowledge ... . . 436414. Of diversities in moral judgment m connexion with differences

in civil and political institutions . . . 437415 Of diversities and obliquities ot moral judgment in co&nenon~"~, with speculative opinions . . . ib.416 Further illustrations of the influence of wrong speculative opin-ions ... . 439

417. Influence of early associations on moral judgments . . .440418 Of diversities in the moraljudgment in connexion with an emiVstate of the passions 441

CHAPTER VMORAL EDUCATION.

419. Suggestions on the importance of moral education . . . 44U420 The mind early occupied either with good or bad principles . 443121. Of the time when moral instruction ought to commence . . 444422 Of the discouragements attending a process of moral instruction 445423. Of the importance, in a moral point of view, ot adopting correct

speculative opinions 440124. Of the knowledge of the Supreme Being, aid of the study of re-

ligious truth generally 447

THE SENSIBILITIES, OR SENSITIVE NATURESENSITIVE STATES OP THE MIND OR SENTIMENTSPART III.

IMPERFECT OR DISORDERED SENSITIVE ACTION.CHAPTER I

DISORDERED AND ALIENATED ACTION OF THE APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES425. Introductory remarks on disordered sensitive action . . 451426 Of what is meant by a disordered and alienated state of the sensi

bihties . 1


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CONTENTS XVI)fecctioj Pag


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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

DIVISION FIRST.THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING.

INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OP THE MIND.

PART FIRST.INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN


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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,CHAPTER I.

OKIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.1 The mind susceptible of a thieefold division

THE Human Mind, regarded as a whole, is undoubled-i) to be considered as constituting a nature or existencewhich is truly, and in the strictest sense, one and indivis-ible. At the same time, if we would have a co. *w u .. 7thorough knowledge of it, it is necessary to co^ *,'it in three distinct points of view. Accordingly, '< ;ing Divisions in which the Mind presents its


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18 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.the existence and presence of external objects. If themind were insulated and cut off from the outward andmaterial world, or if there were no such outward world,we could not touch, nor hear, nor see. All those mentalstates which we express when we speak of the diversitiesof touch, and smell, and taste, of sound and sight, areimmediately dependent on the existence and presence ofsomething which is exterior to the intellect itself.But there are other states of the Intellect, such, for in-stance, as are expressed by the words TRUTH, FALSEHOOD,POWER, INTELLIGENCE, MERIT, DEMERIT, CAUSE, OBLIGATION,&c., which are not thus closely connected with externalthings. And these, in distinction from those of Exter-nal origin, are denominated intellectual states of Internalorigin.

$ 3 Of the connexion of the mind with the material worldAs a general statement, the knowledge which is Exter-

nal in its origin is acquired first the knowledge which isInternal is subsequent. The mind, whatever may ulti-mately be found to be the extent of its powers of percep-tion, appears, in the first instance, to be wholly destituteof any actual knowledge ; and is first brought into action,and is put in the way of acquiring knowledge, by meansDf its connexion with the material or outward world.

This leads us to remark, that there is a correspondence,i mutual adaptation, between the mind and outward ma-terial things. They appear to be made for each other.The Creator has obviously established a close relationbetween them ; and it is a striking and important fact,that, in this connexion of the mental and material world,as we have just had occasion to intimate, we are proba-bly to look for the commencement of the mind's activity,and for the beginnings of knowledge.The soul, considered in its relationship to external na-ture, may be compared to a stringed instrument Re-garded in itself, it is an invisible existence, having thecapacity and elements of harmony The nerves, the eye,and the senses generally, are the chords and artificialframework which God has woven round its unseen andunsearchable essence. This living and curious instru-


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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 19ment, made up of the invisible soul and the bodily fiame-work which surrounds it, is at first voiceless and silent.Nor does it appear that it will ever send forth its soundsof harmony, until it is touched and operated upon bythose outward influences which exist in the various formsand adaptations of the material world. Under these in-fluences it is first awakened into activity.

6 4. Our first knowledge m general of a material or external originIn accordance with what has been said, we lay downthe general principles, FIRST, that during the early periodof life there is an intimate connexion between the mind

and the material world ; and, SECOND, that far the great-er portion of the mind's acts during that period can betraced to a material source. In proof of both positions,particularly the latter, we may properly attend to the fol-lowing considerations.

(I.) What has been said will, in the first place, befound agreeable to each one's individual experience. Ifwe look back to the early periods of life, we discover,not merely that our ideas are then comparatively few innumber, but that far the greater proportion of them aresuggested by external objects. They are forced upon usby our immediate wants ; they have relation to what weourselves see, or hear, or touch ; and only a small pro-portion are internal and abstract As we advance inyears, susceptibilities of the mind are brought into exer-cise, which have a less intimate connexion with thingsexternal; and thoughts from within are more rapidlymultiplied than from without. * We have in some meas-ure exhausted that which is external ; and as the mind,awakened to a love of knowledge and a consciousnessof its powers, has at last been brought fully into actionby means of repeated affections of the senses, a newworld (as yet in some degree a TERRA INCOGNITA) projectsitself upon our attention, where ^ e are called upon topush our researches and gratify our curiosity. This is thegeneral experience, the testimony which each one cangive for himself.

