egypt's new regime and the future of the u.s.-egyptian strategic relationship

7/30/2019 Egypt's New Regime and the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship

1/62

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.


2/62

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army WarCollege and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related tonational security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate-gic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategicstudies that develop policy recommendations on:

Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combinedemployment of military forces;

Regional strategic appraisals;

The nature of land warfare;

Matters affecting the Armys future;

The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and

Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern top-ics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department ofDefense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topicsof special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedingsof conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within theArmy to address strategic and other issues in support of Armyparticipation in national security policy formulation.


3/62

Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

EGYPTS NEW REGIME ANDTHE FUTURE OF THE

U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Gregory Aftandilian

April 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or theU.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press publications enjoy full academic free-dom, provided they do not disclose classied information, jeop-ardize operations security, or misrepresent ofcial U.S. policy.Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and some-times controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering de-bate on key issues.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not becopyrighted.


4/62

ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 AshburnDrive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army WarCollege (USAWC) Press publications may be downloadedfree of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this re-port may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last byplacing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may bequoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and ap-propriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Insti-tute and USAWC Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and USAWC Presspublishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the nationalsecurity community on the research of our analysts, recent andforthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsoredby the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic com-mentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested inreceiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website atwww.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-565-8


5/62

iii

FOREWORD

Egypts domestic scene has profoundly changedsince early 2011 when a popular revolution, ultimate-ly backed by the military, forced President Mubarakto resign. New and old political players and organiza-tions are contesting Egypts more open political space,and public policy is likely to be more inuenced bypublic opinion than ever before. Egypts transition isstill incomplete, but it now has a newly-elected presi-dent from the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood whois exercising leadership in domestic politics, foreignaffairs, and in the military and security spheres. In abold move in August 2012, he replaced the leadershipof the military, which had been running the countrysince February of 2011, with individuals drawn froma younger generation of ofcers. As of September

2012, with the new Constitution still unnished andnew parliamentary elections months away, we do notknow the delineation of powers between the branchesof government or how much power the new presidentwill ultimately wield.

It is against this backdrop that Mr. Gregory Af-tandilian, a consultant, academic, and a former StateDepartment Egypt analyst, wrote this monograph onhow the United States can best preserve its strategicrelationship with Egypt given these changes. Egypthas been a strategic partner of the United States formore than 3 decades, and has been one of the largestrecipients of U.S. foreign aid, most of which has beento assist the Egyptian military. Egypt has not onlyplayed a pivotal role in the Arab-Israeli peace process

but has cooperated with the United States in many re-gional security matters such as providing overightrights for U.S. military aircraft and expedited transit


6/62

for U.S. naval ships passing through the importantSuez Canal on the way to the Arabian Sea and the Per-

sian Gulf, especially during times of crisis.Mr. Aftandilian cogently analyzes the develop-

ments in Egypt from January 2011 to August 2012,especially the relationship between the military andthe civilian authorities. He outlines several scenariosthat could ensue and gives sound recommendationson how the United States can best preserve its stra-tegic interests in Egypt while supporting that coun-trys democratic transition. He also offers specic rec-ommendations for the U.S. Army in its relationshipwith Egypt.

The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the ndingsin this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. policy-makers and U.S. Army ofcers as they deal with a crit-ical ally during this very sensitive transition period.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

iv


7/62


8/62


9/62

vii

SUMMARY

This monograph, completed in August 2012, ana-lyzes the developments in Egypt from January 2011to August 2012 and addresses the following questionsthat are pertinent to U.S. policymakers: How does theUnited States maintain good relations and preserve itsstrategic partnership with Egypt under Cairos newpolitical leadership and the changing political environ-ment in the country? How does it do so while adher-ing to American values such as supporting democracyeven when those coming to power do not share U.S.strategic goals?

The monograph rst examines Egypts strategicimportance for the United States by exploring Egyptsrole in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its geographicalrole (providing air and naval access) for U.S. military

assets heading to the Persian Gulf, and joint trainingprograms. With so much at stake in the Middle East,losing Egypt as a strategic ally would be a signi-cant setback for the United States.

The Egyptian revolution of early 2011 was wel-comed by U.S. ofcials because the protestors wanteddemocratic government, which conformed to U.S. ide-als, and the institution that would shepherd the transi-tion, the Egyptian military, had close ties to the UnitedStates. However, the transition was marked by manydifculties, including violence by military authoritiesagainst protestors, a crackdown on American non-government organizations (NGOs), and the militarysreluctance to cede real power to civilian authorities.Nonetheless, U.S. ofcials continued to court the mili-

tary because they believed it had equities they neededto protect, and they developed relations with the Mus-lim Brotherhood, an organization that was critical of


10/62

viii

many U.S. foreign policy goals, because the Brother-hood had emerged as the strongest political organi-

zation in the country. In the process, many Egyptianliberals felt slighted by this two-stop shopping byhigh-ranking U.S. ofcials.

The rst round of Egypts presidential electionsdivided the polity, and the top two vote-getters werea former Mubarak prime minister and a Brotherhoodofcial, both of whom alarmed many Egyptians. Whenit appeared that the Brotherhood candidate, Moham-med Morsi, won the election in the second round, theEgyptian military hesitated to announce the winner,prompting criticism from the United States. The mili-tary relented, but not before issuing declarations thatgave itself vast powers and restricted the presidentspowers. Less than 2 months later, Morsi felt con-dent enough to change the militarys leadership, and

claimed vast powers for himself.Morsi appears to have won this power play, but

many in Egypt fear that he could become an authori-tarian gure and use the Brotherhood organization tomonopolize power. The monograph argues that anideal outcome for Egypt, and one that would preservethe U.S. Egyptian strategic relationship, would be forMorsi not to interfere in the drafting of the new Con-stitution, nor in the parliamentary elections, and allowall political factions to compete fairly. A political sys-tem with parliament not dominated by the Brother-hood, with checks and balances put in place, plus themilitary retaining its autonomy, would help to fosterdemocracy in Egypt and maintain the U.S.-Egyptianstrategic relationship, even though public opinion

might make Egypt less likely to cooperate with someU.S. initiatives.


11/62

ix

The monograph then examines scenarios whereMorsi acts in an authoritarian manner, pursues a nar-

row Islamist agenda, and moves to purge the militaryof elements not supportive of the Brotherhood. Insuch scenarios, the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relation-ship would suffer not only because anti-U.S. elementswould come to dominate Egypt but because the U.S.Congress would likely reduce or cut off U.S. assistancein reaction to such moves.

The monograph notes that Morsi, so far, has nottaken any dramatic steps against traditional Egyptianforeign and security policies, perhaps not wishing toalienate the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the Egyp-tian military because he needs their support. For ex-ample, although Morsi traveled to Iran in late August2012 to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit,he delivered a hard-hitting speech against the Syrian

regime, Irans principal ally in the Arab world, muchto the Iranian leaderships chagrin.

To bolster the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and helpkeep Egypt on the democratic path, the monographargues that U.S. military aid should not be cut, andeconomic aid should be increased. At the same time,U.S. administration ofcials should not oppose con-gressional conditions tying aid to democratic normsbecause they signal U.S. support for democracy. TheUnited States should continue to speak out for freeand fair elections and other international norms, butshould avoid commenting on the role of religion andIslamic law in the Egyptian Constitution. Helping theEgyptian military deal with the extremist threat in theSinai, which the United States has already offered,

should also be continued.As for the U.S. Army, the monograph argues that

its leaders should continue to advocate for military-tomilitary contacts, encourage their Egyptian counter-


12/62


13/62

1

EGYPTS NEW REGIME ANDTHE FUTURE OF THE

U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

The revolution in Egypt in January-February 2011that removed President Hosni Mubarak from powerhas resulted in profound changes to the Egyptiandomestic scene. Authority has passed from a long-standing authoritarian president to a military govern-ment and has now entered a phase in which a newpresident, originally from the once-banned MuslimBrotherhood, is trying to exercise real power not onlyover the civilian government, but over the military es-tablishment as well. Meanwhile, an activist judiciaryhas disbanded the original body charged to writeEgypts new constitution as well as the parliamentthat was elected in late 2011-early 2012 that came to

be dominated by the Brotherhood. As of this writing,Egypt still must pass through several more politicalhurdlesthe drafting of a new constitution by a new-ly-constituted body selected for that task, passage ofthis constitution by way of a public referendum, andnew parliamentary electionsbefore we know whattype of political system will emerge in the country andthe main political forces that will shape its future.

