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TRANSCRIPT
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 1
Electronic Surveillance In Extremistan
K. A. Taipale Executive Director, Center for Advanced Studies
Presented at:
Law at the Intersection of National Security, Privacy, and Technological Change (TLR)
Austin, TX, February 4-6, 2010
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
• More info: http://taipale.info/
http://foreign-intelligence.info/
http://surveillance-society.info/
• These slides available at: http://extremistan.info/
Slide 2
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 3
Overview
1. Extremistan 2. New vulnerabilities, new threats 3. Converging missions 4. Rethinking electronic surveillance 5. e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty 6. Cautions/caveats 7. Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 4
Overview
1. Extremistan – DEFINING BORDERS 2. New vulnerabilities, new threats 3. Converging missions 4. Rethinking electronic surveillance 5. e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty 6. Cautions/caveats 7. Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
• Where is Extremistan?
Slide 5
Key question
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Extremistan is the domain of low probability, high consequent events
Slide 6
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Extremistan vs. Mediocristan
Slide 7
MEDIOCRISTAN Bounded
Nonscalable Type 1 (mild)
Impervious to BS
EXTREMISTAN Unbounded
Scalable/scale-free Type 2 (wild)
Vulnerable to BS
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
National Security lives in Extremistan
• Goal: to maintain survival of the nation state through the use of instruments of national power (DIME) Avoid low probability, high consequent (intolerable) events
Counter/preempt existential threats to the nation state • Prevent seizure or subjugation of land or peoples and
destruction or control of vital physical or geographic assets
Counter/preempt existential threats to “way of life” • Protect the strategic fragility of civil society
• Power law distribution and potentially catastrophic outcomes prevents “rational” risk management
Slide 8
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Law Enforcement lives in Mediocristan
• Goal: to reduce undesirable or deviant (criminal) behavior to sociably tolerable levels
• Presumption of innocence heuristic “better that 9 guilty go free than 1 innocent be convicted”, see
Coffin vs. US (1895); cf. Volokh, “n Guilty Men” (UPLR 1997)
Premised on linear scale (tolerable) consequences
• Normal distribution and predictable/acceptable outcomes allows “rational” risk management
Slide 9
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Prediction, Allocation and Risk Management (Preemption vs. Suppression)
Slide 10
Response/mitigation strategies (and legal regimes?) appropriate in one domain are IRRATIONAL in the other
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• What kind of vulnerabilities and threats are in Extremistan for policy purposes?
Slide 11
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 12
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats – NEW RESPONSES • Converging missions • Rethinking electronic surveillance • e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats • Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
New Vulnerabilities to Defend
• “Strategic fragility” of infrastructure Single points of failure Cascading failures Efficiency undermines security (eliminates redundancy and
resilience, systems are brittle in an engineering sense)
• “Political/social fragility” (zero-tolerance for risks) “Spectacular Terrorism” (~ 9/11) Critical infrastructure cyberattacks (~ Cyber Pearl Harbor)
• ~ self inflicted (other defensive strategies)? • ~ political/ideological contingent borders?