$ 5 Shown further from what we notice in children.Tn Jhr second place, what has been said finds eonfirnra-


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20 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.tion in what we observe of the progress of the mind ininfants and children generally. The course of thingswhich we observe in them, agrees with what our person-al consciousness and remembrance, as far back as it goes,enables us to testify with no little confidence in our owncase. No one can observe the operations of the mind ininfants and children, without being led to believe, thatthe Creator has instituted a connexion between the mindand the material world, and that the greater portion ofour early knowledge is from an outward source.To the infant its nursery is the world. The first ideasof the human race are its particular conceptions of itsnurse and mother ; and the origin and history of all itsnotions may be traced to its animal wants, to the lightthat breaks in from its window, and to the few objects inthe immediate neighbourhood of the cradle and hearth.When it has become a few years of age, there are othersources of information, other fountains of thought, butthey are still external and material. The child thenlearns the topography of his native village ; he exploresthe margin of its river, ascends its flowering hills, andpenetrates the seclusion of its valleys. His mind js fullof activity ; new and exalting views crowd upon his per-ceptions ; he beholds, and hears, and handles ; he won-ders, and is delighted. And it is not till after he hasgrasped the elements of knowledge which the outwardworld oives, that he retires within himself, compares,reasons, and seeks for causes and effects.

It is in accordance with what has now been stated ofthe tendencies of mind in children, that we generally findthem instructed by means of sensible objects, or by pic-tures of such objects. When their teachers make an ab-stract statement to them of an action or event, they donot understand it ; they listen to it with an appearanceof 'confusion and vacancy, for the process is undoubtedlyagainst nature. But show them the objects themselves,or a faithful picture of them, and interpret your abstractexpressions by a reference to the object or picture, andthey are observed to learn with rapidity and pleasure-The time has not yet arrived for the springing up anduiowth of thoughts of an internal and abstract origin.


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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 21$ 6. Fuithcr proof of the beginnings of knowledge from extemal causes.

In the third place, the history of language is a strongproof of the correctness of the position, that the mind isfirst brought into action by means of the senses, and ac-quires its earliest knowledge from that source. At firstwords are few in number, corresponding to the limited ex-tent of ideas. The vocabulary of savage tribes (those,for example, which inhabit the American continent) is ingeneral exceedingly limited. The growth of a languagecorresponds to the growth of mind ; it extends itself bythe increased number and power of its words, nearlyin exact correspondence with the multiplication and theincreased complexity of thought. Now the history of alllanguages teaches us, that words, which were inventedand brought into use one after another in the gradual wayjust mentioned, were first employed to express externalobjects, and afterward were used to express thoughts ofinternal origin.Almost all the words in every language, expressive ofthe susceptibilities and operations of the mind, may beclearly shown to have had an external origin and appli-cation before they were applied to the mind. To IMAGINE,in its literal signification, implies the forming of a picture $to IMPRESS conveys the idea of leaving a stamp or mark,as the seal leaves its exact likeness or stamp on wax ; to RE-FLECT literally means to turn back, to go over the groundagain, &c. These words cannot be applied to the mindin the literal sense ; the nature of the mind will not admitof such an application ; the inference therefore is, thatthey first had an external application. Now if it be anestablished truth, as the history of languages seems toshow that it is, that all language has a primary referenceto external objects, and that there is no term expressiveof mental acts which was not originally expressive ofsomething material, the conclusion would seem to be afan: one, that the part of our knowledge which has its riseby means of the senses, is, as a general statement, first inorigin. And the more so, when we combine with theseviews the considerations which have been previously ad-vanced.


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22 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.


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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 2.1fellow-beings by means of oral or written language, andnot

paiticularly compelled,as he had every care taken ofhim by his friends and relations, to bring his faculties intc

exercise, the powers of his mind remained without hav-ing opportunity to unfold themselves. Being examinedby some men of discernment, it was found that he had noidea of a God, of a soul, of the moral merit or demeritof human actions, and, what might seem to be yet moreremarkable, he knew not what it was to die ; the agoniesof dissolution, the grief of friends, and the ceremoniesof interment being to him inexplicable mysteries.Here we see how much knowledge a person was de-prived of, merely by his wanting the single sense of hear-ing ; a proof that the senses were designed by our Cre-ator to be the first source of knowledge, and that withoutthem the faculties of the soul would never become oper-ative.

$ S Illustration fiom the case of James MitchellBut this is not the only instance of this sort which in-

genious men have noticed and recorded. In the Transac-tions of the Royal Society at Edinburgh, (vol. vii., parti.,) is a Memoir communicated by Dugald Stewart, whichgives an account of James Mitchell, a hoy born deaf andblind. The history of this lad, who laboured under theuncommon affliction of this double deprivation, illustratesand confirms all that has been above stated. He madewhat use he could of the only senses which he possessed,those of touch, taste, and smell, and gained from them anumber of ideas. It was a proof of the diligence withwhich he employed the limited means which were givenhim, that he had by the sense of touch thoroughly ex-plored the ground m the neighbourhood of the housewhere he lived for hundreds of yards. But deprived ofsight, of hearing, and of intercourse by speech, it wasvery evident to those who observed him, as might be ex-pected, that his knowledge was in amount exceedinglysmall. He was destitute of those perceptions which areappropriate to the particular senses of which he was de-prived 5 and also of many other notions of an internalorigin, which would undoubtedly have arisen, if the


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*24 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

powers of the mind had previously been rendered fullyoperative by means of those

assistances which it usuallyreceives from the bodily organs. Such instances as these,however they may at first appear, are extremely importank They furnish us with an appeal, not to mere spec-ulations, but to fact. And it is only by checking unduespeculation, and by continually recurring to facts, thatour progress in this science will become sure, rapid, anddelightful.