For the time being, Egypts powerful military es-tablishment has acquiesced to the new presidentsdecision to shake up the military hierarchy.1 In Au-gust 2012, President Mohammed Morsi retired De-fense Minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, headof the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF),and his deputy in the SCAF, army chief of staff Gen-

eral Sami Anan, as well as the chiefs of the navy, airforce, and air defense commands. He had previouslyretired the head of Egypts intelligence service. He has


14/62

2

replaced these gures with a younger generation ofmilitary men.2 Although Morsi took a political gamble

against the old guard within the SCAF and won, it isstill unclear how far his authority reaches. Signicant-ly, Morsi did not choose a civilian to head the DefenseMinistry, but instead chose an ofcer who was head ofmilitary intelligence and a member of the SCAF to beTantawis replacement. Although rumors abound inCairo that Morsi wants to exercise full civilian controlover the military (including over its nontransparentbudget), he was careful not to go too far. The mili-tary still retains control over its vast economic enter-prises, which some analysts suggest may represent asmuch as 20-25 percent of the countrys gross domesticproduct (GDP).3

Amid these political changes is the growing inse-curity in the Sinai region bordering Israel and the Gaza

Strip. The Sinai, long neglected by Cairo except for thepopular tourist destinations in the south, has becomea sort of Wild West. Northern Sinai is populated by acombustible mix of disaffected Bedouin tribes, jihad-ists from outside of Egypt, some radical Palestinianextremists from Gaza, and home-grown Egyptianterrorists, many of whom were released from prisonduring the revolution in early 2011. In early August2012, a group of extremists killed 16 Egyptian soldiersguarding the border region in an operation that wasaimed at striking Israel, prompting the Egyptian mili-tary to take retaliatory strikes in the area and destroy-ing many of the tunnels that have been used by theextremists to smuggle goods and weapons from Sinaiinto the Gaza Strip and vice-versa.4 More such inci-

dents are likely in the future.Key questions for U.S. foreign policy and defense

ofcials are: How does the United States maintain


15/62

3

good relations and preserve its strategic partner-ship with Egypt under its new political leadership

and a changing political environment? How does theUnited States do so while it adheres to American val-ues such as supporting a democratic transition evenwhen democratic processes may result in political ac-tors coming to power who do not share U.S. foreignpolicy and security goals?

EGYPTS IMPORTANCE TO U.S. STRATEGICGOALS IN THE REGION

A cursory glance at a map of the Middle East showshow pivotal Egypt is to U.S. strategic goals. It is onthe same latitude as the Persian Gulf through whicha signicant share of the worlds oil still passes (mak-ing overight and refueling stops in Egypt for U.S.

military aircraft headed to that region all the more im-portant, especially during times of crisis), and its SuezCanal is a key transit waterway for U.S. naval shipspassing from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea andthen on to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. In areport released publicly in 2006, the U.S. GovernmentAccountability Ofce noted that between 2001 and2005, the Egyptian government provided overightpermission to 36,553 U.S. military aircraft and grantedexpedited transit of 861 U.S. naval ships through theSuez Canal.5 Such gures underscore the importanceof Egypt for U.S. strategic planners. In addition, Egyptborders Israel and the Gaza Strip, making it an impor-tant player, strategically and politically, in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Egypt also borders Libya to its

west and Sudan to its south, both countries that canimpact its security.


16/62

4

As the most populous country in the Arab world(estimates are that its population may now be about

85 million), and one that houses important intellectualcenterssuch as Al-Azhar University, the leadinginstitute of religious education in the Sunni Muslimworld, and longstanding secular institutions like Cai-ro Universityand has been a leader in the region interms of the development of political parties and civicorganizations (Egypts Bar Association, for example,was started in 1912)what happens in Egypt is close-ly watched by people and governments throughoutthe region. Moreover, Egypt has long considered itselfa leader of the Arab world, even when other countrieshave eclipsed this role.6

Since the 1970s, when the late Egyptian PresidentAnwar Sadat switched sides in the Cold War, Egypthas been considered an important strategic asset for

the United States. The U.S.-brokered Camp DavidAccords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace trea-ty in 1979 brought Egypt closer into the U.S. camp.Although Egypt entered into these arrangements forits own national security interests, its positions con-formed to U.S. strategic goals at the time of keepingEgypt outside of the Soviet orbit and lessening thechances of another major Arab-Israeli war.7 Since thattime, Egypt has been a major recipient of U.S. nan-cial assistance, receiving about $1.3 billion in militaryaid annually, which has held steady for more than 30years, as well as substantial civilian aid (which was$800 million for many years and is now between $200million and $300 million a year).

This aid, particularly the military assistance, has

been seen as an important barometer of U.S. supportfor Egypt and has weathered several stormy patchesin the relationship. But this aid has also been problem-


17/62

5

atic on a political level. Many political gures in theUnited States consider the aid to be a form of leverage

over Egypt and believe it entitles the United States toexpect certain norms of behavior from the Egyptiangovernment. From the Egyptian perspective, the aid isthe least the United States can do to reward Egypt forall it does strategically and politically for the UnitedStates in the region. There has always been resent-ment by the Egyptians that they play second ddle tothe Israelis. When Egypt was receiving $2.1 billion inaid from the United States, Israel was receiving $3 bil-lion, and aid to Israel always had less strings attachedthan aid to Egypt. Moreover, freezing the military aidat $1.3 billion a year meant that in real terms (whenadjusted for ination), actual U.S. military assistancehas been on a steady decline.8

Nonetheless, the bilateral military relationship

has resulted in a couple of generations of Egyptianmilitary ofcers receiving U.S. military education (atvarious professional military education (PME) institu-tions in the United States),9 familiarization with U.S.military doctrine, and a generally favorable disposi-tion toward the United States. Egypts purchase ofU.S. military hardware (which most of the militaryaid is used for) has resulted in better interoperabilityof forces between the two countries. Until recently,the United States and Egypt staged biennial militaryexercises called Bright Star on Egyptian soil,10 andsuch exercises have assisted the United States in timesof crisis, like the rst Gulf war of 1990-91, when U.S.and Egyptian forces worked together in the effort todefend Saudi Arabia and roll back the Iraqi invasion

of Kuwait.Although the Cold War is over and Egypt may not

be the cornerstone country it once was for U.S. strate-


18/62

6

gic planners, the idea of losing Egypt as a strategically is not an attractive option for U.S. ofcials. At the

very least, it would put the Arab-Israeli situation injeopardy, contributing to instability in the region, andmake it more difcult for the United States to confrontsecurity threats in the Horn of Africa and the PersianGulf region.

THE CHALLENGE OF DEALING WITHDIFFERENT CENTERS OF POWER

Under Sadat, and later Mubarak, the United Stateshad one address to which it went to get cooperationon various issues related to Middle Eastern affairsand securitythat was, in essence, the presidentialofce. Sadat and Mubarak were the decisionmakers,parliament was largely a rubber stamp institution, the

press and opposition gures were either co-opted orwere on a short leash, and the military were subor-dinate to the president. Egyptian President Mubarak,for example, often took unpopular positions at homeif he believed such positions would be benecial forU.S.-Egyptian strategic ties and Egypts position inthe region, such as being the go-between for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

During the revolution of January-February 2011,the U.S. administration, after some initial hesitation,came to the conclusion that Mubarak had become aliabilitythe aged leader was unwilling to make sig-nicant changes to mollify his peopleand the UnitedStates was willing to encourage the Egyptian militaryto convince Mubarak that it was time to step down.11

The belief at the time was that the Egyptian militarywould shepherd the democratic transition, and thisinstitution, being so powerful in its own right, would


19/62

7

help to preserve the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relation-ship. Moreover, most of the young people who came

to demonstrate in Tahrir Square did not espouse ananti-U.S. agenda but instead were calling for demo-cratic government, which conformed to U.S. ideals.After Mubarak was toppled, the once-banned MuslimBrotherhood, because of its organizational strengthand its history of opposition to the Mubarak regime,soon emerged as the most important political orga-nization in Egypt, compelling U.S. policymakers totake notice and begin to cultivate ties to its leader-ship. Hence, when high-ranking U.S. ofcials came toCairo in 2011, they made a point of visiting ofcials inthe Brotherhood as well as the SCAF.12 After the par-liamentary elections of late 2011 and early 2012, theBrotherhood, winning about 47 percent of the seats,became the dominant party in that body and con-

trolled not only the position of speaker but most of theparliamentary committees.

