"El Gobierno nos Abandonó" Free Trade Agreements in

Colombia: a Case for Systemic Violence

Julie Moreno Supervised by Dr. Denise Brown Undergraduate Honours Thesis

Faculty of Arts University of Calgary

April 2014

Submitted to the Faculty of Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Development Studies.

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ABSTRACT

Latin America is a region characterized by socio-economically disadvantaged masses and inequality, a situation that has proven to be self-perpetuating since the colonial and subsequent independence periods through to the present. This thesis uses primary data and original data analysis in order to test the idea of systemic violence, which the literature suggests is intangible, therefore difficult to substantiate and prove. Establishing the necessity of analyzing systemic violence in its unique political, sociological and economic aspects, the theoretical framework is a descriptive analysis of the causes and responses of current free trade agreement negotiations in Latin America. Employing a case study of Colombia as evidence of the systemic violence framework reveals the power relationships ingrained in the Colombian political system. It is suggested that the rural sector was systematically excluded from the negotiation process, which led to their aggressive response. This thesis represents an original contribution to studies of systemic violence by testing the utility of this framework for understanding a recent social and political situation in Colombia.

RESUMEN

Latinoamérica es una región caracterizada por la desigualdad socio-económica de las masas marginadas, una situación que se ha auto-perpetuado desde el período de la colonia y subsecuente independencia hasta el presente. Esta tesis ha utilizado información primaria así como una lectura y una análisis original de los datos, con el fin de poner a prueba la idea de la violencia sistemática, la cual se define por los academicos como intangible, por consiguiente difícil de probar y justificar. Se establece entonces la necesidad de analizar la violencia de manera sistemática desde sus aspectos individuales como los políticos, sociológicos y económicos. El marco teórico es un análisis descriptivo de las causas y respuestas actuales relacionadas con las negociaciones y acuerdos de libre comercio en Latino America. Empleando un estudio de caso en Colombia como evidencia de la violencia sistémica, el marco teórico revela los poderosos engranajes relacionados con el sistema político colombiano. Se sugiere que el sector rural fue sistemáticamente excluido de los procesos de negociación, lo cual conllevó a su respuesta agresiva. Esta tesis constituye una contribución original para los estudios de la violencia sistemática, comprobando la utilidad de este marco teórico para el entendimiento de la situación política y social reciente en Colombia.

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Table of Contents CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 3

CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ...................................................... 8 Structural Violence and Interpersonal Violence ......................................................................................... 10 Structural Violence and Imperialism .............................................................................................................. 13 Structural Violence and Power .......................................................................................................................... 15 Structural Violence and Hegemonic Masculinity ........................................................................................ 17 Poverty as Structural Violence........................................................................................................................... 19 Structural Violence and Indigenous Identity ................................................................................................ 21 Structural Violence and Development ............................................................................................................ 22 Structural Violence in Latin America .............................................................................................................. 25 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................. 27 CHAPTER THREE: COLOMBIA SIGNS THE TLC .............................................................. 29 What is a Free Trade Agreement? .................................................................................................................... 29 History of Free Trade in the Region ................................................................................................................. 30 FTA’s and Colombia ............................................................................................................................................... 32 Expected Actors/Groups/Associations in FTA Negotiations ................................................................... 35 Who was Actually Involved in FTA Negotiations? ...................................................................................... 37

Table 1: Expected Actors and Actors in evidence in FTA Negotiations ............................................ 42 Discussion .................................................................................................................................................................. 43 CHAPTER FOUR: COLOMBIA’S RESPONSE TO THE TLC ................................................ 47 The Strike: Complaints, Demands, and Response ........................................................................................ 47

Table 2: Actors Involved in FTA Protests ........................................................................................................ 48 How did the strike get to this point? ................................................................................................................ 54 Government Response to Protests and Strikes ............................................................................................. 56 Discussion .................................................................................................................................................................. 57 CHAPTER FIVE: A CASE FOR SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE ....................................................... 59 Using the Systemic/Structural Violence Framework ................................................................................ 59 Patterns Found in the Negotiation of FTA’s .................................................................................................. 62

Table 3: Synthesis of Tables 1 and 2.................................................................................................................. 63 Patterns Found in the Strikes/Protests/Manifestations as a Response .............................................. 66 Discussion .................................................................................................................................................................. 69 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 73

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 75

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Latin America is a region characterized by socio-economically disadvantaged

masses and inequality, a situation that has proven to be self-perpetuating since the

colonial and subsequent independence periods through to the present. The fact that these

conditions reproduce themselves suggests that there are also features within the

sociopolitical system that have resisted pressures to change from the demographic masses,

further keeping them in their disadvantaged place. This thesis addresses how these

obstacles work, arguing that they are systemic and structural.

To approach the question, the thesis will explore the recent signing of the Tratado

de Libre Comercio (TLC), or Free Trade Agreement, between Colombia and other

important players in the Americas as well as the European Union among others, which

has provoked violent reaction from the rural agricultural sector. Since May 12th 2012,

various TLC’s have been officially set in place, connecting Colombia to those who have

signed the treaty in a free market sense. The signing of this treaty has recently provoked

hundreds of riots among the Colombian campesinos (rural sector), which I propose is due

to their subjection to systemic violence. By exploring the idea that campesinos were

systematically excluded from the negotiation process, the following thesis proposes to

demonstrate the deeper root causes of said violence.

The hypothesis is that there was a systematic exclusion of that sector from the

negotiations, and that this represents systemic violence. In other words, it is proposed that

the reaction by the rural sector to the signing of this agreement is due to the perception by

the campesinos that within the structures revolving the signing of this treaty, they were

subject to some sort of systematic exclusion that was not accidental.

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My current hypothesis also rests on the idea that there is a “political culture,”

which underlies the social and political structures that sustain the hierarchy of inequality

in this region. Theoreticians of the Latin American political system have identified this

system, which contains within its features deeper systems of inequality (Prevost &

Vanden 2010). Given that such systems have now become institutionalized, they are

resistant to change, thus maintain and reproduce structures of inequality that perpetrate

systemic violence on the people and groups of individuals that live within these societies.

In a sense, it has proven beneficial for some of these elitist governments to maintain

inequality or even worsen the current poverty levels of their respective countries (Prevost

& Vanden 2010). As a result, those who are born into the disadvantaged masses will

more than likely remain in these masses. This type of system has become so engrained in

the politics of Latin America that it has been inherently viewed as virtually impossible to

change. A favored and powerful elite minority versus the disempowered masses thus can

create an environment for said systemic violence, especially in a political culture of

patron-clientelism, where the patron can maintain control over the populations (the client)

using constitutional tradition as evidence and support for their cause with the expectation

of little meaningful resistance (Prevost & Vanden 2010, Van der Linden 2012).

This thesis will be focusing its argument on the case of Colombia, in order to

narrow the scope of research. The research question emerges from recent reactions to the

signing of a trade agreement. Although trade policy is one of the key components of any

effective foreign policy, the establishment of trade relationships can facilitate domestic

growth and industry expansion while simultaneously expanding inequality and even

increasing poverty. Powerful negotiators such as the U.S. may have a vested interest in

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seeing economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries given that this

creates more secure investment environments and increase the productivity of the world

economy (Arias 2010). However, if the policy of negotiating bilateral trade agreements to

achieve better terms of trade is not adequately designed to reduce inequality and poverty

or to reach sustained economic growth in developing countries, it may be more

appropriate to re-evaluate these policies and attempt to identify more effective

mechanisms for achieving these goals. Therefore, it is important to look closely at the

social and political context of the countries in the global south that are signing these free

trade agreements.

In Latin America, structural barriers to breaking down social inequality have

proven resistant to change in the past, given that bringing in a free and democratic vote

on behalf of the people has not always proven effective (Arias 2010). Therefore, the

research question is significant, given that further research in this area can aid in

empowering the masses to escape their current and dire realities, where these have arisen

as a result of systemic violence.

The thesis will be organized as follows: Chapter Two poses the question: “what is

structural or systemic violence?” Based on a review and synthesis of published material,

this chapter will provide the overall theoretical framework to the structural approach that

is key to the thesis argument. By addressing what systemic violence is, this chapter

frames the discussions in the next two chapters, in which empirical data are analyzed in

light of this phenomenon.

Chapter Three poses the question: “Is there evidence that the processes involved

in the signing of the free trade agreements were characterized by systemic violence

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against a sector of the Colombian society?” The data set that will be employed relies

mostly on newspaper articles and library/archival primary research to explore possible

evidence of violence. Based on this data, it is proposed that there was systematic

exclusion of certain voices in this process, and it is argued that this represents evidence of

systemic or structural violence.

Chapter Four poses the question: “Is the reaction to the signing of the free trade

agreement also a reaction to systemic violence against, and as detected by, segments of

the Colombian society?” This chapter will analyze data from press reports regarding the

response and reaction of the Colombian campesinos. In other words, this chapter will rely

solely on primary data based on what the campesinos are saying, where they’re going and

what they’re trying to accomplish. This material will inform the subsequent analysis of

the Colombian TLC case study.

Finally, Chapter Five poses the question: “Does the free trade agreement in

Colombia provide evidence of social and political structures in place that limit the

potentialities of certain groups within the Colombian society?” Chapter Five will provide

a synthesis and discussion on all the information and context that has been discussed thus

far and argue that the structure of the negotiations leading up to the signing, together with

the reaction to the signing, do provide sufficient evidence of systemic violence against a

particular segment of Colombian society – the rural, small farmer sector. The concluding

chapter of this thesis will provide a final statement of why this issue is important and

what future research questions may emerge from this study.

As of this moment, deep changes to the current political system have proven

virtually impossible given that a large number of these masses have become quite passive

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to the situation, whereby they have become virtually accustomed to the way the system

works against their favor. As a result, they have come to accept the existing political

culture, a legacy of the colonial era, with little to no protestation or demand for more

rights or a government in which they can truly believe in and trust. Therefore, impeding

the full participation of groups within a society can inhibit innovation and growth. By

bringing to light the real details of a profoundly entrenched political culture that engulfs

this region, it is hoped that the popular masses may become more aware of the structures

underlying their class position, develop a more acute class-consciousness, and move

more successfully towards positive change.

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CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Structural violence, also known as systemic violence, is a concept that scholars

have attempted to define and understand for many years. Surprisingly, the notion of this

concept still has not found wide acceptance in the social sciences, given that it is often

described vaguely as “settings within which individuals may do enormous amounts of

harm to other human beings without ever intending to do so” (Hoivik 1977:59). This

means that individuals may commit acts of violence simply by performing their regular

duties as described by their post within the structure (Bernbeck 2008). But in reality, it is

much more complicated and insidious than this. The earliest and most widely accepted

definition was that of Galtung who first described structural violence as “the gap between

actual and potential conditions, meaning the gap that exists between the actual world we

observe and the potential one we can only guess at, conjecture or model” (cited in Hoivik,

1977:59). To follow this definition it is clear that this concept has proven to be of a

hybrid nature, given its half empirical and half theoretical aspects.

Galtung also added the term cultural violence to his studies in order to denote

“the production of ideological legitimation for both structural and personal violence.”

Therefore, in combination with personal and structural violence, he identifies a triangle of

violence (Bernbeck 2008:395). Galtung’s tripartite classification of violence involving

the categories of personal, structural and cultural violence has become one of the most

prevailing paradigms guiding research within the field of peace studies. Furthermore,

according to Galtung as described by Vorobej (2008:85), “violence is present when

human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are

below their potential realizations.” In other words, Galtung’s definition of violence

requires us to compare the actual realizations of groups within a society with their

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potential realizations, and conclude that violence may be present when the actual level of

realization is proven to be lower than the potential level of realization.

Scholars that have followed Galtung have added to his concept, arguing that

previous definitions continued to be theoretically unsound and that “the practical

consequences of adopting any such wide definition of violence was likely to be

disappointing” (Vorobej 2008:85). As a result, more recent scholars have defined

structural violence as discriminative and oppressive in nature, characterized by “suffering

caused through social relationships such as those found in the civil, social and economic

relations of public policy” (Crawshaw et al. 2010:3). In other words, structural violence

now enables us to bring together in a single concept issues as diverse as poverty and

income inequality, unacceptable living and working conditions, aggressive economic and

trade policies, institutionalized forms of discrimination, denial of human rights, sickness

or disability caused by unaffordable health care and the suffering from war and genocide

as well as the likelihood of exposed to crime and fear of insecurity. The root cause of all

of these conditions may be found in violence inherent to a system, rather than violence

perpetrated by an individual or group. This makes it difficult to detect, since the

viciousness of structural violence “will always sound relatively innocuous unless one is

attentive to its cumulative effects” (Bernbeck 2008:396). In others words, no single

process, event, or types of events will suffice to produce a convincing account of

structural violence. On the contrary, only examination of vast political-economic contexts

and their encroachment on concrete persons and groups can illuminate such situations.