Slide 13
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 14
Random vs. scale-free networks
Human social evolution
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Strategic fragility – supercritical nodes
Slide 15
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
E.g. #1, Internet has logical SPF > DNS
Slide 16
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
And, physical SPFs > 7 Telecom Hotels
Slide 17
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
And, undersea cables
Slide 18
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Jan/Feb 2008
Slide 19
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
E.g. #2, the 5 major shipping routes
Slide 20
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
With 15 major shipping ports
Slide 21
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Cascading failure and “systemic” risks
Slide 22
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Political/Social Fragility
• Zero tolerance for risk • No more 9/11s, no “Cyber Pearl Harbors”
Slide 23
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
New Threats to Counter (Super-empowered groups and individuals – Hammes 5GW)
• Super-empowered capabilities (effort multiplied) International and transnational terrorists Insurgencies and anti-globalization forces Criminal organizations and gangs Rogue corporations
• Super-empowered capacities (effect multiplied) Hackers/crackers (Weapons Mass Disruption) NCB (Weapons Mass Destruction)
• Hybrids and proxies (plausible deniability) (no “agent”) Motivational ambiguity dilutes traditional DIME responses
Slide 24
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
“Spectacular” terrorism
• Mass casualty (kinetic, physical) NCB Coordinated conventional Critical infrastructure targets with secondary effects
• Mass disruption (kinetic or cyber) Critical infrastructure
• Utilities/services Critical systems
• Transportation/communication • Financial
Slide 25
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Kinds of cyberattacks
• Unauthorized access (exploit) Espionage/surveillance
• Syntactic (attack/deny functionality) (~ force) Take switch or server down (NB: bomb or virus) Attack target as info appliance or as control device (SCADA)
• Semantic (alter meaning/outcomes) (***) System appears to be working but does more, or less, or
provides wrong/unreliable outcomes. “Low and slow” (e.g., skew time stamps)
Slide 26
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
New D“I”ME Responses Available
• If political consensus for preemption exists Requires prediction/anticipation of future events, which Requires observation/analysis of behavior or associations
• Electronic Surveillance (defensive) Lyotard: “We are all nodes” (including terrorists and hackers) Communication Analysis (“wiretap”) (deep packet filter)
Traffic Analysis (social network analysis) Behavior Analysis (systems monitoring, anomaly detection) Data Analysis (dataveillance, data mining, analytics)
Remote and Technical Sensing (data acquisition)
• Information Operations (offensive)
Slide 27
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• Under what legal/policy regime(s) should these various defensive and offensive response mechanisms be managed?
Slide 28
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 29
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats • Converging missions - BORDERLESS THREATS • Rethinking electronic surveillance • e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats • Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Traditional National Security Model (Westphalian, 1st, 2nd GW)
Slide 30
National Security Power
Destruction
Deterrence
ACTIVE
NATION STATE
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Extended National Security Model (3rd, 4th GW, SOF)
Slide 31
National Security Power
Destruction
Deterrence
ACTIVE
NATION STATE
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I LIC
OOTW
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
NatSec Legal Regime
Slide 32
National Security Power
Destruction
Deterrence
ACTIVE
NATION STATE
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I LIC
OOTW
US Constitution NSA 1947
LOAC in
Title 10 USC (Mil) Title 50 USC (Intel)
UN Charter Int’l Agreements
ML and BL Treaties
Executive Orders
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Traditional LE Model (Beccarian - punishment)
Slide 33
Law Enforcement Power
Prosecution
Deterrence
REACTIVE
INDIVIDUAL
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Extended LE Model (Intelligence based policing)
Slide 34
Law Enforcement Power
Prosecution
Deterrence
REACTIVE
INDIVIDUAL
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I OC IntT CC
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
LE Legal Regime
Slide 35
Law Enforcement Power
Prosecution
Deterrence
REACTIVE
INDIVIDUAL
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I OC IntT CC
US Constitution Title 18 USC
State Criminal State and Fed Civil
Int’l Agreements MLAT
Att’y Gen Guidelines
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
5GW > DIME+LE
Slide 36
National Security Power
Destruction
Law Enforcement Power
Prosecution
Deterrence Deterrence
ACTIVE REACTIVE
NATION STATE INDIVIDUAL
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I CT
CT/W
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
The Fog of Law
Slide 37
National Security Power
Destruction
Law Enforcement Power
Prosecution
Deterrence Deterrence
ACTIVE REACTIVE
NATION STATE INDIVIDUAL
Disruption
Preemption
S-E G/I CT
CT/W
Title 10 USC Title 50 USC
LOAC
Title 18 USC State Criminal State/Fed Civil
Title 6 USC
FISA ECPA
AG Guidelines
HSPD 23 / NSPD 54
EO 12333
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
The clarity of politics?
• “We are at war” President Obama, Jan. 7, 2010 • Political consensus for preemption of
Spectacular terrorist acts • Coordinated mass-casualty conventional attacks • Critical infrastructure kinetic attacks • NBC attacks
Critical infrastructure cyber attacks
Use of WMD/WMD is politically intolerable
Slide 38
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• What are the government’s security interests/needs/assumptions for using electronic surveillance to counter these threats?