This two-stop shopping by U.S, ofcialsreach-ing out mainly to the military and the Brotherhoodhad its limitations, however. It has had the unintendedeffect of convincing many Egyptian liberalsin manyrespects the natural allies of the United Statesthatthe United States was very willing to deal with whatthey saw was Egypts illiberal forcesthe militaryand the Brotherhoodat the expense of the trulydemocratic forces.13 This is a sentiment that was alsoshared by the young revolutionaries who mobilizedtheir supporters in Tahrir Square in 2011 as well aspolitical parties espousing liberal philosophies. Whenthe Brotherhood appeared to overplay its hand in par-

liament in early 2012, tried to monopolize the consti-tution writing process, and appeared to do very littleto improve the Egyptian economy, the Brotherhoods


20/62

8

image among the general public fell. The liberals foundan ally in the courts, which disbanded the assembly,

picked largely by the Brotherhood to write the con-stitution, and later dissolved the lower house of par-liament itself on technical grounds (arguing that thepresent conguration had violated the rule that one-third of the seats would be reserved for independentcandidates).14

Be that as it may, U.S. policymakers continued tocourt the Egyptian military and the Brotherhood, evenwhen bilateral relations went through a very difcultperiod, namely the late December 2011 crackdown onAmerican and other foreign nongovernmental organi-zations (NGOs) that were involved in democracy pro-motion work. Although the instigator of this crack-down was probably a holdover from the Mubarakregime, Minister of International Cooperation Fayza

Abouel Naga, the Egyptian military went along withthe crackdown and initially showed no interest in re-solving it.15 Only after several weeks of phone callsfrom President Barack Obama and visits by the Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior membersof Congress, along with threats to cut off U.S. mili-tary aid, did the SCAF relent and allow the Americanand other foreign NGO workers to leave Egypt, but itdid not resolve the issue of the democracy promotionNGOs in Egypt themselves, which the Egyptian gov-ernment saw as interference in their domestic affairs.16

The Egyptian militarys initial reluctance to releasethe American NGO workers, including the son of theU.S. Secretary of Transportation who was working forthe International Republican Institute and had taken

refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, was probablybecause it was piqued that the U.S. administrationhad criticized it in the last months of 2011 because


21/62

9

of the violence perpetrated against demonstrators inNovember and December. The U.S. Congress added

language in the Fiscal Year (FY) 12 omnibus spend-ing bill that was passed in late 2011 to the effect thatthe United States should withhold aid to Egypt unlessthe administration could certify that Egypt was meet-ing certain democratic benchmarks. After the UnitedStates paid roughly $5 million to Egypt for the releaseof its nationals in the NGO controversy, a Senate com-mittee deducted $5 million from Egypts economicsupport funds for FY 13 as a way of getting some ofour money back.17 Meanwhile, when the Secretaryof State exercised the national security waiver in theFY12 legislation to give Egypt the $1.3 billion in mili-tary aid (despite the fact that Egypt did not meet thedemocratic benchmarks in the legislation), some inu-ential members of Congress, like Democratic Senator

Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Opera-tions Subcommittee, sharply criticized the Obama ad-ministration for exercising this waiver.18 Clearly, theU.S. administration believed that holding up militaryassistance to Egypt would damage its ties to the Egyp-tian military and was willing to buck congressionalpressure to maintain these links.19

That said, the Obama administration was criticalof what it believed was the Egyptian militarys re-luctance to give up powerespecially following thepresidential election in June 2012, which the SCAFhad pledged earlier would be the time when the mili-tary would go back to the barracks. With the electionresults indicating that Muslim Brotherhood candidateMohammed Morsi had won the presidential contest

over a former military man, Ahmed Shaq, the SCAF,on June 17, 2012, issued a constitutional declarationgiving it vast powers (including legislative powers in


22/62

10

the absence of a parliament) and severely limiting thepowers of the new president. The new president would

have no control over the military (and the militarybudget) and would not be authorized to declare warwithout the consent of the military.20 This was widelyseen in Egypt and in Washington not only as the mili-tarys attempt to keep power for itself but to keep theBrotherhood in check. During Secretary of State Hil-ary Clintons visit to Egypt in mid-July, after Morsiwas sworn in as president under these new edicts,Defense Minister Tantawi tried to justify the SCAFsmoves by saying that Egypt will never fall . . . to acertain groupthe armed forces will not allow it.21However, Secretary Clinton stated publicly shortlybefore meeting with Tantawi and shortly after meet-ing with Morsi that the United States supports Egyptsfull transition to civilian rule, and the return of its

military to a purely national security role.22

Thiswas a U.S. signal that Washington was unhappy withthe Egyptian militarys apparent power grab, proba-bly believing that prolonged military rule would leadto instability and strife. Even though Washington wasprobably not pleased that Egypts new president camefrom the Muslim Brotherhoodwith which it has hadmany differences over foreign policy issuesU.S.policymakers believed the outcome of the presiden-tial election should be respected, and that the UnitedStates could have a good working relationship withMorsi. Later in the month, Defense Secretary Panettavisited Cairo and also had meetings with Morsi andTantawi. Panetta mentioned publicly that Morsi ishis own man,23 suggesting that he was taking him at

his word that he had resigned from the Brotherhoodand was acting independently of any political faction.Panetta also said that Morsi and Tantawi appeared to


23/62

11

have a good working relationshipwhich we nowknow in hindsight was not the casegiven that Morsi

forced Tantawi to retire only a couple of weeks later.These episodes showed that the United States, de-

spite its criticism of the Egyptian military, still pur-sued the policy of two-stop shopping it had begunmonths earlier. This may have been logical given thefact that the military was a known institution to theUnited States and the Brotherhood had emerged asthe preeminent political organization in the country.However, as the rst round of the Egyptian presiden-tial elections showed, the Egyptian peoples politicalpreferences were varied.24 In a divided eld, severalcandidates of different political persuasions got almostthe same number of votes. The two top vote-getterswound up being Mohammed Morsi, the Brotherhoodcandidate, and Ahmed Shaq, the former air force

commander, former minister of civil aviation andMubaraks last prime minister. But both of these re-ceived only about 25 percent of the vote, hardly a ring-ing endorsement of their philosophies. The electoratewas thus left with a choice of the Brotherhood or aformer Mubarak regime ofcial in the second round ofvoting, an unappealing prospect to many Egyptians.25

Moreover, the fact that Morsi edged out Shaq inthe second round of the presidential election did notmean that a majority of Egyptians had swung aroundand become Brotherhood supporters. Many Egyptiansof liberal persuasion simply stayed home while Broth-erhood supporters came out in strong numbers, andmany of the young revolutionaries threw their sup-port behind Morsi because they feared a return of the

old regime if Shaq won.26 Hence, the second round ofthe presidential election was not a true indicator of theEgyptian peoples political preferences.


24/62

12

Morsi, considered a rather lackluster candidate,nonetheless grew comfortable in his new job after he

was sworn in as president on June 30, and when anopportunity arose to change the power congurationin the country, he quickly seized it. That opportunitywas the killing of 16 Egyptian soldiers in the Sinaialong the Egyptian-Israeli border on August 5, 2012. Agroup of Islamist extremists red on the soldiers, stoletheir armored vehicles, and attempted to smash intothe Israeli side of the border before being stopped byIsraeli forces. In the aftermath of this incident, Morsired Egypts intelligence chief and later proceededto shake up the Egyptian military establishment. Heissued orders to retire Tantawi, army chief of staffAnan, as well as the chiefs of the navy, air force, andair defense commands, and he replaced them withyounger ofcers. Surprisingly to many in Egypt, the

senior members of the military went along with thesechanges, and Morsi won an important political victo-ry.27 Although the complete story of this episode is notyet known, it appears that Morsi may have reachedout to some younger members of the SCAF ahead oftime to signal his intent, and so his moves were nota complete surprise.28 He chose as his new defenseminister a current member of the SCAF and the for-mer military intelligence chief, General Abdel Fatahal-Sissi. Although Morsis moves appeared radical, hedid not choose a civilian to head up the defense minis-try but someone from the defense establishment itself.Nor did he make any moves to rein in the militarysautonomy or business interests. He probably guredthat to move on these fronts at this stage would be a

bridge too far. Instead, he settled on a shakeup of themilitary hierarchy. The fact that Tantawi and Ananwere associated with many of the repressive poli-


25/62

13

cies of the SCAFs rule in 2011 and 2012 also allowedMorsi to score some points with the public, or at

least with the activist youth groups who took part inthe revolution.