Structural violence has also been viewed as violence that results in harm but is not

caused by a clearly identifiable actor, where “positive peace” is defined as the absence of

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structural violence (Vorobej 2008). Failure to achieve positive peace can and will be

attributable to conditions of structural and possibly personal violence. However, if one

were to define the concept of peace as merely the absence of violence, then too little is

rejected when peace is upheld as an ideal. In other words, highly unacceptable social

orders could still be compatible with peace, if there is no personal violence taking place.

It is for this reason that the need to expand the definition of violence to include the

concept of systemic violence is an indispensable one (Vorobej 2008).

Whereas personal violence typically is manifested and is evident to victim and

perpetrator alike, structural violence is often invisible and intangible. Precisely because it

can seem so natural within a given society, by identifying structural limitations of certain

groups to realize their potential as a type of violence, one is far more likely to perceive

more accurately the full extent of the problem. Unless one bears in mind that distinct

types of violence stand in this intimate causal relationship, one runs the risk of working

for peace along paths that are self-defeating, given that reducing personal violence might

lead to the escalation in the level of structural violence, or vice versa. By calling attention

to parallels and the relationship between personal and structural violence, there is hope

that people who are concerned with opposing interpersonal violence will also work to

oppose structural violence in the future.

Structural Violence and Interpersonal Violence

As mentioned previously, another important aspect of structural/systemic violence

is the act of interpersonal violence, which is also rooted in institutional crime. While

structural violence is caused by unfair inflexible rules in the system of a society and as

such, is almost always invisible, personal violence occurs when there exists a clearly

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identifiable actor who is the cause of the difference between the actual and potential

realization (Vorobej 2008). Structural violence on the other hand involves no such actor.

In other words, individuals and groups within a society enjoy unequal life chances and

there is no clearly identifiable agent causally responsible for this discrepancy (Vorobej

2008).

Loss of life within structural violence is possible, as caused by social conditions,

where victims are social groups rather than individuals as is the case with interpersonal

violence (Hoivik 1977). In other words, we can recognize structural violence at work

only at the collective level when we observe survival rates that are too low relative to

resource levels. The amount of structural violence leveled against a particular group,

depends, therefore, on where the borders of society are drawn – when borders shift,

potentials will also change (Hoivik 1977). Given that causes of structural violence lie in

the structure itself, it tends to be measured by relative rather than absolute deprivation.

Galtung also addressed the theoretical worry that the distinction between personal

and structural violence is not one that is clear or even real. In his findings, he grapples

with the serious objection that by encouraging individuals to eliminate both personal and

structural violence, their hands may be tied in such a manner that their efforts to help

sustain and/or produce societies in which personal nor structural violence are eliminated,

could be counteracted (cited in Vorobej 2008). In other words, interpersonal violence and

structural violence are coupled in such a way that it is very difficult to get rid of both

evils.

Pinto (2003) notes a connection between structural violence and human rights

proposing that rights violations are often symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and

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are linked intimately to the social conditions that often determine who will suffer abuse

and who will be shielded from it. This inequality of justice is a manifestation of structural

violence. As a result, scholars of human rights need their approach to be historically deep

and geographically broad by researching further back than recent past history to

understand how these conditions came about through time, and to see the connections

among cases around the world. In this light, Pinto (2003) warns that those scholars who

move away from research to dedicate their energy to activism run the risk of reinforcing,

rather than breaking down the mechanisms that constitute structural violence by viewing

poverty from the wrong lens.

A recent example could be the violence that occurred in 9/11, which, according to

Madriz (2001) is rooted in institutional as well as structural violence, specifically in

human rights abuses that currently exist in various countries of the Arab world.

According to this scholar (2001:47), while those in the West are still split over how to

properly respond to the attack, failure of Arab leadership to create accountable political

institutions, ensure civil liberties, and provide their people a measure of social justice and

economic equity is also a factor. Madriz (2001) also finds that there is a split between

those on the one hand, who believe it is vital to understand the role of U.S. policies in

creating this situation while on the other hand, those who have focused on internal

conditions within the Middle East that include aspects such as tyrannical regimes,

rejections of modernity and abuses of individual rights, as well as hierarchical social

structures and restrictions on individual freedom, all of which help reveal the link

between interpersonal and institutionalized violence. Here is an example of where

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systemic or institutional violence arguably was the cause of interpersonal violence

perpetrated against individuals.

Structural Violence and Imperialism Schwebel (2011) demonstrated that structural violence works to maintain and

reproduce inequality and social injustice even in democratic societies, where there has

been a historic implementation of slavery, male dominance, and the degradation of racial,

religious, ethnic and lower social class social groups generating divisiveness and conflict

among them. As a result, there is a system in place, and, in his words, “the real world

today continues to be marked by imperialist relationships between and among nations as

well as between and among classes within nations, which are colored and influenced by

these imperial values” (Schwebel 2011:95). In such a system, entities of international

scope continue to distribute resources unevenly and this perpetuates an unequal

distribution of power. Such systematic and systemic limitations can be construed as

violence that works indirectly and is rarely discernible in terms of actions that can be

rectified through legal, diplomatic or other means. As a result, sharp inequalities are not

only evident as material differences but also as social exclusion to the point of

humiliation on a social and spiritual level that is equal to an assault on human dignity

(Bernbeck 2008). In other words, such structures are not just more or less static spatial

expressions of institutional entities that enframe practices; rather, such remnants of

imperialistic structures have the potential to inflict violence even to the extent that they

can lead to death, demolition and other types of personal disaster (Bernbeck 2008).

However, there is no identifiable perpetrator of this kind of violence.

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For this purpose, imperialism may be defined as “the policy of one nation to

extend its control directly or indirectly or have undue influence over another nation”

(Schwebel 2011:94). However in its modern and more sophisticated version, the

subordinate government may have all the appearances of an independent nation, such as

an elected leader, while remaining under the influence, if not the dictates, of one or more

powerful nations. As a result, imperialism is often unrecognized as a factor in regard to

direct and indirect violence alike. However, any constraint on human potential caused by

economic and political structures, unequal access to resources, political power, education,

health care, or legal standing may provoke acts of crime, rebellion, and terrorism by the

affected individuals and group, to which the State could answer using overt violent and

repressive measures, setting up an unending cycle of violence. In this way, systemic

(intangible) violence provoking personal (tangible) violence, confronted in turn by the

system imposing further personal (tangible) violence, and perpetuating the systemic

(intangible) violence against the group whose potential was compromised in the first

place by that same system, will lead to an unending cycle (Schwebel 2011).

Perpetuating underdevelopment as the basis for imperialistic relationships

between nations, and between ruling groups and underdeveloped communities,

exploitation can become a handmaiden to imperialism. This is because a developing

agent will be reluctant to allow the developing community to take control of the

development process. As a result, development becomes an exogenous entity and can

work to keep the development agents, or actor causing the harm, in their dominant spot

where they are empowered to determine the rate and direction of development

indefinitely (Kotze 1978). If this relationship of dependence of the developed on the

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developing becomes self-perpetuating, it can provide an example of how development

administration should not be conducted in practice. In contrast, a non-paternalistic (non-

imperialistic) development administration will achieve the opposite effect by creating the

very conditions, which will enable the developing community to take control of the

development and for the center and periphery to interact on a basis of equality, rather

than one of exploitation and domination (Kotze 1978). This could be the development

initiative that would break down the structures of imperialism that were designed to limit

the potential of the colony, in short, the structures of systemic violence against the

disempowered people of such areas.

Structural Violence and Power

Although Galtung was one of the first scholars to accurately define and depict the

concept of structural violence within the social sciences, his notion of the concept has

often been criticized due to a “lack of sufficient analytic and normative clarity from other

important political concepts, thus evading a clear articulation of peace and violence as

distinct political-philosophical concepts” (Parsons 2007:173). In other words, his

understanding of structural violence conflates important distinctions made by more recent

theories of violence and power that better explain how direct and indirect forms of

violence make for specific power relations, and how this results in particular relations of

violence. This understanding of structural violence recognizes that there is a struggle by

subordinate groups to establish conditions whereby they are not subject to harm and

injuries as a result of routinized relations and practices designed to benefit dominant

groups (Parsons 2007).

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Scholars such as Parsons have taken the concept of structural violence further to

focus on the “nature of harms” (2007:74), which demonstrates how a person is affected

and how to eliminate what makes those harms possible instead of merely focusing on

what is done to another by a particular subject and how that action is later carried out.

Although Parsons (2007) still utilizes the notion of the gap between the potential and the

actual just as Galtung suggested, he contends that objectionable forms of power are not

reducible to relations of violence. In other words, he believes violence is used as a means

to other ends, which is “instrumental for gaining control, power, strength and influence

within and beyond immediate social activity and localized contexts” (Parsons 2007:174).

Therefore, the use of violence can be deemed good only when it effectively serves as a

means of the creation or strengthening of pluralistic, nonviolent, civil society secured by

publically accountable political-legal institutions (Parsons 2007). In other words,

violence may be justified when it serves to reduce or eradicate other worse forms of

violence.

Given that structural violence is the “unintended and indirect constraint impeding

people and groups from their own self-realization where those structures themselves are

not natural and immutable,” (Parsons 2007:175) it must be recognized that the structure

itself has been designed at some point to deprive those individuals and groups from

bringing their power to bear against the “top dogs” (Parsons 2007). In other words,

structural violence is not the most obvious manifestation of power but it does denote that

organized relations function to perpetuate or suppress instances of violence. As a result,

in order to recognize this kind of violence, it is important to analyze the conditions of

domination and the outcomes of the distribution of benefits in regards to material

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constraints that are forced on subordinate groups, as well as the instruments used to

further the domination of certain other groups.

Structural Violence and Hegemonic Masculinity

Hegemonic masculinity is another concept that has been linked to structural

violence, which allows us to understand institutionalized forms of discrimination,

repression and legitimation of inequalities (Crawshaw et al., 2010:2). Hegemony by

definition refers to the “cultural dynamic by which a group sustains a leading position in

social life” (Crawshaw et al. 2010:3). For its part, masculinity operates as a gender

ideology that works to determine both relationships between men and women as well as

relationships between men and other men (Crawshaw et al. 2010). In fact, hegemonic

masculinity is not isolated, rather it is an aspect of a larger construction of gender, and

definitions are deeply enmeshed in the history of institutions and economic structures that

continue to be held in place today. According to Crawshaw et al (2010), dominance of

this type of masculinity is not surprising, given that it overlaps with certain kinds of

economic behaviour that are dictated by the equally dominant neoliberal economic model

and the acting out of structural violence as a response. In other words, clear links between

the hegemony of this form of manhood and resulting encouragement of power

inequalities between individuals and social groups are reflected and reproduced in power

inequalities between classes, ethnicities, genders and social institutions. As this system is

put into action, it limits the potential of certain individuals and groups, thus constituting

systemic violence.

The dominant forms of masculinity and patriarchal social relationships that are so

deeply entrenched in many political cultures may be harmful not only to women and girls

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but also to men themselves. Such structural factors, which are largely determined by the

economic organization of nation states and the wider global community, are particularly

evident and implicated in the perpetuation of inequalities in areas such as the Global

South. As a result, the relationship between these areas and crime is quite clear.

According to Crawshaw et al, such inequalities are associated with “high levels of social

and economic deprivation, low levels of social capital, disorganized and fragmented

communities, low levels of education, and high levels of worklessness” (2010:2). This

type of masculinity present in the construction of criminal identities, subcultures, and the

positioning of men within these roles, make them just as vulnerable to becoming victims

of the structural system themselves.

