einstein on religion and science - srce

OriginalPaperUDC2:001/EinsteinReceivedApril18th,2006

Marko UršičUniverzavLjubljani,Filozofskafakulteta,Aškerčeva2,SI-1000Ljubljana

[email protected]

Einstein on Religion and Science

Abstractthe main issue of this paper is the question what Einstein actually meant from the philo-sophical and/or theological point of view in his famous phrase Goddoesnotplaydice. What is the ‘underlying’ concept of necessity in this phrase, and first of all: which God here does not play dice – theistic, deistic, pantheistic? Some other passages from Einstein’s in-formal writings and public speeches suggest that he was very close to pantheism, following Spinoza, whom he admired and appreciated mostly among philosophers. However, Spino-za’s pantheism implies determinism which was presumably not the main point of Einstein’s protest against ‘dicing God’ in quantum physics… So, is Einstein’s God nevertheless closer to Newton’s Pantocrator as to Spinoza’s Deussivenatura? Maybe yes, but only in case if the ‘Universal ruler’ does not punish, neither reward his creatures, ourselves, tiny human beings in the mighty and incredibly ‘well-tuned’ cosmos. the enigma of the famous phrase remains.

Key WordsGod,playingdice,panteism,determinism,religion,science,AlbertEinstein

Formottoofmycontributioninthisconferenceat100thanniversaryofEin-stein’sSpecialTheoryofRelativity,Ihavechosenaquotationfromhisfa-mousessaythe World As I See It(1930),whichrevealsverywellEinstein’sgreatness,hismodesty,compassionandhumanfaith:

“Howstrangeisthelotofusmortals!Eachofusishereforabriefsojourn;forwhatpurposeheknowsnot,thoughhesometimesthinkshesensesit.Butwithoutdeeperreflectiononeknowsfromdailylifethatoneexistsforotherpeople–firstofallforthoseuponwhosesmilesandwell-beingourownhappinessiswhollydependent,andthenforthemany,unknowntous,towhosedestiniesweareboundbythetiesofsympathy.AhundredtimeseverydayIremindmyselfthatmyinnerandouterlifearebasedonthelaborsofothermen,livinganddead,andImustexertmyselfinordertogiveinthesamemeasureasIhavereceivedandamstillreceiving.[…]Theidealsthathavelightedmyway,andtimeaftertimehavegivenmenewcouragetofacelifecheerfully,havebeenKindness,Beauty,andTruth.”1

InmyreflectionsofEinstein-philosopher,whooftenponderedontherelationbetweenscienceandreligion,consideringhisownscientificworkasakindofreligiousdevotion,asunveilingGod’s“Design”,asscientificquestingoftheultimateLogosinCosmos–inthesereflectionsIamreferringmainlytosomewellknownarticlesonreligion,whichEinsteinwroteafter1930,motivatedalsobyseveralmisunderstandingsfromthesidemanytheologiansandother

1

Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, ThreeRiversPress,NewYork21982,pp.8–9.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA42(2/2006)pp.(267–283)

M.Uršič,EinsteinonReligionandScience268

people,whoestimatedhimanatheist.Einstein’sarticlesonreligionwerein-cludedintotwowell-knowncollections,inthe World As I See It(1949)andOut of My later Days (1950),butherearequotedfromalateredition,titledIdeas and Opinions(1954);nexttothesearticlesIquotesomepassagesfromEinstein’s letters,particularly toMaxBorn.Assecondary literature, I refermainly to bothAbraham Pais’ monographs about Einstein’s life and work(Subtle is the lord,1982,andEinstein lived Here,1994),toMaxJammer’sbook Einstein and religion (1999), and to some recent articles of GeraldHoltonandAlanH.batten.Einsteinoutlinesinreligion and Science(1930)threestagesofreligiousde-velopmentinthehistoryofmankind:1. religionoffear;2. socialandmoralreligion(“GodasProvidence”);3. “cosmicreligiousfeeling”(die kosmische religiosität).

Einsteinsaysthat“withprimitivemanitisaboveallfearthatevokesreligiousnotions–fearofhunger,wildbeasts,sickness,death”,andthatiswhy“thehumanmindcreatesillusorybeingsmoreorlessanalogoustoitself[…and]triestosecurethefavorofthesebeingsbycarryingoutactionsandbyofferingsacrifices…”.2AccordingtoEinstein,wecanexplainwithhumanfearalso“theformationofaspecialpriestlycastewhichsetsitselfupasamediatorbetweenthepeopleandthebeingstheyfear,anderectsahegemonyonthisbasis”.3

Onthesecondstage:

“Thedesireforguidance,loveandsupportpromptsmentoformthesocialormoralconceptionofGod.ThisistheGodofProvidence,whoprotects,disposes,rewards,andpunishes,[…]thecomforterinsorrowandunsatisfiedlonging;hewhopreservesthesoulsofthedead”4,

i.e.,Godassaviour(sotér),inChristianityincarnatedinJesus,SonofMan.Inothercultures,saysEinstein,thereareothergodsofprovidence,yettheircommonfeatureistheanthropomorphicconception.Thethirdandthehigheststageofreligiousexperience–whichbelongspartly,butnotinthepureform,alreadytothefirstandsecondstages–isthe“cos-micreligious feeling”,withoutany“anthropomorphicconceptionofGod”.Themainfeaturesofthisfeelingareoutlinedinthefollowingpassagefromreligion and Science:

“Theindividualfeelsthefutilityofhumandesiresandaimsandthesublimityandmarvelousorderwhichrevealthemselvesbothinnatureandintheworldofthought.Individualexistenceimpresseshimasasortofprisonandhewantstoexperiencetheuniverseasasinglesignificantwhole.[…]Thereligiousgeniusesofallageshavebeendistinguishedbythiskindofreligiousfeeling,whichknowsnodogmaandnoGodconceivedinman’simage;sothattherecanbenochurchwhosecentralteachingsarebasedonit.Henceitispreciselyamongthehereticsofeveryagethatwefindmenwhowerefilledwiththishighestkindofreligiousfeelingandwereinmanycasesregardedbytheircontemporariesasatheists,sometimesalsoassaints.Lookedat in this light,men likeDemocritus,FrancisofAssisi, andSpinozaarecloselyakin tooneanother.”5

ForEinstein,inhisreligiousquest,thekeyreferenceisSpinoza.Wearenotfar from truth ifwe consider Einstein as amodern, scientific and cosmo-logicalSpinozist,i.e.,apantheistwhosereligiousattitudeandfeelingis die kosmische religiosität.SpinozawasEinstein’sfavoritephilosopher,quotedandmentionedbyhimmanytimesinhiswritings,lettersandconversations.



Heevencomposedapoem,anodeto Spinoza’s Ethics (1920),whichbeginswiththeverses:

How much do I love that noble man More than I could tell with words I fear though he’ll remain alone With a holy halo of his own.6

EinsteindeclaredhisbeliefinSpinoza’sGod(Deus sive natura)alsointhefamoustelegramwhichhesentin1929toNewYork’srabbiHerbertS.Gold-stein,whowasworriedbytheBoston’scardinal’schargethatEinstein’sthe-oryofrelativityimplies“theghastyapparitionofatheism”.GoldsteinaskedEinstein:“Doyoubelieve inGod?Stop.Answerpaid50words.”EinsteinansweredGodsteinin25Germanwords,hereinEnglish:

ibelieveinspinoza’sgod,whorevealshimselfinthelawfulharmonyoftheworld,notinagodwhoconcernshimselfwiththefateandthedoingsofmankind.

