eisenhower and kennedy: a comparison of confrontations at little rock and ole miss

Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3,1993 (575-588)

Eisenhower and Kennedy: A Comparison ofConfrontations at Little Rock ds\A Ole Miss

Mark Stern

The purpose <^this study is to assess the ways in which President Dwight D.Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy reacted to the civil rights crises inLittle Rock in1957 and ai Ole Miss in 1962. A side theme is to assesspresidentittl leaming byseeing what Kennedy teamed from the lesscms taught by Eisenhower. Eachpresident was reluctant to cemtmit federal troops to erfcrdng civil rights, wasconcemed about the problems associated witit federalism, and ended tip feelingforced to commit troops nonetheless. The message is that despite the presidents'best intentions, troops ultimately had to be corn/rutted. Kennedy was unable toavoidthetrapsthat Eisenhower hadaicountered,andtheimpositicmcfthenationalgovenvnent on the atforcement cf civil rights wasftrmly established.

Introduction

This study examines how Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F.Kennedy dealt with similar policy crises: the use of federal troc^s to enforce federalschool desegregation court orders that were openly defied by state govemments. Bothepisodes, the desegregation of Little Rock Centra High School in 1957 and of theUniversity of Mississippi (Ole Miss) in 1962, developed in remarkably parallel fashionas state governors defied the federal courts and then maneuvered to deceive thepresident of the United States. This paper also examines the lessons learned by theKennedy administration from its predecessor's handling of the Little Rock crisis, andto what effect those lesscms were used. Finally, this study suggests that decisions madeduring these crises may have had a critical impact on the federal-state relationship.

Major policy innovation, as Nelson Polsby (1984, pp. 161,165) points out ismost often associated with elections in the United States. Candidates need policyproposals in order to gain votes, and thus a predictable periodicity to major policyinnovations occurs. However, most policy change, as Charles Lindblom (1959,1980)and others have pointed out, is incremental and a matter of bargaining and minoradjustments. In most cases, policy change therefore involves a fairly routinized andix-edictable sequence of events and actors. Crises, that is situations demanding quickresponse by decisionmakers, compress the usual pattems of policymaking anddecisicHimaldng. TTie occurrence ofcrises is often unpredictable, andcrisispolicymakingis often ad hoc. Time is of the essence during crises. Crises, by definition, often fwcequick decisions from a limited array of participants who usually choose from among abrief set of options which yield what is often hoped to be,atbesta"satisficing" solution.The latter solution solves the problem at hand in a reasonable, if not c^timal, fashicm.Crises truncate the consultative jMticess, as well as the systematic exploration of policyalternatives (Polsby, 1984, pp. 168,147-159). Innational dcsnestic crises the president

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afterconsultati(Hiwithasmall,indmategrraipofadvisCTS,is(rftenthekeydecisiomnaker.As such, the pa'esident's values and the context of the crisis as he and a limited arrayof advisers view i t usually become the majw determinants of action in these crises.Crises bring attention to a problem, frequently, as Kingdon (1984,^). 104,199) notes,thrcHigh a "focusing event" The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations each hada "focusing event" which forced them to use federal troops to resolve schooldesegregation crises: open gubamatorial defiance of a federal court order.

Eisenhower and Little Rock

President Eisenhower's approach to the desegregation crisis at Little RockCentral High School mirrored his beliefs about race rel^ons, the nature of law andpeople, and the federal govemment's role under the Constitution (Duram, 1981).Eisenhower believed in the equality of the races, but he also believed that equaltreatment for racial minorities was a matter than would be achieved among indi v idualsand not by legal mandate. While he believed that federal law was supreme, and wouldbe enfwced, he tied this to a respect for the traditional bounds of the federal-state

Eisenhower and his attomey general, Herbert Brownell, meticulously re-viewed the federal govemment's brief that was submitted to the U. S. Supreme Courtin its implementation of the 1954 desegregation decision. Brown v. Board ofEduca-tion,etal. (see Kluger, 1976). ITK administration supported the plaintiffs (Stem, 1989;Elman, 1987; Brownell, 1967). Eisenhower sent a telegram to the 1954 AnnualMeetingof the National Association for the Advancementof Colored People, in whichhe stated that he regarded the Brown decision as a "milestone of social advance." Buthe wamed, "We must have patience without compromise of principle. We must haveunderstanding without disregard for differences which actually exist We must havecontinued social progress, calmly twt persistently made ..." (Eisenhower, 1954a).Eisaihower continually maintained the latter position, albeit with a more empatheticunderstanding ofthe southem white need for gradualism than the southem black needfor speedy movement towards equality.

