effect of cross-border ethinic conflicts on social

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

EFFECT OF CROSS-BORDER ETHNIC CONFLICTS ON SOCIAL

ECONOMIC SECURITY OF PASTORALIST LIVING ALONG

KENYA-UGANDA BORDER: A CASE OF TURKANA

COMMUNITY 2000-2018

BANCIE SARAH NJERI

R52/81827/2015

SUPERVISOR

SENIOR LECTURER, GERRISHON IKIARA

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI.

NOVEMBER 2018

ii

DECLARATION

I, Bancie Njeri hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not

been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed……………………………………… Date…………………………..

Bancie Sarah Njeri

R52/81827/2015

This research project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as

University Supervisor;

Signed…………………………………….. Date…………………………….

Gerrishon Ikiara

Senior Lecturer,

IDIS, University of Nairobi.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank God for His grace and mercy that has sustained me through my entire educational

process. Special thanks to my supervisor Gerrishon Ikiara for his advice, guidance and

suggestions throughout the project. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to my

mother for her support and encouragement. Appreciation to my classmates for their support

in one way or another toward successful completion of this project. May God bless you all.

iv

ABSTRACT

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border ethnic conflict

on socio-economic security of pastoralist communities living along Kenya Uganda border,

particularly the Turkana community. The study was guided by the following specific

objectives: to examine the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County;

to determine the effect of cross border conflict on socio-economic security of households

in Turkana County; and to evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-

border conflict on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. The study

used descriptive research design. The design provided insight into the research problem

and examined the associative relationships and information on potential cause-and-effect

relationships of the problem. The target population was drawn from residents of Loima

location/ward in Turkana County along Kenya-Uganda border. A sample size of 100

respondents was selected from the target population of 19,848. The data collection exercise

involved questionnaires and interactive interviews with respondents. The questionnaire

provided depth understanding of the issues under. Primary data was collected by the

researcher with assistance of field assistants who also double up as interpreters where

necessary. The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach. Study found that cattle raid by

non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of

locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyans are the frequent forms or

types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda boarder. In addition,

these attacks are done jointly with locals and are motivated by cultural practices and

revenge motives to settle scores; major effects of cross border conflict includes loss of

properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses; low response rate to cross

border aggressions by the state security agencies. Lastly, the study found that security

agents that respond to cross border aggression are locals and home guard or combined

operation between local and home guards and the government agents; and disarmament

has lowly improved insecurity a lot as resident do harm themselves for personal security.

The study recommend for multi strategy approach to combat cross border conflict.

v

TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION ...................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iii

ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... iix

LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ...................................... 1

1.1 Background of the Problem....................................................................................... 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem .......................................................................................... 5

1.3 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................................ 6

1.4 Hypothesis of the Study ........................................................................................... 7

1.5 Significance of the Study ......................................................................................... 7

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study ......................................................................... 9

1.7 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 10

1.7.1. Nature of Cross Border Conflict in Turkana ................................................... 10

1.7.2. Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Economic Security in Turkana .............. 11

1.8. Conceptual Framework .......................................................................................... 16

1.9. Research Methodology ........................................................................................... 18

1.9.1 Research Design ............................................................................................... 18

1.9.2 Target Population ............................................................................................. 19

1.9.3 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure .............................................................. 20

1.9.4 Data Collection Tools and Methods ................................................................. 21

vi

1.9.5 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 21

1.10 Chapter Outline ..................................................................................................... 21

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................ 22

AN OVERVIEW OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS AND THEIR DRIVERS ... 22

2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 22

2.2 The Nature of Cross Border Conflict in East Africa ............................................... 22

2.3 Factors Contributing to Cross Border Conflicts ..................................................... 24

2.3.1 Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies ................................................................. 24

2.3.2 Environmental Factors ..................................................................................... 26

2.3.3 Commercialization of Cattle Raiding ............................................................... 27

2.3.4. Lack of State Security Provision .................................................................... 28

2.3.5 Proliferation of Small Arms ............................................................................ 30

CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................................ 32

IMPACT OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICT ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC

SECURITY IN TURKANA ........................................................................................... 32

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 32

3.2 The impact of cross-border conflict on social economic activities of marginalized

communities living along the border……………………………..……………………...33

3.2.1 Access to Productive Assets ............................................................................. 34

3.2.2 Access to Basic Services .................................................................................. 34

3.2.3 Dependence on aid ........................................................................................... 34

3.2.4 Food crisis......................................................................................................... 35

3.2.5 Conflict ............................................................................................................. 36

vii

3.3 Disarmament Operation on Cross Border Conflict in East Africa .......................... 37

3.3.1 Disarmament in the North Rift Region of Kenya ............................................. 37

3.3.2 Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda ................................................................ 40

3.2 Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Social-Economic Security ............................ 40

CHAPTER FOUR ........................................................................................................... 46

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION ......................... 46

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 46

4.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 46

4.3 Response Rate ......................................................................................................... 46

4.4 Demographic Information ...................................................................................... 47

4.4.1 Age of the Respondent ..................................................................................... 48

4.4.2 Gender…………………………………………………………………..........50

4.4.3 Highest level of Education……...……………………………………………51

4.4.4 Engagement in Business Activity ..................................................................... 51

4.4 Objective Finding .................................................................................................... 53

4.4.1 The Nature and Extent of Cross Border Aggression in Turkana County ......... 53

4.4.2 Effect of Cross Border Aggression on Socio-Economic Security of Households

in Turkana County ..................................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................ 75

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 75

5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 75

5.2 Summary of Findings .............................................................................................. 75

5.3.1 Summary of Key Objective Findings ................................................................... 75

5.3.1 Nature and extent of the cross border aggression ............................................. 76

viii

5.3.2 Cross border aggression have adverse effect ................................................... 76

5.3.3 Response Strategies has Little Effect ............................................................... 80

5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 81

5.5 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 82

REFERENCE .................................................................................................................. 79

APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 85

Appendix I: Letter of Introduction ............................................................................... 85

Appendix II: Respondents Questionnaire ..................................................................... 86

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Target Population............................................................................................. 19

Table 4.1: Response Rate .................................................................................................. 47

Table 4.2: Respondents’ age distribution......................................................................... 49

Table 4.3: Gender Participation ........................................................................................ 49

Table 4.4: Highest level of education ............................................................................... 50

Table 4.5: Highest level of education ............................................................................... 52

Table 4.6: Kenya conduct attack across border ................................................................ 59

Table 4.7: Nature of loss suffered by business as a result of cross border conflict .......... 60

Table 4.8: Security agencies commonly respond to cross border aggression ................... 65

Table 4.9: Security agencies commonly respond to cross border aggression ................... 72

x

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................... 17

Figure 2: Participation in Cross Border Conflict .............................................................. 54

Figure 3: Nature/Type of cross border attacks .................................................................. 55

Figure 4: How attack are conducted ................................................................................. 57

Figure 5: Motives/reasons for cross border conflict ......................................................... 59

Figure 6: Safety levels ...................................................................................................... 62

Figure 7: State response after aggression.......................................................................... 63

Figure 8: Efficiency of state personnel ............................................................................. 66

Figure 9: State response to cross border aggression ......................................................... 67

Figure 10: State security agent response to disarmament ................................................. 69

Figure 11: Locals response to disarmament...................................................................... 72

Figure 12: Locals rating disarmament .............................................................................. 73

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the Problem

International conflicts might occur between governments striving to monopolize

the exploitation of resources in disputed territories. Conflicts between countries are often

presented as occurring between their governments while the bone of contention is usually

territory or some other economic resource1. It is seldom the welfare of the ordinary citizens

of the states concerned that provokes conflict situations. Even when such reasons are

brandished, they often turn out to be attempts at concealing other agendas.

In Africa the phenomena of cross-border raids and rebel militia insurgencies have

indeed become prominent and aggravating sources of regional insecurity and political

destabilization in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea,

Uganda, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Orogun2 demonstrates that cross-

border wars, rebel infiltrations and direct military, state action against renegade militias

have occurred in Southern, Central, and Western African regions since the end of the Cold

War era3. The net effect of the cross border aggression has been the erosion of the

inviolable principle of the sanctity of the territorial sovereignty of many post-colonial

African states, violation of human rights, and grave loss of livelihoods in the affected

1 Asobie, A. 2003. Nigeria, Cameroun and the unending conflict over Bakassi. Available

from:www.nigerdeltacongress.com/narticles/nigeria_cameroun_and_the_unendin.htm 2 Orogun S. Paul. (2002). “An analysis of Armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic

Republic of Congo”. Paper presented at the 2002 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24-March 27, 2002. 3 Ibid

http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/narticles/nigeria_cameroun_and_the_unendin.htm

2

communities4. Moreover, cross border aggression and raids have persistently undermined

concerted efforts by the local governments and international community to facilitate the

processes of provision of security and socio-economic development.

There are several cases of cross border resource based conflicts in Africa. Examples

include, Nigeria- Cameroon conflict over the Bakassi peninsula, South Sudan –Sudan

conflict over disputed territories along the border including in the contested Abyei and Blue

Nile states, Kenya- Uganda Migingo Island in Lake Victoria and others. It could arise when

a nation-state intervenes in the domestic disputes of another state. Occasionally, a conflict

may occur where the nationals of one state are attacked, killed or maimed and their property

destroyed by the agents of another state5.

In many pastoral regions, the realization of adequate security objective is, heavily

challenged by insecurity propagated through cross border conflict which reflects a

combination of threats and vulnerabilities that may lead to state collapse6. Conflict

resulting from cross-border aggression is considered one of the main threats to developing

countries’ peace and security in the post-Cold War era7. The effects of such violent conflict

on Africa have had far reaching consequences. According to Zeleza, violent conflict of one

type or another have afflicted Africa and exerted a heavy toll on the continent’s societies,

polities and economies, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic

4 Zartman, I. William. (1995). Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority.

(Eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 5 Amutabi, M N. (2010). “Land and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle of East Africa”. Kenya Studies Review

Volume 1 Number 2 December 2010. 6 ibid 7 Gerson, Joseph and Bruce, Birchard. (1991). The Sun Never Sets: Confronting The Network of Foreign US

Military Bases. (Eds). Boston: South End Press

3

possibilities8. Poverty is continuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible for

conflict in many parts of Africa. Poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly in

Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration9. Studies have indicated that poverty makes

conflict more likely and conflicts in turn worsen poverty10. These relations are stronger for

very poor communities than for well off communities and conflicts tend to last longer in

poorer communities where the majority are pastoralists. According the UNDP11, armed

violence has a constraining influence on the resource allocations that are at the root of many

of Africa’s pastoral conflicts, and measures to reduce the violence have failed in most

African pastoral contexts.

Eastern Africa has numerous pastoral groups who live in a broad geographical area

that stretches from the Kenya-Somalia border northwards into Ethiopia, and northwest to

encompass regions of Uganda and Sudan. These regions suffer large-scale intra-state wars

that have grave consequences on the economic security of the people. Many conflicts in

pastoral Eastern Africa, whether violent or non-violent, usually occur over scarcity of

resources and mostly during droughts and famine that raiding for livestock intensifies in

the pastoralist domains12. Conflicts over resources are typical of Turkana where these

conflicts are protracted and human livelihoods are greatly destroyed. In the county, certain

8 Zeleza, T. P., (2008). “The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to ‘War on

Terror” in Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs.

Ohio: Ohio University Press. 9 Draman, Rasheed. (2003). “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship”. Paper

prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa,

May 19-23, 2003. 10 Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”, Harvard University. 11 United Nations Development Programme. (2007) “Armed Violence in African Pastoral Communities”.

UN, New York. 12 Amutabi, M N. (2010). “Land and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle of East Africa”. Kenya Studies Review

Volume 1 Number 2 December 2010.

4

cross border ethnic groups have been raiding the county indiscriminately. The situation has

been made more complicated and grave by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry

originating from neighbouring states, through porous international borders13. In Turkana

where the economy is principally dependent upon pastoralism, the state has limited

presence for maintenance of basic levels of security14.

Border security relations remain major source of contestation with regard to Kenya-

Somalia-South Sudan-Uganda and Ethiopia political, military, and diplomatic relations.