Slide 39
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 40
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats • Converging missions • Rethinking electronic surveillance – NOT “WIRETAP” • e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats • Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Preemption requires actionable intelligence
• Preemption requires anticipating and countering potential future events
• Short of clairvoyance, future events can only be anticipated by examining current or past associations or behaviors
• Associations and behaviors are evidenced in electronic communications
• Thus, electronic surveillance can lead to actionable intelligence
Slide 41
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Conflicting paradigms for electronic surveillance
Intelligence/NatSec Law Enforcement
Activity Signals intelligence Targeted wiretap
Purpose Situational awareness Evidence/forensics
Goal Disruption Conviction
Strategy Move/countermove Linear investigation
Predicate Anticipatory/preemptive Reactive
Target Programmatic Targeted Slide 42
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
“Special needs”
Intelligence Law Enforcement
Activity Signals intelligence Targeted wiretap
Purpose Situational awareness Evidence**/forensics
Goal Disruption Conviction
Strategy Move/countermove Linear investigation
Predicate Anticipatory/preemptive Reactive
Target Programmatic Targeted Slide 43
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
But, preserve outcome choices
Intelligence Law Enforcement
Activity Signals intelligence Targeted wiretap
Purpose Situational awareness Evidence**/forensics
Goal Disruption Conviction
Strategy Move/countermove Linear investigation
Predicate Anticipatory/preemptive Reactive
Target Programmatic Targeted Slide 44
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
FISA
• History – never intended to cover progr. intl. comms Used outdated technology-based distinction – wire/wireless
• NSA TSP – responded to four problems Foreign comm intercepted from switches “within the US” Collateral intercepts to and from US/USP Pattern matching CDRs (traffic analysis) Monitoring places/methods vs. individual (“exclusive use”)
• FISA amendments PAA/FAA didn’t solve Contacts (communities of interest) (traffic analysis) Collateral content (ex ante predicate vs. ex post review ~ pc) Programmatic (cf. pattern vs. roving, “specific” individual)
Slide 45
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• What alternative or additional doctrines/regimes should be considered?
Slide 46
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 47
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats • Converging missions • Rethinking electronic surveillance • e-Terry, NSSA, DI, SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats • Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Collateral intercept or “contact”
Slide 48
Reasonable suspicion PROBABLE CAUSE beyond a reasonable doubt
Terry
target/ search ?
adjudication
Real world OBSERVE
Cyber world
seizure adjudication
ES
PROBLEM: How to get to probable cause where contact with FI target is the first or only indication of suspicion?
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
The e-Terry Stop
Slide 49
ES E-Terry
TARGET
Minimize FI target
“Contact” with FIT can be reasonable suspicion for limited follow up to eliminate or establish probable cause for targeting
SANCTION
Reasonable suspicion PROBABLE CAUSE beyond a reasonable doubt
Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Reasonableness is contextual determined based on “totality of the circumstances”
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Programmatic/systemic surveillance
• FISA is aimed at individuals (“agents of FP”) and particular places (cf. roving**) [~ ECPA]
• Need for “data-focused” authorities (NSSA Kerr 2008) Patterns of communication Conduits/means; Methods Process of elimination/negative space
• “Warrant” (or ?) would issue when identity is unknown and surveillance is likely to yield “terrorist intelligence information” (would not require “specific individual”)
• Results as basis for subsequent targeting under FISA
Slide 50
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Domestic Intelligence Agency
• To facilitate oversight and limit potential harms • Compare w/ Posner suggestion for warrantless
surveillance with no “pro forma” ex ante predicate but ex post review and reporting mechanisms and prohibition on use of information for most non-national security related crimes
• Instead an independent agency with broad authority/narrow charter (i.e., no general LE powers) could preserve availability of criminal sanctions (cf. MI5/SB)
• Maintain “tools” and avoid “wall”
Slide 51
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Network Systems Administrator
• Specialized agency with broad deep-packet surveillance and filtering authority restricted to maintaining network functionality
• Cf. NTSB, CDC, etc. • Authorities/functions
Develop and audit security practices (prophylactic) Monitor systems in real-time (for systemic risk) Respond to incidents (identify, quarantine/isolate, counter) Report on incidents (signatures, forensics, evidence)
• International issues; jurisdiction
Slide 52
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Authorized use/re-use standards
• Existing policy/law overly focused on collections (policy based on analog information technologies) Economics of analog information collection served as “check”
on system Practical obscurity thru information technology inefficiencies
• Digital technologies with zero/low marginal cost of acquisition and storage require shifting focus to “use” and “re-use” not colections Markle Task Force Reports (http://markletaskforce.org/) Taipale Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony
Slide 53
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Offensive information operations
• Need for authorities to engage in offensive information operations (Taipale 2002) (~PFIB 1990s)
Slide 54
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
How to authorize information operations?
