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g

After you have read the research report,

pleas e give u s your fra n k opin ion on th e con -

tents. All comments––large or small, compli

mentary or caustic––will be appreciated. Mail

th em to CADRE/ AR, Bu ilding 1400 , 401

Ch en n a u lt Circle, Ma xwell AFB AL 36 11 2-

6428 .

Thinking Effects

Effects -Bas ed Methodology

for Joint Operations

Mann, Endersby, & Searle

Th an k you for your as sis ta n ce.



COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Thinkin g Effects

E ffe c t s -B a s e d Me t h o d o l o g y

fo r J o i n t O p e r a t i o n s

EDWARD C. MANN III

Colonel, USAF, Retired

GARY ENDERSBY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired

THOMAS R. SEARLE

Resea rch Fellow

CADRE Paper No. 15

Air Un ivers ity Pres s

Maxwell Air Force Ba se, Alab am a 361 12-6 615

h t tp : / / au press .ma xwell.af.mil

October 200 2



Air Universit y Library Cataloging Data

Man n, Edward C. , 1947-Think ing effects : effects-ba sed meth odology for joint opera tions / Edward C.

Mann III, Gary En dersb y, Thom as R. Searle.

p. cm . – (CADRE pa per ; 15 ).Includ es bibliograph ical references.Contents: Time for a new paradigm? – Historical background on effects –

Conceptual basis for effects – A general theory of joint effects-based operations – Anidealized joint EBO process – Wha t ar e the m ajor challenges in imp lem enting th e EBOmethodology?

ISBN 1-58566 -112-0ISSN 1537-337 11. Operational art (Military science). 2. Unified operations (Military science) –

Plan ning. 3. Militar y doctr ine – United States . I. En dersb y, Gary. II. Searle, Thom asR., 1960- III. Title. IV. Series.

355.4––dc21

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States AirForce, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public

release: distribution unlimited.

This CADRE Paper and others in the series are available elec

tronically at th e AU Press Web si te http :/ / au press .ma xwell.af.mil

an d th e Air University Resea rch Web site ht tp:/ / resea rch .ma xwell.

af.mil.

ii



CADRE Pa pe rs

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iii



Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EF FE CTS . . . . 17

CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFE CTS . . . . . . . . 29

A GENERAL THEORY OF J OINT EFF ECTS-BASE D OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

AN IDEALIZED J OINT EBO PROCE SS . . . . . . . 55

WHAT ARE THE MAJ OR CHALLENGES INIMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY? 77

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Illustrations

Figure

1 Th e Du al Nat u re of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2 Exam ple of Firs t / Second / Th ird Order Effects . . 32

3 Com plexity of High er Ord er Effects . . . . . . . . . 33

4 Fu n da m ent al Relat ions h ips of Var iou s Effects . . 40

v



Figure Page

5 Rela tion s h ip s bet ween O bject ives a n dStra tegies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

6 Objectives-Ba sed Meth odology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

7 Th e Effects -Bas ed Meth odology . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

8 Rela tion s h ip s bet ween In d ir ect Effect san d Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

9 Effects -Bas ed-Plan n in g Process Model . . . . . . . 56

10 Deta il of Na tiona l-Level Proces s . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

11 J oin t Cam pa ign-Level Process Cycle . . . . . . . . 74

Table

1 Rela t ion s h ip of Ob ject ives , E ffect s , a n d Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

vi



Foreword

Th e United Stat es h as a r epu tat ion for ha vin g the s tron gest

military force in the world—perhaps even the best in history.

Still we continue to struggle with force application in an era

with out th e m onolith ic Soviet en em y. Ou r d octrine, written in

a paradigm seeking “total victory,” has been refined through

World War II, Korea, Vietn am , a n d th e Pers ia n Gu lf War. It h as

been as sidu ous ly ada pted for ma jor theater warfare an d wha t

can be called the conquest paradigm. We need to change. We

need to adapt to a different world of continuing struggle

between an d with in na t ion-states , one where m ilitary s tr ength

and political persuasion are applied with smarter flexibility.

In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint

Operations, Col Edward C. Mann III, USAF, retired, Lt Col Gary

Endersby, USAF, retired, and Thomas R. Searle propose that

military actions should be employed through effects-based

operations (EBO). These authors have developed an extended

explanation of EBO methodology earlier defined in an Air

Combat Command white paper, “Effects-Based Operations.”

Cha llenged by the wh ite pa per to defin e procedu res in th e EBO

methodology, they further codified the EBO way of thinking.

Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they

recogn ize two m a jor a rea s of ch a llen ge. First, is m odifyin g both

service an d join t d octrine to fu lly articu late wha t ca n be a ccom

plish ed with EBO. Secon d, th ere are m ajor iss u es in t h e area of

com m an d a nd contr ol (C2). Effect ive C2 for EBO depends on h ow

intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are per-

formed but also integrated into the planning process.

The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

(CADRE) is pleased to publish this study as a CADRE Paper

and thereby make it available to a wider audience within the

US Air Force and beyond.

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

Ch ief of Resea rch

Airpower Research In st itu te

vii



About the Authors

Col Edward C. Mann III, USAF, retired (BS, Pepperdine

University; MA, University of Southern California), is head of

the Effec ts -Based Opera t ions Research Team, Airpower

Research Institute (ARI) in the College of Aerospace Doctrine,

Research and Education (CADRE), at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

He flew th e KC-135 aircraft with ap proxim at ely 5,200 h our s of

flyin g time. Colon el Man n was a r esea rch fellow at th e Fletch er

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and has been

a p as t contr ibutor to Military Rev iew , Air Force T im es , a n d Air

an d S pa ce Pow er Journa l (AS PJ)— formerly Airpow er Journa l

(APJ) a n d Aerosp ace Pow er Journ a l (APJ).

Lt Col Gary P. En der sb y, USAF, retired (BS, S ta te Un ivers ity

of New York Mar itime College; MPA, Golden Ga te Un ivers ity),

is a senior defense analyst with Cubic Applications, Inc., at

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He flew F-111 and F-16 aircraft and

served in n u m erou s flyin g and com m an d a nd sta ff posit ions in

Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces in Europe, and

NATO du ring h is Air Force ca reer. Colon el En der sb y is a grad

u at e of th e USAF Figh ter Weapon s S chool an d a pa st con trib

u tor to ASPJ .

Thomas R. Searle (BSE, Princeton University), a research

fellow at ARI in CADRE, is a doctoral candidate in Military

History at Duke University and an Army Reserve major

assigned to the US Special Operations Command. He served

as an active du ty Arm y officer for 10 years leading ar m or u n its

in Germany and Korea and serving as a special forces officer

in th e Middle Eas t where h e earn ed th e Com bat In fan trym an ’s

Bad ge du rin g the Pers ian Gu lf War.

ix



Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the leadership of Air

University (AU) and the College of Aerospace Doctrine,

Resea rch an d E du cation (CADRE) for th eir wisd om a n d s tead -

fast support during this lengthy research effort—AU com

manders Lt Gen Lance Lord and Lt Gen Dona ld A.

LaMon ta gn e; CADRE comm an ders Colonels J am es Ru ttler

an d Bobby J . Wilkes; an d th e vice comm an der Col Sta n Norris.

Th e au th ors a re m ost a ppr eciative of th e feedba ck provided by

th e followin g in dividu a ls : Gen J ohn Sh au d, USAF, retired; Lt

Gen Lance L. Smith, commander, Air Force Doctrine Center;

Maj Gen David F. MacGh ee J r., comm an da n t, Air Wa r College;

an d Maj Gen Ch a rles Lin k, USAF, retired. App reciation is a lso

expr ess ed for th e ad vice received from Mr. Sam Gard in er a n d

Mr. Robert Brodel and for the remarkable insight, encourage

ment, and guidance provided by Maj Gen David Deptula.

xi



Introduction

A n otable sh ift in geopolitics b egan m ore th an 10 years ago

with the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the perspective of th e US m ilita ry, th e prima ry thru st of th is s h ift was t o replace

a unitary, implacable, and constantly threatening foe—world

com m u n ism , represented by the Soviet Un ion, China a n d th eir

al l ies—with more nebulous and mult ifar ious threats . Com

bined with the experience of World War II, this long-enduring

face-off contributed to the development of a conquest para

digm in US military doctrine. Despite the experiences in

Korea, Vietnam, and other places over the ensuing decades,

th e m ajority of doctrin e was written to dea l specifically with a

m ajor th eater wa r (MTW) th rou gh th e em ploym en t of th e con -

ques t p aradigm .

While the cold war brought relative clarity and stability to

US military and foreign policy, the twenty-first century has

displayed a decidedly changed geopolitical climate. The US

m ilita ry is u n dergoin g a t ra n sform at ion to be pr epar ed for op

erat ions across the spectrum of engagement. Consequently,

this s tudy proposes that part of the transformation shoulddeal with how the mil i tary thinks and operates . In this man

ner, military actions should be employed through effects-

based operations (EBO), originally outlined in the May 2002

Air Combat Command (ACC) white paper on EBO. Both the

ACC white paper an d th is s tu dy stress th at E BO is n ot focu sed

on conquest or necessarily even warfare as traditionally de-

fin ed. Ess entially, EBO represen ts th ose act ions tak en again st

enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that con-

tribu te d irectly to desired m ilita ry an d political out com es. In ageneral sense, US forces have always had certain desired ef

fects in mind when conducting military operations. However,

th ey often pu rs u ed m ilita ry objectives with ou t d irect r eference

to appropriate effects that would create the conditions for

achieving them and with little consideration of other effects

th at were creat ed a long th e way. Th e EBO m eth odology is d e-

sign ed s pecifically to add ress th ese a reas as well as provide a

better environment to assess the results of military actions.

1



CADRE PAPER

EBO n eeds to be u n ders tood in th e con text of wha t it rea lly

is a n d is n ot. EBO is n ot a n ew form of war figh tin g nor does

it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare.

Attrit ion, a n n ih ilat ion, coercion, m an eu ver, an d a ll other s u chwarfare con cepts are u n affected by EBO. For cons isten t , su s

tained su ccess, th ere mu st b e a com preh ens ive, sha red vis ion

of wha t EBO is a n d h ow it works . Th e stu dy seeks to elab orate

on th e followin g th ree s pecific a rea s:

• a fu lly developed th eory grou n ded in effects-ba sed th in k

ing;

• a p rocess to facilita te developm ent of an organ izat iona l

culture of EBO processes; and• a lexicon th a t promotes u nders tan ding through a com

mon language.

To realize all that EBO offers, it must be incorporated into

military planning and operations. The EBO methodology is

simply a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing

operations designed to attain the effects required to achieve

desired national security outcomes. The EBO methodology is

actually a refinement or evolution of the objectives-based

planning currently incorporated in US military doctrine. The

objectives-based methodology utilizes a strategy-to-task ap

proa ch for plan n in g milita ry operation s. An EBO m eth odology

takes this process a s tep further by al lowing planners and

commanders to examine condit ions and causal l inkages

th rou gh which action s lead to objectives. Cau sa l lin ka ges, per-

haps the most crit ical element of the methodology, explain

why planners believe the proposed actions will create the de-

sired effects.Th e EBO m eth odology is m u ch broa der th an solely milita ry

ap plication s. It in corpora tes all th e elemen ts of n at iona l power—

diplomatic, economic, military, and information—for a particular

situation and is applicable across the full spectrum of activi

ties from peace through global war. As with the objectives-

bas ed a pproach , EBO requires m ilitary com m an ders to explic

itly an d compr eh ens ively lin k—to th e greatest exten t p ossible—

str at egic a n d operation al objectives t o each ta ctical action .

2



MANN, ENDERSBY, AND SEARLE

A proposed idealized planning model will enhance effects-

based thinking before, during, and after operations. The

process is both continuous and i terat ive and contains f ive

phases: s trategic environment research, determine policygoals, d evelopin g a s tra tegy, m iss ion p ar sing an d int egra tion,

an d effects as sess m ent. Firs t , s t rategic environm ent res earch

attempts to gather relevant information regarding potential

adversaries . Such background information may indicate po

tential centers of gravity (COG) and answer a number of

broad-ranging questions. For example: What type of effects

would be most appropriate in the given set of circumstances?

How m igh t th ese effects b e ach ieved, an d wh at kind of in dica

tors would determine the nature and extent of the effects?Second, to determine policy goals include a statement of the

in ten ded effects a n d ou tcomes th at will lead to ach ievin g those

goals. Third, developing a strategy is to employ the vast range

of resources available to achieve desired effects. Fourth, the

mission parsing and integrat ion phase determines the ele

m ents of n at ion al power best su ited for each ta sk an d h ow al l

the elements will work together to achieve the policy goals.

Th is p h as e defin es th e mission for comba tan t an d/ or join t

force comm an ders (J FC). Fifth , th is p h as e is effects a ss ess ment, wherein information provided through intelligence col

lect ion a n d oth er sou rces is u sed to determ in e whether policy

goals a re bein g ach ieved an d wh at n eeds to be don e next. Th is

series of ph as es requ ires intera gency discu ss ion an d decision s

by th e pres iden t or th e secreta ry of defens e. Th e m ilita ry needs

to participate proactively in these deliberations and research.

Alth ough th e m ilita ry does n ot con trol th is p ar ticu lar as pect of

the process, it can benefit from fully articulating a clearly de-

fined effects-based process such as this one, even though itm ight n ot be precisely im plem ent ed.

In summary, EBO represents act ions designed to achieve

sp ecific effects a n d ca n be incorp orat ed int o a m eth odology for

plan n in g, execu tin g, an d a ss essing operat ion s required to a t

tain desired national security outcomes. This methodology is

extremely promising, but at the same t ime i t presents major

challenges. To be fully successful it requires the development

an d u n dersta n din g of a compreh ens ive EBO th eory an d as so-

3



CADRE PAPER

ciated lexicon. The methodology itself will require changes to

process es an d procedu res with in th e join t / in teragen cy aren a

that have been in place for some time. The EBO methodology

should be viewed as an expansion of the current objectives-ba sed p rocess , wh ich offers s ignifican t ben efits for m eetin g th e

cha llenges a n d exploitin g the opp ortu n ities in th e twenty-firs t

century.

Time for a New Paradigm?

Going into the second decade of the post-cold-war era, the

US military establishment is sti l l struggling with the altered

geopolitics and the role it is asked to play in the new worldorder. The military leadership, though trying hard, cannot

seem to shake the legacy of World War II and its aftermath. It

is s truggling with new understandings, but much of the con

ceptu al thinking and developmen t is s tu ck in an old p ara digm

that the authors cal l the conquest paradigm. This paradigm,

which may or may not have ever been appropriate, certainly

does n ot app ly n ow. Wh en Gen Douglas MacArth u r sa id “th ere

is no substitute for victory,” he was not merely stating a sen

t iment that many US mil i tary leaders adhered to throughoutthe twentieth century but also voiced a central tenet of the

con qu est p ara digm . Th is tenet , express ed in m an y ways over

the years since Korea and Vietnam, holds that use of the mil

itar y sh ou ld be a las t resort wh en d iplom acy an d politics h ave

fai led. At th is p oin t s tatesm en a n d polit ic ian s s h ould tu rn th e

problem over to th e m ilita ry an d a fford th e ar m ed forces free

dom of action. The military would then employ the required

force to redu ce to as h es th e ad vers a ry’s a bility an d will to re

sist , thereby achieving total victory as measured by the complete defeat of enemy forces and the unconditional surrender

of th e enem y’s m ilita ry an d political lead ers . Th a t ta sk com

pleted, the military would then relinquish control back to its

civilian m as ters.

Th a t p a ra digm , h owever, fits only a n ar row ra n ge of toda y’s

tas ks an d ch allenges. Ou r n at ion ’s a rm ed forces n eed to m ove

to a new paradigm; one based not on conquest , which is a l

m ost n ever th e goal today, bu t on ach ievin g su ccess a cross th e

4




ent ire s pectru m of engagemen t wh eth er, political, milita ry, hu

manitar ian, or some combination thereof .1 Perhaps i t can be

called th e su ccess pa ra digm . Wh ile Joint Vis ion 2 02 0 ( JV 202 0)

m oves US m ilita ry thinking several steps closer to su ch a pa radigm, the military services, acting jointly, need to take at

least one remaining step: define an overarching implementa

tion concep t for JV 20 20 . Th is con st ru ct will focu s t h e fou r op

erationa l con cepts of JV 20 20 —dom in an t ma n eu ver, precision

engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protec

tion—on effects the military can create to produce the vision

of full-spectrum dominance articulated by chairman of the

J oin t Ch iefs of St a ff (CJ CS).

Each service and the joint staff have taken halting steps inth e direction of EBO by experim ent in g with , or discu ss in g, at

least some aspects of EBO. The USAF has studied “effects-

based targeting” for many years but, to date, has not codified

the concept in any formal sense. The joint services do not

sh a re a com m only a greed lexicon of effects -ba s ed ter m in ology.

Such terms are commonly used as i f they had clear defini

tions, but they do not. This study proposes correctives to in-

corpora te EBO in USAF an d join t doctrin e th rou gh an effects-

based lexicon, theory, and process.

The path to implementing the EBO concept and a corre

sponding EBO methodology along with comprehensive effects-

ba sed th in king for m ilita ry action s will not b e eas y to traverse.

Such a shif t in operat ional concepts wil l not guarantee suc

cess, n or will these con cepts clear th e n orm al fog an d friction

of war. An EBO methodology will provide a systematic ap

proach to planning, executing, and assessing results of mili

tary act ions a cross th e entire spectru m of engagemen t ran gin gfrom peacetime t o global war a n d b ack to pea cetim e. It will as

sis t military plan n ers to focu s on ou tpu t not in pu t , and on n a

t ional goals rather than the capabil i t ies and prerequisi tes of

th e s ervices , s ingly or collectively.2 This shift in thinking can-

not help but make the US mil i tary bet ter and more prudent

gu ard ian s of th e n at ion ’s peace an d p rosperity. Th is s tu dy

does n ot provide fin al an swers, bu t it does sta rt th e process of

bringin g togeth er th e con ceptu al deba te th at will m ove th e US

5



CADRE PAPER

m ilita ry esta blish m ent firm ly from th e old p ar ad igm to a n ew,

m ore appropriate one.

Th e USAF h as emba rked u pon a path to prepare for military

action in the current and future geopolitical environment. America’s Air Force: Air Force Vision 2020—Global Vigilance,

Reach, an d Pow er outlines the reorganization to an expedi

tionary air and space force, the movement to integrate the air

operations center (AOC) as a weapon system, and the Force

Development—formerly the Developing Aerospace Leaders—

program, which is further explained later in this study. These

actions are aimed at developing a more agile, more capable,

and more relevant Air Force. With an eye towards the future,

an EBO methodology may be the final piece the Air Forcen eeds to fu lly im plem ent AF 20 20 a n d JV 202 0.3

The Imperative to Change Now

Th e cold wa r b rou ght r ela tive cla rity a n d s ta bility to US m il

ita ry an d foreign policy. Th rou gh out th e cold wa r th e m ain for

eign policy goals of the United States were to contain the

spr ead of in tern at ion al com m u n ism an d l im it th e in flu ence of

the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent , Communist China.

Th e Soviet Union h ad extremely capa ble arm ed forces; an d S oviet leaders were explicit and outspoken in their intention to

weaken and, if possible, destroy the United States. When So

viet pr em ier Nikita Kh ru sh chev an grily told t h e United Sta tes,

“we will bury you,” he meant i t ; and though he and subse

quent Soviet leaders failed to do so, it was not for lack of try

ing. The Soviets posed an enormous threat to the United

States , perhaps the greatest threat the nat ion has ever faced.

That threa t was not only immense and imminent but a lso

clear and remarkably persis tent . Against this backdrop, theprocess of organizing, training, and equipping forces to meet

the threat was fairly straightforward. It was also fairly simple

to see who would be likely allies in the effort to contain com

munism. This clarity and stabili ty extended to the entire in

teragency process.

The end of the cold war, following collapse of world commu

nism an d su bsequent d isap pearan ce of the th rea t from th e So

viet Union a n d its Wa rs aw Pact a llies, ch an ged everyth in g. Th e

6




United Sta tes n o longer faced a n obviou s t h reat to its very ex

is ten ce, an d m an y form er ad versaries becam e fr iends . Several

former Warsaw Pact foes have since joined the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and become formal allies of the UnitedSta tes. From a global persp ective, th e end of th e cold war con

flict left the world with several local and regional conflicts,

som e new, some old, an d each qu ite different from t h e oth ers.

Th e threats in t h e post-cold-war world ar e nu m erou s; bu t th ey

are much less clear , persis tent , and predictable than was the

Soviet th reat .

The Korean War and Vietnam War were fought in the con-

text of this global cold war. The communist governments in

Beijing and Moscow actively supported foes of US allies inKorea and Vietnam. Communist China and the Soviet Union

hoped to use these wars to expand world communism, while

the United States fought in both places to contain interna

t ional communism. In contras t , Opera t ions Jus t Cause in

Pan am a a n d Desert Storm in th e Middle Eas t were not part of

any global conflict but were regional conflicts.4 More su rpris

in gly, th e foes in th ese a ctions —Man u el Noriega’s Pan am a an d

Sa dd am Hu ss ein ’s Iraq—h ad n ot always b een “enem ies” of th e

United Stat es. In fact ea ch h ad received sign ifican t as sista n cefrom th e Un ited Sta tes p rior to event s th at led to the in terven

t ions. Both cases represent the more transient nature of in

tern at iona l relations h ips in th e n ew geopolitics.

The New Environment

The cold war world was a black-and-white world in which

the United States had a clear understanding—from year to

year—of who were its foes and friends, with a relatively small

number of states falling into the gray area between these twopoles. The US military knew without question who the poten

tial enem ies were an d war figh ters s tu died Soviet an d War sa w

Pact doctrine, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Year a fter year, plan n ers cou ld s im ply revise p la n s t o dea l with

a m as sive Soviet in vas ion th rough th e Fulda Gap in Germ an y

or through Iran into the Middle East. Today they face a much

grayer world with no clear-cut enemies and a handful of

“st at es of concer n .” In Noriega’s Pa n am a, en em y doctrin e an d

7



CADRE PAPER

equipment were largely similar to those of the invading US

forces because President Noriega and many members of the

Panamanian mil i tary had at tended US mil i tary schools , and

had bought a lot of US military equipment.