WemaynoteherethatSpinoza,strictlyspeaking,wouldnotsaythatGod“re-veals”Himself(orItself)in…,butthatGodactuallyis thesameas“thelawfulharmonyoftheworld”.Thisisnamelythestrictpantheistposition,sowemayassumefromEinstein’stelegramthathewasnotquiteastrictpantheist.MaxJammerquotesanEinstein’sanswer,whenhewasaskedtodefineGod:

“I’amnotanatheist,andIdon’tthinkIcancallmyselfapantheist.”7

Thenhespeaksabouthisbeliefinthelawsofthemarvelouslyordereduni-verse, which give evidence of the divine Creator. However, Einstein wassurelyapantheistinsomebroadersense;atanotheroccasion,speakingofthesuperiorMindthatrevealsitselfintheworld,hemaintainedthat“incommonparlancethismaybedescribedas‘pantheistic’(belief)inSpinoza’s(sense)”.8JammerunderstandsEinstein’s‘pantheistic’attitudeinthefollowingway:

“EinsteinagreedwithSpinozathathewhoknowsNatureknowsGod,butnotbecauseNatureisGodbutbecausethepursuitofscienceinstudyingNatureleadstoreligion.”9

Well, thiscouldbesaidofsometheistaswell,soletussuspendadefiniteconclusionatthemoment.AsGerardHoltoncorrectlypointsout, themainEinstein’smotiveand theprincipalmethodologicalmaximeinhisquestofthe“thirdparadise”,i.e.,oftheunionofhisfirstandsecond“paradises”,religionandsciencerespectively,

2

A.Einstein, Ideas and Opinions,pp.36–37.

3

Ibid.,p.37.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.,p.38.

6

See: Max Jammer, Einstein and religion,PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton 1999,p.43; in theAppendixof thisbookwe findthewholepoemintheoriginalGerman;herewequotejustthefirststrophe:

Wie lieb ich diesen edlen Mann Mehr als ich mit Worten sagen kann. Doch fuercht’ ich, dass er bleibt allein Mit seinem strahlenden Heiligenschein.

7

M.Jammer,Einstein and religion,p.48.

8

Ibid.,p.75.

9

Ibid.,p.148.



wasdie Einheitlichkeit,thesupremeUnityofallphenomena.10Thiswas,ofcourse,alsothebasicideabehindEinstein’s“PrincipleofRelativity”andthelater“PrincipleofGeneralCovariance”.WeknowfromhisbiographiesthatEinsteinwasnotcontentwithassociationswhichhisexpression“PrincipleofRelativity”(or“TheoryofRelativity”)hadprovoked,sohewouldpreferthathistheorywasnameddie Invariantentheorie(TheoryofInvariance),follow-ingFelixKlein’sterm,butitwasalreadytoolatetorenameit.Soonafterthepublicationofhisfamous“fieldequations”oftheGeneralThe-oryofRelativity(GTR),EinsteinwrotetoWillemdeSitter(1916):

“Iamdrivenbymyneedtogeneralize(mein Verall-gemeinerung-bedürfnis;thewordiswrittenintheoriginalGermanwithouthyphens!).”11

ThisneedtogeneralizeisprincipalforallEinstein’sscientificsearchandforhisphilosophicalworld-view.Thequestfordie Einheitlichkeit is thebasicmotivealsoforhislaterendeavorstoformulatethe“UnifiedFieldTheory”(UFT),whichwouldunitegravityandelectromagnetism.Einsteinwasnotsuccessfulinhisfinalsearch,however,hewasindeedavisionary,sincethequestforaunifiedtheoryhasbecomethe“HolyGrail”ofmodernphysics.Nowadays, thesearchofunificationofall fourbasicforces innature(gra-vity,electomagneticforce,weakandstrongnuclearforce)isgoingonotherlines, followingmainlyquantumtheories.Thebestcandidatefor the“FinalTheory”,12whichwouldunitemicrocosmos(quantumforces)andmacrocos-mos(gravity),issupposedtobesome“stringtheory”(thereisasetofdiffe-rentstringtheories):verytiny“strings”,whichvibrateinmanydimensions,are introduced to replace particles, in order to resolve the incompatibilitybetweenquantummechanics(QM)and(GTR).Waysaredifferent,butthemainmotiveforthisunificationisstillthesameasEinstein’s:thequestofdie Einheitlichkeit of physics, and consequently of thewhole natural sci-ence.WemaysaythatEinstein’sepistemologicalidealwassuchatheoryofnature,whichwouldnotonlyconnect(GRT)and(QM),butalsoresolveallcontingencies(presumablyalsoconstantsinpresentlyknownphysicalequa-tions)intolawfulnecessities.ThiswouldbeindeedthefinalTheory(T),the“UniversalEquation”.Spinoza’sEthica, ordine geometrico demonstratawasforEinsteinthehighestidealofunityofphilosophyandreligion,ofreasonandfaith,basedonneces-sity,culminatinginSpinoza’samor dei intellectualis.FromthisphilosophicalandscientificbeliefwecanalsounderstandEinstein’sfamousdictum(1941),aparaphraseofKant:

“Sciencewithoutreligionislame,religionwithoutscienceisblind.”13

orasimilarthoughtinEinstein’searlierpaper(1930):

“Imaintainthatthecosmicreligiousfeelingisthestrongestandnoblestmotiveforscientificresearch.[…]Whatadeepconvictionoftherationalityoftheuniverseandwhatayearningtounderstand,wereitbutafeeblereflectionofthemindrevealedinthisworld,KeplerandNewtonmusthavehadtoenablethemtospendyearsofsolitarylaborindisentanglingtheprinciplesofcelestialmechanics!”14

Butherewehave toaddsomethingessential:yes,Keplerhad indeedverydeepconvictionintherationalityoftheuniverse,sincewithoutthisconvic-tion he could not formulate the laws of planetarymotions – however, hisPlatonicmetaphysicalbeliefswerealmosttoodeepforabreak-throughinsci-ence,whenhetriedinhisearlyworkMysterium cosmographicum(1597)toexplaintheorbitsofplanetswithfivePlatonic“idealgeometricalbodies”;so



hislaterscientificsuccesswastheresultofhavingabandonedthe“idealcir-cles”infavorofempiricallyfoundedellipses.(OfcoursethisdoesnotmeanthatPlatonismisawrongphilosophicalbasisforscientificinvestigations–onthecontrary:IaminclinedtothinkthatPlatonisminsome“refined”senseistheultimategroundofscientificlawsandthebestfoundationofthescientificquestoftruth.)ComparingKeplerwithNewton,wemay say that the latter’sbelief in therationalityoftheuniverseismoreindependentofhisreligiousfeelingsandreflectionsasformer’s.True,Newton’spantocrator,UniversalRuler,“Godofaworkingday”(ifweuseAlexandreKoyré’sterm),isalwaysandevery-wherepresent“behind”oreven“in”nature,sincespaceisHissensorium,yetNewton’sGodispracticallyabsentinthephysicalcalculusofthe“celestialmechanics”:fromthescientificpointofview,circlesandellipsesareequallyright,theonlythingwhichmattersinmodernscienceistheconsistencyofthemathematicalsystemanditsadequacyforthedescriptionofphysicalfacts;theworld“outside”issupposedtobeontologicallyreal,objective,however,itsrealityisnotamatterofscience,butofphilosophyand/ortheology.Anyway,Einsteinwasprobablyright,whenhesaidthatsome“religiousfeeling”(whetherpantheisticortheisticordeistic)isneededforgreatachievementsinscience,especiallyincosmology,butontheotherhandwemustnotoverlookthatsuch“religious”attitudeinscienceis,fromthemethodologicalpointofview,actuallyadeviationfromtheconceptionofmodernscience,letussayfromthe“Galileanscience”,whichisbasedonlyonempiricalfactsandmathe-matical tools.Sowemaysay thatNielsBohrwithhis“Copenhagen inter-pretation”of(Qm)wasinsomedeeperphilosophicalsenseacloserfollowerofGalilean“antirealism”,comparedwithEinstein’s“realism”concerningtheequationsof(GTR)–namely,Bohrarguedthatsciencehastolimititselftophenomena,andhedefinedthewordphenomenonasreferring“exclusivelyto observations under specified circumstances, including an account of thewhole experiment”;15 of course, considering the second part of the quotedphrase,whichisavariantofthe“ComplementarityPrinciple”(Bohr,1928),themethodof(QM)differsverymuchfromtheGalileanscience.ForEinstein,thisnew“phenomenological”attitudeinsciencewasunacceptable,sinceitignoresthe“objectivereality”.AndtherealityisforhiminsomefundamentalwayconnectedwithhisreligiousfeelingofGodwhodoesnot“playdice”.Now,therearetwomainproblems(amongothers)ofpantheism–problems,which are radically solved in the “pure” pantheismof Spinoza, butwhichremainproblemsinEinstein’spantheistic“cosmicreligion”:

10

Gerald Holton, “Einstein’s Third Paradise”,Daedalus,Fall2003,fromInternet.

