effective pha applications & tips for evolving...

Steven T. Maher, PE CSP

1Risk Management Professionals – www.RMPCorp.com

Risk Management ProfessionalsRMMMP


26 February 2014

Risk Management Professionals



Effective PHA Applications & Tips for

Evolving GuidelinesSteven T. Maher, PE, CSP

Risk Management Professionals949/282-0123

www.RMPCorp.com

Evolution of SMS Guidelines & Regulations to Performance (Goal) – Based Standards

Onshore Process Safety (USA)

Offshore Safety Management Systems (USA)

Offshore Safety Management Systems (UK)





26 February 2014




Tandem Advances in Protection System Design Architectures & Analysis

Protection System Design Evolution

Reliability Criteria & Design Architecture Specifications

Safety Integrity Levels

.

SIL-1(10-2 ≤ PFDAVG < 10-1)

SIL-2(10-3 ≤ PFDAVG < 10-2)

SIL-3(10-4 ≤ PFDAVG < 10-3)

Voting LogicSingle-ElementAnalog Devices

ElectronicSensing &

Sig. Processing




Control/Protection System Spectrum – BPCS & SIS/HIPS

Redundancy

Diversity

End DeviceFeedback

Loops

Single-ElementAnalog Devices

ElectronicSensing &

Sig. Processing

Decreased Cost Increased Redundancy, Diversity, Pedigree

Separation ofControl &Protection

SmartSensors

High PedigreeDevices

Increasing Reliability & Larger SIL (SIS-Only, ANSI/ISA-S84.01 & IEC-61508/61511)

BPCS = Basic Process Control System, SIS = Safety Instrumented System,HIPS = High Integrity Protection System

Voting Logic





26 February 2014




Focusing on the Objective(The “Big Picture”)

• RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCES– Probability =

Likelihood of Occurrence

– Consequences = Effects of Occurrence

• For Engineered Systems:– Risk = Σ Pi * Ci

Increasing Consequences

Incr

easi

ng

Fre

qu

ency

2

3

4

5

1

Acceptable

Unacceptable




Hazards Analysis Tool Spectrum

Each of these tools provides a different perspective & different insights. Allows Risk

Quantification & Graphical Scenario

Development

What-If HAZOP

ETA

Risk-GraphFTA

Checklist

FMECA

Less Effort Increased Effort, with Increased Insights

What-If/Checklist

API RP 14CReview

HAZID Bow-tieJSA

LOPA





26 February 2014




Simple HAZOP Study Example

LT1

L

LP

HP

Conditions: 2-50% capacity relief valvesexist to provide overpressure protection for downstream LP vessel during gas blowby.

LIC1

FC

NC




Simple HAZOP Study Example

Devia-tion

Cause Conseq-euences

Safeguards S L R Recommendations

More Flow

LV-1 malfunctions open, possibly due to a failure of LT/LIC-1, or bypass valve inadvertently open.

Gas blow-by resulting in overpressurization of downstream equipment and resultant release of hydrocarbons and H2S, Potential for severe injury or fatality.

- LAL-1, if LT/LIC-1 is not the cause of the malfunction.

- 2-50% capacity relief valves on downstream LP vessel

B 3 2 Consider evaluating the merits of:

- Installing a separate level transmitter and low alarm

- Installing a separate emergency isolation valve fed by an independent level transmitter

- Reconfiguring LV-1 to include a separate SIS closure feature





26 February 2014




Risk/SIL Ranking

(1) Likely(> 10-2)

(2) Un-likely

(10-2–10-3)

(3) VeryUnlikely

(10-3–10-4)

(4) Extr.Unlikely

(10-4–10-5)

(5) Remote(< 10-5)

Moderate(E)

Serious(D)

Major(C)

Catastrophic(B)

Disastrous(A)

Level 1 Risk(first priority)Level 2 Risk

(tolerable if ALARP)

Level 3 Risk(acceptable)

Startw/o SIS

Targetw/ SIS

Note: Risk/SIL Ranking bases typically come from operating company.