CHAPTER II.SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

9 Sensation a simple mental state originating in the sensesIN tracing the history of that portion of human thoughtwhich is of external origin, w^e have frequent occasion tomake use of the words Sensation and Perception. The

term SENSATION is not of so general a nature as to includeevery variety of mental state, but is limited to such asanswer to a particular description. It does not appearthat the usage of language would forbid our speaking of&e feelings of warmth, and coldness, and hardness, aswell as of thefeelings of love, and benevolence, and an-ger, but it would clearly forbid our using the term SEN^A-TION with an application equally extensive. Its applica-tion is not only limited, but is fixed with a considerabledegree of precision.

Sensation, being a simple act or state of the mind, isunsusceptible of definition ; and this is one of its charac-teristics. As this alone, however, would not separate itfrom many other mental states, it has this peculiarity todistinguish it, that it is immediately successive to a changein some organ tf sense, or, at least) to a bodily change ofsome kind. But it is evident, that, in respect to numerousother feelings, this statement does not hold good. Theyare immediately subsequent, not lo bodily impressions,hut to other states of the soul itself. Hence it is, thai


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SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 25while we speak of the sensations of heat and cold, ofhardness,

of smoothness, roughness, and the like, we donot commonly apply this term to joy and sorrow, hatredand love, and other emotions and passions.10 All sensation is properly and truly m the mind

Sensation-is often regarded as something having a po-sition, and as taking place in the body, and particularlyin the organ of sense. The sensation of touch, as weseem to imagine, is in the hand, which is the organ oftouch, and is not truly internal ; the hearing is in the ear,and the vision in the eye, and not in the soul. But allwe can say with truth and on good grounds is, that theorgans of sense are accessory to sensation and necessaryto it ; but the sensation or feeling itself is wholly in themind. How often it is said the eye sees ; but the psoperlanguage, if we look at tlie subject philosophically, is,that the soul sees ; for the eye is only the organ, instru-ment, or minister of the soul in visual perceptions."A man," says Dr Reid, " cannot see the satellitesof Jupiter but by a telescope. Does he conclude fromthis that it is the telescope that sees those stars ? Byno means; such a conclusion would be absurd. It is roless absurd to conclude that it is the eye that sees, or theear that hears. The telescope is an artificial organ ofsight, but it sees not The eye is a natural organ pi*sight, by which we see ; but the natural organ sees as litlie as the artificial."

$11. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objectsBut while we are careful to assign sensations their true

place in the mind, and to look upon what is outward in&e body as merely the antecedents or cause of them, it isa matter of some consequence to guard against a dangerdiiectly the reverse of that which has been remarked on.We are apt to transfer to the sensation, considered as ex-isting in the mind, some of those qualities which belong tothe external object. But in point of fact, our sensationsare by no means copies, pictures, or images of outward ob-jects ; nor are they representations of them in any materialsense whatever ; nor do they possess any of their qualities


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26 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.It is true, we often think it otherwise ; constantly oc

cupied with external objects, when in the act of contemplation we retire within the mind, we unwarily carrjwith us the form and qualities of matter, and stamp its.Ikeness on the thought itself. But the thought, whatev-er it may by the constitution of our nature be the sign of,has no form, and presents no image analogous to whatare outwardly objects of touch and sight ; nor has it formor image in any sense which we can conceive of. When,therefore, "Vre have an idea of some object as round, weare not to infer, from the existence of the quality in theoutward object, that the mental state is possessed of thesame quality. When we think of anything as extendedit is not to be supposed that the thought itself has exten-sion. When we behold and admire the varieties ofcolour, we are not at liberty to indulge the presumptionthat the inward feelings are painted over, and radianlwith corresponding hues. There is nothing of the kind ;and the admission of such a principle would lead to amultitude of errors.$ 12. The connexion between the mental and physical change not capa-ble of explanation

(I.) External bodies operate on the senses, beforethere is any affection of the mind, but it is not easy to saywhat the precise character and extent of this operationis. We know that some object capable of affecting theorgan must be applied to it in some way either directly orindirectly, and it is a matter of knowledge also, that somechange in the organ actually takes place; but furtherthan this we are involved in uncertainty. All we canundertake to do at present is merely to make a statementof the facts, viz., the application of an external body,and some change in consequence of it in the organ ofsense.

(II.) Subsequently to the change in the organ, eitherat its extremity and outward developement or in thebrain, with which it is connected, and of which it may beconsidered as making a part, a change

in the mind or anew state of the mind immediately takes place. Herealso we are limited to the mere statement of the fact


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SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 27We here touch upon one of those boundaries of the in-tellect which men are probahly not destined to pass in thepresent life. We find ourselves unable to resolve andexplain the connexion between mind and matter in thiscase, as we do in all others. All we know, and all wecan state with confidence is, that a mental affection isimmediately subsequent to an affection or change whichis physical. Such is our nature, and such the appoint-ment of Him who ordered it.

13. Of the meaning and nature of perceptionWe next come to the subject of PERCEPTION, which isintimately connected with that of sensation. This term,like many others, admits of a considerable latitude in itsapplication. In common language we are not only saidto have the power of perceiving outward objects, but alsoof perceiving the agreement or disagreement in the actsDf the mind itself. Accordingly, we perceive a tree inthe forest or a ship at sea, and we also perceive that thewhole is greater than a part, and that the three angles ofa triangle are equal 1o two right angles. But what wehave to say here does not concern internal perception, butmerely that which relates to objects exterior to the mind

Perception, using the term in its application to outwardobjects, differs from sensation as a whole does from a part ;it embraces more. It may be defined, therefore, an affec-tion or state of the mind which is immediately successiveto certain affections of the organs of sense, and which isreferred by us to something external as its cause.