More controversial during this time was Morsisdecision to assume both presidential and legislativepowers that the military, under Tantawi, had claimedfor itself just 2 months earlier. Morsi also movedagainst several media personalities who have beencritical of him and the Brotherhood. The Shura Council,the upper body of parliament that was not disbandedby the courts and which has been dominated by theBrotherhood since the elections in the early spring of2012, appointed pro-Brotherhood editors to head thegovernment-owned newspaper. Many observers inEgypt believe that Morsi was personally involved inthe decision to appoint these editors.29

For liberal-oriented Egyptians, Morsi won plauditsfor his moves against an illiberal military hierarchythat had thrown thousands of Egyptians into prisonsince February 2011 and for his exertion of presiden-tial control over the military.30 However, these posi-tive moves, in their view, were counterbalanced by hisapparent power grab. The latter fed their worst fearsabout the Brotherhood. Morsi, in their view, was nowacting in an authoritarian manner and might even tryto inuence the constitutional writing process throughhis proxies (like the military before him, he reservedthe right to draft the new constitution if the body setto write it failed to do its job) as well as new parlia-mentary elections. Egyptian liberals keenly want thenew constitution to reect the ideals of a civic state

in which all Egyptians are equal before the law andin which religion is not a deciding factor.31 They alsowant to compete on a level playing eld in the par-


26/62

14

liamentary elections. Although Morsi has ofcially re-signed from the Brotherhood, they fear he still wants

to impose a narrow Islamist agenda on the country.Hence, as of late August 2012, Egypts political

map encompasses Morsi as president, the military as apowerful institution behind the scenes, and many un-knownssuch as the political parties and factions thatwill control parliament in the near future. (Morsi haschosen a cabinet but his cabinet ministers are mostlymade up of nonpowerful technocrats).32 Although theBrotherhood and the more fundamentalist Sala par-ties held a majority in parliament in early 2012 beforethat body was dissolved by the courts, it is not as-sured that they will get the same percentage of seatswhen the new parliament is elected. In late 2011 andearly 2012, much of the Brotherhoods vote came fromnon-Brotherhood members willing to give this long-

standing opposition party a try, and they did not likewhat they saw. For non-Brotherhood members, theBrotherhood was seen as trying to impose its will onthe rest of parliament and monopolize not only parlia-ments agenda but the constitutional writing processas well.33 Hence, if the new parliamentary electionsare free and fair, we can probably expect a drop inthe Brotherhoods support from the 47 percent of theseats it won last time. Moreover, it is very possiblethat many Egyptians will vote strategically this timearound. Facing a president originally from the Broth-erhood, many Egyptians will now want parliamentnot to be dominated by this same organization; hence,they may vote in a way to make parliament serve as acheck on the president. They would want parliament

to exercise signicant power for this same reason.Finally, the judiciary is also an institution that bearswatching. Morsi has appointed two brothers from the


27/62

15

Mekki family to his administration (they were outspo-ken judges against the Mubarak regime during the

late Mubarak era). One, Mahmoud Mekki, has beenappointed vice president, the other, Ahmed Mekki,has been appointed minister of justice. Although nei-ther of them are members of the Muslim Brotherhood,they are believed to be sympathetic toward it.34 SomeEgyptians believe that Morsi made these selections toreform the judiciary, which still has many judges whowere put in place during the Mubarak regime. How-ever, the judiciary in Egypt is a respected institutionand if Morsi is seen as trying to appoint like-mind-ed judges (such as those sympathetic to the MuslimBrotherhood) to the higher courts, he runs the risk ofa popular backlash. It remains to be seen what he andhis new minister of justice will do.

THE NEW REGIMES FOREIGN ANDSECURITY POLICIES

Although Egypts political picture is still a workin progress, there are already some trends underwaythat are affecting its foreign policy and security po-sitions. The most immediate security concern facingEgypt (expressed by Morsi and the military) is thelawlessness of the Sinai and the extremist operationstherein. The Egyptian military is taking the lead inbringing more military assets to the area to clampdown on the extremist groups, and there have alreadybeen clashes between the military and some of theseextremists. On August 20, 2012, new Defense MinisterGeneral Abdel Fattah al-Sissi traveled to the northern

Sinai to meet with disaffected Bedouin leaders to heartheir complaints and to enlist their support against theextremists. Reportedly, al-Sissi offered rewards to the


28/62

16

Bedouin to collect weapons in the area. He also prom-ised them that $165 million in development assistance

would be given to the area.35

The Egyptian govern-ments strategy seems to be to peel off Bedouin sup-port for the extremists and enlist them in the struggleto isolate and confront the extremists. Long neglectedby Cairo, the Bedouin will probably take a wait-and-see approach until they observe actual assistance ar-riving from the central government. Most of the Bed-ouin in the Sinai are not religious fanatics, and someobservers believe that those Bedouin youth who havejoined the extremists have done so either for monetaryreasons or because they had become susceptible to theextremists message because of their own poor stationin life. Hence, it makes sense for the Egyptian govern-ment and military to pursue this strategy, but onlytime will tell if it will actually work.

Press reports indicate that the U.S. military is alsovery interested in helping the Egyptians deal with thesecurity situation in the Sinai. On August 14, 2012, theWashington Post reported that the U.S. administrationis eager to enter discussions with the new Egyptianmilitary leadership to chart a collaborative plan torestore order in the restless Sinai. More broadly, a se-nior unnamed U.S. defense ofcial was quoted in thesame report as stating that U.S. military ofcials willalso want to discuss with their Egyptian counterpartsways to make the Egyptian military into a more nimbleforce as opposed to reliance on heavy armor and warplans. To underscore Washingtons interest in help-ing the Egyptian military, discussions have alreadystarted to increase information sharing on a variety

of issues and ways of cooperating even more.36 OnAugust 20, 2012, the Cable News Network (CNN) re-ported that the Pentagon is offering to supply Egypts


29/62


30/62

18

how they should view their long-term threats. More-over, any U.S. suggestions to downsize their large

standing army are also likely to encounter resistance.In the Egyptian view, downsizing spells weakness, es-pecially when confronted by a more technologicallyadvanced Israeli force. Additionally, a large force alsocontributes to their clout domestically in Egypt.

As for relations with Iran, Morsi is attempting toex his muscles somewhat. For most of the Mubarakera, relations with Iran were either poor or nonexis-tent, not so much because Mubarak wanted to followthe U.S. lead but rather because he saw Iran and theIranian revolution as antithetical to Egypts nationalsecurity interests. Morsi has already welcomed the Ira-nian vice president to Cairo, and he traveled to Tehranin late August 2012 to attend a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement over U.S. objections.39 Iran has sig-

naled it has no opposition to a restoration of relationswith Egypt, but it expects Cairo to take the initiativeon this issue. Under a Morsi presidency, it is possibleto expect somewhat of a warming of Egyptian-Iranianrelations, but close ties are probably not in the off-ing. Indicative of this ambiguity, although Morsi waswarmly received by the Iranian leadership when hearrived in Tehran, he gave a hard-hitting speech at themeeting against the Syrian regimeIrans ally in theArab worldmuch to the consternation of this sameIranian leadership.40 Egypt also has other interests itneeds to maintain, such as those with Saudi Arabiaand the United States, which want to keep Iran boxedin and keep it from developing nuclear weapons. Tooclose a relationship with Iran might very well work

to hinder U.S. and Saudi nancial assistance to Egypt.Moreover, as a preeminent Sunni Muslim country,Egypt is never going to see eye-to-eye with Iran on


31/62

19

many issues as long as a Shiite clerical regime rulesfrom Tehran. Nonetheless, Egypt is likely to outwardly

irt with Iran to show, both for domestic and regionalreasons, that it is pursuing an independent foreignpolicy. It should be remembered that this reaching outto Iran even occurred in the late Mubarak eraEgypt,during this period, received some Iranian diplomatsas a way of showing independence from the UnitedStates when it was annoyed with U.S. policies onother issues.

