ee579t/5 #1 spring 2005 © 2000-2005, richard a. stanley ee579t / cs525t network security 5: ssl and...

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Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T/5 #1 EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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Page 1: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #1

EE579T / CS525TNetwork Security

5: SSL and SET

Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Page 2: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #2

Overview of Tonight’s Class

• Review of last week’s class

• Security in the news

• Secure sockets layer (SSL)

• Secure electronic transactions (SET)

Page 3: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #3

Last time...

• IPSec is a complex security protocol, originally developed for roll-out with IP v6

• Provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality services to IP transmission

• Improves on basic protocols like D-H

• Many implementations available for IP v4, so it is usable today

• Authentication and encapsulation services provide a basis for VPNs

Page 4: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #4

Overview of Tonight’s Class

• Review of last week’s class

• Security in the news

• Secure sockets layer (SSL)

• Secure electronic transactions (SET)

Page 5: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #5

The Weakest Link

Page 6: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #6

Bobax-H

• Worm distributed as email attachment• Purports to show photos of dead Saddam Hussein

or captured Usama bin Laden• When run, Bobax-H

– Forwards itself to other email clients– Disables anti-virus & security software– Installs email relay

• Not new—this vulnerability has been exploited before

Page 7: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #7

Bagle

• Back again!

• Open source– Installs own SMTP– Disables anti-virus & security software– Trojan Horse turns computer into zombie

• Distributed both as email attachment and peer-to-peer application

Page 8: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #8

Small Justice

• Blaster-B author convicted, sentenced– Infected 48,000 machines, did $1.2M damage

• Jeffrey Lee Parson admitted writing Blaster-B– Plea bargained for 18 months confinement and 10

months community service

– Maximum sentence: 10 years & $250,000 fine

– 18 years old when arrested

• Blaster-A (the basic program) author still unknown despite $250,000 bounty

Page 9: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #9

Overview of Tonight’s Class

• Review of last week’s class

• Security in the news

• Secure sockets layer (SSL)

• Secure electronic transactions (SET)

Page 10: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #10

If IPSec is So Good...

• Why do we need anything else?– One could also ask, if C++ is such a good

programming language, why do we need Java?– SSL provides another choice for achieving security

over insecure networks (e.g. Internet)

• Where they are:– IPSec operates at the network level– SSL operates at the transport level– Other protocols operate at the application level

Page 11: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #11

Network Level Security

HTTP FTP SMTP

TCP

IP/IPSec

Page 12: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #12

Transport Level Security

SSL / TLS

HTTP FTP SMTP

TCP

IP/(IPSec)

Page 13: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #13

Application Level Security

TCP

IP/(IPSec)

Kerberos

S/MIME PGP SET

UDP

SMTP HTTP

Page 14: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #14

What’s a Socket?

• The name, Secure Sockets Layer, implies we are securing something called a socket. What is that?

• Remember that TCP applications separate themselves by listening on one or more of 64K possible ports (i.e. addresses)

• A socket is a fully-specified TCP/IP address, e.g.10.1.7.203:80 or 192.168.5.7:23

Page 15: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #15

Well-Known Ports

• Many common IP services operate on what are routinely called well-known ports– Port 80: HTTP– Ports 20, 21: FTP– Port 23: Telnet– Port 25: SMTP– Port 119: NNTP

• SSL operates on Port 443

Page 16: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #16

SSL Factoids

• Developed by Netscape

• Current version is SSLv3, dates to mid-90’s

• Many efforts along the way to develop a multi-vendor approach, all of which have led to dead ends (i.e. Microsoft did not succeed in moving Netscape to their point of view)

Page 17: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #17

SSL Provides

• Confidentiality– Using symmetric key cryptography

• Integrity– Using asymmetric key cryptography and

hashing

• Authenticity– Using digital signatures and certificates on

server, and optionally, on client side

Page 18: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

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SSL Architecture

• Two layers of protocols on top of TCP– Top level

• SSL Handshake protocol

• SSL ChangeCipherSpec protocol

• SSL Alert protocol

– SSL Record Protocol

Page 19: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #19

SSL Architecture Overview

SSL Record Protocol

SSL Alert HTTP

TCP

IP/(IPSec)

SSL CipherChange Spec

SSL Handshake

NB: This diagram does not infer the order in which the protocols are applied.