,$ 14. Perception makes us acquainted with a material world.

It will be recollected, that the term SENSATION, whenapplied to the mind, expresses merely the state of themihd, without reference to anything external, which mightbe the cause of it, and that it is the name of a truly sim-ple feeling. Perception, on the contrary, is the name ofa complex mental state, including not merely the internalaffection of the mind, but also a reference to the exterioicause. Sensation is wholly within ; but Perception car-ries us, as it were, out of ourselves, and makes us ac-quainted with the world around us. It is especially fry


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28 SENSATTON AND PERCEPTION.means of this last power, that material nature, in all itsvarieties of form and beauty, is brought within

the rangeof our inspection. If we had but sensation alone, therewould still be form, and fragrance, and colour, and har-mony of sound, but it would seem to be wholly inwardThe mind would seem to constitute everything ; we couldknow no other world, no other form of being. ^Percep-tion prevents the possibility of such a mistake ; it unde-ceives and dissipates the flattering notion, that all thingsare in the soul ; it leads us to other existences, and, inparticular, to the knowledge of the vast and complicatediabric of the material creation.

15. Of the primary and secondary qualities of matterFrom what has been said, it will be noticed that SEN-

SATION implies the existence of an external material worldES its cause, and that PERCEPTION implies the same exist-ence both, as cause and object. It is hardly necessary tojay, that we are altogether ignorant of the subjective orreal essence of matter. Our knowledge embraces merelyits qualities or properties, and nothing more. Withoutproposing to enter into a minute examination of them,^ itwill be proper to state here, that the qualities of materialbodies have been ranked by writers under the two headsof Primary and Secondary.The PRIMARY QUALITIES are known by being essential tome existence of all bodies. They are extension, figure,divisibility, and solidity ; and some writers have includedmotion. They are called PRIMARY for the reason alreadydistinctly referred to, that all men embrace them in thenotions which they form of matter, and that they are es-sential to its existence. All bodies have extension, allbodies Hve figure, all are capable of division, all possessthe attribute of solidity.By SOLIDITY in bodies (perhaps some would prefer theterm RESISTANCE) is to be understood that quality by which

a body hinders the approach of others between which itis interposed. In this sense even water, and all otherfluids are solid. If particles of water could be preventedfrom separating, they would oppose so great resistance,that it would be impossible for an} two bodies between


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SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 29which they might be to come in contact. This wasshown in an experiment which was once made at Floi>ence. A quantity of water was enclosed in a gold ball,which, on the most violent pressure, could not be made tofill the internal cavity until the water inside was forcedthrough the pores.Theie is reason also for that part of the arrangementwhich includes DIVISIBILITY. We cannot conceive of aparticle so small as not to be susceptible of division.And to that small particle must belong, not only divisi*bility, but the qualities of solidity, extension, and figure.

16 Of the secondary qualities of matter.The SECONDARY qualities of bodies are of two Mnds.

(1.) Those which have relation to the perceiving andsentient mind ; (2.) Those which have relation to otherbodies.Under the fiist class are to be included sound, colour,taste, smell, hardness and softness, heat and cold, rough-ness and smoothness, &c. When we say of a body ithas sound, we imply in this remark that it possessesqualities which will cause certain effects in the mind;the term sound being applicable, by the use of language,both to the qualities of the external object and to the ef-fect produced within. When we say^ it has colour, wealways make a like reference to the mind, which beholdsand contemplates it ; and it is the same of the other sec-ondary qualities of this description.The other class of secondary qualities, (or properties,as they are not unfrequently termed,) those which haverelation to other material bodies, are exceedingly variousand numerous. The material substance which, in rela-tion to the mind, possesses the qualities of sound and col-our, may possess also, in relation to other bodies, the qual-ities or properties of malleability, fusibility, solubility*permeability, and the like. 2


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THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE

CHAPTER ID.THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE.

$ 17. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowledge.IT is desirable to keep clearly in mind the precise re-

lation of the senses to the origin, progress, and amountof our knowledge, and to possess, if possible, a correctunderstanding of their true value. ^ In a certain sense, thepossession of the bodily organs with which we are fur-nished, is not essential and prerequisite to the possessionof that knowledge which we are accustomed to ascribeto them. There is nothing unwarrantable and unreason-able in the supposition that the knowledge which

wenow have by their means might have been possessedwithout their aid, either immediately, or in some wayaltogether different. Their use and mdispensableness inthe acquisition of a certain portion of what men are per-mitted to know, is a matter of arrangement and appoint-ment on the part of our Maker. It is undoubtedly anevidence of the correctness of this remark, that the Su-preme Being has a full acquaintance with all those out-ward objects which present themselves to our notice,without being indebted to any material instrumentality ,and mediation. He perceives in another way, or, rather,all knowledge is inherent in, and originally and unalter-ably essential to himself.

It is not so, as we have reason to believe, with anyother beings, and certainly not with man. ^ Although agreat part of his knowledge relates to material things, heis so formed, and his constitution is so ordered, that he iswholly dependent for it on the senses. Deprive him ofthe ear, and all nature becomes silent; deprive him ofthe eye, and the sun and moon withdraw their light, andthe universe becomes darkened \ deprive him of the senseof touch, and he is then entirely insulated, and as muchcut off from all communication with others as if he werethe only being in existence.