5

Similarly in thePersian Gulf War, Iraqi foes and coalition friends were often

armed wi th the same equipment and had been t ra ined ac

cording to several different doctrines, sometimes similar,

sometimes not. In contrast to the good old days, a single

friend -or -foe equipm en t qu iz for th e en tire force wou ld n ow be

unfeasible, since friends and foes can change dramatically

from scen ar io to scen ar io. In stea d th e m ilita ry will need t o tai

lor and conduct such training based on the contingency at

hand and the specific allies and foes involved. The notion of u n iversa l, worldwide th reat doctrin e is clearly ou tda ted.

In this changed climate, military actions will be radically

more complicated. US forces may have to respond with li t t le

advance warning and lit t le beforehand knowledge of who the

enemy is. They may need to switch rapidly between humani

tarian relief operations (HUMRO), peacekeeping, and fierce

combat. In Panama, in la te 1989 and early 1990, Operat ion

J u st Cau se began with a few days of com bat bu t qu ickly tran

sitioned to n ation bu ilding. In Haiti in 199 4, th e United St atesprepar ed to depose a govern m ent b y force of ar m s b u t wou n d

u p doin g so with ou t firin g a s h ot. Th e force as sem bled to over-

whelm th e Haitian m ilita ry im m ediat ely ha d t o redirect i ts ef

forts to rebu ildin g a n at ion th at ha d s u ffered n eith er war n or

natural disaster but simply decades of extremely bad govern

ment. During 1993 in Somalia , the t ransi t ion went the other

way when a force sent to perform a HUMRO found itself in

combat against some of the very people they were originally

tryin g to as sist .Recently US military forces have been involved around the

world, h elping people recover from n atu ra l an d m an -ma de dis

asters, acts of terrorism, and from armed conflicts. These

forces have been trying simultaneously to keep the peace in

places as diverse as the Sinai desert and the mountainous

ju n gles on th e border between Peru an d E cu ador. In al l th ese

situations, US forces are making the world a better place and

con tr ibu tin g to US na tional securi ty; but often t erm s s u ch a s

8




enemy , victory , an d certain ly conquest are not appropriate. In

fact, many familiar old cold war concepts are detrimental to

US national goals in this new environment. US forces need to

develop concepts of m ilitar y action to m eet th e ch allenges a n dexploit th e opportu n ities p resen ted b y the cu rren t geopolitical

environment .

Perha ps one of th e m ost s trikin g ch an ges in th e geopolitical

environment is the fact that in this new era one cannot as

sume that future conflicts will typically be between nation-

states. At the same time that globalization and new technolo

gies are bringing unprecedented prosperity to people around

the world, they are also facili tating transnational threats to

national securi ty. These new threats include such groups asdru g cartels an d intern at ion al cr im in al an d terroris t organ iza

t ions . Opera t ion End u r ing Freedom h as sh own th a t com bat

in g the terroris t th reat , in par t icular , requires u n preceden ted

levels of interservice, interagency, and international coordina

tion, as well as highly sophisticated understanding of the di

rect , indirect , intended, and unintended consequences of al l

actions taken. Additionally, the United States has learned

th rough bit ter experience tha t crackin g down on dru g produ c

t ion or money laundering in one country encourages thespread of these activities to other countries. In the past the

United Sta tes h as n ot always a dequa tely an ticipated th ese re

sponses, and the effectiveness of operations has been com

promised by the inability to prevent drug production moving

to new areas and new money laundering operat ions from re-

placing old on es .

Humanitar ian cr ises are another chal lenge encountered

m ore often in th is n ew era. As prosperity in creases a roun d th e

world, the internat ional community and the US public havedeveloped a growing intolerance for human suffering and na

tion a l in st ab ility, som etimes in ar eas of little or n o str a tegic in

teres t. The US m ilita ry fin ds its elf in crea sin gly in volved in m it

iga t ing na tu ra l an d ma n-m ade hu m an itar ian d isas ters a rou nd

the world. This trend will likely continue, and the United

States will need to improve its abili ty to conduct these kinds

of action s. S ometimes th ey will in volve comb at, su ch as Oper

at ion Allied Force in 199 9, a n d in other in st an ces, action will

9



CADRE PAPER

be p u rely n on comb at , as in flood relief efforts in Moza m biqu e.

The success of these act ions requires a seamless melding of

capabilit ies into a joint, interagency, and international effort

that mit igates the immediate humanitar ian cr is is , creates thebasis for a sustainable long-term recovery, and improves liv

ing conditions. Traditionally the US military has been among

th e firs t on th e scene of a cr is is an d h as emph as ized add ress

ing the immediate problem. This is important, but the joint

forces need to meet initial objectives for crisis response and

then work in concert with other appropriate agencies for a

sm ooth tran si t ion to n orma lity.

A Revolution in Military Affairs?

Geopolitics is not the only thing that has been changing.

Since th e en d of th e cold wa r expan ded ap plication of ra pidly

developing technologies (particularly information technolo

gies), combined with new business practices and organiza

tional concepts, have enabled commercial firms to radically

tran sform th e way th ey do bu siness. Th e end of th e cold war

and this expanding use of information technologies have pro

moted the globalization of economic activity. Economic andcommercial globalization promise to make both the internal

and external mechanisms of national economies more effi

cient , more prosperous, and more integrated than they were

previous ly. Th ese cha n ges h ave con tribu ted enorm ous ly to the

new challenges and opportunities faced by the United States

and its military. Many of these developments have served as

force multipliers but also present new and different kinds of

vulnerabilit ies. On the one hand, networked information sys

tems have increased efficiency and effectiveness in organizat ions that have embraced them. At the same t ime these tech

n ologies h ave in creas ed th e ir u ser ’s vu ln era bi lity to

des tru ctive “cyber at ta cks ” of types t h a t were pu re s cien ce fic

tion a few sh ort years ago. US forces h ave taken ad van ta ge of

som e origin ally com m ercial con cepts, s u ch a s jus t-in -tim e de-

livery, an d a re in th e process of emb ra cin g in form at ion opera

tions . However, th e im plication s of th ese ch an ges h ave not yet

fu lly worked th eir wa y in to in st itu tiona l think in g.

10




For exam ple, no one is su re h ow all th ese cha n ges a ffect tra

ditional military actions. Economic globalization would seem

to make such tradi t ional mil i tary act ions as blockades dra

m atically m ore effective tha n in th e pas t becau se n at ion-st atesare more dependent than ever on trade with other countr ies .

The increased importance of internat ional t rade means that

the unintended collateral effects of an embargo against a tar-

get nation are more difficult to understand fully. Its trading

par tn ers will a lso be more severely im pacted th an in th e pas t .

Wh o will be da m aged m ore by a blockad e: th e target n at ion or

its tr ad in g pa rtn ers, som e or all of whom th e blockading cou n

tries may not intend to harm? Similarly, traditional strategic

a t tacks on weapons ma nu factur ing p lan ts an d ind u s t r ia l ta r -gets m ay be less effective th an in th e pas t if th e equ ipm ent de

stroyed and any production lost can be quickly and easily re-

placed in the international marketplace. Additionally, now

that capital flows are more global than ever before, i t may

prove that an industrial facili ty in a hostile country is owned

either by a friendly country or a US-based firm. Deciding

whether or how to at tack such faci l i t ies requires much more

sophisticated coordination and forecasting of collateral, indi

rect , and unintended consequences than anything faced inplanning attacks on the Soviet Union during the cold war.

Fortunately, the technologies that succeeded so spectacu

lar ly in Op eration Des ert Storm an d th e new tech n ologies th at

have been emerging since may offer the tools to increase ef

fectivenes s in th is n ew global environ m ent . As m ore accu ra te

and comprehensive real-time information about the world is

available, military planners and operators can—with in-

creased precision—tailor activities to the evolving situation.

Given the increased availability of precision tools such as air-born e las ers , sm all sm art bomb s, concentrat ed air-deliverable

humanitarian rations, and similar devices, US forces will be

able to achieve even more exact physical effects. These tech

n ologies will dra m a tically expa n d m ilita ry cap ab ilities. To ben

efit fully, planners and operators must avoid the trap of sim

ply using new tools to do the same old things in better ways.

In stead th ey m u st take a fresh look a t everyth in g to determ in e

wha t exactly th ey are tr yin g to ach ieve an d wheth er, in ligh t of

11



CADRE PAPER

m u st cha n ge. Most im portan tly, the thou gh t processes u sed to

th in k th rough con tin gencies of al l types m u st also ch an ge.

Most current military doctrine is rooted in the concept of

m ilitary act ion th at th e au th ors call the con ques t pa radigm . Inth is th eoretical fra m ework, m ilita ry action s ar e n ot viewed as

an extension of politics and diplomacy but rather the end, or

more specifically, the failure of politics and diplomacy. Such

actions are total wars fought by any and all means until vic

tory is a ch ieved. Th e ch ief m odel of th e m oder n era was World

Wa r II, wh ich res u lted in tota l victory of th e Allies over Axis

forces. Th e m ean s a vailab le in th ese total wars ar e lim ited b y

the laws of physics and national budgets, or more correctly,

resou rces , an d n ot mu ch e lse . Und er th is pa radigm, a ny tar -get that makes sense mil i tar i ly can and should be at tacked

and destroyed. In traditional theory, the ultimate goal of

ground action normally is the enemy capital, which armies

reach th rou gh t h e in term ediate goal of dest royin g th e capa bil

ity an d will of th e en em y’s m ilita ry forces to res ist . Conqu est

resu lts in total peace. Once th e war is over, th e politician s a n d

diplomats reclaim their prewar leadership roles while the

armed forces demobilize and resume peacetime training.

The conquest paradigm is rigorously fight-centric and almost obsessed with the big fight, wherein the armed forces

concentrate on physically destroying opposing military forces.

Th ey also iden tify, ta rget, an d dest roy in fra str u ctu re th at s u p-

port s th e ab ility of th e enem y’s m ilita ry to s u st ain opp osition .

Achievin g both goals is th e ma in , an d perh ap s on ly, im porta n t

measure of effectiveness. This paradigm is often actively hos

tile to “u n n ecess ar y” (read an y) political restr aints on th e u se

of military force and to politically motivated actions. It ac

knowledges but has little tolerance for military operationsother than war (MOOTW). The conquest paradigm assumes

relat ively clear a n d a bru pt t ra n si t ions between war a n d p eace,

an d em ploys ter m s l ike des ired en d s tate—a u sefu l term when

em ployed correctly an d a s J oin t Pu blication (J P) 3-0, Doctrine

for Joint Operations , carefully defines this concept.8 However,

the term, taken on face value, seems to imply that military

forces can set the world right, then redeploy to peacetime

bases and readiness s tatus unti l the next t ime a mil i tary cr i-

14




sis em erges. Th e tru th in geopolitics is th at n othing is ever re-

ally over. Each resolution simply establishes a new baseline

for continuing interactions—some of which the United States

will like and others it will not.The conquest paradigm has been prominent in airpower

theories since the days of Giulio Douhet in the beginning of

the twentieth century. However, i t does not provide an ade

quate basis for understanding the totality of military actions.

Rath er th an clar ifyin g m ilita ry think in g, th is a pp roach to con

flict has led to deep confusion and dissatisfaction within the

US military because military actions almost never attain the

total war/ total victory assu m ptions of th e con qu est pa rad igm .

Th e Korean War, for exam ple, end ed in a s ta lema te n ot a p olitical or military victory. General MacArthur’s efforts to

ach ieve th e goa l of tota l victory by con qu ering North Korea led

to Chinese intervention and a 50-year-long standoff at the

38t h pa ra llel. MacArth u r’s belief an d tra in in g in th e th eories

of the conquest paradigm led him to contemplate t ransform

in g a sm all war again st Ch in ese forces in a p u ppet s t ate in to

a large war in Ch in a. E ven a fter MacArth u r’s failu res in Korea ,

US military leaders held fast to the precepts of the conquest

paradigm and continued to ground mil i tary doctr ine andplanning upon that paradigm. They found themselves just as

fru str ated in Vietn am . Yet, even a s late a s th e Persian Gu lf

War, some Air Force planners and theorists were stil l con

vinced that the proper role of airpower was to force the total

collapse of the enemy. While the collapse of the Iraqi military

forces and society would have helped achieve the military goal

of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it was not necessary for

ach ievin g th at goal n or was it con sidered to be in th e u ltim ate

political interests of the coalition arrayed against Iraq.Conversely, some US military leaders in the Gulf War re

sented the Scud hunting operat ions of Desert Storm because

they did not consider those missiles militarily effective

weapons. Since the Scuds were not significant in terms of the

da m age th ey cou ld inflict on coa lition m ilita ry forces or ind u s

trial capacity, these leaders believed the coalition should ig

nore them rather than divert valuable resources to an objec

t ive tha t would no t con t r ibu te d i rec t ly to de fea t and

15



CADRE PAPER

capitulation of the Iraqis. Because they grew up in the cold

war conquest paradigm, they did not fully recognize that the

entirety of military actions in the theater was only conceivable

within the political context of a fragile coalition, which mighteas ily ha ve been broken by Isr ael’s en try in to th e war a gains t

Ira q. Th is was precisely Sa dd am ’s inten t in lau n ching th e

Scuds into Israel. If Saddam broke the coalition, prosecution

of the war was likely to become much more difficult if not im

possible. The net result could have been a failure, regardless

of how militarily efficient coalition actions might otherwise be.

If Scu d h u n tin g was critical to sa vin g the coalition, th en it was

one of th e mos t im porta n t action s of th e entire war, regar dless

of its pu rely m ilita ry imp licat ions .Milita ry a ction s in toda y’s geopolitical environ m en t often re-

qu ire cons idera ble restra in t, n ot n ecess ar ily u sing every avail-

able weapon and not at tacking every possible target but un

derstanding the full political context of all actions. Restraint

can be frustrating, and the political context within which the

m ilita ry operates can be en orm ous ly com plicated. Yet, m ilita ry

action s a re condu cted in vain, if th ey do n ot serve real na tion

a l political goals.

With th e en d of th e cold war, th e conqu est pa ra digm b ecam e

an almost wholly dysfunctional view of military actions. At

least u n til a h ost ile peer com petitor appea rs , US n ation al su r

vival is not likely to be at risk. When the military is called to

ac t ion as in Korea , Vie tnam, Kuwai t , Bosnia , Kosovo,

Afgh an ist an —an d so ma n y other places in r ecent years —th ere

usually will be political considerations more important than

m ilitary con quest . In su ch s itu at ion s, th e dema n ds of m ilitary

efficiency often will have to be sacrificed in favor of more important political concerns . It may not be welcome news that

military efficiency will sometimes take a back seat to other

con siderat ions . In s u ch cas es, the m ilitary ha s a du ty an d re

sponsibility to explain and request all the things it believes it

needs to achieve national goals. At the same time, military

profession als n eed to learn to accept th at s ometim es other n a

tional priorities will mean they do not get all the autonomy

th ey wou ld like.

16




None of these comments about the conquest paradigm and

th e need for a n ew effects-bas ed su ccess p ara digm is m ean t to

su ggest tha t the m ilitary has been droppin g bombs or mar ch

ing around the countryside at tacking enemy posi t ions for novalid rea son . In a genera l sen se, th ey h ave always h ad certain

desired effects in mind when conducting military actions.

However, they have often pursued military objectives without

direct reference to appropriate effects that would create the

conditions for achieving them and with li t t le consideration of

other effects that would be created along the way. The EBO

methodology is designed to correct these deficiencies as well

as provide a better environment to assess the results of mili

tary a ct ions.

Historical Background on Effects

At least as far back as World War II, some air planners were

tryin g to im plem ent th e essen tial con cepts of EBO. In th e late

193 0s , pa rticu lar ly at th e Air Corps Tactical Sch ool, US Arm y

Air Corps (USAAC) thinkers had developed a number of theo

ries a bou t air war far e, in clu ding on e wh ich ca m e to be kn own

as the industrial-web theory. This theory was actually quitewell grounded in concepts that would later come to be known

as effects-based. In its essentials, the industrial-web theory

was n ot u n like m an y of th e systems or system -of-system s th e

ories of recent years. The basic idea was that a modern war

m achine , su ch as the Germ an or J apa nese arm ies of the t im e,

required th e su pport of a h u ge in du str ial com plex comprised

of many interlinked subelements called the web. Manufactur

in g plan ts, tra n sp ortation s yst ems , power produ ction, delivery

systems, and other cr i t ical e lements made up this web. Furth er, there were thou gh t to be a fin ite an d determ in able n u m

ber of vital links or what we now call critical nodes, which if

successfully destroyed or debilitated, would bring about col

lap se of th e en tire web.9 In 1941 the USAAC set out to define

th ese cr it ical lin ks in h opes th at s tra tegic bomba rdm ent, by it -

self, could brin g th e Germ an an d J apa n ese war m ach in es to a

grinding halt or, alternatively, “break the will of the people to

con tin u e resis ta n ce.”10

17



CADRE PAPER

His torical Examples of Effects-Bas ed Thinking

In 1941 an d 194 2 th e Un ited States a n d Britain, workin g to

gether, developed plans for a strategic bombing campaign

again st Nazi Germa n y. Thes e plan s were, in par t , bas ed on th ebelief that the German economy—like the British economy—

was fully mobilized in support of the war effort. With this in

mind and for reasons s tated below, the planners decided to

focus on the ball-bearing industry rather than “the electrical

power grid . . . tra n sp ortation n etwork . . . an d th e oil an d pe

troleu m in du str y” as sta ted in th e earliest USAAC plan s. 11 Th e

German aircraft industry was actually listed as first priority,

but principally as an intermediate objective to enable allied

bomber operations. While all these systems were consideredvital to German war production, ball-bearing production was

con centrated in a sm aller n u m ber of facilit ies th an th e others .

USAAC and Royal Air Force planners operated on the as

sumption that the German electr ical power system was s imi

lar ly con stru cted to th e US system, which h ad a great d eal of

redundancy, robust interconnection, and, therefore, high re-

silience.12 If one sector of the power grid was damaged, it was

assumed the Germans would shutt le power from another . Ei

th er ta rget s et, in th e end , cou ld a chieve th e desired effect; bu tth e ba ll-bearing indu st ry seem ed to offer th e greater leverage

an d th e prom ise of a qu icker end to Germ an y’s a bility to su s

tain its war effort.

The assumptions that Germany was on a ful l war footing

an d th at its electrical power distribu tion wou ld prove res ilient

were a result of mirror imaging. That is, in lieu of actual in-

formation, planners deliberately accepted the US system as a

logically satisfactory model of the German system. They were

also reasonable assumptions, based on available data . SinceHitler claimed to have achieved full employment in Germany

by 1939, pr esu m ab ly there was low probability that m an pow

er could be expanded significantly. Hitler had begun a rapid,

highly publicized, and apparently massive weapons-building

program before the start of the war; so it was also reasonable

to ass u m e he was ah ead of, not beh in d, th e Allies in th e pace

of industrial mobilization. American and British planners as

sumed that Hit ler would not have s tar ted the largest war in

18




history without first fully mobilizing his economy to fight it.

Rational or not, we know—in retrospect—that the German

economy was not fully mobilized until 1944, and by then the

war was already lost. This was fortunate for the Allied causeand contributed substantially to the defeat of Nazi Germany,

but i t does not change the fact that Allied wartime planning

was ba sed on m ore than one false ass u m ption. Bom bin g low

ered maximum possible output at any given t ime but did not

result in reduced overall output until very near the end of the

war. In fact , Germ an war produ ction a ctua lly qu adr u pled be-

tween 194 2 a n d 19 44 in s pite of h eavy an d relatively accu ra te

British an d US bom bing of in du str ial an d civilian ta rgets .13

According to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, conductedafter the war, the German electrical power grid was not near

ly as robu st a s th e US grid a n d was one of th e few pa rts of th e

Nazi econ omy th at was operating n ear fu ll capa city early in th e

war. It m ay actu ally ha ve been th e m agic th read USAAC plan

n ers were looking for in th e Germ an in du str ial web. Heavy an d

sustained at tacks on power generat ion might have had the

disas trou s effects on th e Nazi war econom y tha t USAAC plan

n ers were s eekin g—h ad th eir initial plan s p revailed—bu t oth er

priorities intervened. Attacks on the ball-bearing plants produced a great deal of damage to factories , but not as much

damage as was thought a t the t ime, due to er rors in assess

m ent. Th e sole m ean s of as sess in g dam age was overhead im

agery in which a photointerpreter (PI) could only see building

exteriors , rather than the much more cr i t ical production ma

chinery and equipment inside the building. Using the tech

nologies of the time, PIs did an excellent job of assessing the

percentage of roof area destroyed in bombing raids, but this

tu rn ed out n ot to be a good gau ge of th e dam age su ffered bysu ch impor tant produ ct ion e lements as heavy equipment a nd

m ach in e tools u n der t h e roofs. For exam ple, roofs of th e bu ild

in gs a t th e Sch wein fu rt b all-bearing plan ts were ju dged by PIs

to be 75 percent destroyed after the second raid in October

1943; yet later information indicated that only 10 percent of

cr i t ical equipment was damaged. Imports from Sweden and

Switzerlan d covered im m ediate Germ an produ ction sh ortfalls.

In the meantime, the Germans were able to sufficiently dis-

19



CADRE PAPER

perse ball-bearing production so that i t became a poor target

set for th e rem aind er of th e war.14

This example il lustrates the need to stay focused upon real,

desired effects such as disruption of production in this case.Surrogates or extrapolat ions such as roof area destroyed are

n ot viab le m ean s of determ in in g actu al effects. Usin g the p er-

cent of roof area destroyed as the critical measure actually

proved counterproductive because the type of ordnance that

will des tr oy th e grea tes t a m ou n t of roofin g (i.e., la rge nu m bers

of small bombs) is relatively ineffective against the critical ele

ment of production in this case, the heavy machinery. De

stroying the critical and hard to replace heavy equipment

under the roofs required large, heavy bombs that could onlybe carried and dropped in relatively small numbers with less

spectacular impact on the roof. Hard-learned lessons from

this experience would actually interfere with EBO analysis a

full 50 years later during the Persian Gulf War. The struggle

for va lid p osts trike a n alyses du ring World War II would cr eat e

another, similarly enduring problem for that same later con

flict . During the campaign in the European theater, PIs found

th at ph otos ta ken d u rin g a ra id tend ed to exaggerate the dam -

age in flicted by the ra id. Th e sm oke, du st, a n d explosions captured by photos taken during a raid looked spectacular but

also made near misses look like direct hits. From this experi

ence th e in telligence a n alysis comm u n ity drew the conclus ion

that only poststrike photos could provide valid analytic data,

which b ecam e the pr im ary, and u su ally on ly, mea n s of deter-

m in in g bom bin g effectiven ess .