On Israel, Egypt has no choice but to cooperatewith Israel on security issues related to their commonborder, but on larger Israeli-Palestinian issues, Egyptwill probably not play the helping hand that it did un-der the Mubarak regime. While Egypt remains com-mitted to helping to secure a Palestinian modus vi-vendi between Hamas and Fatah,41 and it tried to calm

tensions between Israel and Hamas in June 2012,42

it isnot likely to play the middleman role it once did if thatcalls for real pressure on the Palestinians. One reasonis that Egyptian diplomacy is likely to be more inu-enced by domestic public opinion than ever before,and the Egyptian public, whether Islamist or secular-ist, remains highly critical of Israel. Symptomatic ofthis sentiment, when Morsi received a congratulatoryletter from Israeli President Shimon Peres on the oc-casion of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and ac-knowledged it, news of the exchange became so con-troversial in Egypt that Morsi quickly denied that hehad ever responded to the Peres letter.43

Egypts relations with Israel during the Mubarakera were often characterized as a Cold Peace. None-

theless, Mubarak received many Israeli visitors andproved to be, more often than not, a helpful player inthe peace process. It is hard to imagine at this stage


32/62

20

that Morsi would receive Israeli ofcial visitors. Al-though Morsi has pledged that he would respect all

of Egypts international treatiesimplying the peacetreaty with Israelthe Brotherhood has historicallynever supported the peace treaty, nor recognized theState of Israel. After the toppling of Mubarak, theBrotherhood, like several other political factions andpolitical gures in Egypt, called for a revision of someof the treatys terms, like the restrictions on Egyptianmilitary deployments in the Sinai.44 Ironically, as men-tioned earlier, given the instability in the Sinai, evenIsrael has signaled that it would not be averse to sometemporary, enhanced Egyptian security on its bor-der as a way of dealing with the extremist menace,though this sentiment has its limits.45 On August 21,2012, Israeli ofcials charged that Egypt was violatingthe peace treaty by deploying tanks along the Israeli

border. The press reported that, in the wake of the ter-rorist attack on Egyptian soldiers on August 5, Egyptdeployed armored personnel carriers and attack he-licopters to the area in coordination with the Israelis.But the subsequent Egyptian military deploymentswere apparently not coordinated with Israel, prompt-ing Israeli concern. Press reports have indicated thatthe Israeli military sent several messages to the Egyp-tians about the latter deployments but received noresponse. One Israeli defense ofcial was quoted assaying, We must be very severe with abiding by thespirit and the letter of the peace treatyotherwise wewill be on a slippery slope, and no one knows wherethis might lead.46 It seems that the Israelis objected onAugust 21 not because of Egypts deployment of the

tanks to the border area, but rather because they werenot consulted about this move ahead of time.


33/62

21

With the Israeli-Palestinian peace process track es-sentially in abeyance and with relative calm between

the Israelis and the Palestinians, Morsi does not haveto make any difcult decisions on Egyptian policytoward the Israeli-Palestinian situation at this junc-ture. However, this situation could change overnightif a new are-up occurs in Gaza between Hamas andIsraeli forces. There are long, historical ties betweenEgypts Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas; indeed,Hamas grew out of the Palestinian Muslim Brother-hood. If violence recurs between Israel and Gaza, it ispossible that a Morsi presidency might allow for somemilitary aid to be given to Hamas, which controlsGaza. The Egyptian military might initially resist suchassistance, particularly because it might jeopardizethe peace treaty between the two countries and leadto retaliatory Israeli strikes on Egypt that the Egyptian

military would not be in a position to respond to andwin. On the other hand, Egyptian popular pressureto assist the Palestinians might become so strong thatthe Egyptian military might feel that it has no choicebut to assist the Palestinians. It should be rememberedthat during the last violent are-up in early 2009, theMubarak regimes decision to keep the Egyptian-Gazaborder closed led to Egyptian public demonstrationsand anger against the regime.47 (It is important to notethat after the completion of this monograph in August2012, President Morsi did provide political, but notmilitary, support to Hamas when violence recurred inthe Fall of 2012.)

How does the United States maintain its inuencein this changing environment? Given that Morsi and

the military are still in an uneasy dance, the UnitedStates should still deal with both. Morsi is the demo-cratically elected president of the country, and he


34/62

22

should continue to be courted by U.S. ofcials. Butit should be remembered that even though a strong

presidency is part of Egyptian political culture, parlia-ment is likely to have more powers than it had un-der the Mubarak regime. Although much dependson how the new constitution will be written and thedelineation of powers that will be in that document,it is probably safe to assume that parliament will notbe the rubber stamp institution that it was in the pastunder Mubarak. This means it will likely weigh instrongly on domestic and foreign policy issues. Assuch, U.S. policymakers should meet with the ma-jority party or factions within parliament as well aswith the opposition. This would not only signal U.S.support for democracy and Egypts legislative body,but will help to develop relations with parties and po-litical gures who might come to power in the future.

Indeed, if Egypt develops into a democracy or evena quasi-democracy where presidents and parliamentsare subject to free and fair elections (implying a turn-over of power), relying on merely the president andthe military would be shortsighted.

Finally, Egypt has long wanted to reclaim its lead-ership role in the Arab world, and Egyptians of allpolitical persuasions believe this is a natural role forthe country to play.48 Given Egypts current economicproblems (zero growth, depletion of foreign exchangereserves, and high unemployment) as well as its un-settled political situation, it is not in a position to do sonow, but for many Egyptians this is just a temporarycondition. Once Egypt puts its economic and politicalhouse in order, the thinking goes, it will be ready to

lead the Arab world again. This type of thinking mayseem more of a pipe dream at this point, but it maycome to pass down the road. This positioning may put


35/62

23

Egypt at odds with Saudi Arabia which, with the sup-port of the much smaller state of Qatar, tried to act as

a leader of the Arab world in the past decade. This ismost evident in relation to the ongoing Syrian crisis.Although Egypt and Saudi Arabia often see eye-to-eye on many regional issues, there is also tension andrivalry beneath the surface.49 This will be a challengefor U.S. policymakers as they try to navigate betweenthese two competitors for Arab leadership in theyears ahead.

EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SCENARIOS AND U.S.STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Although the discussion above has outlined likelyEgyptian foreign and security policies in the monthsand years ahead, much also depends on how Egyptian

politics are settled, the powers of various institutionsin the country, the relationship between the presidentand the military and parliament, and the outcome ofthe parliamentary elections. The following sectiondiscusses various scenarios and explores how each ofthem will affect U.S. strategic interests.

Scenario I.

President Morsi acts as a democratic leader for allEgyptians and does not interfere with the constitu-tional drafting process and parliamentary elections,allowing secular-liberal and leftist groups to winseats and share power with Islamists in that body.Morsi also allows the Egyptian military to retain

its autonomy.This scenario is probably the best outcome for

Egypts democratic advancement. Morsi does not


36/62

24

pursue a narrow Islamist agenda despite his MuslimBrotherhood background but instead tries to act above

party politics. His main concerns are to see that theconstitution drafting process is fair (allowing Egyptsdiverse political factions to feel that they are part ofthe process and not excluded), that parliamentaryelections take place without presidential bias towardMuslim Brotherhood candidates, and that parliamentbecomes an equal branch of government. Concern-ing the military, Morsi will try to inuence mattersthrough his handpicked Defense Minister but willnot interfere in the militarys policies except to freeEgyptians who were imprisoned during SCAFs reign(something he is already doing). He will likely presideover weekly meetings of the national defense coun-cil to show that he is in charge, but he will not inter-fere in the militarys expenditures and priorities. The

military will take the lead in pacifying the Sinai andin cooperating with the Israelis on border issues butwill keep Morsi informed about these developments.Given Egypts severe economic problems, Morsi willhave his hands full trying to revitalize the Egyptianeconomy while adhering to International MonetaryFund (IMF) conditions that will accompany the ex-pected IMF loan and will not pursue an adventurousforeign policy. He will not extend a helping hand tothe Israelis in the peace process but neither will hepursue an antagonistic policy toward Israel.

