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Election quality,

public trust are central issues

for Africa’s upcoming contests By Peter Penar, Rose Aiko, Thomas Bentley, and Kangwook Han

Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 35 | September 2016


Introduction

Nothing kindles democracy’s energies, anxieties, hopes, and frustrations like an election. The

quality of an election can spell the difference between a cooking fire and an explosion.

If a successful election can calm and focus a nation (e.g. Namibia 2015), a disputed election

can tear it apart (e.g. Burundi 2015, Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Kenya 2008).

With at least 25 African countries conducting national elections in 2016-2017,1 great attention

is focused on electoral management bodies – typically national electoral commissions – as

crucial players in electoral processes and in shaping public perceptions of how well

democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud and, even if it

doesn’t swing an election, produce political alienation, public mistrust, protest, and violence.

In 2016, we have already seen examples of unrest in Kenya, where opposition calls for

electoral commission reforms using the hashtag #IEBCMustFall have sparked demonstrations

and a violent reaction from security forces; in the Republic of the Congo, where election

malpractices led to violent protests; and in Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after

President Ali Bongo claimed a widely disputed re-election victory. In Ghana, pre-election

anxieties are high amid questions about the electoral commission’s revision of the voter roll

for December’s election.

Against the backdrop of history’s examples – in Africa and elsewhere – of tampering with

voter rolls, suppression of competition and voter turnout, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, multiple

voting, and manipulation of results, free and fair elections, agreed to in the African Union’s

Charter on Good Governance and Elections, depend on competent election management

supported by citizen sensitization efforts to build public confidence.

Using 2014/2015 Afrobarometer data from 36 African countries, this analysis examines public

perceptions of electoral management institutions and the quality of elections. Overall, public

trust in national electoral commissions is moderate at best. Although a majority of citizens say

their most recent elections were mostly free and fair, citizens express serious concerns about

the fairness of vote counts, corruption during elections, and the safety of voters during

campaigns and at the polls. Citizens’ views of electoral commission performance and

election quality generally mirror the opinions of country experts found in international

assessments.

More broadly, many citizens say elections are not working well as mechanisms t o ensure that

people’s views are represented and that voters can hold non-performing leaders

accountable. Few countries have achieved improvement in the perceived performance of

elections over the past decade.

Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude

surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more

than 30 countries in Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013,

and findings from Round 6 surveys (2014/2015) are currently being released. Afrobarometer

conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent’s choice with nationally

representative samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2% (for

samples of 2,400) or +/3% (for samples of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.

Round 6 interviews with almost 54,000 citizens in 36 countries (see list in Appendix Table A.1)

represent the views of more than three-fourths of the continent’s population.

1 According to the National Democratic Institute, national elections (not counting constitutional referenda) in

2016 include: Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic

of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Morocco, Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, and Zambia. In 2017: Algeria, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone. See https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar/.


Key findings

On average across 36 surveyed countries, just half (50%) of respondents say they trust

their electoral commission “somewhat” (25%) or “a lot” (25%). Some of the lowest

levels of trust are expressed in countries with closely contested elections in 2016

including Gabon (25%), São Tomé and Príncipe (31%), and Ghana (37%).

Two-thirds of Africans rate their most recent election as “completely free and fair”

(41%) or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (24%). Citizens’ views on election

quality are generally consistent with assessments by international experts.


But substantial proportions of the population are skeptical about the quality of their

elections. More than four in 10 Africans say that voters are at least “sometimes”

threatened with violence at the polls (44%); that opposition parties and candidates

are at least “sometimes” prevented from running (43%); that the news media “never”

or only “sometimes” provides fair coverage of all candidates (43%); and that voters

are “often” or “always” bribed (43%).

Only one-third (34%) of Africans think that votes are “always” counted fairly. Several

countries with a history of election-related violence express low levels of confidence

in the vote count, including Kenya (26%), Zimbabwe (22%), and Nigeria (6%).

Fully half of Africans say that elections do not work well as mechanisms to ensure that

people’s views are represented (50%) or that voters are able to remove non -

performing leaders from office (51%). Countries with the highest levels of

dissatisfaction with the representation and accountability performance of elections

include Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Madagascar.

Trust in national electoral commissions

Election management in Africa is the focus of considerable attention from the United Nations,

African regional organisations, and international entities such as the Electoral Institute for

Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems

(IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

At the national level, electoral management bodies are engaged in ongoing review and

reform efforts to improve logistical management and transparency. Countries are auditing

their voter rolls, implementing biometric voter registration and identification, engaging

political stakeholders to monitor management procedures, and improving processes for

transmitting results. Some of the most visible reforms have centered on electoral commissions

themselves, with a view to improving performance on one important measure of election

management: public trust in electoral management bodies.

Across 35 African countries, just half of citizens say they trust their national electoral

commission “somewhat” (25%) or “a lot” (25%) (Figure 1). One in five respondents (21%) say

they have no trust whatsoever in their election management body. On a scale of 1 (not at

all) to 4 (a lot), the average extent of trust in electoral commissions in Africa is 2.6, which lies

between “just a little” and “somewhat.”

Three countries with elections this year express some of the lowest levels of trust: Gabon (25%

trust “somewhat” or ”a lot”), São Tomé and Príncipe (31%), and Ghana (37%). Other

countries showing remarkably low levels of trust in their electoral commissions include Sudan

(28%), Nigeria (31%), Algeria (31%), Liberia (33%), Togo (37%), and Sierra Leone (37%). At the

other extreme are Burundi (surveyed in September-October 2014), Niger, and Namibia (each

74%).

With regard to elections in 2017 and 2018, there are warning signs for Kenya and Zimbabwe,

as less than half (46%) of citizens trust their electoral commission in these countries, which

have experienced high levels of election-related violence in the past.

When considering public trust levels by country, it is important to note the timing of the

Afrobarometer Round 6 fieldwork and its proximity to elections (see Appendix Table A.1 for

fieldwork and election dates). In Sudan, for example, where recorded trust levels are low, the

survey was fielded shortly after the April 2015 elections, which were so flawed that the

African Union considered not sending observers and all major opposition parties boycotted

the polls. In Nigeria, the survey was conducted three months prior to the March 2015

elections, which were the object of widespread anxieties but turned out to be largely

peaceful and successful. In Namibia, the survey was completed during the run-up to the

November 2014 elections, a period marked by optimism about the implementation of

electronic voting machines. These particulars of the timing of the survey relative to the


national election calendar can have some effect on the findings and should be kept in mind

when making cross-country comparisons.

Figure 1: Trust in national electoral commissions | 35 countries* | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: How m uch do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: National Electoral Commission? (* Question was not asked in Morocco.)

Average levels of public trust in electoral commissions have not changed dramatically over

time. Across 32 countries where this question was asked in both Round 5 and Round 6, trust

levels have remained essentially unchanged (50% “somewhat” or “a lot” in 2011/2013 and

51% in 2014/2015).

