edward langley senior thesis 2012

822019 Edward Langley Senior Thesis 2012

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ldquoAre You Jacob Marleyrdquo

The Apprehension of Substance Considered

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Thomas Aquinas College in

Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Author Edward Langley

Advisor Dr Christopher Decaen

March 11 2012



You donrsquot believe in me observed the Ghost

ldquoI donrsquotrdquo said Scrooge

ldquoWhat evidence would you have of my reality beyond that of your sensesrdquo

ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo said Scrooge

ldquoWhy do you doubt your sensesrdquo

ldquoBecauserdquo said Scrooge ldquoa little thing affects them A slight disorder of the stomach makes them cheats You may be an undigested bit of beefa blot of mustard a crumb of cheese a fragment of an underdone potatoTherersquos more of gravy than of grave about you whatever you arerdquo

mdashndashCharles Dickens A Christmas Carol

When discussing how Berkeleyrsquos philosophy appeared to be self-evidentlyfalse but impossible to refute Dr Johnson kicked out at a nearby stoneexclaiming ldquoI refute it thusrdquo

mdashndashBoswellrsquos Life of Samuel Johnson



Contents

Contents i

1 Objections 6

Mistakes about substance 6

Sense qualities can change while the substance remains 6

Substance cannot change the sense 7

Sense does not comprehend substance 7

To be sensed per accidens is not really to be sensed 8

Does the brute sense substance 8

Sensation of an image 9

2 Sed Contra 10

Aristotle and Others on the Sensation of Substance 10

Twofold Division of Sensible Per Accidens 12

Sense is of Particulars Understanding of Universals 14

i



3 Response 17

Substance as sensed by each sense 17

The Mediated Action in Sensation 17

Union of knower with known 23

Substance as Sensed Per Se 28

4 Responses to Objections 36


Sensible qualities can change while the substance remains 38

Substance cannot change sense 39





A St Albert ldquodigressio declarans gradus abstractionis et modumrdquo 47

Prooemium 47

Grades of Abstraction 47

Distinction between ldquointentio reirdquo and ldquoforma reirdquo 48

B On Sense as compared to intellect 49

Why sense is of singulars and intellect of universals 49

How the universal is in the soul 50

C John of St Thomas on Accidental Sensibles 51

ii



D Descartesrsquo Wax Experiment 55

Bibliography 57

iii



Prooemium

When someone sees a chicken crossing the road he sees the chicken and not its colors

alone He would only doubt his vision of the chicken if he suspected that he suffered

from some disorder such as hallucinations or was a philosopher with preconceived

notions on the subject The philosophers in the perennial tradition would agree

with this hypothetical man it seems self-evident that the chicken is sensed In fact

Aristotle thought this so manifest that he spends very little time on the question

in the De Anima not saying much more than that the ldquoson of Diaresrdquo is sensed

accidentally1

The Angelic Doctor and his teacher St Albert concur with him but

they spend more time elaborating the subtleties All these seem to hold that sense

knows more than what imprints itself upon the external senses a coyote watching

our hypothetical chicken would see a tasty dinner which seems slightly different from

a portmanteau of colors odors and sounds Thus those who hold that substance is

not sensedndashwhether they think it is or notmdashdeny a self-evident proposition

The self-evident of this truth is attested by the very fact that it is difficult to

1Aristotle De Anima II 6

1



refute those who deny it Boswell illustrates this in the opening quotation from

his Life of Samuel Johnson Dr Johnson could not see a defect in Berkeleyrsquos

arguments even though he remained adamantly opposed to his conclusions This

difficulty arises because the more fundamental a proposition is the harder it is to

see what it relies upon For example it is difficult to know whether one can demon-

strate Euclidrsquos fourth proposition because there are few middle terms through which

a demonstration could be made and at this stage in the science each is known

relatively indistinctly

But if the proposition really is self-evident it seems odd to argue at length about

it to do this seems to admit the subject of inquiry to be doubtful This appearance

deceives for it neglects the human condition as knowers whose intellect is among

knowers as the oculus vespertilionis 2mdashnot only must a proposition be intrinsically

self-evident but it must present its evidence to our intellect That is since a self-

evident proposition is one in which the understanding of the subject includes the

predicate3 one grasps the proposition in proportion to onersquos comprehension of the

terms

Now various impediments can limit onersquos comprehension of the terms some

impediments come from the natures signified while others from extrinsic factors

Thus since Godrsquos existence is his essence the proposition ldquoGod existsrdquo is self-evident

nevertheless due to his incorporeality men require an argument to see it Here the

problem is fundamentally the proportion of the human intellect to bodily essences4

2St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae II1 co3ibid4ST I84 a7

2



since God is not a body his nature hides in ldquounapproachable lightrdquo (1 Τιμ 616)

In other cases extrinsic factors limit our understanding Sometimes this is be-

cause the one deceived has not yet considered the principlersquos subject So one may

think incorporeal substances to be in place because one has not reflected on the na-

ture of place5 or as is frequently held that one infinite is larger than another insofar

as it is infinite (the claim that there are ldquomorerdquo real numbers than rational ones is

one instance of this) In both cases the impediment is some lack of understanding

those making the claims overlook the contradiction between subject and predicate

Since place is the limit of a body it cannot be predicated of something without one

In the mistake about the infinite one has not yet noticed that the limits of the lesser

fall within the greater consequently the lesser must have limits which is against the

notion of the infinitemdashie the unlimited

Furthermore understanding can be impeded by a bad will someone who wonders

whether he ought to love his parents or whether the good is to be sought can only

do so through some willful defect Thus in speaking about these sources of error

Aristotle says in the Topics

Not every problem nor every thesis should be examined but only onewhich might puzzle one of those who need argument not punishment orsensation For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to hon-our the gods and love onersquos parents or not need punishment while [thosewho are puzzled to know] whether snow is white or not need sensation6

5From Boethiusrsquo De Hebdomadibus quoted in ST Q2 a16Οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλ΄ ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου

δεομένων καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεωςbull οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶτοὺς γονέας ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὒ κολαάσεως δέονται ὁι δὲ πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὒ αἰσθήσεως (AristotleTopics 105a5)

3



Thus Aristotle holds that some problems should not be argued about since the

willingness to doubt them is a moral defect deserving punishment

There is also a third case between the preceding ones because of prior con-

victions one denies what is self-evident Here the principle is denied because one

cannot see how it can be held without contradiction Since the principle is clear

however this denial can only occur through an act of the will Thus Dedekindrsquos

claim that ldquoa set can be a part of itselfrdquo follows necessarily from his definition of

rsquopartrsquo7 This mistake is particularly dangerous in philosophy for the sake of a the-

ory which appeals to onersquos imagination or other habits of thought one might abandon

less appealing truths The unwarranted assumption of the truth of the Aristotelian

cosmos for example led many to wrongly reject the system proposed by Copernicus

as Kepler developed it Popular conceptions such as those of the Churchrsquos role in

the Galileo trial and other forms of prejudice are other sources of such errors

Whether substance is sensed seems to fall in this last category most people think

they see their dog Some philosophers due to various prior considerations lost sight

of this basic truth Thus Descartes committed to the proposition that philosophy

starts with what is clear and distinct8 held that substance was only known by the

mind because one knows that it remains despite many sensible changes9 Berkeley

and Hume deny the very existence of substance because of a misapplication of the

principle that nothing is known which has not been sensed10 These thinkers seem

7The Nature and Meaning of Numbers I3 ldquoA system A is said to be rsquopartrsquo of a systemS when every element of A is also element of S rdquo

8Cf Meditations on First Philosophy Meditation 29Ibid Meditation 2 quoted as Appendix D below10Find Citations

4



to deny that substance is sensed because they cannot see how it would happen if

Berkeley and Hume had seen that the substance is in the sense through its accidents

or Descartes had noticed the sensible unity of the changing object perhaps they

would not have made these mistakes

In such a case since the controversy is over something self-evident it is necessary

to go through objections in order to get a firm grasp of the difficulties involved

For unless one sees the difficulties the arguments given will seem vain as proving

something which need not be proved Consequently I will begin by articulating seven

objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections

Mistakes about substance

The first of these is that substance does not seem to be sensed because if it were

one would not mistake it One often finds oneself mistaken about the substance of a

thing one takes salt to be sugar and one person to be another He who is mistaken

however does not know that about which he is mistaken Now since the reason

for making such mistakes is similarities of sensible qualities (salt and sugar are bothwhite two people have similar features) sensation does not seem to know substance

Sense qualities can change while the substance

remains

Descartes raises a second objection in his Meditations1 If one takes a piece of

beeswax and examines it one notices many sensible qualities its yellowish color the

1Meditation 3

6



scent of honey the noise it makes when struck the slight sweetness its temperature

and its shape When it melts however all of these change it becomes clear odorless

and tasteless it does not sound when struck it is hot and has no particular shape

Yet everyone thinks it to be the same substance and very few would deny this Since

all the sensible qualities have changed however sense cannot be the basis for thinking

this Moreover for any sensible there is a situation in which it changes while the

substance remains one-legged men three-legged dogs grey hair etc Consequently

it seems that substance cannot be sensed since none of the sensibles is a reliable

indicator of the substance

Substance cannot change the sense

A third objection to the sensation of substance is that sensing ldquoconsists in a certain

suffering or being changedrdquo2 whereas substance does not appear to change the sense3

not the paper but the whiteness in the paper seems to change the sense For this

reason then one might suppose that substance is not an object of the sense power

Sense does not comprehend substance

A fourth objection could be raised from St Thomasrsquo assertion that ldquothe sensitive

powers do not reach all the way to comprehension of the substancerdquo 4 Thus we

2 ldquoSentire consistit in quodam pati et alterarirdquo (Sentencia Libri II De Anima l 13 all Latintranslations are my own)

3Cf Aristotle De Anima II6 ldquoFor it senses this thing accidentally because it happens to the

white which is sensed Whence the sense suffers nothing from this sensible as suchrdquo4 ldquoSensitivae potentiae non pertingunt usque ad substantiae comprehensionemrdquo (St Thomas

Aquinas Super De Trinitate V3)

7



cannot distinguish nitrogen and oxygen simply by sensing them attentively5 they

have neither distinctive colors smells sounds tastes nor do they differ tangibly Yet

since it is commonly held that they are different substances it seems that substance

cannot be known by sense

To be sensed per accidens is not really to be sensed

A fifth objection admits that substance is sensed per accidens but urges that for

something to be sensed per accidens requires that it is sensed per se by some other

power Thus someone might object that substance is not actually sensed by the

external senses and that the one saying it to be sensed speaks metaphorically as

Christ is when he says ldquoI saw Satan falling like lightningrdquo (Lk 1018) For Christ

did not literally see Satan a spirit fall but rather called knowledge of that fall

sight

Does the brute sense substanceA sixth objection might be raised as follows since man knows substance according to

sense it seems that the brute animals can sense substance also But the substance

of a thing is what it is to be that thing that is the essence But it belongs to intellect

to know the essence of a thing Consequently since the brutes lack intellect they

seem to be unable to sense substance

5Ignoring for the moment the sensible effects they have such as causing a smoldering match

to flare up

8



Sensation of an image

Finally if it is said that the exterior senses only sense substance insofar as they sense

its accidents this seems insufficient For those accidents can be duplicated in an

image for example a painting or a CD In an image however the image rather

than the substance underlies the sensibles Consequently it seems odd to claim that

sensation is of the substance since it does not matter whether the proper subject is

really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra

Aristotle and Others on the Sensation of Substance

Against these objections several authorities may be cited Aristotle holds that sub-

stance is sensible per accidens in the following text

A sensible is called accidental eg if a white thing is the son of DiareFor it senses this thing accidentally because it happens to the whitewhich is sensed1