Pockets of militias, extremists and criminal gangs have persistently carried out cross-

border raids into contiguous territories and caused cruel destruction of border village

communities and pillaged resources. In case in mind is the prolonged al-Shabaab terrorist

threat on Kenya. Its cumulative socio-economic devastation and strain imposed on Kenya

provoked the later to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on “self defence” and made

incursions into Somalia in October 201115.

Numerous reports in the media show that Turkana has been affected by cross-

border aggression perpetrated by state actors either directly or through proxies and by non-

state actors comprising of militias, bandits and raiders. Incidents of destruction of property

and massacre of the Turkana by militiamen from Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda during cattle

rustling have raised serious questions about the level of security in the region. But

13 ibid

14 Mkutu, K. (2003). “Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region”. Saferworld.

15 The Standard News paper, Friday, 23 Septembers, 2011, Nairobi.

5

whenever cross border conflicts have occurred, the state has used multidisciplinary

interventionist response strategy mostly heavy-handed coercive disarmament operations16.

All states have a fundamental objective of obtaining and enjoying maximum

national security so as to satisfy their interests as they safeguard their sovereignty. This is

enshrined in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia on which the United Nations (UN) Charter of

26 June 1945 is founded17. The existence of the states obligates them to provide adequate

security to their citizens in accordance with the “social contract” between the individual

and the government. Accordingly, the state’s obligation is to maintain public order, defend

citizens’ lives and their property from predators, enforce agreements and provide economic

opportunity. Article 238 of the Kenyan constitution recognizes citizens as being central to

state security since they are the first object of securitization18.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Several studies have been done concerning the insecurity brought about by cross-

border conflict in Turkana. Most of these studies concentrate on small arms found in the

county, because of its close proximity to most unstable and violent countries in Africa:

Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. Mohamud Adan and Isabella Masinde have

in their study focused on the internally displaced victims of the ongoing conflict in

Turkana. Stephen K. Muntet focuses on cattle rastling as a major contributor to violence

witnessed in Turkana and the solutions to that Conflict. To pastoralist “A Cow is Life”.


17 United Nations. (2000). Basic Facts about the United Nations. UN, New York. 18 Katumanaga, M. (2011). “Morphying Mirror Images of Military Culture and the Emerging Nation State

Insecurity”. (Unpublished discussion paper). Nairobi.

6

In spite of a number of response strategies, little appears to have been achieved in

alleviating the problem of cross border aggression. Failure to properly address the impact

of the conflict on socio-economic security may reverse the little gains in the County in

addition to being a threat to national economic security, sovereignty and territorial

integrity.

Arising from the foregoing, a number of fundamental questions emerge which

constitute the main focus of the study: What is the nature and extent of the conflict? What

is the impact of the conflict on economic security of the County? What is the impact of

response on economic security? It would be difficult to address state security concerns

without addressing the impact of cross border conflict on economic security in Turkana. It

is against this background that this study seeks to provide important insight into the effects

of cross border conflict on the community’s economic security.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border

aggression on socio-economic security of pastoralists living along Kenya Uganda border

with reference to Turkana County. To achieve this, the following specific objectives guided

the study:

i. To examine the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County.

ii. To determine the effect of cross border aggression on socio-economic security

of households in Turkana County.

iii. To evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border

aggression on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County.

7

1.4 Hypotheses of the Study

i. The extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused by

poverty in the region.

ii. Cross border conflict have adverse effect on the socio-economic security of

households in Turkana County.

iii. The response strategies have had little effect on combating cross-border ethnic

conflict in Turkana County.

1.5 Significance of the Study

There are varios explanations for frequent reports of acts of cross border aggression

in Turkana emanating from Toposa, Merille (Dassenach), Dodoth, Nyangtom and

Karamojong armed groups. Despite many studies on the area, there is remarkably little

empirical evidence on the impact of cross border violent conflict on socio-economic

security in Turkana. Much less is available on the conceptualization, measurement and

analysis of the possible link between cross border conflict and economic security in

Turkana. There is therefore desire for increased research in linkages between violent

conflict and economic insecurity.

This study adopts a micro-level analysis of the relationship between cross border

conflict and household economic security in Turkana. The study is influenced by the fact

that, most studies on this subject have focused on macro-level, cross-sectional violent

conflicts19. Further, most existing research on the economic motivations of violent conflict

is, however, based on intra state conflict and its level of analysis is at national-level, which

19 Brown, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Luckham, 2003; Luckham, 2004;

Singer and Small, 1994.

8

assumes the course of armed conflict to be determined by the preferences and behaviour of

elites. This approach offers limited application to the conflict of external aggression nature,

and the analysis of the economic behaviour of households in conflict communities.

Additionally in academia sphere, the study will seek to demonstrate that

relationship between household’s (individuals) economic security and conflict provide

valuable though overlooked micro foundations to debates on the causes and frequency of

cross border conflict. Therefore, the findings of this study are likely to add to the existing

literature on the interrelationships between conflict and economic security and also counter

response strategies. Furthermore, the methodology used in the study and the results will

deepen understanding of various aspects under investigation on external aggression.

All forms of cross border conflict and the subsequent responses shape the economic

behaviour of households in ways that will have significant implications for policies,

especially those that are aimed at the prevention of new conflicts and the resolution of

ongoing ones. For that matter, and with regard to policy, it is hoped the study will have

direct and indirect implications in determining which intervention strategies are best to

enhance security and those that threaten security. The findings and recommendations

would help policy makers and stakeholders in security sector. Academic and scholars will

also benefit from the study.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study collected data among traders, household heads and public administrators.

The study focused on the nature and extent of cross border conflict, the impact of

aggression on economic security of households in the County, and the effects of state

9

response strategies on the economic security of the County. The study targeted the

borderline divisions of Loima (at border of Kenya and Uganda)

The main limitations envisaged in conducting the study include the following. The

first being general insecurity in the target divisions which may hinder proper data

collection. Secondly, poor infrastructure, nomadic lifestyle, the sparse population and

rugged terrain may militate against easy accessibility to the target respondents. Lastly is

the limitation of the language. The instrument for data collection, the questionnaires, is in

English, but considering most of the targeted respondents are illiterate. These limitations

will be addressed or mitigated by use of research assistant. The research assistant will aid

in administering and translating research contents to the respondents. In addition, the

researcher will create a favorable rapport with respondents to ease any tension that might

arise during data collection.

1.7. Literature Review

This section reviewed literature on the nature of cross border conflict in Turkana

County, the impact of the conflict on households’ economic security.

1.7.1. Nature of Cross Border Conflict in Turkana

Reports of skirmishes and clashes in Turkana especially in areas along international

borders abound. According to Liotta20, conflicts occur among tribes as well as with those

across the border in neighbouring countries. The main cause of external aggression in

Turkana region has been compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons

20 Liotta, P. H. (March 2005). “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of

Security”. Security Dialogue vol. 36, no. 1.

10

(SLWs) and events in neighbouring states and porous international borders. Inter-tribal

clashes in the area have frequently erupted between the Turkana (Kenya) and the Toposa

(Sudan), Turkana and Merille (Ethiopia) and between Turkana and Karamojong (Uganda).

The consequences of the conflicts range from grave fatalities, displacement of families,

and severe depletion of livestock to heightened human insecurity21. According to McEvoy

and Ryan, a total of 164,457 people were displaced by conflict in northern Kenya22. This

state of affairs has seriously undermined peace, safety, and economic security of the

community.

Leff23 study that analyzed the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many

pastoral conflicts, has observed that, the border lands occupied by the Turkana connecting

Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda experience harsh environmental conditions that favour

pastoralist activity. The study further observes that with limited access to water and

competing rights to land, porous borders, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from

one tribe enter the territory of another.

A chronology of external attacks on Turkana reveals disturbing trend as highlighted

below. On May 3 2011, the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Osman Warfa reported

that the Merrille tribesmen from Ethiopia killed at least 42 people among them 37 Turkana

villagers in Todonyang area, Daily Nation, (June 2011). The same reports were

collaborated by OCHA. On 14 February 2010, two Kenyan soldiers were shot dead and six

others injured in an attack along the Nadapal-Lokichogio border, New Sudan Vision,

21 Mkutu, K. (2003). “Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region”. Saferworld. 22 McEvoy C. and Ryan M (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern

Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 23 In a study entitled “Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border

Region”,

11

(Monday, 15 February 2010). There have been frequent cases of shootouts between

Kenyan security forces and the Toposa militia opposed to the former’s presence in the area,

New Sudan Vision.

Violent confrontations involving the Toposa and Turkana have been reported in the

last decade too. For instance, in May 2008, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio

Division, resulting in an estimated forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa24. In one

such raid in October 1992, more than 200 Turkana were massacred when a Toposa raiding

party attacked them in Narus in southern Sudan where they had migrated to escape a dry

spell. A similar raid had occurred on the Kenyan side of the border in 1988 when a Toposa

raiding party attacked Turkana villages at a watering point near Lokichogio killing more

than 190 people25.

1.7.2. Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Economic Security in Turkana

The impact of cross border conflict on the economic security through trade and

other related economic activities among communities that heavily depend on trade either

for local barter exchange or exchange for profit cannot be underestimated. The Turkana

have remained one of the most isolated ethnic groups in Kenya, and have engaged in small

scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs among

themselves and between their neighbours26. The economy is extremely limited and

24 McEvoy Claire and Ryan Murray. (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence

in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms

Survey. 25 Zeleza, T. Paul. (2008). “The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to ‘War on


Ohio: Ohio University Press. 26 Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). “Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya”, OXFAM GB – Kenya

Programme Report, May 2006.

12

predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Trade is considered the

backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a mainstay of

economic security of Turkana. Estimates put the ratio between traders and total population

in Turkana as one trader more or less per every 100 people. Moreover, it is estimated that

trade in the County is conducted by small traders (77%), medium traders (20%), large

traders (3%); or retailers (97%) and wholesalers (3%)27. Despite profitability of trade, the

onset of conflict has had negative impact on the flow of trade and market integration

between the County and her neighbours.

The empirical analyses of violent conflict point to low-per capita income as the

most robust explanatory factor in determining the risk of violent internal conflict breaking

out28. Further, some studies have focused on the relationship between conflict and poverty.

Poverty has continuously been cited as one of the principal factors responsible for conflict

in many parts of Africa. Similarly, poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly

in Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. Studies indicate that poverty makes

conflict more likely, and conflicts in turn worsen poverty. Macartan29 notes that these

relations are stronger for very poor communities than for well off communities and

conflicts tend to last longer in poorer communities. Moreover, Draman30 observes that

some of the hot spots in Africa reveal that there is a very high correlation between poverty

and conflict. Similarly, some analysts view participants in many of Africa’s violent

27 ibid 28 Collier and Hoeffler. (2010). cited in Draman, Rasheed “Democratizing Security for a Safer World: What

Role for Parliamentarians?” Discussion Paper for Africa-Canada Parliamentary Policy Dialogue, Parliament

Buildings, Ottawa, September 23-26, 2003 29 Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”, Harvard University. 30 Draman, R. (2003). “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship”. Paper prepared

for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-

23, 2003.

13

conflicts as being motivated by poor economic conditions under which they live. However,

there are those who dismiss the link between poverty and conflict, and argue that poverty

may lead to conflict when other factors prevail. Among the economic studies and

explanations which link conflicts to poverty include Dramer31, have questioned the

explanation linking conflict to poverty, especially those that conduct empirical

measurement of poverty using the income inequality index of Gini coefficient.

There are several ways conflict may affect economic security of a community.

According to Kalyvas32, violent conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and

households through the intensity and type of violence they set in motion, and the impact of

such violence on economic security of units is either direct or indirect. Direct effects

include changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and changes in the

household economic status due to the destruction of assets and livelihood activities and

effects caused by forced displacement. Indirect effects take place at the community level

and include changes in households’ access to and relationship with local markets, business,

and employment.

Cross border conflict causes death to many local people, in addition to causing

extensive injuries, disability and psychological damage. During violent conflicts, assets

such as houses, land, labour, property, utensils, and livestock get lost or destroyed through

heavy fighting and looting. Ibanez and Moya33 have noted that these effects are made worse

by the large population displacements that accompany most violent conflicts. Turkana

31 ibid 32 Kalyvas, S. (2004), “The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars”, Security Studies 13(3): 131. 33 Ibanez, A M & Moya A, (2006). ‘The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare and

Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for the Displaced Population in Colombia’, Households in

Conflict Network, Working Paper 23 (http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp23.pdf)

http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp23.pdf

14

County has the highest number of displaced persons most of the displaced were from

Kakuma and Lokichogio divisions. Kondylis34 and Steele35 showed that displaced

populations often struggle to find work, are less likely to work in the post-conflict period,

exhibit lower productivity levels, and also the same displaced people may be pushed in

criminal or illegal forms of activity with adverse economic outcomes36.