Furthermore, this concept of hegemonic masculinity has been previously

characterized by negative attributes such as toughness, aggressiveness, excessive risk-

taking and emotional illiteracy alongside other more positive attributes that include

strength, protectiveness, decisiveness and courage (Crawshaw et al., 2010). Additionally,

features of more debatable value such as individualism, competitiveness, rationality and

practical orientation are more neutral but also critical when defining and explaining this

concept (Crawshaw et al., 2010). According to Crawshaw et al (2010), these attributes

can be played out both in the actions and dispositions of individual men and also in the

wider political and ideological composition of governments and nation states. Social

relations and public policies of countries, which have explicitly rejected patriarchal forms

of governance, continue to be undermined given that tough, aggressive, and unemotional

models of manhood generate tough, aggressive and unemotional politics and public

policies (Crawshaw et al., 2010). As a result, hegemonic masculinity, a form of power

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that profoundly determines social and political relations, can be stabilized and

destabilized by other types of power relations such as social class and ethnicity

(Crawshaw et al. 2010). Hence inasmuch as the construction of hegemonic masculinity

impacts on other power relations, it can prove beneficial and useful to look closely at this

in the wider study of inequality that is evident in many societies today.

In conclusion, links between hegemonic inequality and structural violence are

clear. Both concepts refer to institutionalized forms of social, cultural and political

dominance, which work to systematically oppress those groups who find themselves

powerless in the face of patriarchal and economic domination alike (Crawshaw et al.,

2010). It has been proven that states, which are characterized by higher levels of gender

equality use, lower levels of physical violence during international crises when compared

to those with lower indices of gender equality. As a result, states that include more

women in their politics also tend to have more egalitarian policies and societies.

Challenging this type of hegemony is not limited to addressing the attitudes and

behaviors of individual men, but rather involves systematic assault on already embedded

sets of ideologies and practices that lie at the heart of current political and social systems

(Crawshaw et al. 2010). That is to say, systemic violence transcends the attitudes and

behaviors of individuals—it is inherent in social systems, and therefore corrective

measures must be designed at that level.

Poverty as Structural Violence

Given that Gatlung first defined violence as “avoidable impairment of

fundamental human needs or the impairment of human life that lowers the actual degree

to which someone is able to meet their demands below that which otherwise be possible,”

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structural violence exposes a clear logic behind how violence is distributed throughout

societies (Ho 2007:9). Additional layers and multiple dimensions of structural violence

build upon existing fundamental and unequal distribution of power that systematically

disadvantages those who do not hold power at all. As a result, this is manifested in terms

of economic and social inequalities.

On the other hand, as articulated by Amartya Sen, poverty consists of “a

systematic or structural denial of basic freedoms, resulting in agency constrained to the

extent that individuals are unable or lack the capability to meet their basic needs” (Sen,

cited in Ho, 2007:9). Consequently, the denial of one freedom amplifies or multiplies the

denial of other freedoms, rendering the poor disproportionately vulnerable to a whole

array of other types of violations. Farmer (2009:23) agrees, and proposed a concept of

“complex societies” that characterizes extremely unequal and in-egalitarian social

structures. In other words, he contends that the world’s poor are the chief victims of

structural violence, ignorance of which has thus far defied the analysis of many seeking

to understand the nature and distribution of extreme suffering (Farmer 2009). If this cycle

is to be broken, one has to identify the forces conspiring to promote suffering, with the

understanding that these will be differentially weighted in different settings. The point

would be to not only focus on the poor, but to look more widely at the social system.

Structural analysis of poverty and violence also focuses on the holistic aspects of

society, including interdependent relationships among individuals, collectives,

institutions and organizations, which are interested in the social, political and economic

networks that form between and among individuals (Ho 2007). Individuals and groups

who are embedded in such relational structures will shape their identities, interests and

21

interactions in accordance with these structures. Such structures include class and class

coalitions. The institutions might include business organizations, political parties and

global institutions such as the United Nations (U.N.), the World Trade Organization

(WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all of which tend to

continue to reproduce historically-established balances of power and economically-driven

processes that reaffirm the status quo. That is, these institutions tend to allow their users

- the rich - to get richer and maintain power reproducing the system which is central to

the inequality that gives rise to structural violence (Ho 2007).

Structural Violence and Indigenous Identity Contestation over indigenous identity also perpetuates a form of symbolic

political violence that Galtung would have described as structural and cultural over time

(Maddison 2013). Regulation of indigenous identity through structural violence has led to

fragmentation as well as the creation of divisions within marginalized groups and

functions by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization, both of which are

required for effective struggle against exploitation (Maddison 2013). Furthermore,

contemporary identity struggles are complicated by the difficult challenge and legacy of

structural violence inherent in past policies of identity control, with reference to

colonialist intentions to convert, destroy, displace, isolate and eventually assimilate

aboriginal peoples. Such structural and cultural violence that is inherent to settler

colonialism manifests over time in government policy becoming instilled in community

attitudes. This tends to result in the relentless pressure on aboriginal people to

simultaneously defend their authenticity and assimilate into the mainstream of society

(Maddison 2013). This untenable positioning of aboriginal people in the post-colonial

22

context has had a crippling effect, and can be seen as an example of systemic violence

resulting in physical harm to individuals and groups, even in the absence of physical

violence exercised against them by the dominant system.

An example of a clear and more current diagnosis of structural violence is the

indigenous people of Chiapas, who engaged in the struggle for empowerment, land

reform, and the provision of health care and education in the early 1990s (Pinto 2003).

The Zapatista movement emerged in this Maya region to protest against Mexico’s signing

of the North American Free trade agreement (NAFTA) and was met with both a direct

military response and by right-wing paramilitary groups founded by the land-owning elite,

demonstrating a clear example of the cycle of structural violence in the Mexican political

system. In this case, indigenous people with little in the way of political representation

and material resources found themselves unable to compete with the lobbying efforts of

México’s wealthy elite and other U.S.-based traditional corporations in defining the terms

of the free trade agreement. Therefore, the Zapatista movement represented an organized

response to the inability of the Maya to reach their potential in terms of defending their

territory. In other words, their response to the systemic violence that they felt was

perpetrated against them, while the State, for its part, responded with a heavy hand. When

examining indigenous identity, authenticity and the structural violence of settler

colonialism, one must understand that a violent structure leaves marks not only on the

human body but also on the mind and spirit (Maddison 2013).

Structural Violence and Development

By definition, a condition of full development is the existence of social justice

defined as the equal, though not always similar treatment of all persons, qualified in the

23

light of certain principles (Kotze 1978). According to Kotze (1978), these include the

recognition of contributions, the keeping of agreements, non-injury, non-interference,

non-impoverishment, protection and perhaps the provision and improvement of

opportunity. In a poor nation, material resources tend to be divided relative to the national

development goals, which in turn should be realistic about the availability of material

resources. Failure to appreciate the relativity of development, both as a process and as a

condition, will produce a situation known as the “revolution of rising expectations”

(Kotze 1978:32). It is in these poorer countries where affluence exists in isolated pockets

and poverty for the masses along with other traits of underdevelopment, such as the

government’s inability to provide the minimum conditions for achieving the good life and

persistence of ascription, impoverishment, unequal distribution of goods and services as

well as unequal opportunity. Thus development of a certain kind of non-material aspect

such as education and greater social mobility, without corresponding material satisfaction,

tends to create immediate rank disequilibrium accompanied by violent or revolutionary

propensities (Kotze 1978).

The allocation of material resources is actually of crucial importance because

these resources provide the groundwork for any fully-fledged development effort. As a

result, a situation of structural violence will emerge in an area where misdistribution of

resources is taking place and its perpetuation is largely the choice of an elite-dominated

government (Kotze 1978). In other words, not only is the government of an

underdeveloped country often able to perpetuate structural violence through selectively

withholding development, but it can also achieve the same effect by thrusting upon an

area a type of development that is designed to perpetuate other kinds of dependent

24

relationships. Kotze (1978:36) sees this kind of development as a result of one of the

following: “a desire in the center to maintain the status quo, a reward to the periphery for

political support, the spin-off of the extraction of raw material for export or the actual

rewards of which go towards strengthening the central position of those powerful elites in

the center.” This type of control that the center has over the periphery is “facilitated by

the prevention of the joint articulation by the peripheries of their problems, aspirations

and dissatisfactions” (Kotze 1978:37). As a result, this is achieved by prohibiting

associative integration such as bringing together people on the basis of their similarity of

status, where freedom of association is often prohibited under these circumstances. This

increases the threat of direct violence, but it is seen as a necessary measure for elite-run

governments that wish to remain in power. The curbing of the rights of the poor masses,

supported by the oppressive machine of the state, is the perfect combination of systemic

violence and the threat of physical violence, which lessens the ability of the masses to

meet their potential.

However, the concept of structural violence as a development norm loses some

legitimacy due to the criticisms leveled against it: its variables of social justice and

equality are both subject to cultural differences, which also result in differences in

regards to the concept of the ideal state of development (Kotze 1978). While some

suggest that violence should be defined as the cause of deviation from the optimal

resource allocation, this type of development norm is also entirely materialistic.

Therefore, a type of multidimensional development strategy will prevent aggression as

well as allowing the government to act as an anti-status quo agency where attempts to

promote social change, economic growth and political participation can also take place.

25

In other words, a development process where government activity is a prerequisite for

achieving and maintaining positive peace is preferable to a situation where desires for

maintaining the status quo could prove adverse (Kotze 1978).

In terms of avoiding structural violence, a clear and endogenous type of

development places responsibility for its success on the developing community itself

while placing efforts to break down existing violent structures through a carefully

controlled campaign of non-violent social conflict (Kotze 1978). By using existing

structure and opportunities for purposes determined by the periphery, one is able to

change the system from the inside out. However, this can prove problematic, given that

exceptional strength of purpose, maintained for more than one generation is required to

counter the tendency inherent in systems that want to annihilate those who want to

change them (Kotze 1978). It can also prove rather difficult to determine at what point

the system has actually changed. Another possibility would be to formulate alternative

development ideologies that propose a different structure for the distribution of wealth,

status and opportunity. A final possibility is that the center and periphery meet and arrive

at a common understanding of the true meaning of development and ways of arriving

there. Adherence to a common development ideology is perhaps the most crucial

requirement for successful, practical and evolutionary development, where endogenous

and exogenous efforts are combined. Unless this is the case, every development effort has

inherent possibilities for structural violence.

Structural Violence in Latin America

Violent pluralism refers to the “paradox of dynamic, democratic practices that

elect certain actors to political power while coexisting with other actors who are fighting

26

for control of territory and other groups in societies where corruption, oppression, and

coercive forms are necessary to maintain democracy” (Taylor 2011:892). In the past,

“Latin American societies have been constituted through both formal and informal means

from the beginning, not only in the creation of the physical habitat through urbanization,

but also in the re-creation of survival activities, where violence emerges as reactive

opposition in the game of power legitimization” (Taylor 2011:892). However, violent

pluralism does not imply equality of power between political actors, rather it highlights

how violence by the subjugated can be part of the struggle to construct more just and

democratic societies.

Furthermore, violence in the region cannot be seen as a dichotomy of the state

trying to keep order in the face of violent counter-state actors. Rather, the violence has

multiple sources and many of them have their origins within the state apparatus itself. A

prevalence of violence should not be understood as instances of “state failure and the

ideal-type democracy should be the standard by which these states are evaluated, given

that understanding Latin America involves developing a much more robust notion of the

armed groups that currently operate there” (Taylor 2011:892). This is not only apparent

in the criminal organizations themselves, but also in the panoply of such actors who

affect politics to an extent greater than studies that formal democratic institutions address.

Historically, democracies in Latin America have stemmed from a complex mix of

power, clandestine links, illegality, and hidden authoritarian regimes. Until now,

neoliberal economic reforms have not brought their promised prosperity for the poor in

the region, and formal democratic governance has failed to adequately provide civil

liberties and rights to that same population (Taylor 2011). As a result, widespread

27

violence in the region is best understood not as failure of institutions and democracy,

rather as an integral element in the configuration of those institutions and as an

instrument for popular challenge to their legitimacy thus far (Taylor 2011). As a result,

Latin American democracies can be conceptualized as violently plural with violence

constituting a basic element in the foundation of democratic states. Therefore, violence

has proven to be an instrument that allows democracies in the region to remain in power

despite the unpopularity of policies.