Page 20: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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Sessions and Connections

• An SSL session is a client/server association– Created by Handshake protocol– Defined security parameters

• An SSL connection is a transport that provides a service (e.g., HTTP)– Connections are transient– Many connections can exist within a single session

Page 21: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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SSL Handshake Protocol

• Most complex part of SSL

• Starts when client connects to server

• Sets up session protocols

• Selects crypto system to be used

• Authenticates client and server

• Sets up basis for shared secret key, the MasterSecret

Page 22: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #22

SSL Handshake OverviewClient Server

1. Supported ciphers, random number

2. Cipher choice, certificate, random number

3. PreMasterSecret (encrypted in server’s public key)

Verify certificate,Generate

PreMasterSecret

4. Generate keys4. Generate

keys

6. HMAC over handshake messages received

5. HMAC over handshake messages sent

Page 23: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #23

Key Generation

Server random number

Client random number

PreMasterSecret

Label information

Key Generator

MasterSecret

SSL session keys

Page 24: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #24

Client/Server Random Numbers

• Consist of– 32-bit timestamp– 28-byte random number generated by secure

RNG– So, 32 bytes long overall

• These random numbers serve as nonces

• Protect against replay attacks

Page 25: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #25

PreMasterSecret

• Key to setting up secure exchange

• 48-byte random value, generated by client’s secure RNG

• Sent to server encrypted with server’s public key (from certificate sent in Step 2)

• Provides the secure basis for computing the MasterSecret

Page 26: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #26

SSL-Supported Ciphers

Algorithm KeyLength

Algorithm KeyLength

IDEA 128 RC4-40 40RC2-40 40 RC4-128 128DES-40 40DES 563DES (TDEA) 168Fortezza 80

Block Ciphers Stream Ciphers

Page 27: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #27

SSL Keys

• The MasterSecret allows calculation of four symmetric keys, used as follows:– Authentication key for client to server data– Authentication key for server to client data– Encryption key for client to server data– Encryption key for server to client data

• Use of symmetric keys in these areas allows for faster data transfer than asymmetric key

Page 28: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #28

HMAC Revisited

• Hashed Message Authentication Code is a recursive MAC– I.e., it is a hash of data that includes a hash– Both hash functions inputs padded by repeated

instances of 5C hex (opad) or 36 hex (ipad)– Both the “internal” and “external” hash is

computed using a secret key, developed from the MasterSecret

Page 29: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #29

SSL ChangeCipherSpec

• This protocol is used to change from one encryption algorithm to another– Called “strategies” in the RFC

• To change ciphers, client and server negotiate a new CipherSpec and keys– Then send ChangeCipherSpec message, which triggers

use of the new algorithm and keys

• CipherSpec usually changed at end of SSL handshake, but can be done anytime

Page 30: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

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SSL Alert Protocol• Used to provide connection management

• Involves messages such as\– Digital certificate status– Handshake failure– MD failure

• Two levels of alert– Warning: nonfatal problem– Fatal: immediately terminates session

Page 31: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #31

SSL Record Protocol

• Provides two SSL services:– Confidentiality

• Using shared symmetric keys from MasterSecret

– Message integrity• Using MAC generated using shared symmetric keys

from MasterSecret

• Also provides for message fragmentation and (optionally) compression (lossless)

Page 32: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #32

SSL Overview

• At a minimum, SSL authenticates the server to the client and establishes a secure data session (confidentiality + integrity)– This is what happens when the lock closes on your

browser while you are eShopping– Careful--JavaScript can make the lock close!

• Optionally, if the client has a certificate acceptable to the server, the session can be authenticated in both directions

Page 33: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #33

SSL Versions

• Current version is Version 3.0

• Version 2.0 was the first version to actually see commercial service– Contains many security flaws– Don’t use it unless absolutely necessary!

• Current browsers all support SSL 3.0

Page 34: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #34

How Do You Get It?

• SSL comes pre-configured on modern browsers, which also have a large suite of root certificates

• SSL must be enabled on the appropriate server during the server configuration process– Easy on IIS -- check boxes to select parameters– A completely different build for Apache

Page 35: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #35

How Do You Know If You Have It?

• SSL is identified by the mnemonics HTTPS, FTPS, SMTPS

• Operates on port 443 rather than port 80 (used by HTTP)

• When operating with an HTTP connection, the URL will begin https://...

• Conversely, if SSL is enabled, it can be accessed by addressing https://...

Page 36: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #36

What About Authenticating the User?

• Where in our discussion did the user present a certificate to the server?

• Advantages?

• Disadvantages?