Note that to say that something is sensible per accidens does not imply that it is not

sensed just as to say that digging for oil is a cause per accidens of finding gold is not

to say that the digging was not a cause rather to hold this is to hold that the digging

is not a cause of the finding insofar as it was for the sake of oil similarly to say that

ldquoson of Diaresrdquo is sensed per accidens does not that he is sensed Commenting on

1Κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱόςbull κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς

γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται (De Anima II6 tr GlenCoughlin)

10



this passage St Thomas makes an interesting excursus into distinctions between

interior senses First he considers how man knows this man or this wood

If it the accidental sensible is apprehended in the singular (such aswhen I see a colored [thing] I perceive this man or this animal) thisapprehension comes to be in man through the vis cogitativa which isalso called ldquoparticular reasonrdquo in that it collects individual intentions justas universal reason collects universal notions Nevertheless this power isin the sensitive part since the sensitive power in its highest participates[in] something of the intellective power in man in which the sense is

joined to the intellect 2

Thus St Thomas holds that the singular is apprehended in man by a power knownas the cogitative power This power is a sensitive power which collects ldquoindividual

intentionsrdquo and is the sensitive soulrsquos participation in intellect He goes on to consider

the corresponding power in animals and how it differs from manrsquos power

But in the irrational animal the apprehension of the individual intentionscomes to be through natural estimation

The estimative and cogitative [powers] stand differently in relation to this

For the cogitative apprehends the individual as existing under a commonnature which pertains to it insofar as it is joined to the intellective [power]in the same subject whence it knows this man insofar as it is this manand this insofar as it is this wood The estimative however does notapprehend some individual as under a common nature but only as aterm or principle of some action or passion3

2Si apprehendatur in singulari utputa cum video coloratum percipio hunc hominem vel hocanimal huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam quae dicitur etiam ratioparticularis eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium sicut ratio universalis est collativarationum universalium Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva quia vis sensitiva in suisupremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur (St

Thomas Aquinas Setencia Libri De Anima II13)3In animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis individualis per aestimativam

naturalem

11



Thus while the cogitative power can extend to sensing this under a common nature

through its cooperation with reason the estimative only senses this as a ldquoprinciple

or termrdquo of an individual action to be done immediately Thus by this power the

sheep sees ldquothis wolfrdquo as a principle of impending harm Of particular importance

St Thomas does not deny that the animal senses substance by this power but he

denies that it senses it under a common nature Since the sensible accidents before

me are not necessarily fearful as sensible accidents there is no necessity that these

proper or common sensibles arouse fear as such rather one is afraid that to which

these accidents belong

A Twofold Division of the Sensible Per Accidens

Suggested by John of St Thomas

John of St Thomas goes into more detail about the various ways in which something

is an accidental sensible The first sense he gives however is how substance is such

The sensible per accidens is the substance to which as an object theproper and common sensibles inhere And the sensible per accidens isdistinguished from the sensible per se since the sensible per accidens

pertains to the object of sense only insofar as it is the subject of thesensersquos object whence it is drawn subjectively to the notion of the sensersquosobject and thus it is truly and properly attained by sense not as a formal

Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa et aestimativa Nam cogitativa apprehenditindividuum ut existens sub natura communi quod contingit ei inquantum unitur intellectivae ineodem subiecto unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo et hoc lignum prout est hoc

lignum Aestimativa autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum secundum quod est sub naturacommuni sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis(Sentencia Libri II De Anima l13)

12



notion changing the sense but as the subject to which such a notion ispresent per accidens 4

Later in the same text he expands the notion of the accidentally sensible to include

more of the formalities of the thing sensed in this he follows the distinctions made

by St Thomas in his commentary5

St Thomas adds below two other conditions of the sensible per accidens First that it happens to that which is sensible per se Second that isis apprehended by the sentient being by some power so that it does notwholly hide and is apprehended either through an imaginative [power] orthrough intellect6

The order of exposition followed here seems to be important first he points out that

substance as the root of existence for the proper sensibles is a per accidens sensible

in its own peculiar way and then he shows to us a more general notion This suggests

that the sensitive power has a relation to the underlying substance different from the

relation it has to the other per accidens sensibles

4Sensibile per accidens est substantia cui tamquam obiecto inhaerent sensibilia propria et

communia Et distinguitur sensibile per accidens a sensibili per se quia sensibile per accidensnon pertinet ad obiectum sensus nisi in quantum est subiectum obiecti sensus unde subiective

trahitur ad rationem obiecti sensus et sic vere et proprie attingitur a sensu non ut ratio formalis

immutans sensum sed ut subiectum cui per accidens inest talis ratio (Cursus PhilosophicusThomisticus L III Q4 A2)

5Prima quod accidat ei quod per se est sensibile Secunda quod sit apprehensum a sentienteper aliam potentiam ita quod non omnino lateat ipsum (lectio 13)

6Addit infra S Thomas alias duas conditiones sensibilis per accidens Prima quod accidat

ei quod per se est sensibile Secunda quod sit apprehensum a sentiente per aliam potentiam ita

quod non omnino lateat ipsum apprehendaturque vel per imaginativam vel per intellectum(CursusPhilosophicus Thomisticus L III Q4 A2)

13



Sense is of Particulars Understanding of Universals

In this line the Philosopher says in the Physics that ldquoUnderstanding is of the univer-

sal while sense is of the particularrdquo 7 First substance is particular and gives existence

to all other particulars Consequently if sense is of particular colors even more so

is it of first substance St Albert goes into more detail about this passage in his

commentary

And this is what Aristotle says excellently in the second book of the De

Anima that the senses are of particulars and he does not say that they

are only of some form but of the whole particular as also understanding

is of the universals which is an acquaintance and species not of the partbut of the whole and therefore it makes one acquainted with the whole 8

St Thomas also states in many places that sense knows the singular that is the

substance for example

As the Philosopher says in the De Anima book three ldquoPhantasms standto our intellect as sensibles to senserdquo as colors which are outside the soulstand to sight Whence just as the species which is in sense is abstracted

from things themselves and through it the knowledge of sense is continuedto sensible things themselves so our intellect abstracts the species fromphantasms and through it knowledge is continued in a certain way tophantasms But nevertheless there is this difference the similitude

which is in sense is abstracted from a thing as from a knowable

object and therefore through that similitude the thing itself is

known per se directly but the similitude that is in intellect is notabstracted from phantasms as from a knowable object but as from amedium of knowledge through the mode in which our sense receives a

7ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τοῦ καθόλου ἡ δ᾿αἲσθησις τοῦ κατὰ μέρος (Aristotle Physics I5)8

Et hoc est quod egregie dicit Aristoteles in secundo libro suo de anima quod sensus suntparticularium et non dicit quod sint formae alicuius tantum sed totius particularis sicut etintellectus est universalium quod non est notitia et species partis sed totius et ideo notitiam facitdetoto (Liber II De Anima Tract III C IV Cited at length as Appendix A on page 47)

14



similitude of a thing which is in a mirror while it is born into it not asinto a certain thing but as into the similitude of a thing9

Thus Aristotle St Thomas and St Albert all seem to agree that sensation is of

the particular substance as such and not merely of its accidents

John of St Thomas speaks in more detail about how substance is attained in the

action of the external senses

Substance is said to be in sense not per se separately from the propersensible but under it and as clothed by that outward sensibility and soit can come to the intellect Nor is it required that something that is

in the intellect be in sense as it is in intellect but [that it be in sense]through its effects and accidents10

This conclusion that substance is present ldquothrough its effects and accidentsrdquo shows

at least this much the substance is present in the sense by power but not by its

essence and accordingly it is sensed per accidens and not per se

Finally we should remember Pre-Socratic maxim ldquoNature loves to hiderdquo11 what-

ever else may be true about the way substance is sensed these quotes establish that

9Ut philosophus dicit in III de anima phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicutsensibilia ad sensum ut colores qui sunt extra animam ad visum unde sicut species quae est insensu abstrahitur a rebus ipsis et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles itaintellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatibus et per eam eius cognitio quodammodo adphantasmata continuatur Sed tamen tantum interest quod similitudo quae est in sensu abstrahi-tur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili et ideo per illam similitudinem res ipsa per se directe cognoscitursimilitudo autem quae est in intellectu non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto cognoscibilised sicut a medio cognitionis per modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est inspeculo dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam sed ut in similitudinem rei (De veritateq 2 a 6 co)

10Dicitur autem substantia esse in sensu non per se seorsum a sensibili proprio sed sub illo et

ut induta externa illa sensibilitate sicque potest ad intellectum pervenire Nec requiritur ut aliquid

quod sit in intellectu sit in sensu sicut in intellectu sed per effectus et accidentia sua (Ioahannesde Sancto Thomae Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus III Q4 A2)

11Heraclitus DK 123

15



the this-ness of the thing sensed is hidden from the external senses as such and as

we will see the what-ness is hidden from animals yet it is achieved to some degree

by men

16



Chapter 3

Response

When one peruses the works of the scholastics one is struck by this fact none argues

that substance is sensed rather they all take that it is sensed as self-evident and

consider the implications for the sensitive faculty If this is a self-evident principle

the natural philosopher cannot argue demonstratively about it but must consider

the question dialectically Bearing this firmly in mind I will try to show how this

principle accords with the nature of a sensitive being

Substance as sensed by each sense

The Mediated Action in Sensation

The act of sensation

To prove the position one ought to begin by carefully distinguishing what changes

the sense per se from what does so per accidens Preparatory to articulating this

distinction the act of sensationrsquos twofold nature must be observed In order for any

17



sensation to happen the sense must first be perfected by receiving the sensible form

and then the animal senses its object by it1 Aristotle points enigmatically to this

distinction at the very end of Book Two of the De Anima

What therefore is smelling except suffering something Or is not smellingalso sensing while the air suffering quickly becomes sensible2

As he says smelling is not merely suffering but is also sensing There is a transitive

action of the sense object impressing itself upon the sense power but unlike in the

medium the animal brings forth the immanent action of sensation which proceeds

from the perfected sense power3

1As St Albert points out in his commentary on the De Anima a passive power is not sufficientto bring forth its own action but must be perfected in order to act (Cf St Albertus MagnusLiber II De Anima Tractatus III Caput I)

2De Anima 424b15ff St Thomasrsquo Commentary on this passageSaying that if something suffers from odor Dicens quod si aliquid patitur ab odore

which does then what is to smell besides to quod non odorat quid est odorare nisi pati ali-suffer something from odor And he responds quid ab odore Et respondet quod odorare estthat to smell is so to suffer from odor that one sic aliquid pati ab odore quod sentiat odoremsenses the odor Air however does not suffer so Aer autem non sic patitur ut sentiat quia nonthat it senses since it does not have a sensitive habet potentiam sensitivam sed sic patitur utpower but it so suffer that is sensible insofar sit sensibilis inquantum scilicet est medium in

as it is a medium in sense sensu (St Thomas Aquinas Sentencia Deanima II l 24)