This concept is abstracted from the direct actions of individuals and has also been

viewed as part of a wider set of processes and practices, which act upon individuals,

communities and societies alike. When speaking of Latin America, some scholars have

looked at “political institutions to explain the failure of the rule of law while others have

interrogated the role of global capitalism and structural inequalities in the continuum of

violence both public and private, following the region’s democratic transition in the 20th

century” (Neumann 2013:168). Latin American citizens today have astonishingly little

confidence in the capacity of procedural democracy to deliver social justice and/or

prosperity to the people. As a result, struggles over the meaning of events during

dictatorships will continue to divide public officials and populations for the foreseeable

future (Williams 2005). However, records show that when people mobilize in powerful

groups, make their demands known through policy statements of their organizations, and

broadcast those demands widely through repeated massive demonstrations; they can

succeed in electing responsive leaders (Schwebel 2011).

Conclusion

28

Systemic or structural violence clearly represents a barrier to rectifying social

inequality in Latin America, the most unequal region in the world. Although widely

recognized as a critical issue by scholars from across the social sciences, by its embedded

nature, it is difficult to study. Since it is traceable only through its manifestations, and

even then its very existence difficult to substantiate, it has proven resistant to study. The

synthesis presented in this chapter shows the insidious nature of systemic violence that

results in almost intangible violent situations, which are found the roots of some very

tangible acts of resistance that result in real physical violence. When the same system that

limits the attainment of potential by individuals and groups, activates the oppressive

machine to rectify and reorder, the “system” is returned to the status quo.

The following chapters examine two related recent situations in Colombia: one,

the signing of the free trade agreement by the powers-that-be, and the second, the

reaction to that signing by the rural sector of Colombia. It is proposed that both of these

situations are related to systemic violence: the first, because of the categorical exclusion

of certain groups and sectors in this initiative; the second, due to the actors involved in

the protests to the initiative, and the discourse that they use. In both cases, systemic

violence is inferred. This discussion is included in the final chapter.

29

CHAPTER THREE: COLOMBIA SIGNS THE TLC

Space or arenas for participation in national decision-making are structured in

numerous ways. The recent signing of a free trade agreement in Colombia is one example

of such a decision-making process at the national level. Therefore, in this chapter we will

address the question: “were there equal opportunities for participation of all interested

parties in the negotiations surrounding the signing of this agreement?” In other words,

this chapter will explore the decision-making process by mapping and tracing the

participating sectors and groups to see if there is indeed a pattern in their inclusion or

exclusion from the process. Additionally, to understand current issues with the most

recent Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC), or free trade agreement (FTA), it is important

to have a basic contextual history of how FTA’s have been organized and managed in

Latin America in the past followed by a closer look at FTA’s in general along with their

respective pros and cons in the Colombian context.

What is a Free Trade Agreement?

In theory, free trade agreements are designed to eliminate tariffs and other barriers

to goods and services, while expanding trade between its respective countries. By

providing better and cheaper goods and services through increased competition, it is

projected by neoliberal economists that there will also be an increase in consumer surplus

for all respective partners. These economic welfare gains may also lead to spillover

benefits including higher levels of innovation and investment that may contribute to

economic recovery, growth and distribution (Fandl 2006). It is argued that FTA’s may

also enhance economic growth and prosperity between these regions, by generating

export opportunities in areas such as agriculture, industry, and service, which will help

30

create employment opportunities. FTA’s provide partner nations with reciprocal duty-free

access to each other’s markets, effectively creating a common market whereby trade

flows and increasing economic efficiencies are facilitated (Needleman 2013). By

increasing the scope and speed of market access, there should also be faster results in

turnover as well as the creation of investible domestic surpluses.

More specifically, bilateral free trade agreements offer each country a set of

particularized benefits that will increase its position as an exporter to the other party

(Fandl 2006). Such benefits include reduced tariffs and quotas on key products exported

to their country, which allow exporters to reduce overall costs. For their part, critics of

FTA’s warn that these agreements promise short-term gains in both trade access and

political capital, which may bring growth to certain sectors where, in the majority of

cases, the developing country experiences a reduction in economic growth and an

expansion of poverty (Needleman 2013). FTA’s may also aid in fostering economic

development as well as contributing to political and social efforts that, in fact, may

threaten democracy and regional stability (Anonymous 2006). But, in the case of

Colombia, a free trade agreement is an essential component of a U.S. regional strategy to

advance free trade within the hemisphere, combat the current drug war, and build

democratic institutions to promote economic development. In other words, the U.S.

proposes that Colombia remove barriers to trade in services, provide a secure and

predictable framework for U.S. investors operating in Colombia, provide for effective

enforcement of labor and environmental laws, protect intellectual property and provide an

effective system to settle disputes (Anonymous 2006).

History of Free Trade in the Region

31

For Latin America, the U.S. offers a substantial export market; lower shipping

costs and a population receptive to its goods and services. In the past, the region’s trade

policies throughout the 1970’s relied largely on import substitution and infant industry

protection which involved significant state assistance for new industries and the

promotion of industries that do not necessarily have a global comparative advantage in

trade (Fandl 2007). The theory behind import substitution is that by limiting foreign

imports of manufactured goods and replacing them with domestically produced goods,

exports will begin to exceed imports and economic growth will occur (Fandl 2007). In

contrast, a theory of comparative advantage urges countries to emphasize production in

those sectors in which they have a productivity advantage over other countries. In

practice, many countries in Latin America adhered to this theory at the expense of

focusing on other, faster-growing commodity exports in which they did not possess the

same advantages (Anonymous 2006). As a result, growth nearly fell to zero in the 1980’s,

where per capita income in Latin America declined by 10% (Fandl 2007).

The openness of the Latin American economy to foreign direct investment and

reliance on foreign capital goods ultimately led to an increased debt burden as well as an

economic shock. It was not until 1991 that Colombia began to reduce its trade barriers

and engage in regional trade agreements, becoming an associative member of

MERCOSUR and a member of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 1998

(Anonymous 2006). However, the U.S.-supported Washington consensus, a term used to

describe the imposition of free trade policies and liberal reforms throughout Latin

America in the 19902, is now broadly opposed throughout the region, making the

negotiation of a regional trade agreement especially challenging (Anonymous 2006). This

32

has made more difficult the implementation of an FTA in Latin America (FTAA) that

would have allowed the U.S. to effectively consolidate its political and economic

dominance in the region. With the demise of the multilateral free trade agreement, the

U.S. has continued to apply pressure on countries to sign bilateral FTA’s.

FTA’s and Colombia

Before the most recent TLC signed in 2012, the previous fair and free trade

agreement was the FTA of February 27th 2006. This agreement solidified many of the

trading practices that were in place since 1991 under the Andean Trade Preference Act

(ATPA), which had expired earlier that year, putting Colombia on the verge of losing its

trade preferences (Needleman 2013). As a result, in May of 2004, the U.S. initiated free

trade agreement negotiations with three Andean regions, namely Colombia, Peru and

Ecuador (Anonymous 2006). The proposed FTA was comprehensive in addressing issues

relating to trade, commerce, customs administration, and trade facilitation while

safeguarding intellectual property rights (Needleman 2013). As a result, in 2005

Colombia and the U.S. had 14.3 billion dollars in two-way trade, making Colombia the

second largest agricultural market for the U.S. in Latin America (Anonymous 2006).

After it was signed, the treaty was submitted for ratification to the Colombian Congress

in November of 2006 and approved in June 2007, becoming public law 143 in July of

that same year. The Colombian house and senate later approved an amendment in

November, concluding that the agreement did in fact conform to Colombia’s constitution

(Fandl 2006). At that time, 90% of Colombian products enjoyed unilateral free access to

U.S. under the most favored nation tariff rates signed in 2002. However, U.S. exporters

33

were paying tariffs as high as 35% to enter the Colombian market, which the proposed

FTA looked to eliminate by establishing bilateral access (Montana 2008).

The predicted prognosis contended that the new FTA would benefit Colombia by

opening its market to more import competition, which would provide its consumers with

better quality products at lower costs (Fandl 2006). Economic progress in Colombia

would also help promote social development, reduce violence and curb the activities of

drug cartels, which promised to lead the country down a more stable and prosperous path.

It was further proposed that the FTA might also have the potential to provide viable

alternatives to violence and trafficking through rapid economic growth, job creation and

foreign investments (Anonymous 2006). Conversely, by not implementing the FTA, it

was warned, Colombian investment could potentially decrease by 4.5% and GDP by the

same amount while causing a 1.8% increase in unemployment and poverty levels by 1.4

points, according to a study by the University of Antioquia in Medellin (Anonymous

2006). Mutual gains also were identified, including uniform market access where no

agricultural products are excluded, as well as phased tariff elimination within fifteen

years starting with an immediate 0 duty for 80% of U.S. exports (Needleman 2013). A

survey conducted in the consulate of Colombia in Atlanta, Georgia where out of a sample

of 950 Colombian-Americans, 65.5% voted in favor, which was cited to show that the

FTA enjoyed overwhelming support of the Colombian people (Fandl 2006). Clearly, this

was not a representative sample, given that surveys were conducted among Colombians

living in the U.S. and not among Colombians living in Colombia, much less the rural

farming sector most immediately to be affected by such an agreement.

34

Nevertheless, consensus at a high level was reached given the belief that stronger

ties with the U.S. would help the country become more secure, stable, and prosperous.

Then Colombian President Alvaro Uribe also supported president Bush in his push for a

regional FTA, by creating a law to enforce a model of agrarian development that would

directly undermine the so-called subsistence farming economy (Richani 2012). In other

words, this law did not consider or protect the property rights of the forcibly displaced

populations; rather the plan reinforced the trend towards transforming the rural economy

from food production for local or regional consumption to food production for capitalist

gains (Montana 2008). Despite Uribe’s political popularity, his decision was not

supported by the majority of the Colombian population (Needleman 2013).

The characteristics of previously ordained FTA’s in the region continue to show

up in the current agreement with some minor adjustments designed to improve economic

gains for both parties. However, given Colombia’s outstanding human rights cases, the

2012 FTA could not pass through congress until a Labor Action Plan (LAP) was agreed

to in April 2011. According to one author, this so-called labor plan was drafted mainly to

address three central problems: “violence against activists and impunity for government

and military officials, use of illegal party agencies to replace direct employment, and

other devious methods of eliminating collective bargaining and unions” (Needleman

2013:53). Then, the final draft of the FTA was ratified in October of the same year

without a shred of evidence that the LAP would be implemented. Worse still, workers

have seen a dramatic expansion of “contingent labor” since the ratification, in the form of

casual or temporary work, especially reliance on third-party employee agencies, despite

35

the fact that most contingent labor relations were explicitly prohibited in the LAP for key

sectors of the economy, including agriculture (Needleman 2013).

Expected Actors/Groups/Associations in FTA Negotiations

Currently, Colombia’s rural population comprises 15 million people, which is

close to 38% of the total population, 60% of whom rely for their livelihood on agriculture,

while the remaining 40% depend on service-related employment, artisan mining, fishing,

tourism, laboring in extractive multinational corporations and other smaller sectors

(Montana 2008). With its focus on export and the idea of comparative advantage, clearly

any FTA that the Colombian government decides to put in place will have the greatest

effects on the agricultural sector, which dominates more than half of the country’s

national economy. As a result, the core challenge to rural economies is the transformation

of its products into commodities, subject to laws of capitalist circulation and exchange

(Richani 2012).

However, current trends of liberalization associated with the FTA as well as oil

discoveries and production have contributed to increased commodity and land prices as

well as appreciation of the currency, which has benefitted land speculators and rentier

capitalism (Richani 2012). In other words, overall high costs of land in Colombia have

significantly increased production costs that affect mainly small producers with small

landholdings, mainly feeding the unrelenting trend of land concentration, which has

strengthened the had of the landed oligopoly and has created economic dislocation and

inflexibility in the market (Montana 2008). The dairy and meat sectors of the agrarian

economy have been the hardest hit in terms of price increases in current years, therefore

36

the dairy farmers and cattle ranchers may be expected to suffer the most from FTA

foreign policies.

In light of these negotiations and all the changes in terms of economic and social

issues, it is expected that many sectors would be involved in the design of the FTA. One

is able to derive a list of the main actors, groups and government associations that would

be expected to be involved in such FTA negotiations if the premise is to bring about a

fully comprehensive economic plan that will benefit the nation as a whole. Based on a

cursory analysis of the structure of the Colombian economy, it would be estimated that

representatives of the following groups would be at the table.

These include top levels of government such as the president Juan Manuel Santos

and his ministers with portfolios related to the subject at hand, including the minister of

agriculture, top-level government economists, the secretary of agriculture and the

secretary of state, among others. On a medium level, one would also expect to find

representation from non-governmental organizations such as labor unions, and other

groups related to the sectors most affected by the FTA. These included sectors such as the

coffee growers organizations (cafeteros), trucker organizations (camioneros), other

agrarian unions, miners, and even paramilitary groups.

