Sidhom

Sandra Sidhom

Monday, April 30, 2012

Thesis: The Copts in the New Egypt

Jonathon Miner

History of the Copts

Abstract: Through extensive research and analysis, the preface of this

paper will address the major causes of Sectarian Tensions in Egypt, and

maintains that the root cause of tension can be traced back to authoritarian

attempts to maintain control during times of political and economic

declines and utilized the symbol of the Coptic community as a scapegoat as

well as provides a historical background for post-revolutionary conditions.

During the transitional phase of the new Egypt, there has been a significant

decline in the political role of the Copts as the Islamists quickly assumed

power in the parliament and the Congressional Assembly. Social

conditions have also been strained during the transitional phase as

sectarian tensions have risen as a result of the lingering distrust created

since the Sadat regime, and the economic decline of the country; however,

the rise of the Islamists also represents an improvement in personal status

laws. Finally, the Copts who once prevailed in the economic arenas are

now struggling to maintain their role in the post-revolutionary Egypt as

discrimination prevails and the surge in Coptic emigration deprives the

community of their most influential advocates. The paper concludes with

positive predictions for the future, and considers the current status of the

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Copts to be only a temporary effect of Egypt’s transition into democracy

and that the rise of Islamists will only be a short lived victory as the

general public becomes disenchanted by their propaganda and calls for

more effective change in the form of a liberal sectarian regime. During the

final state of the revolution discrimination against Copts will end in all

arenas and they will finally be completely assimilated into the New Egypt.

The twelve million Copts of Egypt are the descendents of the pharaohs, members of the

earliest Christian community, and the hosts of the holy family during their plight. The Copts

have established a unique and multi-faceted identity, which regards the importance of their

common faith while simultaneously maintaining a cohesive Egyptian identity. Although the

Copts have long called Egypt their home, their rights have been under siege for centuries. The

Coptic Orthodox Christians of Egypt have relentlessly maintained their faith in the face of

centuries of inequality, discrimination, persecution, martyrdom, and injustice. While the Copts

have suffered persecution under multiple oppressors for centuries, the wave of sectarian

violence, which began in the 1970s, can be attributed to authoritarian attempts to secure control

in times of socio-economic hardship. In addition, the Coptic community has suffered due to

their symbolic role in Islamic society. The political symbol of the Coptic community bears the

brunt of the historical Western colonial presence and intervention in the Middle East, United

States foreign policy in the region, strategic myth making caused by a mutual suspicion and

distrust which sectarian violence has exacerbated. However, the January 25 revolution has

brought on a newfound unity in the Egyptian community and improved sectarian relations for the

Coptic Community.

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Although Coptic discrimination existed for centuries prior to the Revolution of 1957,

Egypt’s modern era of self-determination began with its independence from British rule and

Gamal Abdel Nassser’s presidency. Under Nasser the Coptic Christian minority suffered

primarily from non-state actors. Although Copts felt threatened by the Free Officer’s

movement’s sympathies with the Muslim Brotherhood (Scott, 2010, p. 41), this was purely a

relationship of convenience. The Muslim Brotherhood had supported the revolutionary efforts of

the Free Officer’s Movement from 1948-1953 in order to coordinate liberation efforts to achieve

their common goal of removing the British from the Suez Canal (Servold, 2003, p. 48). In order

to show gratitude for their efforts, the Free Officer’s Revolutionary Command Council did not

ban the Brotherhood after the Coup in July 1952 (Servold, 2003, p. 48). However, Nasser had to

repel the opposition groups of the Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood during the course of

his regime in order to maintain the cohesion of the military (Bill & Springborg 156). “President

Nasser feared and distrusted the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though many of its projects

concentrated on social works, it was its political edge that concerned Nasser.” (Devichand,

2010). Nasser was more secular than many of his counterparts; however, in a failed attempt to

appease the Muslim Brotherhood without compromising his secular beliefs, He declared Islam as

the national religion in the constitution of 1956. Nasser’s charter was intended to advocate a

secular Egyptian/Arab identity, rather than a particularly Islamic identity, through supporting

religious freedoms and declaring that all religions are in some way equal (Scott, 2010, p. 42).

The Muslim Brotherhood was outraged with Nasser’s meager attempts to implement Sharia law,

his failure to take more aggressive action against Israel, and the unsatisfactory terms of the

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 concerning the Suez Canal (Servold, 2003, p. 49) In addition, the

Islamic undertones of Arab Nationalism still existed, and many of his reforms isolated Copts

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even though these reforms did not directly address religion, such as the agrarian reforms which

disseminated the Coptic elites (Scott, 2010, p. 42). In addition, international disputes such as the

Arab-Israeli conflict deepened discrimination and established the foundation of the modern

Coptic Christian symbol as fears a Coptic succession escalated (Scott, 2010, p. 43). However,

the Coptic Patriarch, Pope Kirollos VI, has acted as the political representative of the community

through a unique diplomatic relationship established with President Nasser. This ‘Millet

Partnership,’ which existed with the patriarch and the nation’s leaders since the Ottoman

occupation, provided protections for the church and the community in exchange for regime

loyalty (Sedra, 1999, p. 224). Pope Kyrillos IV encouraged Nasser’s theme of national unity

through assisting and advocating of Egyptian policy at home and abroad (Sedra, 1999, p. 225).

While the church is not inherently political, it is important to realize that the issues that the

Patriarch endorsed were strictly in line with Christian values, and publically encouraged national

unity rather than addressed persecution in an effort to preserve and protect his congregation

(Sedra, 1999, p. 225). However, the Pope would voice the concerns of his congregation to the

president away from the public eye, and these dialogues granted the church presidential approval

for church repair and building and assisted in the maintenance of positive relationship between

Muslims and Christians (Sedra, 1999, p. 225). While Pope Kyrillos faced criticism by elites of

the community for not pushing for the rights of his community more actively; he ensured that

they were provided with adequate education and protection. Nasser focused much of his energy

on establishing national unity; however, after the losses against Israel and the fear of an uprising

from the Copts, the Muslim majority realized that Arab backwardness, dependency, and poverty

did not lay in the lack of unity (Scott, 2010, p. 43). These losses and this realization is what led

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to the loss of identity in 1967, and after the death of Nasser in 1970, Islam took the place of the

national identity that Nasser had worked so hard to create.