After years of round-the-clock bombing, the Allies succeed

ed in finding and seriously degrading two target systems that

proved critical to the German war effort: transportation andoil. Tra n sp ortation was a ttra ctive for opera tiona l reas ons ; tha t

is , th e m ajor ra il yard s were easier to h it in ba d weath er th an

individual factories because they gave a very distinctive radar

retu rn . Oil was p art icu lar ly at t ra ct ive for ass essm ent reason s:

the military units that relied heavily on oil also relied heavily

on radios the Allies could monitor, so they were able to inter

cept German assessments of the effectiveness of strikes. At-

tacks on these two systems were also highly synergistic. At-

20




tacks on the rail system took down phone lines, which were

colocated with the rail l ines, thus forcing the Germans to

greater rel iance on radio transmissions, which further en

h an ced intelligence gath erin g again st th e oil target set. At th esame t ime, these a t tacks increased re l iance upon less fue l -

efficient road transport, which suffered from direct attack as

well as th e at ta cks on p etroleum produ ction a n d s u pplies . Th e

leveraging effect here is obvious.

Again the USAF learned much from all these experiences,

but some of the learning—such as the effectiveness of strike

versu s post str ike ph otogra ph y—was influ enced by the sta te of

technology of the time. During Desert Storm, the intelligence

system continued to insist that only poststrike imagery wasu sefu l for deter m in in g strike effectivenes s. This ca u sed prob

lems because some heavy , pene t ra t ing bombs punched

through thick layers of reinforced concrete and earth to ex

plode in side sh elters a n d bu n kers , leavin g beh in d only a r ela

tively small entry hole and no external indication of blast or

h eat. An an alyst could tell lit t le ab ou t pr obab le da m age in side

th e stru ctu re from th e relat ively sm all pen etrat ion h ole. Com

bining that evidence with a strike video showing the penetra

tion, explosion and resultant indications of overpressure in-s ide the bunker gave a much bet ter idea of probable

effectiveness. However, the lesson that poststrike imagery was

th e only reliab le sou rce for an alysis was long h eld, a n d it was

very difficu lt to get an alyst s t o con sider oth er s ou rces of in tel

ligence for making battle damage assessments (BDA). As a re

su lt , in some cas es bomb ers revisi ted ta rgets th at d id n ot need

to be at ta cked again . Becau se of an an alyt ic bias toward ph ys

ical da m a ge, it wa s very difficu lt t o verify syst em ic effects s u ch

as loss of electrical power in Baghdad.Another problem that affected both planning and combat

analysis had to do with the approach employed for targeting

various systems, for example the electrical power system.

World War II was a long war, fought with little concern for

postwar consequences of the level of infrastructure destruc

tion n ecessa ry to victory. Becau se of lim itat ions of th en sta te-

of-th e-art b omb in g tech n ologies, lar ge bom ber form at ions h ad

to be sent against single target complexes; and follow-up at-

21



CADRE PAPER

tacks were necessarily infrequent. The Allies simply did not

h ave th e resources to con tin u ally at tack th e sam e com plexes.

Th erefore, it was imp ortan t to ach ieve ma xim u m long-term de

str u ction from a n y one bom bing atta ck. Sin ce it was tota l war,very little in Germ an y was off lim its to bom bing a n d little or n o

concern was given to postwar conditions. One specific learn

in g ou tcome was th at th e best wa y to create long-term effects

on th e electrical power genera tin g an d distribu tion s ystem wa s

to destroy the heavy generators that produced the power.

Without them there was no power to distribute. Power gener

ators were big, expensive, and difficult to replace. Thus, their

destruction would cause a relatively long-term loss of power.

Under th e conqu est par adigm , this was a valua ble lesson; bu t ,once again, this lesson would ha u n t plan n ers in a la ter, more

tech n ologically ad van ced wa r.

Fifty years after World War II, armed with the best of late

twen tieth-cen tu ry ha rdware, th e US m ilitary once a gain t est

ed theories of strategic bombardment in what initially looked

like a n oth er “good war.” Un der th e tu telage of Col J ohn A.

War den III, th e Ch eckm a te Division of th e Air S ta ff h ad devel

oped a new conceptualization of strategic air warfare, later

du bb ed p ar allel war far e. Th eir view of a n ad vers ar y’s m ilita ry-industrial capabilit ies and requirements were strikingly simi

lar to the industrial-web theories of five decades earlier, but

th ey pr oposed to ta ke down critical elem ent s of th e web so fas t

th a t cap a bility to s u pp ort a war effort wou ld collap se (an effect

th ey ca lled s tra tegic pa ra lysis). Colonel War den ’s t eam pr o-

posed to att ack th e will of Sa dda m Hu ss ein ’s desp otic regim e

and perhaps the will of the people of Iraq as well. These plan

ners th ou ght th a t su ch a t ta cks might b r ing about a chan ge in

th e regim e’s d ecision t o claim Ku wait by force or tu r n th e people against the regime and bring it down. 15 Once again, as in

ea rly pla n n ing for World Wa r II, at ta ckin g th e en em y’s electr i

cal power production and distribution system was a key ele

ment of the plan. Air campaign planners considered the elec

trical power system a highly leveraged target set because not

only might it achieve the desired psychological effects men

tioned above but also “damage to it would likely affect other

crit ical target sets (su ch a s m ilitary com m u n icat ions an d th e

22



CADRE PAPER

fects a s opposed to th e level of ph ysical dam age th at wou ld b e

created. In fact, their ideal would have been to turn off the

power with a switch, so they could turn i t back on again as

soon as Iraq was compliant with internat ional demands. Inlieu of this capability, the military planners decided the best

comp rom ise b etween effect on electrical power syst em s in Ira q

an d a bility to rebu ild was to target tran sform er yar ds . Repair

in g tran sform er yard s wou ld be m u ch less expens ive an d ta ke

less t ime than generator hal ls . The planners foresaw a dual

ben efit from th is ap proa ch. First , t h e poten tial for qu ickly re-

building critical infrastructure would offer the carrot in their

vision of a carrot-and-stick approach to operations—that is,

“do what we want and we will help you quickly rebuild.” Second , th e benefit was t o save on fu tu re US aid expen ditu res or,

in other words , th e cost of th e carrot th at wou ld r ewar d Iraq’s

expected compliance.18 The planners eventually carried their

poin t , bu t it was n ot eas y.

Even after the operational planners had prevailed in their

point with both the joint force air component commander

(JFACC) and theater combatant commander (formerly com

mander in chief), there was stil l a crit ical problem with as

sessment . The US combat assessment sys tem was programmed to credit effect on the power grid only when

generator halls were confirmed destroyed. Thus, while plan

n ers were as su red by oth er sour ces th at th e ligh ts were ou t in

Baghdad, intelligence analysts were assessing only moderate

effectiveness against the electrical target set. Mission planners

at flying units soon figured out this disconnect and—when

given a generating plant as a target—some of them would

choose generator ha lls ra th er tha n th e ass ociated tra n sform er

fields , as aim poin ts, to get better BDA reports from th e comba t a s sessment sys tem.19 While this created immediate con

flicts between des ired an d actu al targetin g ou tcomes th at were

quickly recognized, a much larger disconnect between objec

tives and actions would not be fully appreciated until years

later.

The focus operational planners maintained on desired ef

fects and outcomes was commendable and productive, but

nei ther the planning nor assessment system even considered

24




the potential long-term second- and third-order collateral ef

fects created by total loss of electrical power in a major city

l ike Baghdad. Resultant subsystem fai lures included water

and sewage t rea tment p lants and hospi ta ls tha t u l t imate lycau sed m ore deva st a ting long-ter m effects on th e Ira qi civilia n

populat ion than anything the coali t ion intended. Saddam

sh ould get mu ch of th e credit for the m agnitu de an d du rat ion

of Iraqi civilian suffering, due to postwar neglect of the popu

lace and recalcitrant reactions to United Nations stipulations.

However, he was a ble to u se this u n in tended a n d u n fortun ate

effect of su ffering by in n ocent citizen s t o hu rt th e pu blic im age

of the United States in the Arab world. In some quarters, i t

may even have created sympathy for Saddam himself. If so,coalition action s agains t t h e Ira qi electrical system u ltim ately

ach ieved t h e opposite of th e in ten ded policy goal. Rath er th an

turning the people against Saddam, it allowed him to exploit

the suffering of his own people.

A lot more could be said about USAF efforts to implement

effects-based planning in the past , but these two examples

suffice to make the point. The USAF has been implementing

effects-based concepts for a long time, but doing it piecemeal,

n ot coheren tly, an d n ot rea lly recording or codifyin g wh at h asbeen lear n ed th rou gh th ese experiences. A differen t, m ore co

h erent a pp roach is requ ired. Even toda y, lit t le is kn own a bou t

imposition of systemic and psychological effects through mili

ta ry actions . Th e ab ility to affect m orale an d will, for in st an ce,

and the ability to coerce changes in behavior are sti l l essen

tially matters of assertion. There is no comprehensive under-

sta n ding of h ow to create su ch effects, wheth er it is tru ly pos

sible or h ow to as ses s th e progress an d extent of su ch effects.

Th is sh ortfall will rem ain tru e u n til th e US m ilita ry adopts anagreed concept for EBO that addresses these and other cr i t i

cal iss u es.

The Premise for the EBO Methodology

Throughout history senior US decision makers have striven

to attain policy goals by creating desired effects. As noted in

th e pr evious pa ges, civilian an d m ilita ry leaders n orm ally ha ve

objectives and a desired effect or effects in mind when con-

25



CADRE PAPER

fron tin g a crisis or conflict, althou gh th ey m ay or m ay n ot be

willing—or even able in some cases—to articulate them. For

senior Air Force personnel, achieving effects often equates

solely to target destr u ction, wh ich som etim es is referred t o aseffects-based targeting. Attaining specific effects applies

acr oss th e fu ll sp ectru m of en gagemen t at all levels of em ploy

m ent a n d en tai ls a great dea l m ore than simply destroyin g or

degrading selected ta rgets. 20 The underlying premise of an ef

fects-based concept asserts that affecting a particular target

set in a part icular way may have functional , systemic, and

ps ych ological effects well beyond sim ple dest ru ction or degra

da tion of th e target set. Rat h er th an bein g an end in its elf, the

destruction of targets should more logically be viewed as ameans (creating desired effects) to achieving an end (policy

goals).21 Military power, and airpower in particular, may still

seek to destroy targets; but physical destruction is only one

possible desired effect within a wide spectrum of options.

Specifically, it should be one of many possibilities available in

a p rocess th at s eeks h igh er order effects. Other option s m igh t

in clu de ma n eu ver, non leth al at ta ck to in clu de in form at ion op

erations like in tru sion int o an ad versa ry’s comm u n ication s

systems or even logistics as in a HUMRO.Viewed a n other way, the ch allen ge is to sh ift from in pu t- to

output-driven planning for military actions, or more specifi

cally in the case of targeting, away from a mentality of servic

ing targets to producing effects that accomplish specified ob-

jectives. 22 Overall , the premise of EBO is to use both lethal

(e.g., target destruction) and nonlethal (e.g., information oper

ations) means at the tactical level to produce predetermined

direct (firs t ord er) a n d in direct (secon d a n d t h ird order ) effects

at th e operation al an d s tra tegic levels of em ploym ent . Th e n etresult of this precise application of military resources is to

generate effects that will r ipple and cascade throughout the

system over time, th ereby circu m scribin g option s availab le to

opponents and increasing those available to friendly forces. 23

Effects m u st n ot be an a fterth ough t of th e targetin g process or

th e sole doma in of as sess ors a t temp tin g to determ in e if a tar-

get was dest royed. Rath er effects s h ou ld b e th e in tegra l lin ch

pin that binds together the planning, execution, and assess-

26




ment of all military actions and the actions of other agencies

as well.

Arguably airmen have moved faster than others in the mili

ta ry to ad opt effects-ba sed con cepts, p rin cipa lly in th e form of effects-based targeting.24 This stems partly from the different

perspective inherent in air actions, which predisposes airmen

to view th e en tire b att le sp ace fu n ctiona lly, as opposed to ge-

ographically. 25 This functional perspective allows airmen to

see the bat t le space as a whole more s imilar to what a JFC

sees than does a surface force commander, who general ly

fights his war in a clearly delineated area with boundaries

separat ing his area from those of other surface commanders .

As a n at u ra l ou tgrowth of th is p ersp ective, airm en often qu estion—in a way different from surface commanders—how ac

tions in one part of the battle space are linked with and af

fected by actions elsewhere. For instance, airmen have been

more inclined to see the possibili ty of operational and strate

gic outcomes as the result of individual tactical actions.

Stra tegic att ack is a prime exam ple of tactical action s leading

to strategic outcomes. A considerable challenge for the EBO

methodology is to translate the effects-based targeting view

described above from a less air-centric view into a more jointEBO perspective that leads to effects-based thinking and

process es th at a re ap plicable across th e entire spectru m of en

gagement.

On th e su rface, the con cept of EBO appear s obvious an d n ot

particularly new to many military people. On closer inspec

tion, th ou gh , it is n ot widely un ders tood a n d worse yet, often

va st ly m isu n ders tood. Ma n y of th e wide variety of concep ts ex

plorin g on e facet or an other of EBO, su ch a s effects-ba sed tar

geting or fires and effects, are too narrowly defined. One presumably informed source s tated that disabling targets while

minimizing collateral damage was the goal of effects-based

targeting.26 All of th ese des cription s con ta in tru th an d, in fact,

effects-b as ed ta rgetin g is on e neces sa ry elem en t of EBO. How-

ever, su ch a focu s exclu des effects-ba sed m an eu ver, logist ics,

m obility, an d oth er im porta n t a sp ects of a real join t EBO con

cept . These and other such misunderstandings of EBO con

cepts pa rtially explain t h e Air Force’s a n d oth er m ilita ry ser -

27



CADRE PAPER

vices’ sp otty tra ck record in a pp licat ion of EBO a cross th e

spectru m of engagemen t.

Over at least the past three decades, the Air Force has

sought to enhance its abili ty to create ever more discrete effects. Specifically, technological improvements for the Air

Force centered on th e developm ent or im provem ent of stea lth ,

precision , leth ality, an d comm an d a n d contr ol (C2) sys tem s . In

light of all these technological advancements, American air-

power can n ow dest roy ta rgets m ore reliab ly with great er pr e

cis ion and lethal i ty at a much lower r isk to combatants than

it could at any time in the past. As significant as these ac

complishments are, they stil l have a limited impact on creat

in g effects th rou gh out th e ba ttle spa ce. Most of th e techn ological improvements discussed here have exerted their greatest

in flu ence on m ilitar y action s th rou gh th e ph ysical dest ru ction

of targets. These advancements are absolutely necessary to

th e con cept of EBO bu t , to the extent th at th in kin g about th eir

application remains mired down at the tactical level of em

ployment, they fail to address the wide range of noncombat

military actions US forces are called upon to execute today. In

order to realize the full potential of EBO, both objectives and

effects m u st be lin ked across all th ree levels of em ploymen t—strategic, operational, and tactical. In a similar fashion, i t is

also im portan t to think jus t as h ard abou t th e kin ds of effects

necessary for success across the spectrum of employment

from MOOTW u p to a n d in clu ding MTW.

There are those who claim the EBO concept is already well

and universal ly understood but has fai led in the past s imply

because intel l igence has been unable to assess resul ts prop

erly. Therefore, rather than further developing the concept,

th ey believe it is on ly necess ar y to bu y more s oph isticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to

collect an d d iss em in ate m ore com plete in form ation for com ba t

assessment. Part of the confusion here results from the fact

that the US military has, in fact, over the last few decades

va st ly im pr oved th e lin ka ge of a ction s t o objectives in p la n n in g

processes. Linking actions to objectives has similar connota

tions to lin king them to effects bu t is n ot quite the sa m e th in g.

Generally speaking, objectives do not specify operational ac-

28




thors recommend the following concise definition for the term

effects : Effects consist of a full range of outcomes, events, or

consequences that result from a specific action.

This definition provides a departure point for categorizingand classifying associated concepts . In the most basic sense

effects ca n be b roken down int o direct a n d in direct effects.31 A

direct effect is the result of actions with no intervening effect

or mechanism between act and outcome. Direct effects are

usually immediate and easily recognizable. For example,

bombing enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and associ

a ted C2 fa cilities m ay p rodu ce th e d irect effect of ph ysically de

stroying those targets. Direct effects can trigger additional

out com es r eferred t o as in direct effects, which m ay be clas sified as th ose effects th at a re created thr ough a n in term ediate

effect or mechanism to produce a final outcome or result .

Goin g back to th e SAM site exam ple, a pos sible in direct effect

might be the refusal of operators at other SAM sites to target

aircraft out of fear of being attacked. Direct and indirect ef

fects may be physical, functional, or psychological in nature.

Indirect effects also may be systemic and tend to be delayed

an d/ or m a y be d ifficu lt to recogn ize. In direct effects a re often

the cumulative or cascading result of many combined direct

effects.32

The relationship between direct and indirect effects can be

seen in th e exam ple of an at ta ck on a n enem y’s C 2 system . De

str oyin g a s in gle com m u n ication s n ode creates a direct effect:

that specif ic communicat ions node is degraded or ceases to

function. The cumulative result (i.e., indirect effect) of multi

ple s tr ikes against a number of s imilar and related targets

cou ld r esu lt in a chievin g the a ir p lan n ers’ tru e objective: un der m in in g th e enem y’s a bility to comm an d m ilita ry forces ef

fectively. During the Gulf War, attacks against Saddam Hus

sein’s C2 faci l i t ies forced his mil i tary into autonomous

operat ion s, s ometh ing th ey were n eith er t ra in ed n or equ ipped

to handle. As noted earlier, indirect effects usually occur over

time, and it may take an indeterminate period of t ime before

th e overall lack of comm u n ication s h as a deleterious effect on

th e enem y.33 Overa ll, th e comb in a tion of direct a n d ind irect ef-

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CADRE PAPER

fects ca n ach ieve th e u ltima te objective of a n y a ction —to com

pel or sh ape a desired resu lt .

Firs t , S econd, and Third Order Effects

Firs t ord er effects a re s yn onymou s with direct effects. Second

an d t h ird order effects cons titu te ind irect effects (see fig. 2). Maj

J ay M. Kreigh bau m provides th e exam ple of first/ secon d/ th ird

order effects.34

- For fight-centric––For example, designated mean

- For mobility-centric operations––For example, aerialport of delivery or debarkation

Impact Point

point of impact

1st Order Effect

- Direct, immediate result

2d/3d Order Effect

- Destruction/neutralization of physical object- Disaster relief––Initial distribution of aid

- Directly related to object and/or situation

- Downstream result from a physical action- Indirect result, delayed in time

- Indirectly or directly related to object and/or situation

Figure 2. Example of First/Second/Third Order Effects

First Order (Direct Effects). First order effects r esu lt im

m ediat ely from an action . Th e resu lts ar e directly at tribu ta ble

to a m ilita ry atta ck on a ta rget or other a ctions at a s pecific lo-

cation an d occu r imm ediately or very nea rly im m ediately afterthe specific actions.35

Second/Third Order (Indirect Effects). Those effects that

are created through an intermediate effect or mechanism,

thereby producing a final outcome or result . Simply stated a

cau ses b , cau ses c, cau ses —see figu re 3 for the relat ions h ip of

first , second, and third order effects.36 Fur thermore , second

an d t h ird order effects a re indirect effects, which m ay be fu n c

tional, systemic, or psychological in nature. Indirect effects

32




ten d t o be delayed a n d t ypically are m ore difficu lt to recognize

than direct effects.37 Depending on the situation, indirect ef

fects may occur over an indeterminate period of t ime. An ex-

am ple of second an d th ird order indirect effects would be disruptions in the electric grid, which yields rolling blackouts

that disrupts petroleum deliveries to airfields and that dis

rupts air operat ions.

DirectIndirect

1st OrderEffect

2d Order

Effect

3d OrderEffect

Source: Briefing and paper, USAF Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: “Strategic and In-

direct Effect: Defining and Modeling,” 11 August 2000.

Figure 3. Complexity of Higher Order Effects

Cumulative and Cascading Effects

Direct and indirect effects can be cumulative or they can

cascade through the course of an action. Cumulative effects

result from the aggregate of many direct or indirect effects.This aggregation of effects may occur at the same or at differ

ent levels of employment. Typically, a cumulative effect flows

from lower-to-higher levels of employment and occurs at the

h igher levels; h owever, it m a y occur at th e sa m e level a s a con

tributing lower-order effect. As an example, increased opera

tion a l-level a ir s u periority could b e th e cu m u lat ive effect of de

stroying numerous SAM sites at the tactical level.38 A second

exam ple would be the dis tr ibut ion of h u m an itar ian a id at n u -

Action

A

33



CADRE PAPER

merous airports throughout a country or region with the cu

m u la tive effect of pr ovidin g th e neces sa ry food an d disa st er re-

lief m at erials to t h e m ajority of th e popu lation r equirin g su ch

aid. Alth ough cu m u lative effects m ay occur at th e ta ctical levelof em ploym en t, th ey most typically occu r a t th e operation al or

st ra tegic levels of em ploym en t.

Indirect effects can ripple through an enemy target system

in a combat scenario or a situation in MOOTW and often af

fecting other systems. Most frequently indirect effects cascade

or flow from higher to lower levels of employment. For exam

ple, wh en a n enem y centra l h eadqu arters is d estroyed th e ef

fects cascad e down th rough th e enem y echelons to u lt im ately

disrupt numerous tact ical units on the bat t lef ield (an admittedly fight-centric example).39 Similar ly, in a n exam ple in volv

ing mobility operations, working directly with a host-nation

govern m ent can h ave a positive cas cading effect on th e overall

efficiency an d su ccess of h u m an itar ian operat ion s with in th at

nation. When supplies are given directly to the government,

dis tr ibution to the dis tressed populace may be enhanced

through a cascading effect.

Virtu ally no pa rt of a t ar get au dien ce or i ts in fra st ru ctu re is

truly isolated.40 In other words , effects, wh eth er d irect or ind irect, ha ve a ripp le or distribu tive im pa ct th rou gh ou t th e target

environm ent or system whether a n at ion -state or a loosely knit

internat ional terroris t group. The cumulat ive and cascading

nature of direct and indirect effects contributes to their dis

tribu tive cha ra cter.41 With su ccess ive layers of in direct effects ,

it becomes increasingly difficult to precisely predict and mea

sure outcomes. Historically, it has proven extremely difficult

to predict with any degree of certainty beyond the third order

effects d iscu ss ed a bove. Th is cha ra cteristic h igh ligh ts th e factth a t th ere a re few, if an y, clear lin es of dem a rca tion for effects

beyond the third order. Table 1 shows the increasing com

plexity in volved with su ch effects with in a n extrem ely com plex

and in ter re la ted sys tem such as an enemy s ta te . 42 Nonstate

actors , su ch a s terroris t organ izat ion s a n d n etworks also m ay

be inherently complex. Furthermore, Table 1 provides exam

ples of effects a cross th e levels of em ploym en t a n d ties togeth

er th e categories an d concepts p resented to this poin t .