8%

10%

7%

16%

10%

13%

20%

18%

19%

17%

16%

25%

11%

22%

22%

31%

26%

34%

25%

27%

15%

30%

39%

21%

18%

38%

34%

31%

37%

32%

26%

21%

34%

38%

53%

49%

17%

18%

24%

15%

21%

20%

17%

19%

18%

24%

25%

17%

34%

24%

24%

17%

22%

14%

25%

27%

39%

25%

17%

35%

39%

19%

23%

28%

23%

29%

41%

46%

35%

36%

22%

25%

24%

25%

36%

40%

24%

38%

21%

22%

26%

29%

27%

27%

22%

22%

21%

28%

20%

20%

23%

22%

28%

19%

10%

20%

22%

21%

16%

23%

22%

20%

19%

20%

20%

18%

10%

11%

51%

39%

31%

18%

35%

28%

37%

37%

24%

27%

26%

30%

22%

27%

25%

19%

18%

28%

21%

19%

18%

18%

21%

12%

13%

17%

14%

16%

13%

15%

8%

8%

11%

7%

10%

9%

1%

7%

2%

10%

10%

2%

6%

3%

13%

4%

5%

2%

11%

5%

8%

5%

14%

4%

6%

6%

8%

13%

12%

8%

5%

13%

4%

5%

4%

5%

4%

1%

1%

6%

5%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Gabon

Sudan

Nigeria

São Tomé and Príncipe

Algeria

Liberia

Togo

Ghana

Sierra Leone

Benin

Cameroon

Côte d'Ivoire

Cape Verde

Kenya

Zimbabwe

Zambia

Mozambique

Guinea

Average (35 countries)

Uganda

Madagascar

Tunisia

Lesotho

Egypt

Swaziland

Malawi

Senegal

South Africa

Burkina Faso

Botswana

Tanzania

Mauritius

Mali

Namibia

Niger

Burundi

A lot Somewhat Just a little Not at all Don't know


Across 18 countries2 tracked since 2005/2006, trust shows a modest negative trend: Strong

positive sentiments (trust “a lot”) have declined slightly, replaced by modest positive

sentiments (trust “somewhat”), while a decrease in “don’t know” responses is matched by

small increases in “not at all” and “just a little” responses (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Change in public trust in national electoral commissions | 18 countries

| 2005-2015

Respondents were asked: How m uch do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough

about them to say: National Electoral Com m ission?

While average changes are small, there is significant over-time variation within countries in

public trust. Between 2011/2013 and 2014/2015, trust in electoral comm issions increased

sharply in Mali (by 28 percentage points), Egypt (22 points), and Namibia (17 points) while

dropping precipitously in Ghana (by 22 percentage points), Sierra Leone (19 points), Benin

(14 points), and South Africa (11 points) (Figure 3).

For some countries, increases in trust between 2011/2013 and 2014/2015 may reflect reforms

and technological advances. Namibia, for example, introduced electronic voting in its 2014

general elections. In Mali and Madagascar, electoral commissions may have garnered trust

from the way they managed elections that brought an end to political instability.

Interestingly, among those with significant recent decreases in trust are countries that have

high levels of electoral competition and are generally viewed as relatively democratic,

including Ghana, Benin, South Africa, Cape Verde, and Zambia. This may reflect citizens’

rising expectations of what constitutes a high-quality election; increasing oversight of

election processes, especially by opposition parties and civil society; and the view that even

minor irregularities in elections may influence the outcome in very tight contests.

2 Countries tracked since 2005/2006 are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,

Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

30% 26%

28%

26%

23% 24%

25%

27%

20% 20%

23% 22%

17%

21%

17%

20%

11% 9%

7% 6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015

A lot Somewhat Just a little Not at all Don't know


Figure 3: Recent changes in public trust in national electoral commissions | 32 countries* | 2011-2015

Figure shows increase or decrease, in percentage points, from 2011/2013 to 2014/2015 in the proportion

of respondents saying they trust their national electoral com mission “som ewhat” or “a lot.” (*Question not asked in Morocco, not asked in Tunisia in 2011/2013; Gabon and São Tom é and Príncipe were not

surveyed in 2011/2013.).

Examining longer-term trends among 18 countries tracked over the past decade, significant

increases in trust were recorded in Namibia (18 percentage points), Zimbabwe (17 points),

Mali (15 points), and Zambia (15 points, although in Zambia trust started declining again in

2011/2013) (Figure 4). But several countries registered alarming decreases in trust over the

past decade, led by Ghana (a drop of 38 percentage points), Mozambique (24 points), and

Tanzania (19 points) (Figure 5).

Moreover, trends over the past decade may obscure significant short -term ups and downs

within countries, such as dips in Senegal (2008) and Mali (2013) followed by increases. In

Kenya, an overall 7-percentage-point decline in trust over the past decade includes a

dramatic 27-point drop in the 2008 survey, reflecting the country’s violent presidential

election, followed by a full recovery in the 2011 survey. From 2011 to 2014, public trust in

Kenya’s electoral commission declined again (by 7 percentage points) – perhaps an

example of the fact that in some cases, efforts to improve election practices may fail to

-22

-19

-14

-11

-10

-10

-8

-7

-6

-6

-4

-3

-1

-1

0

1

2

3

3

3

4

5

8

9

9

10

10

11

12

17

22

28

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40

Ghana

Sierra Leone

Benin

South Africa

Cape Verde

Liberia

Zambia

Kenya

Malawi

Mozambique

Mauritius

Nigeria

Guinea

Burkina Faso

Botswana

Sudan

Algeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Togo

Cameroon

Lesotho

Tanzania

Senegal

Burundi

Swaziland

Niger

Zimbabwe

Uganda

Madagascar

Namibia

Egypt

Mali


meet expectations and may even erode public confidence as existing weaknesses are

revealed. Kenya implemented biometric voter registration and identification before its 2013

general elections, but procurement, management, and technical problems led many

Kenyans to question the integrity or competence of the electoral commission. A more recent

example comes from Ghana, where the electoral commission was directed by the judiciary

to conduct a full audit of the voter list. The revelation of many inaccuracies in the voter list

and questions about whether the electoral commission will have time to correct these

inaccuracies by December 2016 may have aggravated the decade-long downhill slide of

public trust in the commission.

Figure 4: Changes in public trust in national electoral commissions | countries with

largest increases | 2005-2015



(% who say “som ewhat or “a lot”)

Figure 5: Changes in public trust in national electoral commissions | countries with

largest decreases | 2005-2015



(% who say “som ewhat or “a lot”)

56% 63%

57%

74%

29% 31% 36%

46%

53% 53%

40%

68%

33% 41%

56% 48%

20% 28%

33% 31%

49%

34%

50%

58%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015

Namibia Zimbabwe Mali

Zambia Nigeria Senegal

75%

66%

59%

37%

72%

66% 54%

48%

86%

77% 62% 67%

67%

51%

56% 62%

41% 43%

53% 53%

25%

53% 46%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015

Ghana Mozambique Tanzania

Lesotho Uganda Kenya


Freeness and fairness of elections

Citizens’ assessments of the quality of their elections surpass their trust in their electoral

commission: Two-thirds (65%) say their most recent election was either “completely free and

fair” (41%) or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (24%) (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Freeness and fairness of elections | 36 countries | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last

national election, held in [20xx]?

This overall assessment has been fairly stable, both across 34 countries surveyed in 2011/2013

and across 18 countries tracked over the past decade (Figure 7),

Figure 7: Freeness and fairness of elections | 18 countries | 2005-2015

Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]?

(Note: This question was not asked in Afrobarom eter Round 4 (2008/2009).)

41%

24%

14%

11%

10%

Completely free and fair

Free and fair, but with

minor problems

Free and fair, with major

problems

Not free and fair

Don’t know

41%

47%

44%

24% 23% 24%

12% 11% 14%

10% 9%

9% 10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

2005/2006 2011/2013 2014/2015

Completely free and fair Free and fair, but with minor problems

Free and fair, with major problems Not free and fair

Don’t know


However, countries vary greatly in their citizens’ perceptions of overall election quality.

Citizens in Mauritius (91%), Senegal (87%), and Madagascar (84%) believe in overwhelming

numbers that their elections are completely or mostly free and fair (Figure 8). Malagasy views

on their 2013 general election are intriguing given persistent concerns about the

management of recent elections. Burundians’ views of their 2010 elections are also

overwhelmingly positive (81%); these views were expressed well before the 2015 presidential

election rejected by the international community.

In contrast, only minorities see their elections as free and fair in Sudan (29%), Morocco (34%),

Gabon (37% for its 2011 election), Algeria (43%), Nigeria (46%), and Ghana (46%).