Sadat took on far more Islamist policies than his predecessor and within one year of his

election, Sadat ratified an entirely new constitution in which he stated, “Islam is the religion of

the state, Arabic is the official language, and the principles of Shari’a are a main source of

legislation (Scott, 2010, p. 46).” While this statement is drastically different than Nasser’s

opinion on these matters, it is still deliberately vague in order to appease Islamists and begin

negotiations with them on the level of involvement that Islam should play within the government

(Scott, 2010, p. 46). While Anwar Sadat rehabilitated the Muslim Brotherhood and sought its

support in the 1970s, his refusal to grant them unconditional legal status as a political party

further made many of the Islamist implementations useless (Muslim Brotherhood). However, the

ratification of the new constitution riddled with Islamic references would intentionally create a

sectarian divide.

Minority discrimination was harshest under the rule of Sadat, especially to the Coptic

Orthodox Christians. Pope Shenouda III took an active role in preserving the dignity of the

Coptic community through social welfare programs in rural and urban slums which provided the

community with economic opportunities through education, vocational-training, and family

planning programs and publically advocated the rights of the Coptic community (Sedra, 1999, p.

226). Pope Shenouda III was more vocal than his predecessor on political issues; however, the

constitutional revisions created a necessity for increased involvement in the political matters

(Sedra, 1999, p. 226). Pope Shenouda’s refusal to pledge loyalty to the regime ended the millet

partnership of the papacy and the president and it also marked the beginning of an era Coptic

conflict and sectarian divide (Sedra, 1999, p. 226). On July 1972, the Assembly of the Christian

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Church’s called for an end to discrimination in personal status cases, government appointments,

and restrictions on church construction (Sedra, 1999, p. 226).

The demands of the Copts were not unreasonable; however, they were delivered during a

period of severe economic decline caused by Sadat’s poor policy decisions. Sadat utilized the

Copts as scapegoats for his failures through the tactful initiation of a relentless anti-Coptic

campaign. This campaign was designed to create an aura of distrust for Copts through a targeted

attack on the credibility of the leader through accusations that would ignite strong religious

sentiments through strategic myth making. Sadat also took advantage of fresh wounds and

sentiments caused by Arab-Israeli conflict to build myths that would ignite a response fueled by

passion rather than reason that would breed sectarian violence. The anti-Coptic campaign began

in 1972 when distributed pamphlets claimed, “Pope Shenouda was aggressively conducting a

missionary campaign to convert Muslims to Christianity, and that the Pope was planning a

takeover of Egypt (Brown, 2000, p. 1059).” Riots and demonstrations insured shortly after as

rumors of this alleged ‘Coptic scheme’ spread like wild fire. The sectarian divide transformed

into violence in November once a church was set on fire that November (Sedra, 1999, p. 226).

The church response was to hold a prayer service at the rubble of the destroyed church, which

ignited an anti-Coptic street demonstration, which according police became violence once “an

un-known person, thought to be a Copt, fired shots into the air (Brown, 2000, p. 11).”

Considering the known corruption of the Egyptian police force, attributed the shots fired to a

Copt is most likely a government attempt of strategic myth making. This event marked the

beginnings of sectarian violence among Muslims and Christians in modern Egypt, and the riots

resulted in the deaths of 48 people and the destruction of homes and businesses.

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Sadat began his anti-Coptic campaign to divert the Egyptian people’s attention from the

declining economy, and redirect angst and frustration at the Coptic community. The economic

decline, which began from 1971, created intolerable conditions in Egypt. Sadat’s failed

economic liberation policy left massive wealth disparities as 34% of the country’s wealth was

possessed by only 5% of the population. The poor struggled to survive as inflation climbed to

17% in urban areas and 22% in rural areas in only five years (Sedra, 1999, p. 226). While the

Coptic middle-class was able to stay afloat due to the social welfare programs developed by

Pope Shenouda III, sectarian violence was escalated due to these economic disparities among

Muslims and Copts (Sedra, 1999, p. 226).

Sectarian violence rapidly continued as the Coptic community insisted on their rights. In

January 1977, the Coptic Church had a conference to call for an end of the consideration of

Shari’a law on non Muslims, end restrictions of the building of churches, end discrimination in

high state positions, and the freedom to publish books on Christian history and heritage (Scott,

2010, p. 68). These demands were ignored, and remain issues even today. On November 25,

hundreds of Copts protested over their right to build a church in Gaza and were met with tear gas

and Molotov cocktails. 156 people were also arrested in response to the protests, even leaving

one Copt dead (The CNN Wire Staff). When Pope Shenouda saw there was no progress or

answer given in March 1980, he issued a statement objecting to Article 2 of the constitution

which states that Shari’a is the major source of legislation (Scott, 2010, p. 68). Sadat utilized

religious sentiments and the Islamic identity in an attempt to maintain control and responded by

affirming his status as, “A Muslim ruler of an Islamic country and that he would oppose any

attempt to dilute the Islamic identity (Scott, 2010, p. 69).” Sadat then arrested 22 priests and 8

bishops and canceled the decree that appointed Pope Shenouda in September 1981 (Scott, 2010,

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p. 69). In addition dethroning the pope, he also exiled him in response to the Pope’s refusal to

hold any public services for Easter by refusing to receive any of the President’s delegates on this

occasion (Pope Shenouda III, 2010). The pope was exiled and sent to the Monastery of St.

Bishoy, and was only released by Hosni Mubarak 4 years later (Pope Shenouda III, 2010).