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THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 31() 18. Connexion of the brain with sensation and perception

(I.) It may perhaps be asked. Whether these viewsELC intended to exclude the "brain, as having a connexionwith the senses in the results which are here ascribed tothem ? And this inquiry leads us to observe, (what hasbeen before alluded to,) that the brain is a prominent or-gan in the material part of the process of sensation andof external perception. Tlie senses evidently cannot beseparated from the nervous system. But the substancewhich is found in the nerves, excepting the coat in whichit is enveloped, is the same as in the brain, being of thesame soft and fibrous texture, and in continuity with it.As a general statement, when the brain has been in anyway injured, the inward sensation, which would other-wise be distinct on the presence of an external body, isimperfect. Also, if the nerve be injured, or if its conti-nuity be disturbed by the pressure of a tight ligature, theeffect is the same ; a circumstance which goes to confirmthe alleged identity of substance in the two.

(H.) The brain, therefore, and whatever of the samsubstance is in continuity with it, particularly the nerves,constitutes the sensorial organ, which, in the subordinateorgans of tgste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing, presentsitself under different modifications to external objects. Onthis organ, the sensorial, as thus explained, an impressionmust be made before there can be sensation and percep-tion.An impression, for instance,' is made on that part of thesensorial organ called the auditory nerve, and a state ofmind immediately succeeds which is variously termed, ac-cording to the view in which it is contemplated, eitherthe sensation or the perception of sound.An impression is made by the rays of light on that ex-pansion of the optic nerve which forms what is called theRETINA of the eye, and the intellectual principle $is imme-diately brought into that new position, which is termedvisual perception or a perception of sight.The hand is impressed on a body of an uneven andrough surface,

and immediately consequent on this appli-cation and pressure is that state of mind which is termeda sensation or perception of roughness.


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32 THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE.19 Order m which the senses are to be considered.

friconsidering

those ideas which we become possessedof by means of the senses, it is natural to begin with thatsense which will cause us the least difficulty in the anal-ysis of its results ; and to proceed to others successively,as we find them increasing in importance. It may not bealtogether easy to apply this principle with strictness, butit will answer all the purpose for which it is here intio-duced, if we consider the senses in the following order,the smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight.The mind holds a communication with the materialworld by means of the sense of smelling. All animaland vegetable bodies (and the same will probably holdgood of other bodies, though generally in a less degree)are continually sending out effluvia of great subtilty.These small particles are rapidly and widely scatteredabroad in the neighbourhood of the body from which theyproceed. No sentient being can come within the circum-ference occupied by these continually moving and vola-tile atoms, without experiencing effects from it.

20 Of the sense and sensations of smellThe medium through which we have the sensationsand perceptions of smell, is the organ which is termed

the olfactory nerve, situated principally in the nostrils, butpartly in some continuous cavities. When some odorifer-ous particles, sent from external objects, affect this organ,there is a certain state of mind produced which varieswith the nature of the odoriferous bodies. But we can nomore infer from the sensation itself merely, that there ex-ists any necessary connexion between the smell and theexternal objects, than that there exists a connexion be-tween the emotions of joy and sorrow and the same ob-jects. It might indeed be suggested to us by the changein our mental states, that there must be some cause or an-tecedent to the change, but this suggestion would be farfiom implying the necessity of a corporeal cause.

(II.) How then does it happen, that we are not merelysensible of the paiticular sensation, but refer it at once tosouie external object, to the rose, or the honeysuckle 1In Answer it may be remarked, if we had always beeD


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THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 33destitute of the senses of sight and touch, this referencenever could have been made ; but, having been furnishedwith them by the beneficent Author of our being, we**)jake this reference by experience. When we have seenthe rose, when we have been near to it and handled it, wehave uniformly been conscious of that state of mind whichwe term a sensation of smell. When we have come intothe neighbourhood of the honeysuckle, or when it hasbeen gathered and presented to us, we have been remind-ed of its fragrance. And thus, having learned by expe-rience that the presence of the odorifeious body is alwaysattended with the sensations of smell, we form the habitof attributing the sensations to that body as their cause

21 Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensationsThe mental reference spoken of in the last section ismade with almost as much promptness as if it were ne-cessarily involved in the sensation itself. It is at least so

rapid, that we find ourselves utterly unable to mark themind's progress from the inward feeling to the concep-tion of the outward cause. Nor is this inability surpri-sing, when \ve consider that we have repeated this process, both in this and in analogous cases, from our earliest childhood. No object has ever been present to uicapable of operating on the senses, where this process h&,not been gone through. The result of this long-contin-ued and frequent repetition has been an astonishing quick*ness in the mental action ; so much so that the mind leapsoutward with the rapidity of lightning, to be presentwith, and to comprehend the causes of the feeling within.This view, it will be seen, helps in illustrating the na-ture of PERCEPTION as distinguished from sensation. Theoutlines of that distinction have already been given; andevery one of the senses, as well as that now under consid-eiation, will furnish proofs and illustrations of it. Ac-cordingly, when we are said to perceive the smell, or tohave perceptions of the smell of a body, the rapid pro-cess which has been described is gone through, and thtthree things which were involved in the definition of Per-ception, already given, are supposed to exist; (1.) Thepresence of the odoriferous body and the affection of its


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34 THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE.

appropriate organ ; (2.) The change or sensation in themind; and., (3.) The reference of the sensation

to the ex-ternal body as its cause.