As the Suprane Court worked on the Brown implementation decision,Eisenhower wrote to a close friend th£a the desegregation issue will "become acute ortend to die out according to the character of the procedure orders that the Court will...issue" (Eisenhower, 1954b). Southem political leaders overwhelmingly opposed theBrown decision, and the implementation mling did not lessen their opposition despitethe Court's allowance for the local execution of the desegregation process with "alldeliberate speed."

Despite the intensity of southem opposition \o Brown and his sympathy forthe southem position, Eisenhower consistently maintained that the Court's mandatew(Hild be upheld. On March 14,1956, three days after 101 southem members of theU. S. Senate and House of Representatives issued the "Southem Manifesto," voicingtheir qjposition to any enforcement of the school desegregation order, EisenhowCTpublicly stated, "the [southem white] peqjle who have this deep emotional reaction...

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woe not acting over the past three generations in d^iance of law. They were actingin compliance with the law as interpreted by the Court [in Plessy v. Ferguson]." Brown"completely reversed" the earlier case, "and it is going to take time for them to adjusttheir thinking and their {»Dgress to thaL... I don't know anything about the length oftime it will take." The ptsident wamed, however, that he could not accept "nullifica-tion" of federal law by a state, as prqxjsed in the Manifesto. "There wcaild," he noted,"be a place where we get to a very bad spot for the simple reason I am swom to defendand iqjhold the Constitution of the United States and, of course, I can never abandonor refuse to carry out my duty" {Public papers, 1957, pp. 304-305; Eisenhower,1956a).' Socm afterwards he told his cabinet "In the long run the Constitution is goingto be enfcax^d. That's my duty, but the Supreme Court gave us some time. Ourcomplaint is that time is not being used [wisely]. Instead states have merely sat downand said 'we defy*" (Cabinet Meeting, 1956). How long "the long run" was going totake was..an c ^ n matter at this point.

Neither in public nor in private did Eisenhower personally endorse thesubstanceof.Brown during his presidential tenure I*rivately,EisenhowQ'occasionallyindicated his lack of support. Fcff example, when the Platform Committee at the 1956Republican National Convention iHX)posed to state that the Eisenhowa- Administra-tion supported the Brown decision, the president called his attomey general, who wasat the drafting sessions, and told him that statranent had to be deleted OT he would notattend the convention. The item was removed from the platfram document Thepresident indicated to Brownell that "because of the Supreme Court's ruling the wholeissue has been set back, and badly" (Eisenhower, 1956b). Yet, he wrote to his friend,Swede Hazlett, "If the day comes when we can obey the orders of the Courts only whenwe personally approve of them, the end ofthe American system... will not be far off'(Eisenhower, 1957a). And that was the nub ofthe issue for Eisenhower. Whether ornot he supported the substance of the Brown decision was irrelevant; peservation ofthe federal-state constitutional relationship was the relevant issue. While he would notvoice an cpinion on the substance of Brown, he maintained that it would be upheld asthe law of the land {New York Times, 1963).^

Of the southem states, only Arkansas and Texas took steps to begin thedesegregation of public schools in 1956, the school year following the implementationdecision, and in both cases the state and local authorities backed away from thedesegregation process in the face of public agitation {New York Times, 1955).^ Whenasked at a Sqjtranber 6,1956 news conference what his administration planned to doabout the ̂ t ive opposition to school desegregation by state and local officials in Texasand Tennessee, the president answered that the district judges had "the primaryrespcmsibility for insuring that progress... was made." He continued, "it is difficultthrough laws and through force to change a man's heart." Everyone had a responsi-bility to "bring a change in spirit so... [there] is recognition of the equality of men."Asked if he endorsed the Brown decision, the president replied that it made "nodifference whether I endorse i t The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interpretsit, and I must conform to that and do my best to see thai, it is carried out in this country"[Public papers, 1956a, R ) . 735,737). On September 11,1956, again in response to ajournalist's question about federal efforts to stop the public turmoil that blocked school

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(tesegregation in Texas, the president responded that the federal govemment couldonly intervene if "calleduponby theGovemor of a state" {Public pc^rs, 1957,p. 766).

Over the next year, as soutfiem oppositicm kept school desegregation effortsatanear standstill, the iwesidentwas repeatedly adced about his administration'sintentto use fedCTal Inxqjs, if necessary, to enforce Brown. In July of 1957, EisenhowCTrespcBided, "I can't imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to sendFederal troops... into an area to enfrace the orders of aFederal court..." He followedthis up by stating he "would never believe it would be a wise thing to do in this country"{Public papers, 1958,p.546). Thatfall,Eisenhowerfoundthecireumslances such thathe had to send federal troc^s into Little Rock to enforce a federal court order for schooldesegregation.