St Albertrsquos commentaryAnd to this we say that to smell is not to Et ad hoc dicimus quod odorare non est ab-

suffer something from the sensible but rather solute pati aliquid a sensibili sed potius odorareto smell is to sense and judge the odor which est sentire et judicare odorem quod est secundais the second perfection of sense and it is not sensus perfectio et non est tantum pati sedonly to suffer but to do something and the operari aliquid et hoc modo sensibile ad ope-sensible does not act to the operation of sense rationem sensus non agit in id quod est inani-in this way in that which is inanimate matum (St Albert the Great Liber II De

Anima Tract IV C II)

3There is a striking analogy with any created being here when the form is impressed upon thematter the nature composed of this form and this matter brings forth a proper operation which isthe proper operation of that substance similarly when sense is impressed with the sensible formit brings forth the operation proper to the reception of that sensible

18



Now in the first part of this action the power becomes what it will know This

happens in virtue of the sensible qualities inhering in the object Nevertheless al-

though the sense is changed by these qualities they are insufficient to accomplish the

change of the sense by themselves Rather just as the sense does not sense but the

animal senses by the sense so the sensible quality is not what acts upon the sense

but the means by which a substance acts upon it

The dependency of the sensibles in being

This can be seen by considering the way the sensible qualities are rooted in the

substance Red for example can only affect the sense by inhering in the surface of

some body This is manifest in experience the smaller the red surface is the harder

the red is to see Thus redness depends on the extension of the surface for its ability

to affect the sense Because of this dependency the quantitative characteristics of

the surface the common sensibles are sensed as well

Similarly the surface depends on the substance for its existence since a surface

is a limit of a substance Thus because a surface depends on its substance for its

existence the redness depending on the surface will as well This is sufficient to

argue the point for the definition of an accident includes its subject Thus since

infinite regress is impossible there must be a first subject But such a subject as

a first cause in the order of subjects makes all posterior subjects to be subjects

Consequently the surface is a fit subject for the sensible quality Thus if the surface

characteristics are sensed because the proper sensibles depend upon them a fortiori the substance is as well

19



The principle of the action of the sensible on the sense

The substance however is not sensed separately from the proper and common sen-

sibles Rather the act of the sensible quality upon the sense is more properly the act

of the substance on the sense for substances are the principles of action through the

qualities inhering in them4 Thus a substance impresses itself upon sense through

its sensible qualities Since in transitive action the act of the agent and patient

is one and is in the patient from the agent the sense becomes the sensible quality

impressed by the substance Then the animal senses the impressed quality

Therefore to sense this quality is to sense the substance to see someonersquos color

and shape for example is to see him The sensible qualities then mediate the

action of the substance by making the substance able to produce a certain affection

(a species of quality) in another substance apt to receive it

Consequently substance really changes the sense Since whatever changes the

sense is sensed5 the substance acting is sensed Nevertheless since it does not

change the sense as such it is not sensed per se Rather it is sensed through the per

se sensibles6 as the agent impressing them upon the sense Thus one could say that

it is sensed per aliud that is through the proper and common sensibles7

4St Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones De Trinitate Q5 A3Accidents come upon a substance in a certain Accidentia superveniunt substantiae quodam

order For quantity comes first then quality ordine Nam primo advenit ei quantitas deindethen passions and motions qualitas deinde passiones et motus

5Sentencia Libri De Anima II l136In what follows I use the term rsquoper se sensiblersquo (as distinct from rsquoproper sensiblersquo) to refer to

both the common and proper sensibles since they are both sensed per se 7

For a parallel account in the intelligible order see St Thomas Aquinas In Boethii DeTrinitate

Each thing is intelligible insofar as it is in Unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis secundum

20



So when the eyes sees a piece of paper the paper rather than the color is the first

efficient cause of the impression upon the sense The paper however is not sensed by

the eye as paper but as colored Consequently one attends to color in the underlying

without a distinct attention to the underlying Lacking a distinct attention to the

underlying is not the same as not attending to the underlying rather to attend to

the underlying in this way is to know the composite through what stands to it as

act

Now in this case to be sensed per aliud is to be sensed per accidens since

substance is not the proper object of any external sense and it is accidental that

this or that sensible quality correspond to this particular substance here then to

be sensed per accidens is to be the unnoticed cause of what is sensed thus the

paper is not noticed by sight but is nevertheless seen through its whiteness There

is however another way that something is a sensible per accidens that is when

something which does not change the sense in question is apprehended per se by

another power for example if we say that ldquowe see someone is aliverdquo 8 because we see

him to be moving for seeing the motion we perceive by intellect that he is alive

Here is St Thomasrsquos account of how something is called a sensible per accidens

Therefore it ought to be known that for something to be sensible per

accidens first it is required that it happen to that which is sensible per

act whether insofar as it is a certain act quod est in actu vel secundum quod est ac-or according to that which its act or accord- tus quidam vel secundum id quod est actusing to that which is to it in the place of act eius vel secundum id quod est ei loco actus

(QV a3)

Here St Thomas points out that a composite of act and potency is understood because what isactual in it has been received analogously the reception of the sensible in act is the sensation of the composite of the sensible form and its proper subject

8Example from St Thomas Aquinas Sentencia De anima II l 13

21



se as being a man happens to the white as does being sweet Second itis required that it is apprehended by the sentient being for if it shouldhappen to the sensible that it were hidden from the sentient being it

would not be said to be sensedper accidens

It is necessary thereforethat it is known per se by some other knowing power of the sentientbeing9

Substance is sensed per accidens in this way as the proper object of intellect (at

least) but even if this were not so it could be said to be sensed insofar as the per

se sensibles make it known10

The way in which these sensibles make known the substance is a particular case

of the general principle that form desires to communicate itself This principle can

be substantiated from experience a shovelrsquos purpose can be deduced from its shape

blushing indicates shame a manrsquos speech makes him known higher beings like to

reproduce knowers enjoy teaching the highest goods are common11

This can be more definitely illustrated as follows sensation is clearly of some-

thing existing outside since the sense organ is not itself sensed12 That thing acts

upon the sense assimilating the sense to itself like any good agent That which as-

9Sciendum est igitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens primo requiritur quodaccidat ei quod per se est sensibile sicut accidit albo esse hominem et accidit ei esse dulce Secundorequiritur quod sit apprehensum a sentiente si enim accideret sensibili quod lateret sentientemnon diceretur per accidens sentiri Oportet igitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potentiacognoscitiva sentientis (St Thomas Aquinas Sentencia De Anima lib 2 l 13 n 13)

10See for example Ioannes a Sancto Thomae Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus L6 C3But substance is said to be in sense not per Dicitur autem substantia esse in sensu non

se distinct from the proper sensible but under per se seorsum a sensibili proprio sed sub illoit a as clother by that external sensibility and et ut induta externa illa sensibilitate sicquethus it can come to intellect Nor is it required potest ad intellectum pervenire Nec requiriturthat something which is in intellect be in sense ut aliquid quod sit in intellectu sit in sensu si-as [it is] in intellect but [that it be in sense] cut in intellectu sed per effectus et accidentia

through its effects and accidents sua

11Cf Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics I212A sign of this is that one cannot sense when one wills

22



similates cannot be merely an accident because properly speaking accidents do not

act anymore than they exist it would be sheer insanity to say ldquothe brown bit merdquo or

ldquothe hard stabbed merdquo without also admitting that it is primarily the ldquodogrdquo or the

ldquospearrdquo that does it In fact those first statements sound plausible only because of

the concrete mode of signifying which includes the underlying substance If one uses

the abstract noun which signifies the form by itself the sentences are even stranger

ldquobrownness bit merdquo ldquohardness stabbed merdquo Since what assimilates cannot be an

accident it must be a substance But since it produces the accidents in the sense

these must be produced as instruments of its own self communication13

Union of knower with known

Begins with joining to sense

The self-communication of substance suggests a second mode of argument on the

side of the second action in sensation For this second act is perceiving that which

has become one with the knower in the first act For as Aristotle says in theDe

Anima ldquoThe act of the sensible and the sense is one and the same yet their being

is not the samerdquo 14 Thus taking this with the self-communication of substance the

knower becomes one with the substance when he knows Thus generally speaking

13An instrumental cause is one which produces an effect to which it is disproportioned Forexample a pen is an instrumental cause of an essay because while it can explain the color and sizeof the lines on the paper it cannot explain the shape or order among the lines Consequently itmust be a means by which some prior cause writes an essay The color even so is an instrumentonly analogously rather than being a defective agent acting by its own form it is itself the formby which the agent acts

14ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐϛι καὶ μία τὸ δ᾿εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς(De Anima 425b tr Edward Langley)

23



the object of the knower as such is substance15 all the powers of the knower are

means by which it unifies itself with substance

Differences between powers are from their objects

Now if there were only one knowing power such an account of knowledge would

be sufficient If the knower has many knowing powers it has been shown that the

knower has substance as his object Thus right away it is given that sense knows

substance since it is a knowing power

But an obvious difficulty arises since powers differ which have different objects

the number of powers corresponds to the number of objects There is one object

substance consequently there is only one power Yet no one thinks that sight and

hearing are one and the same power

To solve this difficulty it is necessary to distinguish between what is known and

how it is known knowing Socrates is knowing the teacher of Plato but these are

two different ways of knowing him Thus powers are not distinguished by what

is known but by how it is known Consequently if a knower has many powers it

must perceive substance in many different ways A sign of this is the division of

the powerrsquos objects one does not divide them by what the sensible thing is but by

how it is For example one does not divide the objects of sight into animate and

inanimate but rather into white and black or red green and blue

15This if true would indicate a fundamental unity to the act of the knower namely the knoweris always knowing ldquothisrdquo by means of its powers This strikes me as a ThomisticAristoteliancounterpart to Kantrsquos ldquoSynthetic Unity of Apperceptionrdquo on the side of the thing known rather

than on the side of the knower ie that which accounts for the unity of each experience as thisexperience

24



That this account is true can be verified from the unity of experience when

I perceive ldquothis thingrdquo my perception is one and involves at once many different

aspects of the thing I hear it imagine it et cetera Consequently it is necessary

that there is some one thing is common to every sensation by which experience can

be unified in such a way thus it must be able to be common in some way to color

and pitch to taste and texture and to each of these and the common sensibles This

is the underlying substance which shares its subsistence individuating the various

accidents in it16 Consequently each power knows substance under some accident

In this way all perception seems to be a particular case of the general rule that

ldquowhatever is received is received in the mode of the receiverrdquo17

Another consideration illustrating this point is that every sense senses one which

seems to be closely connected to the sensation of substance For to perceive some-

thing as one is to perceive its undivided existence18 as distinct from its surroundings

to perceive this way is to go beyond sensing positive accidents of the thing (color

shape etc) and to touch its very substance thus we can be misled by trompe lrsquoœil

painting to think something painted is a separate object from the painting This

deception about the number of substances is a result of the illusion produced by

skillful use of color

Thus collecting from the preceding substance can be called the material object

of each power and how it is apprehended is the formal object Now as has been seen