22 Of the sense and the sensations of tasteThe tongue, which is covered with numerous nervous

papillae, forms essentially the organ of taste, althoughthe papillae are found scattered in other parts of the cavi-ty of the mouth. The application of any sapid body tothis organ immediately causes in it a change or affec-tion ; and that is at once followed by a mental affectionor a new state of the mind. In this way we have the sen-sations and perceptions, to which we give the namessweet, bitter, sour, acrid, &c.

Having experienced the inward sensation, the affectionsof the mind are then referred by us to something externalas their cause. We do not, however, always, nor even gen-erally, distinguish the qualities which constitute this causeby separate and appropriate designations; but expressthem by the names that are employed for the internalfeeling, viz., sweetness, bitterness, sourness, &c. Thisreference of what is internally experienced to its externalcause is very rapidly made ; so that we at once say ofone apple it is sweet, and of another it is sour.^ Still itis to be kept in mind, that, in point of fact, it is subse-quent, both in the order of nature and of time, to themere sensation ; although we may not be able, in conse-quence of its rapidity, to mark distinctly the progress ofthe mental action from the one to the other. As in the caseof smells, which have already been remarked upon, thereference is the result of our former experience. We sayof one body it is sweet, and of another it is sour, be-cause we have ever observed that the mental states in-dicated by those terms have always existed in connexionwith the presence of those bodies.

"Whenever, therefore, we say of any bodies that theyare sweet, bitter,, sour, or apply any other epithets ex-pressive of sapid qualities, we mean to be understood tosay that such bodies are fitted, in the constitution oftMngs, to 3aruse in the mind the sensations of sweetness,bitterness, and sourness, or other sensations expressed bv


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THE SENSE OF HEARING. 35denominations of taste. Or, in other words, that theyare the established antecedents of such mental states, asthere is, further than this, no necessary connexion befween them.

CHAPTER IV.THE SENSE OF HEARING.

23. Organ of the sense of hearing.FOLLOWING the order which has been proposed, we are

next to consider the sense of HEADING. And, in proceed-ing to the consideration of this subject, the remark is avery obvious one, that we should be unable to hear if wehad not a sense designed for, and appropriate to, that re-sult. The air, when put strongly in motion, is distinctlyperceived by the touch; but no impression which it couldmake on that sense would cause that internal feelingwhich is termed a sensation of sound. Our Creator,therefore, has taken cate that these sensations shall havetheir own organ ; and it is obviously one of precise andelaborate workmanship.The ear is designedly planted in a position where,

with the greatest ease, it takes cognizance of whatever isgoing on in the contiguous atmosphere. When we ex-amine it externally, we not only find it thus favourablysituated, but presenting a hollowed and capacious sur-face, so formed as to grasp and gather in the undula-tions of air, continually floating and in motion around it.Without, however, delaying to give a minute descriptionof the internal construction of the ear, which belongsrather to the physiologist, it will answer our present pur-pose merely to add, that these undulations are conductedby it through various windings, till they are brought in astate of concentration, as it were, against the membranecalled the TYMPANUM. It is worthy of notice, that on theinternal surface of this membrane (the drum, as it is pop-ularly called) there is a nerve spread out in a manneranalogous to the expansion of the optic nerve at thebot-


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36 THE SENSE OF HEARLTO.torn of the eye. Whether this nervous expansion be in-dispensably necessary to the

result or not, it is certainthat a pressure upon or affection of the tympanum by theexternal air, is followed by a new state of the mind,known as the sensation or perception of sound.

24 Yaneties of the sensation of sound.The sensations which we thus become possessed of by

f'ie hearing are far more numerous than the words andIhe forms of speech, having relation to them in differentlanguages, would lead us to suppose. It will help to il-lustrate this subject if we recur a moment to the senseof TASTE. The remark has somewhere been made to thiseffect j and probably with much truth, that if a personwere to examine five hundred different wines, he wouldhardly find two of them of precisely the same flavourThe diversity is almost endless, although there is no lan-guage which distinguishes each variety of taste by a sep-arate name. It is the same in respect to the sensationsof sound. These sensations exhibit the greatest variety,although their differences are too minute to be separatelyand distinctly represented by language.These views will appear the less objectionable whenit is remembered that sounds differ from each other bothin the tone and in the strength of the tone. It is remark-ed by Dr. Reid, that five hundred variations of tone maybe perceived by the ear, also an equal number of varia-tions in the strength of the tone ; making, as he express-ly informs us, by a combination of the tones and of thedegrees of strength, more than twenty thousand simplesounds, differing either in tone or strength.

In a perfect tone, a great many undulations of elasticair are required, which must be of equal duration andextent, and follow each other with perfect regularity.Each undulation is made up of the advance and retreatof innumerable particles, whose motions are all uniformin direction, force, and time. Accordingly, there willbe varieties also and shades of difference in the sametone, arising from the position and manner of striking thesonorous body, from the constitution of the elastic medi-um, and from the state of the organ of hearing.


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THE SENSE OF HE IKING. 37Different instruments, such as a flute, a violin, and a

bass-viol, may all sound the same tone, and yet "be easilydistinguishable. A considerable number of human voicesmay sound the same note, and with equal stiength, andyet there will be some difference. The same voice,while it maintains the proper distinctions of sound, mayyet be varied many ways by sickness or health, youth orage, and other alterations in our bodily condition towhich we are incident.