When the 1957 school year commenced, Govemor Orval E. Faubus ofAilcansas used his state's National Guard to block the desegregation of Little RockCentral High School. Eisenhower initially indicated that he doubted the U. S.Department of Justice would intervene {Pre-press cor^erence notes, 1957). OnSeptember 5, the govsnor asked the president for his understanding as he defied thecourt The president replied, "The only assurance I can give you is that the FederalConstitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at my command (Eisenhower,1965, pp. 164-165; New York Times, 1957, p. 9). On September 11, Faubus, usingArkansas Representative Brooks Hays as an intermediary to presidential assistantSherman Adams, asked the president to meet with him. After receiving assurancesfrcfflfi the govemor that he intended "to comply with the order that has been issued bythe District Court in this case...," the president acceded to the request {Public papers1958, pp. 673-674). Brownell wamed the president not to agree to the meeting. Hebelieved the govemor would double-cross his chief, but Eisenhower persevered in anattempt to resolve the crisis without a further federal-state confrontation (Eisenhower,1957b).

Governor Faubus met the president on September 14, while the latter was onvacation at Newport, Rhode Island. After the meeting was over, Eisenhower wrote inhis diary that he believed Faubus was "going back to Arkansas to act within a matterof hours torevoke his orders to the guard to prevent re-entry ofthe Negro children intothe school" {Notes, 1957a). Eisenhower later noted that he told the govemor, "I did notbelieve thatit was beneficial toanybodytohaveatest of strength between the presidentand a govemor because in any area where the federal govemment had assumedjurisdiction and this was upheld by the Sujweme Court there could be only oneoutcome—that is, the state would lose, and I did not want to see any Govemorhumili^ed" {Notes, 1957b). Within days the president leamed that the govemor "wasnot goingtocarry out the orderof the court..." (Goodpaster, 1957). On September 23,the president issued a proclamation which wamed, "I will use the full power of theUnited States iiKluding whatever force may be necessary to prevent any obstiuctionof the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court" {Pidilic papers, 1958, p.689). Faubus remained defiant

The next day Eisenhower retumed to the White House, informed his staff ofhis intentiwi to use federal tnx>ps to enforce the court crder, and went on nationaltelevisirai to inform the nation of his decision. He stated that "Undo- the leadra^ship of

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demagogic extremists, disorderly mobs have {^evented the carrying out of pnqjCTorders from a federal court Local authorities have not eliminated that violentopposition.... Whenever ncamal agencies prove inadequate to the task and it becomesnecessary fcff the Executive Branch of the Federal Govemment to use its powers andauthority to uphold Federal Courts, the President's responsibility is inescapable."Eisenhowra" continued, "With that responsibility, I have today issued an ExecutiveOrder directing the use of troops under Federal authority to aid in the executive ofFederal law at Little Rock, Arkansas" to enfcffce "the Court's order relitting to theadmission ofNegrochildrentoschoor'(/'!<fe;/c/Ji¥'«rj, 1958, pp. 689-694). He noted,"This became necessary when my proclamation of yesterday was not observed, and theobstmction of justice still continues."

Eisenhower explained his position further "[my] personal opinions aboutthe [Court's dese^gation] decision have no bearing on the matter of enforeement theresponsibility and authority of the S upreme Court to interpret the Constitution are veryclear." The federal courts had "issue[d] such orders and decrees as might be necessaryto achieve admission to the public schools without regard to race—^and with alldeliberate speed.... When large gatherings of obstmctionists macte it impossible for thedecrees of the Court to be carried out both the law and the national interest demandedthat the President take action." He also argued, "The very basis of our individual rightsand freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President and the Executive branch ofGovernment will support and insure the cany ing out of decisions of the Federal Courts,even, when necessary, with all the means at the President's command. Unless thePresident did so, anarehy would result." The president maintained, "from intimatepersonal knowledge, I know that the overwhelming majority of the people in theSouth—including those of Arkansas and of Little Rock—are of good will and respectthe law even when they disagree with it They do not sympathize with mob rule." Heexplained that he understood the basis of southem concem with desegregation, and hetold the nation he knew that the South believed in the rule of law. Near the end of histalk he pleaded, "I call upon the citizens of the State of Arkansas to assist in bringingto an immediate end all interference with the law and its processes. If resistance to theFederal Court orders ceases at once, the furtho" presence of Federal troops will beunnecessary." The troops remained in Little Rock throughout the school year.