Following his release, Pope Shenouda III realized that in the current political climate of Egypt, in

which hundreds of his congregations have died, the only way to protect the safety and security of

the church is through a millet partnership with the President (Sedra, 1999, p. 227). Pope

Shenouda adopted a low-profile cooperative regime with the Mubarak administration, and

acknowledges the importance and success of national unity publicly while negotiating with the

government behind the scenes (Sedra, 1999, p. 227). In an attempt to reconcile the sectarian

divide, Pope Shenouda released the following statement upon his release, “I would like to do my

best to deepen love, peace and reconciliation between the Church and the State, between the

Church and our Muslim citizens. We are like organs in the one body, which is Egypt (Pope

Shenouda III, 2010)."

While Pope Shenouda has made reconciliatory efforts since 1985, the aura of distrust created

by Sadat’s anti-Coptic campaign and the foreign policy of Western actors has firmly established

the salient Coptic political symbol within Egyptian society. Prior to Sadat’s anti-Coptic

campaign, the Coptic Christians were historically known for standing beside their Muslim

counterparts for centuries (Sedra, 1999, p. 223). In the face of the Crusades, the Copts defended

Egypt and were labeled as unbelievers for their support (Sedra, 1999, p. 223). Even when the

Russians offered the Copts protection from Ottoman rule, the Copts vehemently rejected the

offer and joined hands with their Muslim counterparts in the face of the French and British

chanting “Egypt is for the Egyptians (Sedra, 1999, p. 223).” Even during the 1973 war, Muslim

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and Coptic soldiers exhibited extraordinary unity and the Coptic soldiers would fast during

Ramadan with their Muslim brothers (Sedra, 1999, p. 221). Even today, Copts are not permitted

to visit the Holy Land in support of the struggles their Muslim brothers. Unfortunately, following

Sadat’s diligent efforts to establish distrust among the Egyptian community, the days of mutual

respect and unity have been set aside. Sadat’s accusation of Coptic Secession resonated deeply

with the Egyptian people especially following the Arab-Israeli conflict, and etched the Copts

association with the Western world into stone. After these accusations, many Egyptian Muslims

began to associate the actions of the Christian nation of the United States, as the crimes of their

Christian neighbors. “When Muslim public opinion is indignant at the actions of one or another

Western power, their anger is frequently directed, not at those distant Christian nations of the

West who are safely beyond their reach, but towards local Christians (Thomas Michel in Davis

et. All, 8)."

Among Islamist groups, Copts not only bare the symbol of Western governments but also

their own domestic secular governments. Islamists view Copts as “privileged guests in a Muslim

home, enjoying the unwarranted indulgence of state secularism at the hands of their host, the

Egyptian President (Sedra, 1999, p. 220). Therefore, the struggle of Islamists to implement

Sharia law and the secular president’s attempts to maintain a secular government is embodied in

the Coptic symbol (Sedra, 1999, p. 220). Therefore, Islamist violence towards Copts is no longer

simply an attack against Christianity or Western ideals, it is rather a deeply personal retaliation

against the State and the President, which has repressed their members and hindered the

implementation of their ideology (Sedra, 1999, p. 220).” Therefore, the Copts are trapped in

between the violent hammer of Islamists and the anvil of the government which represses them

(Sedra, 1999, p. 220).

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Due to the nature of symbolic power in Middle Eastern politics, many elite Copts have

employed the national unity discourse in an attempt to weaken the grip of the Coptic symbol on

Egyptian society. The national unity discourse is often employed by elite Copts to emphasize a

strong unified Egyptian identity, rather than victimized and distinctively Coptic identity.

According to William Soliman Kelada, ‘Despite Egypt’s varied religious history of Pharaonism,

Christianity and Islam, the sense of belonging to the land of Egypt is a unifying bond that

guarantees the continuation of a unique Egyptian world view (Sedra, 1999, p. 222).” The

national unity discourse provides vivid images of a common unity and pride is more effective in

replacing animosities associated with the Coptic symbol than the persecution discourse. For this

reason, many Coptic elites may encourage the national unity discourse in order to destroy the

political symbol associated with their religion in order to further their pursuits in business.

However in my opinion, I do not believe that the Coptic elites have abandoned their aspirations

for political equality, rather that they are utilizing their success in the business world as a bridge

to a mutual understanding and respect with their Muslim counterparts to gradually achieve

political reform.

The Egyptian revolution illustrates the proper measures to bridging the gap between Muslims

and Christians in order to create a unified society. On January 25, 2011 Egypt saw the first

massive protest against authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Over the course of two weeks,

Christians and Muslims united together regardless of religious differences in order to transform

their country. They held massive interfaith services on Tahrir Square and protected one another

using their bodies as human shields to preserve the life of the Muslim and Christian brothers and

sisters. The youth of Egypt united to end the 30-year authoritarian rule of Mubarak and in the

process they have built a bridge to create peaceful relations between Christians and Muslims as

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the country prepares for democracy. Within a few days, we have seen the solutions to reach

peace and integrate Christians into Egyptian society become a reality as Muslims and Christian’s

united and marched side-by-side as Egyptians rather than religions. Over the course of only

fourteen days, Egypt has made leaps and bounds in ending Christian persecution and creating an

integrated society based on mutual goals and understanding. The Christian’s have continued to

protest and ensure that their voice is heard during this critical time in Egyptian history. The

Muslim people and the presidential candidates have stood behind the Copts and have shown their

support through their presence and the Easter services. Even in Qena, where Muslims stand in

protest of their Christian appointed governor, they have exhibited their tolerance and respect of

their Christian peers through continuing their protests in silence out of respect for Easter.

Although Muslim and Christian relations still need to progress, the foundation of a unified Egypt

based on the bridge of mutual understanding and respect has been built. The revolution provided

Egyptians with something far more important than the end of the Mubarak regime; rather, it

provided them all, Muslims and Christians, with ownership of their country and their voice. The

true power of the revolution will continue to seep through all of the aspects of Egyptian life,

because now that the people have gained their voice, they will not allow anyone to ruin their

country. They will take to the streets and march triumphantly and in unison once again to join

hands on Tahrir Square, and fight all forms of injustice. I believe that this spirit of the revolution

will be the means to keep Egypt free even in the face of the Islamists rise to power.