These direct effects of violence will result for many household in considerable

reductions in total income and consumption due to the loss of livelihoods and decreases in

productivity and human capital when key household workers die or are incapacitated.

Surviving members may forgo other economic activities to care for injured and disabled

household members.

With regard to conflict and trade, the study37 notes that, for a long time the classical

liberals have provided competing arguments on the relationship between trade and conflict.

Yet the relationship between trade and conflict remains mired in a host of conflicting logics

and empirical results. Liberals have always argued that interdependence reduces conflict

because conflict discourages commerce. The use of force reduces the gains from trade and

imperils the flow of information necessary for the development of mutual understanding38.

According to Liberal like Paul Krugman, trade improves quality of life and reduces the

likelihood of conflict. Economic interdependence promotes peace because conflict is

34 Kondylis, Florence. (2007). ‘Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a

Policy Intervention in Rwanda’, Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 28

(http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp28.pdf) 35 Steele, Abbey. (2007). ‘Massive Civilian Displacement in Civil War: Assessing Variation in Households

in Conflict Network”. Working Paper 29 (http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp29.pdf) 36 ibid 37 ibid 38 Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). “Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes”



15

inconsistent with mutually beneficial economic ties39. Omar et al40 have noted that an

interstate dispute reduces bilateral trade, but trade does not reduce the risk of a dispute.

According to Stein41, a core contradiction of trade is that it generates conflict even as it is

intended to facilitate conflict avoidance. Trade reduces both the occurrence of political

crises and the need for militarized actions once they arise42.

The impact of conflict on trade (markets and exchange business in general) has the

consequence of affecting the incomes of the business community through changes in the

market price of goods sold and purchased by the household. Costs of transacting business

are likely to rise as a result of insecurity. Savings and hence potential investment are bound

to suffer and will have negative consequences for productive decisions. During armed

conflict markets and businesses may fail to operate resulting in significant reductions in

household utility and welfare. Watson and van Binsbergen43 have singled out insecurity

as being a major impediment to both livestock production and marketing particularly in the

northeast of the Turkana, where cross-border raids are a frequent occurrence. According

to the study, insecurity depresses livestock prices as traders have to factor in possible losses

from theft, and makes moving cash risky. Furthermore, the lack of cash diminishes chances

of access to credit with the consequence of limiting livestock marketing which further

weakens the capital base as well as diminishing the pastoralists’ bargaining power. In a

39 Polachek, S & Xiang J., (2008). “How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete

Information Game”. Unpublished. 40 Omar, M. et al. (2004). “Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of

Interdependence and Armed Conflict”. Journal of Politics 66(4):1155–1179. 41 Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). “Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes” 42 ibid 43 Watson, D.J. and Van, Binsbergen. J. (2008). “Livelihood Diversification opportunities for Pastoralists in

Turkana Kenya”. ILRI Research Report (5). Nairobi, Kenya.

16

related study but different focus, Graham Carrington44 has analyzed the effects of cross-

border conflict on trade between Sudan and Uganda and its implications for peace building,

whose results show that organized and formal interstate trade helps to promote peace and

reduce conflict among communities.

1.8. Conceptual Framework

Arising from the literature and field pilot study, a conceptual model has been

synthesized for the proposed research as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The study conceptualizes

that low national incomes and natural resources are almost always associated with the

occurrence and duration of conflicts. In the framework, we conceptualise that conflict

impacts on household economic security through a range of direct and indirect effects.

Direct effects of conflict on the household may involve its breakdown through killings,

injuries and physical and mental disability. Other direct effects are through loss and/or

destruction of assets and population displacement. Indirect effects of the conflict include

disruption of proper functioning of local markets or businesses (trade), employment market

and social networks. During and in the aftermath of the conflict, the households are left

with limited resources for socio-economic survival and advancement. The direct and

indirect effects of violent conflicts may be made more or less serious through response

strategies that may directly and indirectly influence changes in socio-economic

development in the affected area. These effects and relationship are depicted in Figure 1.1.

44 ibid

17

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: own data

The study identified the following as specific ways through which conflict can affect

social-economic security of households. First, violent conflict may hinder previously well

off individuals from prospering by increasing dependence ratio. Second, the conflict may

lead to breakdown networks for example through displacement from areas of economic

and productive activities. Third way is when conflict and counter conflict strategies disrupt

trade and business resulting in dysfunctional markets making accessibility to tradable items

and food difficult, thereby accentuating household socio-economic insecurity and poverty.

Cross

border

violent

conflict

Household

socio-

economic

security

Direct

effects

Indirect

effects

Res

pon

se

stra

tegy

18

The fourth way is when conflict creates opportunities for some people in the community

accumulate fortunes.

1.9. Research Methodology

This section provides an overview of the research methodology to be adopted by

the study. It highlights on research design, sample size, sampling methodology, variables,

instrumentation, and procedures for data collection, data analysis and interpretation.

1.9.1 Research Design

The study used descriptive research design. The descriptive approach provided

insight into the research problem by describing the variables of interest, and also examining

associative relationships, while the causal design provided information on potential cause-

and-effect relationships of the problem45. In addition the study employed the qualitative

approach as it mostly focuses on respondents’ perceptions of life and life related issues.

This approach gave more room for interpretation and understanding as opposed to other

techniques. Conversely, Strass and Corbin46 have shown that those who use qualitative

research obtain satisfactory results and appropriate answers to the central research

questions being investigated. The design has been chosen because of its usefulness in

obtaining an overall picture of a situation at a particular time.

45 Kumar, Ranjit. (2011). Research Methodology: A Step by step guide for beginners (3rd edition). New

Delhi: SAGE 46 Strass, A. L. & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and

techniques. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA.

19

1.9.2 Target Population

Study population as the bigger group or residents of a community about whom the

study is concerned while sample is a subgroup of the population which is the focus of the

enquiry and is elected carefully to represent the study population47. The target population

was residents of Loima location/ward in Turkana County living along Kenya-Uganda

border. According to the Kenya Population and Housing Census Basic Report of 31st

August 2010, there were 19,848 people distributed among 2550 households within Loima

Ward as shown in Table 1.1

Table 1.1: Target Population

Gender Population Percent

Male 8,535 43%

Female 11,313 57%

Totals 19,848 100%

Source: Kenya Population and Housing Census Basic Report (2010)

1.9.3 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Researchers conservatively set the smallest legitimate sample size at 100 units;

however Guthrie notes that a sample of 30 will usually give results similar to a normal

distribution, although such would be good for small studies; and for larger projects, the

sample ranges between 30 and 400 for populations ranging from 30 to one million48. In the

contrary, if research is mainly of qualitative nature, whose main focus is to describe a


Delhi: SAGE 48 Guthrie, Gerard. (2010). Basic Research Methods: An Entry to Social Science Research. SAGE

Publications. New Delhi.

20

situation, issue or phenomenon, the question of size of the sample is less important

according to Kumar49. The study sample size will be worked out using Slovin’s sample

size formula. Slovin’s sample size formula is ideal used when the target population is

finite50, like in the case of study. The sample is worked out as follows:

𝑛 = 𝑁

1 + 𝑁(𝑒)2

Where: n = the sample size

N = the population size

e = the error tolerant allowed by researcher.

From the target population of 19,848 and a sampling error of 0.1, the worked sample size

is 100 respondents. The study will apply simple random sampling method to select

respondents to be issued with questionnaire.

1.9.4 Data Collection Tools and Methods

The methods for data collection for the study were both qualitative in nature and

will mainly use primary data sources. The instruments that the researcher intends to use in

the study for primary data collection is structured questionnaires. According to Rasmussen

et al. the primary data collection tools are useful for getting in-depth understanding of the

issues under investigation rather than measuring those issues51. Primary data collection will


Delhi: SAGE 50 According to Orotho & Kombo (2002) 51 Rasmussen, Erik S., et al. (2006). Essentials of Social Research Methodology. Odense University Press of

Southern Denmark.

21

be done by the researcher with assistance of field assistants who also double up as

interpreters where necessary, and drawn from the sample divisions.

1.9.5 Data Analysis

Collected data was analyzed using descriptive statistics in order to determine

frequencies and percentages with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)

version 23. These frequencies and percentages are presented in tables and graphically.

1.10 Chapter Outline

The study consisted of five chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the study

and it provides foundation of the project. It gives the objectives of the study, the

methodology and the study hypotheses. It also provides the literature review and research

methodology. Chapter two provided a historical and more descriptive overview of the

causes of cross-border ethnic conflict in Kenya. Chapter three examined effects of

strategies adopted to curb cross-border ethnic conflict. Chapter four discussed social-

economic security challenges arising from ethnic conflict and finally chapter five will gives

the summary, key findings and recommendations and suggestions for further research.

22

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS AND THEIR DRIVERS

2.1 Introduction

This section undertakes a more detailed literature review on the nature of cross

border conflict in Turkana County, the impact of the conflict on households’ economic

security.

2.2 The Nature of Cross Border Conflict in East Africa

Reports of skirmishes and clashes in Turkana especially in areas along international

borders abound. According to Liotta52, conflicts occur among tribes as well as with those

across the border in neighbouring countries. The main cause of external aggression in

Turkana region has been compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons

(SLWs) and events in neighbouring states and porous international borders. Inter-tribal

clashes in the area have frequently erupted between the Turkana (Kenya) and the Toposa

(Sudan), Turkana and Merille (Ethiopia) and between Turkana and Karamojong (Uganda).

The consequences of the conflicts range from grave fatalities, displacement of families,

and severe depletion of livestock to heightened human insecurity53. According to McEvoy

and Ryan, a total of 164,457 people were displaced by conflict in northern Kenya54. This

state of affairs has seriously undermined peace, safety, and economic security of the

community.


Security”. Security Dialogue vol. 36, no. 1. 53 Mkutu, K. (2003). “Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region”. Saferworld. 54 McEvoy C. and Ryan M (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern

Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

23

Leff55 study that analyzed the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many

pastoral conflicts, has observed that, the border lands occupied by the Turkana connecting

Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda experience harsh environmental conditions that favour

pastoralist activity. The study further observes that with limited access to water and

competing rights to land, porous borders, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from

one tribe enter the territory of another.

A chronology of external attacks on Turkana reveals disturbing trend as highlighted

below. On May 3 2011, the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Osman Warfa reported

that the Merrille tribesmen from Ethiopia killed at least 42 people among them 37 Turkana

villagers in Todonyang area, Daily Nation, (June 2011). The same reports were

collaborated by OCHA. On 14 February 2010, two Kenyan soldiers were shot dead and six

others injured in an attack along the Nadapal-Lokichogio border, New Sudan Vision,

(Monday, 15 February 2010). There have been frequent cases of shootouts between

Kenyan security forces and the Toposa militia opposed to the former’s presence in the area,

New Sudan Vision.

Violent confrontations involving the Toposa and Turkana have been reported in the

last decade too. For instance, in May 2008, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio

Division, resulting in an estimated forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa56. In one

such raid in October 1992, more than 200 Turkana were massacred when a Toposa raiding

party attacked them in Narus in southern Sudan where they had migrated to escape a dry

55 In a study entitled “Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border

Region”, 56 McEvoy Claire and Ryan Murray. (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence


Survey.

24

spell. A similar raid had occurred on the Kenyan side of the border in 1988 when a Toposa

raiding party attacked Turkana villages at a watering point near Lokichogio killing more

than 190 people57.

2.3 Factors Contributing to Cross Border Conflicts

2.3.1 Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies

Cattle raiding among pastoralists is a phenomenon that stretches back centuries.

Traditionally, cattle rustling, often involving some violence was redistributive and only

involved the theft of cattle to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride

price58. When tribe members were killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the

culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical

government, councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups were at the center of

authority among tribes. As such, they governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out

of control, and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle

them59. Typically, there was some loss of life from raiding, but on a much smaller scale.

Colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of

provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free

movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from

one generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with

57 Zeleza, T. Paul. (2008). “The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to ‘War on


Ohio: Ohio University Press. 58 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf. 59 ibid

25

discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom60. In addition, pastoral communities were

isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development61.

The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism

itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening

of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists’ authority and ability to settle

disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and

security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment62.

Today, with a colonial attitude that has persisted in the post-colonial era, the spread

of land privatization, and government policies favoring sedentary groups and large scale

agriculture over nomadic livelihoods, competition over grazing areas has grown

increasingly fierce. Pastoralists are also heavily underrepresented in parliament and civil

service posts63. Furthermore, Duffield argues that neo-liberal policies that embrace a

market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that

disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and

banditry. Local business and political elites use cattle rustling as a means for commercial

profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.

60 Kandagor, D., (2005), Rethinking Pastoralism and African Development: A Case Study of the Horn of

Africa. www. codesria.org/Links/conferences/general.../kandagor.pdf 61 Mburu, N., (1999), Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History, and Political

Implications. Nordic Journal of African Studies 8 (2): 89–107 62 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf 63 Duffield, M., (1997). Ethnic war and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective. In

Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review, ed S. Kratli and J. Swift,

1997 University of Sussex, UK

26

2.3.2 Environmental Factors

Unfavorable climatic conditions play a critical role and often precipitate the need

for pastoralists to migrate in search of pasturelands and water. During the dry season,

sources of water become desiccated and lands turn arid. This forces young pastoralists to

leave villages with their livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is during these

times that pastoralists engage in conflict over herding territory and replenishment of lost

cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become

more intensified and frequent.

In the past few decades, drought-related emergencies have risen sharply. Oxfam64,

for instance, reports that from 1975 to 2006 the number of people affected by drought rose

from 16,000 to an estimated three million. This calculation does not take into account that

the population has also grown significantly, but not nearly as exponentially as those

impacted by the recurrent droughts. The Turkana have been faced with a persistent drought

problem since 1999. In some areas of Turkana District, 70 percent of people’s livestock

were lost. In financial terms, this is equivalent to losing 70 percent of one’s savings. Not

surprisingly, prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating

levels of violence in the region. In the past, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the

impacts of drought. However, more severe weather patterns terns resulting from climate

change, coupled with colonial and post-colonial policies that constrain the movement of

pastoralists, makes inter- and intra-tribal rivalries more commonplace.

64 Oxfam. (2006). Delivering the Agenda: Addressing Chronic Under-development in Kenya’s Arid Lands.

Oxfam International Briefing Paper 88

27

2.3.3 Commercialization of Cattle Raiding

The emergence of local elites that aim to profit from cattle rustling is a fairly new

phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives

that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality associated with raiding and

has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Mkutu writes

that commercialization in cattle rustling is “leading to major changes in economic, social

and political structures in the border area”. Local businessmen and even politicians

reportedly fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as

South Africa and Saudi Arabia65. Stolen cattle are also used to supply large towns, which

have grown in population through rural-to-urban migration. Whereas small-scale raiding

does not deplete entire stocks, commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical

know-how can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind66 suggest

that there are typically five large raids in Southern Turkana in a given year. Large

infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents create an environment of

insecurity and financial hardship.

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the

pastoralist economy. Whereas cattle traditionally circulated within the pastoralist region,

they are now being sold outside without any revenue to speak of. In many instances,

warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. There is also

evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids67.

65 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf 66 Buchanan-Smith, Margie, and Jeremy Lind. 2005. Armed Violence and Poverty in Northern Kenya.

Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford, UK. 67 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf

28

The lack of state control in the pastoralist region has made way for, what Osamba calls

“the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia” (2000). Without proper security

provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great

number of people.

2.3.4. Lack of State Security Provision

As part of a political campaign that favors sedentary communities over non-

sedentary groups, governments have neglected to invest a great deal in infrastructure and

public services in the pastoralist border areas, thus exacerbating the lack of state security

in the region. Without sufficient roads, accessible lines of communication, and a large

qualified security presence, pastoralists have had no choice but to take up arms in order to

protect their families and livestock. Moreover, cross-border raiders are immune from

prosecution, because governments lack the capacity or infrastructure required to prosecute

those involved in acts taking place in other jurisdictions. The Small Arms Survey reports

that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied

with security provisions in their communities68.

In Kenya and Uganda, where the military’s role is restricted to responding to large-

scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programs, governments have

armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These comprise civilians

who are given a registered firearm and ammunition without any training or remuneration.

In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-

68 McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence


Survey.

29

pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to

local crime and disputes. While the KPR are sometimes effective in defending communities

against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding

purposes, undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008

ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was

Kenyan-manufactured; revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded

stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials69.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan has also been

accused of corruption and poor response to violent incidents. There is a growing police

force in Southern Sudan, but it lacks training, is poorly funded, and due to insufficient

transportation and communications, cannot respond in time to violent events. Between the

border town of Nadapal (Sudan) and Lokichoggio (Kenya), a disputed 25-kilometer road

connects the two countries. Without any security posts on the road, Turkana warriors from

the hills are able to ambush the many cars that travel up and down this road daily. The

SPLA Commander of Nadapal confirmed that banditry on the border road results in

fatalities on a weekly basis. Deficits in the government security sector are compounded by

the common practice of governments and security forces arming paramilitary groups for

political advantage against opponents, notably in Uganda and Sudan. This, among other

things, sustains the circulation and widespread availability of small arms.

69 Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District.

Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

30

2.3.5 Proliferation of Small Arms

Pastoralists living in the border region provide a large market for small arms.

Traditionally, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, with the

availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47, the

conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate

killing during raids. A 2008 study in Karamoja, Uganda, found that 88 percent of

respondents recalled a small arm being used in the last violent attack on their community70.

Likewise, the Small Arms Survey suggests that small arms are used in 96.9 per cent of

cattle rustling events in the Kenya-Sudan border region71. While it is difficult to estimate

the exact number of small arms in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well

over 300,00072.

Pastoralist communities arm themselves for several reasons. First, they need to

protect their family and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits. Second, guns

are used to raid livestock from other communities. Lastly, guns are an investment that can

be traded for livestock and other commercial goods. Small arms have been present

throughout the region since the early twentieth century. However, past wars in Uganda,

Sudan, and Ethiopia left a surplus of weapons in circulation. One event, in particular, that

is often recalled is the 1979 raid on the Moroto arms depot in Uganda, following the

collapse of the Idi Amin regime.

70 Bevan, James. (2008). Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District.

Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 71 McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence


Survey. 72 Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security (2006)

31

The Matheniko Karimojong sub-clan were successful in acquiring large quantities

of weapons and ammunition during the raid73. A similar event took place in Kapoeta,

Southern Sudan, in 2002, during the North-South war. After the SPLA captured Kapoeta,

which at the time was a military stronghold of the north, security at arms stores was lax or

non-existent, and as a result, Taposa tribesmen (who live around Kapoeta) were able to

seize thousands of weapons74. Compounding the situation, the SPLA laid off several

hundred troops after the war, offering them small arms as part of their retirement package.

Not surprisingly, many of the officers sold them to gun markets in Sudan, Uganda, and

Kenya75. Furthermore, it is widely believed that the government of Sudan in Khartoum

provides arms to pastoralist communities in the South in order to destabilize the

government of Southern Sudan’s power base, and to challenge the authority of the SPLA.

These weapons inevitably leak out of communities into the greater arms trade routes of the

region.

73 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf 74 Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District.

Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 75 Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld.

http://www.saferworld. org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf

32

CHAPTER THREE

IMPACT OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICT ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC

SECURITY IN TURKANA

3.1 Introduction

This section reviews literature on the impact of cross border conflict on social-

economic security. It commences with a review of the concept of social-economic security,

followed by impact of cross border conflict on social security and impact of cross-border

conflict on economic security.

3.2 The impact of Cross Border Conflict on Social Economic

The main effects that cross border conflict has on the marginalized communities

that live along the border on social and economic activities are immense. This section

highlights on a few:

3.2.1 Access to Productive Assets

The access and use of an extensive area of land coupled with high levels of mobility

are ‘the double imperative of cross border conflict76. Pastoralists need seasonally varied

grazing lands and water sources for their different livestock species. Freedom of movement

over large areas is a crucial element of the pastoralists’ resource management system in the

dry lands77. Land issues, including use, access and property rights are a well-known

determinant of pastoralists’ vulnerability and in the literature they are widely discussed in

76 Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International 77 ibid

33

relation to their political marginalization78. As discussed above, formal institutions have

systematically failed to recognize pastoralists’ rights to the land since the colonial era. For

example in Kenya ‘land tenure is based on English property law, which does not recognize

the communal system as understood and practiced by pastoralists’79. Similarly, customary

tenure arrangements in Ethiopia have been increasingly ‘subordinated to unitary national

land legislation on the basis of issues relevant primarily to the arable agriculture in the

highlands. The pastoral areas [are] either ignored or very superficially treated’.

The ongoing appropriation of land for commercial, tourist, environmental and

conservation projects, in many cases without consultation or even communication to

pastoralists living in the area, has deprived those groups from a key productive asset and

has often rendered pastoralism unsustainable. Many pastoralist groups have been unable to

defend their land rights and as a result many have dropped out of pastoralism or have been

forced to migrate. The progressive loss of their productive assets is partly due to the fact

that pastoralists are in many cases unaware of their rights, often unable to articulate their

demands collectively, and ill-equipped to make their voices heard within formal

institutions. In addition to the difficulties in accessing productive assets, access to markets

a precondition for growth and efficiency of livestock production- is another challenge for

pastoral communities in the HoA.

78 Morton J. 2005. Legislators and Livestock: A comparative Analysis of Pastoralist Parliamentary Groups

in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Final Report for the NRI/PENHA Research Project on Pastoralist

Parliamentary Groups 79 Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International

34

3.2.2 Access to Basic Services

Pastoral including Turkana areas have long been neglected by central governments

in the provision of basic services, such as health and education. In the East Africa education

participation rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages80. In Kenya, primary

schooling enrolment in the Central province is up to 91.2%, while in the Northern Eastern

province, where the majority of pastoralists’ communities live, the enrolment is only

20.5%81. In Ethiopia, while the national average gross enrolment for the primary level is

64.4%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the enrolment drops to 13.8% and 15.1%

respectively82. A similar disparity can be observed also in relation to health statistics. Lack

of education among pastoralists’ communities is a key determinant of pastoralists’ political

marginalization as it significantly reduces their ability to engage in advocacy activities and

‘to understand and speak out for their rights’83.

3.2.3 Dependence on aid

There is a growing awareness that the resilience of marginalized communities has

been progressively weakened and that pastoralists are increasingly unable to cope with

environmental shocks. In the last few decades, droughts in the HoA have triggered

widespread and severe livelihoods crisis and have plunged millions of pastoralists into

humanitarian crisis. For example, the increased frequency and severity of droughts in

Kenya is leaving pastoralists more and more exposed to shocks as the time needed to

rebuild the herd (15-20 years) is longer than the intervals between the occurrences of

80 Trench P, Rowley J, Diarra M, Sano F, Keita B. 2007. Beyond Any Drought. Root causes of chronic

vulnerability in the Sahel. The Sahel Working Group 81 Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International 82 ibid 83 Oxfam. 2008. Survival of the fittest. Pastoralism and climate change in East Africa. Oxfam Briefing

Paper no. 116

35

drought84. Unable to recover, pastoralists become trapped in a downward spiral of

vulnerability and destitution and are increasingly dependent on international aid. Their

dependency on relief assistance however can also be seen as related to ‘years of neglect

and misunderstanding by central governments’85.

Rather than addressing pastoralists’ vulnerabilities with social protection

mechanisms, such as the provision of safety nets or any rapid responding

mechanism with compensatory protection, all too often national

governments can ‘get away with the neglect [of pastoralists areas] in the

knowledge that the international community will step in as a guarantor of

last resort of the lives of the very poorest’86.