On October 3, 1957, Eisenhower told a press conference, "No one candeplore more than I do the sending of Federal troops anywhere. It is not good for thetroops, it is not good for the locality. It is not really American except as it becomesabsolutely necessary for the support of the institutions that are vital to our form ofgovernment" {Public papers, 1958, pp. 708-709). The president understood theviolence that the use of federal troops over state objection inevitably wrought upon thefederal-state relationship. Yet his belief in the supremacy of federal law, and theSupreme Court as the interpreter of la w under the Constitution, brought him to resolvethis crisis in a manner he had previously thought to be almost unimaginable.

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Kennedy and Ole Miss

President Kennedy's approach to the desegregation crisis which occurred atthe University of Mississippi in 1962 refiected his beliefs about race relations, thenature of law and peq)le, and the federal govemment's role under the Constitution, aswell as the lessons of the Little Rock crisis as he understood them. Koinedy believedthat differences over issues could be solved rationally, with individuals coming toagreement over logical, reasonable solutions. Civil rights and r£K;e relations were themost passionate, obstinate, and irrational issues in American history and politics, andKennedy had little contact with them prior to his (Residency, save as Wef campaignmatters (Stem, 1992). Martin Luther King, Jr., recaUed of this first meeting withKennedy in June of 1960, "At the time I was imjaessed with his concem and I wasimpressed with his willingness to leam more about civil rights. He did not have thegrasp and the comprehension of the depths and dimensions of the problem at that time..." (King, 1964). After a brief discussion of racial matters with Kennedy in August,1960, Harris Wofford, a friend of Martin Luther King, Jr., and a Kennedy adviser,concluded, "He considered it [race relations] irrational. He was not knowledgeableaboutit Itwasalientohisexperience" (Wofford, 1965). In October of 1960, Kennedy,at the urging of his brotha--in-law, Sargent Shriver, made an impromptu telephone callto Corma King to express his concem and support for her and her husband when hewas arrested and jailed for picketing a segregated department store, in violation of accmdition of parole stemming from a previous traffic violation. This event whichhelped Kennedy win black votes in the 1960 presidential election, was the only civilrights occurrence with which he had a direct experience. Kennedy was to have muchmcxB direct experience with the race issue as his administration grappled with thenaticm's reactions to the ever more forceful stirring of the civil rights movement.

President Kennedy publicly endorsed the substance of the Brown decisionand made it clear that he believed segregation was morally and legally unjust (Brauer,1977, p. 74). The civil rights voice ofthe president was, however, most often that ofhis brother Robert the attomey general and his most trusted political confidante.Martin Lutha" King, Jr., recalled, "Whenever I talked with the Attomey General, Ialways felt he was talking for the President... he was speakingfor the president" (King,1964). Harris WoffOTd notes, "Mostof [John Kennedy'sjkey decisions... in civil rightswCTe made with Bob Kennedy, and you really didn 't know what happened" (Wofford,1969). Roy WiUcins put it succinctly, "I think we were able to say 'the Kennedys'because I don't think there was any difference between Robert and Jack" (Wilkins,1964).

Initially, the Kennedy administration dq)endedon the vigorous enforcementof civil rights law through the judicial process, but it also tried to negotiate desegrega-tion plans with southem school systans. In the fall of 1960, when the New Orleanspublic school system refused to comply with a desegregation order and was supportedby the Louisiana state legislature, Attomey General Robert Kennedy strongly backedAssistant Attomey General fcH* Civil Rights Burke Marshall as the latter institutedC4Xitempt proceedings against the responsible public officials. New Orleans soonbegan to desegregate its public school system (Kennedy & Marshall, 1964).

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Both nationaUy and within the South, Robert Kennedy articulated theadministration'sschool desegregation positi(Hi. On May 6,196I,hecourageouslytotdaLaw Day audierice at the University of Georgia that he personally believed in schooldesegregation, "but my belief d o « not matter-it is now the law." He continued, "I sayto you today that if the ordCTS of the court are circumvented, the Department of JusticewHlsat" {NewYorkTimes, 1961a). On the cxher hand, the administration leaders madeit clear that they understood the South's position and that they preferred negotiatedsettlements of desegregation disputes. In an intaview published in the Mareh 28,1961Look magazine, Robert Kennedy acknowledged that white southemers "have grownup with totally different backgrounds and mores, which we can't change overnight"(Maas, 1961, pp. 24-26). On January 2, 1962, Robert Kainedy told a Houseajqiropriations subcommittee, "I feel very strongly that this (H'oblem [of race relations]is not going to be solved by just passing some laws. It will require some understand-ing." Quiet discussions and "good will," Robert Kennedy argued, were the best toolsfor bringing about change in this area (Brauer, 1977, p. 126).