16To lay this out more clearly a substance is what does not exist through another but throughitself (Posterior Analytics 73b5) thus since what exists through another must be founded uponwhat exists through itself the existence of accidents is founded upon substance ( Metaphysics

1003b1ff)17Summa Theologiae I q 75 a 5 corpus18St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Q11 A1

25



diversity of formal objects corresponds to diversity of powers19 thus since color is

different from smell one power corresponds to each

Now it might be objected that this is not sufficient after all the common sensi-

bles differ in account from the proper sensibles yet they do not diversify the power

Notice however that the sensibles such as color seem to be prior to the common

sensibles in the order of sensation one cannot see a particular shape without seeing

color but one can see color without seeing that particular shape20 Furthermore

one common sensible is sensed by different senses both sight and touch sense shape

Since that by which something differs must be proper to it the common senses

cannot be principles of differentiation

Differences and order of powers in particular

Now if this account is true we should be able to distinguish and order the given

powers (external senses sensus communis imagination vis cogitativa and intellect)

by their formal objects Thus in first place are the external senses they achieve

some formality of the thing apprehended (color pitch odor taste texture) but are

limited to a present object Thus for example we see this colored thing here and

when it leaves or we look away we cease to see it

The common sense differs from this because it not only perceives the particu-

lar sensible qualities it discerns between them and integrates them into one sense-

19Cf St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae I Q1 a3 co20Cf Sentencia De Anima II lectio 13 Descartes seems think that since the common sensibles

are prior according to nature they are also prior in sensation thus he speculates that differences

of color are the result of unnoticed patterns being seen This seems to be one case among manywhere he confuses the order of knowing with that of being

26



experience Thus its object is substance as sensible that is not insofar as it is

colored or odiferous but as the formalities of the different senses in a higher more

unified mode Thus it relates to the proper senses as a ldquolimitrdquo ie as common to

many distinct things This is to say in the common sense the present singular is

reconstructed ldquointentionallyrdquo to the degree that its sensible qualities permits any

new formality must result either from removing some condition of matter21 or by

comparing it with experience or instinct

The first such formality is absence Thus the imagination can recall anything

which has been sensed a mathematical diagram a face etc Thus imagination

differs from the previous powers because through it substance is perceived as sensible

without being perceived as present This formality implies that this power is more

active the animal or some other agent can summon or compose an image in the

imagination22 without requiring something beyond the power and past experience

One interesting result of this is that this power perfects the knowledge of motion

because it is capable of presenting motion as a whole

Because they will be treated in more detail below I pass over the details of the

cogitativa or aestimativa suffice it to say that they are the highest powers of the

sensitive part through which it is apt to be joined to an intellect whether onersquos own

or anotherrsquos (eg when a dog is trained) As such they grasp the singular as far to

the degree that it is possible for the animal in question Intellect finally knows the

21Compare this with Kant he seems to think of experience as built up by the interior powerswhereas St Thomas and Aristotle seem to think of it as pared down by excluding the accidentalcharacteristics from the impressions upon the senses

22Whether this is always done consciously is hard to see perhaps some rudimentary animalshave images brought forth reflexively or instinctually

27



common nature predicable of the singular Since my thesis is restricted to the way

substance is known by the senses I will not consider the intellect in any great detail

Thus we can see that sensation (in man) is part of an order leading to a full

knowledge of substance Seen this way the order can be seen as increasing degrees

of unification between the soul and that which it knows since each step receives its

impression from the one before23 the process is not always to something different

but rather to an increasingly intimate union with something one

Substance as sensed by cogitativaaestimativa (per

se)

Up to this point we have considered three powers of the sensitive soul which do

not formally consider anything beyond the per se sensibles the proper senses the

common sense and the imagination Generally these can be divided into two groups

the receptive powers which are the common and proper senses and the retentive

power imagination These powers cannot be a sufficient account of perception for

otherwise the animal would only achieve its good per accidens since a good or bad

disposition of the per se sensibles is not a necessary indicator of the helpful and

harmful For example the color and shape of a wolf are not harmful to a sheep as

color and shape rather the wolf which preys upon sheep is harmful Thus for a

sheep to perceive a wolf as an enemy differs from perceiving it as having one of the

per se sensibles Such sensibles are called ldquoparticular intentionsrdquo23Cf Aristotle De Anima 431b20

28



Before continuing notice the word ldquointentionrdquo St Thomas uses this word but

does not define it in a context applicable to knowing powers St Albert in his

Commentary on the De Anima however has a particularly enlightening text on

what it means

Intention however names that through which a thing is signified indi-vidually or universally under diverse grades of abstraction and this doesnot give being to anything neither the sense when it is in it nor even theintellect when it is in it but [the intention] makes a sign of the thing andan acquaintance [with it] And therefore intention is not a part of thething as a form but is rather the species of [onersquos] whole acquaintance

with a thing

24

Thus any power which apprehends an object has a received intention of that object

In the case of the intentions at hand they must be qualified as ldquounsensedrdquo intentions

that is they are not per se objects of an external sense

Now St Thomas posits two such powers in man the cogitative perceives the

particular intentions and the memory retains them The argument he gives for the

diversity of principles however seems weak in light of modern science he arguesthat they must be different because in corporeal things what receives a form easily

the wet and fluid is not what retains its form easily the dry and hard25 Whether

or not this is a sufficient account does not seem to matter since memory which

retains the particular intentions presupposes the estimative power which senses

them Consequently in what follows we need not consider memory

24St Albert the Great Liber II De Anima Tractatus III Caput IV quoted as Appendix

A below25Cf Summa Theologiae I78

29



Continuing to restrict our consideration to man the need for the cogitative power

can be seen as follows Formally what is apprehend by the other powers is different

from what our intellect can understand sense attains to the sensibles per se (color

sound etc) yet we know substance (man dog etc) Not only do we know substance

we know it universally Thus without some mediating power which can associate the

experiences of per se sensibles with universals the intellect would form the concepts

of substance de novo For all the sensible qualities are accidents and are as such

not necessary indicators of the essence26 Thus it seems necessary that a sensible

power exist in man which perceives per se the substance under the accidents

If we consider action the need for such a power is also clear Our intellect knows

what is good universally but can not of itself know which singulars fulfill the cri-

teria Consequently if there were not some power applying the universal notion to

particulars and thus it would be impossible to form the practical syllogism

Every B is goodThis is a B

there4 This is good

since the minor premise requires a composition of a singular and a universal Con-

26This seems to be a position similar to Descartesrsquo and in a different way to Lockersquos substancewould be perceived by direct intellectual inspection alone and would merely signify what underliesthese without any notion of existing per se or as the principle acting through the sensible acci-dents Alternatively one might think with Kant that apprehension of the underlying substanceis first apprehended by an inference from change This route seems to make substance a matter of appearances for if to sense the primary and secondary qualities is not to sense the substance andeverything known is first in sense how can the idea of substance be something impressed Rather

it is necessary that if this is sensed as under the universal substance the concept of substance comefrom the structure of the receiver rather than the thing impressed for what is sensed is particularand substance is universal

30



sequently unless there were a power able to see the singular under the universal

the will could not command action Since one universal in the intellect is substance

then this power must perceive this as a substance Thus such a power would have

substance as its formal object

To illustrate in more detail how this might happen consider how Aristotle mani-

fests the underlying of change in the Physics27 He shows that in every coming to be

there must be something which is able to be other namely matter and that which it

is able to become form Furthermore the matter must lack the form coming to be

for otherwise it would have changed already Thus change shows us that everything

which changes must be composed of an underlying and either a lack of a form (before

the change) or a form (after the change) Perhaps the substance underlying the ac-

cidents is sensed by the vis cogitativa in an analogous way motion is presented to it

by the imagination and it automatically ldquoinfersrdquo the existence of an underlying sub-

stance28 This seems to fit with experience in several ways First one only questions

the substantial unity of ordinary substances after reflection no one is an atomist by

nature Rather as the history of philosophy shows people tend to think that what

presents itself as one substance is so without reflection one might think a glass

of water to be one substance Second in dreams one experiences odd occurrences

one person (call him Cyril) assumes the appearance of another (perhaps Methodius)

while remaining himself A description of such experiences will involve expressions

like ldquoI met Syril who looked like Methodiusrdquo In both these cases what changes is

27Aristotle Physics I728This language is slightly misleading just as the intellect does not need an argument (except

as a pedagogical device) to see the matter-form composition of changing things so one need notreflect upon onersquos experience to sense the substance underlying the accidental change

31



judged to have an underlying substance which remains throughout the change This

perceived unity then would be a sign of the existence of the vis cogitativa

In considering whether the irrational animals have a faculty which senses sub-

stance per se one must consider both how the brutes are like man and how they

differ Since in men differ by intellect their senses should differ through their con-

nection to intellect Thus to see if the irrational animals sense substance per se

one must seek the differences in the sensitive faculties arising from the presence of

intellect

If we consider the order of beings from the inanimate to man a certain relation

is seen to hold the higher beings have indeterminately what the lower ones have

determinately One example of this is the presence of the various kinds of bodies A

rock insofar as it is present is only present to what is immediately in contact with

it it only acts on such things and such things only act upon it29 Next comes plants

because they grow they are less bound to the place they are in one sign of this is that

unlike rocks which only move in one direction by nature the head of the plant grows

up and its roots down Nevertheless they always remain to the degree possible

where they have been Animals since they can apprehend qualities transmitted

through a medium generally have a greater presence that is they are aware of

things near and far and can pursue or avoid things necessary for life The means by

which they achieve their ends and the ends themselves are largely determinate as

is clear from Fabre For example the Languedocian Sphex will continue to wall up

its nest even when the larva is removed from the nest and consequently the task at29Even if these are indeterminate in some sense due to the motion of the earth or the complica-

tions surrounding the notion of ldquosurfacerdquo they are still more determinate here than elsewhere

32



hand is vain30 In humans this determination is removed they perceive the natures

not only of the surrounding things but of all bodies by intellect and consequently can

set themselves means and ends appropriate to the current situation This implies

that a manrsquos sensitive powers and appetites are influenced by intellect both insofar as

they provide the material to be understood and the means for the person to achieve

his ends Thus the higher more authoritative powers should be more determinate

in an animal than they are in a man

Through reflection on the nature of the intellect the nature of the expected

determination can be made more precise if animals lacking intellect sense substance

per se they will sense this as a substance without knowing what it is For properly

speaking to know what something is belongs to intellect once the common nature

is apprehended the cogitative power can apply it to the particular things sensed

Thus sensing the substance under a common nature is possible per aliud that is

through intellect Since the perceiving subject perceives by virtue of the powers it

has and not those had by another the blind man for example cannot know color

by anotherrsquos power of sight Consequently the animal lacking intellect will not sense

the singular under a common nature because it lacks the ability to see the common

nature by which the singular could be seen

Thus the meaning of the statement ldquosubstance is sensedrdquo must be elaborated

to see if it can mean something applicable to a brute animal In Aristotlersquos Cat-

egories he points out the analogy of the word substance it always means ldquowhat

exists not in anotherrdquo but sometimes it names what exists in such a way and some-30Jean Henri Fabre The Wonders of Instinct