Figure 8: Freeness and fairness of elections | 36 countries | 2014/2015



(% who say “free and fair, but with m inor problem s” or “com pletely free and fair”)

29%

34%

37%

43%

46%

46%

52%

54%

55%

56%

56%

58%

60%

61%

62%

64%

65%

65%

67%

69%

69%

70%

70%

72%

75%

75%

76%

77%

78%

80%

81%

83%

83%

83%

84%

87%

91%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Sudan

Morocco

Gabon

Algeria

Nigeria

Ghana

Mozambique

Liberia

Côte d'Ivoire

Cape Verde

Zimbabwe

Cameroon

Egypt

Togo

Kenya

Burkina Faso

Average

Benin

Guinea

Uganda

Sierra Leone

Malawi

Tunisia

South Africa

Lesotho

Tanzania

Swaziland

Botswana

Zambia

Namibia

Burundi

Niger


Mali

Madagascar

Senegal

Mauritius


Within countries, men and women offer similar assessments of the freeness and fairness of

elections. But rural residents are more likely to see elections as free and fair than urban

dwellers, 69% vs. 60%, which may reflect the amount and quality of information that reaches

rural residents and the fact that many ruling parties invest heavily in rural areas. Gaps in rural

vs. urban perceptions of whether elections were free and fair are largest in Burundi (85% rural

vs. 55% urban), Zimbabwe (63% vs. 43%), Burkina Faso (68% vs. 48%), and Togo (69% v. 50%)

(Figure 9).

Figure 9: Rural-urban differences in perceptions of elections as free and fair | 36 countries | 2014/2015



(% who say “free and fair, but with m inor problem s” or “com pletely free and fair”)

67%

50%

36%

72%

93%

77%

54%

57%

68%

87%

78%

75%

28%

54%

82%

67%

76%

71%

80%

41%

77%

66%

50%

70%

57%

60%

35%

52%

60%

41%

71%

72%

58%

50%

48%

43%

55%

54%

43%

30%

67%

89%

74%

51%

54%

66%

87%

78%

75%

30%

56%

85%

71%

79%

75%

84%

46%

82%

71%

57%

77%

64%

69%

44%

63%

71%

53%

85%

86%

72%

69%

68%

63%

85%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Egypt

Nigeria

Morocco

Tunisia

Mauritius

Lesotho

Mozambique

Cape Verde

Guinea

Senegal

Zambia

Tanzania

Sudan

Côte d'Ivoire


Malawi

Botswana

South Africa

Mali

Algeria

Namibia

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Swaziland

Kenya

Average

Gabon

Cameroon

Uganda

Ghana

Niger

Madagascar

Benin

Togo

Burkina Faso

Zimbabwe

Burundi

Rural Urban


While average assessments of election quality may be fairly stable over time, individual

countries have experienced significant changes. Since the previous survey round in

2011/2013, the proportion of Kenyans who describe their last national election as completely

or mostly free and fair has increased by 31 percentage points, and similar improvement are

seen in Madagascar (30 points) and Mali (26 points). At the other extreme are Ghana (a 34-

percentage–point drop), Nigeria (25 points), and Liberia (22 points) (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Freeness and fairness of elections over time | 34 countries | 2011-2015

Figure shows increase or decrease, in percentage points, from 2011/2013 to 2014/2015 in the proportion

of respondents who say their m ost recent national elections were “com pletely free and fair” or “free and fair, but with m inor problem s.”

Looking over the past decade, the proportion of citizens who see their previous election as

completely or mostly free and fair has increased by 49 percentage points in Zambia, by 27

points in Malawi, by 20 points in Zimbabwe, and by 19 points in Mali (Figure 11). This does not

necessarily mean that these countries have attained very positive views on election quality,

only that there has been a large positive change. For instance, in Zimbabwe, while positive

-34

-25

-22

-20

-12

-9

-8

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-6

-5

-5

-4

-3

0

1

1

2

4

5

5

5

7

8

12

14

15

18

19

26

30

31

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40

Ghana

Nigeria

Liberia

Cape Verde

Mozambique

Benin

Tanzania

Burkina Faso

Zambia

Lesotho

Sudan

Morocco

Botswana

South Africa

Algeria

Senegal

Burundi

Average

Mauritius

Malawi

Sierra Leone

Tunisia

Namibia

Uganda

Guinea

Niger

Swaziland

Cameroon

Togo

Egypt

Zimbabwe

Côte d'Ivoire

Mali

Madagascar

Kenya


assessments have risen by 20 percentage points since 2005 (after the severely flawed 2002

elections), still only 56% of citizens say in 2014/2015 that the 2013 election was free and fair

(Figure 12a).

Notably, several countries that election support experts see as making progress on election

management experienced sharp declines in public opinion about the freeness and fairness

of elections, including Ghana (a drop of 31 percentage points), Kenya (17 points), and Benin

(9 points) (Figure 12b). As with public trust in electoral commissions, these decreases may

reflect increasingly vibrant political competition and higher citizen expectations of what a

free and fair election should look like.

Again, changes over the past decade can obscure large short -term swings in citizens’

perceptions of election quality that are highly dependent on the context of a particular

election. Some of the biggest swings have occurred in Kenya, Madagascar, and Nigeria

(Figure 12c). In Kenya, respondents in the 2011 survey rated the violent 2007 general election

process very poorly, in contrast to much more positive views of the 2013 general election.

However, ratings of the 2013 election are still more unfavourable than t hose given in the 2005

survey (concerning the 2002 general election).

For Nigeria, the 2011 election marked a high-water mark in election quality approval, after

severely flawed elections in 2003 and 2007. However, in the tense run-up to the 2015 election,

citizens may have begun to recast even the image of the 2011 election in light of what they

saw as potential problems in the upcoming contest.

Figure 11: Change in perceived freeness and fairness of elections | 18 countries

| 2005-2015

Figure shows the increase or decrease, in percentage points, from 2005/2006 to 2014/2015 in the

proportion of respondents who say their m ost recent elections were “free and fair, but with m inor problem s” or “com pletely free and fair”)

-31

-25

-17

-9

-7

-4

-3

-3

-2

2

3

4

7

9

16

19

20

27

49

-50 0 50 100

Ghana

Mozambique

Kenya

Benin

Botswana

Lesotho

Tanzania

South Africa

Cape Verde

Namibia

Average (18 countries)

Uganda

Madagascar

Senegal

Nigeria

Mali

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Zambia


29%

85%

78%

43%

69% 70%

36% 38%

56%

64%

58%

83%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2011/2013 2014/2015

Zambia Malawi

Zimbabwe Mali

77% 80%

46% 64% 52%

79%

31%

62%

74% 74% 65%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2011/2013 2014/2015

Ghana Mozambique

Kenya Benin

79%

31%

62% 77%

53%

84%

30%

71%

46%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2011/2013 2014/2015

Kenya Madagascar

Nigeria

Figure 12: Change in perceived freeness and fairness of elections | largest increases,

decreases, and swings | 18 countries| 2005-2015

12a: Largest increases 12b: Largest decreases

12c: Dramatic changes



(% who say “free and fair, but with m inor problem s”

or “com pletely free and fair”)

Citizens vs. “experts” as judges of election quality

A comparison of Afrobarometer survey findings regarding election quality with ratings by

Freedom House and the Electoral Integrity Project’s Perceptions of Election Integrity (PEI)

survey suggests that citizens generally reach similar conclusions about election quality as

experts with access to election observation reports, feedback from political leaders, and

other specialized information.

In addition to its broad ratings of civil and political freedoms, Freedom House provides a

subscore for election quality (Freedom House, 2009-2016).3 These Freedom House scores and

3 The Freedom House election scores used here correspond to the elections that the Afrobarometer

questionnaire asked about. For instance, Kenyans were asked about the 2013 election in the Afrobarometer survey, so the 2013 Freedom House election score is used.


citizens’ perceptions of election quality are moderately correlated (at 0.30, p < 0.076) (Figure

13). If we remove from the analysis four countries where citizens rate election quality much

higher than the experts (Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Swaz iland, shown in the upper-left

corner of the figure), the correlation is much stronger (at 0.59, p < 0.000). In two countries

(Ghana and Cape Verde, in the lower-right corner of the figure), citizens give significantly

more critical assessments than experts.