11

G.Holton,“Einstein’sThirdParadise”.

12

Theterm“FinalTheory”isknownfromSte-ven Weinberg’s popular book Dreams of a Final theory: the Scientist’s Search for the Ultimate laws of Nature, Random HouseInc.,London1994.Weinberghopesthatsucha Theory is possible, at least in principle.StephenHawking uses the term “Theory ofEverything” (TOE) for theTheory which issupposedtoexplain“theoriginandfateofthe

universe”andlinktogetherallknownphysi-cal phenomena; however, (TOE) is usuallymeant in a more specific sense, namely asa theory that would unify four fundamentalphysicalforces(orinteractions).

13

A.Einstein,Ideas and Opinions,p.46.

14

Ibid.,p.39.

15

Niels Bohr, quoted from: Abraham Pais,Subtle is the lord,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford1982,p.455.



I. DoesEinstein’s“cosmicreligion”necessarilyimplythenegationofGodasPerson?

II. WhathasEinsteinreallymeantwithdeterminism?

Inthefollowing,Idiscussthesetwoquestions,whicharemutuallyconnect-ed.Ad I.:Einstein’sopencritiqueofthe“personalGod”ofChristianityandJuda-ismispresentinthesecondpartofhisessayScience and religion,whichhepresentedinthe“ConferenceonScience,Philosophy,andReligion”,heldattheJewishTheologicalSeminaryofAmerica,inNewYork,1940,andwhichwaspublishedthesameyearinthefamousjournalNature(№146),anditis,incidentally, theonlyEinstein’spaperon religion,published ina scientificjournal;ayearlaterthistextwasincludedintotheproceedingsofthissympo-sium(1941).16Letusseesomepassages:

“Itseemstomethatwhatisimportantistheforceofthesuperpersonalcontentandthedepthoftheconvictionconcerningitsoverpoweringmeaningfulness,regardlessofwhetheranyattemptismadetounitethiscontentwithadivineBeing,forotherwiseitwouldnotbepossibletocountbuddhaandSpinozaasreligiouspersonalities.”17

Thephrase“superpersonalcontent”refersbothtohumansuperpersonal(orsuperindividual)attitudetowardsGodandalsotoGod’sownsuperpersonalnature.ThenEinsteingoesonwithhisreflectiononreligionandscience:

“…aconflict[betweenreligionandscience]ariseswhenareligiouscommunityinsistsontheabsolutetruthfulnessofallstatementsrecordedinthebible.Thismeansaninterventiononthepartofreligionintothesphereofscience;thisiswherethestruggleoftheChurchagainstthedoctrinesofGalileoandDarwinbelongs.Ontheotherhand,representativesofsciencehaveoftenmadeanattempttoarriveatfundamentaljudgmentswithrespecttovaluesandendsonthebasisofscientificmethod,andinthiswayhavesetthemselvesinoppositiontoreligion.Theseconflictshaveallsprungfromfatalerrors.”18

Thisstrategyofdistinctionbetweenreligious(“moral”)andscientificlevelofdiscoursehasbeenknownfromMiddleAgeson,fromAbelardandOckham,toCopernicusandBruno,GalileoandSpinoza,uptoHumeandKant.Ein-stein’sspecificpointinthisancientdisputebetweenscienceandphilosophyontheonesideandreligionortheologyontheotherishisinsisting–whichisnotpresentinsuchsharpnessneitherinSpinoza–thatthemainsourceoftroubleisthetheisticconceptofa“personalGod”,withwhommancanhavepersonalrelations(inprayer,ritualsetc.).ItisinterestingthatEinsteininsiststhatthe“anthropomorphiccharacter”ofthe“personalGod”isevennowadays(i.e.,in20thcentury)theheaviestobstacleforcollaborationbetweenthees-tablishedreligion(s)andscience(s):

“TheideaofGodinthereligionstaughtatpresentisasublimationofthatoldconceptofthegods.Itsanthropomorphiccharacterisshown,forinstance,bythefactthatmenappealtotheDivineBeinginprayersandpleadforthefulfillmentoftheirwishes.[…]Themainsourceofthepresent-dayconflictsbetweenthespheresofreligionandofscienceliesinthisconceptofapersonalGod.”19

Wemayask:why?Whatiswrongwiththe“personalGod”inrelationtosci-ence?EinsteinisconvincedthateverypersonalGodmusthaveafreewill,namelysuchthatHecaninterfereintheprocessesofnaturewithmiracles,revelations,propheciesetc.–andthatis,followingEinstein,indirectopposi-tionwithscience,withnaturallaws,forwhich“absolutelygeneralvalidityisrequired”.Spinoza’sopinionsaboutmiracleswereverysimilar,andwemayagreewithbothonthispoint,neverthelesswecandoubtinEinstein’spresup-



positionthateveryideaofa“personalGod”impliesHisinterveningintothepresumablyfixed“orderofnature”.Forexample,oneof themost famousphilosophicaltheists,Leibniz,doesnotthinkofGodinthisway;andneitherNewton’spantocrator performsmiracles,He just “guarantees” theproperfunctioningofthe“worldmechanism”.EvenSpinoza,inspiteofhisnegativeattitude to miracles in tractatus theologico-politicus, does not explicitlynegate thebiblical“personalGod”;hismainpoint is that theBiblehas tobe understood as symbolic, “moral” discourse, not as a scientific treatise.Although Einstein agrees with such a moderate attitude towards the HolyScript,yethegoesoninhiscritiqueofa“personalGod”,andintheabovementionedconferencedeliversaratherunrealisticproposalfor“teachersofreligion”:

“Intheirstrugglefortheethicalgood,teachersofreligionmusthavethestaturetogiveupthedoctrineofapersonalGod,thatis,giveupthatsourceoffearandhopewhichinthepastplacedsuchvastpowerinthehandsofpriests.Intheir laborstheywillhavetoavail themselvesofthoseforceswhicharecapableofcultivatingtheGood,theTrue,andtheBeautifulinhumanityitself.”20

