Electocracy with Accountabilities? 

England and Wales’ Novel Public Governance Model of Police and Crime Commissioners

Professor John W Raine

14th May 2015

Just a week in politics….

The possible election of a Labour Government and the abolition of Police and Crime Commissioners! (though no indication of how a Labour Government would approach police governance and accountability instead)

But now a degree more stability for the PCC model and the prospect of a second round of PCC elections in May 2017.

A mostly troubled start…

Voter ignorance, confusion and apathy Allegations of cronyism Criticisms of excessive spending The TV Revelations from Kent’s PCC Fall-outs with chief constables The ‘Rotherham problem’

How much are the police and crime commissioners costing you?• BBC research how many staff the new PCCs are employing

and how much they are being paid.• No central register of the information - but found that 41

PCCs have employed at least 449 staff since taking office.• Wide variations in salaries and the size of each PCC team

in the 41 police areas outside of London. • The Home Office said it expected the directly elected

commissioners to cut costs - but it's not clear yet whether PCCs are costing more or less than the system they replaced.

Channel 4 programme: ‘Meet the Police Commissioner’Kent PCC, Ann Barnes

Police and crime commissioner Ann Barnes has apologised for appearing in a controversial fly-on-the-wall TV documentary.But she defiantly insisted she would carry on in the £85,000-a-year job despite accusations from officers in Kent that the Channel 4 programme made their force a "laughing stock".

…who struggled to explain what her role involved

Lincolnshire's PCC spent £160,000 by 'unnecessarily' suspending the chief constable, a report found.Temporary police chief Neil Rhodes was suspended by the force's PCC, Alan Hardwick, in February 2013 over an employment dispute.A judicial review found in Mr Rhodes' favour and he has since been given the job permanently.

South Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner FINALLY resigns over Rotherham sex abuse scandal 'for sake of victims'

A police and crime commissioner made a "serious error of judgement" by revealing the name of a whistleblower, an investigation has found.In May, Avon and Somerset's Chief Constable Nick Gargan was suspended over allegations he made inappropriate advances to female staff.The Police and Crime Panel found Sue Mountstevens breached her own code of conduct by telling Mr Gargan who had made the allegations. Last week, Ms Mountstevens apologised.

A police and crime commissioner (PCC) threatened to "humiliate" a chief constable if she did not quit, MPs have been told.Carmel Napier, the former chief constable of Gwent police, stepped down in June after PCC Ian Johnston ordered her to retire.

MPs 'cast Gwent police commissioner Ian Johnston as villain'

But what about the basic concept, and experience so far, of the PCC model of police governance?

Electocracy with Accountabilities? 

The Police Authority

Chief Constable

The Public

Assoc of Chief Police

Officers

Local Councils

The Pre-2012 Police Governance and Accountability Framework

The Home Secretary

The tripartiterelationship

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary

Police & CrimeCommissioner

Police &Crime Panel

Chief Constable

The Public

Assoc of Chief Police

Officers

Local PoliticalParties/Councils

The PCC Police Governance and Accountability Framework

The Home Secretary

Her Majesty’sInspectorate ofConstabulary

The StrategicPolicing Requirement

The Police and Crime Commissioner

The Voters and the Local Public

The Police & Crime Panel

The Chief Constable & Police Force

SponsoringPolitical Party

Local AuthorityCommunity

Safety Partnerships

The Local CriminalJustice

Agencies

Other Providers of Community Safety/Crim

Justice Services

PCC Relationships and Accountabilities

Central Govt (Home Office) (plus Ministry of Justice/Dept for Communities & Local Govt)

Five Potential Accountabilities

1. Accountability of the PCC to the Voters and Public

2. Accountability of the PCC to the Police and Crime Panel

3. Accountability of the PCC to Central Government

4. Accountability of the PCC to Political Sponsors

5. Accountability of the Chief Constable to the PCC

The Underlying Conceptual Framework of Principal-Agent Theory

Problems of ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘multiple principals’

1. PCC as Agent of the voters/people

2. PCC in a (weak) Agent role with the Police and Crime Panel

3. PCC in a (limited) Agent role with the Home Secretary

4. Some PCCs in a (limited) Agent role with their political sponsors

5. PCC as Principal to the chief constable and police force

The Research…

Interviews with 9 PCCs – conducted between June and October

2013 Three Conservative; three Labour; and 3

Independents One of each in (respectively) the north, the

midlands and the south of England & Wales A cross-section of mainly rural, mixed

urban/rural, and mainly metropolitan police force areas

The Nine selected PCCs

1. Accountability to Voters & wider Public

Significant out-and-about in communities and with local groups – “PCCs are set to become some of the most recognised

public leaders in the country – more so than most local councillors and many members of parliament.”

– “The police themselves have been amazed at what this is all producing by way of complaints from public.”