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The Copts in the New Egypt

When the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and toppled dictators across the

region, the outlook for the 10 million Copts living in Egypt appeared optimistic. Surely the

newly enlightened and liberalized Egyptians would not deny their Coptic neighbors, who fought

by their side in Tahrir Square on January 25 to remove their oppressor, of their rights and

freedom. Unfortunately, after Mubarak was toppled, the unity and cohesion of the Egyptian

people was weakened as the Muslim Brotherhood (now known as the Freedom and Justice Party)

Salafi’s Al Nour, and other groups began to fight for a share in the stake of Egypt the short lived

peace was destroyed and the Copts where once again marginalized and the scapegoat for the

country’s misfortunes. The current state of Egypt appears to be far less promising than the

oppression of the Mubarak regime, as the Copts have been increasingly marginalized politically,

economically, and socially as the country has grown increasingly Islamist. While Coptic Leaders

originally viewed the fall of Mubarak and the beginning of military rule as a “historic

opportunity” for the Copts to become more integrated in Egypt but tragedies such as the Burning

of the Two Martyr’s Church in Sole and the Maspiro massacre have threatened the Coptic dream

of playing a part in their own country. In the current state of the transitional Egypt conditions for

the Copts are not ideal because they are not politically integrated nor accurately represented in

major governmental institutions as Islamists parties steadily take control. There has also been an

increase of social tensions, which have been seen through sectarian tensions on the grass roots

level, and the economic position of the Copts has significantly declined as a massive post-

revolutionary Diaspora has swept over the community. However, there is still hope for an

integrated Coptic community within the New Egypt and the spirit of the revolution will continue

to ignite within the hearts of the oppressed until the stages of Egypt’s revolution are complete

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and all of its people are integrated in all aspects of their country. This paper will address the

current conditions facing the Coptic community in the current state of the transitional Egypt and

the predictions for their role under an Islamist government and conclude with optimism

regarding the future of their role in the New Egypt after the fall of the Islamists.

Political

During the transitional phase, Egyptians have been marginalized politically as a result of

their reluctance to form a religious political party, the rise of Islamists, and the

underrepresentation of Copts in major governmental institution. Politically, the Coptic Church

has not supported the mobilization of a political party centered around their religion, “The Coptic

Church declared it was unwilling to support candidates on a Christian platform; it banned

campaigns on church premises and forbade priests from speaking on political matter (Mayton,

2012).” The Copts have chosen not to create a political affiliation based on religion because their

identity is centralized on their homeland Egypt, and genuinely do not seek separatism but rather

a secular state which preserves their religious freedoms, and they have allied themselves with

secular and liberal candidates such as Amr Moussa. The reluctance of the Coptic community to

pursue their own political party reflects their commitment to the national unity rhetoric, and

prevents backlash against the community on the grassroots levels for demanding differential

treatment or special rights. This in turn offers the Copts an opportunity to improve the image of

their symbolic role in Egyptian society.

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The elections for the New Egypt reveal an over representation of Islamists party’s with a

severe underrepresentation for liberal, secular, and minority parties. The results of the

Parliamentary elections were extremely discouraging as Islamists won over 2/3rds of the seats,

which indicates a significant shift away from secular politics to a far more Islamist government

ruling the new Egypt (Leyne, 2012). The Freedom and Justice Party won 235 seats and have

47% of the seats in Parliament, and the ultra conservative Nour Party won 121 seats and have

approximately 24.3% of the seats in Parliament (Leyne, 2012). The results of the parliamentary

elections indicate a dramatic shift of Egyptian society towards Islamism and away from

secularism. The Islamists rise to power after the revolution doesn’t necessarily mean they will

become a permanent staple in Egyptian politics. The Islamists gained support during the

oppression of the Mubarak regime, because they were able to provide the masses with the

essential goods and services that the government could not provide. When the Islamists parties

could not achieve the political goals they promised when they were elected to parliament, they

could blame their poor performance on Mubarak’s regime’s (and now SCAF’s) refusal to

relinquish power. Now that the Islamists have come to power and control so many aspects of the

New Egypt, their faulty ideology will come into question when they fail to improve conditions in

the country and they will be exposed. Heba Sharobeem, a Coptic Christian and the acting Head

of the English Department of Alexandria University, is optimistic of the revolution despite the

Islamists rise to power “We were happy when the Salafi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood came to

power, because now they have revealed themselves. They once hid behind the tenants of religion

and claimed to be victims of the regime, but now that they have come to power they have

revealed themselves as the victimizers.” The rise of the Islamists is a temporary phenomena and

the country has already began to be disenchanted by them. During a march and peaceful sit in on

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the 6th October Bridge on April 20, 2012, members of the April 6 Youth Movement chanted

against SCAF and the Islamists parties, “The Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood betrayed us

and sold all the principles of the revolution (Phillips & Mustard, 2012).”

The dearly departed Pope Shenouda III, the former pope and patriarch of the Coptic

Church who often served as a spokesman for the Coptic community, had been actively seeking

solutions for Coptic advocacy in the New Egypt. Pope Shenouda III met with Mohamed

Tantawy, chief of the ruling military council, following the violence of the Maspiro incident and

to discuss the issues regarding church building permits (Ammar, 2012). The Tantawy and

Shenouda’s meeting resulted in both parties agreeing to resolve key concerns of the Coptic

community, and at the meeting, the military council promised Pope Shenouda that they would

pass a law dealing comprehensively with the issue of church construction and would issue

licenses to those churches currently operating without them (Ammar, 2012). Dialogue between

the church and the state is vital for the nation’s stability, and It also sends a message to Coptic

Egyptians, emphasizing their role as an intrinsic part of the nation while reassuring Copts that the

state is willing to take measures ensuring that violence against their community will not reoccur

(Ammar, 2012). According to an unverified Church source, Pope Shenouda began dialogue with

the Freedom and Justice Party (formerly known as the Muslim Brotherhood) in order to ensure

that the Coptic community will have a voice in the civilian government. According to this

source, His Holiness would support the Freedom and Justice Party, “[they have] the full right to

form the government on the condition that it will be representative of all communities in the

society (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012).” Pope Shenouda III believes that the solution to ensuring

the Freedom and Justice Party is able to accurately represent the Coptic Community is, “to

nominate four Coptic figures to ministerial positions in a new government formed by the

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Freedom and Justice Party if such a government comes to fruition (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012).”