While the Kennedys' understarvding of the South's plight and the utility ofpassing legislation to deal with race relations sounded much like Eisenhower'sunderstanding of these matters, they believed the Eisenhower adminiaration's use oftroops to enforce desegregation was a failure. In the Look interview noted above,Robert Kermedy stated that he could not imagine "evCT sending troops to any part ofthis counlry." He could not "conceive of this administration's letting the situationdeteriorate to that level." President Kennedy's deputy attomey general, Nicholas deB.Kalzenbach, later recalled, "They both [John Kennedy and Robert Kermedy], andparticularly the President had a real conviction that it was wrong to send troops in....[John Kennedy] felt that Little Rock was a great failure in the Eisenhower administra-tion ... because they sent in troops" (Katzenbach, 1985, p. 52). This, the Kennedysbelieved, would never occur during their tenure in the White House.

On September 13,1962,Federal District Court Judge Sidney C. Mize issuedan order fw the admission of James C. Meredith, a black man, into the University ofMississiiqji- That night Mississippi's Govemor Ross Bamett in a statewide televisedbroadcast spoke of a federal policy of "racial genocide," his code words fcff integration.He called for resistance to this policy, and cited the 1832 South Carolina Act ofNullification, which declared federal laws that violated a given state's laws to be nulland void within that state, as the basis for his refusal to allow Meredith to enter theUniversity of Mississippi. The Justice Department moved to enter the case. Theadmirustration understood a crisis was imminent given the vocal opposition ofMississi{q)i's govemor to the integrated schools (Katzenbach, 1964;Brauer, 1977,pp.180-240; Branch, 1988, pp. 633-672).

From September 15, when the attcaney genwal first spoke directly with thegovemor and was assured there would be no violence, until aftCT the presidentaddressed the nation at 9:00 p.m. on Se^Member 30 with a plea for calm at Ole Miss asriotingbroke cut on thecampus, the KmnedysandFaubus remained in ccHitactAvain,and at times burlesque-like, effcat ensued to avert the use of federal troops.

On September 20, the govemor personally denied Meredith's attempt toregister at the univa^ty. Mississippi highway patrolmen esccrtea Mwedith, several

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U.S. marshak, and Justice Departmentattomeys from the campus whileacrowd jeeredand threw rocks at them {New York Times, l%lb). On September 24, the universitytrustees, undra court rader from Judge Mize, agreed to register Meredith. Bamett letRcAert Kennedy know that he still would not let Mwedith register for classes at OleMiss.

Thenextday, September 25, Assistant AUOTneyGeneralJohn Doar and ChiefU.S. Marshal James McShane escorted Meredith to the Federal Building in downtownJackson, Mississippi, where the university registrar h^l agreed to sign the papers ofadmission. The registrar was not there. Robert Kennedy spoke with the govemor, andwas assured "They*renot going tobother him [Meredith]." The justice team then wentwith Meredith to the state legislative building. There, as Doar addressed the govemorin full view of a jeering crowd of Mississippi state legislators, with television and radiocameras carrying the confrontaticm live across the state, Bamett again proclaimed theright of "interposition" on behalf of the State of Mississippi and did "hereby finallydeny you admission to the University of Mississippi." Amid jeers and taunts directedat Meredith and the federal officials, and cheers directed at the govemor, theregistration mission was aborted. That evaiing, Robert Kennedy again called diegovemcff and angdly told him th^ Meredith would be registered at Ole Miss. Thatnight the federal govemment secured an order for Bamett to appear before the FifthCircuit Court fcff a contempt hearing.