• Information operation “warrants” for interference with domestic communications (1st A?) Website Communication channel Message content
• Triage/quarantine authority (5th Amendment?) Disconnect/isolate networks POTUS authority in cybersecurity bill
• International regime (and conflict w/ US Const.) Constrain ambiguity Assign R2A
Slide 55
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• What dangers should be considered?
Slide 56
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 57
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats • Converging missions • Rethinking electronic surveillance • e-Terry, NSSA, DI5/SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats – SLIPPERY SLOPE, ABUSE, ERROR • Context/subtext
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Caveats
• Slippery slope Bureaucratic imperative Indiscriminate tools
• Abuse and misuse Make it “hard to do, easy to spot” Immutable logging (avoid post hoc rationalization)
• Error and error correction Make errors visible (internal advocate, oversight, etc.) Due process
Slide 58
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Key question
• What values should be considered?
Slide 59
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 60
Overview
• Extremistan • New vulnerabilities, new threats • Converging missions • Rethinking electronic surveillance • e-Terry, NSSA, DI5/SysAdmin, OIOW-Triage-Treaty • Cautions/caveats • Context/subtext – “PRIVACY”, SURVEILLANCE VS.
OMNIVEILLANCE, CONTROL SOCIETY
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 61
A Brief History of “Privacy”
• Physical privacy (~ universal norm?) Home is your castle Property right
• Information privacy (culturally and technology specific) Cf., Ancient Greek world, private persons were idiotes since
you had to engage in public discourse to have an opinion
• Print created “privacy” by unifying the two Private “thinking” space Modern notion of individuality and privacy Michel de Montaigne (16thC) -- “the back room” Based on enforcing borders or barriers
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 62
The U.S. Legal Claim to “Privacy”
• The emergence of “mass media” technologies resulted in violations of social borders (previously enforced through physical space)
• Warren/Brandeis article (Harv. L.R. 1890) Tabloid press and fast/mobile photography Claim to privacy based on property rights (“intrusion”)
• Unpacking the modern notion of privacy Secrecy (don’t know) (4th A) Anonymity (don’t attribute) (1st A) Autonomy (don’t care) (power over use) (5th A)
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 63
Information flows and privacy
• Technologies of communication bound potentialities Oral culture: information exchange is bidirectional Print culture: information exchange is unidirectional Net culture: information exchange is omnidirectional
• In a network the most important characteristics of a node are its connection not its intrinsic properties
• Is ontological separation (nee “privacy”) viable? • Compare “confidentiality” based on relationships
(protect autonomy directly?) (EU-dignity, UK-conf)
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 64
Failure of U.S. Privacy Law
• Authoritarian Based on experts and authorities
• Relevance Aging notions of individuality Privacy vs. personalization
• Subjective perception of violation Personal and contextual Therefore local, not broad based
• Privacy law overly focused on disclosure/collection (secrecy) rather than use (autonomy)
• Regulatory capture: using privacy claims to render powerful institutional actions opaque while making others transparent
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 65
Social ~ Technical privacy
• Social privacy - group awareness vs. individual “P” • Technical privacy - system awareness vs. user “P” • Value sensitive policy and technology design process
tries to expose all aspects of both these relationships early and throughout the design, development, and implementation of socio-technical systems
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 66
Emergence of the Surveillance Society
• Surveillance - collection and analysis of information about populations in order to govern their activities
• Surveillance is the social response to privacy and anonymity
• Surveillance is a social control mechanism to provide accountability for behavior within systems (thru audit)
• Counterparty trust • Surveillance is a feature of modernity