Figure 13: Election quality: Citizen vs. Freedom House assessments | 36 countries

| 2014/2015

Correlation coefficient: 0.30, two-tailed Pearson’s correlation at p < 0.076

Source: Afrobarom eter and Freedom House

Another source of expert opinion on election quality is the Perceptions of Election Integrity

(PEI) Index (Norris, Martínez i Coma, Nai, & Groemping, 2016), which has surveyed country

experts about the quality of elections since 2012 across 49 subject areas (e.g. voter

registration and roll, boundary demarcation, media freedom). PEI calculates an overall score

for each election using the expert survey results. The imputed overall score (included in the

PEI data set) used in this analysis corrects for any missing data from the expert survey. For the

18 countries for which both PEI and Afrobarometer data are available, citizen and expert

opinions on election quality are correlated (at 0.34, p < 0.171).

While PEI Index scores were calculated only for elections from 2012 to 2015, with additional

coding in PEI format4 we can calculate a PEI Index score for all elections covered in the

Afrobarometer Round 6 questionnaire. Adding data in the PEI format for 17 countries not

covered in the PEI data yields a similar correlation (at 0.36, p < 0.031) (Figure 14).

4 As part of his dissertation project, Peter Penar has coded elections not included in the PEI Index since 2000 using the same PEI survey. These data were merged with the existing PEI data to produce Figure 14.

Algeria

Benin

Botswana

Burkina Faso

Burundi

CameroonCape VerdeCote d'Ivoire

Egypt

Gabon

Ghana

Guinea

Kenya

Lesotho

Liberia

Madagascar

Malawi

Mauritius

Morocco

Mozambique

Namibia

Nigeria

Sao Tome & Principe

Senegal

Sierra Leone

South Africa

Sudan

Swaziland Tanzania

Togo

TunisiaUganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Mali Niger

.2.4

.6.8

1

Ele

ctio

n q

ualit

y (

% fre

e a

nd

fair

or

with m

inor

pro

ble

ms)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Freedom House election subscore


Thus, comparisons with both Freedom House and PEI assessments suggest that citizens are

largely drawing the same conclusions about election quality as experts with extensive access

to additional information about the quality of elections.

Figure 14: Election quality: Citizens vs. Perceptions of Election Integrity Index (imputed) and additional data | 35 countries* | 2014/2015

Correlation coefficient: 0.36, two-tailed Pearson’s correlation at p < 0.031

Sources: Afrobarometer, PEI 4.0, Penar original PEI form at coding. (* No data are available for Morocco.)

Components of election quality

A free and fair election presupposes a level playing field for candidates and a safe

environment for voters to express their preferences. Elections are full cycles that include

components before Election Day (voter registration, maintenance of the voter roll), on

Election Day (voting), and after Election Day (vote count, results announcement).

Afrobarometer’s 2014/2015 survey asked citizens about their personal safety during

campaigns and at the polls, the opposition’s ability to campaign freely, whether media

coverage of all candidates was fair or biased, the fairness of the vote count, and bribery of

voters.

Fear during campaigns and at the polls

Ensuring voter safety during election campaigns and at the polls is an important part of

protecting the freedom of citizens to express their political preferences. Government security

forces can protect voters from ad hoc political violence, but they can also be used to

repress political dissent and intimidate voters under the guise of ensuring public safety.

Across 36 countries, a majority (55%) of respondents say they do not fear becoming a victim

of intimidation or violence during campaigns, whereas 30% say they fear this possibility “a

little bit” or “somewhat” and 13% say they fear violence “a lot” (Figure 15). Fear is most

Algeria

Benin

Botswana

Burkina Faso

Burundi

CameroonCape VerdeCote d'Ivoire

Egypt

Gabon

Ghana

Guinea

Kenya

Lesotho

Liberia

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mauritius

Mozambique

NamibiaNiger

Nigeria

Sao Tome & Principe

Senegal

Sierra Leone

South Africa

Sudan

Swaziland Tanzania

Togo

TunisiaUganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

.2.4

.6.8

1

Ele

ctio

n q

ualit

y (

% fre

e a

nd

fair

or

with m

inor

pro

ble

ms)

35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80

PEI overall score (with additional data)


common in countries with a history of election-related violence and civil conflict, such as

Côte d'Ivoire (where 33% of citizens express “a lot” of fear), Uganda (32%), Zimbabwe (25%),

Kenya (24%), and Nigeria (24%). At the other extreme, almost nine in 10 citizens in Niger,

Cape Verde, and Madagascar say they are “not at all” afraid during election campaigns.

Figure 15: Fear during election campaigns | 36 countries | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: During election cam paigns in this country, how m uch do you personally fear

becom ing a victim of political intim idation or violence?

Similarly, about half (48%) of respondents say voters are “never” threatened with violence at

the polls on Election Day (Figure 16). But substantial minorities say that violence threatens

voters “sometimes” (25%), often (12%), or “always” (8%). At the aggregate level, there are

only small differences between urban and rural dwellers and between men and women in

their assessments of how often voters are threatened.

18%

28%

30%

32%

33%

35%

36%

36%

39%

42%

44%

46%

47%

48%

50%

52%

55%

55%

57%

59%

61%

62%

62%

63%

64%

65%

65%

65%

67%

71%

71%

72%

75%

77%

86%

87%

89%

57%

38%

52%

54%

42%

41%

31%

47%

36%

41%

32%

29%

31%

46%

28%

34%

24%

30%

30%

33%

26%

31%

17%

24%

30%

24%

31%

17%

25%

22%

21%

21%

18%

21%

14%

9%

8%

24%

33%

12%

11%

24%

23%

32%

10%

25%

11%

22%

17%

22%

5%

23%

7%

20%

13%

9%

4%

12%

5%

19%

12%

6%

11%

3%

16%

8%

5%

7%

5%

5%

1%

1%

2%

2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Liberia

Kenya

Gabon

Uganda

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

Sudan

Zambia

Sierra Leone

Togo

Tanzania

Guinea

Algeria

Malawi

Average

Cameroon

Morocco

Swaziland

South Africa

Lesotho

Ghana

Benin

Mali

Namibia

Tunisia

Senegal


Botswana

Burundi

Burkina Faso

Mauritius

Madagascar

Cape Verde

Niger

Not at all A little bit/Somewhat A lot


Citizens of Botswana, Guinea, and Madagascar are least likely to express concern about

violence at the polls: More than 70% say it “never” occurs. Guineans, who have experienced

election-related violence, appear to differentiate between violence associated with

campaigns (which only 50% say they fear “not at all”) and the threat of violence on Election

Day (which 72% say “never” occurs). This indicates that citizens’ concerns about violence

can vary depending on the stage in the election cycle.

Taken together, survey findings suggest that fear is a very real part of the election process in

a number of African countries, especially Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, and

Zimbabwe. This may call into question the legitimacy of the election process, since violence

and intimidation can be used as manipulative tools to suppress campaign activities, voter

turnout, and civil-society activities designed to ensure a free and fair election.

Figure 16: Threats of violence at the polls | 36 countries | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country’s

elections: Voters are threatened with violence at the polls?

14%

21%

21%

26%

27%

29%

29%

30%

31%

32%

39%

39%

42%

42%

44%

44%

45%

48%

49%

49%

50%

52%

53%

53%

59%

60%

61%

62%

62%

63%

67%

67%

69%

70%

71%

72%

73%

46%

37%

36%

35%

41%

32%

29%

30%

34%

40%

28%

24%

21%

24%

21%

32%

31%

25%

22%

23%

28%

21%

21%

26%

24%

17%

20%

27%

10%

13%

12%

16%

14%

8%

22%

15%

8%

34%

28%

42%

33%

27%

21%

25%

29%

32%

24%

27%

20%

20%

17%

21%

18%

20%

20%

17%

16%

13%

24%

14%

17%

14%

15%

6%

10%

9%

24%

18%

13%

11%

21%

6%

10%

13%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Nigeria

Egypt

Côte d'Ivoire

Zimbabwe

Kenya

Morocco

Mozambique

Ghana

Gabon

Tanzania

Uganda

Algeria

Sierra Leone

Cape Verde

Cameroon

Zambia

Liberia

Average

Sudan

Tunisia

South Africa

Togo


Senegal

Malawi

Swaziland

Mauritius

Benin

Lesotho

Mali

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Namibia

Niger

Madagascar

Guinea

Botswana

Never Sometimes Often/always


Opposition’s ability to contest

While multiparty elections cannot happen without opposition candidates, countries vary

greatly in how much freedom the opposition is given to operate. Many election-related

grievances involve treatment of opposition parties that is perceived as unfair, sometimes

leading to protests and election boycotts.