– “Being out and about and listening is how you learn about how the force is working.”

– I have listened to your experiences, concerns, and suggestions; So in a very real sense, this is your Police and Crime Plan. You are my co-authors because you know your communities better than anyone else”.

– “In determining my priorities I have listened to the views that the public have expressed through engagement events and feedback questionnaires.

– “This plan sets out our priorities for 2013-2017 which are based on the issues you have raised. You have told me that your concerns are anti-social behaviour, burglary and domestic and sexual violence. I will ensure that wherever you live – rural, suburban, town or city – your police will work with you to deliver these priorities.”

– “Listening is what this job is all about – people say things to you in the street that they wouldn’t say to you in a booked appointment or if they were come into the building”.

2. Accountability to the Police and Crime Panel

Several of the PCPs shifted their position from initial scepticism and negativity to being generally supportive - once they had heard the Commissioner’s explanations and had understood the thinking behind the choices and decisions.

The challenge for former police authority members in coming to terms with their role as ‘scrutineers’ of the Commissioner’s decisions.

The challenge for panels of part-time councillors (from across the area) in scrutinising the decisions of a full-time PCC

Most PCCs were fairly sceptical about the quality of scrutiny offered by their panels; – “a bit tokenistic”, – “without real teeth” and “not very dynamic”,– “a wholly inadequate way of holding you to

account”. But do the Panels select the right councillors

for the role?

3. Accountability to Central Government

Contrary to expectations, PCCs commented positively on the constructive balance they felt the Home Office had struck between providing support, if and when requested (including good access to the Home Secretary in person), and allowing each to go about their role in their own way

While recognising their obligations in support of the national ‘strategic policing requirement’, none saw this as presenting contentious pressures for them, or creating particular conflicts with their own commitments and priorities.

4. Accountability to Political Sponsors

Of 41 elected PCCs, 29 were sponsored by a political party (16 by the Conservative party and 13 by the Labour party), while the other 12 (nearly one in 3) are ‘independents’.

“a clear message from the [election] campaign was that the public don’t want politics in policing – so the rosettes are off”.

But some perceptible differences in polity:– Three Conservative PCCs emphasised a strong

managerialist agenda (improving VfM in policing, in ‘getting upstream’ and preventing crime; and in more integration between services)

– One was very critical of the police in relation to strategic management.

“ They talk endlessly about strategy but are not good at it. Most of their work is about meeting deadlines in minutes and hours, and they struggle to lift their sights

towards the longer term”, “I hadn’t prepared [myself] for the shambolic state of the

business side of policing - not policing itself – but the systems and processes by which it is managed”.

Three Labour PCCs talked more about local issues – and more about ‘problem-solving’

PCCs with experience in the judiciary also articulated strong concerns for issues of fairness and equity. – One former magistrate talked of concerns about the force’s

‘stop and search’ policies and practices and spoke of the challenges in communicating with hard-to-reach groups and minorities.

– Another with judicial experience had prioritised domestic and sexual abuse and violence in the Police and Crime Plan.

Possibly some differences reflected the character of the different areas and criminogenic factors. But also individual backgrounds and experience of PCCs.

5. Holding the Chief Constable to Account

The PCC as Principal! Keen awareness of the significance of the less-than-

clearly-defined ‘boundary line’ between their own more strategic area of responsibility and that for operational policing of their chief constable

In most cases, the boundary line had been (gently) ‘tested’ on more than one occasion!

working relationships mostly described as ‘good’, but emphasising the importance of the ‘keeping of distance’ and ‘retaining a certain formality’.

Two had made their own appointments; and two had known their chief constables very well from previous roles.

All held regular formal meetings with their chief constables for the purpose of ‘holding to account’ (and with official minutes taken of such meetings); mostly on a weekly or fortnightly basis, plus near daily additional contact.

Mostly PCCs have chosen to site their offices within Police Headquarters - for pragmatic and cost reasons.

Conclusions The dominant accountability is with the voters and

public (and with little indication of competing accountabilities in practice)

The personal dimension is particularly important (in meetings and in public settings) though public knowledge of the PCC role and person remains low

It is still too early to reach firm conclusions about either the impacts or balance of benefits of the PCC model of police governance.

The story so far seems to be of police governance in England and Wales becoming distinctly more visible, more consultative and, by implication, more publicly accountable too.

But is it the most appropriate model?

An alternative model…? The Committee on Standards in Public Life

– I argued for a directly-elected PCC to chair a Police Committee of nominated councillors from each constituent local authority of the police area.

Along the lines informally established by the late Bob Jones in West Midlands.

Retaining the advantages of strong, informed and democratic leadership and account-holding by the PCC, while also building and sustaining strong local accountability and responsiveness

Abandoning Police & Crime Panels to provide scrutiny as well as support for the PCC

Thank you for Listening!