Under this scenario, U.S. strategic relations withEgypt are largely maintained. Morsi would not act ina way that would jeopardize the annual $1.3 billion inU.S. military assistance approved by Congress. Egypt

would continue to grant access to U.S. military aircraftand naval ships moving through its air and sea lanes,and Egyptian ofcers would continue to come to the


37/62

25

United States for training. Any cooperation with theUnited States and Israel on Sinai security issues will

probably be discussed under the radar screen to avoidany public backlash. Although the Egyptian militarywould still be an institution operating off the booksin terms of budget issues, Morsi would countenancethat as long as the military does not interfere in do-mestic politics. Parliament would represent the Egyp-tian publics diverse political sentiments and wouldnot pursue a strict Islamist agenda that many in Wash-ington would see as hurting minority and womensrights. Egypt would be seen as a success in terms ofdemocratic transition and may be rewarded by theU.S. Congress with additional economic assistance.Although relations with Israel would be maintained,Egypt would not likely be an intermediary betweenthe Palestinians and the Israelis. But as long as no out-

break of violence occurs, continued maintenance ofa cold peace would be as much as could be expectedunder a Muslim Brotherhood presidency.

Scenario II.

Morsi becomes an authoritarian leader, clampsdown on dissent, purges the judiciary and the press ofcritics of the Brotherhood, and inuences the draftingof the constitution and the parliamentary elections tofavor the Brotherhoods Islamist agenda and its ide-ology. He allows the military, however, to retain itsautonomy and does not interfere with their operationsor their interests.

Under this scenario, U.S. security interests would

also be preserved, at least initially, but at a price. Mor-si would concentrate on domestic matters to pursue anarrow Islamist agenda and would generally leave the


38/62

26

military alone. Democracy would be compromised,as he would concentrate power in the hands of the

presidency and try to bring parliament, which wouldbe dominated by the Brotherhood, under his control.Although lip service would be given to the separationof powers, in essence the Brotherhood, through Morsias president, would have a near monopoly of politi-cal life in the country. Minority rights and womensrights would be curtailed, social restrictions would beimposed on Egyptian citizens, and his critics wouldbe thrown in jail under the presidencys control ofthe Ministry of Interiors police forces. Morsi wouldleave the defense and security realm to the military,and because he would not interfere with militarymatters, he would in essence be striking a deal withthat institution. The military would want to maintaintheir links with the United States and to keep peace

with the Israelis (especially in terms of securing theSinai), and it would bank on the fact that the UnitedStates, wishing to preserve these security links, wouldoverlook the authoritarian nature of the government.It would not be a stretch for the Egyptian military tothink this way because for decades under Sadat andMubarak, the United States did its best to downplaythe authoritarian nature of these governments forgeo-strategic interests. However, it is highly likelythat the U.S. Congress would not countenance a closerelationship with Egypt under these circumstances. IfMorsi does become an authoritarian leader and worksto make Egypt an Islamist state that curtails minorityand womens rights, it is conceivable that Congresswould reduce or cut off aid to Egypt; even the military

aid that has been the backbone of the relationship.Although there would be countervailing pressuresfrom elements in the U.S. administration arguing such


39/62

27

draconian measures would cut the links with the onepro-U.S. institution remaining in the country and be

counterproductive, Congress would likely prevail inthis struggle as inuential members argue that theUnited States should not reward authoritarianism thatin some respects would be worse than the Mubarakregime. With U.S. withdrawal of support to the Egyp-tian military, U.S. security links to the Egyptian mili-taryalong with overight and refueling stops forU.S. military aircraftwould be adversely affected.

Scenario III.

Morsi becomes an authoritarian leader and pur-sues a narrow Islamist agenda that gives the Brother-hood a monopoly of power over all major institutionsin the country. He also takes rmer control over the

military, clamps down on the militarys autonomy,and purges the ofcer corps of those not sympatheticto the Brotherhoods agenda. He pursues an aggres-sive foreign policy that openly sides with Hamas andother Islamist groups in the region. While not embark-ing on war with Israel, he declares that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is no longer valid and openlyfunnels arms to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. He alsoopenly disagrees with Saudi Arabia about regionalsecurity threats.

This would be a worst-case scenario for U.S. secu-rity interests. Not only would Morsi scuttle the hopesfor a democratic transition in Egyptjeopardizingcontinued U.S. assistancebut he would embark ona policy that would change the nature and ideology

of the Egyptian military to the point where it wouldnot be inclined to maintain links to the U.S. military.Although a major purge of the ofcer corps would


40/62

28

take time and there would be vestiges of pro-U.S. sen-timent within the military for some time, a compre-

hensive and transformative shake up of the militarywould likely end the close collaboration between U.S.and Egyptian military services that has been in exis-tence for the past 30 years. The United States wouldlose access and overight rights, and could not counton Egypt for assistance in case of major security chal-lenges in the Persian Gulf. On the Palestinian-Israelifront, although Morsi, under this scenario, would notwant to start a war with Israel given the likelihood thatEgypt would lose the Sinai again, if he does take anactive role to aid Hamas militarily, the Israelis mightconclude that it would be in their interests to strikeEgypt rst, as it did in 1967. Even a mini-war betweenIsrael and Egypt would have untold regional conse-quences, perhaps drawing other countries and par-

ties into the conict. Because it would lack leveragewith the Egyptians, the United States would be pow-erless to stop such a war from happening. Althoughconventional thinking is that the United States wouldhave enough clout to stop an Israeli attack on Egypt,if Israel believes that its security is threatened by arevanchist Egypt, no amount of U.S. pressure woulddeter the Israelis if they felt their security would be onthe line.

How Does the United States Optimize Its Leverageto See that Scenario I Comes to Pass Instead ofScenarios II or III?

It is in the U.S. national security interest to have

Egypt become a democratic state where basic free-doms are respected, checks and balances betweengovernment institutions are developed, and the


41/62

29

United States maintains close links to the Egyptianmilitary. Although democracy will mean that public

opinion will be much more of a factor in the forma-tion of Egyptian foreign and security policies in waysit has not been beforemaking relations with theUnited States and Israel even more controversial thanthey were in the pastthe alternative to democracy ismore problematic. A return to authoritarian govern-ment, especially one with a narrow Islamist agendathat would impose prohibitions against alcohol andwestern-style dress for women and limit opportunitiesfor its Coptic Christian minority would hurt the returnof tourism and foreign investment to the country, leadto increased sectarian strife in Egypt, and dash thehopes of Egypts younger generation, many of whomput their lives on the line in 2011 to bring down theMubarak authoritarian regime in favor of democratic

government. For this reason, on the political level, theU.S. policymakers should continue to emphasize thatthe new rulers of Egypt should respect the universalnorms of freedom of assembly, press, and religion,and that minority and womens rights should also berespected in whatever new constitution Egypt adopts.At the same time, the United States should stay awayfrom the very sensitive issue of the role of religion andsharia (Islamic law) in the new constitution becausethat is for the Egyptians themselves to decide, andwhatever comments the United States makes on thoseissues would likely backre in any case.

Ideally, with a former Muslim Brotherhood of-cial now in control of the presidency, it would be inthe interest of Egypt (and the U.S.) for the yet-to-be

elected parliament not to be under the Brotherhoodssway. Having control over both the presidency andparliament might tempt more hard-line elements in


42/62

30

the Brotherhood to seize the opportunity and pushthrough legislation that would change the nature of

Egypt and its liberal traditions. Although a signicantminority of Egyptians would be happy living undera strict Islamist state, a majority of Egyptianswhotend to see religion as a personal matter and not some-thing that should be imposed by the statewould not.It should be remembered that in a divided presiden-tial eld, as was the case of the rst round of the presi-dential elections in May 2012, Morsi only receivedabout 25 percent of the vote. Presumably, the other 75percent of Egyptians do not want to be under a Mus-lim Brotherhood-dominated regime. In some respects,Morsi is smart enough to understand this, and forthis reason he resigned from the Brotherhood and hassince tried to reinvent himself as a democratic nation-alist working for the interests of all Egyptians.

However, it would be counterproductive for theUnited States to try to inuence the outcome of theparliamentary elections by favoring one political fac-tion over another. The favored faction would be la-beled an American lackey and may lose public supportbecause Egyptians are very sensitive to outside inter-ference. What U.S. policymakers can do is to continueto call for such elections to be free and fair without oneparty having an unfair advantage over the eld. Thiswould be in line with universal democratic norms.When U.S. foreign policy and defense ofcials visitEgypt, they should be open to visit all political partiesand factions, and not just spend their time courtingthe military and the Brotherhood (and the president).Such two-stop shopping gives the impression in

Egypt that the United States has cut a deal with theBrotherhood and the military and does not care aboutthe fate of the other groups. Secondly, some of these


43/62


44/62

32

tary exercises, holding discussions about regional se-curity threats, and helping them deal with immediate

security threats such as the extremist presence in theSinai. Now that Morsi has taken away the militaryspolitical role and the military has acquiesced to thischange, relations between the U.S. and Egyptian mili-taries can go back to their more natural condition, asthey were before the revolution of early 2011.