Page 37: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #37

After SSL: TLS

• Transmission Level Security (TLS) is an IETF approach to creating a “non-vendor specific” SSL

• TLS 1.0 is actually SSL v3.1, and the SSL handshake so identifies it– TLS uses a different suite of ciphers (e.g., adds AES)

– TLS uses HMAC differently from SSL

• Supported by all current browsers

Page 38: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #38

Before SSL: S-HTTP

• Before SSL was developed and fielded, another secure system was developed for signing and encrypting HTTP information

• S-HTTP includes some features that SSL omits, such as having previously signed documents on a server

• For all intents and purposes, S-HTTP is a dead-end protocol, not implemented in current browsers or other clients

Page 39: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

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SSL Summary

• SSL provides a means for secure transport layer communications in TCP/IP networks

• SSL is a commonly used protocol, developed by Netscape, but ubiquitously used in browsers, etc.

• The key element of SSL is the handshake protocol

Page 40: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #40

Overview of Tonight’s Class

• Review of last week’s class

• Security in the news

• Secure sockets layer (SSL)

• Secure electronic transactions (SET)

Page 41: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #41

SET: Secure Electronic Transaction

• Security specification to protect credit card transactions conducted over the Internet

• Product of MasterCard and Visa call for proposals to develop such a standard

• Differs from encryption standards so far discussed in its intent and implementation

• Introduced the concept of a dual digital signature, which can have other uses

Page 42: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

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SET Services

• Secure communications among all parties involved in a transaction

• Authentication using X.509v3 certificates

• Privacy, as only the information required by each party to the transaction is provided to that party– We will see some details of how this works

later

Page 43: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #43

Key Concepts

• Order information (OI) and payment information (PI) are separate, but linked– Vendor needs order information to process the

order, but does not need payment information• Vendor needs to be paid, but doesn’t need the

details of the payment (e.g. credit card number)

– Payor does not need order information, but needs to be able to link order to payment info to prevent fraud

Page 44: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #44

SET Overview• Confidentiality of PI and OI

• Integrity of all transmitted data

• Authentication– Card user is legitimate user of card– Merchant is authorized to accept card

• Independent of transport security

• Independent of platform, O/S, etc.

• Use well-reviewed cryptographic protocols

Page 45: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #45

SET Cryptography

• Confidentiality– DES

• Data integrity– SHA-1

• Authentication– X.509v3 certificates, RSA digital signatures

• No choices! This is a single application with a single purpose, not a GP protocol

Page 46: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #46

The Players• Cardholder (the customer!)

• Merchant (sells the goods or services)

• Issuer (of the customer’s credit card)

• Acquirer (has account with merchant, provides card authorization, EFT)

• Payment gateway (processes merchant payment messages)

• Certification Authority (CA)

Page 47: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #47

Sequence of Events - 1

• Customer opens SET-capable account

• Customer receives digital certificate

• Merchant obtains certificates– Certificate for signing messages– Certificate for public key exchange– Payment gateway’s public key certificate

• Customer places order

Page 48: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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EE579T/5 #48

Sequence of Events - 2

• Merchant verified to customer

• Order and payment info sent to merchant

• Merchant requests payment authorization

• Merchant confirms order

• Merchant provides goods and services

• Merchant requests payment

Page 49: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #49

Dual Signature: Why?

• Merchant needs to know customer can pay for the goods, but does not need to know the details of the payment information

• Issuer of card needs to know payment information, but does not need to know the details of the order

• The order and payment info must be linked to prevent fraud

Page 50: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #50

Dual Signature

PIMD

OIMD

Hash POMD En- crypt

Customer’sprivate key

Dual Sig.

Merchant

Bank

PI

OI Hash

Hash

Customer’spublic key

Page 51: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #51

Now What?

• Merchant can compute– Decrypt of dual signature– Hash of OI (because it has OI) = OIMD– Hash of OIMD concatenated with PIMD =POMD

= decrypt of DS– If these are equal, OI and PI are linked

• it is infeasible to create or modify either and maintain the linkage (hashing basics)

• Bank can do the same with PI

Page 52: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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EE579T/5 #52

Payment Processing

• Customer initiates purchase request– Purchase information (PI)

– Order information (OI)

– Cardholder certificate

• Merchant verifies cardholder certificate and dual signature, processes order

• Merchant requests payment through gateway, gets authorization, completes order

Page 53: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

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EE579T/5 #53

SET Summary

• SET provides a robust set of specialized protocols to facilitate Internet commerce

• The unique feature of SET is the dual signature, which could be applied elsewhere

• SET is not required to perform Internet commerce, and is not ubiquitous

• SET does not deal with security or privacy of customer data once it is stored

Page 54: EE579T/5 #1 Spring 2005 © 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley EE579T / CS525T Network Security 5: SSL and SET Prof. Richard A. Stanley

Spring 2005© 2000-2005, Richard A. Stanley

EE579T/5 #54

Homework

• Read Stallings, Chapter 9.1

• Do the following problems from Stallings, Chapter 7:– 7.1– 7.2