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CADRE PAPER

era te su bsequent e ffects tha t were u nin tended and/ or u na n

ticipated. It is important to distinguish between collateral

damage and collateral effects. According to Air Force Instruc

t ion 14 -210, US AF Targeting In telligen ce Guide , collatera l dam -age is br oadly defin ed as th e u n in ten tiona l or in ciden ta l da m -

age affecting facilities, equipment, or personnel that were not

targeted. Such damage can occur to fr iendly, neutral , and

even enemy forces. This definition seems unnecessarily re

strictive as it implies collateral damage is solely negative and

never results in benefit to the plan.

During operational planning, potential collateral effects

evalua t ion s h ould con sider s econd an d t hird order effects th at

may impact outcomes either positively or negatively. WorldWar II provides an excellent example of collateral effects. In

preparation for the Normandy invasion, the Allies attacked

rai lroad m ars h allin g yard s in a m ajor a ir a ct ion to disru pt th e

reinforcement and resupply of German divisions in the inva

sion ar ea. The direct effect of action s agains t th e ra il syst ems

of both France and Germany was successful interdict ion and

disru ption th at , in tu rn , in direct ly isolated th e Norma n dy bat

tlefield from supporting forces and supplies. Additionally,

there were two collateral effects associated with these air at-

tacks . Th e destru ct ion an d disru ption of th e rail system h ad a

positive effect by contributing to the collapse of the overall

German war economy. Conversely, destroying these mar

sh allin g yard s h a d th e n egative collat era l effect of den yin g th e

Allied forces use of the same railroad systems to move troops

and logistical supplies forward in the ensuing ground cam

pa ign in Fra n ce. Du ring World War II th ere m ay h ave been n o

other choice, even h ad th e n egat ive collat eral effects b een an ticipated. Today, however, planners might consider other

m ean s for ach ievin g the d esired effects. Perha ps ta rgetin g on ly

very key poin ts of th e rail system in a m an n er th at wou ld a llow

quick repair by the Allies similar to the attacks against Iraqi

electrical distribution in Desert Storm described earlier. Col

lateral effects should be a major, deliberate consideration in

planning, executing, and assessing mil i tary act ions on any

scale.

36



CADRE PAPER

the remaining operational capability of a targeted facility or

object. A fu n ctiona l ass ess m ent is m ore difficu lt a n d deta iled

th an a ph ysical-dam age as sess m ent. In th e EBO m ethodology,

this area of analysis must be expanded to include the functional-impact assessment of positive events, such as con

struction of infrastructure to support friendly target audi

ences.

Systemic effects are those indirect effects aimed at affecting

or disrupting the operation of a specific system or set of sys

tem s. The distinction between fu n ctiona l an d s ystem ic effects

hinges upon what exactly is affected as defined by the objec

t ive. If it is a target su ch as a t ran sform er yard , th en a fu n c

tional effect is what is desired. Conversely, if the desire is toaffect an entire system such as an electrical power grid, then

it is a systemic effect.47 The loss of power from an electrical

power plant could affect numerous systems including com

m u nica t ions , C2 , an d pet roleum product ion am ong others a nd

h ence h ave cu m u lat ive or cas cad in g effects. On th e down side,

dest ru ction of m ain electrical power grids u su ally ha s th e col

lat era l effect of disru pt in g power to su ch facilities as h osp ita ls

an d s ewage-treatm ent p lan ts . With regard to ass essm ent, Air

Force Pamphlet 14-210, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, 1Febru ary 199 8, provides ins igh t on what is term ed ta rget-system

as sess m ent. Target-system as sess m ent u ses BDA in form ation

that is then fused with functional damage to a target system

and an evaluation is made of the overall impact on the sys

tem ’s cap ab ilities. On ce aga in , th e EBO m eth odology will re-

qu ire expan din g the cu rrent view of target-system as sess m ent

to in clu de p ositive effects on friend ly sys tem s for act ions su ch

as MOOTW an d HUMRO.

Psych ological effects a re th e resu lts of act ions th at in flu en ceem otions , m otives, objective rea son in g, an d u ltim ately th e be

h avior of foreign govern m ent s, organ izat ions , grou ps , an d in

dividu a ls. Th ese effects m a y be eith er d irect or in direct effects

resu ltin g from su ch m ilita ry actions . For exam ple, stra tegic at

tacks—in particular—against an adversary may have the ef

fect of dem oralizin g en em y lead ers h ip, m ilita ry forces, a n d th e

popu lat ion, th u s a ffectin g th e enem y’s will to wage wa r. On th e

other hand, i t may be important in other types of act ions to

38




achieve positive psychological effects on a given target audi

en ce. In eith er ca se, a ch ievin g a ps ych ological effect can be a n

elu sive goal an d on e th at is extrem ely difficu lt to m eas u re a c-

curately.

48

Th e con cept is a very im porta n t one, h owever, an dshould not be discarded or downplayed simply because of the

difficulties involved in defining and measuring success.

There is a natural l inkage among physical, functional, sys

temic, and psychological effects. The linkage may vary in de

gree but appears to always be present. For example, a bridge

may be physically destroyed. As a result , the bridge is no

longer functional, and its lack of functionality degrades the

transportat ion system. Furthermore, the loss of the bridge

m ay h ave a p sychological im pa ct on th e ad versa ry, esp eciallyif it was one of th e prima ry avenu es of escap e or retreat in th e

face of advancing military forces. The important aspect is to

develop a better understanding of the inherent interrelation-

ship of effects and to incorporate this understanding into

plan n in g, execution , an d a ss essm ent of operat ion s.

Tact ical , Operat ional , and S trategic

Level Effects

The so-called levels of war or spectrum of conflict are doctrinal perspectives that clarify links between strategic objec

tives an d ta ctical action s. Th is pers pective ten ds to lim it d oc

trinal discussions to fight-centric scenarios. To avoid that

lim ita tion, a s explain ed p reviou sly, th e term s leve ls of em ploy

m en t a n d s pectrum of engagemen t are used in lieu of levels of

war a n d s pectru m of conflict. Alth ough th ere a re n o fin ite lim

its or boundaries between them, the three levels are generally

described as strategic, operational, and tactical. In a broader

sen se t h e levels actu ally app ly to both wa r a n d MOOTW, sinceeffects-based operations may be employed anywhere in the

spectrum of engagement, from peacetime through MTW. 49 Air

Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Em

ploym en t of Aerosp ace Pow er , captures the associat ion pre

cisely when it states, “the focus at a given level of war is not

on th e specific weapons u sed, or on th e targets a t tacked, bu t

rather on the desired effects.” Effects are the tactical, opera

tiona l, or st ra tegic level out comes th at m ilita ry action s ar e in -

39




st ra tegy, a bility, or will to wage war or ca rry ou t a ggres s ive a c

tivity through destruction or disruption of his COGs or other

vital target sets. COGs may typically include command ele

ments , war production assets , f ie lded forces, and key sup-porting in fra str u ctu re. Stra tegic effects can resu lt from th e ac

tions of air and space or surface forces at the lower levels of

em ploym ent . An exam ple of th e lat ter would be des tru ction of

th e en emy arm y on th e bat t lefield. Su ch a tact ical an d/ or op

erationa l-level action wou ld, in tu rn , im pa ir th e enem y st ra te

gy to th e poin t wh ere it is forced to ceas e fightin g. In th is ca s e,

the cumulative results from the tactical level are eventually

felt at the strategic level.51 Strategic effects in general require

a lon ger tim e to m an ifest th an do effects at t h e opera tiona l an dtactical levels. However, i t is important to note that there are

in sta n ces of em ployin g milita ry forces aim ed a t pr odu cin g the

direct strategic effect of enemy defeat with no intermediate

level effects on en em y forces involved. 52

The operational level describes activities associated with

campaigns, major actions, and activities that affect an entire

theater of operations. At this level, efforts focus either on the

war -ma king poten tial of th e enem y or the a bility to ha ve thea ter -

wide influence in a nonfight-centric scenario. The principalfocu s at th is level is on enem y forces, an enem y’s operation al

COG, or the cond itions beh in d th e specific circu m sta n ces in a

MOOTW. Operational-level effects contribute to reducing and

u n balan cin g an adversa ry’s capacity to condu ct su ccessfu l

cam pa ign s a n d wage war. Th ese effects u su ally ta ke less t im e

to be real ized than do strategic ones but are less immediate

than effects at the tactical level.53

Tactical effects are the result of an action or actions at the

individual unit level. Such effects can be either direct or indirect and typically act in concert with other tactical effects to

produce results at higher levels of employment. Tactical ef

fects generally occur on a localized basis and are immediate

and of short duration. Most often they contribute to overall

success through cumulat ive outcomes of missions, engage

m ent s, a n d individu al batt les. Sign ifican t exam ples includ e air

su periority, isolat in g enem y un its on th e bat tlefield, a n d ra pid

deployment of forces to the arena of action.54

41



CADRE PAPER

In figh t-centric scena rios, force can be u sed to eith er des troy

or control the enemy. The use of force to control rather than

dest roy an opponen t’s ab ility to act len ds a different pers pec

tive to the most effective use of military power. However, theab ility to in flu ence eith er an ad versa ry or a s itu at ion d epen ds

on the strategic events stemming from an overwhelming im

pact of direct and indirect effects. Creating the right effects

does not necessarily imply the ability to manipulate all indi

vidual events or actions at the tactical level of employment.

For exam ple, du rin g the Gu lf War, Ira q was ab le to lau n ch in

dividu a l aircra ft s orties; however, becau se Ira q’s C2 an d a i r de

fense systems were rendered ineffective by coalition actions,

such individual sorties were of negligible consequence.55

Thiseffect resulted not only because the Iraqi C 2 sys tem was se

verely disrupted but also because coalition systems detected

virtually every move they made.

Effects-based terminology provides a useful foundation for

EBO th eory. Th e new term in ology an d in form ation u sed h ere-

in m ay ap pear a b it overwhelm in g an d ta ke time to fu lly digest.

However, th e a bu n da n ce of term in ology is an in dicator of th e

all-encompassing nature of EBO. Overall , the lexicon should

serve as a common reference point for EBO terms and definitions th at m ay be in corpora ted in service an d join t doctrin e. A

full l isting is presented of recommended EBO terms and defi

n itions in th e fin al section of th is s tu dy.

A General Theory of Joint

Effects -Bas ed Operat ions

While recognizing that military actions usually create im

mediate physical effects, the focus of the EBO construct presen ted h ere t ran scends im m ediate p h ysical resu lts . Th erefore,

this concept does not address resul ts in terms of destruct ion

but in terms of outcomes that may or may not include de

struct ion. EBO does not at tempt to replace at tr i t ion or anni

hilation as goals of military actions in situations where they

m ay be a ppr opriat e. It s im ply recogn izes th em as two specific

types of military outcomes that might be useful in certain

cases but certainly not in all cases. Attrit ion and annihilation

42




play smaller and smaller roles in contingencies as they move

from the higher-intensity to the lower-intensity end of the

sp ectru m of en gagemen t. They will rar ely, if ever, play an y role

in HUMRO and noncombatant-evacuation operations. Effectsin these kinds of contingencies will be more inclined toward

constructive—both physical and psychological—accretion of

positive factors and outlooks and protection of endangered

an d/ or be leagu ered groups .

Even where destruct ion, a t t r i t ion, and annihi lat ion are

used, the real desire is often to create higher-level psycholog

ical effects like decreasing the will of a people to resist (e.g.,

World War II s tra tegic bom bing), or a lterin g th e decision -m ak

ing process of a national leadership (e.g., Operation DesertStorm ). On th e oth er end of th e spectru m , bu ilding the will of

a people to defeat oppressive conditions may be the desired

goal (e.g., Berlin airlift). This highlights the fact that EBO is

n ot centered u pon a n adversa ry bu t , rath er, on th e condit ions

n ecessa ry to achieve su ccess in an y act ion.

The EBO Methodology Overview

The EBO methodology appears to be an optimum way to

deal with the wide range of actions confronting the UnitedStates today. It can be applied to virtually every national se

cu rity a ctivity, in clu din g all m ilita ry actions . It d oes n ot ap ply

only to ta rgetin g, fires , or att ack . Effects -ba sed s u pp ly, for ex-

ample, can be the key to success in a HUMRO or peacetime

engagement with a friendly foreign government or military

force. For instance, “accumulation of sufficient foodstuffs and

medical supplies at forward dis tr ibution points to guarantee

100 percen t availab ility th rou gh t h e win ter m onth s,” m igh t be

a very useful effect to help achieve the objective of avertingstarvation and disease in a population victimized by a major

natural disaster. Focusing on just one aspect of military ac

tions, like targeting, would greatly reduce the overall efficacy

of th e EBO m eth odology.

Planning, executing, and assessing operat ions designed to

at tain t h e effects requ ired to ach ieve desired n at iona l secu rity

ou tcom es n ecess a rily im plies forekn owledge of sp ecific a ch iev

able conditions believed necessary for attaining specified ob-

43




in g an y ar m y, an ywhere, an ytim e. In a very genera lized sen se,

th is m ay actu al ly be true, m aking the con cept a ll th e more se

ductive. In all cases however, even the World War II example

th at leads down th is p at h , th ere ar e n egative collat eral effectsassociated with this approach. If planners carefully consider

th e conditions (i.e., effects) th at m u st be es ta blish ed to a ch ieve

objectives in a given case and the underlying causal l inkages

th ey expect will ach ieve th ese effects , th ey will som etimes fin d

potential negative collateral effects outweigh the positive in-

tended effects.

Relat ionship between Object ives and Strategies

One reason for the lack of consistency in applying effects-based thinking to military operations is reflected in service

and joint doctrine. The concept of effects-based operations is

discu ss ed to a l im ited extent in US m ilita ry doctrine toda y, bu t

no methodology is offered to systematically apply it. For ex-

am ple, J P 3-0 s tat es th at th e levels of war (st ra tegic, opera

tiona l, an d t actical) ar e doctrin al pers pectives t h at clar ify the

lin ka ges b etween str ategic objectives a n d t actical action s. Fu r

thermore, these levels are defined by their effect or contribu

tion to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives;bu t n o meth odology for ap plyin g or an alyzin g th ese lin ka ges is

offered.57 In addressing this issue, AFDD 2 explains and ex

pands on the objective-strategy-effect relationship by employ

ing what has been colloquially termed the Z-diagram (fig. 5).

Th is d iagram is th e resu lt of m u ch of th e work done on t h e ob

jectives-based approach at the RAND Corporation and illus

trates the interrelationship between objectives and strategies

at the various levels of war. Each level should have a clear set

of objectives, which, through certain mechanisms form astrategy for that particular level. Objectives normally are de-

rived from the objectives at the next higher level of war and

m ay d evolve from h igher -level str a tegies. 58 As th e actu al oper

ation progresses, assessment of lower-level results—or ef

fects—suggests modifications to higher-level strategies or ob

jectives. Unfortu n a tely, n eith er s ervice n or join t d octrine fully

clar ifies h ow an d wh y effects a n d m echa n ism s r elate t o objec

tives and strategy. There is no definition for effects in service

45



CADRE PAPER

or joint doctrine; and no methodology that adequately cap

tures why effects are important considerations, how they

m igh t be a n alyzed, an d wh at th ey con tr ibu te to operat ion s or

attainment of objectives.

Level

Strategic: Objective Strategy

Mechanism

Mechanism

Operational: Objective Strategy

Tactical: Objective Mechanism Strategy

Figure 5. Relationships between Objectives and Strategies

Th e lack of su ch a m eth odology in doctrin e explains why an

effects-based approach to warfare has not been prevalent in

military history and why a purely objectives-based approach

may be poorly executed. Fully articulating an EBO methodol

ogy would be extremely beneficial to military commanders in

plan n in g, executing, an d a ss essing cam paign s.

Th e firs t s tep m u st be to defin e certain fu n dam enta l term ss u c h a s effect a n d EBO. As stated previously, the term effect

refers to a full range of outcomes, events, or consequences

th at resu lt from a s pecific action. EBO is d efin ed as th ose ac

tions ta ken agains t enem y system s des ign ed to achieve specif

ic effects that contribute directly to desired military and polit

ical outcomes. To expand on this definition slightly, decision

makers must have a clear idea of what i t is they are trying to

accomplish, what act ions might be taken, and how the pro-

posed actions will contribute to the desired end state. They

must also have some reasonable explanation of why they ex

pect the operat ions to work, that is , an anticipated causal

linkage between action and effect.59

Based upon these definitions, the EBO methodology is a

means for planning, executing, and assessing operat ions de-

sign ed to at tain th e effects requ ired to a chieve desired n at ion

al security outcomes. This methodology really is a refinement

or evolu tion of th e objectives-b as ed plan n in g m eth odology th at

46




h as been clearly an d ca refu lly in corpora ted in US m ilita ry doc-

trine over the last decade by implementing a strategies-to-

tas ks ap proach for plan n in g military operat ions. 60 Objectives-

based methodology connects clearly stated objectives to

proposed tasks or act ions, essential ly through a process of

h istorical an alysis, an d th en refin es th em to opera tiona l plan s

th rou gh th e stra tegies-to-task s a ppr oach (fig. 6).61 On th e pos

itive side this methodology focuses on objectives at every level

of employment and ties tactical events to operational and

st ra tegic objectives. However, th e m a jor lim iting fact or in th is

approach is i t does not take into account why such tasks or

actions will cause the objectives to be achieved.

Strategies to Tasks

T O O MO

T = tasks (actions) CO = campaign objectiveOO = operational NMO = national military

objective objective

• Focuses on objectives or tasks at every level• Provides audit trail from tactical events to operational and

strategic objectives• Considers the linkages only between objectives and the

strategies to achieve those objectives

O C N

Figure 6. Objectives-Based Methodology

Objectives-Based Methodology

With the objectives-based approach, past actions are re-

viewed in order to look for exam ples th at h ave ach ieved objec

tives similar to the current ones (either formally through an

established process or informally through individual thought

pr ocess es). Even s eem in gly in n ovat ive actions a re u su ally evo

lutions of past successful operations. For example, all permu-

47



CADRE PAPER

ta t ions of at tack on important nat ional infrastructure are es

sen tial ly bas ed u pon th e sam e general ass u m ptions; if n at ion

al functioning can be sufficiently disrupted, war-making ca

pa city or th e n ation al will to ma ke war will also be disru pted.Attacking transportation systems, electrical power distribu

t ion grids, p etroleu m produ ction a n d s torage, an d s im ilar in

fras tru ctur e h as worked—to varyin g degrees—in th e pas t a n d

can be expected to work, to var yin g degrees, in th e fu tu re.

For example, the US attack on the Confederate economy

during the American Civil War made a major contribution to

victory an d followed a two-fold a pp roa ch by at ta cking cap a bil

ity and will. Toward the end of the conflict Gen Ulysses S.

Gran t contin u ous ly at tacked Confederate capa bility by pu rsu ing Gen Robert E. Lee’s a r m y in Virgin ia.62 Two major cam

paigns were designed to break the will of the Confederacy:

Sh erm an ’s m arch to the sea an d Sh eridan ’s devas tat ion of th e

Shenandoah Valley seriously weakened Confederate agricul

tu re. Addit ionally, a n aval blockad e denied th e South m an u

factured goods, thus fostering inflation and reducing Confed

erate morale . Perhaps as important , the blockade restr icted

southern exports of cot ton, which undermined the f inancial

heal th of the South.63

Ninety years later, in a generally moreindustrialized age, the UN attack on the North Korean econo

m y did n ot h ave a s im ilar ly sign ifican t imp act. While lan d, s ea,

an d a ir operat ions devas tated th e North Korean econ omy, th e

war con tin u ed in a long, bloody sta lema te. Unlike th e Con fed

eracy, North Korea received critical logistical support from

protected sanctuaries in China and the Soviet Union that

could not be interdicted by a naval blockade. Diplomacy and

airpower, the latter restricted to operations entirely within

Korea, could not halt the flow of supplies. Even though theNorth Korean economy was destroyed and a sustained air

campaign impeded communis t opera t ions , the communis ts

were able to su pport a larger ar m y at th e end of th e war th an

th e origin al on e tha t in vaded Sou th Korea in J u n e 1950. 64

The EBO Methodology Described

The EBO methodology takes the objectives-based process a

step further, allowing planners and commanders to examine

48



CADRE PAPER

EBO methodology and how this kind of analysis can help plan

ners understand whether they may reasonably expect the pro-

posed actions to create the desired effects under existing cir

cumstances.To exemplify, disruption of enemy C2 networks has, in the

past, contributed to information superiority. One historically

proven action to attain this particular effect is to damage or de

str oy C2 cen ters. Th ere are a n u m ber of poten tial cau sa l lin kages

conn ectin g this a ction with th e desired effect, bu t a coup le of key

ones wou ld b e th e enem y’s ina bility to receive an d comm u n icate

com m an ders’ orders an d perha ps th e death of key com m an ders

themselves. Another possible action to attain a similar effect

wou ld b e to in tru de in th e enem y’s C2

stru cture u sing inform ation operation s system s an d techn iqu es. If don e cleverly, false or

ders a n d m isdirections cou ld be inserted into th e enemy system

(action ), cau sing th e troops to dra w false con clu sion s a bou t th eir

mission (causal linkage) which, in turn, brings them to act fa

vorably to friendly plan s, th u s d isru ptin g the enem y comm an d

ers ’ plan s (des ired effect). Either action would con tribu te to at

tainment and maintenance of information superiority (objective)

u n der th e righ t circu m sta n ces, bu t each th rough en tirely differ

ent cau sa l lin kages.A real-world example may help to further i l lustrate this

point. During most of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian

Gulf, coalition forces enjoyed a favorable information differen

tial over Sa dda m Hu ss ein ’s ar m y in Ku wait. Th is different ial

became obvious to both sides during the Battle of al-Khafji

when Iraqi forces occupied the evacuated Saudi border town

but were unable to hold it . Information superiority allowed

coalition forces to monitor Iraqi movements, while preventing

the Iraqis from acquiring information on coalition troop movements or properly coordinating their engaged and reinforcing

forces. Inside the town, a small contingent of trapped US

Marines was able to relay information on Iraqi dispositions

and movements .65 At the same time, in the air , an E-8 joint

su rveillan ce, target at ta ck ra da r s yst em (J STARS) aircraft was

able to monitor Iraqi su pport in g m ovemen ts a n d pa ss th at in-

formation to a horde of attacking aircraft .66 As a result , the

Iraqis with six to eight times more artillery and four to six

50




t im es m ore arm or availab le th an th e coalit ion were u n able to

hold the town. By relentlessly attacking Iraqi communication

nodes and denying them useful information on coalition posi

tions and movements (action), the coalition was able to denyIra qi forces a n y u sefu l in form at ion on th e coalition forces a n d

disru pt t h eir a bility to comm u n icate an d coordinate m ovemen ts

(effect). The coalition achieved this effect by destroying commu

nications equipment and intimidating Iraqi forces (causal link-

age).67 Achieving the objective of information superiority con

ferred tremen dous tactical an d operational advan tages u pon th e

coalition in this case. This vignette is not intended to tell the

whole story of al-Khafji but merely to illustrate how analysis of

the action-causal linkage-effect-objectives relationship can helpin u n dersta n din g the p otent ial con tribu tion of a par ticular a ction

to a ch ievin g objectives by crea ting desired effects .