25, Marmci in which we learn the place of soundsIt is a fact particularly worthy of notice in respect to

sounds, that we should not know, previous to all experi-ence on the subject, whether a sound came from the rightor left, from above or below, from a smaller or greaterdistance. And this will appear the less surprising whenwe remember that the undulations of air are alwayschanged from their oiiginal direction by the channels andthe windings of the ear before they strike the tympanum.Abundant facts confirm this statement.

Dr. Reid mentions a that once, as he was lying in bed,having been put into a fright, he heard his own heart beat.He took it to be some one knocking at the door, andarose and opened the door oftener than once before hediscovered that the sound was in his own breast. Sometraveller has related that, when he first heard the roaringof a lion in a desert wilderness, not seeing the animal^he did not know on what side to apprehend danger, asthe sound seemed to him to proceed from the ground, andto enclose a circle, of wilich he and his companions stoodin the centre.

It is by custom or experience that we learn to distin-guish the place of things, and, in some measure also, theirnature, by means of their sound. It is thus that we learnthat one noise is in a contiguous room, that another isabove our heads, and another is in the street. And whatseems to be an evidence of this is, that when we are in astrange place, after all our experience, we very frequent-ly find ourselves mistaken in these respects

If a man born deaf were suddenly made to hear, hewould probably consider his first sensations of sound asD


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THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

originating wholly within himself. But in process oftime we learn not only to refer the origin of sounds to aposition above or below, to the right or left \ but to con-nect each particular sound with a particular externalcause, referring one to a bell as its appropriate externalcause, another to a flute, another to a trumpet.

CHAPTER V.THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

$ 26 Of the sense of touch in geneial and its sensationsWE are next to consider the sense of TOUCH. ^ Theprincipal organ of this sense is the hand, although it is notlimited to that part of our frame, but is diffused over thewhole body. The hand principally arrests our attentionas the organ of this sense, because, being furnished withvarious articulations, it is easily moveable by the muscles,and can readily adapt itself to the various changes ofform in the objects to which it is applied.The senses, which have hitherto been examined, aremore simple and uniform in their results than that of thetouch. By the ear we merely possess that

sensationwhich we denominate hearing ; we have the knowledgeof sounds, and that is all. By the palate we acquire aknowledge of tastes, and by the sense of smelling webecome acquainted with the odours of bodies. Theknowledge which is directly acquired by all these sensesis limited to the qualities which have been mentioned.By the sense of touch, on the contrary, we become ac-quainted not with one merely, but with a variety of quali-ties, such as the following, heat and cold, hardness andsoftness, roughness and smoothness, solidity or resistance,extension, and figure ; and, in particular, it gives occasionfor the origin of the antecedent and more general notionof externality.

27. Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the touchIf man were possessed of the sense of smell alone, itwould be found that the earliest elements of his knowl-


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THE SENSE OF TOUCH.edoe consisted exclusively in sensations of odours. Ac-cording, however, as

these sensations were agreeable ordisagreeable, he would acquire the additional ideas ofpleasure and pain. And having experienced pleasureand pain, we may suppose that this would subsequentlygive rise both to the feelings and the abstract concep-tions of desire and aversion. But if he had no othersense, all these feelings would seem to him to be internal,not only in their experience, but their origin; in otherwords, to be mere emanations from the soul itself; andhe would be incapable of referring them to an externalcause. If he were possessed of the sense of hearingalone, the result would be similar ; his existence wouldthen seem to consist essentially of sounds, as in the otheicase it would be made up of odours ; nor, indeed, by theaid of merely both these senses combined would, he beable to form an idea of externality or outwaidness.But this idea is a most impoitant one \ it is the con-necting thought which introduces us to an acquaintancewith a new form of existence, different from that inte-rior existence which we variously call by the namesspirit, mind, or soul. This idea first arises in the mind,although it is not directly addressed to that sense, bymeans of the touch.

There is no question that the other senses might ofthemselves furnish a basis of considerable extent for themental action. By means of their aid alone, such a de-velopement of the mind might take place, that we couldperceive, think, compare, abstract, reason, and will. Andalthough, under such circumstances, everything wouldseem to us to be internal, yet we should probably findthe mental action unembarrassed and easy, and a sourceof pleasure. But after a time we decide to move thelirnbs in a particular direction, and to press the hand orgome other part of the body through some hard and re-sisting substance. It is when we attempt to do anythingof this kind, which calls the sense of touch into action,that we find the wonted series of thoughts disturbed, thedesire checked, and the volition counteracted. It isprobably at this precise position of the mind, with scarce-ly the interval of a momentary pause of wonder, that


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16 THE SENSE OF TOUCH,there arises vividly in the soul a new perception, a newthought, which we call the idea of externality or outness.It is the sense of touch which impinges upon the obsta-cle that stands in our way ; and no other sense admitsof this peculiar application. It is thus the means of par-tially disturbing the previous connexion and tendency ofthought, and of giving occasion for the rise of the newidea which is under consideration. And this idea, calledinto existence under these circumstances, becomes associ-ated with all those notions which we subsequently formof matter. It may be of some importance to add here,that we shall have occasion to refer to this idea againunder the head of Original Suggestion. It is to be re-membered, that externality is not a direct object of thetouch, as extension and hardness are, but that the tactualsense simply furnishes the occasion on which it is formed.

