edmund burke and reason of state

7/27/2019 Edmund Burke and Reason of State

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/edmund-burke-and-reason-of-state 1/19



Edmund B u r k e

a n d R e a s o n o f S t a t e

David Armitage

EdmundBurkehas beenone of the few politicalthinkers o be treated eri-

ouslyby internationalheorists.According o MartinWight,oneof the foundersof theso-called"EnglishSchool"of internationalheory,Burkewas "[t]heonly

political philosopherwho has turnedwholly frompolitical theoryto interna-

tionaltheory."2 heresurgenceof interest n Burkeas an internationalheorist

has not, however,generatedany consensus abouthow he mightbe classified

withinthe traditionsof internationalheory.Wightvariouslydividedthinkers

into trichotomousschools of Realists, Rationalists,andRevolutionaries,Ma-

chiavellians,Grotians,andKantians,or theorists of international narchy,ha-

bitual ntercourse, rmoralsolidarity;3more recent nternationalheoristshave

refined or supplemented hese categoriesto constructsimilartrinitarianradi-tions of Realism,Liberalism,andSocialism,andof EmpiricalRealism,Univer-

sal MoralOrder,andHistoricalReason.4Burke'splacewithinanyof thesetra-

ditions remainsuncertain.Debate over whetherhe was a realistoranidealist,a

My thanksto JackCenser,IstvanHont, SusanMarks,Damn McMahon,JuliaRudolph,andespecially JeremyWaldron or their commentson earlierversionsof this essay.

' See David P. Fidler and Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.), Empireand Community:Edmund

Burkes Writings nd Speeches on InternationalRelations(Boulder,1999).2 Martin

Wight, "Whyis There No International

Theory?"Diplomatic Investigations:Essays in the Theoryof InternationalPolitics, ed. HerbertButterfieldandMartinWight(Lon-

don, 1966), 20; on whom see Tim Dunne, InventingInternationalSociety:A History of the

English School (Houndmills,1998), 47-63.3 MartinWight,InternationalTheory:The ThreeTraditions, d. GabrieleWightandBrian

Porter(London, 1991); Wight, "An Anatomyof InternationalThought,"Review of Interna-

tionalStudies, 13 (1987), 221-27; Hedley Bull, "MartinWightandthe Theoryof International

Relations,"British Journal of InternationalStudies,2 (1976), 101-16 (repr.Wight,Interna-

tional Theory,ed. GabrieleWightandPorter, x-xxiii); BrianPorter,"Patterns f Thoughtand

Practice:MartinWight's 'InternationalTheory,'" The Reason of States:A Studyin Interna-

tionalPolitical Theory,ed. Michael Donelan(London, 1978),64-74.4 Michael W. Doyle, Waysof Warand Peace. Realism,Liberalism,and Socialism (New

York,1997), 18-20,andpassim; DavidBoucher,Political Theoriesof InternationalRelations:From Thucydides o the Present(Oxford, 1998), 28-43, andpassim.

617

Copyright000byJournalf theHistoryf Ideas,nc.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.64 on Thu, 22 Nov 2012 22:00:56 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





David Armitage

RationalistoraRevolutionist,has concludedvariously hathe was a"conserva-

tive crusader" ran"historical mpiricist,"a belateddualistor a ColdWarrior

beforethefact,or,mostegregiously,"aproto-Marxist, rmorepreciselyproto-Gramscian"heoristof hegemony.5The fact thatBurkeso obviouslyeludesdefi-

nitionmay putin doubt the analyticalutilityof closely-defined"traditions" finternationalheory.6

Burke'srelationship o conceptionsof reasonof stateprovidesa morepre-cise exampleof theconfusionwithinsuchtaxonomies.According o onerecent

historianof internationalheory,Burke"laid hefoundations" f the "conserva-

tive approacho InternationalRelations nformedby the two moder notionsof

state nterestandnecessity,by raisond 'etat";however, n thewordsof another,

"Burke .. was vehementlyopposedto the idea of Reasonof Stateanddid not

subscribe o theview thatnational nterestsoverridemoral aws."7Theassump-

tions onwhich each of these udgmentsrestsareclearly ncompatible: n theonehand that a "conservativeapproach"n the realmof foreignaffairsimplies an

espousalof reason of statedefined as theprimacyof "state nterestandneces-

sity," hatBurkedid indeedacknowledge;ontheotherhandthatreasonof state

is definedmoreexactlyas "theview thatnational nterestsoverridemoral aws"

andthatBurkedid not holdsuch a view, so couldnotbe definedas areason-of-

statetheorist.It mightof coursebe possible that Burkeheld variousviews on

suchmattersatvariouspointsin his long literaryandpoliticalcareeror thathe

argued ordifferingconceptionsof reasonof statein differingcontexts.Totest

such a hypothesisdemands a historicalaccount of Burke'srelationship o thetheoriesof reasonof stateheldby his contemporaries ndpredecessors.