Last but not least, at the lower end of the political spectrum, one would expect to

find individual and/or independent campesinos along with their families, students, and

other members of society that are not directly involved with or organized through any

other association in the country. All of these expected actors and/or groups/associations

are listed more specifically by name in Table 1 below. These are the groups, both

governmental and non-governmental, whose interests are most affected by an FTA, either

37

because they are involved in macro-level national policy, or because their livelihood

relies on agricultural production, the focus of much of the FTA negotiations and

agreements.

Who was Actually Involved in FTA Negotiations?

This section examines who is actually at the table in FTA negotiations in

Colombia. The question posed is: are those organizations and individuals that are

expected to be present because they are knowledgeable about the sectors to be affected

included in the negotiations? If not, is there a pattern to their exclusion, and has their

exclusion affected their ability to perform to their potential? To do this, actors involved

in five FTA negotiations carried on by Colombia in the recent past are examined, and that

list compared to the expected actors developed in the previous section (See Table 1). In

other words, we will look for patterns that clearly suggest whether or not the voices of

many important actors/groups/associations were systematically excluded from FTA talks

and debates.

In this section, an analysis is undertaken of reports in ten newspaper articles about

the protests published in Colombia’s Semana Magazine, given its accessibility in terms of

online archives, in the time period between December 2012 and October 2013. The goal

of this analysis is to identify (a) the actors, groups, individuals and sectors who are

involved in the signing of such agreements (b) the nature of their components to see if

there are also patterns in their presence and/or exclusion from negotiations.

Since the signing of a free trade agreement with the U.S. in 2012, advantages for

the global elite have been so remarkable that Colombia has now entered into trade

agreements with Canada, the E.U., Israel, Japan and South Korea, with an FTA in China

38

currently in progress (Needleman 2013). Although the agrarian political economy will

indeed grow stronger, losses of land to global competition will also continue to increase

and fall into the hands of external and non-local parties such as developers, agribusiness

and multinational mining and oil corporations (Richani 2012). This has come at a great

cost, given that Colombian workers have become more endangered and their jobs

precarious. Currently, it is currently estimated that only 4.6% of Colombia’s workforce

labors under a union contract, which does not protect workers from terror, threats, or

forced removal from their homelands (Fandl 2006). Additionally, the FTA would affect

seasonal food crops such as rice, wheat, corn and beans, which are the main food staples

of the Colombian population, according to recent studies by the Ministry of Agriculture

(Montana 2008). As a result, negative impacts are already taking place given that the area

dedicated to these food staples has decreased by 324,334 hectares over the past decade

(Montana 2008). Logically, this affects the poor more than the wealthy.

Problems are not only evident in statistical terms, but the negotiation process

itself has taken shape without the consent of many campesino agriculturalists. Although

the agricultural minister Lizarralde has been traveling from one department to the next on

a weekly basis ostensibly in order to incorporate the needs of campesino associations,

local authorities, municipalities and other important players in the agrarian sector, the

voices of these marginalized groups continue to be suppressed on a larger and

international scale (Pacto Nacional Agrario 2013). This is clearly noted in ongoing

negotiations of the TLC with other countries, such as Israel, Panama, Costa Rica, South

Korea, E.U., México, Canada, and Venezuela to name a few.

39

In September of this year, Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos travelled to

Israel to set in place the final rubric for the legal approval of the TLC process that was

begun in June. In attendance at this meeting were the Colombian president and his

economic minister Sergio Diaz, as well as Israeli president Shimon Peres and his minister

Naftali Bennet (Semana, September 2013). The main intentions behind this treaty were to

bring a bridge Colombian and Israeli interests, whose respective strengths in agriculture

and technology could bring commercial balances and more than 685 million dollars in

gains (Semana, September 2013). With the TLC, 70% of goods exchanged between Israel

and Colombia would be exempt from custom fees and other types of tariff barriers, a

percentage that would be extended to all trade practices within ten years (Semana,

September 2013). In summary, negotiations in this specific case study were exclusive to

the Colombian and Israeli presidents, as well as their respective economic ministers.

Another prominent example is that of South Korea, which approved the TLC with

Colombia in February of 2013. After the initial oversight by the South Korean cabinet,

formal authorities, including ambassadors of both countries, united in order to discuss

and finalize treaty details (Semana, February 2013). This was done with the assurance

that Colombia would increase its exports to South Korea, especially those in the

agricultural sector, which would favor South Korean investments in the region in sectors

such as mining, construction and hydrocarbons (Semana, February 2013). Both parties

signed the preliminary texts of the bilateral TLC in august of 2012, two months after

South Korean president Lee Myung-bak and Colombian president Santos sealed the final

negotiations in Bogotá. South Korea had previously exported products to Colombia at an

estimated value of 1.6 million dollars in 2011, which was the last year of recorded data

40

for bilateral commerce between these parties (Semana, February 2013). In this case,

negotiations also demonstrate exclusiveness in participation to cabinets’ formal

authorities, ambassadors and respective presidential actors.

In Costa Rica, President Juan Manuel Santos formalized negotiations with his

colleague Laura Chinchilla, where he was also accompanied by his minister of commerce,

industry and tourism Sergio Diaz, who is responsible for the details of this bilateral FTA

(Semana, June 2012). The announcement of such a treaty is the objective of president

Santos’ visit to San José, according to the Colombian executives. While in Costa Rica,

Santos also plans to hold a business meeting with Colombian transnational corporations

established in this central American country, whereby Diaz will meet with Costa Rican

foreign trade minister Anabel Gonzalez in order to sign further legal documents which

formalize the start of negotiations (Semana, June 2012). The Colombian minister of

commerce stated in previous interviews that his country is indeed moving forward in it

trade agenda, aimed at opening its markets by attracting investment and tourists to

contribute to Colombia’s poverty eradication efforts as well as generation of jobs

(Semana, June 2012). Costa Rica continues the pattern of exclusivity, given that

negotiations included respective presidents, as well as other executives, ministers,

businessmen and transnational corporations to the seeming exclusion of other voices.

Another great feat for Colombian free trade and economic liberalization was the

approval of an FTA with the European Union. According to President Santos, the

approval of this TLC marks the beginning of a new stage of prosperity for Colombia that

will bring much needed employment to all Colombian citizens (Semana, December 2012).

In December of 2012, the European parliament approved in Strasbourg the FTA with

41

Colombia with a great majority of 486 votes in favor (Semana). Finance minister

Mauricio Cárdenas also stated that an FTA with Europe opens the door to one of the

world’s major markets. As a result, he welcomed the decision of the parliament given that

it allows for the arrival of products from Colombia to the 27 EU members on favorable

terms (Semana, December 2012). Although Cárdenas briefly touched on the areas that

could be detrimental to the FTA, such as the dairy sector given increased competition, he

strongly believes the European economy is a source for many Colombian business

opportunities. All in all, the trade agreement between Colombia and the EU is the second

largest and most important after signing the entry into the international market with the

U.S. FTA earlier that year (Semana, December 2012). However, Santos and the European

parliament along with Colombia’s finance ministers were the only ones present in this

important turning point in Colombia’s economic future.

A fifth and final example is that of Panama, which proved to be one of the hardest

signatories of them all. In March of 2011, a senior Colombian delegation of high power

met with U.S. trade officials and the White House to discuss TLC issues between these

Latin American countries. More specifically, two American senators solicited the U.S.

commercial representative Ron Kirk in order to initiate technical discussions with the

finance committee regarding the implementation of the TLC with Colombia and Panama

that had been stagnant for five years (Semana, March 2011). In this meeting, it was

mentioned that a concrete plan on behalf of the U.S. government was needed in order to

promote the TLC with Colombia and allow for a legislative evaluation of the three

pending treaties before the 1st of July (Semana, March 2011). Furthermore, the loss of

commercial opportunities was blamed on the Obama administration, which was

42

succumbing to pressure coming from interest groups. As a result, the Colombian

ambassador in the U.S. as well as the presidency’s secretary general and senior advisor

for public and private management and coordinator of the TLC met with officials of the

U.S. trade office to discuss further action (Semana, March 2011). The treaty with

Colombia and Panama has been stagnant due to concerns over the number of union

members that have been assassinated in the past couple of years. As a result, the actors

that have been working to get this deal through are those pertaining to high-level

government office of Panama and Colombia as well as the U.S. These include, trade

officials, delegations, commercial representatives and respective presidents.

Table 1: Expected Actors and Actors in evidence in FTA Negotiations Expected Group/Actors

Where they Involved in FTA negotiations?

Number of times they were mentioned

Transnational Corporations

Yes IIII

Government Administrations – Presidents and Congress (both national and foreign)

Yes IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII IIIII III

Large Landowners No Government – Economists (both national and foreign)

Yes IIIII I

Government – Secretary of Agriculture (both national and foreign)

Yes IIIII I

Government – Agricultural Minister (both national and foreign)

Yes IIIII II

Government – Banco Agrario

Yes III

Campesinos – la Mesa Nacional Agropecuaria de

Yes III

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Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA), Asociacion de Campesinos (ASCAMCAT) Beef, Dairy and Potato Farmers

Yes I

Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC)

No

Labor Unions Yes I FARC (paramilitary groups)

No

Miners – Confederacion Nacional de Mineros de Colombia (Conalminercol)

No

Cafeteros – Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros

No

Camioneros – Asociacion Colombia de Camioneros (ACC)

No

Independent Campesinos (Farmers and Families)

Yes III

Students No Health Care Workers No Indigenous Groups – Organizacion Nacional de Indigenas Colombianos

No

Discussion

Table 1 “Expected Actors and Actors in evidence in FTA Negotiations,” provides

a synthesis of those groups one would expect to find in such FTA negotiations, and the

actors that were actually involved, according to the data set examined. In this we can see

the following patterns: Although there are qualifying limitations of the data set in this

44

pilot study, given that there could be a more complete use of more reports with other

methods such as interview, a clear patterns emerges as to whom the true and main

players/actors are behind the current and ongoing negotiations of the TLC, even though a

stated aim is to connect the Colombian agricultural sector, among others, to other regions

in the international free market arena. While there is always an ideal theory of who

should be involved in such negotiations if all voices and sectors are to be represented, in

practice, a different pattern emerges. In other words, while one would expect the voices

of those most directly affected to be taken into account, such as the campesino groups

and other types of labor unions, current news reports and government-issued websites

demonstrate a patterned difference between the list of people/groups/sectors whose

interests will be affected by the negotiations, and a second list of people/groups/sectors

who are actually reported as being consulted in the process.

Therefore, one might be left to wonder, “what would be the implications if their

were voices excluded?” In reality, the absence of these voices means that it is unlikely

that their main interests and concerns were taken into account when such policy changes

were made and discussed at the national level. Additionally, one might ask, “What’s the

implication of leaving sectors out?” These implications are clear: sectors excluded from

FTA negotiations will feel they are not engaged in national and/or important

conversations, as well as feelings of exclusion and a lack of opinion and consensus over

decisions that will have a direct impact on their livelihoods and on their life chances.

These individuals and groups not only have a strong interest in the themes under

discussion in the negotiations, but also have knowledge and wisdom to bring to the table.

An absence of their voice would suggest that inasmuch as their futures will be impacted,

45

no remedial or anticipatory actions would have been taken into consideration in the plan.

If there are negative impacts on the small scale agricultural sector or on labour, as has

been shown to be the case in previous examples, then this could be felt as an act of

violence against these sectors, since they are being constrained from full participation in

decisions affecting their life chances. In the context of this present research and

complementing data set, it is not possible to point an accusational finger at any individual

or group, given that there is not enough evidence to prove intentionality. As a result, if

there is no purposeful intention and these people are excluded, then arguably it is the

system that is structured in such a way as to enable this systematic exclusion. This leads

to an insidious problem: given that it is easier to address these issues if they are in fact

intentional, how does one identify the perpetrator in such cases, if corrective action is to

be taken?

Laws introduced during the past few years have clearly not mitigated or protected

the interest of the small rural/peasant class; instead, these laws have legitimized their

losses by providing a systemic legal instrument for new owners and foreign actors to

register their claims. Therefore, the neoliberal ideal of a completely flexible workforce

that is too fearful to organize and too desperate to turn down any job, could be used to

describe the impact of current FTA negotiations in the Colombian region. As a result, the

FTA has recently been linked to an escalation in threats, violence and forced relocations,

all aimed at enabling massive development projects for export, which has resulted in

more protests in the last two years than in the past twenty combined (Semana, December

2012). These reactions by the Colombian people and other civil society have not been

entirely peaceful. In the next chapter, an analysis of newspaper and other media reports of

46

these protests is undertaken to explore patterns in those actions, for comparison to the

results found in this chapter.