Freq

uenc

y (/y

r)

Severity




Example Risk-Graph





26 February 2014




Fault Tree Logic Representation

LV-1Malfunctions

Open

LT/LIC-1Fails High

Bypass ValveInadvertently

Open byOperator

AlarmFails

toAnnunciate

LT/LIC-1Fails High

OperatorFails to

Respond toAlarm

PSV-1Fails to Openon Demand

PSV-2Fails to Openon Demand

Significant Damagedue to Fire / Explosion

LV-1 orBypass Open

OperatorResponse toAlarm Fails

PressureRelief

Failure

Protection Layers (OP Action,Control Sys, Prot Sys)

HAZOP = ConsequencesLOPA = Consequences

HAZOP = SafeguardsLOPA = IPL

HAZOP = CauseLOPA = Init Event




Wellpad OverpressurizationEvent Tree

Op Inadv. Closes

DwnstrmValve

Null

Null

Flange Leakage

Vessel Failure

PAHHIso.

PSV PeoplePresent

EgressSuccessful

Imm.Ignition

DelayedIgnition

No Hazard

Env. Imp., Fire

Env. Imp., Fire

Jet Fire, Injury

Flash Fire, Injury

Minor Env. Imp.

Jet/Flash Fire, Equip. Damage

Jet Fire, Injury

Flash Fire, Injury

Minor Env. Imp.

OP, Pot. Fatality





26 February 2014




• Visualization of Key Hazard Relationships – Threats / Causes

– Preventive Controls / Proactive Controls

– Top Event

– Reactive Controls

– Consequences / Impacts

Reference: “Lessons Learned from Real World Application of the Bow-tie Method” by Steve Lewis and Kris Smith

What is a Bow-tie?




Closing the Loop

Control & Communicate

PSM

EPPSI

PHA

OP

TRN

CONPSS

RMI

HWP

MOC

II

EP&R

CA

Identify/Analyze Manage

What-If HAZOP

ETA

Risk-Graph FTA

Checklist

FMECA

Less Effort Increased Effort, with Increased Insights

What-If/Checklist

API RP 14CReview

HAZID Bow-tieJSA

LOPA





26 February 2014




Tips for Addressing 2013/2014 Evolving PHA Guidelines




PHA – Evolving Guidelines &Best Practices

• Chemical Safety Board (CSB)• Federal Occupational Safety & Health

Administration (OSHA)• California Division of Occupational Safety and

Health (Cal/OSHA)• California Accidental Release Prevention

(CalARP) Program• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)





26 February 2014




1 – Damage Mechanism Hazard Review

• Reference– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-9

• Focus – California Oil Refineries

• Objective– Improve Identification of Mechanical Failure

Vulnerabilities– Minimize Failure Potential

• Stated Requirements– Conduct Damage Mechanism Hazard Review– Include MI Review During PHA

• Tips




2 – Effectiveness of Safeguards

• Reference– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-6– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-12

• Focus – CalARP Facilities

• Objective– Validate Effectiveness of Safeguards

• Stated Requirements– Document “recognized methodologies, rationale,

and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective”

– Qualitative, Quantitative, or Semi-Quantitative Basis

• Tips





26 February 2014




3 – Action Item Completion Status

• Reference– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-10– OSHA RFI Topic 6

• Focus – PSM Facilities, California Oil Refineries

• Objective– Support Action Item Implementation

• Stated Requirements– Report Action Item Completion Status

• Tips




4 – Revalidation

• Reference– CalARP Proposed Changes to Section 2755.2


• Objective– Ensure Quality/Completeness of Revalidation Efforts– Hazard review revalidation can only occur once

between full hazard reviews

• Stated Requirements– Alternate Revalidations Should Perform a Redo

• Tips





26 February 2014




5 – Inherently Safer Designs

• Reference– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-7– CSB Recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-13


• Objective– Minimize Risk to the Public, Personnel, and the

Environment

• Stated Requirements– Perform an Inherently Safer Systems (ISS) Analysis

Triggered by Al MOC and PHA Reviews

• Tips




Implementation of Inherently Safer Design Features During Process Design





26 February 2014




Questions?



Steven T. Maher, PE [email protected]

877/532-0806www.RMPCorp.com

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