5 R. J. Vincent, "EdmundBurke and the Theory of InternationalRelations,"Review ofInternationalStudies, 10 (1984), 205-18; David Boucher,"The Characterof the Historyof

Philosophyof InternationalRelations and theCase of EdmundBurke,"ReviewofInternational

Studies, 17 (1991), 127-48; Boucher,Political Theoriesof InternationalRelations, 308-29;

Vilho Harle,"Burke he InternationalTheorist-or theWarof the Sons of Lightand the Sons of

Darkness,"EuropeanValues n InternationalRelations,ed. Vilho Harle(London, 1990), 59,

72; KennethW.Thompson,Fathersof InternationalThought:TheLegacy of Political Theory

(BatonRouge, 1994), 100;FredHalliday,Rethinking nternationalRelations(London, 1994),

108-13. (Thanksto Anders Stephanson or this last reference.)6 JenniferM. Welsh, Edmund Burke and InternationalRelations (London, 1995), 6-9,

172-80; Welsh, "EdmundBurke and the Commonwealthof Europe:The CulturalBases of

InternationalOrder,"Classical Theoriesof InternationalRelations,eds. IanClark and IverB.

Neumann(Houndmills, 1996), 173-77, 183-86;Empireand Community,d. FidlerandWelsh,

38-39, 51-56;andsee Traditions f InternationalEthics,eds. TerryNardinand DavidR. Mapel

(Cambridge,1992);TimothyDunne,"Mythologyor Methodology?Traditionsn International

Theory,"Reviewof InternationalStudies, 19(1993), 305-18; IanClark,"Traditions f Thoughtand ClassicalTheories of InternationalRelations,"Classical Theoriesof InternationalRela-

tions, eds. ClarkandNeumann, 1-19.7Torbj6mL. Knutsen,A History of InternationalRelations Theory:An Introduction

(Manchester,1992), 141, 143; Boucher,Political Theoriesof InternationalRelations, 14.

618







EdmundBurke

ToplaceBurkewithintraditions f reasonof statemightseemto be asimple

categoryerror.After all, he famously scorned"dashingMachiavellianpoliti-

cians,"deplored"theodious maxims of a Machiavellianpolicy,"condemned

"thedreadfulmaxim of Machiavel hat ngreataffairsmenarenotto be wicked

by halves,"andidentifiedthe Discorsi as the inflammatoryextbookof Frenchrepublicanism.8His strictureson MachiavelliandMachiavellianismaffirmed

avant a lettre heclassicmoder accountof reasonof stateofferedby Friedrich

Meinecke,which counterposed"raisond'etat on the one hand,and ethics and

law on the other"andtracedthe emergenceof this separation o the heathen

Florentinewho hadgiven thetraditionts familiarnickname.9Suchaccountsof

reasonof stateand of Machiavellireinforced helong-standingnterpretationf

Burkeas the lastof the medieval theoristsof natural aw, forwhom no merely

humancalculationsof advantage rinterest ouldoverride he dictatesof divine

reason. freasonof staterepresentedhe doctrine hatpoliticalexpediencyshould

supersedemorallaw,thenBurke couldonly have been its (andMachiavelli's)

enemy:his "politics ... were groundedon recognitionof the universallaw of

reasonand ustice ordainedby Godas the foundationof a good community. n

thisrecognitionheMachiavellianchismbetweenpoliticsandmoralitys closed,

andit is exactlyinthisrespectthatBurkestandsapart romthe moder positiv-

ists andpragmatistswho in claiming him have diminishedhim."'0To accept

otherwisewould haveallowed himto fall back ntothehandsof thoseexponentsof expediency, heutilitarians ndthe secularists.