The next day, Septembo" 26, while the New York Times (l%2a) headlinesread: "U.S. is Prepared to Send Troops as Mississippi Govemor Defies Courtand BarsNegro Student" Meredith, McShane, and Marshall wenttoOxford. Meredith's thirdattempt to register met with failure. This time. Lieutenant Govemor Paul Johnson,backed by state troqjers and sheriffs, rebuffed the registration effort

Robert Kennedy and Ross Bamett now discussed a new scenario: a force ofabout 25 U.S. marshals, guns drawn, would confront the govemor and foree him toyield. Robert Kennedy equivocated, "I hate to have them all draw their guns as I thinkit would create hard feelings. Isn't it sufficient if I have one man draw his gun and theothCTs keep their hands on their holsters?" Bamett responded, "They must all drawtheir guns. Then they should point their guns at us and then we could step aside."Kennedy: "There will be no problem?" Bamett "Everyone pull your guns and pointthemandwewillstandasideandyouwillgorightthrough." Kennedy: "You wilt makesure not the mar^als but the state police will preserve order?" Bamett: "There won'tbe any violence." That discussion took place at 2:50 p.m. At 6:35 p.m., after twoadditional convarsations between the govemor and the attomey general, anotherexchange took place. Bamett "General, I'm worried.... You don't realize what'sgoingon. There are several thousand people here with cars, trucks.... Wedon'tknowthese people." Kennedy: "I had better send them [the marshals] back." Bamett:"There is liable to be a hundred people killed here. Itwouldniinallofus.... Wecan'tcontrol people like that Alotofpeoplearegoingtogetkilled. It would be embarrassingtome." Kennedy: "I don't know if it would be embarrassing— t̂hat would not be thefeeling." Bamett "It would be bad all over the nation." Kennedy: "I'll send themback" (Navasky, 1971, pp. 209-217).

On Sq)tember 28 the administration raised the ante when it publiclyannounced that th& Jmtice Department had consulted with Major General Creighton

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Abrams, assistant deputy army chief of staff for military operations, about the possibleuse of troc^s in Mississippi. In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, vidthAssistantAttomeyGeneralforCivilRightsBurke Marshall (HBsentingthegovemment'sargumoit found Bamettguilty of contempt of court. The govemwhad until October2 to purge himself cff face arrest and a fine of $10,000 for each day he remained incontempt of the court {New York Times, 1962b).

On Saturday, September 29, the president called Bamett twice to try to workout a ^ a l . Bamett refused to guarantee that Mississippi authcaities could assureMeredith's safety. Nothing came of the discussion. At 7:00 that evening, Bamettcalled the pesident and assured him that if Meredith were secretly registered in Jacksonthe state police could guarantee his safety. John Kennedy agreed to the deal. Threehours lato", after attending an Ole Miss football game held in Jackson, Mississi[^i, andtelling a roaring crowd, "I love Mississippi. I love our people. I love our customs,"Bamett told the president he could not go through with his latest deal (Schlesinger,1967, pp. 862-864).

At midnight Norbert Schlei, of the Office of Legal Counsel, brought JohnKainedy a proclamation ordering those who were obstructing justice in Mississippi tocease and disperse,andanotherdocumentfederalizing the Mississippi National Guard.Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who was with John Kennedy at the time, reports that thepresidentasked Schlei, "Is this pretty much what Dee signed in 1957 with the LittleRockthing?" With minor changes, it was. Schlesinger reports, "Kennedy signed, snaprpedoff the light and headed into the hall" (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 345).

The next moming, Bamett called the attomey geno-al and proposed a stagedsurrender of Mississippi forces to armed federal troops. Robert Kennedy derisivelycalled this "a foolish and dangerous show." He also told Bamett "The president isgoing on TV tonight... He will have to say why he called up the National Guard; thatyou had an agreement to permit Meredith to go to Jackscm to register...." Bamettresponded, "That won't do at all." "You broke your word to him," the attomey generalinterjected. With great anxiety Bamett continued, "Don't say that Please don'tmention it.... We will go on and do it in any way. Let's agree to it now and forget itIdon'twantthePresidentsayinglbrokemy word.... We will cooperate with you." Thegovemcnr and the attomey general agreed toa Sunday registration. Few students wouldbeoncampus. "Youwon'tmindifIraisecainaboutit?"askedBameu. "Idon'tmindthat," Kennedy answered, "just say law and order will be maintained" (Schlesinger,1978, p. 345).

It appeared that the crisis was going to be resolved peacefully. RobertKennedy agreed to keq) the govemor abreast of all developments in Meredith'sregistration, and the govemor agreed to let Kennedy clear the statement he planned tomake to the people of Mississippi apprising them of his capitulation. At 7:30 p.m.,Mississippi time, Bamett told a statewide television audience, he "urged all Mississip-pians...toprBserve peace andtoavoid violence in any form." He wenton,"Surroundedon all sides by the oppnessive power of the armed forces of the United States ofAmerica, my courage and my convictions do not waver. My heart still says, 'Never,'but my calm judgment abhors the bloodshed that would follow [armed resistance]"(Brauer, 1977, pp. 192-193).