33



times that which is said of this What is common to the notion of substance is that

it is per se what differs is whether it names what exists per se or the nature of what

is apt to so exist In the former sense only singular substances are substances (this

man this horse this dog) in the latter the nature is a substance Aristotle indi-

cates the priority of one to the other by calling the singular ldquofirst substancerdquo and the

nature ldquosecond substancerdquo Thus if an animal senses substance it is not as second

substance since this requires intellect which can grasp the nature common to many

individuals Consequently the question is can an animal perceive first substance

Every animals acts for its own good for the first appetite of nature is self-

preservation31 Consequently whatever is necessary to an animalrsquos self-preservation

must be given to it by nature otherwise such a natural appetite would be vain

Now usefulness and harmfulness to the animal are not the proper objects of any

of the preceding powers (besides the vis cogitativa ) as is clear from the account

given above For even if sight will ldquoavoidrdquo by its natural inclination what destroys

it it can only perceive this as harmful to the power rather than the nature simply

speaking Now what is pursued as useful and harmful for an animal goes beyond the

inclination of any natural appetite of the faculties because such inclinations seek the

well-being of that faculty to which may be opposed to the animalrsquos well-being the

lizard sheds its tail to save its life Thus since desire follows knowledge there must

be an apprehensive power that sees the good for the animal and not simply for this

or that faculty Moreover since this faculty must see it as harmful to the animalrsquos

nature it cannot simply perceive the sensibles as such since the harmfulness does31Cf Summa Theologiae I-II Q94 a2 co

34



not come from these principally but rather from the underlying nature Thus since

a good which is sought on the basis of the accidental is not reliably obtained the

animal must be able to instinctually distinguish the harmful and the useful But

in order to do this it must grasp substance in some way as the ldquosubjectrdquo of the

judgment ldquothis is harmfulrdquo

35



Chapter 4

Responses to Objections

Having established that substance is sensed it is necessary to answer the objections

presented This done not only will the fact be established but doubts one might

have will also be laid to rest


Thus in response to the first objection about confusing salt and sugar the following

may be urged To make a mistake about substance is contingent upon the ability to

perceive it This is a result of evil being a privation blindness is an evil consisting in

a lack of sight Consequently the man deceived about particular substance (thinking

that salt is sugar for example) is deceived because sugar and salt both form white

cubical crystals and so when such crystals are seen he thinks it is either salt or

sugar It is this very inclination to think it one or the other that shows substance to

be sensed for only a power capable of perceiving correctly can make a mistake

36



In fact insofar as each of the external senses grasps substance they cannot be

mistaken For the external senses are only actualized by a present sensible and such a

sensible is a mean proportioning a substance to a sense-power Consequently insofar

as the sense cannot be deceived about whether or not the proper sensible is present

it cannot be deceived about whether some substance is present

This does not mean that the animal cannot be mistaken in its distinct grasp of

substance (ie where it is whether it is this color or that whether it is salt or sugar

etc) because these depend upon further judgments beyond the simple recognition of

presence This deception can even be about the number of substances present (eg

sight does not distinguish the salt and water in a glass of salt-water) yet since the

well-disposed power cannot be deceived in its judgments about its proper object and

this object is some actuality received from another it cannot be deceived about the

presence of another substance

Perhaps the idea that truth and falsity are only in combination and separation

illuminates this point in its fundamental grasp of the sensible all that is known is

the presence of an agent having a particular quality and this conception does not

imply any positive aspect of the substance besides the proper sensibles Thus the

particular color is apprehended in something even if it appears where it is not due

to a mistake about either accidental or common sensibles or both

37



Sensible qualities can change while the substance

remains

To the next objection that if substance is perceived something sensed should remain

throughout the various changes the following should be said first since the per se

sensibles are accidents on Aristotlersquos account it is not surprising that nothing similar

is perceived through all accidental changes rather the sensation of substance will

be of the unity underlying such changes Thus substance is not sensed as what sense

notices but insofar as a perceived intention makes known the whole substance St

Thomas speaks this way about the intelligible form when he says ldquothe intelligible

form is the quiddity of the thingrdquo 1 In that passage he simply equates the intelligible

form and the essence because as he had indicated earlier in that article potency is

known through its relation to act consequently knowing the essence one knows the

ens St Albert speaks more generally about this when he distinguishes intention

and form and uses the colors in the eye as an example

An intention is not a part of the thing as a form but is rather the speciesof onersquos whole acquaintance with the thing For the intention of thecolored [ie the sensible form] which is in the eye makes known thewhole thing2

St Albert distinguishes here the meaning of forma from that of intentio St

Thomas on the other hand seems to ignore the distinction of the names or perhaps

1Forma intelligibilis [ie intentio universalis] est quidditas rei (Super De Trinitate pars 3 q 5a 2 ad 2)

2Intentio non est pars rei sicut forma sed potius est species totius notitiae rei Intentio enimcolorati [ie forma sensibilis] quae est in oculo totam rem notificat (St Albert the Great LiberII De Anima Tractatus III Caput IV Quoted at length as Appendix F below)

38



is considering the intentio not as belonging to another but as informing the intellect

He seems to imply St Albertrsquos distinction in this text

It is manifest therefore that the similitude of the thing received in senserepresents the thing insofar as it is singular3

He does not say that it represents the thingrsquos sensible aspect but that it represents

the thing Thus it seems that these thinkers are teaching the same thing the species

impressed upon an knowing power makes known the whole thing and not merely an

accident

Substance cannot change sense

The third objection about substance not changing the sense fails to consider the

nature of the proper sensibles These are qualities of the third species affective

qualities The notion of a quality is determination4 in this case of determination to

action The color of a body therefore determines that body to act upon surrounding

objects Consequently since to sense is to be changed by such a quality it is receiving

the action of an exterior substance Consequently since the action of the substance

and the sensible quality are one sensation being of that action is of the substance

under a sensible quality

Another way to see this is to consider the sensersquos power to abstract As was

pointed out above all the sensibles depend upon the substance for their activity

3Manifestum est igitur quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem secundum quodest singularis (Sentencia libri De anima II l12 quoted as appendix B below)

4Cf Aristotle Metaphysics 1020a35ff

39



In a similar way the proper sensibles depend upon the common sensibles Conse-

quently it is impossible to know a proper sensible without knowing its surface and

similarly it is impossible to separate knowledge of the per se sensibles from that of

the substance From this it follows that substance is prior to its surface and surface

to the sensibles in the surface by the second sense of prior In such an order as

St Thomas points out the prior can be known without the posterior 5 but not con-

versely this abstraction makes mathematics possible Sense however seems unable

to make the last separation completely because it is limited to perceiving the sin-

gular since the principle by which this singular is this singular is intimately bound

with extension only a power capable of abstracting from singularity will be able to

wholly distinguish the notion of substance from that of extension


In response to the fourth objection from St Thomasrsquo position that sense does not

comprehend substance one ought to distinguish knowing from comprehending the

latter indicates a full grasp of the thing known6 while the former may be more or less

5Super Boethium De Trinitate Q5 A26While comprehension most properly implies an exhaustive grasp of the thing known it seems

reasonable to say that intellectual knowledge comprehends insofar as it involves a greater unitywith the thing known than sense-knowledge This usage seems to be implicit in the passage quotedin the object as is clear from its context

But accidents come to substance in a certain Sed accidentia superveniunt substantiae quo-order For first comes quantity next quality dam ordine Nam primo advenit ei quantitasnext passions and motions Whence quantity deinde qualitas deinde passiones et motus Un-can be understood in its subject matter before de quantitas potest intelligi in materia subiectathe sensible qualities by which it is called sensi- antequam intelligantur in ea qualitates sensibi-

ble matter are understood in it And thus ac- les a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis Et siccording to the notion of its substance quantity secundum rationem suae substantiae non de-does not depend upon sensible matter but on pendet quantitas a materia sensibili sed solum

40



superficial one can point out triangles without being a geometer The geometer

however can not only identify a triangle but he can also demonstrate its causes

and properties Similarly although sense may be able to apprehend some particular

substance it cannot apprehend the account of some substance in itself for exam-

ple seeing that ldquothis manrdquo and that ldquothis womanrdquo it cannot form a wholly unified

conception of man applicable to each


Two answers can be provided for the objection that what is sensed per accidens is

not truly sensed The first is to point out that the sensibles per accidens are first

received while a sensible per se is being sensed one does not know what a dog is

until a dog has been seen Thus the what-ness of a dog can be called sensible insofar

as it is acquired through sensation

Further the relation of substance to the per se sensibles provides a more par-

ticular reason to say that substance is sensed per accidens sensation is noticing an

actuality common to both the sensing and the sensed substance Since the existence

of such an actuality in the sensed substance is its making that substance able to act

upon the sense sensation of that actuality is also sensation of substance

intelligible matter alone For substance having a materia intelligibili Substantia enim remo-removed these accidents remains comprehensi- tis accidentibus non manet nisi intellectu com-ble only to intellect insofar as the sensitive pow- prehensibilis eo quod sensitivae potentiae noners do not attain all the way to comprehension pertingunt usque ad substantiae comprehensio-of substance nem (Super De Trinitate Q5 A3)

Here St Thomas is primarily concerned with what the powers can attain and consequently

he seems to use the word ldquocomprehensiordquo to indicate a universal grasp as opposed to grasping theparticular

41



Does the brute sense substance

A proper understanding of substance as the brute apprehends it will answer the

objection about brutes sensing substance Having noted the analogy of the term

ldquosubstancerdquo and distinguished it into first and second substance the adequacy of the

brutersquos powers for such an object can be seen Notice that while second substances

are taken from three of the five universals of Porphyryrsquos Isagogue (genus species

and difference) first substances are not universal in fact to be a first substance to

be this man this dog this rock is relatively opposed to being a universal for as the

species is to the genus so is the singular to the species Because of this the humanintellect which knows by means of universals cannot apprehend such things except

through reflection on sensation7 In fact it is precisely the intentional character of

sensation the necessity that it be sensation of something other that allows for the

intellectrsquos knowledge to extend to singulars Since sensing something outside belongs

to the sensitive soul as such all animals can be said to sense substance


In relation to the objection about images two things should be noted First since

substance is not the proper object of the power the power need not judge about

it accurately In fact insofar as it is sensed accidentally the sense cannot attain

distinct awareness of the substance at all Rather it attains a knowledge of it insofar

as it is a subject proportioned to the sensersquos proper object Consequently if the

proper sensible can be deceptive about its subject the sense can be deceived some