47

CHAPTER FOUR: COLOMBIA’S RESPONSE TO THE TLC

In the previous chapter we have shown that there were indeed patterns to the

participation of different actors in the process of signing. Subsequent to the signing and

FTA negotiations, massive protests erupted in Colombia about this agreement and its

respective changes. Therefore, in this chapter, we pose the following question: “are there

patterns to protesters’ rhetoric and behaviour, and if so, how do these patterns compare to

those found in the previous chapter?”

The Strike: Complaints, Demands, and Response

A strike began on August 19th of 2013 which had at its heart the mobilization of

agrarian sectors headed by coffee growers (cafeteros), but also included truckers

(camioneros), health workers, student groups and other labor unions, who complained the

government had breached previous and important agreements. In the first half of that year,

coffee producers made strenuous representations to the government due to difficult

experiences in light of low bean prices, among other factors (Semana, August 17 2013).

In consequence and to raise unemployment levels, growers signed an agreement in which

the government promised to help with an 800,000 million peso subsidy.1 However, as

months passed, la Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros (coffee growers organization)

insisted that they had been operating at a loss and demanded more help. This is not an

easy situation for the government, given that all agricultural sectors are demanding

subsidies given the threats of free trade coming from FTA negotiations (Semana, August

17 2013). This claim was also joined by other organizations such as the coca and potato

1 Equivalent to $440 million Canadian dollars

48

farming sectors, which the agrarian strike called “defensa de la produccion nacional” or

“in defense of national agricultural production”.

In the months following the signing of various FTA’s with several countries and

regions in an international scale, strikes and protests erupted in around Colombia in

numerous departmentos (States) including Boyacá, the Atlantic, Antioquia, Santander,

and other coffee and banana growing regions. These were organized and carried out by

several labor organizations as well as campesino (small scale agricultural) and other rural

sectors mentioned in the table below. In this section, an analysis is undertaken of reports

in ten newspaper articles about the protests published in Colombia’s Semana Magazine,

given its accessibility in terms of online archives, in the time period between December

2012 and October 2013. The goal of this analysis is to identify (a) the actors, groups,

individuals and sectors who are protesting, as well as (b) the nature of their objections as

reflected in their discourse to see if there are also patterns in their responses.

Table 2: Actors Involved in FTA Protests Expected Group/Actors

Where they Involved in FTA protests?

Number of times they were mentioned

Transnational Corporations

No

Government Administrations – Presidents and Congress (both national and foreign)

No

Large Landowners No Government – Economists (both national and foreign)

Government – Secretary of Agriculture (both national and foreign)

No

Government – No

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Agricultural Minister (both national and foreign) Government – Banco Agrario

No

Campesinos – la Mesa Nacional Agropecuaria de Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA), Asociacion de Campesinos (ASCAMCAT)

Yes IIIII

Beef, Dairy And Potato Farmers

Yes IIIII IIIII

Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC)

Yes II

Labor Unions Yes III FARC (paramilitary groups)

Yes III

Miners – Confederacion Nacional de Mineros de Colombia (Conalminercol)

Yes IIIII

Cafeteros – Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros

Yes IIIII IIIII I

Camioneros – Asociacion Colombia de Camioneros (ACC)

Yes IIII

Independent Campesinos (Farmers and Families)

Yes IIIII IIIII II

Students Yes IIIII III Health Care Workers Yes IIIII Indigenous Groups – Organizacion Nacional de Indigenas Colombianos

Yes IIIII

Complaints of abandonment on the part of small and medium-sized producers

also relate to their perception of the system’s vulnerability to trade liberalization, which

50

seems to work positively only for consumers in urban areas. In fact, the rejection of free

trade has been a primary issue of current protests, a demand that is evident in currently

ongoing negotiating tables as well as one that is being shouted on the streets. In the case

of unemployed farmers, complaints of current conditions in which they feel they cannot

compete with cheap imports as a result of NAFTA and other FTA’s are most prominent.

One is quoted as saying: "In general, everyone keeps thinking that the problem [with the

FTA] is the importation of wheat, barley, soybeans, sorghum and other grains. But that's

over. What is new is that farmers [should] have been protected in a [new] series of

products that Colombia has also begun to import: potato, milk, vegetables, cocoa, coffee

and sugar” (Semana, September 2013 – Aurelio Suarez, Economist)2. This is problematic

because Colombia is now beginning to import items that the Colombian farmers have

traditionally produced in the past. Additionally, it has proven almost impossible for

farmers to compete with the framework of free trade in a country that does not allow for

cheap credit or supplies, and where product marketing and distribution of inputs are

controlled by monopoly structures. These structures have not been challenged to help the

small producer. In the rather sarcastic words of one protester: “that miracle has not been

made by anyone as of yet” (Semana, September 2013 – Suarez)3.

Furthermore, farmers who have gathered on the side of the road came together to

protest the low prices of their product on the market which contrasts with the high prices

of inputs, along with other factors such as the revaluation of the peso, high costs of

2 “En general todo el mundo sigue pensando que el problema (con los TLC) es la importación de trigo, de cebada, de soya, de sorgo y otros granos. Pero eso ya pasó. Lo nuevo es que los agricultores se resguardaron en una serie de productos que también se empezaron a importar: papa, leche, hortalizas, cacao, café, azúcar.” (Semana, September 2013 – Aurelio Suarez, Economist). 3 “Ese milagro no lo ha hecho nadie” (Semana, September 2013 – Suarez).

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gasoline and bulk import of processed products, claiming: "We are broke and the

government has abandoned us. Look, prepping the soil, planting, harvesting, packing and

getting a load of potatoes ready (two bags of 50 kilos) for a truck to pickup costs me

65,000 pesos.4 But for about four months now, the situation has been hard, because the

value of the load has decreased to 20,000 pesos.5 That’s not enough for anything so tell

me: how am I expected to pay the 140 million pesos6 loan I owe?" (Semana, August 24

2013)7. In other words, it is quite clear that there is a crisis, which is seen daily in the

deterioration of the quality of life of the small-scale farmers since the signing of several

FTA’s. In the words of another farmer: "with what they pay us we do not receive enough

money to pay for the fertilizers and fungicides, which is roughly equivalent to 40 percent

of total production costs. While FTA’s have placed us in bankruptcy, nothing has been

done to reduce the price of these inputs. How is it that a package of frozen potatoes

imported from Holland is cheaper than one grown and processed in Boyacá, which is 100

kilometers from Bogotá?" (Semana, August 24 2013)8.

4 Equivalent to $36.00 Canadian dollars 5 Equivalent to $11.10 Canadian dollars 6 Equivalent to $77,000 Canadian dollars 7 “Estamos quebrados y el gobierno nos abandonó. Mire; arreglar el terreno, sembrar, recoger, empacar y dejar lista una carga de papa (dos bultos de 50 kilos) para que la recoja un camión me valen 65.000 pesos. Pero desde hace unos cuatro meses, la situación se puso dura, porque la carga se bajó a unos 20.000 pesos. Eso no alcanza pa’ nada y dígame: ¿cómo voy a pagar los 140 millones de pesos en créditos que hice para sembrar?” (Semana, August 24 2013). 8 “Con lo que nos pagan no sacamos ni la plata de los abonos y los fungicidas, que equivalen casi al 40 por ciento de los costos de producción. Mientras que los TLC nos están quebrando no han servido para disminuir el precio de esos insumos. ¿Cómo se explica que un paquete de papa congelada traída desde Holanda vale menos en El Éxito que una cultivada y procesada en Boyacá, que está a 100 kilómetros de Bogotá?” (Semana, August 24 2013).

52

Miners associated with la Confederacion Nacional de Mineros de Colombia

(CONALMINERCOL) from northern Antioquia were also protesting matters in an area

where exploitation of informal and illegal mines has increased (Semana, August 17 2013).

The demands on behalf of the miners’ concentrate on government decrees 2235 of 2012,

which authorize police to impound the heavy equipment used for illicit mines (Semana,

August 17 2013). The other 14 demands on the miners’ list include social and economic

changes as well as the informal protocols that serve to separate them from criminal gangs.

However, the Santos administration considered the main issues behind such protests non-

negotiable given that changes in this area are instrumental on behalf of the state if they

are to fight against groups that continue to operate on the margins of society, such as

guerrilla and other criminal bands who fund their actions through illegal mining (Semana

August 17 2013). Although the government has attempted to negotiate with the miners,

there have been no positive changes and/or results until now.

The truckers’ union, La asociacion Colombia de Camioneros (ACC), has also

joined mobilizations, given that they have been in constant conflict with the government

for freight and fuel prices, causing the union to go on strike several times in recent years

(Semana, August 17th 2013). The ACC claims the government has disappointed them by

failing to adhere to 10 of the 13 agreements reached in March earlier this year, which

lifted the last protest (Semana, August 17 2013). Since the beginning of renewed conflict

between the ACC and the Santos administration, camioneros have parked their vehicles

in the middle of the main highways, making their presence in the strike one of the most

concerning. In addition to the sectors under el Movimiento de Dignidades, coalitions of

other agrarian groups have also taken to the streets. One such group is la Mesa Nacional

53

Agropecuaria de Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA) that, in addition to fighting for coffee

and cacao prices, has also added more structural claims in regards to access to land and

support for traditional miners as well as other campesino territories (Semana, August 17

2013). Last but not least, health sector workers also announced that hospitals would stop

their usual activities and attend emergencies only.

Student groups from both private and public universities also joined protests in

the southern tip of Bogotá, which demanded more resources for the Faculty of Arts

(Semana, August 29, 2013). In the midst of some uncontrolled situations, the scenario of

marches planned by various sectors also turned violent, where students were chanting in

front of banks: “there they are, those are the ones who stole the nation,” (Semana, August

29 2013)9 as well as: “here lies the money of the Colombian campesinos” (Semana,

August 29 2013)10. These students were constantly followed by police officers in riot

gear. Furthermore, posters were seen with phrases such as “education is a right” (Semana,

August 29 2013)11 and “out with the FTA’s” (Semana, August 29 2013)12 as well as “the

agrarian strike does exist” (Semana, August 29 2013)13 in response to a comment made

by president Santos, who claimed there was no national strike. Later that week, Santos

was forced to rectify his comments, adding that there are certain situations that give rise

to protests, although they should never fall into the hands of violence.

However, protests have not been limited to the current economic situation

surrounding FTA’s. In fact, many indigenous groups around the country took advantage

9 “Ahi estan, esos son los que roban la nacion” (Semana, August 29th 2013). 10 “Aqui esta el dinero de los campesinos colombianos” (Semana, August 29th 2013). 11 “La educacion es un derecho” (Semana, August 29th, 2013). 12 “Fuera el TLC” (Semana, August 29th, 2013). 13 “El paro agrario si existe” (Semana, August 29th, 2013).

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of nationwide strikes and protests to also voice their demands and concerns to the

government. Demonstrations of more than 40,000 indigenous people throughout the

country gathered to protest the failure of previous agreements they had accomplished

with the Colombian government (Semana, October 2013). Protesters argue that the

Santos administration has not complied with the covenants on human rights violations in

the context of armed conflict, respect for indigenous lands and territories, their political

and administrative autonomy, review of mining policies as well as the impact of NAFTA

on agricultural policies (Semana, October 2013). Feliciano Valencia, the legal

representative of the indigenous association of northern Cauca (la Asociacion de

Cabildos Indigenas del Norte del Cauca) stated to the local press that blockades on the

main roads are permanent and will only be lifted when government decides to meet and

negotiate with indigenous groups (Semana, October 2013). Ivan Marquez, a.k.a. Luciano

Marin Arango, chief negotiator for the FARC (guerrilla group), stated to reporters in

Havana that it is not right for the government to criminalize social protests. He also

proposed that the government revise the current FTA’s, which he asserted were signed

with little regard for national economic realities while ignoring the current and precarious

situation in Colombia (Semana, August 19 2013). As of recently, roads have been

blocked by 22 indigenous protests that have taken place in the Atlantic, Cauca, Risaralda,

Tolima, Chocó, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia among others (Semana, October 2013).