This proposal has been greeted with support from the Freedom and Justice Party, “Brotherhood

Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat al-Shater said Wednesday that the Brotherhood’s political arm

the Freedom and Justice Party is ready to form a coalition government in place of the current

government headed by Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012).” Based

on the recent actions of the Freedom and Justice Party, Coptic integration into the political and

social spectrum may actually be enhanced with a moderate Islamist leader. In fact, the third in

command and one of the founding members of the Freedom and Justice Party is a Coptic

Christian named Dr. Rafiq Habib; however, serious questions have been raised on his level of

influence in the organization and if he shares the views of the majority of Coptic voters (Hope,

2011).

In the past, leaders have considered the Coptic Church as an institution responsible for

the guardianship of the nation’s 10 million Copts. However, current moderate Islamist leaders

have encouraged the rights of the Coptic community and have assumed responsibility for

protecting those rights on not only the government level, but also the grassroots levels as well.

Political Islamic currents asserted that respect of Coptic minority rights is the duty of every

Muslim, “especially because these rights are enshrined in the Sharia [Law] …. Therefore,

political Islam considered that the application of Sharia was the guarantor of the Copts’

“protection… (Riad, 2012).” Additionally, they judged that the “protection” of Copts is

responsibility that falls on Muslims as individuals - not as a responsibility of the state towards its

citizens (Riad, 2012).” While this is a promising sign of prospective improvements, it appears

that these heavy statements that have serious stipulations may simply be a means of garnering

international support without committing to government actions. Even if the Freedom and Justice

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Party intends to solidify these statements with laws protecting the Coptic Community this

implies that Copts are not treated as Egyptians but rather granted Dhimmi status and return to the

former concepts of inequality as they are treated as second class citizens with a series of

stipulations which must be followed in order to remain under protection. While under

international scrutiny the Muslim Brotherhood protected the Coptic Church during their New

Year’s Eve services; however, after the cameras were off many Islamist leaders have criticized

churches that fail to meet the licensing requirement and implied that Mosques would be built in

their place (Ibrahim, 2012). Unfortunately, this type of public support followed by private

backlash is all too familiar with the Coptic community, and the Copts is rightly spectacle of the

fulfillment of these statements.

Once the Islamists assume control over the civilian government, Sharia will become a

part of the lives of all Egyptians and could impact the Copts tremendously. Even moderate

members of the Muslim brotherhood such as Abdul Maqgoud Rageh Dardery, who appear to

support the Copts with statements like, “We would like to think of Christians as our brothers and

sisters--as full citizens...they have the same rights as us. What hurts them hurts us (Picket,

2012),” acknowledge that Sharia law will be implemented under their party. Unfortunately,

under certain interpretations of Sharia law, Christians are not granted the same rights as Muslims

and are not treated as full citizens; rather, they are deemed as Dhimmis. Now, more than ever, the

civil liberties of the Copts are at risk because Islamists almost exclusively control the parliament

and the constitutional committee. In the most important legislative institutions in the New Egypt,

the Copts were barely represented. Out of the 100 members of the committee selected to reform

Egypt’s constitution only six of them were Copts, six of them were women and a handful of

liberals leaving the committee disproportionally represented and the Islamists dominating the

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discussions (Batrawy, 2012). Recently the six Copts in the constitutional assembly are

boycotting the committing as a result of the Islamist dominance, which entirely eliminates the

voice of the Copts for the new constitution (Batrawy, 2012). SCAF responded to claims of the

Islamists being exclusionist in the Constitutional Assembly by freezing all of their activities until

a solution can be reached.

These developments indicate that Sharia law will definitely play a significant role in the

life of the Copts in the New Egypt, the only question is to what extent, “Some [Shari’a

Fundamentalist] interpretations are used to justify cruel punishments such as amputation and

stoning as well as unequal treatment of women in inheritance, dress, and independence. The

debate is growing as to whether Sharia can coexist with secularism, democracy, or even

modernity (Hulsman 2012)." However, it is important to point out that the majority of Muslims

who call for Sharia implementation vehemently oppose the Shari’a fundamentalist’s anti-

Christian interpretation and assert that the Prophet respected Christians and their rights to

worship, “The maintenance or the building of churches in Egypt is not forbidden or prohibited

by Islam. In fact, Prophet Muhammad never pressured his wife Maria, an Egyptian Copt, to

adopt Islam, even as a favor for her husband, the prophet of Islam (Hulsman, 2011).” In fact,

many Islamic scholars have proven that the “Al-Ohda Al-Umirayah” or the Pact of Umar, which

is often cited to deny Christians the right to build or repair Churches, lacks authenticity and it has

no basis in Sharia law because it is a forged document. That being said, fear arises from the

multiple potential interpretation of Sharia, because the same laws that are designed to protect the

Copts can be manipulated to persecute them in times of political and economic instability which

is an all to familiar ploy the Copts have suffered through since Anwar Sadat’s presidency.

In regards to selecting a presidential candidate, the Islamists once had a tremendous grip

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on the elections as they have already assumed approximately 70% of the seats in parliament.