7Cf Aristotle De Anima 429b10ff

42



animals turn this to their advantage by mimicking a predator or the surrounding

environment

Additionally it should be noticed that an image is an image That is that an

image insofar as it is an image refers to something other than itself8 Thus for it to be

sensed as an image is for that of which it is an image to be sensed Consequently the

substance represented is sensed This is not however for it to be sensed immediately

rather it is sensed as mediated by a representation of it

This is similar to the way St Thomas treats the phantasmrsquos role in intellectual

knowing in this quote

8(Check this footnote) Cf Aristotle On Memory and Reminiscence 450b15Granted that there is in us something like εἴ τ΄ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ

an impression of picture why should the per- ἐν ἡμῖν͵ἡ τούτου αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμηception of the mere impression be memory of ἑτέρου͵ἀλλ΄ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶνsomething else instead of being related to this τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεταιimpression alone For when one actually re- τούτου πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν μνημονεύσει εἴηmembers this impression is what he contem- γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν καὶ ἀκούειν ἢplates and this is what he perceives How then ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνειν τοῦτο οἷονdoes he remember what is not present One γὰρ τὸ ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷόνmight as well suppose it possible also to see or ἐστι καὶ εἰκών͵καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ΄ ἐστὶνhear that which is not present In reply we sug- ἄμφω͵τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν͵καὶ ἔστιgest that this very thing is quite conceivable θεωρεῖν καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα͵οὕτω καὶ τὸ

nay actually occurs in experience A picture ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό τι καθ΄painted on a panel is at once a picture and a αὑτὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλου [φάντασμα] ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ΄likeness that is while one and the same it is αὑτό͵θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν͵ᾗ δ΄ ἄλλου͵οἷονboth of these although the rsquobeingrsquo of both is not εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμαthe same and one may contemplate it either asa picture or as a likeness Just in the same waywe have to conceive that the mnemonic presen-tation within us is something which by itself ismerely an object of contemplation while in re-lation to something else it is also a presentationof that other thing In so far as it is regarded initself it is only an object of contemplation ora presentation but when considered as relative

to something else eg as its likeness it is alsoa mnemonic token

43



The likeness which is in sense is abstracted from the thing as from aknowable object and therefore through that likeness the thing itself isknown per se and directly the likeness which is in the intellect however

is not abstracted from the phantasms as from a knowable object but asfrom a mean of knowledge through the way in which our sense takes alikeness of a thing which is in a mirror while it is born into it not as intoa certain thing but as into a likeness of a thing9

This is instructive because it shows us that St Thomas considers images as simil-

itudes of things It also shows us that since he does want to say that the intellect

knows things through their likeness that to know a likeness is in some way to know

that of which it is a likeness

9Similitudo quae est in sensu abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili et ideo per illamsimilitudinem res ipsa per se directe cognoscitur similitudo autem quae est in intellectu non

abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto cognoscibili sed sicut a medio cognitionis per modumquo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo dum fertur in eam non ut in remquamdam sed ut in similitudinem rei (Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones De Veritate q 2 a 6co)

44



Conclusion

From what has been said it is self-evident that sensation is of substance In the

two ways which apply to sense in general the common opinion has been defended

and in this way it seems to be a principle knowable by all The first of these that

the very essence of an affective quality is to be a quality making a substance able to

act in a certain way shows that sensation is a suffering from a substance as under

some accident Similarly the second way shows sensation to be intrinsically part

of a process of uniting the knower to the substance known whether this union is

for the sake of practical action alone as in animals or for both practical action and

human contemplation Thus in both cases if the subject sensation is analyzed the

predicate is found to be in its notion substance is sensed either because sensation is

receiving the action of a substance or because it is an action by which the sentient

being is united to the thing sensed This truth is readily acknowledged by those

lacking philosophical prejudices as is attested by the initial quotes Jacob Marley

asks Scrooge to give a reason why he should doubt his senses immediately after the

interchange quoted he manages to convince Scrooge by a ghostly howl Similarly

45



Dr Johnsonrsquos proposed refutation of Berkeley illustrates how the man of common

sense would react to someone who denies this proposition he appeals to his own

senses as showing the manifest falsity of the claim

Insofar as the proper object of the vis cogitativa or aestimativa is substance

however the proposition seems self-evident to the wise for these powers are rather

obscure and to be seen they require philosophical training and careful reflection on

the experience of sensation yet when they have been discovered it is clear that

they know first substance since they consider unsensed intentions which must be

truly predicated of the individual rather than the per se sensibles Thus it has been

shown that the statement ldquosensation is of first substancerdquo is self-evident

46



Appendix A

St Albert ldquodigressio declarans

gradus abstractionis et modumrdquo

ProoemiumAntequam nos loquamur de sensibilius singulariter oportet nos loqui de sensibili generaliter quiasicut diximus obiecta sunt priora actibus et actus potentiis secundum rationem Et quia de commu-nibus etiam quoad nos debemus primo loqui de sensibili in communi Se ad faciliorem intellectumeorum quae dicturi sumus faciemus capitulum breve de modo apprehensonis potentiarum appre-hansivarum omnium hoc enim perutile erit ad omnium sequentium notitiam faciliorem

Dicimus igitur quod omne apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi non secundum essequod habet in eo quod apprehenditur sed secundum quod est intentio ipsius et species sub qua ali-qua sensibilis vel intellectualis notitia apprehensi habetur Haec autem apprehensio ut universaliter

loquendo quattuor habet gradus

Grades of AbstractionQuorum primus et infimus est quod abstrahitur et separatur forma a materia sed non ab eiuspraesentia nec ab eius appendiciis et hanc facit vis apprehensiva deforis quae est sensus

Secundus autem gradus est quod separatur forma a materia et a praesentia materiae sednon ab appendiciis materiae sive condicionibus materiae et hanc apprehensionem facit imaginativapotentia quae etiam singularibus non praesentibus retinet formas sensibilium sed non denudat easa materiae appendiciis Dico autem appendicias materiae condiciones et proprietates quas habetsubiectum formae secundum quod est in tali vel tali materia sicut verbi gratia talis membrorumsitus vel talis color faciei vel talis aetas vel talis figura capitis vel talis locus generationis Haec

enim sunt quaedam indivuantia formam quae sic sunt in uno individuo unius speciei quod nonsunt in alio Et hac apprehensione saepe non praesentem imaginamur crispum et album et senemvel iuvenem et cum longis digitis vel brevibus quorum nullum accidit ei inquantum est homoHaec igitur est secunda apprehensio

47



Tertius autem gradus apprehensionis est quo accipimus non tantum sensibilia sed etiam quas-dam intentiones quae non imprimuntur sensibus sed tamen sine sensibilibus numquam nobis in-notescunt sicut est esse socialem et amicum et delectabilem in convictu et affabilem et his contrariaquae quidem cum sensibilibus accipimus et tamen eorum nullum sensibus imprimitur Et tale est

quod accipimus hunc esse filium Deonis et esse agnum vel hominem aliud autem esse lupum velleonem secundum quod substantiales formae mediantibus sensibilibus et non separatae ab ipsisapprehenduntur Et iste gradus propinquus est cognitioni et numquam est sine aestimatione etcollatione

Quartus autem et ultimus gradus est qui apprehendit rerum quidditates denudatas ab omnibusappendiciis materiae nec accipit ipsas cum sensibilium intentionibus sed potius simplices et sepa-ratas ab eis Et ista apprehensio solius est intellectus sicut est intellectus hominis per hoc quodconvenit omni homini vel intellectus substantiae et ut universaliter dicatur intellectus quidditatesuniversalis omnis rei secundum quod est quidditas ipsius et non per hoc quod convenit isti et nonilli Hoc enim quod convenit uni et non alii proprium est et singulare et est aliquid de material-ibus et individuantibus Quaecumque autem sunt communia et ita uni sicut alii et eodem modoconvenientia absque dubio sunt universalia quae solus accipit intellectus Secundum autem hosgradus abstractionis sive separationis distinguentur inferius vires apprehensivae

Distinction between ldquointentio reirdquo and ldquoforma reirdquo Adhuc autem notandum est quod differunt forma rei et intentio rei forma enim proprie est quaeinformando dat esse actu materiae et composito ex materia et forma Intentio autem vocatur idper quod significatur res individualiter vel universaliter secundum diversos gradus abstractionis ethaec non dat esse alicui nec sensui quando est in ipso nec etiam intellectui quando est in illosed signum facit de re et notitiam Et ideo intentio non est pars rei sicut forma set potius estspecies totius notitiae rei et ideo intentio quia abstrahitur de toto et est significatio totius de repraedicatur intentio enim colorati quae est in oculo totam rem notificat sicut et intentio quaeest in imaginatione particulari non praesente

Et hoc est quod egregie dicit Aristoteles in secundo libro suo de anima quod sensus

sunt particularium et non dicit quod sint formae alicuius tantum sed totius particularis sicutet intellectus est universalium quod non est notitia et species partis sed totius et ideo notitiamfacit detoto Non enim accipitur per visum notitia coloris tantum sed colorati et species eiusin visu species est colorati secundum quod colaratum est et iudicium fit de colorato secundumquod coloratum est Et sic est de aliis intentionibus in quocumque gradu abstractionis accipianturSimiliter autem est quando dicitur quod abstractio fit intelligitur quod materia est quoddamparticulare quod particularitatem suam habet a materia Hoc enim est primum subiectum formaeet per ipsam substat particulare et naturae communi quae abstrahitur universaliter ab intellectuet individuantibus formis quarum intentiones ab aliis gradibus apprehensionis abstrahuntur Sicutautem in principio physicorum dictum est communis natura aliquando accipitur ut confusa inparticularibus et non separata ab eis et tunc scientia talis est singularium et exigit singulare sicutetiam sensus sicut in praehabito capitulo diximus1

2

1St Albert the Great Liber II De Anima Tractatus III Caput IV2Otto Jespersen The Philosophy of Grammar pg 75

48



Appendix B

On Sense as compared to intellect

Deinde cum dicit differunt tamen quia posuerat similitudinem inter sentire in actu et considerarevult ostendere differentiam inter ea cuius quidem differentiae causam assignare incipit ex differ-entia obiectorum scilicet sensibilium et intelligibilium quae sentiuntur et considerantur in actuSensibilia enim quae sunt activa operationis sensitivae scilicet visibile et audibile et alia huius-modi sunt extra animam Cuius causa est quia sensus secundum actum sunt singularium quaesunt extra animam sed scientia est universalium quae quodammodo sunt in anima Ex quo patetquod ille qui iam habet scientiam non oportet quod quaerat extra sua obiecta sed habet ea in seunde potest considerare ea cum vult nisi forte per accidens impediatur Sed sentire non potestaliquis cum vult quia sensibilia non habet in se sed oportet quod adsint ei extra

Et sicut est de operatione sensuum ita est in scientiis sensibilium quia etiam sensibilia suntde numero singularium et eorum quae sunt extra animam Unde homo non potest consideraresecundum scientiam omnia sensibilia quae vult sed illa tantum quae sensu percipit Sed secundumcertitudinem determinare de his iterum erit tempus scilicet in tertio ubi agetur de intellectu et

de comparatione intellectus ad sensum

Why sense is of singulars and intellect of universalsCirca ea vero quae hic dicuntur considerandum est quare sensus sit singularium scientia verouniversalium et quomodo universalia sint in anima Sciendum est igitur circa primum quod sensusest virtus in organo corporali intellectus vero est virtus immaterialis quae non est actus alicuiusorgani corporalis Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui Cognitio autem om-nis fit per hoc quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente scilicet secundum similitudinemNam cognoscens in actu est ipsum cognitum in actu Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter etmaterialiter recipiat similitudinem rei quae sentitur Intellectus autem recipit similitudinem eiusquod intelligitur incorporaliter et immaterialiter Individuatio autem naturae communis in rebus

corporalibus et materialibus est ex materia corporali sub determinatis dimensionibus contentauniversale autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi materia et materialibus conditionibus indi-viduantibus Manifestum est igitur quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem secundum