3.2.4 Food crisis

Food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition continue to plague pastoral areas in

the East Africa. The seminal work of a number of scholars has pointed to the need of

understanding food crises as long drawn out political processes87,88. A focus on the process

that leads to malnutrition and culminates in starvation is especially useful as it helps to

focus the analysis on the reasons why those crises happen. There is plenty of evidence that

food crises occur even in times of plenty and that people starve because they lack the

political power to secure access over an adequate amount of food. Amartya Sen’s famously

argued that ‘starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is

not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat’89. The political, social and economic

84 Longley K and Wekesa. 2008. M. An Analysis of Kenya’s Drought Response: Lessons from the 2005-06

drought response in pastoral areas (draft unpublished) 85 Grahn R. 2008. The Paradox of Pastoral Vulnerability. Background Paper for the development of From

Poverty to Power. How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World. Oxfam GB 86 ibid 87 De Waal A. 1989. Famines that Kill: Darfur 1984-85. Claredon Press, Oxford; 88 Keen, D. 1994. The Benefits of Famine: A political economy of famine and relief in southwestern Sudan

1983 – 1989. Princeton University Press, Princeton 89 Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford University Press,

Oxford

36

marginalization of pastoralist groups is a primary cause of the food crises that recurrently

engulf pastoral areas in the.

3.2.5 Conflict

Competition for scarce natural resource is widely understood to be a primary cause

of conflict in the region and is in part related to the inability of pastoralists to assert their

land rights. In addition to loss of grazing land to irrigation schemes, conservation projects,

natural reserves and so on, trends in land use also indicate a shift towards converting

rangelands to croplands. This even if the potential of the rangelands for sedentary

agriculture under the low production system and the variability and unpredictability of

rainfall is marginal90. In some regions these trends are alarming. The land under crop

production in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia amounts to an estimated total of 2,030,172

hectares: Loss of communal grazing land to increased farming activities or to

environmental degradation has fuelled conflicts in a number pastoral area across the HoA91.

For example in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia, home of the Afar pastoralists for

centuries, the irrigation potential of the Awash river has been attracting the attention of the

Ethiopian state since the 1950s. The gradual appropriation of large areas along the river for

cultivation purposes by the state has led to the progressive exclusion of Afar pastoralists

from some of the most important resources of the Valley92. Having lost access to key

livelihoods resources, the Afar started to utilize larger tracts of the open rangelands. The

competition for scarce resources with the neighboring clan, the Somali Issa, has led to the

90 Lautze, S., Aklilu, Y., Raven-Roberts, A., Young, H., Kebede, G. and Leaning, J. 2003. Risk and

Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past. Report prepared for USAID 91 ibid 92 Hedlund K. 2007. Slow-onset disaster: drought and food and livelihoods insecurity. Learning from

previous relief and recovery responses. ALNAP and Prevention Consortium

37

conflict between the two clans, with raids and counter-raids being a regular feature.

Ultimately, ‘the lack of attention to the needs of pastoral producers has created a highly

volatile security situation and a continued need for food security emergency interventions

in the area93.

3.3 Disarmament Operation on Cross Border Conflict in East Africa

The internationally prescribed and favored course of action for governments in

response to conflict of this nature has been civilian disarmament programs. In East Africa,

and particularly Kenya, governments have implemented heavy-handed coercive

disarmament programs. Such crackdown operations often intensify insecurity for disarmed

groups, in some cases prompting raids from neighboring tribes who seek to take advantage

of their neighbors’ temporary weakness.

3.3.1 Disarmament in the North Rift Region of Kenya

The government of Kenya also launched a series of military led disarmament

programs in seven districts of the North Rift region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in

three phases: (1) Operation Dumisha Amani (maintain peace), a voluntary weapons

collection that promised increased security and amnesty from prosecution, where no force

was used; (2) Operation Okota I (collect 1), a forceful disarmament of communities that

had not cooperated with phase one of the program; and (3) Okota II (collect 2), a

development component designed to improve economic conditions in previously armed

areas so as to reduce incentives for arms possession94. The disarmament campaign returned

93 ibid 94 Riam Riam. 2007. Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience. Presented at the IGAD Regional

Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007.

38

approximately 1,710 firearms and 5,700 rounds of ammunition from Turkana District95.

Disarmament, however, came at a price, especially for those in Turkana South, where

neighboring tribes repeatedly attacked disarmed communities96. During the exercise, the

Pokot of Turkana South were able to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons

confiscated. The Turkana, on the other hand, were unable to relocate, which left them

exposed to returning Pokot warriors from Uganda. Allegations also surfaced that a number

of Kenyan military personnel tortured and abused civilians when they refused to

voluntarily surrender their weapons or divulge information concerning armed community

members97.

Although well intentioned, the program lacked clear objectives and genuine

consent from community leaders and populations. The campaign was rushed and failed to

sensitize participants. Furthermore, civilian populations rapidly lost confidence when they

discovered that they were not going to be compensated for their surrendered weapons.

Pastoral populations, long used to repressive interventions from the state, interpreted the

disarmament process as yet another offensive intended to undermine their overall

development and freedom of movement98.

When the news from Turkana South reached Turkana North, chiefs and community

leaders requested that the government conduct disarmament on a voluntary basis. As an

alternative to giving up their arms, weapon holders were recruited as KPR, exchanging

95 ibid 96 ibid 97 Riam Riam. 2007. Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience. Presented at the IGAD Regional

Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007. 98 ibid

39

their weapons for registered government-issued ones99. It is clear from these cases that

disarmament schemes that ignore the root causes of demand for small arms, while

simultaneously putting communities on the defensive without proper state-led security

provision may result in an array of unintended consequences. A 2008 Small Arms Survey

report from the Sudan-Kenya border region reports that more than 60 percent of

respondents believe that civilian disarmament would decrease security in their villages100.

When locals were asked how disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the

security of those areas, the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security.

Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community

would change the level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot. Whereas

civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflict resolution

initiatives have brought some hope to the situation101.

3.3.2 Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda

Uganda has long experimented with coercive disarmament of its pastoral

populations, particularly in the Karamoja region. At least eight disarmament campaigns

have been undertaken since 1945. More recent campaigns in 2001 and 2002 led to the

recovery of at least 10,000 weapons, though many (8,000) were subsequently re-issued to

warriors who were recruited into Local Defense Units and Anti-Stock-Theft coalitions102.

By 2006, many of the latter were considered obsolete, with a great deal of their weapons

99 ibid 100 McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed

Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small

Arms Survey 101 ibid 102 Uganda. 2005. Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating the

Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Development 2005–2008. Kampala: Office of the Prime

Minister. June.

40

and ammunition in circulation. Beginning in April 2006, the Uganda People’s Defense

Force (UPDF) launched aggressive “cordon and search” disarmament interventions.

Preliminary assessments suggest that these activities generated widespread distrust and fear

among the local population and a concomitant increase in demand for weapons103.

The UPDF adopted a heavy-handed approach to disarmament in 2006 and 2007.

Forces used mounted machine guns, assault rifles, and grenades against civilians during

offensives in the Karamoja region. The casualties included many (unarmed) women and

children. Predictably, antigovernment/UPDF sentiments flared amongst the Karimojong,

resulting in a number of reprisal attacks104. For example, in mid-October 2006 during

retaliation against cordon and search operations launched near Kotido town, Jie warriors

shot dead 16 soldiers including the commanding officer of the UPDF 67th battalion105.

Moreover, UPDF initiated disarmament campaigns leave Karamoja communities

vulnerable to raids from tribal groups in other areas of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Unable

to defend themselves.

3.4 Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Social-Economic Security

The impact of cross border conflict on the economic security through trade and

other related economic activities among communities that heavily depend on trade either

for local barter exchange or exchange for profit cannot be underestimated. The Turkana

have remained one of the most isolated ethnic groups in Kenya, and have engaged in small

scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs among

103 Bevan, James. 2008. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s

Most Deprived Region. Occasional Paper 21. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 104 ibid 105 Bevan, James. 2008b. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s

Most Deprived Region. Occasional Paper 21. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

41

themselves and between their neighbours106. The economy is extremely limited and

predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Trade is considered the

backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a mainstay of

economic security of Turkana. Estimates put the ratio between traders and total population

in Turkana as one trader more or less per every 100 people. Moreover, it is estimated that

trade in the County is conducted by small traders (77%), medium traders (20%), large

traders (3%); or retailers (97%) and wholesalers (3%)107. Despite profitability of trade, the

onset of conflict has had negative impact on the flow of trade and market integration

between the County and her neighbours.

The empirical analyses of violent conflict point to low-per capita income as the

most robust explanatory factor in determining the risk of violent internal conflict breaking

out108. Further, some studies have focused on the relationship between conflict and poverty.

Poverty has continuously been cited as one of the principal factors responsible for conflict

in many parts of Africa. Similarly, poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly

in Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. Studies indicate that poverty makes

conflict more likely, and conflicts in turn worsen poverty. Macartan109, notes that these

relations are stronger for very poor communities than for well off communities and

conflicts tend to last longer in poorer communities. Moreover, Draman110 observes that

106 Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). “Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya”, OXFAM GB – Kenya

Programme Report, May 2006. 107 ibid 108 Collier and Hoeffler. (2010). cited in Draman, Rasheed “Democratizing Security for a Safer World: What

Role for Parliamentarians?” Discussion Paper for Africa-Canada Parliamentary Policy Dialogue, Parliament

Buildings, Ottawa, September 23-26, 2003 109 Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”, Harvard University. 110 Draman, R. (2003). “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship”. Paper prepared


23, 2003.

42

some of the hot spots in Africa reveal that there is a very high correlation between poverty

and conflict. Similarly, some analysts view participants in many of Africa’s violent

conflicts as being motivated by poor economic conditions under which they live. However,

there are those who dismiss the link between poverty and conflict, and argue that poverty

may lead to conflict when other factors prevail. Among the economic studies and

explanations which link conflicts to poverty include Dramer111, have questioned the

explanation linking conflict to poverty, especially those that conduct empirical

measurement of poverty using the income inequality index of Gini coefficient.

There are several ways conflict may affect economic security of a community.

According to Kalyvas112, violent conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and

households through the intensity and type of violence they set in motion, and the impact of

such violence on economic security of units is either direct or indirect. Direct effects

include changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and changes in the

household economic status due to the destruction of assets and livelihood activities and

effects caused by forced displacement. Indirect effects take place at the community level

and include changes in households’ access to and relationship with local markets, business,

and employment.

Cross border conflict causes death to many local people, in addition to causing

extensive injuries, disability and psychological damage. During violent conflicts, assets

such as houses, land, labour, property, utensils, and livestock get lost or destroyed through

111 ibid 112 Kalyvas, S. (2004), “The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars”, Security Studies 13(3): 131.

43

heavy fighting and looting. Ibanez and Moya113 have noted that these effects are made

worse by the large population displacements that accompany most violent conflicts.

Turkana County has the highest number of displaced persons most of the displaced were

from Kakuma and Lokichogio divisions. Kondylis114 and Steele115 showed that displaced

populations often struggle to find work, are less likely to work in the post-conflict period,

exhibit lower productivity levels, and also the same displaced people may be pushed in

criminal or illegal forms of activity with adverse economic outcomes116.

These direct effects of violence will result for many household in considerable

reductions in total income and consumption due to the loss of livelihoods and decreases in

productivity and human capital when key household workers die or are incapacitated.

Surviving members may forgo other economic activities to care for injured and disabled

household members. With regard to conflict and trade, the study117 notes that, for a long

time the classical liberals have provided competing arguments on the relationship between

trade and conflict. Yet the relationship between trade and conflict remains mired in a host

of conflicting logics and empirical results. Liberals have always argued that

interdependence reduces conflict because conflict discourages commerce. The use of force

reduces the gains from trade and imperils the flow of information necessary for the

113 Ibanez, A M & Moya A, (2006). ‘The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare and

Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for the Displaced Population in Colombia’, Households in

Conflict Network, Working Paper 23 (http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp23.pdf) 114 Kondylis, Florence. (2007). ‘Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a

Policy Intervention in Rwanda’, Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 28

(http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp28.pdf) 115 Steele, Abbey. (2007). ‘Massive Civilian Displacement in Civil War: Assessing Variation in Households

in Conflict Network”. Working Paper 29 (http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp29.pdf) 116 ibid 117 ibid




44

development of mutual understanding118. According to Liberal like Paul Krugman, trade

improves quality of life and reduces the likelihood of conflict. Economic interdependence

promotes peace because conflict is inconsistent with mutually beneficial economic ties119.