Survey findings suggest that many African countries do not fully honour the spirit of multiparty

competition. On average, fully 43% of respondents say that opposition candidates are

“sometimes,” “often,” or “always” prevented from running for office. Majorities in 12 countries

say that opposition candidates are at least sometimes prevented from contesting elections.

This view is most common in Côte d'Ivoire (64%), Zimbabwe (61%), Burundi (61%), Egypt (61%),

Nigeria (60%), and Gabon (56%) (Figure 17). Perceptions of opposition exclusion are lowest in

Botswana (22%), Niger (22%), and Guinea (23%).

Figure 17: Oposition candidates prevented from running | 36 countries | 2014/2015


elections: Opposition candidates are prevented from running for office? (% who say “som etimes,” “often,” or “always”)

22% 22% 23%

27% 27% 28% 30%

33% 33%

35% 37% 37% 38% 38%

43% 43% 44% 45% 45% 46% 46% 46% 47% 48% 48% 50% 50% 51% 51% 52% 53%

56% 60% 61% 61% 61%

64%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

BotswanaNiger

GuineaMali

Cape VerdeLesotho

MauritiusBenin

SenegalBurkina Faso

MoroccoTunisia

Sierra LeoneNamibiaAverage

ZambiaGhana

South AfricaMalawi

CameroonSão Tomé and Principe

UgandaKenyaSudan

TogoMozambique

LiberiaAlgeria

TanzaniaSwaziland

MadagascarGabonNigeria

EgyptBurundi

ZimbabweCôte d'Ivoire


Media coverage during elections

Although election observation reports consistently mention bias in media coverage,

particularly in countries with a dominant state-controlled media outlet, efforts by civil society

and international organisations to develop media regulatory frameworks and engage in

media monitoring during elections can contribute to more balanced coverage. In addition,

some countries have seen the expansion of private media outlets, which can provide a

wider range of coverage.

Nonetheless, more than four in 10 Africans (43%) say the media “never” or only “sometimes”

provides fair coverage of all candidates (Figure 18). Gabonese are the most critical of media

bias (77%), followed by citizens of Madagascar (62%), Malawi (59%), Nigeria (59%),

Zimbabwe (57%), and Sudan (57%). Most citizens in Senegal, Niger, Burundi (in late 2014), and

Botswana say the media does a good job of providing fair coverage of all candidates.

Figure 18: Perceptions of unfair media coverage | 36 countries | 2014/3015


elections: The m edia provides fair coverage of all candidates? (% who say “never” or “som etimes”)

23%

25%

29%

29%

30%

30%

31%

33%

34%

35%

36%

36%

38%

38%

39%

40%

40%

40%

41%

42%

43%

43%

47%

47%

48%

48%

50%

50%

51%

55%

55%

57%

57%

59%

59%

62%

77%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Senegal

Niger

Burundi

Botswana

Swaziland

Lesotho

Sierra Leone

Mauritius

Kenya

Benin

Cape Verde

Uganda

Guinea

Morocco

South Africa

Mali

Ghana

Tanzania

Algeria

São Tomé and Principe

Tunisia

Average

Burkina Faso

Togo

Cameroon

Mozambique

Zambia

Namibia

Côte d'Ivoire

Egypt

Liberia

Sudan

Zimbabwe

Nigeria

Malawi

Madagascar

Gabon


Bribery of voters

The exchange of cash or “gifts” for votes is generally illegal and therefore difficult to observe

directly. Although available evidence questions the effectiveness of vote-buying (Bratton,

2008), survey findings suggest that it persists as a common campaign strategy.

Almost seven in 10 Africans (69%) say that voters are bribed at least “sometimes”; 43% say this

happens “often” or “always” (Figure 19). Bribery of voters is seen as pervasive in Mali (78%

often/always), Gabon (71%), and Senegal (68%). In contrast, fewer than one in five citizens of

Lesotho (15%), Namibia (16%), and Burundi (18%) believe that voters are routinely bribed.

Urbanites are more likely than rural residents to say that voters are often or always bribed

(48% vs. 40%), while men and women are about equally likely to hold this view.

Figure 19: How often voters are bribed during elections | 36 countries | 2014/2015


elections: Voters are bribed?

15%

16%

18%

20%

21%

25%

27%

29%

31%

33%

33%

34%

34%

34%

35%

37%

39%

41%

43%

45%

46%

49%

49%

52%

54%

54%

54%

56%

56%

57%

58%

58%

60%

64%

68%

71%

78%

15%

23%

21%

20%

44%

24%

28%

24%

30%

34%

34%

16%

30%

45%

34%

44%

26%

32%

26%

39%

23%

26%

25%

20%

20%

30%

20%

16%

32%

33%

19%

20%

25%

26%

17%

20%

11%

48%

50%

54%

52%

35%

28%

35%

30%

33%

17%

20%

35%

22%

10%

25%

9%

29%

21%

22%

13%

15%

12%

18%

15%

19%

14%

7%

24%

9%

6%

10%

16%

13%

4%

9%

7%

10%

22%

10%

7%

8%

23%

11%

16%

6%

16%

12%

14%

15%

10%

6%

10%

6%

7%

9%

3%

14%

12%

8%

13%

7%

3%

18%

4%

4%

4%

13%

6%

3%

6%

7%

2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Lesotho

Namibia

Burundi

Guinea

Madagascar

Mozambique

South Africa

Sierra Leone

Malawi

Algeria

Zimbabwe

Botswana

Sudan

Egypt

Zambia

Mauritius

Niger

Tanzania

Average

Liberia


Ghana

Uganda

Cameroon

Togo

Côte d'Ivoire

Cape Verde

Burkina Faso

Kenya

Nigeria

Tunisia

Swaziland

Benin

Morocco

Senegal

Gabon

Mali

Often/always Sometimes Never Don’t know


Fairness of the vote count

The vote count is arguably one of the most important parts of the election cycle. Counting

votes requires high levels of logistical competence as well as transparency to overcome

public skepticism about the intentions of the government and electoral commission to

conduct the count fairly. Low levels of public confidence in the vote count put a country at

risk of post-election protest and violence in response to perceived voter fraud and

manipulation.

Across 36 countries, just one-third (34%) of citizens think that votes are “always” counted fairly

(Figure 20). One in five (19%) say the vote count is “often” fair, while a plurality say the vote

count is “never” (13%) or only “sometimes” (25%) fair.

Figure 20: Fairness of the vote count | 36 countries | 2014/2015


elections: Votes are counted fairly?

6%

15%

15%

16%

16%

19%

20%

22%

22%

24%

26%

26%

27%

28%

30%

30%

31%

32%

33%

34%

34%

36%

36%

37%

37%

38%

38%

40%

41%

45%

47%

56%

57%

59%

63%

67%

69%

17%

27%

12%

19%

17%

25%

25%

15%

17%

12%

24%

17%

29%

14%

13%

27%

13%

9%

13%

19%

31%

33%

9%

14%

27%

21%

26%

12%

31%

22%

19%

9%

16%

20%

17%

22%

14%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Nigeria

Morocco

Gabon

Algeria

Sudan

Cameroon

Egypt

Liberia

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Tunisia

Kenya

Tanzania

Ghana

Cape Verde

Côte d'Ivoire

Togo

Mozambique

Zambia

Average

Benin

Burkina Faso

Sierra Leone

Uganda

Madagascar

Lesotho

Burundi

Guinea

Mali

Swaziland

South Africa


Botswana

Namibia

Senegal

Mauritius

Niger

Always Often


Large majorities have faith in the vote count in Niger (where 69% say it is “always” fair),

Mauritius (67%), and Senegal (63%), but in 30 out of 36 surveyed countries, fewer than half of

all citizens fully trust the vote count. Citizens in Nigeria (6%), Morocco (15%), Gabon (15%),

Algeria (16%), and Sudan (16%) are the most skeptical. (See Appendix Table A.2 for a

detailed breakdown.) Unsurprisingly, countries w ith a history of election-related protests and

violence express quite low levels of confidence in the vote count, including Kenya (26%),

Zimbabwe (22%), and Nigeria (6%). Rural residents are more likely to believe that votes are

counted fairly than urban dwellers (57% v. 49%).