How did the strike get to this point?

Most of the governments that have ruled Colombia since the turn of the 20th

century have displayed an institutional bias towards large landowners, given the

economic structure of the country, in which the landowning sector dominated with

55

pronounced overrepresentation in congress and governmental sectors including the

military (Richani 2008). As a result, the most recent strikes and protests promoted by

producers in the agricultural sector put several items on the country’s agenda that may

have previously been systematically and purposely ignored. In light of this

misrepresentation of demands of those sectors that are most affected in Colombia’s

governmental and politically systemic structure, one might ask how and why the

agricultural strikes and their discontent came to this point.

A penetrating analysis of the strike written by Semana magazine on August 31st,

2013, proposes four reasons as well as possible explanations for these patterns, as

summarized in the following. The first and most obvious reason is the lack of a state

policy that defines what model of agriculture Colombia really needs, what is profitable,

and where all large, medium and small producers fit in the national picture. More

precisely, a lack of an agrarian agenda has led to the pursuit of policies that create

subsidies for certain areas and which in large part ignore the root of the problem. A

second issue relates to the fact that the Colombian countryside still faces serious

infrastructural limitations that different and past governments have failed to overcome,

such as the inefficient road and highway systems, which greatly affects the extraction and

delivery of farm products raising transportation costs, along with failures in marketing

chains where the farmer is often the weakest link. A third issue that has been highlighted

in this “revolution of ruanas,” a symbolic garment traditional to the campesino rural

sector, is the government’s inability to anticipate problems and find solutions before they

explode in its hands. Many complaints and concerns expressed in the agrarian strike, such

as high fertilizer costs, lack of available credit, increased number of imports and

56

contraband, are issues that have been present for a very long time. Finally, a fourth and

final issue is that there is now a bad precedent in the country in which pressure

mechanisms have resulted and have now been imposed by the campesinos against the

government in the form of protests and strikes, in order for them to tackle the most

important issues. This happened with the cafeteros in March of this year, with Catatumbo

in July, and now with potato and dairy farmers of Boyacá as well as other departments.

All the points mentioned above are relevant in the analysis of the current strike by

small-scale farmers. However, it is the first two where structural factors and agrarian

public policies are clear, and where the root of the problem is exposed. Although the

Santos government announced from the start that agriculture would be one of the main

engines of his development plan, three years later the subject it still pending (Semana,

August 2013). The protests are directed against the government and clearly show that the

small-scale agriculture sector along with other rural groups are attempting to have their

voices heard in a context where decisions have been made that are detrimental to their

livelihoods, but in which they feel they have not had sufficient input. These protests

illustrate the awareness on the part of these sectors of their exclusion from decision-

making and policy development at the national level on issues that directly affect them.

It also reveals their awareness of false government claims that the measures will benefit

their sector, when in reality the benefits accrue to other sectors, leaving the rural

agricultural and service activities debilitated, or in “bankruptcy”.

Government Response to Protests and Strikes

Although at first glance the strike of August 19th may be seen as a social and

synchronized protest against the government, further analysis demonstrates that it is a

57

combination of many social movements with multiple requests and legitimate claims.

Nevertheless Santos has responded that he would not sit down and negotiate anything or

with anyone in the middle of a protest and/or strike. Agricultural minister Francisco

Estupiñan went on to state that government has always been willing to negotiate and

develop policies to improve productivity and efficiency in the countryside claiming that

he himself had met with la Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC) to gather

resources and redirect sectors (Semana, August 24 2013). However, Estupiñan also stated

his opinion that the current crisis surrounding coffee growing regions is a problem of

international pricing and revaluation of the peso while the potato is a problem of

overproduction, which together with the excessive use of chemicals and fertilizers,

among others, led to a fall in prices that investments will not support (Semana, August 24

2013). In other words, this demonstrates that although government is trying to stop the

protests and strikes, they continue to believe that problems are not structural or systemic;

rather they are factors and results of international patterns beyond their control.

In response, the president of SAC, Rafael Mejia, claims that it is necessary to

bring more attention to the supply chain itself, adding that while a few years ago 70% of

the value of pasteurized milk was for producers and 30% for the industry, the opposite is

true today (Semana, august 24 2013). Faced with these questions, Estupiñán explicitly

told Semana magazine (August 24, 2013) that the future of agriculture and farmers is not

under discussion in Colombia.

Discussion

Table 2 presents the list compiled in Chapter 3 of all stakeholders whose interests

(political or economic) would be affected by the negotiation of a FTA in Colombia. In

58

Chapter Three, Table 1, we compared this list to those actually mentioned in documents

relating to the signing of the agreements, and found a pattern in those sectors represented

and not represented. In this chapter, we have analyzed a series of articles reporting on

protests that emerged following the signing of the FTA’s and in direct or indirect

response to that government action. In Table 2 we have indicated all of the sectors that

are mentioned in relation to the protests about the FTA's and find that a different pattern

emerges. Again, there is a systematic occurrence of the voices of the local and grassroots

sectors associated with production and service in agriculture and mining, to the exclusion

of the voices of government officials. In the next chapter, the comparison of Table 1 with

Table 2 (compiled into a third table, for convenience) provides strong evidence of social

and political structures of power at play.

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CHAPTER FIVE: A CASE FOR SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE

In the data analysis presented in Chapters Three and Four, it was demonstrated

that there are indeed patterns in the participation of different actors in the negotiations

and signing for, as well as the response to, the process of FTA’s. Therefore, this chapter

seeks to answer the following question: “Do actions surrounding the free trade agreement

in Colombia provide evidence of social and political structures in place that limit the

potentialities of certain groups within the Colombian society?” In other words, do they

present evidence of structural violence? There are some clear patterns that emerge when

comparing Table 1 to Table 2, which are evident in the merged data set presented in

Table 3 below. Despite the fact that the concepts analyzed in Chapter Two do not explain

all processes and outcomes found in the data set, it is argued that a theoretical framework

that utilizes systemic violence has strong explanatory value in terms of the situation

currently taking place in Colombia, as well as similar issues that have been problematic

in other Latin American countries.

Using the Systemic/Structural Violence Framework

As explained earlier, systemic or structural violence is a useful concept to explain

the gap between actual and potential conditions, which is the gap that exists between the

actual world and that one can only guess at, imagine, or model. Additionally, systemic

violence can be described as settings within which individuals or groups may do

enormous amounts of harm to other human beings without explicitly intending to do so.

However, the slippery nature of structural violence is that no single process, event, or

type of events will suffice to produce a convincing account of structural violence. On the

contrary, only aggregated political-economic contexts and their encroachment on

60

concrete persons or groups can illuminate such situations. As mentioned previously,

Latin America is a region characterized by socio-economically disadvantaged masses and

inequality, a situation that has proven to be self-perpetuating since the colonial and

subsequent independence periods. The fact that these conditions reproduce themselves

suggests that there are also features within the sociopolitical system that have resisted

pressures to change from the demographic masses, further keeping them in their

disadvantaged place. As a result, those who are born into the disadvantaged masses will

more than likely stay in these masses. This type of system has become sufficiently

engrained in the politics of Latin America that it is virtually invisible to those in powerful

positions, becoming naturalized, and felt to be impossible to change. The dichotomy

between the favored elite and the disempowered masses thus creates an environment for

said systemic violence, where the patron can maintain control over the population,

inhibiting the ability of the masses to change their life situations and using constitutional

tradition as evidence and support for their cause.

The case study specifically chosen for the dimension of this thesis, the recent

signing of TLC’s between Colombia and other important players in the Americas as well

as the European union among others, provides a lucid example of the systematic

exclusion of the campesino rural workers from the negotiation process, revealing the

deeper root causes of said violence. Structural violence is evidenced by unfair and

inflexible rules in the system of a society, rather than an identifiable actor, and as such, it

is indirect and almost always invisible. In other words, structural violence tends to be

viewed as discriminative and oppressive in nature when characterized by suffering

caused through social relationships in the civil, social and in this case, economic relations

61

of public policy. Given the history of trade in this region, the predicted prognosis

contended that FTA’s would benefit Colombia by opening its market to more import

competition, which would provide its consumers with better quality products at lower

costs.

Promises of economic progress in Colombia would also aid in the promotion of

social development by reducing violence, both direct and indirect, as well as curbing

other illicit activities that had characterized the region for so many years. Mutual gains

were also mentioned, where a uniform market and the inclusion of all agricultural

products would be included and implemented. However, a regional FTA that enforced a

model of agrarian development would directly undermine the subsistence peasant

financial system, transforming the rural economy at the expense of food production for

capitalist gains. In other words, a situation of structural violence will continue and

perhaps worsen in an area where misdistribution of resources is bound to take place and

its perpetuation is largely the choice of an elitist government. By this, we are presumably

referring to a government that represents the interests of the elite and is controlled by the

powerful, who are usually the oligarchy. Ironically, it is common that the government of

an underdeveloped country has the power to perpetuate structural violence through

selectively withholding development and keeping the masses in a situation of poverty, but

it can also achieve the same effect by thrusting upon an area a type of development that is

designed to perpetuate other kinds of dependent relationships. The FTA agreements

threaten to do the latter: impose further limitations on the rural smallholder sector in

terms of its ability to change its structural position and reach its true potential.

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In this chapter, I will provide a synthesis of the data in both chapters and will use

the structural violence framework to argue that the patterns presented constitute a visible

and/or concrete manifestation of this very deep and abstract, but real kind of violence.

With the use of this chosen theoretical framework, the following section will propose

explanations for such patterns. Finding the explanation is the first step in developing

policy and programs to improve the social and political conditions in Colombia, as in

other countries in Latin America.

Patterns Found in the Negotiation of FTA’s In light of these negotiations and all the changes in terms of economic and social

issues, Table 1 derived a list of the expected main actors, groups and government

associations that must be involved in FTA negotiations in order to bring about a fully

comprehensive economic plan that will benefit the nation as a whole, and then compared

those stakeholders with the ones mentioned in articles and websites reporting on the FTA

negotiations and signing events. After searching for and analyzing the data set, problems

of representation throughout the negotiation process have been revealed given the lack of

communication and consent between the Santos government and many campesino

agriculturalist and rural sector actors.

Analysis of the data presented in Table 1 demonstrates and reveals several

patterns, all of which support the idea that agricultural and rural campesino sectors were

systematically excluded from the negotiation process despite the fact that the FTA

focused on the primary sector and therefore this group would be greatly affected. Table 2

went on to present a synthesis of the data set derived from analysis of reports of the

extensive protests following the government’s announcement of the FTA, once again

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comparing the actors involved in the protests with the list of expected stakeholders in the

FTA. Table 3 (below) presents a synthesis of the two previous tables, revealing a telling

pattern in the groups that were included in the negotiations as compared to those that

protested the treaty’s effects.

Table 3: Synthesis of Tables 1 and 2 Expected Groups/Actors

Were they Involved in FTA Negotiations?

Were they Involved in FTA Protests?

Transnational Corporations

Yes No

Government Administrations – Presidents and Congress (both national and foreign)

Yes No

Large Landowners No No Government – Economists (both national and foreign)

Yes No

Government – Secretary of Agriculture (both national and foreign)

Yes No

Government – Agricultural Minister (both national and foreign)

Yes No

Government – Banco Agrario

Yes No

Campesinos – la Mesa Nacional Agropecuaria de Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA), Asociacion de Campesinos (ASCAMCAT)

Yes Yes

Beef, Dairy and Potato Farmers

Yes Yes

Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC)

No Yes

Labor Unions Yes Yes FARC (paramilitary groups)

No Yes

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Miners – Confederacion Nacional de Mineros de Colombia (Conalminercol)

No Yes

Cafeteros – Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros

No Yes

Camioneros – Asociacion Colombia de Camioneros (ACC)

No Yes

Independent Campesinos (Farmers and Families)

Yes Yes

Students No Yes Health Care Workers No Yes Indigenous Groups – Organizacion Nacional de Indigenas Colombianos

No Yes

The first pattern that arises after analyzing the data set, suggests that top-level

government officials including president Juan Manuel Santos, congress, economists,

secretaries and ministers of agriculture were continuously present at every stage of the

negotiation, along with their respective presidential actors in the governments of the

foreign signatories. At times, meetings were held in extreme exclusivity, solely inviting

the presence of the Colombian president along with his foreign counterpart, although

discussion was held either before or after the meeting among all top-levels of government.