28 Ougin of the notion of extension, and of form or figureThe idea of EXTENSION has its origin by means of the

sense of touch. When the touch is applied to bodies,where in the intermediate parts there is a continuity ofthe same substance, we necessarily form that notion. Itis not, however, to be imagined that Extension, as it^ex-ists outwardly, and the corresponding notion in the mind,actually resemble .each other. So far from any imitationand copying from one to the other, or resemblance in anyway, there is a radical and utter diversity. As to out-ward, material extension, it is not necessary to attend toit here ; our business at present is with the correspondinginward feeling. Nor will it be necessary to delay evenupon that ; the more we multiply words upon it, the moreobscure it becomes. As it is a simple idea, we cannot re-solve it into others, and in that way make it clearer bydefining it. We must refer in this case, as in others likeit, to each one's personal experience. It will be betterunderstood in that way than by any form of words.The notion of extension is intimately connected -with,and may be considered in some sort the foundation of,that of the FORM or figure of bodies. Dr. Biown some-where calls the Form of bodies their relation to each other'n space. This is thought to afford matter for reflection;


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THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 41but when we consider that SPACE, whatever it may be ob-jectively or outwardly, exists in the mind as a simple notion, and that the particular relation here spoken of is notpointed out, the remark may not be found to throw muchlight on the subject Still we do not suppose that anyone is ignorant of what FORM is ; men must be supposedto know that, if they are thought to know anything. Allthat is meant to be asserted here is, that the idea of ex-tension is antecedent, in the order of nature, to that ofform; and that the latter could not exist without theother ; but that both, nevertheless, are simple, and bothare to be ascribed to the sense of touch.

$ 29 On the sensations of heat and coldAmong the states of mind which are usually classedwith the intimations of the sense under consideration, are

those which are connected with changes in the tempera-ture of our bodies. Some writers, it is true, have beeninclined to dissent from this arrangement, and have haz-arded an opinion that they ought not to be ascribed tothe sense of TOUCH ; but Dr. Reid, on the contrary, whogave to our sensations the most careful and patient atten-tion, has decidedly assigned to them this origin. Amongother remaiks, he has expressed himself on this subject tothis effect." The words HEAT and COLD," he remarks, (Inquiry intothe Human Mind, ch. v.,) " have each of them two signi-fications ; they sometimes signify certain sensations of themind, which can have no existence when they are notfelt, nor can exist anywhere but in the mind or sentientbeing ; but more frequently they signify a quality in bod-ies, which, by the laws of nature, occasions the sensationsof heat and cold in us; a quality which, though con-nected by custom so closely with the sensation that wecannot without difficulty separate them, yet hath notthe least resemblance to it, and may continue to existwhen there is no sensation at all." The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known,for they neither are, nor can be, anything else than whatwe feel them to be ; but the qualities in bodies, which wecall heat and cold, are unknown. They are only conceiv-B2


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42 THE SENSE OP TOUCH.ed by us as unknown causes or occasions of. the sensations,to which we give the same names. But though commonsense says nothing of the nature of the qualities, it plainlyindicates the existence of them ; and to deny that therecan be heat and cold when they are not felt, is an ab-surdity too gross to merit confutation. For what couldbe more absurd than to say that the thermometer cannotrise or fall unless some person be present, or that the coastof Guinea would be as cold as Nova Zembla if it had noinhabitants." It is the business of philosophers to investigate, byproper experiments and induction, what heat and coldare in bodies. And whether they make heat a particularelement diffused through nature, and accumulated in theheated body, or whether they make it a certain vibrationof the parts of the heated body ; whether they determinethat heat and cold are contrary qualities, as the sensationsundoubtedly are contrary, or that heat only is a quality,and cold its privation; these questions are within theprovince of philosophy ; for common sense says nothingon the one side or the other." But, whatever be the nature of that quality in bodieswhich we call heat, we certainly know this, that it can-not in the least resemble the sensation of heat It is ^noless absurd to suppose a likeness between the sensationand the quality, than it would be to suppose that thepain of the gout resembles a square or a triangle. Thesimplest man that hath common sense does not imaginethe sensation of heat, or anything that resembles thatsensation, to be in the fire. He only imagines that thereis something in the fire which makes him and other sen-tient beings feel heat. Yet as the name of heat, in com-mon language, more frequently and more properly signi-fies this unknown something in the fire than the sensa-tion occasioned by it, he justly laughs at the philosopherwho denies that there is any heat in the fire, and thinksthat he speaks contrary to common sense."

30. Of the sensations of hardness and softness."Let us next consider," continues the same writer,

;* HARDNESS and SOFTNESS; by which ^vords we always


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THB SENSE OF TOUCH. 43understand real properties or qualities of bodies, of which"^re have a distinct conception," When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that itcannot easily be made to change its figure, we callt hard / when its parts are easily displaced, we call itsoft. This is the notion which all mankind have of hard-ness and softness : they are neither sensations nor likeany sensation ; they were real qualities before they wereperceived by touch, and continue to be so when they arenot perceived : for if any man will affirm that diamondswere not hard till they were handled, who would reasonwith him 7" There is, no doubt, a sensation by which we perceivea body to be hard or soft. This sensation of hardness mayeasily be had by piessing one's hand against a table, andattending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside as muchas possible all thought of the table and its qualities, or ofany external thing. But it is one thing to have the sen-sation, and another to attend to it and make it a distinctobject

elements of mental philosophy - a textbook for academies and high schools 1858

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