Not only does this type of analysis help to understand why

a given action may work but also it is likely to reveal the fact

th at h istorically relevan t action s m ay not work in a p ar ticu lar

cas e. Th is is tru e, on ce again , becau se it is n ot on ly th e action

itself that achieves the effect but also the relevance of the

cau sa l lin ka ges a ctivated by the a ction, in ligh t of th e cur ren t

si tuat ion, that determines whether or not the effect is

achieved. In the case discussed earlier, given a decision be-

tween destroying or exploiting enemy C2 nodes, this type of

analysis would also reveal the basic conflict in the two alter-

n at ives. For exam ple, dest royin g a C 2 node that is being fruit-

ful ly exploi ted through intrusion could actual ly impede

progress towar d th e objectives.

As noted previously, EBO itself is not new; certain brilliant

comm an ders h ave recogn ized it at leas t since Su n Tzu ’s time.Formalizing EBO in doctrine would simply bring analytic

m eth odology an d plan n in g process es into lin e with th e way com

plex problems, like warfare and other military operations, are

solved in t h e real world. If cu rren t cond itions ar e n ot servin g na

tiona l objectives, action s a re ta ken to create n ew conditions th at

ar e expected to a chieve th e n ationa l objectives. Cau sa l lin ka ges,

subject to examination in light of relevant information, explain

why the proposed actions are expected to work.

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CADRE PAPER

This examination, to be most useful, must look not only at

the probability of achieving the desired effects. It must also

as k wha t else m ay ha ppen becau se, in a complex world, no ac

tion ever creates only a single outcome. Therefore plannersmust always ask what else and never accept nothing for an

an s wer. Th ere is a lways s om eth in g else—colla tera l effects t h at

m ay be p ositive or n egat ive to desired ou tcomes . To th e exten t

possible their potential impact should be considered before

an y action is ta ken ra th er th an afterward s (fig. 8).

E2d

A CL

E

A CL OE

A CL

E

A = action E = direct effect (condition)CL = causal linkage O = objective

2d, nth = indirect effects

nth

nth

nth

Figure 8. Relationships between Indirect Effects and Objectives

Of cours e, in recent year s everyone h as become very cogn izan t

of collateral damage, especially as it is often shown on national

television, sometimes within minutes of the action. Planners

today spend enormous amounts of time reviewing targets and

known weapons effects to ensure they do not unnecessarily

damage civilian targets. In fact, to many people especially jour

n alists , collat eral dam age ha s b ecom e synon ym ous with civilian

deaths. At a deeper level of analysis, however, planners are still

52




prone to m iss secon d a n d t h ird order effects th at do n ot directly

resu lt in d estr u ction of n onm ilita ry targets or d an ger to civilian s,

principally becau se th ey do n ot look for th em. Th e Desert Storm

air campaign, a monumental intellectual effort, was brilliantlyplanned; yet planners completely missed the second and third

order effects on the civilian populace caused by disruption of

electrical power to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In retrospect

it obviously was possible to have foreseen the closure of sewage-

an d water -treatm ent plant s a n d h ospitals, yet it wou ld be wrong

to say their oversight resulted from deliberate neglect. The cur-

ren t objectives-ba sed plan n in g pa ra digm s im ply does not prom pt

planners to look for this type of collateral effects. The EBO

m eth odology m oves objectives-based plan n in g to th e next level of analysis, thereby providing the necessary analytic rigor. This

rigor comes m ore or less n a tu ra lly with an alysis of des ired effects

an d th e u n derlyin g cau sa l lin kages by wh ich p lan n ed actions a re

expected t o create th e des ired effects.

The EBO methodology requires an ability to deal with com

plex interactions and to adapt rapidly to changing conditions.

Not a ll effects ar e imm ediately or d irectly con n ected t o sp ecif

ic actions. The more complex the desired effect (e.g., psycho-

logical vers u s p h ysical), th e m ore difficu lt it m a y be to see th econnection to precipitating actions. There is a whole array of

different types of effects to deal with: direct, indirect, cascad

ing, cumulative, and collateral (both positive and negative),

just to name a few (see final section of this study for EBO

terms and definitions). Effects of all types can be achieved at

all levels of employment: tactical, operational, and strategic.

As already indicated, some effects will be much more difficult

to mea su re th an others. Th is h olds tru e for an ticipation , as well.

Generally the higher order the effect (e.g., psychological versusphysical) and the further removed from precipitating actions

(e.g., 2d, 3d, nth order indirect effects), the more difficult it will

be to anticipate and to measure. This is important to note, be-

cause the ability to anticipate the effect(s) an action will bring

abou t an d th en m easu re to see if th e an ticipation was correct is

critical to adaptation, and adaptation is critical to success. The

emin ent m ilita ry historian , Micha el Howar d, once declar ed h im -

self “tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doc-

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CADRE PAPER

vices to evaluate jointly. In the next few paragraphs the pro-

posed idealized process model is first described and then ex

pla ined ph ase by ph ase .72

Any such process must begin with a definition of nationalobjectives. What is not so obvious, though, is that i t should

begin not at the advent of a crisis, as seems to be envisioned

n ow, bu t well before a crisis develops . It m u st begin before th e

need for a particular action is even known, where exactly it

may take place, or what its specific objectives may be. This

may seem implausible at f i rs t glance, but i t is in t ruth quite

reasonable. The process is rooted in the overarching national

objectives stated in the National Security Strategy of the Unit

ed S tates and begins with a phase called “Strategic Environment Research .”73 Figure 9 outlines the process along with

com bata n t comm an der’s plan ning cycle.

3. Strategy development

analysis

2. Policy goals/effects/desired outcomes

4. Mission parsing/integration

1. Strategic environmentresearch

5. Effects assessment

1. Combatant commander’sassessment

2. Mission analysiscourse of action (COA)

development

3. COA and effects

4. COA selectionCONOPS developed

5. Selected COA

6. Commander issuesOPORD and EXORD

7. Effectsassessment

CombatantCommandPlanning

converted to OPORD

Legend:CONOPS––concept of operations

EXORD––execution orderOPORD––operations order

Figure 9. Effects-Based-Planning Process Model

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CADRE PAPER

words, assessment really is part of both the first phase of each

of th e cycles an d t h e fin a l ph as e followin g execu tion . It a lso goes

on at all levels of employment—tactical, operational, and strate

gic—and, as stated before, assessment at each level informs thelevels above a n d below.

Strategic Environment Research

US senior military leadersh ip su ch a s th e CJ CS, the J CS,

an d com bat an t com m an ders m u st be fu lly engaged in t h e policy

debates that end with development of the nat ional securi ty

str at egy, a s well as th ose th at lead to sp ecific m ilita ry action s.

Of course, once the combatant commander decides, good mil

i ta ry commanders sa lu te smar t ly and march; but unt i l thenthey must offer candid advice and recommendations based

upon their military expertise. Military commanders must be

awa re of, an d poin t ou t to na tiona l leaders , th e im plication s of

various strategy options for potential military actions. They

m u st b e su re to un dersta n d fu lly wh at is requ ired of th e mili

tary by the s trategy that nat ional leaders define, and they

must produce a nat ional mil i tary s trategy and operat ional

plan s th at fu lly su pport th e n at ion al s tra tegy. Even du rin g this

process , th e m ilitary m u st be already en gaged in th e really h ar d

work of preparing for future actions, through strategic envi

ronment research .

Strategic environment research begins well before any specific

crisis develops and really needs to be a national-level effort,

yet one in which the military are major players. The military

can go it a lone h ere if n ecess a ry, bu t it will not b e a s effective

in the long run. Strategic environment research consists of

th ree ma jor types of research —con textu al , nodal, an d a ss essment—that are conducted on three different levels: generic,

regiona l, a n d ta rget a u dien ce sp ecific.

Contextual Research

In th is EBO con cept, con textu al research is con du cted to u n

derstand audiences that are potential targets of future actions

and what capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses they possess.

The carefully chosen phraseology—target aud iences as opposed

58




to adversaries or enemies—is u sed becau se in m an y cases rath er

th an tryin g to defeat th ese group s, US forces will be tryin g to as

sist them or simply avoid conflict with them while conducting

m ilita ry action s. This is es pecially tru e for peacetim e engagemen tan d m ost MOOTW, wh ich a re expected to m ak e u p th e vas t m a

jority of all military actions in at least the next 15 to 20 years.

Th e term target au d iences is u sed also becau se n ot all group s th e

United Sta tes wish es t o in flu en ce will be n at iona l grou ps or for

mal military forces, as usually conceived in the conquest para

digm. These groups may be informal soldiers of a drug cartel, a

terrorist group, subnational ethnic group, or other nonnational

group. In many (perhaps most) cases, there will be more than

one target audience, with different US objectives pursuant toeach . To Su n Tzu ’s a dm onition to kn ow th e enem y an d ones elf

must be added friends, allies, other affected groups and, with

toda y’s imm ediate m edia, all iden tifiable elem en ts of th e ent ire

global comm u n ity. Th is is a dau n tin g task th at can n ever be fu lly

com pleted, bu t th ere certainly is r oom for im pr ovement over pa st

efforts . Th is type of res ear ch m u st begin well before a sp ecific ac

tion is order ed—it can n ot be played as a picku p gam e. Failu re to

do th is r esear ch in a t im ely way leads to errors like m irror ima g

ing how economics and production were organized in Germany

du ring World War II or m isju dgin g how th e people wou ld r eact to

given stimuli in Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.75

Generic Phase. Subjects of the first or generic phase of

contextual research are the general geopolitical environment

prevailin g in th e world, th e na tu re of h u m an in teract ion, an d

general human psyche. Academic disciplines like the study of

in tern at iona l relat ions , law, a n d politics; m ilitar y science a n d

history; and, psychology, among others, apply here. Severalim portan t qu est ions m u st b e asked s u ch a s th e followin g:

• Wh at ar e the variou s m ethods of in tern ation al problem res

olution, how have they worked historically, and what does

this portend in the current and emerging geopolitical envi

ronment?

• Wh at does th e h is tory of m ilitary operat ion s t each abou t

effective application of military capabilities to attain polit

ical objectives? Also, what does it say about development

59




con sta n t press u re on th em, in terdict in g food s u pplies to ma ke

them hungry , and so on) .78 If one can reduce or destroy

tra in ed soldiers ’ will to resist , it s ta n ds to reas on th e sa m e

would be true with civil populations, who are less likely thansoldiers to h ave the s pecific tra in in g an d d isciplin e n ecess ar y

to with sta n d s u ch efforts . Th e quest ion is h ow, an d a re th ere

an y circu m sta n ces u n der which th e how will be acceptable to

domestic and foreign audiences? Conducting this kind of re-

search certainly is not easy, but these are exactly the kind of

s tudies needed to prepare for EBO. There are many cases

where target audiences have capitulated without being com

pletely defeated or exhausted, as well as cases where they

would not capitulate until they were decisively defeated andunder occupation. In many cases, even af ter occupation a

lar ge segm en t of th e popu lace con tinu ed to res ist covertly. It is

important to t ry to understand why.

Obviously these are very complex issues. Different groups

have different psyches, which includes a stronger or weaker

will to resist. They hold different values for the same things.

They are frightened or intimidated by different things. In fact,

differen t grou ps a ct differen tly wh en frigh ten ed or in timida ted,

and the same group may act differently under differing circumstances? What common factors existed in groups that

have capitulated and what differences? Are there relatively fi

nite and predictable conditions under which capitulation oc

cur s or h as occur red in th e pas t? It m igh t be possible to cate

gorize the will of a given people, and therefore the conditions

u n der which th ey m igh t cap itu late in a given in sta n ce. Th ere

is n o poin t in was ting effort tr yin g to brea k t h eir will if it ca n -

n ot be done. On th e oth er ha n d, in s ome cases it m igh t be the

only thing that is necessary and might even prove relativelyeasy. Generic contextual studies should help national leaders

and mil i ta ry p lanners to unders tand these i ssues and what

th e general ru les ar e . Given a par t icular ps yche an d m in d-set

in a ta rget au dience, when d oes i t help a n d when does i t hu rt

to turn off electrical power or telecommunications? Under

what circumstances should intervening forces generally con

sider replacin g a ta rget a u dien ce’s telecom m u n ication s with

their own transmissions, and when should they leave well

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enough alone? All these questions and many more of similar

n atu re shou ld be address ed du rin g th e generic contextu al pa rt

of strategic environment research.

Regional Phase. Nearly every geopolitical issue has global, regional, and subregional contexts. In most cases what can and

cannot be done in a given action, as well as what should and

sh ou ld n ot, will be h eavily in flu enced by regiona l an d su br egion

al iss u es. How do n ation s a n d su bn ation al group s in teract with -

in the region and with those from outside the region? In this

realm th ere ar e cu ltu ra l iss u es a s well as geopolitical on es. How

is diploma tic, econom ic, an d s ocial in tercour se n orm ally car ried

out in the region? Are decisions made by edict, consensus, or

majority rule? Who are traditional friends and who adversaries,both within the region and with the United States? Is there a

genera l ps ych e tha t can be ap plied? Wh at will a p ar ticu lar t ar get

audience concede with token resistance, and for what, if any-

thing, will they fight fiercely? Do they tend to enhance their ca

pab ilities th rough trainin g and edu cation, an d can th ey organ ize

effectively to conduct operations? These will be important as

pects to consider for several reasons. In adversarial cases, US

forces obvious ly need to know as m u ch a s p ossible abou t th e an

swers t o thes e qu estion s, if th ey ar e to ha ve an y hope of creatingth e effects n ecess a ry to ach ieve na tion a l policy goals. In a ll cas es

th e US m ilita ry will n eed to un ders ta n d th e viewpoin ts , stren gth s

and weaknesses of friends, allies, and neutrals. Information op

erations m ay be necessa ry to ens u re friends rema in friendly du r

in g m ilitary actions a n d n eu trals rema in at leas t n eu tral.

Normally during military actions some of the peoples of a

region will be friend ly towar d th e United St at es a n d US in ter

ests an d s ome ar e likely to be neu tra l. One or more grou pings

may be adversarial. When contemplating a course of action itwill be im portan t to u n dersta n d h ow each of th ese au diences

will react. If they share common cultural or religious beliefs,

som e of th e peoples of th e region m ay be n egat ively affected b y

certain actions, even though they otherwise agree with the

United States concerning the issues in conflict. In this case,

taking the contemplated course of action will create negative

collat eral effects, an d t h e United Sta tes will eith er n eed to pu r

sue a different course of action or act to mitigate its friends’

62




negative reactions to the intended one. This will require ex

panded-regional s tudies to help leaders and planners under-

stand interactions of all the parties affected by the conflict or

military action. Additionally, it will be necessary to undertaketarget au dience-specific s tu dies to t ry to u n dersta n d h ow each

ta rget au dien ce will react t o var ious stim u li an d h ow to create

th e desired m oral an d m enta l effects a m ong th em.

Target Audience-Specific Phase. This phase addresses

m an y of th e sam e iss u es bu t on a n individu al bas is to determ in e

sp ecific s tren gth s an d vu ln erab ilities of all poten tial ta rget a u di

ences. If the generic contextual research is done properly, it will

reveal susceptibility of certain types of target audiences to spe

cific types of actions. Target audience-specific contextual re-search will try to elucidate characteristics of each potential tar-

get au dien ce, an d th ose effects to wh ich th ey m ay be su sceptible.

Also, it wou ld h elp d eterm in e h ow those effects m igh t b e creat ed

in th e sp ecific ta rget a u dien ce. Each potent ial tar get a u dien ce’s

su scep tibility to s pecific effects will cha n ge over t im e, dep en ding

on m an y factors, so these a n alyses will require consta n t u pda te.

Th e n ecessa ry bas is for th is resea rch , h owever, is as sp ecific an

understanding as possible of the psyche of each potential target

au dien ce. In m an y cas es ou ts ide resou rces, like regiona l expertsand historians, will need to provide the necessary detail; but it

will also be necessary for the military to have numbers of per

sonnel sufficiently trained to understand what the experts are

telling them. When US forces begin a military action they must

know how the target audiences are organized, how they think,

who makes decisions, how they make them, what they value,

who has influence, and how their culture differs from others.

Th is will h elp to avoid th e mist ake of a ss u m in g th ey will rea ct as

some other group would in a given circumstance or stereotypingtheir potential responses in some other defective manner. It will

also give a much better feel for how easy or difficult it will be to

create a particular desired mental or moral effect within a par

ticular target au dience.

Nodal Research

Nodal research must be conducted in parallel with contex

tual research and at all the same levels, although the levels

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CADRE PAPER

ar e m ore closely in tertwin ed a n d less d istinct. Noda l resea rch

is the s tudy of subsys tems tha t make up a ta rget audience

and their moral and physical infrastructure. Generic s tudies

an d m ilita ry experien ce will su ggest th e m ost inter esting typesof su bs ystem s for each cas e. To a great exten t th ey ar e alread y

iden tified a n d s im ila r to wha t was cons ider ed in th e World Wa r

II in du str ial web an d Desert S torm ’s s ystem of system s a p

proach. The nature of nodal research can be i l lustrated by

simply continuing the previous discussion of electrical power

produ ction a n d d istr ibu tion s ystem s. Th ese systems will con

tinue to be of interest in many military actions, so it makes a

convenient a n d u sefu l exam ple. US m ilita ry forces will n eed to

u nd ers tand h ow bes t to a t tack an d defend su ch sys tems.All power distribution systems, as they exist today, have

many common factors and similarities. Power-generating

plants a re a l l cons t ruc ted in much the same manner (of

cou rse th ere are n u clear, hydro, oil, an d coal powered p lan ts );

but i t is not difficult to distinguish which is which, and their

construction is very similar by category. Transmission sys

tems are all constructed in very similar ways. Thus it is im

portant to understand the basics of power generat ion and

transmission. Power dis tr ibution systems have also becomequite ubiquitous in the modern era, and are fair ly redundant

and interconnected, which is to say one can no longer consid

er most power dis tr ibu tion systems as discrete an d/ or self-

sufficient. Most national power grids are now interconnected

with other nat ional systems, and power can be rerouted

throughout the sys tem whenever usage pa t terns change or

problems occu r. Th u s, if m ilita ry plan n ers ar e goin g to target

a system for one reason or another, i t will be important for

them to know who else is connected to that system and howth rou gh com preh ens ive regiona l an alysis. Oth erwise th e plan

n ers a re likely to creat e u n desired collat eral effects in n eu tra l

or frien dly cou n tries wh en a tta ckin g an ad versa ry’s s ystem .

Often the desired effects will be achieved through quite dis

crete actions, so analysts will also need to examine each po

tential target system in detail . This is the traditional nodal

an alysis US forces h ave lear n ed to do over th e years . Th e J oin t

Wa r fa re An a lysis Cen ter (J WAC) is b ecom ing very sop h istica t-

64




ed at th is type of an alysis an d can n ow determ in e very accu

rately what a particular type of attack will do, and how to

ach ieve very discrete p h ysical an d fu n ction al effects in a given

system. Planners want to know both how to create the effectsth ey desire an d h ow to do it efficien tly. Th ey a lso wan t to k n ow

what else is l ikely to happen when they act to create the de-

sired effects, in both th e sh ort an d long term . Th e next step is

to achieve a similar level of sophistication for systemic and

ps ych ological effects. In a HUMRO, for in st an ce, plan n ers m ay

need to know how to convey the message that US forces are

there to help—not to control or suppress the populace—and

th at when th ey are fin ish ed h elping, they will go hom e. In th is

case the planners would need to know, among many otherth in gs, th e cr it ical nodes an d l in ks to com m u n icate with m ajor

population elements, as well as who the important elites are

that the people might l isten to. Planners would also need to

know what specific modalities would convey the appropriate

message, without inadvertently conveying other messages

detrimental to their objectives. This problem, though similar

in b as ic cons tru ct, can pr ove cons idera bly m ore comp lex th an

n oda l a n alysis of a n electrical power grid. J WAC an d oth ers

h ave sta r ted work on th is a spect of an alysis already, bu t th ereis a long way to go before th e US m ilita ry poss ess es t h e fu ll ca

pa bility required to condu ct EBO.

Assessment Research

The last, but certainly not least important, part of strategic

environment research is assessment research. I t provides the

grou n dwork for an alysis to determ in e h ow well th e plan is d e

veloping in actual operations. This area probably represents

th e great est plan n in g cha llenge in t ra n sitioning to EBO. In t h epast , combat assessment, which is commonly but incorrect ly

referred to as BDA has been a sort of afterthought. Actually

BDA is only one particular piece of the overall combat assess

ment process. Airmen have often asserted the ability to

achieve functional, systemic, and psychological effects, which

would—in turn—achieve strategic objectives in a more direct

manner than ground forces. For instance, the oft-maligned

Dou h et espou sed, as ear ly as th e 1920s , tha t th e advent of air-

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CADRE PAPER

power h ad com pletely ch an ged th e na tu re of war far e by sh ift

ing the focus from ground to air act ions. He thought that

h eavily ar m ed str ategic bomb ar dm ent a ircra ft , wh ich h e called

batt leplanes, would be able to direct ly at tack and break thewill of a people to resist, while ground forces were still mobi

lizing and before they could move to the frontier to attack

enem y forces. Th u s a political settlem ent wou ld be forced be-

fore surface forces even engaged.79

While the Army Air Corps Air War Plans Division (AWPD)-1

docu m ent p lan n ers esch ewed Dou h et’s concept of direct at-

ta ck on th e civilian popu lace, th ey th ou gh t th at a irpower alone

cou ld win World War II th rou gh s tra tegic att ack on t h e in du s

tr ial web. Su ch an at ta ck, they believed, wou ld b reak both th ecapability and will of enemy nations to resist. This proved

m ore difficu lt th an pr edicted. After m u ch deb at e, th e Allies fi

nally agreed to conduct direct attack against civilians as part

of th e CBO. Un der th is a greem ent US stra tegic bomb ers would

attack industrial plants and storage facili t ies in the daytime

while British bombers would attack adjoining city areas at

n igh t, in h opes th is wou ld degrad e th e mora le of th e people by

keeping them u nd er cons tan t day and n ight p ressu re .80

Once again in Desert Storm, air planners intending to createstrategic paralysis through systemic attack included attack on

th e will of th e people as p a rt of th eir p lan . Th is t im e, however, n o

physical attacks were deliberately directed against civilians. The

planners hoped instead—by disruption of electrical power, pe

troleum products, and transportation combined with a strategic

psychological campaign—to induce the people to turn against

their leader, Saddam Hussein. The strategic psychological cam

paign never developed, however, apparently due to lack of clear

ly designated responsibility for mounting such a campaign andresultant wrangling within the interagency community. 81

Whether or not such a campaign would have made a difference

in the outcome is still a matter of debate.