Omar et al120 have noted that an interstate dispute reduces bilateral trade, but trade does

not reduce the risk of a dispute. According to Stein121, a core contradiction of trade is that

it generates conflict even as it is intended to facilitate conflict avoidance. Trade reduces

both the occurrence of political crises and the need for militarized actions once they

arise122.

The impact of conflict on trade (markets and exchange business in general) has the

consequence of affecting the incomes of the business community through changes in the

market price of goods sold and purchased by the household. Costs of transacting business

are likely to rise as a result of insecurity. Savings and hence potential investment are bound

to suffer and will have negative consequences for productive decisions. During armed

conflict markets and businesses may fail to operate resulting in significant reductions in

household utility and welfare. Watson and van Binsbergen123 have singled out insecurity

as being a major impediment to both livestock production and marketing particularly in the

northeast of the Turkana, where cross-border raids are a frequent occurrence. According

to the study, insecurity depresses livestock prices as traders have to factor in possible losses

118 Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). “Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes” 119 Polachek, S & Xiang J., (2008). “How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an

Incomplete Information Game”. Unpublished. 120 Omar, M. et al. (2004). “Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model

of Interdependence and Armed Conflict”. Journal of Politics 66(4):1155–1179. 121 Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). “Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes” 122 ibid 123 Watson, D.J. and Van, Binsbergen. J. (2008). “Livelihood Diversification opportunities for Pastoralists in

Turkana Kenya”. ILRI Research Report (5). Nairobi, Kenya.

45

from theft, and makes moving cash risky. Furthermore, the lack of cash diminishes chances

of access to credit with the consequence of limiting livestock marketing which further

weakens the capital base as well as diminishing the pastoralists’ bargaining power. In a

related study but different focus, Graham Carrington124 has analyzed the effects of cross-

border conflict on trade between Sudan and Uganda and its implications for peace building,

whose results show that organized and formal interstate trade helps to promote peace and

reduce conflict among communities.

124 ibid

46

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data analyses, interpretation and presentation of finding in

line with the objectives of the study. The chapter is further sub divided into methodology,

response rate, demographic results, and discussion of objective finding.

4.2 Methodology

The study used descriptive research design. The design provided insight into the

research problem and examined the associative relationships and information on potential

cause-and-effect relationships of the problem. The target population was drawn from

residents of Loima location/ward in Turkana County along Kenya-Uganda border. A

sample size of 100 respondents was selected from the target population of 19,848. The data

collection exercise involved questionnaires and interviews with respondents. The

questionnaire provided in depth understanding of the issues under. Primary data was

collected by the researcher with assistance of field assistants who also doubled up as

interpreters where necessary.

4.3 Response Rate

The study issued 100 questionnaires as per the sample size. Out of this, 75

questionnaires were return fully filled, 11 questionnaires partly filled and 14 not returned

at all. This corresponds to 75% response rate for fully filled questionnaire, 11% partly filled

and 14% non response rate as illustrated in Table 4.1. The study considered only fully filled

questionnaires for analysis and this represents a 75% response rate, above the 70%

47

minimum response rate required for analysis according to Creswell (2009). In addition,

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) ascertains that a response rate of 50% is adequate for

analysis and reporting, a rate of 60% is good and a response rate above 70% is excellent.

Therefore, the study response rate of 75% was excellent to progress to analysis. The high

response rate implies a higher degree of awareness of cross border conflict and its effects

among respondents.

Table 4.2: Response Rate

Responses Frequency Percent

Returned Fully Filled 75 75

Returned Partly Filled 11 11

Not Returned 14 14

Total 100 100

Source: own surveyed data

4.4 Demographic Information

Respondent’s background information finding is presented and discussed under

this section. Demographic results discussed are age distribution, gender distribution,

marital status, level of education, and engagement in economic activities.

48

4.4.1 Age of the Respondent

The determination of age distribution within the study respondents’ was important

characteristics in understanding their maturity and ability to provide reliable information

based on experience. The result for respondent’s age distribution is illustrated in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Respondents’ age distribution

Age Bracket Frequency Percentage

18-25 yrs 8 10.67

26-35 yrs 10 13.33

36-45 yrs 9 12.00

46-55 yr 44 58.67

Above 55 yrs 4 5.33

Total 75 100.00


Results illustrated in Table 4.3 reveals that 10.67% of the respondents were in the

age bracket 18-26 yrs, 13.33% in the age bracket of 26-35 yrs, 12.00% in the age bracket

of 36-45 years 58.67% in the age bracket of 46-55 yrs and 5.33% aged above 55 years.

This finding shows that the majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 46-55

years implying respondents were mature adults who are well informed of cross border

conflict and thus provided relevant and important information or data needed for study

objectives. In addition, respondents within the age bracket of 18-35 years may not have

been actively involved in cross border conflict; they were also able to provide their views

on how conflict has impacted on them. Respondents in the age bracket of above 55 yrs

49

provided real and experienced view of the study theme as they have nearly experienced all

conflicts since Kenya gained independence.

4.4.2 Gender

Gender is an important variable that affects respondents’ views, opinion and

response to social or economic phenomenon impact of cross border conflict is not an

exception to it. Therefore, gender issue was important to explain whether gender plays

influence in assessing impact of cross border conflict. The study findings for gender

distribution are shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.4: Gender Participation

Gender Participation Frequency Percentage

Male 54 72

Female 21 28

Total 75 100


According to Table 4.4, the total number of male’s respondents who participated in

the study comprised 72% of total respondents while female comprised of 28% of the

respondents. It can be concluded that the number of males was the dominant gender that

responded to the study. This finding reveals a higher gender disparity in cross border

conflict issues as in most cases women rarely participate in conflict issues. The high gender

disparity may have been due to cultural practices among the study population community.

According to Mutuku125, women are less recognized to talk on behalf of the family and


50

thus participates less due to cultural inclination on gender roles. In African settings, there

is the belief that some roles are purely a reserve for male counterpart, especially those roles

viewed to be masculine in nature, security provision included. This may have greatly

affected women engagement and participation in the study.

4.4.3 Highest level of Education

Just like gender, education is another most important characteristic that might affect

the person’s attitudes and the way of looking and understanding any particular social and

economic phenomena. Therefore, the study sought to find out highest academic

qualification of the respondent. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.4.

Table 4.5: Highest level of education

Level of Education Frequency Percentage

No education 24 32.00

‘A ‘Level 21 28.00

‘O’ Level 16 21.33

Tertiary 8 10.67

Undergraduate 6 8.00

Total 75 100.00


Table 4.5 indicates that 32.00% of the respondents had no education at all, 28.00%

were primary (‘O’ level) school graduates, 21.33% were secondary (‘A’ level) education

graduates, 10.67% and 8% of respondent were tertiary level and undergraduate

respectively. It can be concluded that the majority of the respondents had attained no

51

education followed by primary levels of education. The low level of education can be

attributed to by the marginalization of the area and the constant conflict experienced in the

area leading to low infrastructural development.

This finding are in agreement with Trench et al126 who observed that pastoral

including Turkana areas have long been neglected by central governments in the provision

of basic services, such as health and education. In their finding that education participation

rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages with primary schooling enrolment

in the Central province is up to 91.2%, while in the Northern Eastern province, where the

majority of pastoralists’ communities live, the enrolment is only 20.5%127. Similar situation

also exist in Ethiopia, where the national average gross enrolment for the primary level is

64.4%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the enrolment drops to 13.8% and 15.1%

respectively128.

4.3.4 Engagement in Business Activity

It was also prudent for the study to establish the nature of business activities that

respondents engaged in. first respondents were asked whether they engage in business

activities. Finding showed that majority (78.55%) engaged in economic activities. Further

to that, responses regarding the nature or type of economic activity are illustrated in Table

4.5

126 ibid 127 Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International 128 ibid

52

Table 4.6: Economic Activity

Economic Activity Frequency Percentage

Livestock trade 14 18.67

Fishing/fish trade 11 14.67

Tourism 8 10.67

Shop/grocery trade 13 17.33

Transportation 6 8.00

Mining 5 6.67

Handcraft/weaving 8 10.67

Hawking 10 13.32

Total 75 100.00


Table 4.6 reveales that 18.67% of respondents engaged in livestock trade, 14.67%

engaged in fishing/fish trade business, 10.67% engaged in tourism 17.33% in shop/grocery

trade, 8.00% in transportation, 6.67% in mining, 10.67% in handcraft and 13.32% in

hawking. This finding confirmed that livestock trade, shop/grocery trade, fishing/fish trade

and hawking are the main economic activities among the respondents. This finding

corroborates with the finding of Oxfam129 which reported that the main economic activity

within pastoralist communities is live stock trading and handcraft/weaving. In addition, the

finding illustrated that resident or respondents experience economic loss due to cross

border conflicts.

129 Oxfam. 2008. Survival of the fittest. Pastoralism and climate change in East Africa. Oxfam Briefing

Paper no. 116

53

4.4 Objective Finding

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border

aggression on socio-economic security in Kenya, with reference to Turkana County,

Kenya-Uganda border. Thus, the study was guided by three objectives namely: to examine

the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County; to determine the effect

of cross border aggression on socio-economic security of households in Turkana County,

and to evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border aggression on

the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. Finding for these objectives

are discussed below.

4.4.1 The Nature and Extent of Cross Border Aggression in Turkana County

Study objective one was crafted to assess the nature and extent of cross border

aggression in Turkana County. First, respondent were asked whether they have experienced

or participated in cross border conflict. Finding as shown in figure 2 revealed that 68.98%

have while 31.02% have not. This finding affirmed that cross border conflict is a common

phenomenon among the pastoralist community living along the borders. Similarly, this

finding is supported by Mutuku who attributed this phenomenon a large market for small

arms due to the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely

the AK-47; the conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and

indiscriminate killing during raids.

54

Figure 2: Participation in Cross Border Conflict


Secondly, study sought to identify the common types and nature of cross border

attack along Kenya Uganda border. Respondent were thus asked to specify how frequent

they have experienced incidences relating to the provided attacks in the area. Finding is

illustrated in Figure 2

Yes68.98%

No31.02%

55

Figure 3: Nature/Type of cross border attacks


Findings as illustrated in Figure 3 indicates that 60.00% of the respondents agree that cattle

raid by non-Kenyan community is a very frequent form of cross border attack in Turkana

along Kenya-Uganda border, 32.00% said frequent attack, and 8.00% said rare attack. For

organized raids by foreigners, majority of respondents 45.33% said very frequent attack,

36.00% said frequent attack, 17.33% rare attack and 1.33% very rare attack. For abduction

by foreigners form of cross border attack, 14.67% said is a very frequent attack, 21.33%

said frequent attack, 48.00% aid rare attack, and 16.00% said very rare attack. In addition,

for killing of locals by outsiders’ incident, 38.67% of respondents said very frequent,

46.67% said frequent, 10.67% aid rare and 4.00% said very rare. For cross border robbery

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

%

R

a

t

i

n

g

Types/Forms of cross border attacks

Very

frequen

tFrequen

t

Rare

Very

rare

56

by non-Kenyan, finding shows that 16.00% said very frequent attack, 24.00% said frequent

attack, 49.33% said rare and 10.67% very rare. Finally for rape incident, 16.00% said very

frequent incident, 17.33% said frequent, 67.33% said rare and 9.33% very rare.

This finding confirmed that cattle raid by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid

by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery

by non-Kenyan are the frequent forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County

along Kenya Uganda boarder. In addition, abduction by foreigners and rape are rare types

of cross border incidents. High rate of cattle raid attack was due to the fact that cattle rearing

and trading being is the backbone economic activity in the area. Since most of cattle raiders

use firearms, this in turn flames killing of locals by foreigners (raiders) and cross border

robbery. As argued by one respondent,

‘…rape incidents are rare because in most cases women do not actively

participate in cross border attacks…’ (Respondent)

This finding corroborated with Liotta130, who reported that conflicts occurring

among tribes as well as with those across the border in neighboring countries are mainly

cause of external aggression and compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light

Weapons (SLWs) leading to organized raids, mass killing, and cross border robbery.

Study further sought to know whether cross border attacks are conducted in

collaboration with locals. As argued by Liotta131, the Turkana and Pokot communities live

both in Kenya and Uganda and thus in most case have dual citizens allowing them, in some


Security”. Security Dialogue vol. 36, no. 1. 131 ibid.