Do elections deliver?

Beyond issues of election management and conduct, Afrobarometer asked three questions

to explore whether people perceive that elections function effectively as a way to select

representative and accountable leaders: 1) whether voters are offered a genuine choice at

the polls, 2) how well their elections ensure that the people’s views are represented, and 3)

how well their elections enable voters to remove underperforming leaders from office.

With regard to choice, six in 10 Africans (61%) affirm that elections “often” or “always” offer

voters a genuine choice (Figure 21). More than eight in 10 citizens in Niger (89%), Senegal

(86%), Mali (84%), and Madagascar (81%) say they are offered real choices. But less than four

in 10 share this view in Nigeria (32%), Sudan (34%), and Egypt (39%). While the Sudan and

Egypt results are not surprising, given government’s role in vetting candidates, the small

proportion of Nigerians who feel they have a real choice in their country’s competitive

elections may reflect a general skepticism or dismay about the electoral process.

Even if most Africans believe they are offered real choices at the ballot box, many are

dissatisfied with elections as a vehicle for ensuring that leaders are representative and

accountable. Half (50%) of respondents say that their elections function “not very well” or

“not at all well” to ensure that those elected reflect the views of the people (Figure 22).

Similarly, 51% believe that their elections do not work well in enabling voters to remove

leaders who don’t do what the people want .


Figure 21: Voters given genuine choice at the polls | 36 countries | 2014/2015


elections: Voters are offered a genuine choice in elections? (% who say “always” or “often”)

32%

34%

39%

40%

43%

45%

46%

48%

50%

52%

52%

54%

54%

56%

60%

60%

60%

61%

62%

63%

64%

65%

65%

67%

68%

69%

71%

73%

74%

74%

74%

75%

78%

81%

84%

86%

89%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Nigeria

Sudan

Egypt

Mozambique

Algeria

Gabon

Zimbabwe

Tanzania

Liberia

São Tomé and Principe

Morocco

Kenya

Cape Verde

Cameroon

Namibia

Côte d'Ivoire

Sierra Leone

Average

Zambia

Ghana

Guinea

Togo

Uganda

Tunisia

South Africa

Swaziland

Benin

Burundi

Lesotho

Malawi

Mauritius

Burkina Faso

Botswana

Madagascar

Mali

Senegal

Niger


Figure 22: Performance of elections in Africa | 36 countries | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do

elections: 1. Ensure that m embers of Parliam ent/National Assembly representatives reflect the views of

voters?

2. Enable voters to rem ove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

Namibians, Batswana, and Tunisians are most confident that elections can ensure that

constituents’ views are represented, while Gabonese, Malagasy, and Moroccans are most

skeptical (Figure 23; see Appendix Table A.3 for details).

Figure 23: Representation function of elections | best- and worst-performing

countries | 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections ensure that m em bers of Parliam ent/National Assem bly representatives reflect the views of

voters?

50% 51%

42% 40%

8% 9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Elections ensure voters' views are

reflected

Elections enable voters to remove

underperforming leaders from office

Not at all well/not very well Well/very well Don’t know

63% 62% 58% 57% 56% 56% 51% 51% 51%

76%

67% 67% 64% 62% 62% 62% 60% 60%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Na

mib

ia

Bo

tsw

an

a

Tun

isia

Ma

uritiu

s

Nig

er

Ma

li

Gh

an

a

Zam

bia

Gu

ine

a

Ga

bo

n

Ma

da

ga

sca

r

Mo

roc

co

Alg

eria

Nig

eria

Sw

azi

lan

d

Lib

eria

Su

da

n

Cô

te d

'Ivo

ire

Best performers

(% well or very well)

Worst perfomers

(% not at all well/not very well)


When it comes to holding elected officials accountable, Senegalese, Cape Verdeans,

Batswana, and Ghanaians are most optimistic that elections enable voters to remove non-

performing leaders (Figure 24; see Appendix Table A.4 for details). In contrast, Gabonese,

Swazis, Sudanese, Moroccans, Nigerians, and Algerians are most skeptical that elections help

ensure accountability. Four of these countries face significant barriers to the election

accountability mechanism: Swaziland and Morocco are kingdoms with tight controls over

who is able to compete in elections and limited power for those elected, and Sudan and

Algeria have been de facto one-party states.

Figure 24: Accountability function of elections | best- and worst-performing countries

| 2014/2015

Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country: How well do elections enable voters to rem ove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

Across 18 countries tracked since 2005/2006, the proportion of citizens who say elections

ensure that people’s views are represented has remained stable; about 6% of respondents

have moved out of the “don’t know” column to say that elections do not perform this

representation function well (Figure 25). A similar trend holds for the question on

accountability.

Looking at over-time changes at the country level (Figure 26), Zambia, which has

experienced several transfers of power between different political parties, registers the

greatest improvement among 18 countries tracked over the past decade – a 22-

percentage-point increase in the proportion of citizens who say that elections function well

to ensure representation. Zimbabwe, Senegal, Malawi, and Mali are among countries that

have seen more modest improvements.

Several countries with higher or recently increased levels of political competition exhibit

decreases in the proportion of citizens who say that elections ensure representation: Ghana

(a decrease of 19 percentage points), Mozambique (14 points), Benin (7 points), and South

Africa (6 points). In some cases, this may reflect a public questioning of liberation-party

hegemony (e.g. Mozambique, South Africa) and voters’ growing expectations of what true

representation should look like.

66% 64% 61% 61% 59% 54%

50% 50%

79%

69% 69% 69% 66% 65% 63% 63% 61%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Se

ne

ga

l

Ca

pe

Ve

rde

Bo

tsw

an

a

Gh

an

a

Zam

bia

Tun

isia

Gu

ine

a

Ke

nya

Ga

bo

n

Sw

azi

lan

d

Su

da

n

Mo

roc

co

Nig

eria

Alg

eria

Be

nin

Ma

da

ga

sca

r

Cô

te d

'Ivo

ire

Best performers

(% well/very well)

Worst performers

(% not at all well/not very well)


Figure 25: Changes in performance of elections | 18 countries | 2005-2015


elections: 1. Ensure that m embers of Parliam ent/National Assembly representatives reflect the views of

voters?

2. Enable voters to rem ove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

(Note: This question was not included in the 2011/2013 survey round.)

Figure 26: Changes in proportions who say elections perform ‘well’ or ‘very well’ in ensuring representation | 18 countries | 2005-2015


elections ensure that m em bers of Parliam ent/National Assem bly representatives reflect the views of

voters? (Figure shows the difference, in percentage points, between surveys in 2005/2006 and 2014/2015 in the

proportion of respondents who say that elections perform “well” or “very well” in ensuring that elected

officials represent the views of citizens. Positive num bers indicate increasingly positive assessments.)

41% 40% 47% 40% 41% 47%

46% 47% 46%

47% 46% 46%

13% 12% 7% 13% 13% 7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005/2006 2008/2009 2014/2015 2005/2006 2008/2009 2014/2015

Elections ensure voters' views are

reflected

Elections enable voters to remove

underperforming leaders from office


-19

-14

-7

-6

-6

-6

-3

-3

-3

-1

0

3

5

5

7

8

8

8

22

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Ghana

Mozambique

Benin

Madagascar

South Africa

Uganda

Botswana

Namibia

Tanzania

Lesotho

Average, 18 countries

Nigeria

Cape Verde

Kenya

Mali

Malawi

Senegal

Zimbabwe

Zambia


Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question, for any country and survey

round. It’s easy and free at

www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.