However, after SCAF blocked the candidacy of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strongest candidate,

Al-Shater, they have lost their grip on the presidential elections despite their back-up candidate,

Mohammad Morsi, and Amr Moussa is beginning to take the lead. However, All Egyptians are

struggling to select a candidate, Pro-Islamists argue that conditions were not improved under

secularism, and believe that Islamists are the candidates able to make significant progress for the

country, “We tried the secular liberals, Mubarak was liberal and friends with America and Israel,

let's try the Islamists for four years…[We] want an Islamic candidate to apply Sharia, to bridge

the gap between the rich and the poor, and to veil women (El-Wardani, 2012). Copts and other’s

fear the rise of Islamist parties to the presidency, because then Islamists would control almost

every aspect of the Egyptian government. The blocked candidacy of Suleiman Al-Shater, and

Abu Ismail may be a positive turn of events for the Copts, because it allows for secular and

independent candidates to gain more support. Amr Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister,

appears to be the in forefront of the presidential race and the potential running man for the Copts

because he is a liberal nationalist candidate rather than a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood

or the Salafis. Abdoul Abu Fotouh, an independent Islamist, trails close behind Moussa for the

both the election results and his Christian supporters.

Religious

Earlier this year, the Coptic community was filled with uncertainty as the role of

Islamists became increasingly apparent; however, Pope Shenouda’s leadership comforted them

because he continually made the case for his community without inciting chaos. However, on

March 17, 2012, the Coptic community, Egypt, and the world as a whole lost a great leader and

advocate for peace, unity, and reconciliation. President Obama released a statement regarding the

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death of Pope Shenouda and stated that he was mourning over the loss of, “a man of deep faith, a

leader of a great faith, and an advocate for unity and reconciliation…His commitment to Egypt’s

national unity is also a testament to what can be accomplished when people of all religions and

creeds work together (Keith and Michael, 2012).” Now, without the leadership of Pope

Shenouda, the Copts have not only lost a major spiritual guide but also their sole political

advocate. Pope Shenouda was actively involved in the political spectrum of Egypt, and served as

the delegate diplomatically advocating the rights of the Copts behind the scenes. He also served

as the sole guardian of the Coptic community, “Pope Shenouda’s method was to work behind the

scenes. He sought to contain Christians’ anger and gave strong support to Mubarak’s

government. He avoided pressing Coptic demands too vocally in public to prevent a backlash

from Muslim conservatives (Keath & Michael, 2012).” Although Pope Shenouda III was

actively involved in protecting the rights of the Copts, he debunked statements that question the

integrity of the church and its role with politics, “I distinguish between political activity and civic

activity. The Church is not involved in politics. Indeed, it does not have time for politics. It has

other responsibilities. But, at the same time, it has a national and civic duty. The Church is bound

by loyalty and love to this country and to the [Arab] region. We [the Church] perform our

national role without getting involved in politics. We openly encourage people to participate in

elections and we consider it a national duty. All men of religion are citizens who have voting

cards which they must use to express their opinion. How can I decline to vote, on the grounds

that I am not a professional politician? That would be irrational. Expressing an opinion and

working in politics are two different things (Guindy, et. all, 1999)."

While Pope Shenouda was more involved than his predecessors, he did so only to ensure

the full protection of his people and he has a responsibility as the Patriarch of the Church to use

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his diplomatic power to address the concerns of the community. However his role did not go

undisputed, “In the past year, young and liberal Christians have grown increasingly outspoken in

their criticism of Pope Shenouda’s approach, saying it brought little success in stemming

violence or discrimination. Moreover, they argued, the church’s domination over Christians’

lives further ghettoized them, making them a sect first, Egyptian citizens second (Keath &

Michael, 2012).” Other’s argued that the Pope was too passive when it came to addressing the

political rights of the Copts, “In recent years, some Egyptian Copts had begun to express

criticism of Shenouda for not speaking out on Coptic rights, particularly as sectarian violence

seemed to increase (Al Jazeera, 2012).” Regardless of the criticism, Pope Shenouda III utilized

the tools of diplomacy in order to strive for the greatest level of protection for his people amidst

the chaos that was brewing beneath the surface. He has played a critical role in Egyptian history,

and he has made a significant impact on the future of the country as a whole. The selection of

another pope can take up to three months, and in Egypt’s current turmoil the future role of the

Copts could be significantly impacted by the level of activism and diplomacy assumed by the

next Patriarch.

The Coptic Church assumed a role in the political spectrum of Egypt as a result of a the

inability of the state to provide for the social and economic well being of the Copts and Egypt as

a whole; individuals were forced to rely on religious networks for stability and guidance for their

political orientation. The foundation of the political climate of Egypt was built based on these

conditions, and it is a major contributing factor for the rise of Islamism after the revolution.

There are sects who desire a Pope who focuses solely on spiritual manners and does not get

involved with the political arenas, “the Church should not take any firm political stances but

rather cease interfering in politics and play a purely religious role and let lay Copts fight for their

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civil rights by engaging in secular political parties and groups (El-Hennawy, 2012).” However,

the variables that led the church to play an active role in politics still remain, and without an

active church voice intervening in the political spectrum the Copts could become entirely

marginalized.

The Islamists from the Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour party make up a

significant majority in parliament, and if the Copts do not come together on a unified front their

voice will barely be heard. The political climate cannot allow for a passive Coptic leader,

“[Islamists] will not give the new pope the chance to hold a quiet tone. The new pope will have

no other option but changing the Church’s quiescent discourse,” argued Fahmy (El-Hennawy,

2012).” On the other hand, Pope Shenouda’s predecessor must be careful not exceed the

boundaries of political diplomacy and restrain from adopting an aggressive or critical tone. There

is a delicate balance between taking a strong position against the injustice of the Copts and

increasing the sectarian divide. Pope Shenouda had the gift of diplomacy and he skillfully

addressed issues of injustice behind the scenes while maintaining national unity. If his successor

takes an aggressive stance against injustice, he could further the sectarian divide and lead to great

sectarian conflict and Coptic marginalization. Based on the current circumstances of the country,

the Holy Synod will steer clear of a silent leader and elect three prospective candidates who are

respectful, diplomatic, and politically active enough to maneuver through the country’s uncertain

situation. Ultimately, the Copts have faith that God will provide for them in every way and He

will select a Pope worthy and capable of leading His church during this difficult time.