57

instances, to commit crime in Kenya and seek shelter in their Uganda counterpart. This

implies that there could be a network of criminals coordinating crime or cross border

crimes among respondent. In order to dig into the truth of this matter, respondents were

asking how the attackers act. Finding is shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: How attack are conducted


Figure 4, shows that 28.67% of the respondents are of the view that foreigners conduct

cross border attacks alone, 63.65% conduct cross border attack jointly with locals and

7.68% did not know how these attacks are done. This finding confirms that cross border

attacks are usually done jointly with locals. This finding is supported by Riam Riam who

observed that during the disarmament exercise, the local Pokot of Turkana South were able

28.67%

63.65%

7.68%

Attack alone Attack jointly with locals Do not know

58

to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons confiscated. This clearly indicates that

the attackers have wide network stretching beyond the border and one of the mandates is

to provide refuge to neighbor during disarmament operation. In addition, one respondent

claimed

‘……that during attack, they seek for reinforcement effort from warriors

from Uganda. Similarly, they organize for attack jointly with the locals in

Uganda who acts as their point or guide men.’

In addition, the study further sought to determine wither Kenyans also conduct

cross border attacks in Uganda. In this regard, respondents were asked whether Kenyan

also conduct attack across the border. Finding shows are shown in Table 4.6

Table 4.7: Kenya attacks across border

Category Frequency Percentage

Yes 34 45.33

No 21 28.00

I do not know 20 26.67

Total 75 100.00


Table 4.6 shows that 45.33% agrees that Kenyans do conduct cross border attack,

28.00% did not agree while 26.67% did not know. This finding clearly confirmed that

Kenyan also conduct cross border attack, however the less than halve percent response

shows that is not frequent. In connection to this question, respondents opinion were further

sought to determine the drives or motives of cross border conflict in the area. Findings are

illustrated in figure 5.

59

Figure 5: Motives/reasons for cross border conflict


Figure 5, shows that 20.00% said revenge or settlement of scores is the main motive for

cross border conflict, 13.33 sad wealth accumulation, 34.67% said cultural practice, 8.00%

said to earn a living and 24.00% said combination of several factors. This finding clearly

affirms that cultural practices are the major drive for cross border conflict, followed by

revenge motives to settle scores. In addition, wealth accumulation and to earn a living is

rare motives for cross border attack or conflict.

0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 40.00

Revenge motive

Wealth accumulation

Cultural practice

To earn a living/survival motive

Combination of several motives

% Response

60

4.4.2 Effect of Cross Border Aggression on Socio-Economic Security of

Households in Turkana County

Study objective two was designed to assess the effect of cross border aggression on

socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. In order to achieve this; the

study first inquired whether respondents business or that of other traders has been affected

by cross border aggression. The Finding reveals that 89.02% of respondent businesses have

been affected while 10.08% have not. This finding affirms that cross border conflict affects

all types of business in the areas. The low percentage of those who have not been affects

are either those who begun their business recently. In relation to finding on business

affected by cross border aggression, study further asked respondents with their business

affected to specify the nature of effect based on the provided options. Findings are

illustrated in Table 4.7.

Table 4.8: Nature of loss suffered by business as a result of cross border conflict


Lost property to raiders/looters 35 46.67

No/reduced sales due to insecurity 12 16.00

Increased profits 5 6.67

Increased losses 13 17.33

Increased levies by security agent 10 13.33

Total 75 100.00


Finding for nature of damages suffered by business as a result of cross border

conflict shows that 46.67% of damages are related to loss of property to looters, 16.00%

61

related to no or reduction in sales due to insecurity, 6.67% related to increased profit,

17.33% related to increased losses and 13.33% related to increased levies by the security

agents. This confirms that the major effects of cross border conflict are loss of properties

to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. However, as some businesses suffer

negative effect, there is small margin (6.67%) that strives and reported increased profits.

This finding corroborated by Alessandro De Matteis study that reported that Turkana have

engaged in small scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs

among themselves and between their neighbours132. The economy is extremely limited and

predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Therefore during cross

border conflict, the major activity that suffers is livestock trade, additionally, since trade is

considered the backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a

mainstay of economic security of Turkana, cross border conflict caused estimates of over

65% loss in economic activities.

Additional analysis was conducted to determine whether respondents have been

displaced from their homes or business by cross border conflict or activities by state agents

during security operations. Finding revealed that 100% of respondents have been displaced

and this affirms the greatest effect of cross border conflict as displacement of residents.

Accordingly, Alessandro De Matteis also affirmed that Kenya has long history of

displacement of population especially due to croo border aggression relate conflicts.

Respondents were also asked how they safe they feel living in the area or carrying out their

business. Response for this question is depicted in Figure 6.

132 Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). “Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya”, OXFAM GB – Kenya

Programme Report, May 2006.

62

Figure 6: Safety levels


Figure 6, illustrates that only 16% of respondents felt very safe living in the area or doing

their business activities, 40% of respondents feels safe and 44% of respondents feels not

safe at all. This finding affirm that majority of respondents do not feel safe at all either

living in the area of doing business in the area. This finding confirms that the area is quite

unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other insecurity issues. Specifically Macartan133

affirmed that after disarmament of the local karamajo pastoralist in Uganda, when locals

were asked how disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of those

areas, the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly,

when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community would change the

level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot. Thus he concludes that whereas

civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflicts resolution

133 Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”, Harvard University.

Very safe16%

Safe40%

Not safe at all44%

63

initiatives have brought some hope to the situation. Similarly, Draman134 also reported that

disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, in most cases;

it would decrease security a lot.

Lastly, objective three attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of state response

strategies to cross-border aggression on the socio-economic security of households in

Turkana County. The analysis of this objective was also done on stages and stage one

sought to establish whether security agencies have been responsive to cross border attacks

in the region. In his regard, respondent were asked whether there has been state response

after aggression. Finding is shown in figure 7.

Figure 7: State Response after agression


134 Draman, R. (2003). “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship”. Paper prepared


23, 2003.

Yes28.88%

No71.22%

64

Figure 7 reveals that respondents agreed that 28.88% of cross border aggression are

respondent to by state operators while 71.22% of these aggressions are never responded to.

This finding affirms that there is low response rate to cross border aggressions by the state

security agencies. The low response rate could be attributed to the inaccessibility of the

region due to poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and network.

According to Trench et al135, majority of pastoralist regions in Kenya, Turkana County

included has poor road network and this has been the major hindrance to state response to

aggression operation.

Further analysis was conducted to establish the security agency that commonly

responds to cross border aggression. Finding for this analysis are represented in Table 4.8

and revealed that 16.00% of respondents said that government agents commonly respond

to cross border aggression, 46.67% of respondents agreed that local and home guard

commonly responds to cross border aggression while 37.33% agreed that both government

agents and locals and home guards responds to cross border aggression.

These findings confirm that the frequent security responses to cross border

aggression are made of locals and home guards or combined operation between local and

home guard and the government agents. In addition, the finding also confirms that the

government security agent rarely responds to cross border aggression. This finding also

affirms the previous finding on low response by stare agencies towards cross border

aggression. These finding corroborates with Riam136 finding of that government of Kenya

135 Trench P, Rowley J, Diarra M, Sano F, Keita B. 2007. Beyond Any Drought. Root causes of chronic

vulnerability in the Sahel. The Sahel Working Group 136 Riam Riam. 2007. Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience. Presented at the IGAD Regional

Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007

65

launched a series of military led disarmament programs in seven districts of the North Rift

region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in three phases: (1) Operation Dumisha Amani

(maintain peace), a voluntary weapons collection that promised increased security and

amnesty from prosecution, where no force was used; (2) Operation Okota I (collect 1), a

forceful disarmament of communities that had not cooperated with phase one of the

program; and (3) Okota II (collect 2), a development component designed to improve

economic conditions in previously armed areas so as to reduce incentives for arms

possession.

Table 4.9: Security agencies common responses to cross border aggression


Government security agents 12 16.00

Locals and home guards 35 46.67

Both government and local guards 28 37.00

Total 75 100.00


Having determine the most responsive security agent in cross border conflict,

respondents were also asked to rate the efficiency and promptness of security personnel in

as far as repulsing foreign attacks in the county is concerned. Findings for this response are

depicted in Figure 8.

66

Figure 8: Efficiency of State Personnel


The findings on efficiency and promptness of security personnel repulsing foreign attackers

shown in figure 8 show that 46.67% of respondents said there is poor efficiency and

promptness, 29.33% said average efficiency and promptness, 14.67% said above average

and 9.33% said excellence. This finding affirms that there is poor or below average

efficiency and promptness in security agents repulsing foreign attackers in the county. This

poor or below average efficiency and promptness is as a result of the fact that commonly

and active security agent that respond to cross border conflict are the home guards and

locals, who in most cases lack the knowledge and expertise to conduct successful ant-

aggression operations. In addition, home guards and locals do not have tools, equipment

0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00

Poor

Average

Above average

Excellent

% Response

67

and weapons needed for effecting efficiently and promptly responds to foreign attacks.

This is also echoed by responded who ascertained that the:

“…. local security agents are not well equipped to handle cross border

conflict or aggression because foreign raiders uses sophisticated weapons

superior to local police and reservists…’

The study further inquired how the state has responded to cross border violence conflict

whenever it occurred. In this regard, respondent were asked to rate the extent to which the

provided response strategies by state security agents have prevalent. Result is depicted in

Figure 9

Figure 9: State response to cross border aggression


0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

Disarmament Pursued attackers

across the border

Closed the border Used diplomatic

channels

Very well

well

Some how

Not well

Never

68

Results illustrated in Figure 9 revealed that for disarmament response strategy to

cross border aggression, 8.00% of respondent said it has worked very well, 20.00% said it

has worked well, 33.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked and 26.67% of

respondent agreed that it has not work well with 12.00% respondents agreeing that it has

never worked. For pursuing attackers across the border response strategy to deter cross

border aggression, 6.67% said it has worked well, 11.33%% of respondents said it has

somehow worked 60.00% of respondent agreed that it has not work well and 20.00% of

respondent said it has never worked at all. For temporal closure of border strategy as a

remedy to cross border aggression, 4.00% of respondent said it has worked very well,

16.00% said it has worked well, 29.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked

45.33% of respondent agreed that it has not work well and 10.67% said it has never worked.

Finally for use of diplomatic channels as a remedy to cross border aggression, 6.67% of

respondents said it has worked very well, 20.00% said it has worked well, 24.00% said it

has worked somehow, 45.33% said it has not work well and 4.00% said it has never worked

at all.

This finding affirms that among the study provided state agency response strategy

to cross border aggression, disarmament strategy has somehow worked but not effective,

pursuing attacker across the border has never worked, temporal closure of the border to

restrict movement has not deterred the cross border conflict and use of diplomacy has

equally never worked at all. Thus all strategies employed have not effectively worked

leading to persistence cross border aggression along Kenya – Uganda border. Although it

appears as if local disarmament has somehow deterred revenge attacks, this has weakened

69

local capacity to defend themselves given the inadequate security provided by the state

agents.

In view of the fact that disarmament is the major security operation in the area, the

study sought to determine whether it has effectively and efficiently mitigated cross border

aggression in the study area. To achieve this, respondents were asked whether they have

heard or are aware of disarmament efforts in the area. Findings revealed that 100.00% of

respondents have been victim of disarmament. Furthermore, respondents were asked to

rate how often security agencies have been involved in the disarmament exercise. Finding

is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: State security agent response to disarmament


0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

AP GSU Regular

Police

Army Anty stock

theft

KRP

% R

esp

on

se t

o d

isa

rma

men

t

Security agent

Very well

well

Some how

Not well

Never

70

From figure 10, for administration police response participation in disarmament

revealed that 21.33% of respondent said AP have worked very well, 20.00% said it has

worked well, 33.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked, 13.34% of respondent

agreed that AP has not work well with 12.00% respondents agreeing that it has never

participated in disarmament exercise. For General Service Unit (GSU) police participation

in disarmament revealed that, 10.67% said they have worked very well, 29.33% of

respondents said it has somehow worked, 13.33% of respondent agreed that it has not work

well, 33.33% said not yet and 13.33% agreed GSU have never succeeded in disarmament.