In both World Wa r II an d Des ert St orm cas es, US forces were

less than satisfactorily prepared to assess their level of effec

tiveness, especially as related to systemic or psychological ef

fects. The in telligen ce an a lysis s ystem even h a d grea t d ifficu l

ty delivering physical and functional-damage assessments in

66




t im e to be u sefu l to plan n ers .82 Yea rs a fter th e con flict, effec

tiveness of systemic and psychological effects assessment re-

mains more a matter of debate than scientif ic s tudy.83 What

really happens is that levels of physical destruction are measured, and then a level of functional effectiveness is deter-

m in ed ba sed u pon th e percen t of th e facility destr oyed. Th is is

wha t cu rren t com ba t an alysis m eth odology is des ign ed to do.84

Combat-assessment capabil i ty needs to be improved, but

the entire conceptual izat ion of assessment must also be ex

panded to include effects assessment at all levels of employ

m ent a n d a cross th e spectru m of engagemen t. Not all act ions

include combat, but all actions can be related to effects plan

ners desire to create as well as effects they desire not to create. The concept of effects assessment, as contrasted to com

bat assessment, connotes this broader perspect ive. Combat

assessors must learn to measure funct ional , sys temic , and

ps ych ological effectiven ess with m u ch grea ter a ccu ra cy an d fi

delity. Th is in clu des a n eed for fu n ctiona l, system ic, an d p sy

chological effectiveness models and simulations which will

he lp p lan ners a nd ass essors both to bet ter u nders tan d h ow to

create a part icular effect and to determine whether they are

su cceedin g in a sp ecific in sta n ce. Effects as ses sm en t resea rchmust look for discrete indicators that will tell—with a signifi

cant level of fidelity based on appropriate analysis, modeling,

an d simu lat ion—wheth er actions a re movin g towar d ach ievin g

objectives or not. These indicators will have to be things US

forces and intelligence agencies have the capability to detect

an d th at , a t th e sam e t im e, do not lend th ems elves to eas y de

ception. One example, with respect to a physical effect, would

be m easu rin g the dis t in ct ive in frar ed s ign atu re in a generat ing

plant that indicates the level of power being generated andtransmitted. In this way, i t is possible to measure power gen

eration levels with high fidelity. It is also very hard to mimic

with su fficient accu ra cy to spoof properly tra in ed a n alyst s.

At the generic level analysts will need to know, in general,

wha t kind of in dicat ors can be u sefu l for determ in in g progress

toward or achievement of particular effects—including the full

range of physical, functional, systemic, and psychological—

and how such indicators can be collected. Collection systems

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CADRE PAPER

will h a ve to be r edes igned to qu ickly a n d efficien tly gath er th e

type of in form at ion ident ified in th is an alysis. Th e as ses sm ent

system itself will need to be redesigned to more fully assess

fu n ction a l, syst em ic, an d p sych ological effects. This is goin g tobe a real challenge. In most cases physical and functional ef

fects will be quite generic and continue to be easier to deter-

mine than systemic or psychological effects. Assessment of

da m age to a power p rodu ction plan t will look similar wherev

er the plant is located, and the functional effect produced by

a given physical result will be relatively standard. Multi-spectral

sensing and algorithmic models will be very useful for these

kinds of analyses.

Systemic and psychological effects are not so standard oreas y. Th ese pa rticu lar effects will var y grea tly from on e region

an d ta rget au dience to anoth er. Regional an d cu ltu ral s tu dies

will be required to predict and analyze these types of effects

with any level of accuracy. A lot of this preparation can be

done in con ju n ction with th e oth er s tu dies a lready men tioned

under strategic environment research by keeping one eye

specifically at tu n ed to poten tial ass essm ent m easu remen ts for

th e var iou s effects stu died. Th is pa rticu lar p roblem is pa rt a n d

pa rcel of one of th e grea tes t ch allen ges t o fu lly adop ting EBO.

If the problem of predicting and assessing systemic and psy

chological outcomes with reasonable fidelity cannot be solved,

EBO will lose much of its value for US military forces.

Determination of National Policy Goals

and Desired Strategic Effects

Bas ic na tiona l secu rity objectives a re esta blish ed in th e na

tiona l secur ity str ategy an d th e en su in g milita ry objectives inth e n at iona l milita ry stra tegy. Wh en a crisis d evelops or peace-

t im e act ions are n ecessa ry to avoid on e, the pres ident an d s ec

reta ry of defen se d evelop n at ion al policy goa ls a n d d esired ou t-

comes for the actions. The policy goals define the end state

desired a n d th e s pecific objectives for th e a n ticipa ted action s.

Often this does not happen smoothly, however, and the mili

tary finds itself needing to develop operational objectives and

brief th em b ack t o the n at iona l lead ersh ip. In th e case of EBO

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CADRE PAPER

n at u ra l disa st er.” On e of th e m ilita ry’s r oles in a ch ievin g th is

goal cou ld b e to pr ovide s u fficien t foods tu ffs a n d m edical su p-

plies to maintain a satisfactory level of health and welfare for

the entire nat ion. Ensuring the dis tr ibution of the food andmedical supplies to remote regions of the country would re-

quire the employment of substantial airlift forces. In such a

potentially volatile situation, another desired effect should be

to diffuse civil unrest fostered or encouraged by the crisis. 85

There will always be a number of possible means to achieve

desired effects ranging from direct, massive intervention all

the way down to simply providing supportive friendship, ad-

vice, an d/ or monetary ass is ta n ce. Du rin g th is ph as e of plan

ning, planners are not overly concerned with deciding how toachieve the effects, except for a cursory review of feasibility.

Th e actua l decision as to wh ich m ean s to pu rsu e comes in th e

next phase, strategy development.

S trategy Development

On e of th e comm only u sed defin ition s of st ra tegy is “relating

m ean s to en ds,” which cons t itu tes th e prin cipal thr u st of th is

sp ecific ph as e in plan n in g for EBO. Th ere will be a n u m ber of poss ible app roach es t o ach ievin g the desired effects in th e ex-

ample introduced above. At the high end, the United States

could insert a major military force, declare martial law, and

ta ke over m an agemen t of th e situ ation on beh alf of th e foreign

govern m ent u n til su ch t im e as i t is read y to reas su m e control

on its own. At the low end, the US government could simply

state its faith and confidence in the foreign government and

urge the people to give it a chance to handle the situation on

its own. In between is a wide range of possibilities including

bu t n ot lim ited to th ose out lin ed below:

• Genera te su fficient airlift to bring in foods tu ffs a n d m ed

ical supplies donated by the United States and coalition

par tne r s .

• Undertak e in tern al dis tr ibu tion of food a n d s u pplies by ei

th er the h ost govern m ent or the United States depen din g

on the s i tuat ion.

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• En coura ge non govern m ent al organ ization s (NGO) to pro-

vide an d/ or dis tr ibu te the necess ary su pplies .

• Provide fin an cial su pport to eith er the h ost-n ation gov

ernment or the NGOs for them to procure and distr ibutesupplies .

• Su ppor t hos t -na t ion in tern al secu r ity with cou nter ins u r

gency or other military forces as required.

• Encourage and advise th e indigenous governm ent a s re-

ques ted .

• Provide on-scene a dvisors to deal with th e in su rgency an d

civil unrest issues.

Wh ich st ra tegy or s tra tegies t h e United Sta tes ch ooses will be

based upon strategic environment research, analysis of thecurrent s i tua t ion , and what each sugges ts as the bes t a l te r -

native for the desired end state.

In s trategy development, planners and analysts build a

com preh ens ive list of th e ra n ge of poss ibilit ies an d determ in e

which combination of actions is most l ikely to create the de-

sired effects and achieve policy goals. Next they would com

pare capabilit ies to the range of strategy options based upon

the current s i tua t ion and what i s a l ready known about the

h ost-n at ion’s situ ation from s tra tegic environ m en t resear ch .This process is complicated by the fact that policy goals are

likely to in clu de s om e less explicit, yet n onet h eless equ a lly im

portant , aspects than those outl ined above. Considerat ions

su ch as a desire for few or n o casu alt ies a n d a reason able lim it

to the overall cost of the action must be taken into account.

For each possible s trategy, these costs must be balanced

against both the probability of achieving policy goals and the

valu at ion of th ose goals. For in sta n ce, th e US govern m ent a n d

people are willin g to pa y high er cost for n at ion al su rviva l th a nthey are to ensure humanitar ian treatment of a foreign na

t ional m in ority group . Strategy options m u st also be meas u red

against the capability to accomplish them successfully, and

the possibili ty that execution of these same options may cre

ate undesired collateral effects. There will be a large number

of considerations unique to each case, but the ability to deal

with th em is enh an ced b y resu lts of s tra tegic environm ent re-

search .

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CADRE PAPER

Mission Parsing and Integrat ion

Once a national strategy for implementing policy goals is es

tablished, missions must be assigned to the appropriate agen

cies, an overall-lead agency should be determined, and the actions of the various agencies integrated. This raises a point that

will be one of the great challenges to US policy of the twenty-first

century or at least the early decades of the century until it is

solved. US military forces have struggled for many years to

achieve a satisfactory level of jointness within and between the

respective services. However, for all the challenge that military

integration has been, the question of “interagency-ness” has all

the appearance of being yet much greater. In the current geopo

litical environment, US military forces will rarely be engaged instrictly military actions in pursuit of national-policy goals. Most

of the time military actions will have to be integrated with those

of other govern m en tal an d n ongovern m en tal agencies. Th e m ili

tary will not be acting independently, as normally has been as

sumed under the conquest paradigm. Instead, they will nearly

always be opera tin g alon gside departm ent s of Sta te, J u stice,

Treasury, law enforcement, other agencies and, when warrant

ed, NGOs. Unless and until the interagency process is rational

ized, it will often be u n clear who is in cha rge in su ch cas es. Th ekey point here is that it will be necessary to determine which

agency has primary responsibility for which portions of the ac

tion, a n d, p referab ly, which h as overall lead ersh ip resp ons ibility

for th e ent ire a ction.

In the example of the democratic nation experiencing civil

unrest following a natural disaster, i t is highly probable that

the State Department would be given overall responsibility for

the action. Specifically, the State Department would coordi

nate US participation in the natural disaster relief operationswith the Defense Department providing logistical and other

types of support.86 The Defense Department arguably would

be in ch ar ge of coun terin su rgen cy operation s, eith er to provide

cou nt erin su rgent forces or the app ropriate equ ipm ent an d ad-

vice to th e host n at ion . Th e J u st ice Depar tm ent m igh t be

called upon to advise and support the local government with

law enforcement and judicial procedure. The department in

cha rge migh t ch an ge over time, depen ding on which of th e pol-

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assess progress toward creating the conditions necessary to

ach ieve n ationa l-policy goals. Plan n in g cells m u st be int egra ted

at each level to produce a unified, interactive, anticipatory as

sessment, planning, execution, and effects analysis team. Any“stovepipe” organ izat iona l walls th at cu rren tly exist m u st be b ro

ken down to facilitate effects integration at each planning level,

focu sed by th e vision of th e com m an der a t th at level.

Execut ion

With th e pr oliferation of m obile ta rgets an d th e expan sion of

efforts to car ry out direct s tra tegic actions , it is becom in g ever

more imperative to conduct continuous, i terative planning. In

m ore ways th an ever b efore, execut in g forces pr ovide t h e immediate feedback of direct or first order effects necessary to

plan the next cycle of actions. Cockpit videotapes, for in-

stance, are becoming a necessary postact ion-assessment tool

to ju dge im m ediate, direct effects. The a ss ess m en t of direct ef

fects is imp era tive to th e deter m in a tion of an overa ll effects a s

sess m ent. The tem po of operat ion s is b ecomin g so rapid th at ,

in th e very n ear fu tu re, replan n in g ma y begin with in m in u tes

of initial execution.87 Executing forces will become more and

more part of the immediate planning process, as well as the

immediate and continuous effects assessment phase, which

will be necessary for success of EBO.

A s s e s s m e n t

As already mentioned several t imes, assessment should be

thought of as the beginning, middle, and end of the entire

plan n in g, execution , an d a ss essm ent cycle. Ass essm ent, or at

least planning for assessment, begins long before an individual action is even envisioned and continues long after i t is

com plete. It is crit ical tha t a ss ess m ent is con du cted at all lev

els of employment—strategic through tactical—and that i t is

directly related to the effects desired at each level. To support

EBO, effects assessment will have to be much more compre

h ens ive an d com plete than th e cu rrent CA process . Cu rrently

CA as ses ses ph ysical da m age to a ta rget or objective, th e fu n c

tional effect of the damage, and weapons effectiveness based

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CADRE PAPER

on the physical and functional effect. This assessment is, of

cou rse, necessar y, bu t wha t it does not do is even a t temp t to

as ses s s ystem ic or ps ych ological effects . To ma ke EBO work it

will be necessary to assess these higher-level effects with areasonable level of fidelity.

Effects a ss essm ent m u st continu ous ly feed ba ck to the m il

itary planning cycle, beginning with phase one, combatant

com m an der’s a ss essm ent, to in form t h e operat ion s plan n in g

process . It m u st also feed b ack on a m ore occas ional bas is to

th e na tiona l plan n in g level so decision m ak ers can see h ow ac

tions are developing relative to national objectives and

whether some or all of those objectives might need to be al

tered. This also provides an opportunity to evaluate whethersom e of th ose objectives m ay h ave ch an ged for other r eas ons .

To emph as ize on ce more, the entire process is continu ous an d

iterat ive and each phase must be constantly informed by al l

th e oth er pha ses. Th e discu ss ion of th e process en ds h ere, bu t

th e process itself n ever end s.

Summary: The EBO Methodology and Process

In preparing for warfare or contingency actions, planners

m u st car efu lly exam in e the s cenario an d relevan t circu m sta n cesto determine the effects required for achieving the objectives es

tablished by the national leadership. The main challenge now

facing US defense planners is to consolidate recent and planned

fu tu re im provement s in “ba ttle sp ace” awa ren ess , C2, stealth ca

pability, rapid global mobility, and the capacity for precision en

gagement into the foundation for an effects-based approach

across the spectrum of military operations.88

An additional challenge for joint forces is to start any contin

gency with the ability to understand the situation fully and de-fine the desired effects that will achieve national policy goals. If

the contingency involves a real or potential adversary, then it is

critical to ma n ipu lat e the a dversa ry’s th reat p otential, redu ce his

offensive and defensive options, limit his unpredictability, influ

ence h is will an d p erspectives, an d cons train h is actions so th at

th ey can be recogn ized an d exploited. Th e on u s is on th e J FC to

successfully orient a wide array of military and nonmilitary ac

tions towar d a set of comm on objectives.

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The EBO methodology requires greatly expanded knowledge of

potential target audiences including a well-developed under-

sta n din g of th e stra tegic environm ent backgrou n d a s a prelim i

n ary pha se. Sub sequ ent ph as es in clu de the determ in ation of ob jectives and by extension desired effects to achieve those

objectives. It is paramount that the military forces, and others

involved, be prepared to respond rapidly to a wide variety of

crises an d a pply all availab le leth al an d n onleth al capa bilities a s

ap propr iat e. It is equ ally im porta n t th at t h ey be prep ar ed to fu lly

as sess th e resu ltan t outcomes a n d pr ovide requisite feedba ck to

evalua te progress toward th e J FC’s objectives a n d cu rrent stra t

egy. App lied p roper ly, EBO can ach ieve res u lts ou t of pr oportion

to th e am oun t of m ilita ry force app lied. Th ere a re s ome very seriou s con siderations in prep ar in g to m ove in th is d irection, h ow-

ever, which are discussed in the next section.

What Are the Major Challenges

in Implementing the EBO Methodology?

Implementing the EBO methodology, as described in this

stu dy, will not b e an eas y tas k. For a ll of th e pa st efforts to ori

ent on effects rather than destruction, actually moving to consisten t effects-ba sed th in king will requ ire a cu ltu re ch an ge with -

in the military forces. This undertaking is likely to prove

dau n tin g an d contentiou s, an d bu ildin g th e new cu ltu re will take

m an y year s. As p reviou sly m en tion ed, in th e Air Force’s GE IV

war game, senior mentors and other participants found that

EBO was very effective when plan n ers st ayed focu sed on it. Un

fortu n at ely, it a pp eared difficu lt for th em to rem ain focu sed du e

primarily to their unfamiliarity with effects-based thinking and

processes. As a result, most players fell into the pitfall of revertin g to th eir pr eviou s war -gam in g or operation al experien ces an d

got bogged d own in th e rou tin es of th e AOC. Man y becam e m ired

in the tactical-level targeting cycle and forgot to seriously con

sider th e h igh er -level desired effects th at GE IV plan n ers h ad in -

ten ded as th eir focu s. Ins tead of effectively com m an ding air a n d

space power to attain desired effects, war gamers found them-

selves managing the ATO to service targets.89 The Headquarters

USAF initial rep ort t itled The Air War over Serbia sta ted a s im ilar

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CADRE PAPER

situ at ion occu rred in th e com bined AOC at Vicenza, Ita ly, du ring

th e 78-day air cam paign in 1999 . Wh ile air com m an ders were at-

tem pting to execu te an effects-ba sed t ar getin g cam pa ign , it m ore

closely resembled a servicing of target lists. The result was similar, as commanders found themselves concentrating primarily

on th e ATO rath er th an th e effective emp loym en t of air an d s pa ce90power.

Th e second pitfall observed d u rin g GE IV was a ten den cy to

focus on the input par t of the process ra ther than output .

Specifically, mem bers concentrated on d ata su ch a s n u m bers

of weapons systems, weapons of a certain type, sortie count,

and amounts of ordnance available and expended, almost to

th e exclu sion of other importan t con siderat ion s. Cons equen tly, far too lit t le em ph as is was placed on th e outp u t pa rt of th e

process, which was concerned with achieving the stated ob

jectives. In particular, the functional, systemic, and psycho-

logical effects—which were d eemed im porta n t a t th e ou tset of

the war game—basically were disregarded during the game.91

If GE IV is an y in dicator, th ere a re s om e very sign ifican t ch al

lenges to overcome, especially in the education and training

as sociated with EBO. Alth ough th e cha llenges are su bsta n tial ,

the potential benefits are enormous, if an effects-based approach to military operations is adopted.

With the aforementioned problems as a s tar t ing point , the

authors recognize two major areas of challenge in fully imple

menting the EBO methodology. The first is modifying both

service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be ac

complished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the

area of C2 tha t m u s t be addressed . C2 represents perhaps the

great est of th e th ree ch allenges d iscu ss ed h ere, since effective

C2

for EBO depends on how both intelligence analysis andcom bat a ss essm ent n ot only are perform ed bu t in tegrated in to

th e plan n in g process. In th e rema in der of th is sect ion, each of

th ese iss u es will be ad dres sed m ore fu lly.

Military Doctrine for EBO

From wh at h as been s tated to th is p oin t, it s h ould be fairly ob

vious that one of the first orders of business is to agree upon a

defin ition of th e pr ocess for effects-ba sed plan n in g an d in corpo-

78




ra te th is p rocess into form al service an d join t doctrin e. In a s im

ilar fashion following the Gulf War, the air campaign planning

process used by the air planners became part of joint doctrine.

Th is five-stage air cam pa ign plan n in g process , now kn own a s th eJ AOP process , was refin ed an d becam e the cent erpiece of J P 3-

56.1. J u st a s it was with th e J AOP, it does n ot ma tter if th e EBO

m eth odology is a rticu lat ed pr ecisely as pres ent ed h erein . Th e im

portant matter is the development of a comprehensive effects-

based concept that can be agreed upon and implemented joint

ly. On e of th e poten tial criticism s of th is proposa l is th at th e fu ll

utility of the EBO methodology is heavily dependent upon na

tional level and interagency support. The criticism correctly as

serts th at is there is n o way to ens u re the s u pport of th ese agencies. However, significant benefits can still be realized even if full

national level and interagency support is not secured from the

outset. The military as a whole will profit even if it must incor

porate the EBO methodology unilaterally, as almost certainly it

m u st. Hopefu lly as t h e dividen ds from th e EBO meth odology ar e

realized, other agencies will become more and more supportive

over time.

Th e next, an d closely related , pa rt of th is ch allen ge is to defin e

effects-based terminology. The military services and the jointstaff have been talking a great deal about EBO in recent years.

Th is is one of th e key reas ons it is th e right t im e for th e US m il

ita ry to adopt effects-ba sed th in king. Neverth eless , it is a ppa ren t

that when EBO is discussed, all participants do not share the

same understanding. For example, much of what has been put

forth to th is p oin t from th e Arm y h as revolved ar oun d a con cept

called fires an d effects. In th is con text EBO tak es on a very na r

row defin ition of th e effects of fires in su pp ort of m an eu ver. Th is

Arm y pers pective does n ot add ress other a reas where effects ar eimportant, such as the effects created by maneuver. Almost di

rectly oppos ed to th is view is t h e one th at equ at es EBO only with

th e resu lts of operations other th an th ose ass ociated with trad i

tiona l fires a n d m an eu ver. Su ch effects m ay be ach ieved th rou gh

in form ation operation s a n d/ or the u se of n onletha l weapon s

among a host of other possibilities. Others have defined EBO

wholly in term s of “disab lin g a ta rget u sing leth al an d n onleth al

means while keeping collateral damage to an absolute mini-

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CADRE PAPER

mu m.”92 Suffice it to say that there is a plethora of ideas and

con cepts s u rrou n ding EBO. Perha ps t h e closest pa ra llel of all th e

ser vices to wh at is b ein g proposed h erein is th e Navy’s d evelop

ing concept of EBO and network-centric warfare, which is verysimilar to emerging Air Force and joint views of EBO and infor

mation warfare. There are more perspectives, however, and ex

perience suggests th at th ose who un derstand best what is con

tained in this study regarding EBO readily admit that no one

fu lly u n ders ta n ds th e concept yet. Clearly defin in g effects-ba sed

term in ology can go far in esta blish in g a m u tu al un dersta n din g.