At the very core of sectarian violence, the issue is a severe distrust among followers of

each religious group against their neighbors. According to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations,

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“The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along

the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and

each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military

and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and

competitively promote their particular political and religious values (Huntington, p. 586, 2007).

Copts are struggling to thrive in Huntington’s world, as the clash of civilizations becomes more

and more evident as the violent attacks spread like wild fire through the country.

Social

In the New Egypt, the social role of the Copts is illustrated through the lack of social

integration and the surge in violent attacks against the Coptic Church and community. Clearly, in

the post-revolutionary Egypt, political Islam and sectarian strife have weakened the social

cohesion which once existed during the protests leading to January 25. The first attack against

the Coptic community began only 38 days after the celebrations of the revolution, and it all too

clearly illustrates the dangers of living in Huntington’s world. On March 5, 2011 the small city

of Sole, approximately 130 miles south of Cairo, was set ablaze by sectarian violence which was

ignited by a romantic relationship between a Christian man and a Muslim woman and ended with

The Church of Two Martyrs being burned, ransacked, defiled and converted into a Mosque as

well as the death of 13 people and 140 injuries (Abouzid, 2011). There are deep sentiments of

distrust and hatred on both sides, during the incident Muslim men shouted, “They rape our

women,” while Christians protested the mistreatment of the church, “"They burned our church,

they kicked around the statues of our saints. Our saints! They tore up the Bible, and they're still

[in the church] (Abouzid, 2011)." Sole has become an all to vivid example of the sectarian

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disaster which is brewing under the surface of the superficial unity ignited by the revolution.

However, this surge of violence can be linked to a mutual distrust between Christians and

Muslims, which was a widely propagated idea since the Sadat regime. It will take time for the

wounds of decades of strategic myth making to heal, and the Copts can achieve social integration

through making a conscience effort to positively engage with their Muslim neighbors in order to

shorten the sectarian divide. Nevertheless, Violence has become so intense and the futures of

Copts so uncertain that it is estimated that approximately 350,000 Coptic families have fled the

country. These alarming figures represent a trend away from social integration of the Coptic

community into the social fiber of the new Egypt. Copts are being increasingly marginalized

from the social spectrum, and the trend of Coptic migration is dangerous for the rebuilding of

Egypt. Such a massive migration in a short period of time can lead to a brain drain, at a time

when the country desperately needs all the brain power it can get.

As the centerpiece of Egyptian society becomes dominated by religion, the Copts will

likewise look to their religious entities for social stability. Religiosity in the post revolution

Egypt has increased substantially as the Copts attempt to gain some fragment of normalcy in a

world that is all to unknown. The social fiber of the country is diminishing, and even the security

of the Pope Shenouda’s leadership has been lost. However, prior to the passing of His Holiness,

personal status laws regarding divorce and civil marriages became a point of contention. The

Coptic Church only permits divorce for the victims of adultery; however, a civil ordinance

known a statute 55 allows Copts to divorce and remarry in civil court (Kamal, 2012). In 2010,

tensions erupted over this issue when a Copt sued the Church for their failure to recognize his

divorce and remarriage, and the state demanded that the church abide by this ruling (Kamal,

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2012). However, the church refused to recognize the marriage because it conflicted with their

religious ordinances. This led to severe tensions between the Coptic Church and the state, and it

also revealed how civilian law can be used against the Coptic Church to attack their religious

values. This kind of intrusive state behavior can be equated to a Christian judge forbidding

Muslim women from wearing their veil inside the mosque and demanding its implementation.

This sort of ordinance would be greeted with a worldwide uproar from the Muslim community,

because it is simply not the role of the state to interfere with religious matters.

As the government has the potential to become an Islamist state, Copts are concerned that

the government will utilize its power to coerce the Church to accept and implement the State’s

ordinances within the Church doctrine. There is no denying that Egypt is currently moving a way

from a civilian state towards a religious state and the fears of the Copts are exacerbated by

Article Two of the constitution that states that Islam is the religion of the State and Sharia is its

guiding legal principles. However, if Islamists gain control, Sharia allows non-Muslims to refer

to their religious laws in cases of personal status thus preventing the forceful recognition of civil

marriages for the Church (Kamal, 2012). Overall this allows the church doctrine to remain

autonomous from the influences of outside forces; while still preserving civilian rights. Other

Copts may disagree and claim that the church is limiting their civil rights by not permitting and

recognizing divorces/remarriages but every individual has the right to pursue other religious

avenues if they do not agree with the Church’s doctrine, but the church shouldn’t be expected to

conform its 2000 year old doctrine to whims of a few members of its congregation.

Economic

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Historically, the Copts have always played a major role in the Egyptian economy, and

even know many of the country’s wealthiest people are Copts. For example, Nagib Sawiris, a

Coptic businessman and politician, is the owner the mobile communiting company which

employs approximately 20,000 people which is a major contribution to the Egyptian economy.

The Copts have historically been denied economic opportunities despite their qualifications as a

result of the social divide between their Muslim counter-parts. Persecution is not just limited to

violent attacks, but it has also been seen in the economic spectrums as the Copts are denied

access to some of the country’s most prestigious Universities, refused for government jobs, and

denied economic opportunities based on their religion. While the military forces have promised

to pass an anti-discriminatory law, it is questionable if it will even be enacted into law and if it is

will it even make a difference in a country where the culture of persecution and discrimination is

so deeply engrained in the countries social fabric. Unfortunately, the history of persecution drove

2-3 million high to upper-middle class Copts to Canada, Australia and the US even prior to the

revolution (Rizkala, 2010). The “narrative of persecution … keeps piling on. Higher and upper

middle class Coptic Christians responded by immigrating in huge numbers…estimated to

number between 2 million to 3 million spread over Canada, Australia and the USA.” The surge

in sectarian violence has sent an addition 350,000 Coptic families seeking refugee since January

25, and will have tremendous impacts on the rebuilding the Egyptian economy, which is

currently in shambles.  “A large segment of the overseas Copts includes many experienced

professionals, practitioners, researchers, and scholars in various fields of the modern sciences,

engineering, arts, management, business administration, medicine…etc. These very same Copts

who were denied the opportunities of jobs in Egypt because of their Christian faith, ended up

successful in their new adopted countries (Rizkala, 2010).” If the newly elected Islamists intend

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on reaching their economic goals for the country, they must first attempt to end the Coptic

Diaspora because it is detrimental to Egypt’s growth. A prosperous Egypt must first begin with a

united Egypt, and Copts must be fully integrated in the social and economic arena to do so.