Although language on U.S. aid to Egypt in the newSenate Foreign Operations Subcommittee bill statesthat Egypt must provide civilian control over, andpublic disclosure of, the military and police budget,this will likely be a decision for Egypts new presidentand its yet-to-be elected parliament to gure out. Downthe road they will have to deal with such questions as:Will the militarys budget continue to be secret or willit be subject to open debate? Will the military continue

to be able to run their own businesses and farms? Willmilitary ofcers continue to enjoy perquisites withoutcivilian scrutiny? Although the militarys wings havebeen clipped by Morsi who, in essence, has forced themilitary to return to the barracks, he and the new par-liamentarians that are to be elected later in the yearmight believe they need to tread carefully on militarybudget and military transparency issues so as not toprovoke a military backlash.

Although some Egypt analysts have called for arevamping of the U.S.-Egyptian relationshipmak-ing it less heavily dependent on the military (and U.S.military assistance),50 other analysts have argued thatcutting military aid would signal a lessening of U.S.support for Egypt and would wind up undermining

U.S. inuence in the country.51With the political situation in Egypt still so unset-

tled, it is probably not wise to change the aid congu-


45/62

33

rationwhich is heavily tilted toward the militaryat this time. A cut in military aid would likely be

interpreted in Egypt as a signal that the United Stateswas losing its interest in Egypt, which would have thepotential to hinder or even to end U.S. access rights inEgypt, especially at a time when another crisis in thePersian Gulf may be brewing. Moreover, with Israelreceiving about $3.1 billion annually in U.S. militaryaid, the perception in Egypt would be that the UnitedStates would now be even more biased toward Israelthan in the current situation.

That said, it would also make sense for the UnitedStates to boost civilian aid to Egypt at this time, par-ticularly when the Egyptian economy is in such direstraits. As of this writing, subcommittees in the U.S.House and Senate have approved $1.3 billion in mili-tary aid (foreign military nancing), but only $250 mil-

lion in economic support funds for FY 13, roughly thesame amounts that Egypt has been receiving for thepast few years. Both the Senate and House bills containconditionality on this aid, and they will jointly have toarrive at common language before the spending bill isapproved. The Senate bill contains conditionality onthe military aid (though with a national security waiv-er), stating that the Secretary of State must certify thatthe government in Cairo is democratically elected andis implementing policies to: 1) provide civilian controlover, and public disclosure of, the police and militarybudgets; 2) fully repeal the Emergency Law; and, 3)protect judicial independence, freedom of expression,association, assembly, and religion; the right of politi-cal opposition parties, civil society organizations, and

journalists to operate without harassment or interfer-ence; and due process of law. The House bill says thatboth military aid and economic support funds are re-stricted until the Secretary of State certies that Egypt


46/62

34

is meeting its obligations under the Israeli-Egyptianpeace treaty; has completed the transition to civilian

government, including holding free and fair elections;and is implementing policies that protect freedom ofexpression, association, and religion, and due processof law.52

While such conditionality reects the mood of theCongress to press Egypt to uphold democratic valuesand pursue policies that would be in line with these val-ues, the United States would have a lot more inuencewith the Egyptian government if such conditionalitywere attached to substantially more civilian aid. Thereis a possibility that Egypt might receive additional aidfrom other U.S. foreign aid accounts. For example, theSenate bill approves $1 billion for a Middle East andNorth Africa Incentive Fund, which could be used inpart to fund education, investment, and small enter-

prises in Egypt as well as a reduction in Egypts debt,but the House bill contains no such funding. Instead,the House bill approves $200 million for Middle EastResponse, which includes $175 million for economicassistance and $25 million for military assistance, butthere is no separate language on Egypt.53 It is difcultto know how the two bills will be reconciled in con-ference and what additional money, if any, will gotoward Egypt.

Although the United States faces budget con-straints, and many members of Congress are not in-clined to increase foreign assistance expenditures, acompelling case can be made to the Congress by ad-ministration ofcials on why such aid is needed fora country like Egypt. Administration ofcials should

not argue against conditionality placed on the aidby Congress because it sends a signal to Egypt thatthe United States takes seriously the importance ofrespecting democratic norms. On the other hand, by


47/62

35

not helping Egypt in this difcult transition periodpolitically and economicallywith additional aid,

the United States might send the wrong signal aboutthe U.S. commitment to Egypts future. As mentionedearlier, events in Egypt are closely watched by otherpeoples in the Arab world, and it was not a coinci-dence that other movements in other countries expe-riencing the Arab Spring tried to replicate the TahrirSquare phenomenon in their own countries.54 U.S.military assistance to help Egyptian security forcesin the Sinai would certainly be appreciated by theEgyptian military, but what would count more forthe Egyptian people is tangible U.S. assistance tohelp the struggling Egyptian economy, particularlyin ways that try to tackle the very serious unemploy-ment problem for Egypts younger generation. Suchadditional assistance would go a long way toward

generating goodwill.At the same time, the United States should avoid

efforts to make the Egyptian military a more nimbleforce. This is a losing proposition and will be inter-preted as a way of weakening the Egyptian military,feeding conspiracy theories about some nefarious U.S.plot hatched in conjunction with Israel. Although itmay make sense to make the Egyptian military into aleaner, more mobile force to respond to terrorist plotsand other contingencies, the political downsides ofsuch a proposition are so great as to make the effortnot worth pursuing.

Instead, U.S. policymakers should concentrate onareas of cooperation (like Sinai security) and shouldresume joint-training exercises that are valued by both

militaries.55 These measures will underscore to Egyptthat the United States is respectful of and is eager tohelp Egypt protect its national sovereignty, and theywill earn the United States the goodwill that is crucial


48/62

36

when a regional crisis necessitates Egypts coopera-tion. During the rst Gulf War of 1990-91, for exam-

ple, Egypt not only played an important political roleopposing Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, but its strategicdecision to open its air corridors and bases for refuel-ing stops for thousands of U.S. military aircraft playeda crucial role in the war to reverse Iraqs aggression.56Although for political reasons, one can envision undera Morsi presidency that Egypt might not play such apolitically supportive role if another crisis breaks outin the Gulf (such as one involving Iran), close military-to-military contacts and goodwill might enable stra-tegic cooperation, especially if it is largely out of thepublic spotlight.

Nonetheless, there are likely to be challenges in theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship in the years aheadnow that Egypt is under new presidential leadership.

The United States cannot count on Egypt to do anyheavy lifting in the peace process unless the partiesare very close to a deal that is satisfactory to the Pales-tinians. Morsi is not likely to push the Palestinians, forexample, to accept an Israeli offer if Hamas comes outagainst it. He would lose credibility with his formercolleagues in the Brotherhood and would also likelybe criticized by secular-nationalists within Egypt. Themost the United States can expect from Egypt with-in the next few years is to maintain the peace treatywith Israel and keep up efforts aimed at Palestinianreconciliation. Such efforts might serve to moderateHamass stance if Hamas moves closer to Fatah onpeace process issues, but Egypt would not want to beseen pressuring Hamas in the process.

Concerning Iran, an Israeli or U.S. strike aimed atdamaging its nuclear capabilities would also pose achallenge for the bilateral U.S.-Egyptian relationship.