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John Kennedy cadged his counsel and close aide, Theodore SorenscHi, todrafta^ieech for himtodeliveronanational television hookiQ)th£aevening(Sorenson,1965, p. 484). The p ^ d e n t went on television that Sunday night September 20, at9:00p.m, {Public papers, 1963, f̂ . 726-728). He told the nation, "The o r tos ofthecourt in the case of Meredith versus Fair are beginning to be carried out Mr. JamesMeredith is now in residenceat the campus of the Univwsity of Mississippi." Kennedyemphasized this was being done "without the use of the National Guard or othertroops." Paralleling Eisenhower's national address during the Little Rock crisis,Kennedy stated, "Our nation is founded on the principle that the obsCTvance of law isthe eternal safeguard of liberty and defiance of law is the surest road to tyranny. Thelaw which we obey includes the final rulings of the courts.... Few laws are universallyloved, but they are uniformly respected and not resisted. Americans are free, in short,to disagree with the law but not to disobey i t " He continued, "If any man cff group ofmen by force OT threat of force could long defy the commands of our court and ourConstitution, then no law would stand free from doubt... and no citizen would be safefrom his neighbOTS."

Kennedy di^anced his administration from the substantive matter at hand byarguing, "In this case in which the United States Govemment was not until recentlyinvolved, Mr. Meredith brought a suit in Federal Court against those who wereexcluding him from the University." The federal courts ordered his admissioninto OleMiss

when those orders were defied, and those who sought to implement themthreatened with arrest and violence... the[ir] enforcement.... had become anobligation ofthe United States Government. Even though this Govemmenthas not beoi a party to the case, my r^pcmsibility as Presidott was thereforeinescapable. I axept it. My responsibility under the Constitution ... is toimplement the orders of the cotirt with whatever means are necessary. It is forthis reason that I federalized the Mississippi Natiotial Gttard ... while theUnited S lates marshals earned out the orders of the court and prepared to backthem up with whatever other civil or military enforcement might have beenrequired.*

John Kennedy noted that integration at public universities in nine othersouthem states had proceeded without recourse to armed fedwal intervention, and "Irecognize the present period of transition and adjustment in otir Nation's Southland isa hard one fw many people. Neither Mississippi nor any other southem State deservesto be charged with all the accumulated wrongs of the last hundred years of racerelations.... Thatfailuremustbe shared by us all, by every State, by every citizen." Hepaised Mississippi's citizens for their record of courage in military service to thenation, and he ended his speech by calling on them to "preserve both the law and thepeace."

At 7:25 p.m., Mississippi time, more than one-half hour p io r to thep:esi(fent's televised ^dress, the Mississippi Highway Patrol started to withdraw itsforces from the University, and by 7:40 p.m., Mississippi time, they were substantiallywithdrawn. Kazenbach and the 300 U.S. marshals with him in the university's

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Lyceum Iwilding were on their own, lairrounded by a mob intent on riot and mayhem(Uffd, 1965, pp. 180-184). After his speech, as repeats ofviolence were filtering intohim, the president ^x)ke with Bamett on the teleprfione, "Listen, GovemcH'," he testilysaid, "somebody's been shot down there already smd it's going to get wOTse. Most ofit's hap^ned since the police left and I want them back. Good bye" (Scwenson, 1965,p. 486). At midnight eaaem time, Kat^nbach told the presi^nt federal Uoops wereneeded if the marshals were going tocome out ofthe Lyceum alive. The troops arrivedon campus at 2:15 a.m. as the marshals were running out of tear gas canisters. Aftertherioting was brought under control with the arrival of 5,000 federal troops, the night'sdamage became evident: ova- a third of the marshals were injured, 28 by gunfire; twocivilians were killed; more than 300 pwsons were taken into fed^al custody. As OTderwas being restcwed, Robert Kennedy told an aide, "We're gonna have a hell of apoblem about [explaining] why we didn't handle this situation better" {Audiotape).

When asked at an October 14,1962, news conference about the effects oftheOxford riot and the use of federal troops, the president responded, "I don't think thatwhat happened in Oxford, Mississippi, has caused agood deal of concem. I think thatmost people in the South recognize my responsibihty to carry out the court order, myConstiUiticMial respcaisibility" {Publicpapers, 1963, p. 779). On a live December 17,1962, television interview show he remarked, "we sent in troops when it appeared themarshals were going to be overrun. I don't think that anybody who looks at the situationcan think that we could possibly doanything else" (/'i<^/jc/«iper.s, l%3,p.893). JohnKainedy's view of mx relations, his own rational approach to problems, and hisinho-ent sense ofthe importance of constitutional imperatives, had ineluctably movedhim precisely to the position that he had hoped toavoid. While hepublicly downplayedthe crisis at the University of Mississippi, Kennedy had been forced to use federaltroops to overcome state resistance to desegregation.