With respect to the accountability function of elections, citizens in Ghana, Madagascar,

Mozambique, and Benin express increasing pessimism, whereas Zambia and Cape Verde

experienced the greatest gains in public confidence (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Changes in proportions who say elections perform ‘well’ or ‘very well’ in enabling voters to remove non-performing leaders | 18 countries | 2005-2015


elections enable voters to rem ove from office leaders who do not do what the people want? (Figure shows the difference, in percentage points, between surveys in 2005/2006 and 2014/2015 in the

proportion of respondents who say that elections perform “well” or “very well” in enabling voters to

rem ove underperform ing leaders. Positive num bers reflect increasingly positive assessments.)

Election quality and trust in electoral commission

As we have seen, two important concerns about African elections are the fairness of the

vote count and the freedom that opposition parties have to contest elections. A vote count

that lacks transparency is an easy place for leaders to manipulate election outcomes, and

interference with the opposition is likely to

slow even the strongest opposition parties

from gaining momentum and expanding

their reach.

As might be expected, Afrobarometer

results indicate that public perceptions of

how fairly votes are counted and the

opposition is treated affect citizens’ overall

assessments of election quality as well as their trust in the electoral commission. Citizens who

believe that votes are counted fairly are more likely to believe that elections are “completely

free and fair” or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (Figure 28). The same is true for the

relationship between opposition suppression and election quality (Figure 29).

-18

-16

-16

-14

-11

-7

-3

-3

-2

-2

-1

1

3

4

6

11

11

15

30

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40

Ghana

Madagascar

Mozambique

Benin

Namibia

Malawi

Botswana

South Africa

Mali

Uganda

Average, 18 countries

Tanzania

Nigeria

Lesotho

Zimbabwe

Kenya

Senegal

Cape Verde

Zambia


Figure 28: Votes counted fairly and overall election quality | 36 countries

| 2014/2015

Respondents were asked:

1. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]?

2. In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections: Votes are

counted fairly?

Figure 29: Opposition party suppression and overall election quality | 36 countries

| 2014/2015


1. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held

in [20xx]? 2. In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections: Opposition

candidates are prevented from running for office?

83%

69%

57%

41%

11%

23%

35%

51%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Votes always

counted fairly

Votes often

counted fairly

Votes sometimes

counted fairly

Votes never

counted fairly

Election completely free and fair or with minor problems

Election not free and fair or major problems

74%

60% 57% 60%

19%

33% 34% 34%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Opposition never

prevented from

running

Opposition

sometimes

prevented from

running

Opposition often

prevented from

running

Opposition always

prevented from

running




Since electoral commissions are responsible for managing elections, one would expect that

citizens’ assessments of election quality influence their trust in the commission. Survey findings

confirm that citizens who view elections as free and fair are more likely to have higher levels

of trust in their electoral commissions (Figure 30). Similarly, respondents who hold favourable

views of the fairness of the vote count and the treatment of the opposition are also more

likely to express trust in the electoral commission.

Figure 30: Overall election quality and trust in electoral commissions | 35 countries*

| 2014/2015


1. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]?

2. How m uch do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to

say: National Electoral Com m ission? (* Question was not asked in Morocco.)

Conclusion

The past decade has seen significant investments by civil society, international organisations,

and some national electoral commissions in facilitating dialogue and reforms in election

management in Africa. Despite these efforts, citizens continue to hold mixed views of the

quality of elections and of how well they ultimately perform their functions of ensuring that

voters’ views are represented and officeholders are accountable. By and large, citizens’

views on the state of election quality align with assessments by country experts.

Fears of voter intimidation, perceptions of unfair treatment of opposition parties, and

concerns about the manipulation of election processes and results persist in many countries,

and countries with upcoming elections (2016-2018) have some of the lowest levels of trust in

their national electoral commissions. Such concerns have the potential to influence whether

the people’s will is expressed on Election Day, since fear or a perception of unfairness can

cause voices to remain silent.

These findings suggest that additional reforms and greater transparency are needed to

ensure free and fair elections. Increasing public trust in electoral commissions will depend on

better management of components of the election process, from voter rolls to vote counts.

Election assistance should be sustained, rather than focused only on early pre-election and

Election Day activities, and should be accompanied by public sensitization efforts to ensure

that steps forward are matched by gains in public perceptions and trust.

83%

75%

63%

43%

11% 17%

29%

47%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Trust EC a lot Trust EC somewhat Trust EC just a little Trust EC not at all




References

Bentley, T., Han, K., & Penar, P. H. (2015). African democracy update: Democratic satisfaction remains elusive for many. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 45. Available at www.afrobarometer.org.

Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. Electoral Studies, 27(4), 621-632.

Freedom House. (2009-2016). Freedom in the world. Available at www.freedomhouse.org.

Norris, P., Martínez i Coma, F., Nai, A., & Groemping. M. (2016). The expert survey of perceptions of electoral integrity, PEI_4.0. Available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com and http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI.

http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/

Appendix

Table A.1: Surveyed countries, election years, and survey fieldwork dates

Country Last national

election preceding Round 6 survey

Months when Round 6 fieldwork was

conducted Previous survey rounds

Algeria 2014 May-June 2015 2013

Benin 2011 May-June 2014 2005, 2008, 2011

Botswana 2009 June-July 2014 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008,

2012

Burkina Faso 2012 April-May 2015 2008, 2012

Burundi 2010 September-October

2014 2012

Cameroon 2013 January-February

2015 2013

Cape Verde 2011 November-December

2014 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011

Côte d'Ivoire 2011 August-September

2014 2013

Egypt 2014 June-July 2015 2013

Gabon 2011 September-October

2015 N/A

Ghana 2012 May-June 2014 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008,

2012

Guinea 2013 March-April 2015 2013

Kenya 2013 November-December

2014 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011

Lesotho 2012 May 2014 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008,

2012

Liberia 2011 May 2015 2008, 2012

Madagascar 2013 December 2015-

January 2015 2005, 2008, 2013

Malawi 2009 March-April 2014 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008,

2012

Mali 2013 December 2014 2001, 2002, 2005, 2008,

2013

Mauritius 2010 June-July 2014 2012

Morocco 2011 November 2015 2013

Mozambique 2014 June-August 2015 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012

Namibia 2009 August-September

2014 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008,

2012

Niger 2011 April 2015 2013

Nigeria 2011 December 2014-

January 2015 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008,

2013


2014 July-August 2015 N/A

Senegal 2012 November-December

2014 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013


Country Last national

election preceding Round 6 survey

Months when Round 6 fieldwork was

conducted Previous survey rounds

Sierra Leone 2012 May-June 2015 2012

South Africa 2014 August-September

2015 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008,

2011

Sudan 2015 June 2015 2013

Swaziland 2013 April 2015 2013

Tanzania 2010 August-November

2014 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008,

2012

Togo 2013 October 2014 2012

Tunisia 2014 April-May 2015 2013

Uganda 2011 May 2015 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008,

2012

Zambia 2011 October 2014 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009,

2013

Zimbabwe 2013 November 2014 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009,

2012


Table A.2: Perceived fairness of the vote count | 36 countries |2014/2015

Always Often Sometimes Never Don’t know

Niger 69% 14% 9% 3% 6%

Mauritius 67% 22% 6% 1% 4%

Senegal 63% 17% 9% 3% 8%

Namibia 59% 20% 13% 4% 4%

Botswana 57% 16% 13% 7% 7%

São Tomé and Príncipe 56% 9% 16% 5% 13%

South Africa 47% 19% 21% 7% 7%

Swaziland 45% 22% 20% 5% 9%

Mali 41% 31% 17% 9% 3%

Guinea 40% 12% 21% 20% 7%

Burundi 38% 26% 23% 7% 6%

Lesotho 38% 21% 22% 7% 13%

Madagascar 37% 27% 22% 13% 1%

Uganda 37% 14% 26% 15% 8%

Sierra Leone 36% 9% 21% 14% 21%

Burkina Faso 36% 33% 14% 11% 7%

Benin 34% 31% 25% 7% 2%

Average 34% 19% 25% 13% 8%

Zambia 33% 13% 39% 9% 6%

Mozambique 32% 9% 32% 15% 11%

Togo 31% 13% 18% 27% 11%

Côte d'Ivoire 30% 27% 23% 17% 3%

Cape Verde 30% 13% 28% 11% 18%

Ghana 28% 14% 33% 15% 9%

Tanzania 27% 29% 33% 6% 5%

Kenya 26% 17% 35% 18% 4%

Tunisia 26% 24% 25% 12% 13%

Malawi 24% 12% 34% 23% 8%

Zimbabwe 22% 17% 33% 20% 7%

Liberia 22% 15% 49% 12% 2%

Egypt 20% 25% 35% 8% 12%

Cameroon 19% 25% 21% 21% 14%

Sudan 16% 17% 27% 25% 14%

Algeria 16% 19% 31% 23% 12%

Gabon 15% 12% 31% 41% 2%

Morocco 15% 27% 33% 10% 16%

Nigeria 6% 17% 52% 23% 3%


elections: Votes are counted fairly?