A second pattern that occurred revealed that medium-level organizations slightly more

grassroot and relevant to the content/negotiation at hand were not present in the

negotiations themselves, although they were mentioned as having been notified of the

treaty results after a decision was already made. These included organizations such as La

Mesa Nacional Agropecuaria de Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA), and the Asociacion de

Campesinos (ASCAMCAT), which were named a total of 3 times in a span of 10

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newspaper/magazine articles used for this pilot study, compared to top-level government

officials who were named a total of 54 times in the same 10 articles analyzed. For their

part, and in contrast, primary sector stakeholders including labor unions, beef, dairy and

potato farmers were mentioned a total of only 4 times in the span of the data set, while

other organizations including the Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC) and those

pertaining to the associations of truckers (camioneros), coffee growers (cafeteros) and

miners (mineros) were not mentioned at all. Even so, mention in the reports did not

constitute evidence of inclusion in the actual decision-making of such treaties. On the

contrary, their presence in the newspaper/magazine articles utilized for the present

analysis was solely restricted to opinions and commentary on agreements, decisions and

missions already set in stone.

Last but not least, a third pattern that emerges from the data set reveals that

groups at the lower end of the spectrum such as independent small-scale farmers along

with their families, students, indigenous groups and other members of society not directly

involved with any organization, but still key stakeholders whose livelihoods would be

affected by an agrarian-focused FTA, were only mentioned once, demonstrating an

apparent oversight or exclusion of their voices.

Thus it is easy to note the stark contrast between the expected actors and the true

and main decision makers behind the current and ongoing negotiations of the TLC. While

there is always an ideal theory of who should be involved in such negotiations, in practice,

different patterns have evidently emerged as depicted by the data set described in Chapter

Three. In other words, while one would expect the voices of those most directly affected

to be taken into account, current news reports and government issued websites

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demonstrate a patterned difference between the list of people/groups/sectors whose

interests will be affected by the negotiations, and a second list of those who are actually

reported as being consulted in the process. In consequence, the absence of these voices

implies that their interests and concerns were not taken into account when such policy

changes were made and discussed at the national level among government officials. In

fact, constraints on human potential caused by economic and political structures, unequal

access to resources, political power, education, health care, or legal standing constitute

acts of systemic violence, according to the definitions discussed in Chapter Two (Vorobej

2008). If these acts are perceived and felt to be violent, even if not perpetrated with

explicit intention by an identifiable individual or group, they may provoke a violent

reaction that is beyond systemic and into the category of physical violence.

Therefore, implications are clear and the exclusion of key sectors will most likely

result in the culmination of feelings of rejection, betrayal and exclusion as well as a lack

of opinion and consensus (Vorobej 2008). Additional layers and multiple dimensions of

structural violence are then built upon the fundamental and unequal distribution of power

that systematically disadvantage those who do not hold as much or any power at all. As a

result, this is manifested in terms of economic and social inequalities as already

introduced. If there is no purposeful intention to exclude these groups, then it strengthens

the argument that the system that is structured in such a way, limiting the potential of

certain individuals and groups.

Patterns Found in the Strikes/Protests/Manifestations as a Response

Furthermore, the reaction to the signing of this treaty is also patterned, and in a

way that is complementary to the patterns found in the first instance. As shown in

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Chapter Four, the response was due to the perception by individuals and groups in the

primary sector that within the structures revolving the signing of such agreements, there

was some sort of systematic exclusion that was also not accidental. Until recently, a large

number of these masses have become quite passive to the situation, whereby they have

become virtually accustomed to the way the system works against their favor. As a result,

they have come to accept the legacy of the colonial era with little to no protestation or

demand for more rights from a government in which they cannot truly believe or trust.

However, recent events that erupted in 2013 since the signing of such treaties reveal a

change in participants’ rhetoric and behaviour, one that directly complements the patterns

previously found in Chapter Three. That is to say, those voices not heard in Chapter

Three are the strongest voices evidenced in the data set examined in Chapter Four. Again,

this becomes quite apparent in the synthesis provided on Table 3.

In the first instance, an agrarian strike, which included the mobilization of

agrarian sectors headed by coffee growers, camioneros, health workers, students and

other types of similar labor unions and organizations, began last year in order to bring to

the government’s attention feelings of exclusion and marginalization now present among

the Colombian rural sectors. In light of the strikes and protests that erupted in several

departments carried out by numerous labor organizations as well as campesino and other

rural sectors, it is easy to identify patterns among the actors/groups/individuals/and

sectors who are protesting, as well as patterns in the nature of their objections and

responses as reflected in their discourse demonstrated by Table 2.

The first pattern that arose after analyzing the data set suggests that groups

located at the lower end of the spectrum, such as independent campesinos along with

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their families, students, indigenous groups and other members of society not directly

involved with any organization but still affected by an agrarian-focused FTA, were

continuously present at such protests and strikes. Although they were not always present

in conjunction to one another, all groups took to the streets with a similar explicit aim: to

have their voices heard. Complaints of abandonment on behalf of small and medium-

sized producers relating to the system’s current trade liberalization policies, which seems

to solely benefit consumers in urban areas, were common ground for consensus among

these factions. Such groups were mentioned frequently, a total of 30 times in the 10

articles analyzed. Additionally, a second pattern that emerged fro the analysis revealed

that medium-level organizations such as La Mesa Nacional Agropecuaria de

Interlocucion y Acuerdo (MIA), and the Asociacion de Campesinos (ASCAMCAT),

slightly less grassroot and relevant to the content/negotiation at hand, were also present in

the strikes. These also included the Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC) and those

organizations pertaining to the camioneros, cafeteros and mineros, which were

mentioned a total of 43 times. Such numbers combined with the previous figure reveal a

pattern that demonstrates the degree and strength of such voices in their response to TLC

negotiations and discussions. This is comparable to a third pattern in the data set, which

reveals that top-level government officials including president Juan Manuel Santos,

congress, economists, secretaries and ministers of agriculture were not present in any part

of the protests and strikes, given that the material reviewed did not mention them at all. In

fact, the newspaper articles used for this pilot study did not even include government

commentary to the protests and strikes, an important detail that is a further testimony to

the nature of the system itself. The dominant system is so consolidated and cemented in

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place that such protests against it do not even warrant a response from those in power,

and those who stand to (continue to) benefit most from the decisions made.

Discussion In sum, a comparison of both data sets uncovers patterns that uphold the

hypothesis of the existence of systematic exclusion and structural violence. The first

pattern shows that grassroot groups located at the lower end of the spectrum and medium-

level agrarian organizations, which were systematically excluded from the negotiation

found in Chapter Three, are also the groups most prominent in the protests and strikes

found in Chapter Four. As a result, one may conclude that a sentiment of exclusion and

marginalization of particular societal sectors on behalf of a system of governance that

adheres to a certain political culture, gave way to such results. Although analysis

demonstrates that the strikes are a combination of many social movements with multiple

requests and sectoral claims, data sets also show some similarities as well as a type of

synchronization in terms of the nature of the protests being held against the government.

In fact, the rejection of free trade has been a primary issue of current protests, with

farmers complaining that they cannot compete with the cheap imports that have resulted

from current TLC’s.

A second pattern demonstrates that top-level government officials included in the

decision making about the FTA were never present in the response. This makes sense,

given that an elitist government that makes the decisions on behalf of a nation as a whole,

especially in the context of the political culture of Latin America, will most likely not be

involved in protests nor entertain many complaints. As a result, this leads to a third

pattern which demonstrates that the sectors most excluded in Chapter Three and most

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responsive in Chapter Four, are protesting decisions made on behalf of government

officials most included in the former and clearly absent in the response as mentioned in

the latter. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that groups excluded from negotiations

are the ones that had the strongest and most defensive response in terms of their claims

and demands. In other words, we argue that rupture between the top and lower levels of

political organization in Colombia depicts evidence in regards to some sort of systematic

exclusion of certain groups/organizations/actors from voicing their concerns in national

level decision-making processes and spaces that they interpreted as structural violence

which, in turn, led to a strong and defensive reaction on their behalf.

Its reaction revealed that government has considered the protests and protesters to

be inappropriate in their demands and the way they have disrupted the country as a whole.

Therefore, the discontent that has been brewing from the past was predictable. Although

president Santos has been talking about turning unemployment into an opportunity and

recognized the need to work on a “great national agreement for the agricultural and rural

development sectors,” decades of neglect have left Colombian farmers with little hope for

the future. As argued by Schwebel (2011) in an earlier chapter, political entities continue

to distribute resources unevenly perpetuating an unequal distribution of power that results

in systematic and systemic limitations. Those individuals and groups so limited are likely

to construe this as violence. As a result, sharp inequalities are not only evident in material

differences, but also in terms of social exclusion that is equal to an assault on human

dignity. In other words, current political structures in Colombia are more or less modern

remnants of imperialistic structures that have the potential to inflict violence that, in turn,

may lead to all sorts of personal disasters, as demonstrated by the present analysis.

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Therefore, only the establishment of a clear connection between structural violence and

human rights violations will enable analysts to understand symptoms of deeper

pathologies of power that are linked intimately to social conditions, which often

determine and social reproduce who will suffer abuse (the small-scale primary sector)

and who will be shielded from it (the upper and middle urban capitalist classes).

By continuing to perpetuate underdevelopment as the basis for neo-imperialistic

relationships, the developing agent (in this case, the Colombian government) will

continue to disallow the developing community (namely, the small-scale rural sector) to

take control of the rural development process. In consequence, rural development will

continue to be perceived as an exogenous entity, while keeping the development agents in

a powerful position where they will continue to be empowered to determine the direction

and rate of the so-called development despite any resistance it may face. Such systematic

and systemic limitations can be construed as “violence that works indirectly and is rarely

discernible in terms of actions that can be rectified through legal, diplomatic or other

means” (Vorobej 2008:88).

Sharp inequalities are not only evident as material differences but also as social

exclusion and a lack of participation to the point of humiliation on a social and spiritual

level that is equal to an assault on human dignity. By keeping the marginalized masses in

their impoverished place through systemic means, within the political culture of patron-

client expectation, the “patrons” can continue to exercise their power, control, and

political say, indefinitely. Worse still, the empowered are in the position to punish with

physical violence those who react against the decisions taken, even if those individuals

and groups are reacting to the structures themselves that keep them in their place. This is

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the insidious nature of systemic violence, where a reaction against the system that limits

participation and potential is then met with a violent response from that very dominant

and empowered system, which simultaneously works to maintain the situation of indirect

systemic violence against the disempowered.

Given the government reaction to such protests, it is quite clear that there is also

an expected and “appropriate” way to respond, as well as people and/or groups of people

who can (or cannot) legitimately join in protest. As a result, this is further evidence that

certain expectations are encoded in the system (therefore, are systemic), and that

violation of these expectations will provoke a formal response, such as physical violence.

Now the important question is whether or not through this strike, the agricultural sector

returned to the national agenda. In other words, this could be the opportunity for the

agrarian campesinos to define once and for all their role in the agricultural development

model while demanding government make room for every type of producer: large,

medium and small.

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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The concept of structural or systemic violence helps us articulate a part of the

social and political structures that is normally felt and experienced, but not visible, and

therefore not problematized. In other words, structural violence is intangible and without

direct perpetrators, therefore is only made apparent through the careful study of actions,

players, and consequences. This thesis has attempted to examine the actions, players and

consequences surrounding a recent event in Colombia history, in order to reveal

structural violence. Once identified, concrete remedial actions can be taken through

carefully designed policies to break the cycle and move towards more democratic and

less violent political systems.

Although Colombia was selected for study, the phenomenon is not restricted to

that country. Because such policies and conventional ways of thinking have

implemented themselves in day to day decision-making among the top levels of

government, systematic exclusion, whether conscious or not, is pervasive. Given that

these systems are institutionalized, they are resistant to change thus they continue to

maintain structures of inequality and therefore perpetrate systemic violence on the people

and groups of individuals that live within them.

Understanding the causal variable that underlies the inequalities, inequalities and

violence in Latin America can help lead to policies and initiatives that may be successful

in addressing such issues, which in the final analysis will stimulate economic growth and

the emergence of full participation for all sectors of society across the Latin American

region. As a result, this concept of systemic violence allows us to see, or at least

problematize, otherwise invisible societal structures that are currently retarding/impeding

the full growth and potential of the region in all the political and socioeconomic aspects,

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as well as help us in promoting wider and more successful citizen participation in

decision-making.

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