49/62

37

Some members of the Egyptian ofcer corps mightwelcome such a strike, as they probably believe, like

many Arab security ofcials in the Gulf countries, thatIran poses a security challenge to the region. However,public opinion in Egypt would likely view a strike innegative terms. Even though many Egyptians are op-posed to Iran and its type of government,57 they seemto admire its belligerent positions against Israel andits stance of defying the United States. This is prob-ably one of the reasons Morsi decided to attend theNon-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran. In termsof Irans nuclear question, although many Egyptiansdo not want a nuclear arms race in the regionwhichan Iranian nuclear weapons capability would likelytriggerthey have long been upset about Israels pur-ported nuclear arsenal and see a double-standard inthe response by the United States about this issue.58

Hence, it is likely that a strike by either Israel or theUnited States on Iran would generate anti-Israeli andanti-U.S. demonstrations in Egypt. The Egyptian po-litical leadership would likely side with the demon-strators even though such a stance would not be wel-comed by either Washington or Riyadh, and such astrong public stand would make the Egyptian militaryskittish about cooperating with the United States, evenin terms of access rights, fearing that such cooperationcould become public. There is also the possibility thatMorsi could use the strike to embarrass the Egyptianmilitary if it does cooperate with U.S. defense ofcialsin such an endeavor, though Morsi would have to becareful about how he would play this because, as pres-ident of the country, he is at least nominally in charge

of the military.Preserving the U.S.-Egyptian strategic partnership

under Egypts new regime is thus going to be a chal-lenge for U.S. policymakers in the months and years


50/62

38

ahead. Much depends on how Egypts new presidentacts, how the U.S. Congress responds to his actions,

and the powers and policies of Egypts parliamentonce it is elected. Egypts military will want to pre-serve the strategic relationship, but will have to bemindful of Morsis policies as well as Egyptian publicopinion. U.S. policymakers will also have to be mind-ful that the strategic partnership will be different thanit was under Mubarak, and there will be times wheneither Egypts new leaders or public opinion will poselimits on this partnership. However, there are enoughcommon interests between the two countries to pre-serve this partnership if both sides handle relationswith a good deal of patience, dexterity, and nesse.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

The following suggestions for the U.S. Army willpreserve and enhance the bilateral security relation-ship during Egypts current transition period:

1. Continue military-to-military contacts. The mili-tary relationship between the United States and Egypthas been a key component of the overall bilateral rela-tionship since the late 1970s, and these ties have servedas a steady keel in the relationship even when politicalproblems arose between Cairo and Washington.

2. Continue to encourage Egyptian military of-cers to attend PME institutions in the United States.Such training gives Egyptian ofcers exposure to theUnited States (its people, culture, and politics) as wellas U.S. military doctrine, and allows them the intellec-tual freedom to engage in discussions with their U.S.

counterparts (and other foreign military ofcers at-tending the same institutions) on a variety of regionalissues. Such educational opportunities also allow U.S.army ofcers to learn more about Egyptian culture


51/62

39

and military doctrine. In addition, the development ofpersonal contacts between U.S. and Egyptian army of-

cers, which such schooling provides, can enhance bi-lateral military cooperation, especially when regionalcrises arise.

3. Engage in high-level discussions with Egyptianmilitary ofcials on regional threat perceptions. Al-though such discussions took place fairly regularlyduring the Mubarak era, they have been held onlysporadically since then, as the Egyptian military hi-erarchy has concentrated on running the country andbeen annoyed at U.S. criticism of its domestic policies,according to various press reports. Now that Egyptianpresidential elections have been held, a new militaryleadership is in place, and the military has essentiallygone back to the barracks, it is time to restore suchhigh-level discussions. These talks would help to re-

assure the Egyptian military that the United Statesshares many of its regional security concerns, andwould work toward keeping the discussions on a pro-fessional military level as opposed to the more prob-lematic political level when the SCAF ran the country.

4. Reactivate the Bright Star exercises. These bien-nial exercises were a mainstay of the relationship formore than 2 decades, as they allowed the Egyptian andU.S. militaries to engage in joint training exercises onEgyptian soil. They underscored the U.S. commitmentto Egypts defense and played an important role in therst Gulf war (1990-91) when the U.S. and Egyptianarmies worked together to roll back the Iraqi invasionof Kuwait. Although given the new political dynam-ics in Egypt, approval of such exercises would have

to go through President Morsis ofce. However, hemay not be averse to reactivating Bright Star, perhapsseeing it as a way of mollifying the Egyptian militaryand assuring the United States that there would be no


52/62

40

dramatic turn in Egypts foreign affairs and securityposture. Such a decision on Egypts part to hold these

exercises may not be made until after Egypt nishesits political transition, which includes new parliamen-tary elections in late 2012 or early 2013. In the mean-time, the U.S. Army should continue to encourage theEgyptian military to participate in regional militaryexercises, as it did in Jordan earlier this year.59

5. Continue to offer to provide the Egyptian mili-tary with intelligence and sophisticated equipment todeal with the extremist threat in the Sinai. Accordingto press reports, U.S. defense ofcials have offeredthe Egyptian military such tools to better monitor anddetect terrorist threats in the troublesome Sinai.60 Inthe aftermath of the August 2012 killing of 16 Egyp-tian soldiers along the Israeli-Egyptian border of thenorthern Sinai, the Egyptian political and military es-

tablishment has taken this threat much more seriouslythan in the past. The U.S. offer of help was probablywell-received by the Egyptian army, but for domes-tic political reasons, it needs to show that it is actingalone to confront the extremist menace. The U.S. mili-tary can also play a behind-the-scenes role to deateEgyptian-Israeli tensions over the Sinai by encourag-ing the Egyptian military to notify the Israelis in ad-vance before they bring more military assets to theborder region to confront the extremists.

At the same time, the U.S. Army should avoid en-gagement in the following areas, as they will likelyhurt the bilateral relationship:

1. Discussions about Egyptian domestic poli-

tics and the Muslim Brotherhood. U.S. army ofcersshould be made to understand that this is a very sensi-tive time in Egypts history. Some Egyptian militaryofcers are probably still upset over President Morsis


53/62

41

retirement of the SCAFs old guard as well as thefact that Morsi, a former Muslim Brotherhood ofcial,

is now leader of the country. Other Egyptian militaryofcers have probably come to grips with this new po-litical reality and, as loyal ofcers of the state, believethey should cooperate with Morsi. Still others mayhave strong views about the new constitution, parlia-ment, and the delineation of powers. In discussionswith Egyptian military ofcers about regional securitythreats, U.S. Army ofcers should avoid any discus-sions about domestic politics and keep the talks in therealm of military and security spheres even if someof their Egyptian counterparts are inclined to ventureinto political topics. It is for the Egyptian public todecide who should be their political leaders, and anycomments by U.S. military ofcers would not only beinappropriate but would likely backre, as they would

be used by one faction against another and ultimatelyharm U.S. interests. For example, if it appeared thata U.S. Army ofcer was agreeing with a disgruntledEgyptian military ofcer who espoused negativeviews about Morsi, word would probably get back toMorsi and his allies in the military and feed conspir-acy theories about the United States trying to hatch acoup in Egypt. At the same time, if a pro-Brotherhoodmilitary ofcer started to denigrate Egyptian secular-liberal politicians and a U.S. army ofcer appeared toagree with that position, word of such an exchangemight leak out and feed conspiracy theories alreadyprevalent in Egypt about the United States cutting adeal with the Brotherhood.61 Sticking to discussionsabout military matters is the only safe and appropriate

path to follow for U.S. military ofcers.2. Discussions about downsizing the Egyptian mil-

itary and making it a seemingly more effective force.As mentioned earlier, press reports have suggested


54/62

42

that U.S. defense ofcials are interested in discussingwith their Egyptian counterparts ways to make the

Egyptian military a more nimble force. Although U.S.defense ofcials may sincerely believe such changes tothe Egyptian military will be in Egypts long-term na-tional interests, the Egyptian ofcer corps will likelysee such suggestions in a very negative light. A largestanding army, albeit with lots of inefciencies, none-theless has advantages in the mindset of the Egyptianofcer corps: it serves as a deterrent to its neighborswho may harbor ill-will against Egypt in the future; itserves to balance, to some degree, the Israeli militarystechnological advantage over Egypt; it serves to en-hance the militarys clout in Egyptian society; it makesthe Egyptian military (with its businesses and farms)self-sufcient in many ways and not dependent on ci-vilian politicians for budgetary support; and it helps

take youth, who would otherwise be unemployed, offthe streets for a couple of years and inculcates themwith beliefs, such as respect for the military and estab-lishment Islam (as opposed to an extremist version)that works in the interest of Egyptian stability. Giventhese strong beliefs held by the Egyptian ofcer corps,it would be counterproductive for U.S. Army ofcersto engage with their Egyptian counterparts in discus-sions, while well-intentioned, that even remotely sug-gests a downsizing of the Egyptian military.

ENDNOTES

1. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), on itsFacebook page, called the shake up a natural change and saidthe responsibility has been moved to

egypt's new regime and the future of the u.s.-egyptian strategic relationship

Documents