A key step in implementing any EBO concept, then, would

be to get a ll the s ervices a n d th e join t comm u n ity to agree on

usage of the relevant terms. Current USAF doctrine is lacedwith effects terminology; and there are relatively frequent ref

erences to effects in sister-service and joint doctrine, but

n owh ere is th e term effect even defin ed in an y join t or ser vice

doctrin e docu m ent . Clearly, as a foun da tion, it is n ecess ar y to

define effect specifically and carefully describe how it relates

to the concept of EBO. With th at a s a st ar tin g poin t, th ere are

other t erm s th at almos t certainly n eed som e join t defin ition, if

a common EBO language is to become a reality. For instance,

USAF doctrine defin es t h e term s strategic effect but n ot operational or tactical effect . Besides strategic, operational, and

tact ical effects , various pu blicat ions h ave us ed term s su ch as

cascading, collateral, direct, indirect, intentional, a n d uninten

tional effects to describe specific aspects concerning the ef

fects-ba sed concept. Th ere are almost certa in ly other ter m s to

be defined as well. To help in that process a lexicon of perti

nent terms and recommended joint defini t ions has already

been pres ent ed. Followin g this fin al section of th e stu dy, term s

an d defin itions ar e pr esen ted for th e rea ders ’ review.

Educat ion and Training

Implementing the EBO methodology will require learning a

n ew m in d-set from th e groun d u p. Certainly, comm an ders an d

plan ners sh ou ld be th e absolu te an d u nqu es t ioned exper ts in

m ilita ry art an d s cience. Expertise will ha ve to cross m u ltiple

domains, such as , mil i tary ar t and science plus poli t ics , so

cioeconomics, culture, finance, psychology, physical science,

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and diplomacy, to name a few. While the primary focus must

remain on military art and science, i t also is important to

know at least enough about each of the other domains to

reach out in to the variou s d isciplin es, fin d th e necess ar y factsan d k n owledge, an d a pply th em to act ions th at will create th e

desired effects to achieve national policy goals. The US mili

ta ry will h a ve to grow the r ight kind of sp ecific an d gen era l ex

pertise in future leaders from the moment they enter service

th rough th e t im e they becom e operat ion al plan n ers u n til th ey

are ready to be component commanders , JFCs, and combat-

an t comm an ders . Milita ry leaders will th en b e prepa red to ap

propr iately ad vise n at iona l leaders h ip on th ese iss u es, as well

as to direct appropriate military operations in support of thenational policy goals. Therefore, the EBO methodology re-

quires a new way of thinking. To consistently instil l such a

m in d-set in everyone, a ll profess iona l milita ry an d con tin u in g

edu cation m u st in corporate th e EBO m ethodology.

The Air Force is taking action regarding developing officers

with a much broader background in mil i tary operat ions

through the Force Development initiative. In late 1999 Air

Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters and Air Force Chief of Staff

Michael E. Ryan commissioned the Force Development (thencalled Developing Aerosp ace Lead ers ) st u dy, u n der d irection of

Maj Gen Charles Link, USAF, retired, to consider ways to im

prove the development of war-fighting skills within the USAF

officer corps. Secretary Peters and General Ryan felt that offi

cers n eeded a broader edu cation in con cepts of air an d sp ace

power employment and general war fighting than currently

was pr ovided by th e Air For ce. Wh ile th e Air Force h ad always

expen ded sizab le res ou rces tra in in g officers for th eir p ar ticu

lar career special t ies , n ot a great deal was spen t on edu catin gth em in operat ion al ar t , m ilitary s tra tegy, an d th e ar t a n d s ci

ence of war far e. Alth ou gh th ese ar e th e area s of m ilita ry stu dy

needed by those who might ultimately become war-fighting

commanders, the Air Force had traditionally left this kind of

edu cat ion t o cha n ce an d th e in itiative of th e in dividu al officer.

Many Air Force officers knew only what they had learned on

th e job. Certa in post–Gu lf War stu dies s u pp ort th e con ten tion

that senior Air Force officers were not as schooled as their

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CADRE PAPER

Arm y cou n terpa rts in th e a pplication of m ilita ry power.93 Th e

pu rpose of th e Force Developm ent is to initiate a program th at

ens u res s u bsequ ent generat ion s of Air Force leaders h ave the

opportunity and incentive to develop a much broader back-ground along with their specialties. What is envisioned ap

pears to be the very kin d of ba ckgroun d n ecessa ry to plan an d

direct E BO. Th is pa rt of fu lly im plem ent in g the EBO m eth od

ology will ta ke perh ap s as m u ch as 20 years to fu lly comp lete,

as a new generation of officers is brought through the educa

tiona l an d tra in in g system an d into positions of leaders h ip. In

th e m ean time, toda y’s Air Force lead ers will h a ve to work h ar d

and incorporate these ideas and concepts into future war

gam es, exercises , operat ions, a n d ca m pa ign s.Th e Air Force h as also already begu n to addres s a n other as

pect of this educational challenge in initiating what is collo

quially referred to as the “AOC as a weapon system.” In the

pas t , t rain in g an d edu cation h as been con du cted in a wide va

riety of specialties, but i t has not encompassed the work per-

formed in an AOC, per se. Most importantly, Air Force per

sonnel have not been suff icient ly educated and trained to

u n dersta n d h ow al l th e areas with in an AOC are in terrelated.

In such cases as Opera t ions Deser t Storm, Nor thern andSou th ern Wat ch , a n d NATO’s Opera tion Allied F orce, very

good people were selected to work in the AOCs. Unfortunate

ly, m ost of th em h ad n ever been in an AOC before. Th ere was

n o stan da rd configu ra tion for AOCs for tha t m at ter, so almost

everyone was learning from scratch both how the AOC was

configured and what their individual job was. This situation

gave a s h aky sta r t to operat ion s p lan n in g and con trol.

Air and space power has become an increasingly powerful

tool for the nation. However, to achieve the full potential of airan d s pa ce power, especially in th e ma n y an d var ied operation s

u n derta ken recently, it m u st be cent ra lly contr olled. Th e AOC

is at the very heart of operations planning and execution.

Moreover, th e AOC ha s b ecom e as im porta n t in a chievin g na

tiona l an d m ilita ry objectives a s weap ons system s a n d figh tin g

u n its operating in th e ba ttle spa ce its elf. It is logical to edu cate

and train the people who will work in AOCs as thoroughly as

those who operate complex weapons systems. In this sense

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an d for th is p u rpose, th e Air Force is n ow trea tin g the AOC as

a weapon system its elf an d t ra in in g a fu ll comp lem ent of AOC

personnel to operate this weapon system. The other services

may want to consider adopting similar programs to developoperations center “specialists” for future military actions.

As n oted earlier in th e discu ss ion con cern in g GE IV war gam e,

personnel invariably will rely on their training; therefore, the

EBO methodology must be incorporated into the training regi

mens of the services and joint staff. The need to rapidly cycle

through anticipatory assessment, planning, execution, and ef

fects analysis means Joint Task Force and Component Opera

tions Center personnel, for example, must be very carefully

tra in ed for th at sp ecific role. Moreover, th ese p erson n el m u st beable to un dersta n d th e in tegration of th e variou s roles with in th e

component or functional operations center. To work effectively

they must be trained in system (facilities, equipment, linkages)

capabilities and limitations, as well as the EBO methodology,

prior to experiments, exercises, and war games.

Command and Control of EBO

As used here, C2 refers to al l the resources and systems a

com m an der requires to be properly in form ed, to mak e an d direct implementation of appropriate decisions, and to fully as

ses s r esu lts of operation s. In an att emp t to be all-in clu sive, C2

is sometimes referred to as command, control , communica

tions, and computers intelligence (C 4I), C4ISR, or in other

ways; but for the sake of simplicity, the authors use C2 to en -

com pas s th e en tire system an d as sociated processes. Th e area

of C2 offers much promise in helping implement the EBO

methodology. Many of the difficulties experienced in past at-

tem pts to emp loy effects-ba sed th in king resu lted from in ab ility to observe and analyze the outcomes of actions, especially

at the more esoteric levels of the effects hierarchy. Current

and pending advances in C 2—particularly in the areas of ISR

an d in telligence fu sion—are im pr ovin g capa bilities to obs erve,

detect, analyze, and disseminate exactly the kind of informa

tion n ecess ar y to EBO. One of th e cha llenges for im plem ent a

tion will be buying, sustaining, and organizing the necessary

resources, and training and educating the people to exploit

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CADRE PAPER

these possibilities. It will take some time to get this right; but

if it is done right, the payoff will be huge.

The next challenge in this area for the military services is to

develop commanders and staff officers who can think in effects-based terms and remain focused on the broad perspec

tive of EBO. In pa rticu la r, it is imp era tive for plan n ers , opera -

tors, and assessors to develop synergistic ways of thinking

abou t th e optim u m emp loym ent of m ilitary power an d in th is

sp ecific cas e, air a n d s pa ce power. In st ead of h avin g separ ate

cells in AOCs for intelligence, operations, and space among

others, a more generalist view needs to be adopted. For in-

sta n ce, ra th er th an h avin g in telligence collectors a n d an alysts

working in their own cell and reporting to the planning staff,they need to work side by side with operators and have an

overall u n ders tan ding of operation s in ad dition t o th eir p ar tic

u lar a rea of expertise. At th e sa m e tim e, opera tions experts re-

quire a better understanding of intelligence processes and

produ cts . Th e sa m e is t r u e for all th e other sp ecial is ts th at are

gathered together in military operations centers today.

Th is p oin t is crit ical to su ccess with EBO becau se th e entire

cycle of operation s p lan n in g an d execu tion m u st be fu lly con

nected. Intelligence analysts can contribute much by deter-mining what physical and perhaps functional effects have

been created by operation s. However, th ere is n o way for th ese

an alysts to determ in e th e systemic effects an d t heir impa ct on

overall capa bility an d p syche of a t ar get au dien ce un less th ey

also fully understand the objectives and intent of operations

an d h ow they are u n folding. An effective ap pr oach to EBO re-

qu ires a team of experts an d individu al specialties with a com

plete awareness of the objectives and intent of operations.

Comprehensive education and training—combined with a fam iliar ity regar ding the com m an ders ’ in ten t a n d d esired ef

fects—is necessary to assess whether the military is proceed

ing toward i ts goals and what al terat ions to the plan may be

necessary. It takes this same kind of team effort to perceive

su btle cha n ges in p olicy goals, which som etim es occu r du rin g

opera tion s. A sh ift in p olicy goa ls, even a slight on e, can m a ke

a perfect ly reasoned E BO plan in app ropriate to th e n ew situ

at ion. I t of ten takes careful and informed assessment on the

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part of operations planners to perceive these subtle changes

an d th e ir im pact .

The most vital C2 challenge in implementing the EBO

methodology is the intelligence cycle. A commander needs asconcise, accurate, t imely, and complete information as possi

ble to ma ke operat ion al decision s a n d to as sess th e resu lts of

operations. As already established, two of the most serious

sh ortfalls in p as t at tem pts at EBO h ave been th e ability to col

lect a n d an alyze in form ation on r esu lts of operat ions an d th e

ab ility to determ in e wha t effects th e operation s h ave ach ieved.

Th e cu rren t d octrin al concept of in telligence p repa ra tion of th e

batt le spa ce part ially address es th e firs t iss u e bu t does n ot go

far enou gh . In telligence p repa ra tion of th e ba ttle spa ce is qu iteobvious ly born of th e con qu est pa rad igm an d a ss u m es al l op

erations can be defined as battle. What is lacking is intelli

gen ce prep a ra tion for HUMRO, peacekeep in g opera tion s or, for

th at m atter , peacet im e engagemen t. Preparat ion of th e ba t t le

sp ace as su m es kn owledge of where an d when a m ilita ry action

is plan ned a n d wha t its u lt im ate end s a re. As poin ted ou t pre

viously, by the time an operation is initiated, in many in-

sta n ces it is a lread y too late for the ba sic ba ckgrou n d res earch

necessary for EBO. The EBO methodology requires muchpreparation prior to crisis action planning, and it is incorrect

to assume all actions will be combat.

Jus t as opera t ions p lanners and commanders wi l l have to

broaden their views, so will intelligence collectors and ana

lysts . Th ey will h ave to become concern ed with m u ch broa der

iss u es th an tra ckin g ta rget lists , defin in g weapon s effects, an d

assessing physical and functional effects of combat opera

tions . Tar get au dien ces m ay be viewed a s a system of system s,

and it is vital to predict and assess systemic and psychological effects, as well as physical and functional effects. Obvi

ously, intelligence analysts working alone cannot accomplish

all of th ese fu n ctions . To ach ieve su ccess at th ese h igher lev

els of a n alysis, in telligence a n a lysts will ha ve to b e m ore fu lly

in tegra ted with operation s plan n ers. Togeth er th ey will ha ve to

understand how the higher-level effects can be achieved and

measured. This means a great deal of study for all partici

pants, beginning long before specific operations are envi-

85




able tech n ologies . Th e s tra tegic a ir opera tions of World War II, for

exam ple, were lim ited by th e ab ility to fin d valid s tra tegic ta rgets,

achieve desired effects against them, and measure the results.

Technological improvements made such an approach muchmore feasible by the time of Operation Desert Storm, but there

were still major problems with anticipatory assessment and

h igh-order an a lysis. Proper ly ap plied toda y’s tech n ologies a n d

those just coming on the horizon will reduce the technical chal

lenges dramatically. Stealth, precision, unmanned aerial vehi

cles, improved munitions, multispectral sensors, improved C2

systems, focused and fused ISR, and other technologies can

solve many of the past inhibitors. Application of the EBO

methodology is within grasp, if embraced and instilled as an institutional mind-set. Although technological progress will con

tinue to enable critical aspects of EBO, the institutionalized

m ind -set of the comm an ders, plan ners, operators, and ass essors

employin g the tech n ology is th e m ost imp ortan t factor in imp le

menting the EBO methodology. This new approach must be in-

st illed in pers onn el of a ll the s ervices from th eir very ear liest da ys

of service.

Obvious ly the cha llenges p resented h ere do not exh au st th e

full range of those that must be solved to implement the EBOm eth odology in th e US m ilitar y, bu t th ey provide a good s ta rt

in g poin t. Su ch ch allen ges m ay n ever be fu lly solved, h owever,

initiating the fundamentals of an effects-based approach is a

h u ge step in th e right direction. Su ch a step will pa ve th e way

to a n ew pa ra digm in m ilitar y operation s—one better s u ited to

the uncertain world of the twenty-first century than the old

par adigm of con ques t .

Conclusions

Though promising, implementing the EBO methodology will

not be easy. Perhaps most challenging are the needs for antici

patory assessment and high-order analysis. Many will demand

perfect anticipatory assessment and high-order analysis, while

some will declare them impossible because they cannot be done

per fectly. Both positions proceed from a grain of tru th . Th e EBO

methodology is vitally dependent upon these two functions, and

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CADRE PAPER

they will never be done perfectly. In fact, just doing them rea

sonably well will be a significant challenge requiring extensive

conceptual development, years of education and training, reor

gan ization of m an y plan n in g an d as sess m ent fu n ctions, an d development and application of advanced technologies of many

kinds. However, the question is not, Can it be done perfectly?

The EBO methodology must be evaluated on its promise to pro-

vide greater success in employing the instruments of national

power to achieve national objectives and policy goals. Nothing

can ever comp letely remove wha t Car l von Clau sewitz term ed th e

fog and friction that surrounds and enfolds all political action,

perhaps especially warfare. There are too many variables and

such activities always involve numbers of thinking, adaptivehuman organizations. The problem would seem to be outthink

in g an d ou t-ad ap tin g comp etin g organ izat ions . Properly applied,

the EBO methodology offers tremendous promise for helping to

solve th is pr oblem.

Notes

1. The term sp ectrum of engagemen t is u sed throu ghou t th is s tu dy to de-

scribe the continuum of peacetime through conflict to war and back to

peacetim e. Th e term s pectrum of conflict in other writ ings is s ometimes u sed,bu t a more neu tra l term is u sed in th is s tu dy to move away from conquest

paradigm thinking.

2. Military planners often seem most comfortable talking about what

they will do in a given scenario: how many airplanes of what type will they

sen d, wha t a nd how ma ny weapons will they emp loy, how ma n y sorties will

be flown against which targets or ta rget s ets , an d s o on. It is som etimes dif

ficult to get th em t o focus on wha t a ll this will accomp lish , th at is , wha t ou t-

comes will be achieved by all this input.

3. The other branches of the US armed services are pursuing efforts

along parallel l ines, but the authors are more qualif ied to examine the

USAF’s efforts an d will defer to t h e oth er s ervices t o an alyze an d d escribetheir own u nder takings .

4. Of cou rse Desert St orm obvious ly had global imp lications , witn ess t he

global coalition of forces arrayed against Iraq. However, even though Iraq

was a longtime Soviet and Russian client, the Russians did not orchestrate

Sad dam Hu ss ein’s a ctions or directly enter t he conflict in h is s u pport .

5. For exam ple, one of th e first p risoners of war captu red by th e US Arm y

du ring Opera t ion J u s t Cau se was a Pana ma nian West Poin t gradu ate .

6 . Joint Vis ion 20 20 , J u n e 2 00 0 , 6 .

7. For definit ions of th ese term s see Joint Vision 20 20 .

8. J oin t Pub lication (J P) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Februa ry

1995 , III-2. The p u blication correctly notes th at th e desired end sta te repre-

88




sen ts th e set of conditions necessa ry to achieve str ategic objectives a nd re-

solve a crisis.

9. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940

(1955; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1992), 65–66.

10. Haywood Han sell, The A ir Plan tha t Defeated Hitler (Atlan ta : Higgin s–MacArthur, 1972), 61–93.

11. Wesley Fran k Craven an d J am es Lea Cate, eds. , The Arm y Air Forces

in World Wa r II, vol. 2 , Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December

1 9 4 3 (1949; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983),

357 .

12. Ibid. ; an d Wesley Fran k Craven a nd J am es Lea Cate, The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, Jan ua ry 193 9 to

August 1 942 (1948; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His-

tory, 1983), 362.

13. Fra n klin D’Olier, ch airm an , The United S tates S trategic Bom bing Su r

vey , Su m m ary Rep ort (Europea n War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Print

ing Office [GPO], 1945), 8.14. J ohn F. Kreis , ed. , Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces

Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Muse

ums Program, 1996), 202–3.

15. For a discussion of these goals and how planners hoped to reach

th em , see Col Edwa rd C. Man n III, Thun de r an d Lightning: Des ert Storm an d

the A irpow er Deba tes (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Un ivers ity Pres s, 19 95 ), 37 , 41 .

16. Ibid., 41.

17. Lt Col David A. Deptula, Washington, D.C., transcript of interview

with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, and Lt Col Ed-

ward C. Man n III, 12 December 1 991 , 96.

18 . Alth ough th e p lan ners were genera lly apply ing EBO th oughtprocesses, th e idea th at victory wou ld m ost l ikely produ ce com plian ce ma y

ha ve been an artifact of th e conqu est pa rad igm.

19. Deptu la, 96.

20 . Jus t as the authors have e lec ted to use spectrum of engagement

rather than spectrum of conflict or any other term, they also have chosen

the term levels of employment to refer to the term often called levels of w ar,

th at is , s trat egic, operationa l, an d t actical. This term inology better f its th e

broad concepts of EBO as d iscu ss ed here. Stra tegy, operations, a nd tactics

app ly to military actions in all ph as es of th e spectru m of engagem ent.

21. Col David A. Deptula, Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of War-

fare (Arlin gton, Va.: Aerosp ace E du cation Fou n da tion, 19 95), 10.22. Maj Steven M. Rinaldi, Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Syner

gies and Targeting Methodologies (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

April 1995). Major Rinaldi develops the concept of an output (objective)

bas ed ta rget pr ocess . Rina ldi’s objective-based app roach sta rts with th e

comm an der’s inten t an d th eater objectives th en works th rough what (effects

an d) ta rgets will con tribu te to t h e fu lfillmen t of th e selected objectives.

23 . T. W. Beagle J r., Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise?

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Un ivers ity Pres s, Decem ber 20 01 ), 8.

24. Th e term airmen refers h ere to memb ers of th e ar med forces who are

associated with the application of air and space power rather than the rank

of a n oncom m issioned officer in th e Air Force.

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25. Maj Gen Tim oth y A. Kinn an , as comm an der of th e Air Force DoctrineCent er in 1 99 9, explained t h e fu n ction al pers pective in h is briefing “Let’sGet Serious about Working Together.” He states that surface commandershave a geographic perspective wherein every commander below the jointforce commander has an area of operations (AO). The Air Force contendsth at th e joint force air compon ent com ma nd er (J FACC), as well as othercommanders, such as the joint force special operations component commander, must perform numerous functions (e.g. , counterair , s trategic at-tack, intelligence, su rveillan ce, and reconna iss an ce) th at can not b e relegated to a n y specific AO. Ess ent ially, th e J FACC ha s join t opera ting ar ea orth eater wide res pon sibilities in or der t o best u tilize th e inh eren t flexibility of air an d sp ace power.

26 . Am y But ler, “DOD Urged Not to Forget Ben efits of Att rition, An n ihilation Strategies,” Inside the Air Force, 9 J u n e 2 0 00 , 1 4.

27. Gen J ohn P. J u m per explain ed his perspective regard ing cam paign-by-target-l is t management during his presentation on Operation Allied

Force, Air Wa r College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1 7 Augu st 19 99 .28 . J P 3-60 , Join t Doctrine for Targeting, 17 J an u ary 2002; and Air Force

Doctrine Document 2-1.1, Coun terair Operations , 26 April 2002 . Th ese docu men ts a ddres s th e im pact of effects in m ilitar y operations.

29. Maj J ay M. Kreigh ba u m , “Force App lication Plan n ing: A System s-an d-Effects-Ba sed Appr oach ,” Clas s 7 (m as ter’s t h esis, Sch ool of Advan cedAirpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1997–1998), 25.