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 67
Characteristics of the Surveillance Society
• No single big brother – ability to harness the surveillance efforts of otherwise disparate technologies and organizations (info sharing/access to existing data)
• Power is in taking advantage of existing systems • Interaction of the panoptic and synoptic
Panoptic - few watching the many • Fear and uncertainty about the unseen observer • Classifying populations for management • Or discursively, by constructing subjects
Synoptic - many watching the few • Seduction and enticement rather than coercion
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 68
Consequences of a Surveillance Society
• Surveillance technologies do not monitor people qua individuals but instead operate thru process of dissembling and reassembling data points (audit)
• Creates a subject/identity - data double, surveillant assemblage, digital dossier, virtual self
• To use for social sorting, a technique of power to shape destinies
• Based on what is measurable/auditable in system • Can lead to autonomy trap if not made visible
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 69
The evolution of modern social control
• Sovereign model based on arbitrary decree • Beccarian model based on punishment and
deterrence of deviant acts after they are committed • Foucauldian model (panoptic) of general social
compliance through ubiquitous preventative surveillance and control through systems constraints
• Deleuzian model of a “control society” based on seduction and enticement rather than coercion
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 70
Discourses of Opposition/Resistance
• Privacy (but “connections” are not individual privacy violations but disclosures of social organization)
• Effectiveness (paradoxically reinforces need for more intensive surveillance)
• Technology (battle of the experts) • Identity (profile or reputation?) • Input error (bad data) or threshold error (bad decision) • Function/mission creep
Slippery slope and desensitization “Terrorism” and “Child exploitation”
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 71
Strategies of Opposition/Resistance
• Luddism whack-a-mole (“privacy lobby” v. TIA)
• Techno-fix PET (privacy enhancing technologies) Strategies of consent (notice, P3P, etc.) Strategies to separate kn of identity from kn of behavior
• Selective revelation and rules-based processing • Reintroduce cost/inefficiency as a brake on power • Process intervention points - policy appliances
Audit * (accountability strategies)
• Value sensitive policy and design Expose the social construction to democratic process
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Context/Subtext – the Control Society Divine Right > Beccaria > Foucault > Deleuze
Slide 72
Big Brother or Matrix?
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Slide 73
What is “control society”?
• Control/security is not achieved primarily by law enforcement through arrest and prosecution (“low policing”) but by risk management through surveillance, information exchange, auditing, communication, and classification (“high policing”)
• Result is not homogenization but infinitely fine-tuned differentiation/personalization (Matrix not 1984)
• The endpoint is to eliminate the potential for deviance by managing opportunities (fix potential outcomes)
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Omniveillance
• Is this a 1st, 4th or 5th Amendment problem? • What is the appropriate rhetoric and strategy of
opposition to shape effective policy? • Is “privacy” historically obsolete? • If so, what should replace it?
Slide 74
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Slide 75
<taipale.info> </end>
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Addendum: ECPA
• The Wiretap Act “Super” warrant Transit requirement Voice/video distinction (~ FISA)
• The Stored Communications Act Regular warrants <180 days Admin subpoena > 180 days
• The Pen Register Act Smith ph# > address headers Wholesale collection vs. retail (individual)
Slide 76
K. A. Taipale February 4-6, 2010
Center for Advanced Studies www.advancedstudies.org
Addendum: Third Party Doctrine
• Collection vs. secondary use • U.S. v. Miller
“business records” Cf. bailee cases
• Smith v. Maryland Phone # (~ duration, etc.) Retail/individual record vs. wholesale
• Data quality for re-use
Slide 77