Einstein,withhisunexpectedaddressto“teachersofreligion”thattheyhavetogiveup“thedoctrineofapersonalGod”,provokedmanyJewishandChris-tianclerics,aswellasother toopiouspeopleofAmerica,andraisedsomequite intolerant and anti-Semitic feelings.However, therewere also someveryinterestingphilosophicaland/ortheologicalreactions,amongthemthemostknownandimportantisthecritiqueofthefamousProtestanttheologian,PaulTillich,himselfexiledin1933fromGermanybytheHitlerregimeasthefirstnon-Jewishprofessor,becauseofhiscloseaffiliationwiththeSocial-DemocraticpartyandhisoppositiontoNazism.Twogreatmen,EinsteinandTillich,haveknowneachotherfromtheirBerlindaysintheearlytwenties,andtheybothfeltnotonlyrespecttoeachother,butalsohadmuchincom-mon,especiallytheirquestforEinheitlichkeit,UnityorSythesisofallknow-ledge.However,afterEinstein’s“provocation”,TillichinhiscommentarySci-ence and theology: a discussion with Einstein(1941)wrotesharplythat“nocriticismofthisdistortedideaofGodcanbesharpenough”,butontheotherhandhealsotriedtobesympathetic,offering“asolutioninwhich[Einstein’sargument]isacceptedandovercomeatthesametime”.21Thisallegedsolu-tionwasbasedonTillich’ssymbolicreadingoftheHolyScript–Einsteinhadpresumablynottakenintoaccountthattheterm“personalGod”wasasymbol forexpressing“theexperienceofthenuminous”(inthesenseofRudolfOtto),sothat“thepredicate‘personal’canbesaidtotheDivineonlysymbolicallyorbyanalogy,orifaffirmedandnegatedatthesametime”.22Tillichbelievesandarguesthat“thesymbolofthepersonalGodisindispensableforlivingreligion”.23AndJammerfurtherexplainsTillich’spoint:“OneshouldnotuseaprimitivepatternoftheconceptofthepersonalGodinordertochallenge

16

AbrahamPais,Einstein lived Here,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford1994,p.121.

17


18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.,pp.46–47.

20

Ibid.,p.48.

21


22

PaulTillich,quotedfrom:M.Jammer, ibid.,p.111.

23

Ibid.,p.112.



theideaitself,”sincethematureidea“neednot,andinfactcannot,interferewithscienceandphilosophy.”24Headdsthat

“Tillich’sstatementsconvergetowardEinstein’s‘cosmicreligion’asmuchasispossibleforatheistictheologian.”25

AsimilarcritiquewasaddressedtoEinsteinbythefamousCatholic(andalso“heretical”)theologianHansKüng:

“IfEinsteinspeaksofcosmicreason,thismustbeunderstoodasanexpressionofreverencebe-forethemysteryoftheAbsolute,asopposedtoall-too-human‘theistic’ideasofGod.[…]Godisnotapersonasmanisaperson.”26

IquiteagreewithKüng’sremark.IammorescepticalofTillich’scritique,buthereIcannotenterintothediscussionaboutcomplicatedrelationsbetweenafirmative,negativeandsymbolic(ormystical)theology.Iwouldjustsaythatthehermeneuticalaswellastheologicalproblemofsymbolicreadingofthebibleisfarfrombeingdefinitivelysolved;toseeitwehavetoconsiderjustasimplequestion:arethemiracles,performedbyJesus,meant(only)simboli-cally?AndHisveryResurrection–isitjustasymbol?Tillichwouldprobablyanswerthatsymbolisnotlessbutmorethanempiricalreality.27However,thisattitudeishardtoaccept,sinceitimpliesquiteastrongversionofepistemo-logicalantirealism.Anyway,Tillich’scritiqueofEinstein’smaybe toosimple refusalofaper-sonalGod(atleastatthatconference)ispartlyjustified–especiallyhavinginmindTillich’slatertheologicalreflectionsinhismainworkSystematic theo-logy(1951),wherehewritesthat“theGodwhoisapersonistranscendedbytheGodwhoisthePerson-Itself,thegroundandabyssofeveryperson…”28–yet,ontheotherhand,Einstein’scritiqueofapersonalGodasasourceof“vastpower in thehandsofpriests” is surely justified too. IcouldnotbutagreewithEinsteininhisconcludingsentenceofhispaperonScience and religion:

“Thefurtherthespiritualevolutionofmankindadvances,themorecertainitseemstomethatthepathtogenuinereligiositydoesnotliethroughthefearoflife,andthefearofdeath,andblindfaith,butthroughstrivingafterrationalknowledge.InthissenseIbelievethatthepriestmustbecomeateacherifhewishestodojusticetohisloftyeducationalmission.”29

The refusalof apersonalGodhas several important (andnot allpleasant)consequences,amongthemespeciallythesetwo:a) disbeliefintheimmortalityoftheindividualsoul;b) senselessnessofprayerashumaninvocationofGod’sfavors.

Concerningthesetwopoints,severalEinstein’ssentencesareoftenquoted,amongthemthefamousconcludingpassageofthe World as I See It (1930):

“IcannotconceiveofaGodwhorewardsandpunisheshiscreatures,orhasawillofthekindweexperienceinourselves.NeithercanInorwouldIwanttoconceiveofanindividualthatsurviveshisphysicaldeath;letfeeblesouls,fromfearorabsurdegoism,cherishsuchthoughts.Iamsatisfiedwiththemysteryoftheeternityoflifeandwiththeawarenessandaglimpseofthemarvelousstructureoftheexistingworld,togetherwiththedevotedstrivingtocomprehendaportion,beeversotiny,oftheReasonthatmanifestsitselfinnature.”30

ItisinterestingtonotethatEinstein,incontextofhiscritiqueofapersonalGod,saysthatawill of the kind we experience inourselvesisnottobeexpect-edinGod–ofcourse,hereEinsteinfollowsSpinozaagain,yetwemayask:maybeanimplicitpresumptionishiddenhere,thatnoteverykindofwill(but



justsuchasweexperience)isinappropriateforGod?ItseemsobviousthatEinstein’scritiqueofapersonalGodisdirectedmainlyagainsttheanthropo-morphicconceptionofGod’spredicates.However,inthetraditionaltheologyand/orphilosophyofreligion,God’sWillandhumanwillareconsideredonlyasanalogous, so theessentialquestion is:howfar thisanalogycanbeex-tended?Jammer,forexample,pointsoutthatitisnotonlyaquestionofGod’santhropomorphism,butalsoofHis“anthropopathism”,i.e.,whetherGodcanhaveatleastanalogousfeelings(pathos)ashumanbeings.31Andevenifwegiveanegativeansweralsotothisquestion,stillthemostdifficultquestionremains:isGod’sMind(thatmightycosmiclogoswhodoesnot“playdice”)atleastanalogoustoourhumanmind(s)?Jammersays:

“ItseemslegitimatetoaskwhetheranattributionofthoughtstoGoddoesnotimplythenotionofapersonalGod.”32

Andhequotes aprophet: “My thoughts arenotyour thoughts, neither areyourwaysmyways.”(Isaiah55:8).The“anthropomorphic”natureofGodis,fromEinstein’spointofview,par excellencepresentinChristianitywhereGodisincarnatedinJesus,“SonofMan”.Needless to say, in spite of his great respect forChristianity as thehighestformofa“moral”religion(andinspiteofhisneverforgotten“firstparadise”,whichhehadfoundinreligionasaboy),EinsteinwasfarfrombeingaChristian,hewasclosertounorthodoxJudaismandtotheoldIndianwisdom.33Yet, it is interesting tonote thatEinsteinhimselfhasoftenused

24

M.Jammer,ibid.,p.109.

25

Ibid.,p.112.

26

HansKüng,quoted from:M.Jammer, ibid.,p.113.

27

PaulTillich, “Religious languageas symbo-lic”,in:philosophy of religion,MichaelPe-tersonet al.(eds.),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford1996.

28

P.Tillich,quotedfrom:G.Holton,“Einstein’sThirdParadise”,inInternet.