The Copts living in Egypt can be seen in all different economic classes. Nagib Sawiris,

an Egyptian Copt and media mogul, is the country’s richest man. Many of the world’s most

affluent and influential Copts have already left the country, among them Boutros Boutros Ghali

(former Secretary General of the United Nations, Sir Magdi Yacoub (a world renown cardiac

surgeon), Hani Azer (a prominent civil engineer who has received international recognition for

his work), and Fayez Saroufim (a business man who was listed on Forbes list of the world’s

wealthiest people and he is also the third most influential Arab American). These are among the

best and brightest Egypt has to offer, and they have either left Egypt in their adulthood or their

families sought better opportunities for them abroad while they were children. Either way, the

country has in someway encouraged some of the worlds most influential and affluent minds to

leave Egypt and has robbed their economy of the contributions that their country would so

desperately need. In addition to the extremely affluent Copts, there are also a significant number

of Copts living in the urban areas that are in the upper-middle class sectors of the economy.

These cosmopolitan Copts are often business, medical, engineering and/or legal professionals

who have accumulated their wealth in Egypt or Abroad and are among the most fortunate Copts

in the country. The majority of Copts who have left Egypt in the Diaspora prior to and after the

revolution are the major contributors to the Egyptian economy within this cosmopolitan class.

The only way to stop this massive brain drain from continuing is to create legislation to end the

epidemic of discrimination based on race, religion, and creed in the workplace and allow Copts

to achieve the same potential salaries and promotions as their Muslim counterparts. If the

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cosmopolitan Copts leave Egypt, the country will be left with 60,000 Copts known as Zabaleen

live in Garbage City and collect, separate, sell or reuse the country’s trash and the remaining

70% of Copts who live in the rural areas of upper Egypt where there is little opportunities for

advancement (Lynch, 2012). Another fear is that once the cosmopolitan Copts migrate, the less

affluent and less educated Copts will be forced to navigate the uncertain shores of the new Egypt

alone without the guidance of any major community leaders and the economic pull that the Copts

once had to demand for fair treatment will no longer exist. The Coptic Diaspora hurts the Copts

and the potential for the entire country’s future growth as well.

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Predictions

It is important to remember that the revolution did not happen over night; and likewise,

the work of the revolution will not be completed in a single day. Egypt was suffering from a

deadly disease of tyranny and repression, and although the revolution revived the country, it still

has to endure the pain of healing and the Copts may have to endure some of this pain in order to

be truly free. Egypt will endure three major phases prior to reaching stability and full integration

of Copts: the country is currently enduring its first phase which is marked by the rise of Islamists

and tensions among the competing parties. The first phase will be characterized by political and

social tensions with the Coptic community as the country faces an economic decline and

migration of Copts. The second phase will be more optimistic for the Copts as a disenchantment

of Islamist’s platforms occur, and another smaller revolution takes place (whether it is in the

polls or the streets of Tahrir) where the Egyptian people will call for a secular state. While the

disenchantment has already begun among several segments of the population, this transition

from the first phase to the second will not be a smooth or quick one as many hardliners will

continue to cling to power and it may take longer for the spell to fade on the party’s long time

supporters. Once the revolution is in its second phase the Copts will start to be more integrated

into the political and social sectors and contribute to the economic sectors despite some

grassroots levels of discrimination. The final stage for Egypt’s revolution will take the longest to

be realized; however, once it has become a reality the work of the revolution would be complete

as Muslims and Christians and all minority groups are fully integrated into all aspects of

Egyptian society, fairly represented in Egyptian government and enjoying all of their civil

liberties, and provided equal opportunity to contribute to the Egyptian economy.

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Conclusions

In conclusion, Egypt is currently in a transitional phase and is not prepared to transform

the landscape of its political, social, and economic arenas to fully integrate Copts. The country

must first recover from the decades of corruptions and oppression from the Authoritarian

regimes of Sadat and Mubarak, and the foundation of relations between Copts and Muslims in

must be rebuilt on trust and the mutual love of their country Egypt. The Copts must make an

effort to continue the national unity and avoid the Coptic nationalism rhetoric to prevent their

ostracization through symbolic politics. While the current conditions of the transitional state of

Egypt do not appear to be very inclusive of the Copts in the political, social, and economic

arenas, this is merely a temporary side effect of decades of oppressive rule. While the Copts have

been marginalized in the Political realms of the transitional Egypt as a result of the rise of the

Islamists, the Egyptian people have already begun to be disenchanted by their inability to

improve economic and social conditions while rebuilding the country. Socially, the

disenchantment of the Islamists will be accompanied by an enlightenment in sectarian relations

and once the Egyptian’s take over the polls to dismiss the Islamists, the social divide will

deteriorate as well. Finally, the loss of Egypt’s most valuable Copts could be devastating to the

Coptic community; however, the émigré of Copts provides more funds and means of supporting

the marginalized Copts of the lower economic classes. Rebuilding Egypt isn’t going to be easy,

its going to be messy and its going to take time and things will get worse before they get better;

however, rest assured things will get better once the goals of the revolution have matured.

Overall, I believe that while the Copts may be weary of the future of Egypt and their role in their

country, they do have faith that God will provide, for it is written: “Blessed be my people of

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Egypt (Isaiah 19:25),” and this faith will carry them through all of the stages of the revolution

until Egypt is finally at peace and the Copts are fully integrated in the New Egypt.

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