49



quod est singularis recepta autem in intellectu repraesentat rem secundum rationem universalisnaturae et inde est quod sensus cognoscit singularia intellectus vero universalia et horum suntscientiae

How the universal is in the soulCirca secundum vero considerandum est quod universale potest accipi dupliciter Uno modo potestdici universale ipsa natura communis prout subiacet intentioni universalitatis Alio modo secundumse Sicut et album potest accipi dupliciter vel id cui accidit esse album vel ipsummet secun-dum quod subest albedini Ista autem natura cui advenit intentio universalitatis puta naturahominis habet duplex esse unum quidem materiale secundum quod est in materia naturali aliudautem immateriale secundum quod est in intellectu Secundum igitur quod habet esse in materianaturali non potest ei advenire intentio universalitatis quia per materiam individuatur Advenitigitur ei universalitatis intentio secundum quod abstrahitur a materia individuali Non est autempossibile quod abstrahatur a materia individuali realiter sicut Platonici posuerunt Non enim esthomo naturalis id est realis nisi in his carnibus et in his ossibus sicut probat philosophus in

septimo metaphysicae Relinquitur igitur quod natura humana non habet esse praeter principiaindividuantia nisi tantum in intellectu

Nec tamen intellectus est falsus dum apprehendit naturam communem praeter principia in-dividuantia sine quibus esse non potest in rerum natura Non enim apprehendit hoc intellectusscilicet quod natura communis sit sine principiis individuantibus sed apprehendit naturam com-munem non apprehendendo principia individuantia et hoc non est falsum Primum autem essetfalsum sicut si ab homine albo separarem albedinem hoc modo quod intelligerem eum non essealbum esset enim tunc apprehensio falsa Si autem sic separarem albedinem ab homine quodapprehenderem hominem nihil apprehendendo de albedine eius non esset apprehensio falsa Nonenim exigitur ad veritatem apprehensionis ut quia apprehendit rem aliquam apprehendat omniaquae insunt ei Sic igitur intellectus absque falsitate abstrahit genus a speciebus inquantum in-telligit naturam generis non intelligendo differentias Et similiter abstrahit speciem ab individuisinquantum intelligit naturam speciei non intelligendo individualia principia

Sic igitur patet quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi secun-dum esse quod habet in intellectu sic enim solum est unum de multis prout intelligitur praeterprincipia quibus unum in multa dividitur unde relinquitur quod universalia secundum quod suntuniversalia non sunt nisi in anima Ipsae autem naturae quibus accidit intentio universalitatissunt in rebus Et propter hoc nomina communia significantia naturas ipsas praedicantur de indi-viduis non autem nomina significantia intentiones Socrates enim est homo sed non est speciesquamvis homo sit species1

1St Thomas Aquinas Sentencia De Anima II l12 nn1-8

50



Appendix C

John of St Thomas on Accidental

Sensibles

Dico ULTIMO Sensibile per accidens est substantia cui tamquam obiecto inhaerent sensibiliapropria et communia Et distinguitur sensibile per accidens a sensibili per se quia sensibile peraccidens non pertinet ad obiectum sensus nisi in quantum est subiectum obiecti sensus undesubiective trahitur ad rationem obiecti sensus et sic vere et proprie attingitur a sensu non ut ratioformalis immutans sensum sed ut subiectum cui per accidens inest talis ratio

Haec conclusio sumitur ex Divo Thoma in hoc 2 libro de Anima lect 13 ubi docet exPhilosopho quod secundum accidens sensibile dicitur ut si dicamus quod Socrates est sensibileper accidens quia accidit ei esse album Hoc enim sentitur per accidens quod accidit ei quodsentitur per se Unde nihil patitur sensus ab hoc in quantum huiusmodi Addit infra S Thomasalias duas conditiones sensibilis per accidens Prima quod accidat ei quod per se est sensibileSecunda quod sit apprehensum a sentiente per aliam potentiam ita quod non omnino lateat

ipsum apprehendaturque vel per imaginativam vel per intellectum Quod vero sensus externusetiam aliquam notitiam habeat ipsius sensibilis per accidens licet ab eo non immutetur per se sedmediante sensibili proprio manifeste dicit S Thomas 1 p q 17 art 2 Attingit enim sensusexternus totum illud quod ei obicitur v g corpus coloratum Et ita colligendo ex his rationemsensibilis per accidens dicemus quod sensibile per accidens generaliter potest dici omne illud quodaccidit sensibili per se ita quod nec quoad substantiam nec quoad modificationem per se respiciaturab illo sensu

Et hac generali ratione non solum substantia dicitur sensibile per accidens sed etiam quod-cumque sensibile proprium unius sensus comparatum ad alium sensum erit ei sensibile per accidenssicut album dulce per accidens attingitur a visu in quantum dulce Sed hoc non facit quod dulcesit sensibile per accidens sed quod sit visibile per accidens sentiri autem potest etiam per aliumsensum Ut autem sit sensibile per accidens absolute et respectu omnium sensuum requiritur quod

a nullo sensu percipiatur per se Et hoc solum potest esse substantia seu subiectum ipsum cuiinest ratio obiectiva sensus Sentitur enim non quia per se constituat aut conducat ad rationemobiecti sive tamquam specificans sive tamquam modificans sed quia sustinet et recipit id quodpraebet rationem obiectivam visus vel alterius sensus et sic percipitur ut coniunctum obiecto non

51



ut constituens obiectum vel conducens ad lineam obiecti licet conducat ad sustentationem obiectiin suo esse Cuius signum manifestum est quia mutato subiecto vel etiam omnino remoto ut siaccidens separetur ab omni subiecto eodem modo poterit movere sensum illud accidens separatumatque coniunctum mutato subiecto vel non mutato dummodo maneat sensibile illud proprium cum

sensibilibus communibus quae sunt modificationes per se requisitae ad exercendam sensationemUnde non obstat quod subiectum ipsum seu substantia non minus videatur debere pertinere

ad circumstantias modificantes sensibile proprium quam ea quae quantitatis sunt cum constet nonminus requiri ad individuationem accidentis substantiam quam quantitatem singularitas autem re-quiritur ad hoc ut sentiri possit ipsum sensibile Hoc inquam non obstat quia sustentatio subiectiqua substantia recipit accidens requiritur ad ipsum sensibile non sub speciali ratione qua sensibileest et obiectum sed generali ratione qua est accidens inhaerens et in linea seu genere entitativoquatenus illa inhaerentia et ordo ad subiectum requiritur ad existendum et ad ipsam individua-tionem in genere entis Et sic quia obiectum non potest movere obiective et in linea cognoscibilisnisi supponatur habere existentiam ideo requiritur substantia seu subiectum tamquam sensibileper accidens et ut aliquid praesuppositum in alia linea et genere scilicet in genere entitativo nontamen formaliter constituens aut conducens ad rationem ipsam obiecti et motionem eius in sensusicut sensibile proprium vel commune siquidem si sine subiecto conservetur sensibile eodem modo

movebit sensum non autem si mutetur sensibile proprium vel commune Per accidens enim concurrit quantitatis et qualitatis coniunctio in uno subiectio per se tamen

requiritur et per se modificat in esse obiecti sensibilis ut movere possit sensibili modo potentiamAt vero substantia per se requiritur ad sustentandum in esse et in genere entis sensibile propriumnon tamen ut per se modificans et conducens in ratione et modo sensibilis obiecti Et ratio estquia sensibile externum est aliquid apparens externe substantia autem est interna quidditas et dese latens Unde licet requiratur tamquam radix et sustentans ipsa accidentia externa ea generaliratione qua omnia accidentia dependent a substantia non tamen ut formaliter modificans autpertinens ad ipsam sensibilem et externam apparentiam et rationem obiecti sensibilis ut sensibilisseu apparentis externe Ad quod tamen conducit quantitas seu ea quae ad quantitatem pertinentquia quantitas extendit quoad locum externum et ea quae quantitatis sunt ad externam modifica-tionem pertinent et ita sensibilem apparentiam et motionem per se afficere et modificare possuntSubstantia autem ex eo quod latens et ex eo quod radix est non conducit sensibiliter et externesed entitative sicut etiam relationes coniunctae sunt ipsi sensibili sed non per se conducunt quiaoccultae sunt Et licet requiratur quod sit accidens in concreto ut sentiri possit tamen non idrequiritur formaliter ex vi conducentiae ad sensibilitatem externam et apparentem sed generaliratione ad omnia accidentium munera et entitativam existentiam Et ita substantia non requiri-tur per se formaliter ad rationem obiecti sensibilis sed per se radicaliter et in ratione entis Adconfirmationem respondetur ex dictis quod sensibile commune etiam convenit cum sensibili peraccidens quod neutrum emittit per se et seorsum a sensibili proprio distinctam speciem Sed inratione modificandi speciem sensibilis proprii valde differunt sensibile commune et per accidensquia sensibile commune per se modificat perseitate ipsius sensibilis ut externe apparentis sensibileautem per accidens non licet in genere entis et per modum radicaliter continentis et sustentan-tis sensibile requiratur substantia et tamquam quid occultum non sensibiliter movens externe aut

modificans Unde ex eo quod substantia sit prima radix et primum principium accidentium etvirtutis movendi sensibiliter non sequitur quod per se conducat perseitate formali sensibilitatisexternae et ut requiritur ad motionem externam sed perseitate radicali ut generaliter requiriturad omnia accidentia in ratione entis et cuiuscumque operationis et sic ipsum obiective movere rad-

52



icatur in substantia non ut in obiecto sed ut in subiecto ac proinde licet per se requiratur ut inre existant talia accidentia non tamen per se obiective sed per se subiective