29


30

Ibid.,p.11.–Inthisrespect,Einstein’sviews,writteninletterstovariouspeople,fromprie-ststoaschoolgirl,arequiteexpliciteaswell,forexample(herequotedfromInternet):● “IcannotconceiveofapersonalGodwho

woulddirectlyinfluencetheactionsofin-dividuals,orwoulddirectlysitinjudgmentoncreaturesofhisowncreation.…Mora-lity isof thehighest importance–but forus,notforGod.”(1927)

● “Sinceourinnerexperiencesconsistofre-productions and combinations of sensoryimpressions,theconceptofasoulwithout

abodyseemstometobeemptyanddevoidofmeaning.”(1921)

● “Idonotbelieveinimmortalityoftheindi-vidual,andIconsiderethicstobeanexclu-sivelyhumanconcernwithnosuperhumanauthoritybehindit.”(1953)

● “Scientific research is based on the ideathateverythingthattakesplaceisdetermi-ned by laws of nature, and therefore thisholds for the actions of people. For thisreason, a research scientistwill hardlybeinclinedtobelievethateventscouldbein-fluencedbyaprayer,i.e.byawishaddre-ssedtoasupernaturalbeing.”(1936)

31


32

Ibid.,p.123.

33

However, Einstein saw traces of “anthropo-morphism”,althoughonthehighest levelofknowledge,alsointheEasternwisdom.Thisis evident from his meeting and discussionwithRabindranathTagore:whileTagorebe-lievedthat“thetruthoftheUniverseishumantruth”,Einsteinproteststhat“thisisthepure-lyhumanconceptionoftheuniverse”(see:A.Pais,Einstein lived Here, p.102–103).butthemainquestion remains: canour concep-tionoftheuniversebeotherthanessentiallyhuman?



anthropomorphic predicates when speaking about his cosmic God. besideaddressingHim,quitetraditionally,inthemasculinegender,sayingthat“Hedoesnotplaydice”(notSheorIt),orspeakingof“theoldone”(der Alte),Einsteinalsomaintains,forexample,thatGodis“subtle”,butnot“malicious”(raffiniert ist der Herr Gott, aber boshaft ist Er nicht).Fromthetheologi-caland/orphilosophicalpointofview,theselinguisticdetailsaremaybenotvery important, but it is surely important to distinguish betweenGod as apersonandananthropomorphicGod,sinceitisnotnecessarythateverypos-sible(conceivable?)God’spersonis“anthropomorphic”inEinstein’ssense.ThisdistinctionisintroducedalsoinarecentarticleofAlenH.battenunderthetitle“SubtleareEinstein’sThoughts”,publishedintherenownedjournalphysics World(September,2005).Battenwrites:

“ButwhydidEinsteinnotbelieveinapersonalGod?Toanswerthatquestion,wehavetoun-derstandwhathemeantbytheterm.IwoulddefineapersonalGodasaGodwithwhomhumanbeingscanhavearelationship,analogoustothosetheyhavewithoneanother.AlthoughthisideamightseemtoindicatethatGodhasahumanform,IthinkitisperfectlypossibletobelieveinapersonalGodwhoisnotanthropomorphic.Isuspect–butcannotclearlydemonstrate–thatEinsteinsometimesconfusedthetwoideas.”34

Ofcourse,thetroubleis,asusually,indetails–namely,whatisheremeantby“ahumanform”:justvisual,organicform,oralsoforma mentis?Anyway,IagreewithBattenthatthedistinctionbetween“personal”and“anthropomor-phic”hastobeconsideredwhenwespeakaboutEinstein’sGod.butnexttothisdistinctionIwouldaddthethirdterm:“GodasPerson”(thistermcouldbemeantalso inTillich’ssenseas“Godwho isPerson-Itself”).And ifweintroducethisseconddistinction, thedifferencebetweenpersonal GodandGod-as-person,thefollowingquestionisraised:isGod-as-Personindeedin-compatiblewithEinstein’s “cosmic religion”?Whya“pantheistic”cosmicGodwouldnotbePerson-Itself,whyHe(orSheorIt)wouldnothaveHis (orHer orIts)Will,afterall?Notawillakintoours,notanalogoustoourhumanwill,butGod’sWill.Letus remind thatalsoChristianlord’s prayer says:“LetThinewillhappen”–notmine,butThine!Andinthissense,pantheismandtheismmayfinallyconverge.IwonderhowwouldEinsteincommentthisidea.Ihavetheimpression,togetherwithAlanH.Batten,thatEinstein’sprin-cipalinactuallytheonlyrelevanttargetinhiscritiqueofa“personalGod”washisrefusaltoaccepta“limitedGod”,agodtoomuchakintoourselves.However,theconceptofalimited“anthropomorphic”godisnotimpliedbytheconceptofapersonalGod,andnotatallbytheconceptofaGod-as-Per-son.ThelatterisnotinconsistentwithEinstein’sGod,whois“subtle”,but“notmalicious”,andwhopresumablydoesnot“playdice”.

Ad II.WhathasEinsteinreallymeantwithdeterminism?WhyhasheinsistedthatHerr Gott würfelt nicht?DoesdeterminisminEinstein’ssensenecessar-illyimplythenegationofthefreedomofthehumanwill?Onthelevelof“practicalreason”,namelyinethicsandsociallife,Einstein,as most other determinists, implicitly presupposed some “compatibilism”betweendeterministiclawsofnatureandhumanfreewill,sinceitisindis-pensableforethicalresponsibilityofourdecisionsanddeeds.Ontheotherhand,Einsteinseveraltimesexplicitlyrejectedthephilosophicalconceptoffreedomofthehumanwill,forexampleinhiscontributionforFestschrift für professor A. Stodola(1929):

“HonestlyIcannotunderstandwhatpeoplemeanwhentheytalkaboutthefreedomofthehu-manwill.Ihaveafeeling,forinstance,thatIwillsomethingorother;butwhatrelationthishas



withfreedomIcannotunderstandatall.IfeelthatIwilltolightmypipeandIdoit;buthowcanIconnectthisupwiththeideaoffreedom?Whatisbehindtheactofwillingtolightthepipe?Anotheractofwilling?Schopenhaueroncesaid:‘Der Mensch kann was er will; er kann aber nicht wollen was er will’(‘mancandowhathewillsbuthecannotwillwhathewills’.)”35

Einsteinisevenmoreexplicitinhisalreadyquoted,famousspeechthe World As I See It(1930):

“Idonotatallbelieveinhumanfreedominthephilosophicalsense.Everybodyactsnotonlyunderexternalcompulsionbutalsoinaccordancewithinnernecessity.Schopenhauer’ssaying,‘Amancandowhathewants,butnotwantwhathewants,’hasbeenaveryrealinspirationtomesincemyyouth;ithasbeenacontinualconsolationinthefaceoflife’shardships,myownandothers’,andanunfailingwell-springoftolerance.Thisrealizationmercifullymitigatestheeasilyparalyzingsenseofresponsibilityandpreventsusfromtakingourselvesandotherpeoplealltooseriously;itisconducivetoaviewoflifewhich,inparticular,giveshumoritsdue.”36

Fromthepointoftheso-called“commonsense”,whichconsidersthenega-tionofhumanfreedomassomethingundesirableandtroublesome,itisratherstrangethatEinsteinfinds“consolation”in the“innernecessity”,andevenderivesthesourceof toleranceoutof it.SomebodymightalsoremarkthatEinstein’s“humor”intakingpeoplenot“tooseriously”isclosetocynism.However,itisfarfromthat.EinsteinfollowsSpinozaagaininthismildandgentlesage’sattitudetowardshumanaffairsandlifeingeneral.maxJammertrulysaysthatEinstein’s“theorethicalendorsementofdeterminisminnowayaffectsthedemandsofpracticalethics”.37Nevertheless,forrationallybasedcompatibilismofnecessityandhumanfreedomsometroublesandworriesre-main,sincethequestionofcompatibilityintheproposedsolution,followingSchopenhauer,isjusttransferredtothe“metalevel”;yet,ifwecannotwantwhatwewant,isn’titactuallythesameasnotdoingwhatwewant?However,itseemsthatEinsteinwasmoreasinfreedomofthehumanwillinterested in the freedomofGod’swill, andwithin thiscontextheusuallyplacedthequestionwhetherdeterminismobtainsornot.InalettertooneofhisassistantsinPrinceton,ErnstStraus,hewrote:

“WhatreallyinterestsmeiswhetherGodhadanychoiceinthecreationoftheworld.”38

Inthehistoryofphilosophythereweredifferentanswerstothisforourhumanbrainindeeddifficultquestion–forexample,Spinoza’sanswerwasnegative,whileLeibniz’spositive.InordertobetterunderstandEinstein’stroublescon-cerningGod’schoice(i.e.,HisfreedomofWill)increationoftheworld,wehavetospecifythecontextalittlemore.EinsteindidnotaskhimselfasLeibniz,iftheCreatorhadthefreechoicetoselect inhisMind theworldwhichHewasgoing tocreate(and,asstandsintheodicy,Godallegedlyselected thebestpossibleworld),butheaskedhimself if Herr Gott had the choice to select an imperfect world: im-per-fectasun-finished,namelyfromthephysicalpointofview,worldinwhoseverydepth,initsdeepestfoundations,ishidden(andpresumablyrevealedby

34

Alen H. Batten, “Subtle are Einstein’sthoughts”,physics World,Forum,Sept.2005,quotedfromInternet.

35

A.Pais,Einstein lived Here,p.132.

36

A.Einstein,Ideas and Opinions,p.8–9.

37

M.Jammer,ibid.,p.86.

38

A. Einstein, quoted from: G. Holton, “Ein-stein’sThirdParadise”,inInternet.



quantummechanics)anirreduciblecontingency,“justchance”,whichwasinEinstein’seyesaterrificgapinGod’screation,aninadmissibleabsenceofthe“objectivereality”.Thisgapcanbe,inthebestbutstillbadcase,ful-filledonlypost festum,namelywithhuman (or“observer’s”) intervention,whenthatformidablyunrealquantum“superposition”finally“collapses”intosomedefinite,“objective”state.Inthissense,alsointhissense,wecanunderstandEinstein’smostfamousdictumthatGoddoesnot–andshouldnot–“playdice”.Asthelegendsays,Einstein’smainopponentNielsBohr,thepropo-nentofthe“Copenhageninterpretation”ofquantumphenomena,whichhasbecomestandard,advisedEinsteinnottotellGodwhatHeshoulddo.How-ever,thegreatproblemofthe“objectivereality”hasneverbeenadequatelysolved in (QM),andalsosomeof themainquantumphysicists, especiallySchrödingerwhodiscoveredthewave-functionequation,werenotsatisfiedwithBohr’s“phenomenological”interpretation.Einstein’sworriesaboutindeterminismof(Qm)canbeformulatedinseveralwayswhicharebasicallyequivalent.TheclassicalformulationcanbefoundalsoinAbrahamPais’secondmonograph.Paisputsthequestion:

“WhatdidEinsteinmeanbyGodnotplayingdice?”39

Andheexplains that in theclassicalmechanics,given the initialpositionsandvelocitiesoftheparticles,itispossibletopredicttheirpositionsandve-locitiesatanylatertimeforanyindividualcollision–butnotsoin(QM),asEinstein’sclosefriend,quantumphysicistMaxBornhaswritten:

“Oneobtainstheanswertothequestionnot ‘whatisthestateafterthecollision’but‘howproba-bleisagiveneffectofthecollision’…Herethewholeproblemofdeterminismarises.Fromthepointofviewofquantummechanicsthereexistsnoquantitywhichinanindividualcasecau-sallydeterminestheeffectofacollision…Themotionsofparticlesfollowprobabilitylaws.”40

Probabilitylawsthemselvesareofcoursenecessaryaswellasallotherscien-tificlaws(forexample,Heisenberg’suncertaintyprincipleorSchrödinger’swave-functionequationas suchareperfectlynecessary,notintheleastprob-able),however,necessityofquantumlawsontheir“metalevel”doesnotsolveEinstein’sconcernabouttheabsenceof“objectivereality”andcausationinquantumphenomena,where,aseverywhereinnature,Godshouldnot“playdice”.Probabilitylawsexpresscontingencyofthephysicalworld,whichis,following the Copenhagen interpretation, only phenomenologically “real”,withoutsomedeeperontologicalfoundation.Thisirreduciblecontingencyofquantumphenomenathreatenstounderminethatmagnificentnecessityofthe“pillarsofcreation”whoseoutlineshavebeguntobediscoveredbyEinstein’s“fieldequations”of(GTR).Confrontedwithquantummechanics,Einsteinreactedinaveryrationalway,inHisway.PaisquotesoneofEinstein’searliestexpressionsofdissentwiththenew(QM),datingfrom1926,containedinhisreplytooneofBorn’sletters:

“Quantummechanicsiscertainlyimposing.Butaninnervoicetellsmethatitisnotyettherealthing.Thetheorysaysalot,butdoesnotreallybringusanyclosertothesecretofthe‘oldone’.I,atanyrate,amconvincedthatHeisnotplayingatdice.”41

Einsteinreferstohis“innervoice”,tohisdeepintuitionwhichenabledhimtoformulatehisgreattheory(GTR).And,wemayask:whocanstatewithcertaintythathewasnotrightinanessentialsense,afterall?Namely,evenif strict determinismdoesnot obtain,wasEinstein’s insistingonnecessityofcausationandobjective reality indeedamistake?Letusremindhereof



someotherEinstein’s“mistake”whichhehimselfconsideredasthegreatest–thecosmologicalconstantλ.Cosmologicalinvestigationsinthelastdecadesuggestthatmaybeitwasnotamistakeatall,butapreciousidea,bornfromEinstein’sbrilliantintuition.42

butletusreturntoGodwhodoesnotplaydice.WhatisactuallythemainEinstein’sconcernhere?Determinismorvalidityof theuniversal“LawofCausation”?Somepeoplethinkthatthesetwotermsareequivalent,andEin-steinhimselfdoesnotdistinguishthemexplicitly,however,fromthephilo-sophicalpointofview,theyhavetobeclearlydistinguished.Consequently,Ithinkthattheprincipal,albeitsomehowoverlookedorrathermisinterpretedphilosophicalproblemhereistheuniversal validity of causation,notjustde-terminisminthestrict(Spinozistic)sense.WemayseeEinstein’sconcernforcausalityalsofromhisalreadyconsideredoppositiontoapersonalGodinhisfirstessayonreligion and Science(1930):

“Themanwhoisthoroughlyconvincedoftheuniversaloperationofthelaw of causationcannotforamomententertaintheideaofabeingwhointerferesinthecourseofevents–provided,ofcourse,thathetakesthehypothesisofcausalityreally seriously.”43

Andalsoinhislateryears,Einsteinneverceasedtostresstheimportanceofcausalexplanations,aswecansee,forexample,inhislettertoaclosefriendMicheleBesso(1948):

“Butforme,thecogitativebasisisthetrustinanunrestrictedcausality.”44

It means: seriously has to be taken the universal causal determination ofevents,butitdoesnotmeanthateo ipsoalleventsaredeterminedinadvanceasfaraswegotothefuture.45Determinismandtheuniversal“LawofCau-

39

A.Pais,Einstein lived Here,p.129.

40

MaxBorn, inZeitschr. für phys. 37 (1926),here quoted from A. Pais, Einstein lived Here.

41

A.Einstein, in the letter toBorn,datedDe-cember4th, 1926 (quoted from:MarxBorn,The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955,Mac-millanPress,NewYork2005,p.88).

42

InalettertoJohnMoffat,onMay25,1953,Einstein wrote: “Every individual […] hasto retain his way of thinking if he does notwant toget lost in themazeofpossibilities.However,nobodyissureofhavingtakentherightroad,metheleast.”(Discover – Special Einstein Issue,September2004,p.68.)

