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EU, NATO, AND THE POLITICS OF CONDITIONALITY
Angel Angelov
STRUCTURE OF THE LECTURE
I Introduction to Conditionality
II Enlargement Conditionality
III The EU and NATO Enlargement Conditionality
I INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY
1. Definitions
2. Generations
3. Characteristics
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITYII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO Conditionality
1. DEFINITION
The law of conditionality:
Whatever comes into existence does so in dependence on conditions, and in the absence of those conditions ceases to exist.
(Sangharakshita, A Guide to the Buddhist Path)
A new world order can be created, and development aid, by its conditionality, is one of the instruments to do so.
(Peter Uvin, ‘Do as I Say, Not as I do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality)
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
1. DEFINITION
I will provide you with ‘x’ on a condition you do ‘y’
The idea - old as politics itself
Recent addition to the lexicon of IR
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
1. DEFINITION
The use of fulfilment of stipulated political obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining
economic aid debt relief most-favoured nation status access to subsidized credit membership in desired regional or global
organizations
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
2. GENERATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY
A. First generation Economic conditionality
B. Second generation Political conditionality
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
A. First generation of Conditionality
Late 1970s - economic crisis in the Third World
Reasons - excessive government spending, over-valued currencies, etc.
Prescription - domestic economic reforms
Economic reforms - condition for assistance
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
B. Second generation of conditionality
The end of the Cold War
Democracy and human rights - primary concern in development
Free markets and free elections - essence of aid
Development aid - dependent on political reforms
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONALITY
Power asymmetry
Demander’s availability of alternative sources
Donor’s necessity for interaction with the demander
Elaboration of the conditions
Demander’s commitment to reform
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality
II ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Enlargement conditionality: 3rd generation of conditionality
2. Rational
3. Limitations
I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY III. EU and NATO Conditionality
1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY : 3rd GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
Triggering factors:
Financial crisis in the Third World First generation
End of the Cold War Second generation
NATO and EU post-Cold war enlargements Third generation
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality: 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
Focus:
First generation economic conditions
Second generation brought in the human rights consideration
Third generation ‘full package’
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY
Features of the enlargement conditionality
1990s - beyond a simple listing of membership criteria
Complex and elaborated system of conditions
Extensive and institutionalized monitoring
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement conditionality as a 3rd generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
Goals:
Previous generations more immediate results
Enlargement conditionality longer term perspective and sustainability
1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
Better equipped for bringing and sustaining reforms
The benefits associated with membership:
sufficiently large as to induce far-reaching concessions
2. RATIONAL
Justifying rejection
Ensuring the contribution potential of the newcomers
Protection of the club’s basic values and interests Motivating particular set of reforms in the candidates
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
Geographical limitation
Temporal limitation
3. LIMITATIONS
II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations
III EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership conditionality
2. Characteristics
3. Rational
4. Limitations
I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY
A. EU membership conditionality
B. NATO membership conditionality
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Rational 3. Characteristics
A. EU membership conditionality
Copenhagen conditions:
democracy and protection of human and minority rights
a functioning market economy implementation of the acqui
Fourth basic condition: ‘good neighbourliness’ (Agenda 2000 )
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Rational 3. Characteristics 4. Limitations
B. NATO membership conditionality
‘Study on NATO Enlargement’
Functioning democratic political system Market economy Democratic civil-military relations Minority protection Good-neighbourliness Ability to provide a military contribution and achieve
interoperability
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
Power asymmetry Is there a power asymmetry between EU/NATO and the applicants?
Demander’s availability of alternative sources Are there available alternatives to the EU/NATO membership?
Donor’s necessity for a particular interaction with the ‘demander Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge?
Elaboration of the conditions Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally?
Demander’s commitment to reform Could the applicants have undertaken the required reforms if EU/NATO
membership was not conditioned on them?
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
Is there a power asymmetry?
‘Carrot and stick’ approach
Carrot - positive conditionality If you do ‘x’ we provide you with ‘y’ membership - encourages a peaceful transformation of the
social, political and military systems
Stick - negative conditionality If you do not do ‘x’ we will not provide you with ‘y’ denial of membership
“Carrot and stick” approach = significant power asymmetry
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics3. Rational 4. Limitations
Are there available alternatives to the membership in EU/NATO?
Membership affiliations during and after the Cold War
In economic terms - EU membership is the most attractive option
A dangerous security vacuum
Russia - not in a position, nor requested to assist
Neutrality is not an option
Membership in NATO – the most reliable option
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge?
No enthusiasm for ‘big bang’ enlargement
Significant mismatch between demand and supply
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally?
NATO alone sets the conditions and the timetable for the accession
The applicants – excluded from the decision-making
Partnership for Peace / Stability Pact for SEE
‘Take it or leave it’
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics3. Rational 4. Limitations
Could the applicants have undertaken the reforms if membership was not conditioned on them?
At its best- form of paternalism
At its worst - imposes an alien agenda
Problem of timing
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
Justifying rejection
- keep the unwanted applicants away
Ensuring contribution potential of the newcomers
- sensibility on the inclusion of ‘free riders’
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
Protection of the club’s basic values and interests
- widening should not obstruct deepening
Motivating particular set of reforms
- enlargement is one the most influential foreign policy instruments
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
3. LIMITATIONS TO THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY
1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations
Geographical limitation
limited to the North-Atlantic area
Temporal limitation
limited to the awarding of membership
CONCLUSION
Effective environment shaping instrument Reasons:
functions in an environment of power asymmetry has no viable alternative the demand of membership exceeds the supply many reforms are triggered by EU’s and NATO’s
carrot and stick approach
I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO Enlargement conditionality