For regular police participation in disarmament revealed that 17.33%participated

well, 29.33% of respondents said they have somehow participated, and 26.67% of

respondent agreed that they have not worked. For army participation in disarmament

revealed that 45.33% of respondents agreed they have participated very well, 26.67% of

respondents said they have participated well, 17.33% said they have somehow participated,

and 10.67% said they have not well participated. For the Anti stock theft police

participation, 33.33% agreed to very well extent, 29.33% agreed to well extent, 26.67%

agreed to somehow extent participation, 6.67% said not well participation and 4.00%

agreeing that they have never participated at all in disarmament. Finally for use Kenya

Reservist Police (KRP), 21.33% of respondents said it they have participated very well,

20.00% said it has participated well, 33.33% said they have participated somehow, 13.33%

said they have not participated well and 12.00% agreed that KRP have not participated at

all.

These findings indicate that Administration Police (AP) have somehow participated

in disarmament following cross border conflicts or aggression (GSU) have participated

71

well in disarmament, army have participated very well in disarmament, Anti Stock Theft

Police have somehow participated and finally Kenya Police Reservist (KPR). This find

further affirms that Army, Anti Stock Theft and GSU have actively participated in

disarmament exercise following cross border conflict. This finding concurs with Riam137

who reported that military have been widely used for effective disarmament operations

among the pastoralist communities.

The study also inquired on how disarmament has help improve security in the

region. Response for this finding is presented in Table 4.9. From Table 4.9 it can be seen

that 16.00% of respondents agrees that disarmament has increased security a lot, 21.33%

of respondents agreed that disarmament has increased security a little, 45.33% of

respondents agreed that disarmament did not make a different at all, and 17.34% of

respondent agreed that disarmament decreased security a lot. This finding confirmed that

disarmament has lowly improved insecurity a lot with majority of respondents affirming

that disarmament has made no different at all. Some small margin of respondent conform

that disarmament has decreased in security in the region given that most of resident do

harm themselves for personal security.

137 ibid

72

Table 4.10: Security agencies common responds to cross border aggression

Response Frequency Percentage

Increase security a lot 12 16.00

Increase security a little 16 21.33

Did not make a difference 34 45.33

Decrease security a lot 13 17.34

Total 75 100.00


In relation to how disarmament operation has enhanced security in the area, study further

sought to determine how residents’ feels disarmament operation has assisted improved

security in the area. Findings for this analysis are presented in figure 11.

Figure 11: Locals response to disarmament


Very safe21.33%

Safe 48%

Very unsafe30.67%

73

From figure 11, shows that 21.33% of respondents said that during disarmament

operation they feel very face, 48.00% said they feel safe and 30.67% said they feel very

unsafe during disarmament operations. This finding clearly denotes that during

disarmament operation, residents of Turkana County feel safe. This finding could be

attributed to the fact that foreigners are less bound to attack during disarmament operation

due to presence of security agents in the area. In summary, the study further sought to

determine how the government efforts as far as the disarmament exercise are rated by

respondent. Finding for this result is depicted in figure…

Figure 12: Locals rating disarmament


0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 45.00

Poor

Average

Above average

Excellence

% Response

Rating

74

Figure 12, shows that 42.67% of respondents’ were of the opinion disarmament

efforts have achieved poor results, 30.67% of respondents’ were of the opinion that

disarmament efforts have achieved average result. In addition, 16% of respondents were of

the opinion that disarmament efforts have achieved above average results and 10.67% of

the respondents were of that opinion that disarmament effort have achieved excellence

result. This finding confirmed that disarmament results have achieved poor results. These

findings are in agreement with Macartan138 who affirmed that disarmament of the local in

Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of that area as the majority of respondents

claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential

disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, most said it

would decrease security a lot. This he concluded that whereas civilian disarmament has

yielded mixed results, a number of local conflicts resolution initiatives have brought some

hope to the situation. Similarly, Draman139 also reported that disarmament program in the

community would change the level of security, in most cases; it would decrease security a

lot.

138 Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”, Harvard University.

139 Draman, R. (2003). “Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship”. Paper prepared


23, 2003.

75

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusion and recommendation. It

commences with summary of finding for both demographic and research findings,

followed by conclusions drawn from the study finding and finally recommendation. The

chapter also highlights on suggestion for further analysis.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The study achieved 75% response rate, above the 70% minimum response rate

required for analysis according to Creswell (2009). Summary of respondent background

revealed that majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 46-55 years implying

respondents were mature adults who are well informed of cross border conflict and thus

provided relevant and important information or data needed for study objectives. Male was

the dominant gender that responded to the study as women rarely participate in conflict

issues. Summary finding for level of education revealed that majority of the respondents

had attained no education followed by primary levels of education. Majority of respondents

engaged in economic activities with livestock trade, shop/grocery trade, fishing/fish trade

and hawking are the main economic activities among the respondents.

5.3.1 Summary of Key Objective Findings

The study developed three research hypothesis from the study objective, namely

the nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused

by poverty in the region; cross border aggression have adverse effect on the socio-

economic security of households in Turkana County, and the response strategies has little

76

effect on combating cross-border ethnic conflict in Turkana County. Answers to this

research hypothesis are discussed below.

5.3.1 Nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is

majorly caused by poverty in the region

Since majority of respondent have experienced cross border conflict, the study

affirmed that cattle raid by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to

repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyan

are the frequent are the forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along

Kenya Uganda boarder. These attacks are done jointly with locals. However, he study

affirmed that cultural practices are the major drive for cross border conflict, followed by

revenge motives to settle scores. In addition, wealth accumulation and to earn a living is

rare motives for cross border attack or conflict. Therefore based on the study hypothesis

that nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused

by poverty, the study confirmed that as most of the reasons responsible for cross border

conflict are poverty related.

5.3.2 Cross border aggression have adverse effect on the socio-economic security

of households in Turkana County

Finding for nature of damages suffered by business because of cross border conflict

confirms that the major effects of cross border conflict are loss of properties to

raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. However, as some businesses suffer

negative effect, there is small margin strives and reported increased profits. Additionally,

most of resident feel the area quite unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other insecurity

issues.

77

5.3.3 Response Strategies has Little Effect in Combating Cross-Border Ethnic

Conflict in Turkana County

Study finding affirms that there is low response rate to cross border aggressions by

the state security agencies. The low response rate could be attributed to the inaccessibility

of the region due to poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and

network. Further analysis affirms that the frequent security response to cross border

aggression is locals and home guard or combined operation between local and home guard

and the government agents. In addition, finding also affirms that government security agent

rarely responds to cross border aggression. However, when they respond, response is poor

or below average efficiency and promptness in repulsing foreign attackers in the county.

This poor or below average efficiency and promptness is as a result of the fact that

commonly and active security agent that respond to cross border conflict are the home

guards and locals, who in most cases lack the knowledge and expertise to conduct

successful ant-aggression operations.

5.4 Conclusion

The study draw the following conclusion based on the finding. First, the study

found that cattle raids by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse

insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyan are the

frequent forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda

boarder. In addition, these attacks are done jointly with locals. Secondly, the study

concluded that cultural practices and revenge motives to settle scores are the major drive

for cross border conflict. Thirdly, the study concluded that the major effects of cross border

conflict are loss of properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. This

78

makes most resident feel the area quite unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other

insecurity issues. Fifth, the study concludes that there is low response rate to cross border

aggressions by the state security agencies due to the inaccessibility of the region due to

poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and network. Furthermore,

the study concludes that frequent security agent that response to cross border aggression

are locals and home guard or combined operation between local and home guard and the

government agents. The study also concluded that the response is poor or below average

efficiency and promptness. Finally, the study concluded that disarmament has lowly

improved insecurity a lot as resident do harm themselves for personal security.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the finding and conclusion, the study makes the following

recommendations, Based on finding that cross border raids are organized jointly, the study

recommends a joint operational approach to tackle the matter reaching out to both culprits

in both states. Since cultural practices is the major drive for cross border conflict, the study

recommends that the state should embark on transforming the local culturally from

violence practices to modern civilization. This can best be achieved by increasing the level

of formal education in the area. This too should be approached from multidimensional

approach touching both states. In addition, there is a need for cultural transformation from

“readiness to raid and revenge” to “report [to local authorities] and wait for action.”

Due to finding that disarmament operation negatively affects or decreased security,

as this weakens their ability to protect themselves, the study recommends that disarmament

operations should be conducted jointly and across both states at the same time so as not to

make one opponent be vulnerable. In addition, the government should also enhance

security of the local.

79

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Letter of Introduction

University of Nairobi (UoN)

P O Box

Nairobi.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION

I am a Masters of Art in International Studies student at the UoN. I am conducting a

research entitled “Effect of Cross-Border Ethnic Conflicts on Social Economic Security in

Kenya: A case of Turkana County, Kenya-Uganda Boarder”. I kindly request you to spare

some time to respond to the attached questionnaire. The collected data will be treated with

all necessary confidentiality.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully

Bancie Njeri.

86

Appendix II: Respondents Questionnaire

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information for academic purpose. Please

select the right choice by ticking or filling in.

SECTION B: GENERAL DATA

1. Please select your age bracket:

18 – 25 years

26 – 35 years

36 – 45 years

46 – 55 years

Above 55 years

2. What is your gender?

Male

Female

3. What is your Marital status?

Single

Married

4. Highest level of education?

No education

A’ level

O’ level

Tertiary

Undergraduate

Postgraduate

Others (specify)

87

5. Do you engage in any economic activity/ Occupation

Yes

No

6. Which economic activity do you engage in, and why? (Please list)

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

SECTION C:

7. Have you ever been a victim of cross border conflict in this area?

Yes

No

8. The table below lists the nature/type of the common cross border attacks. Please

choose/tick those that are you have experience indicating the frequency of the incidences

in your area?

Nature Very

frequent

Frequent

Rare Very

Rare

Cattle raids by non-Kenyan communities

Organized raids by foreigners to repulse

insurgents

Abduction by foreigners

Killings of locals by outsiders

Occupation by foreigners

Cross border robbery by non-Kenyan

Rape

88

9. How do the attackers organized?

Attack alone

Attack jointly with locals

Do not know

10. In your opinion, do Kenyans conduct attack across the boarder?

Yes

No

I don’t know

11. In your opinion what is/are the reason(s) for cross border violent conflict?

Revenge motive (settle scores)

Wealth accumulation

Cultural practice

To earn a living/survival motive

Combination of several motives

B Questions relating to business

12. Has your business or that of other traders been affected by cross border aggression?

Yes

No

89

13. If yes, state how.

Lost property to raiders/Looters

No/reduced sales due to insecurity

Increased profits

Increased losses

Increased levies by security agent

14. Have you been displaced from your home and business by cross border conflict or

activities by state agents during security operations?

Yes

No

15. Do you feel doing your business here?

Very safe

Safe

Not safe at all

16. Why?

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

C Questions relating to response to aggression

17. Was there any state response after the aggression?

Yes

No

Don’t know

90

18. If yes, who responded?

Government security agents

Locals and home guards

Both government security agents and locals

19. How would you rate the efficiency and promptness of security personnel in as far as

repulsing foreign attackers in the county is concerned?

Poor

Average

Above average

Excellent

20. Explain your Answer.

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

21. How has the state responded to cross border violent conflict whenever it has occurred?

Response Very

well

well Some

how

Not

well

Never

Disarmed the locals

Repulsed/pursued attackers across the border

Closed the border

Used diplomatic channels

Do not know

91

SECTION D: Questions relating to disarmament

22. Have you heard about the disarmament operation in your division/district?

Yes

No

23. Rate how the following security agencies have been involved in the disarmament

exercise?

Response Very

often

Often Rare Very

rare

Not at

all

AP

GSU

Regular police

Army

Ant stock theft police

KPR

24. Rate hoe disarmament operation has affected the security of the people in the area in

terms of the provided areas.

Response Very

high

High Low Very

low

Not at

all

Increase security a lot

Increase security a little

Did not make a difference

Decrease security a lot

92

25. How safe do members of your household feel going about their daily activities during

disarmament operation?

Very safe

Safe

Very unsafe

26. How would you rate the government’s efforts in as far as the disarmament exercise is

concerned?

Poor

Average

Above average

Excellence

27. How best should cross border conflict be dealt with by the state whenever it occurs?

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................................................

Thank you very much.

effect of cross-border ethinic conflicts on social

Documents