43

A.Einstein,Ideas and Opinions,p.39(italicsbytheauthor).

44

Quotedfrom:M.Jammer,Einstein and reli-gion,p.87.

45

Einstein, of course, knows well that manyprocesses in nature, especially those which

involvethermodynamics,aretoocomplextobe predicted by any available physical the-ory,however,thiscomplexitydoesnotmeanthat causality does not work. In his alreadyquoted paper Science and religion (1941),hewrote: “To be sure,when the number offactorscoming intoplay inaphenomenolo-gicalcomplexistoolarge,scientificmethodinmostcasesfailsus.Oneneedonlythinkoftheweather,inwhichcasepredictionevenforafewdaysaheadisimpossible.Neverthelessnoonedoubtsthatweareconfrontedwithacausalconnectionwhosecausalcomponentsareinthemainknowntous.Occurrencesinthis domain are beyond the reach of exactpredictionbecauseofthevarietyoffactorsinoperation,notbecauseofanylackoforderinnature.”(Einstein,Ideas and Opinions,p.47)–Sowehavetodistinguishtwodifferentme-aningsofuncertainty:ontheonehanduncer-taintyofpredictionsinthermodynamicswhi-chisjust“factual”,derivingfromhypercom-plexity of processes, and on the other handprincipal uncertainty in quantummechanics(Heisenberg). Nevertheless, can we guessthatbehindEinstein’scritiqueof(QM)thereis some implicit belief that these two kindsofuncertaintyhave,fromtheepistemologicalpointofview,yetsomethingincommon?



sation”wouldbeequivalentunder(atleast)twoconditions:1)ifwehadsomewell-formed“FinalTheory”,somescientific“TheoryofEverything”(TOE)orsimplythe theory(T)inEinstein’sidealsense,and2)ifthecausalrelationin(T)werewell-defined(forexample,definedasbeingtransitive,asymmetricetc.)–butactuallywedonothaveanywell-formed(T),neitherwehaveanexactandcomprehensivescientificconceptofcausality…so,wehavetoask:whatdoweactuallymeanwhenwetalkofstrictdeterminisminscientificcontexts?I think that the term‘determinism’canhaveanexact scientific senseonlywithin some well-formed theory. Several definitions of determinism whichoccurinphilosophicalliterature,especiallyinanalyticphilosophy,havetobereadonlyasschemesofdefinitions,forexample:

“Determinism.Theworld isgovernedbydeterminism, ifandonly if,givena specifiedwaythingsareatatimet,thewaythingsgothereafterisfixedasamatterofnaturallaw.”46

Thisisanicedefinition-scheme,butnotaproperdefinitionofdeterminismitself.Inordertoobtainit,wehavetoprecisewhatactuallyisthe“naturallaw”inthedefiniens,otherwisesaid,wehavetopresupposeawell-formed theorywhichexpressesthislaw,actuallyasetorasystem of laws–forexam-pleNewton’sclassicalmechanicsorEinstein’s(GTR)etc.Onlywithinsomewell-formedtheorythequestionofdeterminismcanhaveaproperscientificsense.Butwedonothaveanywell-formed“theoryofeverything”(T),sothetraditionalphilosophicalconceptof“universaldeterminism”(“everythingisdetermined”,namelyinadvance,asfaraswego)cannotbewell-definedasascientificconcept.ItisinterestingtonotethatinsomeEinstein’slatestatements“hisinsistenceon the primacy of an unrestricted determinism somewhat abated”.47 Jam-merreferstoapassagefromWolfgang’sPauli’slettertoMaxBorn,dated31March,1954:

“Inparticular,Einsteindoesnotconsidertheconceptof‘determinism’tobeasfundamentalasitisfrequentlyheldtobe(ashetoldmeemphaticallymanytimes),andhedeniedenergeticallythathehadeverputupapostulatesuchas(yourletter,para.3):‘thesequenceofsuchconditionsmustalsobeobjectiveandreal,thatis,automatic,machine-like,deterministic’.Inthesameway,hedisputesthatheusesascriterionfortheadmissibilityofatheorythequestion‘Isitrigorouslydeterministic?’–Einstein’spointofdeparture is ‘realistic’ rather than ‘deterministic’,whichmeansthathisphilosophicalprejudiceisadifferentone.”48

Jammercommentsthisinterestingpassagethat

“…thisshiftinEinstein’spositionwas,partiallyatleast,theresultofhisfailuretodisprovetheHeisenbergindeterminancyrelation,whichformanintegralpartofthestandardversionofquantummechanics”.49

Wemayagreewiththisstatement,however,ithastobeaddedthatEinstein’spolemic with proponents of (QM), especially with Niels Bohr (in SolvayConferences)andMaxBorn(inletters)hasbeenfromitsbeginningsintwen-tiesmoreorientatedagainstthe“standard”(“Copenhagen”)interpretationofindeterminancylawsthanagainsttheselawsthemselves.Asithasbeenalreadysaid,wehavetodistinguishbetweendeterminisminthestrictphilosophicalsenseandtheuniversalvalidityofthe“LawofCausa-tion”,especiallyfromthepointoftheepistemologyofscience.Namely, inspiteofthefactthatwedonothaveanyexactandcomprehensivescientificconceptof causality (soaswedonothaveanyexact scientificconceptofdeterminism),the“LawofCausation”–withcontrasttothe“hypothesisofdeterminism”–hasastatusofaprincipleineveryscientificinvestigation.Itissupposed tobevaliduniversally,evenifwedonotknoworcannotprove



itinsomeoccasions,especiallyin(QM);namely,wecannotdisproveitnei-ther.Theuniversalvalidityofcausation,understoodasthegeneral principle that every event should have its cause (evenifwedonotknowandcannotexplainthenatureofsomepresumablycausalrelations),has not been strictly disproved in (QM), neither strictly demonstrated as incompatible with theindeterminancy laws,which, aswe know, have very convincing empiricalsupport.Therational thought presupposes causality “in principle”,regard-lessofthespecificconceptofcausalitywhichmaydifferinvarioustheoriesorhistoricalepochs(forexample,inAristotelianepistéme,the“finalcause”,causa finalis,wasincludedamongthe“natural”causes,whatisafterGalileoandNewton,uptoEinstein,ofcoursenotthecase).The principle of universal causality is by its epistemological status simi-lar toLeibniz’sprincipleofsufficient reason.bothprincipleshave tobea priori valid inorder todevelop scienceas rationaldiscourse.miracles areexcludedfromscience,alsofrom(QM).SpeakingaboutEinstein’srejectionofmiracles,namelyfromthescientificpointofview,MaxJammersaysthatEinstein’sbeliefinanunrestricted“determinism”(i.e.causality)insciencecanbeunderstoodashisbeliefthat“anunalternableantecedent–consequentrelationisanecessaryconditionforthecomprehensibilityofexperience([thatis]essentiallyaKantianidea).”50Fromthispointofview,whichisclosetomine,causalityhastheepistemologicalstatusofacategoryofreason.HereIcannotgofurtherintodiscussionifcausalityisatranscendentalcategoryinKantiansense,ifitisknowna priori etc.myintentionhereisjusttopointoutthatEinstein’s“intuition”that(QM)isnotacompletetheory,thatitissome-howprovisional,“notyettherealthing”,since(QM)doesnotyieldcausalexplanations–hasastrongphilosophicalsupport,andthatitis“inprinciple”maybe right,inspiteofthewell-verifiedquantumindeterminancy.Otherwisesaid,that(GTR)ismaybecompatiblewiththe(Qm)onsomelevelwhichhasnotbeendiscoveredyet.Let us resume: Einstein’s principal objection against (QM) is sometimesunderstoodmainlyashisinsistingonthestrictdeterminisminscience.butthingsaremorecomplicated,sincethequestionof“objectivereality”isdeep-er than thequestionwhetherdeterminismobtainsornot.WehavepointedoutthatEinsteindidnotwanttosacrificecausality,notjustdeterminismasweusuallyunderstandit.Namely,ifwegiveupthe“LawofCausation”asageneralprincipleofscience,wecometooclosetosomedeficient“agnos-tic”attitudewhichonly“savesthephenomena”withsuccessfulmathemati-calmodels,withoutreallyunderstandingthem.(“Savingphenomena…”–itsoundsfamiliar, likesomedéjà vu.)That’swhyit is important to takeintoaccounttheepistemologicaldistinctionsbetweensomebasicconceptswhichweareinclinedtoconfuse.Ofcourse,IdonotthinkthatEinstein’sold“UniversalFieldTheory”(UFT)isgoingtoprevailovercontemporary(Qm).Itismoreprobablethattherela-

46

CarlHoefer,“CausalDeterminism”,in:Stan-ford Encyclopedia of philosophy,availableinInternet.