RESPONDETUR quod una et eadem species repraesentat obiectum et modificationem eiusnon tamquam duo obiecta sed ut unum Non enim species praesertim rei singularis et materialis

quae praecisiva non est potest repraesentare rem aliquam ita abstractam a modis et circumstan-tiis quod nihil de modificatione repraesentet Nec pro illa parte qua repraesentatur ille modusdici potest quod est distincta species et directa repraesentatio saltem illius modi Dicitur enimquod species repraesentans aliquid cum aliqua modificatione non respicit modificationem illam utdistinctum repraesentabile directe nec per distinctam repraesentationem sed per eandem ut mod-ificatam Sicut enim modificatio illa non est proprio obiectum sed modus obiecti ita nec eiusrepraesentatio est directa repraesentatio sed repraesentationis modus quod aliqui explicant di-centes quod non repraesentat sed exercet Revera tamen licet repraesentet non tamen ut per sedirecte repraesentabile sed ut modi eius quod per se repraesentatur Nec inconvenit quod idemsensibile commune diversis repraesentationibus repraesentatur v g colore sono etc quia hocipso quod est commune accommodatur singulis iuxta eorum capacitatem ibique diversimode mod-ificat Quod vero dicitur non posse unam speciem repraesentare plura per modum unius nisi siteminens ut in angelis respondetur quod eminentia requiritur ad repraesentandum plura obiecta

per modum obiectorum sub ratione aliqua superiori uniente et manifestante illa Ad repraesentan-dum autem plura quorum unum sit obiectum aliud modificatio eius non requiritur eminentia sedpotius quanto species est magis materialis et imperfecta tanto minus abstrahit ab istis modifica-tionibus eaque concernit Dicitur autem substantia esse in sensu non per se seorsum a sensibiliproprio sed sub illo et ut induta externa illa sensibilitate sicque potest ad intellectum pervenireNec requiritur ut aliquid quod sit in intellectu sit in sensu sicut in intellectu sed per effectuset accidentia sua Ad primam confirmationem respondetur quod invariato colore quoad substan-tiam et modum non variatur sensatio Variato autem colore quoad modificationem v g quoadfiguram situm etc variatur diversa sensatio etiam modificative nec est necesse variari specifica-tive ex parte obiecti directi Illa autem modificatio sufficiet fortasse ad variandum accidentaliterintrinsece visionem et individualiter sicut de notitia abstractiva et intuitiva diximus in Logica q23 Et in hoc differt sensibile commune a sensibill per accidens quod sensibile per accidens necetiam modificative modificatione obiectiva variat sensationem sensibile autem commune licet nonimprimat speciem condistinctam simpliciter a proprio bene tamen modificationem distinctam utex D Thoma explicatum est Ad secundam confirmationem respondetur quod attinet ad coelumposse dici quod habeat qualitates tangibiles positive et per se si admittamus quod qualitates perse sensibiles non solum sunt calidum et frigidam et aliae primae qualitates sed etiam durum etmolle asperum et lene sive oriantur ex primis qualitatibus sive ex alia causa proveniant de quoq 7 dicemus Coelum autem durum est et solidum et tersum et sic sentiri potest sicut sentiturfluidum et molle etc Si autem istae qualitates non sunt per se primo tangibiles aut ita se habentin coelo quod non possunt agere actione reali in tactum sicut requiritur ad sentiendum per illamtunc solum negative sentietur durities in coelo quatenus ibi resistentiam aliquam experitur sicutcum ab angelo aliquis impeditur seu detinetur non sentit aliquam qualitatem tangibilem in angelosed resistentiam aliquam negativam Quando autem infligitur alicui vulnus aut verberatur id quodsentitur est durities corporis aut dividentis in vulnere ac comprimentis in verbere Ex ipsa autem

divisione sentitur dolor quia etiam pertinet ad tactum ut dicemus quaest seq art ult duritiesvero qualitas tangibilis est ut ibi dicemus Denique quando oculis clausis aliquod opacum senti-tur ideo est quia palpebrae claudentes oculos aliquid transparentiae habent per quam admittitur

53



aliquid lucis et sic apposito corpore opaco lux ipsa magis impeditur et sic sentitur opacitas1

1Ioannes a Sancto Thoma Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus L6 C3

54



Appendix D

Descartesrsquo Wax Experiment

Let us now accordingly consider the objects that are commonly thought to be [the most easilyand likewise] the most distinctly known viz the bodies we touch and see not indeed bodies ingeneral for these general notions are usually somewhat more confused but one body in particularTake for example this piece of wax it is quite fresh having been but recently taken from thebeehive it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained it still retains somewhat of theodor of the flowers from which it was gathered its color figure size are apparent ( to the sight)it is hard cold easily handled and sounds when struck upon with the finger In fine all thatcontributes to make a body as distinctly known as possible is found in the one before us Butwhile I am speaking let it be placed near the firendashwhat remained of the taste exhales the smellevaporates the color changes its figure is destroyed its size increases it becomes liquid it growshot it can hardly be handled and although struck upon it emits no sound Does the same waxstill remain after this change It must be admitted that it does remain no one doubts it or judgesotherwise What then was it I knew with so much distinctness in the piece of wax Assuredly it

could be nothing of all that I observed by means of the senses since all the things that fell undertaste smell sight touch and hearing are changed and yet the same wax remains

12 It was perhaps what I now think viz that this wax was neither the sweetness of honeythe pleasant odor of flowers the whiteness the figure nor the sound but only a body that a littlebefore appeared to me conspicuous under these forms and which is now perceived under othersBut to speak precisely what is it that I imagine when I think of it in this way Let it be attentivelyconsidered and retrenching all that does not belong to the wax let us see what remains Therecertainly remains nothing except something extended flexible and movable But what is meantby flexible and movable Is it not that I imagine that the piece of wax being round is capableof becoming square or of passing from a square into a triangular figure Assuredly such is notthe case because I conceive that it admits of an infinity of similar changes and I am moreoverunable to compass this infinity by imagination and consequently this conception which I have of the wax is not the product of the faculty of imagination But what now is this extension Is itnot also unknown for it becomes greater when the wax is melted greater when it is boiled andgreater still when the heat increases and I should not conceive [clearly and] according to truththe wax as it is if I did not suppose that the piece we are considering admitted even of a wider

55



variety of extension than I ever imagined I must therefore admit that I cannot even comprehendby imagination what the piece of wax is and that it is the mind alone which perceives it I speakof one piece in particular for as to wax in general this is still more evident But what is the pieceof wax that can be perceived only by the [understanding or] mind It is certainly the same which

I see touch imagine and in fine it is the same which from the beginning I believed it to beBut (and this it is of moment to observe) the perception of it is neither an act of sight of touchnor of imagination and never was either of these though it might formerly seem so but is simplyan intuition (inspectio) of the mind which may be imperfect and confused as it formerly was orvery clear and distinct as it is at present according as the attention is more or less directed to theelements which it contains and of which it is composed

13 But meanwhile I feel greatly astonished when I observe [the weakness of my mind and]its proneness to error For although without at all giving expression to what I think I consider allthis in my own mind words yet occasionally impede my progress and I am almost led into error bythe terms of ordinary language We say for example that we see the same wax when it is beforeus and not that we judge it to be the same from its retaining the same color and figure whence I

should forthwith be disposed to conclude that the wax is known by the act of sight and not by the

intuition of the mind alone were it not for the analogous instance of human beings passing on in

the street below as observed from a window In this case I do not fail to say that I see the menthemselves just as I say that I see the wax and yet what do I see from the window beyond hatsand cloaks that might cover artificial machines whose motions might be determined by springs But I judge that there are human beings from these appearances and thus I comprehend by thefaculty of judgment alone which is in the mind what I believed I saw with my eyes

56



Bibliography

[1] St Albert the Great De Anima from Opera Omnia (ed A Borgnet) t5 Paris Vivez 1904

[2] Aristotle Topics from Aristoteles Graece (ed E Bekker) v1 Berlin Georgium Reimerum1831

[3] Aristotle Topics from The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed R McKeon) New York RandomHouse 1941

[4] mdashmdash De Anima Trans R Glen Coughlin California Thomas Aquinas College (unpublished2011)

[5] mdashmdash De Anima from Aristoteles Graece (ed E Bekker) v1 Berlin Georgium Reimerum1831

[6] mdashmdash Metaphysics Trans Hippocrates G Apostle Iowa The Peripatetic Press 1979

[7] mdashmdash Nichomachean Ethics from The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed R McKeon) NewYork Random House 1941

[8] mdashmdash On Memory and Reminiscence from Aristoteles Graece (ed E Bekker) v1 BerlinGeorgium Reimerum 1831

[9] mdashmdash Physics Trans Glen Coughlin California St Augustine Press 2005

[10] mdashmdash Posterior Analytics California Thomas Aquinas College (unpublished)

[11] St Thomas Aquinas In Boethii De Trinitate from Corpus Thomisticum(httpwwwcorpusthomisticumorg) viewed 2012

[12] mdashmdash Sentencia Libri De Anima from Corpus Thomisticum(httpwwwcorpusthomisticumorg) viewed 2012

[13] mdashmdash Summa Theologiae from Corpus Thomisticum (httpwwwcorpusthomisticumorg)viewed 2012 15

57



[14] mdashmdash Q D De Veritate from Corpus Thomisticum (httpwwwcorpusthomisticumorg)viewed 2012

[15] Boethius De Hebdomadibus cited in [13]

[16] Richard Dedekind ldquoThe Nature and Meaning of Numbersrdquo in Essays on the Theory ofNumbers Trans Wooster Woodruff Beman New York Dover Publications 1963

[17] Reneacute Descartes Meditationes de Prima Philosophia Trans myself Leipzig C Grum-bach 1913

[18] David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (ed LA Selby-Bigge)Oxford 1902

[19] John of St Thomas Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus ed Ludovicus Vives Paris 1883



You donrsquot believe in me observed the Ghost

ldquoI donrsquotrdquo said Scrooge

ldquoWhat evidence would you have of my reality beyond that of your sensesrdquo

ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo said Scrooge

ldquoWhy do you doubt your sensesrdquo

ldquoBecauserdquo said Scrooge ldquoa little thing affects them A slight disorder of the stomach makes them cheats You may be an undigested bit of beefa blot of mustard a crumb of cheese a fragment of an underdone potatoTherersquos more of gravy than of grave about you whatever you arerdquo

mdashndashCharles Dickens A Christmas Carol

When discussing how Berkeleyrsquos philosophy appeared to be self-evidentlyfalse but impossible to refute Dr Johnson kicked out at a nearby stoneexclaiming ldquoI refute it thusrdquo

mdashndashBoswellrsquos Life of Samuel Johnson



Contents

Contents i

1 Objections 6








2 Sed Contra 10




i



3 Response 17














Prooemium 47







ii




Bibliography 57

iii



Prooemium








accidentally1









1


















terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Contents

Contents i

1 Objections 6








2 Sed Contra 10




i



3 Response 17














Prooemium 47







ii




Bibliography 57

iii



Prooemium








accidentally1









1


















terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











3 Response 17














Prooemium 47







ii




Bibliography 57

iii



Prooemium








accidentally1









1


















terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57












Bibliography 57

iii



Prooemium








accidentally1









1


















terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Prooemium








accidentally1









1


















terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57


























terms







2






















3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






























3

























4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































4











objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57



















objections

5



Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Chapter 1

Objections








remains



1Meditation 3

6
























7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
































7














sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






















sight







to flare up

8









really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















really present

9



Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Chapter 2

Sed Contra












10















naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57























naturalem

11




















12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57




























12





















13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57





























13








commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
















commentary














14



















11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57



























11Heraclitus DK 123

15





by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57













by men

16



Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Chapter 3

Response













17



















18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57



























18
























19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
































19


























20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57


































20









act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















act














(QV a3)



21






















22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






























22






















23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






























23
























24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
































24

























25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































25

























26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































26

























27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































27











se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57



















se)












28






what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57














what it means


with a thing

24













29

















there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

























there4 This is good




30


























31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57


































31










intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57


















intellect
















32

























33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































33

























34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

































34








35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
















35



Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Chapter 4














36






















37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






























37




remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57












remains


















38









accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















accident














39






















40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57






























40























41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57































41
























42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
































42




environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57












environment












43











44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57



















44



Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Conclusion
















45













46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57





















46



Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Appendix A









47









2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















2


48



Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Appendix B







49









50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















50



Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57











Appendix C


Sensibles






51









52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















52








53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57
















53





54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57













54



Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














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Appendix D





55









56



Bibliography














57

















56



Bibliography














57











Bibliography














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edward langley senior thesis 2012

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