Table A.3: Performance of elections in ensuring elected leaders reflect voters’ views | 36 countries | 2014/2015


Gabon 76% 23% 2%

Algeria 64% 24% 13%

Morocco 67% 25% 8%

Cameroon 57% 29% 13%

Côte d'Ivoire 60% 31% 9%

Togo 59% 32% 10%

Swaziland 62% 32% 6%

Sierra Leone 51% 32% 17%

Liberia 62% 33% 5%

Madagascar 67% 33% 0%

Sudan 60% 33% 7%

Nigeria 62% 34% 4%

São Tomé and Príncipe 45% 36% 19%

Egypt 49% 38% 13%

Tanzania 57% 38% 5%

Malawi 58% 38% 3%

Zimbabwe 56% 39% 5%

Burkina Faso 54% 40% 6%

Lesotho 41% 41% 18%

Mozambique 42% 42% 17%

Average 50% 42% 8%

Benin 53% 43% 4%

South Africa 50% 44% 6%

Burundi 51% 44% 5%

Cape Verde 39% 45% 15%

Kenya 47% 47% 6%

Senegal 46% 48% 6%

Uganda 44% 49% 7%

Guinea 42% 51% 7%

Zambia 38% 51% 11%

Ghana 41% 51% 7%

Niger 34% 56% 10%

Mali 43% 56% 1%

Mauritius 34% 57% 8%

Tunisia 34% 58% 8%

Botswana 31% 62% 7%

Namibia 34% 63% 3%


elections ensure that m em bers of Parliam ent/Nation Assembly representatives reflect the views of voters?


Table A.4: Performance of elections in enabling voters to remove underperforming leaders from office | 36 countries | 2014/2015


Gabon 79% 19% 2%

Swaziland 69% 23% 8%

Sudan 69% 23% 8%

Morocco 69% 22% 9%

Nigeria 66% 29% 5%

Algeria 65% 20% 15%

Benin 63% 32% 4%

Madagascar 63% 37% 0%

Côte d'Ivoire 61% 30% 9%

Burkina Faso 60% 32% 9%

Togo 59% 32% 9%

Mali 57% 42% 0%

South Africa 57% 36% 7%

Tanzania 56% 39% 5%

Cameroon 56% 28% 15%

Zimbabwe 56% 38% 6%

Egypt 54% 30% 15%

Average 51% 40% 9%

São Tomé and Príncipe 50% 31% 18%

Mozambique 50% 32% 18%

Namibia 50% 47% 3%

Malawi 48% 49% 3%

Burundi 47% 48% 5%

Uganda 47% 45% 8%

Liberia 47% 47% 6%

Kenya 46% 50% 4%

Niger 46% 43% 11%

Mauritius 44% 44% 11%

Guinea 42% 50% 8%

Sierra Leone 38% 44% 18%

Tunisia 36% 54% 11%

Lesotho 35% 46% 18%

Ghana 33% 61% 6%

Botswana 31% 61% 8%

Zambia 31% 59% 10%

Senegal 28% 66% 6%

Cape Verde 24% 64% 12%


elections enable voters to rem ove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?


Other Round 6 global releases

Where to start? Aligning sustainable development goals with citizen priorities. (2015).

Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 67. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/

files/publications/Dispatches/ ab_r6_dispatchno67_african_priorities_en.pdf.

Building on progress: Infrastructure development still a major challenge in Africa.

(2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 69. Available at www.afrobarometer.org/

publications/ad69-building-progress-infrastructure-development-still-major-challenge-

africa.

Africa’s growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent. (2016).

Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 29. Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/

publications/pp29-africas-growth-dividend-lived-poverty-drops-across-the-continent.

Good neighbours? Africans express high levels of tolerance for many, but not for all.

(2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 74. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/

publications/tolerance-in-africa.

Off-grid or ‘off-on’: Lack of access, unreliable electricity supply still plague majority of Africans. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 75. Available at

http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad75-unreliable-electricity-supply-still-plague-

majority-of-africans.

Lack of safe water, sanitation spurs growing dissatisfaction with government performance. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 76. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/

publications/ad76-lack-of-safe-water-and-sanitation-spurs-growing-dissatisfaction.

Despite gains, barriers keep health care high on Africa’s priority list. Afrobarometer

Policy Paper No. 31. Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp31-

despite-gains-barriers-keep-health-care-high-on-africas-priority-list.

Strong public support for ‘watchdog’ role backs African news media under attack. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 85. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/publications/

ad85-media_in_africa_world_press_freedom_ day_2016.

Regional integration for Africa: Could stronger public support turn ‘rhetoric into reality’? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 91. Available at http://afrobarometer.org/

publications/ad91-regional-integration-africa-could-stronger-public-support-turn-

rhetoric-reality.

Does less engaged mean less empowered? Political participation lags among African youth, especially women. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 34. Available at

http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/youth-day-2016.

Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, trust, and government performance in Africa. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 112. Available at

http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad112-do-trustworthy-institutions-matter-

development-corruption-trust-and-government.

http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/%20files/publications/

http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/%20files/publications/

http://www.afrobarometer.org/

http://www.afrobarometer.org/%20publications/pp29-africas-growth-dividend-lived-poverty-drops-across-the-continent

http://www.afrobarometer.org/%20publications/pp29-africas-growth-dividend-lived-poverty-drops-across-the-continent

http://afrobarometer.org/%20publications/tolerance-in-africa

http://afrobarometer.org/%20publications/tolerance-in-africa

http://afrobarometer.org/

http://afrobarometer.org/

http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp31-despite-gains-barriers-keep-health-care-high-on-africas-priority-list

http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp31-despite-gains-barriers-keep-health-care-high-on-africas-priority-list

http://afrobarometer.org/publications/

http://afrobarometer.org/%20publications/ad91-regional-integration-africa-could-stronger-public-support-turn-rhetoric-reality




Peter Penar is a research assistant for Afrobarometer and PhD student in the

Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. Email:

[email protected]. Twitter: @PPenar.

Rose Aiko is a researcher in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Email:

[email protected].

Thomas Bentley is a research assistant for Afrobarometer and PhD student in the


[email protected].

Kangwook Han is a research assistant for Afrobarometer and PhD student in the


[email protected].

Afrobarometer is produced collaboratively by social scientists from more than 30

African countries. Coordination is provided by the Center for Democratic

Development (CDD) in Ghana, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR)

in South Africa, the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of

Nairobi in Kenya, and the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy

(IREEP) in Benin. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town

(UCT) provide technical support to the network.

Core support for Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6 has been provided by the UK’s

Department for International Development (DFID), the Mo Ibrahim Foundation,

the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank.

Donations help the Afrobarometer Project give voice to African citizens. Please

consider making a contribution (at www.afrobarometer.org) or contact Aba

Kittoe ([email protected]) to discuss institutional funding.

For more information, please visit www.afrobarometer.org.

Cover photo: MONUSCO/Myriam Asm ani [CC BY-SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Infographic design by Soapbox, www.soapbox.com

Contact: [email protected]

Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 35 | September 2016

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.afrobarometer.org/

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