Conclusion

Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams wrote that Eisenhower's use offederal troops at Little Rock was "a Constitutional duty which was the mostrepugnantto him of all his acts in his eight years in the White House" (Adams, 1961). NicholasdeB. Katzenbach, the deputy attomey general at the scene during the crisis at Ole Miss,recounts, "We had to send the troops in," and he adds, "that was regarded by bothPresident Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy as a great failure" (Katzenbach, 1985, p. 52).'The Kennedys were ever-mindful of Eisenhower's failure atLittleRcck, yet they couldnot avoid following the previous administration's path as they were brought into thevortex at the Ole Miss crisis.

The few decisicmmakers who participated in the policy pocess, dominatedby the pesident's beliefs in each instance, generally shared a commtMi view of theConstitution and the public policy pocess. There is little indication of intemal WhiteHouse debate about the wisdom ofthe federal course of action that was pursued in eachcase. Both national presidential addresses, which were givoi as each crisis reached itsapex, were remarkably similar in their depiction of the constitutional basis of the

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federal relationship, the presidential role and responsibilities, and the use of federaltroops. Both administrations sought to avoid confrontation over the issue of federalenforcement of desegregation.

In an interesting set of lectures presented in 1964, Kennedy's assistantattomey general. Burke Marshall, aigued that the United States was "testing ... thedurability of the federal aructure as the conflict [over fedwal enforcement of civilrights] takes place." By deliberate avoidance of the racial issue "the system has beenpx>tected thus fer, since the mid-1870s, by nonrecognition of federally guaranteedrights" fw black Americans (Marshall, 1964, p. 7). In his 1964 study. Federalism,William H. Rika- (1964, pp. 152-153) argued, "The main beneficiary [of the federalpolicy process] has been Southem whites, who have been given the freedom tooppressNegroes...." And, he argued, "The judgment to be passed on feda^ism in the UnitedStates is therefore a judgment on the values of segregation and racial oppression."Mar^aU ccmcluded his talks by arguing, "Those who say that civil rights issues cut intothe falxic of federalism are correct They cut most deeply where police power isinvolved..." (Marshall, 1964, pp. 7,8).

Neither president ever again had to employ federal troops to resolve a civilrights crisis over the objection of state authorities. Each president's ultimate judgmenton federalism was made respectively, if reluctandy, at Little Rock in 1957 and at theUniversity of Mississippi in 1962. The thrust of these judgments was tied to law andthe use of federal troops to enforce the law in the face of a traditional federal reluctanceto interfere with state-mandated racism. The first Reconstmction was maintained inplace by the presence of federal troops m the South. The second Reconstruction tookhold after federal troops were employed to ovwcome state resistance to federal law.Theemploymentofarmedfederal force was traumatic tothe nation,and itpermanentlyaltered the federal-state relationship. Federal hegemony was established in law and infact. That coincided with the rise ofthe modem civil rights movement (Lesser, 1989,pp. 9-12).

Mark Stem (Ph.D., Rochester) is a professor of pohtical science at theUniversity of Central FlcHida and director of the university honors program. He isauthor of over two dozen articles in scholarly journals. His recently published bookis entitled Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights (Rutgers Univer-sity Press, 1992).

Notes

' On March 9, the president wrote to his attomey general, "Ever since the 'separate but equal'decisicHi they have been the Constitution of the United Sutes."

' After he left the presidency, Eisenhower endorsed the decision as morally and legally correct.' See also the study done under the auspices of the Anti-Defamation League of B 'Nai B 'Rith

and circulated in mimeographed foim: John Hcward Griffin and Theodore Freedman, Field Reports onSegregation in the South, Mansfield, Texas, A Report ofthe Crisis Situation Resulting from Efforts to

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Desegregate the School System (New York, N. Y.: n.d.). Donald W. Jackson graciously provided me witha copy of this report.

' Theodore Soroison (1%5, p. 484) notes: "He [Jdin Kennedy] carefully rewrote this speechK> make it clear that the govemment was merely carrying out the orders of the writ in a case it had notinitially brought and was not forcing anything down the throats of Mississippians on its own initiative."

' Schlesinger, in his work Robert Kennedy and His Times (p. 348), writes, "TTie call for troopsitself was a confession of failure."

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eisenhower and kennedy: a comparison of confrontations at little rock and ole miss

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