47


48

Wolfgang Pauli, in: the Born–Einstein letters,p.216.

49

M.Jammer,Einstein and religion,p.53–54.

50

M.Jammer,ibid.,p.88(italicsaddedbytheauthor).



tivistic“locality”hastobesacrificedforsomenewtypeof“holism”inphy-sics,andmaybealsoanisotropyoftimehastobereconsidered.Forthemo-ment,thesearejust“queries”,ifweuseNewton’sterm.Anyway,itisdifficulttoimaginethattheprincipleofcausationitselfwouldbegivenupinscience,sincehumanreasoncannotbesatisfiedwith“phenomenological”descriptionsonly,neverthelesshowsophisticatedandmathematicallyeleganttheymightbe.Letus remindof anotherEinstein’swell-known remark that “themostincomprehensiblethingabouttheuniverseisthatitiscomprehensible”.Intheend,IwillquoteEinstein’sfamouspassageconcerninghis“experienceofmystery”.Butbeforequotingthispassage,letmehintthefollowingspecu-lation:incase,ifEinsteinindeedfoundhisgreatfinalTheory(T)–otherwisesaid,incaseifabsolutelyno“hiddenvariables”remainedinexplainingourworld–wouldthenstillbepossibleour“experienceofmystery”?Couldwestilladmirewith“wonderandawe”themagnificentGod’s“Design”oftheCosmos?Or,isitmaybeoppositethecase:thatjustthenouradmirationofHisSubtlety,BeautyandTruthwouldbeperfect?OfcourseIhavetoleavethisdilemmaopen.Andhereisthefamouspassagefromthe World As I See It (1930):

“Themostbeautifulexperiencewecanhaveisthemysterious.Itisthefundamentalemotionthatstandsatthecradleoftrueartandtruescience.Whoeverdoesnotknowitandcannolongerwonder,nolongermarvel,isasgoodasdead,andhiseyesaredimmed.Itwastheexperienceofmystery–evenifmixedwithfear–thatengenderedreligion.Aknowledgeoftheexistenceofsomethingwecannotpenetrate,ourperceptionsoftheprofoundestreasonandthemostradiantbeauty,whichonlyintheirmostprimitiveformsareaccessibletoourminds:itisthisknowledgeandthisemotionthatconstitutetruereligiosity.Inthissense,andinthisalone,Iamadeeplyreligiousman.”51

References:

1. Einstein,Albert(1954,sd.ed.1982):Ideas and Opinions,ThreeRiversPress,NewYork. (Thisedition includesmostarticles fromtwooriginalcollections:the World As I See ItandOut of My later Years,PhilosophicalLibrary,NewYork,1949and1950).

2. Albert Einstein: the Human Side (1979):ed.HelenDucasandBaneshHoffman,Prin-cetonUniversityPress.

3. Born,Max(2005):The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955,MacmillanPress,NewYork. 4. Pais,Abraham(1982):Subtle is the lord,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford. 5. Pais,Abraham(1994):Einstein lived Here,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford. 6. Jammer,Max(1999):Einstein and religion,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton. 7. Holton,Gerald:“Einstein’sThirdParadise”,Daedalus,Fall2003. 8. Holton,Gerald(2004):“PaulTillich,AlbertEinstein,andtheQuestfortheUltimate”

(fromInternet). 9. Tillich,Paul(1996):“ReligiousLanguageasSymbolic”,in:philosophy of religion,

michaelPetersonet al.(eds.),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.10. Batten,AlanH.:“SubtleareEinstein’sThoughts”,physics World,Forum,Sept.2005.11. Hoefer,Carl:“CausalDeterminism”,inStanford Encyclopedia of philosophy,inIn-

ternet.12. Petković,Tomislav(2005):“AlbertEinstein–čovjek idjelo”, in:Eksperimentalna

fizika i spoznajna teorija,Školskaknjiga,Zagreb.13. Discover – Special Einstein Issue,September2004.



Marko Uršić

Albert Einstein – Wissenschaft und Religion

ZusamenfassungDer Artikel setzt sich vornehmlich mit der Frage auseinander, was es mit Einsteins berühm-tem Dictum Gottwürfeltnicht im philosophischen und/oder theologischen Sinne auf sich hat. Welches ist das grundlegende Konzept der Notwendigkeit, auf der dieser Satz beruht, und vor allem: Welcher Gott, der nicht spielt, ist hier gemeint – der theistische, der deistische oder der pantheistische? Einige Abschnitte aus Einsteins Schriften und öffentlichen reden legen die Vermutung nahe, dass er dem pantheismus zugeneigt war, in Anlehnung an Spinoza, den er stets bewunderte und von allen philosophen am meisten schätzte. Allerdings setzt Spinozas panthei-smus Determinismus voraus, was vermutlich nicht der Hauptgrund für Einsteins protest gegen einen „würfelnden Gott” in der Quantenphysik gewesen sein mag… Sollte demnach Einste-ins Gott dem Newton’schen Pantokrator oder Spinozas Deussivenatura näher stehen? Das ist möglich, aber nur wenn der Universalherrscher seine Kreaturen, uns winzige Geschöpfe, in einem immensen und vor allem „wohltemperierten” Universum weder bestraft noch belohnt. Das Änigma des berühmten Satzes bleibt ungelöst.

SchlüsselwörterGott,Würfeln,Pantheismus,Determinismus,Religion,Wissenschaft,AlbertEinstein

Marko Uršič

Albert Einstein – Science et Religion

Sommairele problème principal présenté dans cet article est le point de vue philosophique ou théolo-gique d’Einstein dans sa phrase célèbre: Dieunejouepasauxdés. Quel en était le concept « fondamental » de nécessité? Et avant tout: quel est ce Dieu qui ne joue pas aux dés? Est-ce un Dieu théiste, déiste ou panthéiste? Certains autres passages des écrits informels d’Einstein et de ses discours montrent qu’il était très proche du panthéisme, admirateur de Spinoza qu’il considérait comme le plus grand des philosophes. pourtant le panthéisme de Spinoza implique le déterminisme qui, probablement, n’a pas été la raison principale de son désaccord avec Dieu qui joue aux dés dans la physique quantique.Donc il est sans importance que le Dieu d’Einstein soit plus proche du Pantocratorde Newton, ou plutôt de Deussivenatura de Spinoza. peut-être que oui, mais seulement si le Souverain universel ne punit ni ne récompense ses créatures, donc nous-mêmes, ces êtres minuscules dans ce monde immense et bien harmonisé. l’énigme est toujours posée.

Mots clésDieu,jouerauxdés,panthéisme,déterminisme,religion,science,AlbertEinstein

51

Einstein,Ideas and Opinions,p.11.

einstein on religion and science - srce

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