30. Robert A. Pape, Bom bing to W in: Air Pow er an d Coercion in Wa r (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor n ell Un ivers ity Pres s, 1 99 6), 56 –57 .

31 . Briefing an d pa per, USAF Doctrin e Cent er, Ma xwell AFB, Ala., su b ject: Stra tegic an d Ind irect Effects: Defining an d Modeling, 11 Au gus t 20 00 ,11–14.

32. Ibid. Th e ph ysical, fu n ction al, syst em ic, an d psych ological nat u re of effects is discussed later in the paper, as are cumulative and cascading effects.

33. Beagle, 6.34. Kreighbau m, 75.35. Beagle, 6.36. While effects may theoretically extend to the fourth order and be

yond, this paper considers all effects beyond the second order under theru bric of th ird order effects.

37. Modified from J P 3-60, “J oin t Doctrine for Tar getin g,” 6 J u n e 2000 ,preliminary coordination draft.

38. J P 3-60 , final coordina tion dra ft, I-12, I-13.39. Ibid. , I-13. Fight-centric scenarios are, as the name implies, those

opera tion s in volving comba t on som e sca le. Conversely, m obility-centr ic operations are those normally associated with disaster response, noncombat-an t evacua t ion , or hu ma nitar ian a id .

40. Rinaldi. Rinaldi extensively covers the interrelatedness of nationaleconomic systems. Specifically, the interactions between sets must be partof the overall decision-making process if the global effects of air and spacepower ar e to be rea lized.

41. Beagle, 10 .42. Ibid., 11.43. Ibid., 7.

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44. Combat assessment (CA) is an overall evaluation of combat operations in relation to command objectives. This link of objectives with assessm ent is lau dab le, but as will be seen , rema ins prima rily at th e tactical levelof war. CA consists of three subassessments: batt le damage assessment(BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and mission assessment(MA). MA addresses the effectiveness of broad apportioned missions, suchas interdiction, counterair, and so forth. MEA analyzes the effectiveness of munitions damage mechanisms, for example, fusing against specific targettypes. The USAF guidance further subdivides the often, overshadowing pillar , BDA, int o ass essm ents of ph ysical dam age, fu nctional dam age, and t ar-get system .

45. J P 3-60, prelimina ry coordina tion d raft , GL-10.46. Beagle, 7.47. Ibid.48 . Air Force Man u a l (AFMAN) 1-1 , vol. 1, Ba s ic Aeros pa ce Doctrine of the

United S tate s Air Force, March 1 992, 12 .

49 . J P 3-0 , Doctrine for Joint Op erations , 1 Febru ary 199 5, II-1.50. Kreighbau m , 22–23.51 . Air Force Doctrin e Docu m en t (AFDD) 2-1 .2, “St ra tegic Att ack ,” dr a ft,

1 J anu ary 2000 , 7 .52. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 J anu ary 2000 , 7 .53. Kreighbau m, 23.54 . Briefing, USAF Doctrin e Cen ter.55. Deptula, Firing for Effect, 5.56. Robert J ervis , System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life

(Princeton , N.J .: Princeton University Press , 199 7), 10.57. J P 3-0, ix.58 . AFDD 2, Organization an d Employm ent of Aerosp a ce Pow er, 17 Feb

ru ary 2000, 88 .59. In st itut e for Defens e An alyses/ J oin t Advan ced War figh ting Program ,

“New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations,” draft annotated briefing,22 March 20 01, 23 , 26–27.

60. Credit is du e to m an y people for the discu ss ion of EBO meth odologyan d th e inform ation conveyed in f igures 2, 3, a nd 4. A great deal of t ime an deffort were spen t on developing th e constr u ct as presen ted h ere, so it is diff icult to determine exactly what credit is due to whom. Certainly the EBOma terials produ ced by the Ins ti tute for Defens e Ana lyses/ J oint AdvancedWarfighting Program and at the Air Force Research Laboratory are progenitors of many of the ideas contained herein. The authors are indebted to

th ose organ izations.61. David E. Thaler, “The Strategies-to-Tasks Framework,” RAND brief

ing at th e Air Force’s Modern izat ion Plan n ing Conference, 23 March 199 3.The figure a lso conta ins m aterial extracted from th e dra ft Concept of Operations for Effects-Based Operations version 2.0 (9 October 2001) by Dr.Maris McCrabb , 7.

62. Archer J ones, The A rt of War in th e Wes tern World (New Yor k : OxfordUniversity Press, 1987), 413.

63 . J am es M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, The Civil War Era (NewYork: Ballant ine Books, 198 9), 81 7–20.

64. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 190–201.

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65. Al Santoli, Perspectives, online a t h t tp : / / www.theh is torynet .com/

Vie tnam/ a r t ic le s / 02963_text .h tm , 11 J un e 2001 .

66. Dr. J am es Titus , “Th e Batt le of Kh afji, An Overview an d Prelim ina ry

Analysis” (paper, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., September 1996).67. Departm ent of Defens e, Cond uct of th e Pers ian Gulf War: Final Rep ort

to Congres s (Was h ington, D.C.: GPO, April 199 2), 20 0–201, 215 .

68 . Mich ael Howard , “Milita ry Science in a n Age of Peace,” RUSI Journ al,

March 1974, 3–11.

69. Gen J ohn A. Sh au d, USAF, retired, Was h ington, D.C., in terviewed by

Gary Endersby and E dward C. Man n III, 15 J u ne 200 0; and Sam Gardiner,

int erviewed by Gar y End ersby, Th omas R. Searle, an d E dward C. Man n III,

20 April 2000, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

70. Discussions with various personnel who have participated in the

games rendered this opinion.

71. As is usually the case when discussing processes, this is both de

scriptive an d p rescriptive. It d escribes a process, wh ich th e au th ors b elievetak es place eith er form ally or informa lly, with or with out our u nd ersta n ding

it, and whether or not in this precise form (description). Formalizing our

thinking about how this process should work aids in decision making and

enables the achievement of desired outcomes (prescription) on a more fre

quen t ba s is .

72. Use of the term phase may be slightly misleading here. These divi

sions of th e process a re n ecess ary to describe the totality of th e process, bu t

th ey are sequ ential only in a very genera l sense. Man y of th em a re occu rring

simultaneously during an operation, and the entire process is i terative

based upon feedback received throughout the operations. For instance, as

already stated, s trategic environment research is a continuous process be-fore, during, and after a given operation. Nonetheless, in order to describe a

process i t must be segmented in some manner , so the te rm phase i s used

here to differentiate th e segmen ts of th e process.

73. Some readers a re likely to try to equ ate th is ph as e to th e strat egic es

timate that theater combatant commanders (formerly referred to as CINCs)

develop for th eir area s of res pon sibility. Th at effort wou ld neces sa rily be pa rt

of, bu t on ly part of, s tr ategic environm ent resear ch, wh ich wou ld a ctu ally be

a m u ch wider con cept encompa ss ing th e efforts of a large nu m ber of agen

cies, t h e joint s ta ff, ser vice st affs, in telligence organ izat ion s (military an d n a

tional) , and so on. I t would also encompass study of a wider range of sub

ject m atter , like th e very na tu re of hu m an psychology an d efforts t o cha n gepeople’s m inds , for one exam ple. Greater d etail is offered in later pa ra graph s.

74. EBO meth odology will ap ply even in peacetim e. Bas ed on th e na tion

al military str ategy, peacetim e engagem ent r equires th e United Sta tes to en-

gage in multilateral training exercises, nation assistance, foreign military

sales, and other activit ies designed to support broad national objectives.

These activities should also be based upon creation of desired effects with-

in t he ta rget au diences, a nd plann ing for them sh ould follow th e sam e gen

eral outlin e as operationa l plan ning in a crisis .

75. Th is is not m ean t to denigrate th e effort of plann ers in th ose cases,

who did the best they could with only l imited information on the subjects .

This makes the point precisely! This knowledge is needed in advance.

92




76. Richa rd Overy, Wh y the Allies Won (New York : W. W. Norton a n d Co.,

1995), 132–33. Overy repor ts th a t indu str ia l absen teeism in J apa n rose to

more tha n 50 percent by the end of the war .

77 . AFMAN 1-1 , 12 .

78. Steph en T. Hosmer, Ps y chological Effects of US Air Operations in Four Wars 194 1–1991 : Less ons for US Comm an ders (Sa n ta Monica, Ca lif.: RAND,

Project Air Force, 1996), 181–86.

79. Giulio Douhet, The Comm an d of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942;

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 261,

293–394.

80. Craven and Cate, 2:370–76.

81. Deptu la interview, 22 –23 May 19 91, 41–42.

82. Ibid. , 11; Overy, 127–28; an d Mann , Thunder and Lightning, 151 .

83. In both cases used here for examples, the USAF tried very hard to

m ake th ese st u dies scient ific , both du ring an d a fter th e conflicts . In World

War II distinguished scholars and industrialists were brought together to

form the Committee of Operations Analysts who were to determine thestra tegic vu lnera bilit ies of Germ an y and J apa n. See Robert Fra nk Fu trell,

Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol.

1 , 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989),

143. The pr oblem was tha t , even th ough th e d is t ingu ish ed scholars an d in

dustrialists contributed significantly to Army Air Forces (AAF) analytic abil

ity, there was a pau city of real inform ation available on th e Germa n system s

in ques tion. S ee Craven an d Cat e, 2:362. Also, while th e comm ittee recom

mended on 8 March 1943 that the AAF make a “continuing analysis of the

successes and failures of air operations,” the AAF did not act on their rec

omm enda tion u nt il the spr ing of 1944 . See Futr ell, 1:143. Thu s, for most of

th e war, air operations su ccess was d eterm ined prima rily th rough posts tr ikeph oto an alysis of ind ividu al str ike m iss ions (althou gh Ultra in tercepts pro

vided much of the contextual information on the generalized effects of

strikes. See Kreis, 76–78). After the war the United States Strategic Bomb

ing Su rvey tr ied to scientifically determine t he imp act, bu t even th ough th ey

had unpara l le led access to damaged targets and German industr ia l is ts ,

their reports were mixed concerning results and have been interpreted in

different ways by different an alysts to prove almost an ything you m igh t wan t

proved. Futrell , 2:144–47. In the case of Desert Storm, once again during

th e war scientific an alysis of fu n ction al effects was m ad e very difficu lt by th e

lack of intelligence collection of anything but photographs of physical dam-

age, and by certain intelligence analysis methodologies that had developedduring the Cold War (for instance, the insistence of some intelligence agen

cies on confirming mobile target kills with overhead photography—some

th ing th at was a lmost never going to ha ppen th rough our collection s ystem).

Some of the planners tr ied mightily, but they were pretty thoroughly ham-

stru ng by th ese l imitations. After th e war th e USAF comm iss ioned th e Gu lf

War Airpower Study to take a more scientific look, but they were severely

cons tra ined b y availability of da ta . Th ey could n ot go to th e vas t m ajority of

targets in Iraq (which included virtually all the strategic targets), and data

on th e tactical an d operationa l tar gets was severely lim ited du e to the da n

ger from clutter and unexploded ordnance on the batt lefield. Once again

they were able to do a pretty good job analyzing levels of physical destruc-

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tion, b u t h igh er -level effects (fu n ction al, s ystem ic, a n d ps ychological) oftenproved too ha rd to do. Deptula interview, 22–23 May 1991, 1 1.

84. Defense Intelligence Agency, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Quick Guide, PC-8060-1-96 (Minneapolis: Department of Defense Intelligence, NavalReserve Unit DIAHQ 0878, 1996), 5–7. The Quick Guide divides analysis intothr ee categories: Physical-dam age ass essm ent, fu nctiona l-dam age ass essm ent,an d t arget-system ass essm ent. However, all of these ass essm ents are d irectlyrelated to physical dam age and it’s accu m u lation over a system . Th ere are noassessment criteria for effects other than physical damage.

85. Th ese can b e thou ght of as t h e na tion al policy effects des ired. At eachlevel of plan n ing (gran d s tra tegic, str at egic, operat ion al, an d ta ctical) th e de-sired effects will need to be defined before the strategy and tactics areplann ed at th at level.

86. Note that t he h ost-na tion a m bas sa dor will play a sign ifican t role.87. Efforts are ongoing to place control of ISR resources directly in the

h an ds of em ploying comm an ders (J FACC’s, J FC’s). Soon th ere will be lin ks

from many ISR assets directly to the “shooters” in the field. This enhancedsituational awareness, combined with improved communications capabili tywill allow imm ediate rep lann ing an d reta sk ing of opera ting forces. Th e plan ning-execution-assessment cycle in some cases may take only seconds andwill requ ire a very agile, contin u ou s, itera tive plan n ing capa bility.

88. Beagle, 39 .89 . Genera l Shau d in terview, 15 J u ne 2000 , au thors’ notes ; and Gar-

diner int erview, 20 April 200 0, au th ors’ n otes.90. Headqu art ers USAF, Air War over Serbia, 25 April 2000 , ix, 38.91 . Genera l Shau d in terview, 15 J u ne 2000 , au thors’ notes ; and Gar-

diner inter view, au th ors’ n otes.92 . Am y But ler, “DOD Urged Not to Forget Ben efits of Att rition, An n ihi

lation Strategies,” In s ide th e A ir Force, 9 J u ne 200 0, 14 , c ited in Early Bird,1 0 J u n e 2 00 0 .

93. See, for in sta nce, Man n, Thund er and Lightning, especially chap. 10.

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Terms and Definit ions

2 d, 3 d , nth order effect s . a cau ses b cau ses c cau ses . . . For

exam ple, disr u pt ions in th e electric grid . . . yields rollin gblackouts . . . , which disrupt petroleum deliveries to air-

fields . . . , which disrupt air operations. (Air Combat

Command [ACC] Effects-Based Operations [EBO] white

paper)

bat t l e damage assessment . An estimate of the damage or

degradation resulting from the application of military

force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a target or sys

tem. Th is est imate sh ould be t im ely an d accu rate an d can

be applied to the employment of all types of weapon system s (e.g., air, grou n d, n aval, sp ecial forces, an d inform a

tion). Battle damage assessment is composed of physical

dam age ass essm ent , fu nct ional dam age ass essm ent , and

target system assessment. Also called BDA. (Modified

from J oin t Pu blicat ion [J P] 3-6 0, “J oin t Doctrine for

Tar getin g,” 6 J u n e 20 00 , pr elim in ar y coordin ation [PC]

draft)

cas cading ef fect s . An indirect effect that ripples through an

adversa ry sys tem, o f ten a f fec t ing o the r sys tems .

Typically, a cascading effect flows from higher-to-lower

levels of employment and is the result of influencing

nodes that are crit ical to multiple adversary systems.

(ACC E BO wh ite p ap er)

causal l inkage. Explanation for how a particular action con-

tribu tes or lead s t o a given effect. It a n swers th e qu estion ,

“Why do planners believe this action will create or help

crea te t h e des ired effect?” (ACC EBO white p ap er)collateral effects. Outcomes tha t resul t when something

occurs other than what was intended. These outcomes

m ay be eith er pos itive or n ega tive to th e origin al in ten t. In

one sense, collateral effects may be the incidental direct

or indirect effects (usually unintentional) that cause

injury or damage to persons, objects, or systems. In a

br oad er p ers pective colla tera l effects cover a wide a rr ay of

poss ible downs trea m resu lts . (ACC EBO wh ite pa per)

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combat assessment . The determination of the overall effec

tiveness of force employment during military actions .

Combat assessment is composed of three major compo

n ent s, (a) ba ttle dam age as ses sm ent (BDA), (b) m u n itionseffects assessment (MEA), and (c) mission assessment

(MA). Also ca lled CA. (Modified from J P 3 -60 PC d ra ft)

cumulative effects. The aggregate result of many direct or

in direct effects a gain st an ad versa ry. Typically, a cu m u la

tive effect flows from lower -to-h igh er levels of em ploym en t

and occur at the higher levels; however, i t may occur at

the same level as a contributing lower-order effect. (ACC

EBO white paper)

direct ef fects . Immediate, first-order effects (e.g., weaponsem ploym ent resu lts). Th ey ar e th e resu lts of action s with

n o in tervening effect or m ech an ism between act a n d ou t-

come. (ACC EBO wh ite p a per)

effect iveness . Th e meas u remen t of th e resu lts or ou tcom es of

m ilita ry act ions . (Modified from J P 3-6 0 PC d ra ft)

effects . A fu ll ra n ge of out comes, event s, or cons equen ces th at

result from a specific action. (ACC EBO white paper)

e f f ec t s assessment . The evaluation of the overall effective

ness of m ilitary actions in terms of measures of merit in

relation to stated objectives and policy goals. (Proposed

definition)

effects-based. An act ion taken with the intent to produce a

distin ctive a n d d esired effect. (ACC EBO wh ite p a per)

effects-based operat ions. Actions taken against enemy sys

tems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute

directly to desired military and political outcomes. (ACC

EBO white paper)effects-based operat ions methodology. A methodology for

planning, executing, and assessing operat ions designed

to attain the effects required to achieve desired national

security outcomes. (ACC EBO white paper)

effects -bas ed s trategy. The coherent application of national

and alliance elements of power through effects-based

processes to accomplish strategic objectives. Also called

EBS . (Propos ed defin ition )

96



funct ional ass es s ment . Th e estim a te of th e im pa ct of m ilita ry

force to degra de/ dest roy or otherwise a ffects th e fu n c

tional or operational capability of a target or system to

perform i ts intended mission. Functional assessmentincludes the level of success of the force applied relative

to the operational objective established. (Proposed defini

tion)

functional effects. Direct or indirect effects of an attack or

opera tion on t h e ab ility of a t a rget to fu n ction pr operly. In

essence, i t answers the quest ion, to what extent has the

function of the target been degraded or affected by those

actions. (ACC EBO white paper)

indirect ef fects . Those effects, which are created through anintermediate effect or mechanism, producing a final out-

come or result . They are 2d, 3d, and nth order effects,

which may be functional, systemic, or psychological in

nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed and typically

are more difficult to recognize than direct effects. (ACC

EBO white paper)

measures of ef fect iveness . The indicators required to deter-

m in e wh eth er or n ot in dividu al comp onen t m iss ions , join t

campa ign ph ases , and / or a th ea ter campa ign in genera lar e meeting sta ted objectives. Ass ess m ent of su ch ind ica

tors normally takes place at the tactical-, operational-,

and even strategic-levels of war. The key is to determine

when the predetermined condit ions have been met that

affect enemy operational employment or overall strategy.

Also ca lled MOE. (Modified from J P 3-6 0, PC d ra ft)

muni t i ons e f f ec t s assessment . An assessment conducted

concurrently and interactively with battle damage assess

m ent . This ass essm ent a pplies to the weapon s ys tem a ndm u n it ions effect iveness to determ in e an d recom m end an y

required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon

sys tem, m u n it ions , fu s ing, an d / o r weapon d e live ry

parameters to increase force effectiveness. Also called

MEA. (Modified from J P 3-6 0, PC dr a ft)

operational effect . The link between tactical results and

strategy; typically, the cumulative outcome of missions,

engagements, and battles. An operational effect also may

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result from the disruption of systems or areas of opera

tion al va lu e. (ACC EBO white p a per)

operat ional e ffect s as s ess ment . Th e m eas u rem ent of effects

at the theater level . Operat ional assessment determineswheth er or n ot m ilitar y action is pr operly su pporting over-

all strategy by meeting operational objectives. (Modified

from J P 3-60, PC draft)

physical damage assessment . Th e est im ate of th e qua nt ita

tive extent of physical damage through munitions blast,

fra gm ent at ion, an d/ or fire da m age effects to a target

resulting from the application of military force. This

assessment i s based upon observed or in terpre ted dam-

a ge. (J P 3-60 , PC dr a ft)physical ef fects . Effects created b y th e direct im pa ct th rou gh

ph ysical alteration on th e object or system ta rgeted by the

a pp licat ion of m ilita ry a ction . (ACC EBO wh ite p ap er)

psychological ef fects . The results of actions that influence

em otions , m otives, objective reas oning, an d u ltim ately th e

behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,

and individuals. (ACC EBO white paper)

strategic ef fect . Disr u pt ion of th e en em y’s overa ll s tra tegy,

ability, or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activi

ty. (ACC EBO white paper)

s trategic e f fect s assessment . Strategic effects assessment

represents the measurement of effects at the s trategic

level of employment . Strategic effects assessment deter-

m in es wh eth er or n ot overall str at egy is working an d if th e

st ra tegic objectives ar e b ein g ach ieved. (Modified from J P

3-60 , PC draft)

synergist ic ef fects . The proper application of a coordinatedforce, which can produce effects that exceed the contri

butions of the individual forces employed separately. The

precise, coordina ted a pp lication of th e var ious elemen ts of

air , space, and surface forces brings disproportionate

pressure on adversaries to comply with our national will .

US m ilita ry power is a ble to accom plish syn ergist ic effects

an d th u s dictate th e tem po and direct ion of an entire war -

fighting effort from military operations other than war

98



through major conflict. (Modified from Air Force Doctrine

Docum ent 1 , Air Force Basic Doctrine, Septem ber 1997)

s ys temic ef fect s . Effects on th e opera tion of a sp ecific syst em

or systems. In essence, i t answers the quest ion to whatdegree ha s th e system or system s been d egrad ed or affect

ed by those actions directed against it. (ACC EBO white

paper)

tact ical ef fects . Effects, which are the result of action(s) at

th e individu al u n it , m iss ion, or engagemen t level. Tactical

effects influence activities at the tactical level of employ

men t an d focus on bat t les an d/ or engagements to accom

plish m ilita ry objectives. Thes e effects can be eith er d irect

or indirect, and typically are acts in concert with othertactical effects to produce results at higher levels of

employment . Examples include individual aircraft and

tank attrit ion, airbase denial, suppression of enemy fire,

and so forth. (Modified from AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22

J an u ary 2000 an d J P 3-60, PC draft )

unintended ef fects . Unanticipated effect that could impact

th e cam pa ign or h ave overall n egat ive con sequ ences . Th e

des tru ction of th e ad vers ar y’s electric grid affects t h e

com m an d a n d control of h is m ilitary operat ions bu t a lsodisru pts p ower to water t reatm ent plan ts , which lead s to

in crea sed levels of disea se. (ACC EBO wh ite p a per)

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Th in k in g Effects

Effects-Bas ed Meth odology

for Joint Operations

Air Un iversity Pres s Tea m

Chief Ed itor

Hattie Minter

Copy Editor

Peggy Smith

Book Des ign a nd Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

effects based methodology for joint operations

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