These accountsof reason of state and of natural aw arguablydepended

upona misapprehension f the moder natural aw theoryto whichBurkewas

heir. Thattheory,revivedinitiallyby Hugo Grotiusandelaboratedby his suc-

cessors, took its foundationalprincipleof self-preservationrom the Stoics.To

determinehelimitsof self-preservationsapractical rinciplealwaysdemanded

8 EdmundBurke,Reflectionson the Revolutionin France (1790), in The Writingsand

Speeches of EdmundBurke,ed. L. G. Mitchell,VIII, The FrenchRevolution1790-1794 (Ox-

ford, 1989),60, 132;Burke,Fourth Letteron a RegicidePeace (1795-96), in R. B. McDowell

(ed.), TheWritings ndSpeechesofEdmundBurke,ed. R. B. McDowell, IX,I: TheRevolution-

ary War1794-1797; II: Ireland(Oxford, 1991), 69 (alludingto Machiavelli,Discorsi, I. 27);

Burke,SecondLetteron a RegicidePeace (1796), Writings nd Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,

282.9 FriedrichMeinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in

ModernHistory, tr. Douglas Scott, intro. WernerStark(New Brunswick, 1998), 28, 29. In

Cosmopolitanism nd the NationState,tr.RobertB. Kimber Princeton,1970), 101, Meinecke

had arguedthat Burke "struck he firstdecisive blow againstconceptionsof the state thatthe

eighteenthcenturyhadformed on the basis of natural aw" andassimilatedhim to Machiavelli

and later advocates of Realpolitikwho had also recognizedthe importanceof "the irrational

componentsof the life of the state,for thepowerof traditions,customs,instinct,andimpulsive

feelings."10Burkes Politics. Selected Writings nd Speechesof EdmundBurke on Reform,Revolu-

tion,and War,Ross J. Hoffmanand PaulLevack(New York,1949),xv.

619







DavidArmitage

calculations of competing goods accordingto consequentialistcriteria."This

was trueno less for bodies politic andtheir rulersthanit was for private per-sons. Inthepoliticalrealm the fundamentaldetermining actorin any calcula-

tionof outcomeswould be necessity.In thecase of therespublica necessity,as

a principleof politicalaction,couldonly bejustifiedby anappealto that saluspopuli whichwas thesuprema ex, in Cicero'sfamouswords(De Legibus,III,

3). Cicero placed severe constraintsupon such calculationsin the municipal

sphere,andrestrictedhemto the ends of self-defense,security,ortheprotectionof liberty;anyactionstaken npursuitof suchends hadalsoto avoidinfamyand

to be in accordancewith therepublicanconstitution.'2n theirlaterrecensions

-shorn of the specifically Roman andrepublican egal contextwithin which

Cicerowrote-such theories could reconciletheprinciplesof natural aw with

strictlylimitedappealsto necessity in the interestsof the commongood; they

couldalso be extendedbeyondthemunicipal o the internationalealm.13This "moder" traditionof natural urisprudence,which restedupon the

arguments f Stoicethics,was utilitariano theextentthat t dependeduponthe

calibration f competinggoodsinrelation o specificends.ToplaceBurkewithin

thetheoryof reasonof statederived romthistraditionmpliesno inconsistencyinhis thought.Theopponentof "Machiavellian"xpediencycouldequallywell

be theproponentof Ciceronian"necessity": he differencebetweenthetwo de-

pendeduponthecriteriadeployed,the circumstanceshatcouldbe appealed o,

andtheconsequences hatweredesiredorimagined.TosituateBurkewithinthis

strainof earlymodemreasonof statetheoryalsomakesitpossibleto appreciate

just "how muchweight [he] attaches to considerationsbased on expediency,treated implyas apractical egard orconsequences."'4 Moreover, incereason

of state within this traditionwas consequentialistprecisely because it was

grounded n a neo-Stoicconceptionof naturalaw,to see Burkeas a reason-of-

statetheorist nthiscontextneatlyavoidsthe steriledisputeabout he truechar-

acter of his political thoughtas either utilitarianor naturalurisprudential.'5t

could be describedas both,so long as the traditionof naturalurisprudencen

questionwas the "moder" one initiatedby Grotiusand so long as the utilitari-

1RichardTuck, "The 'Modem' Theory of NaturalLaw,"The Languages of Political

Theory n Early-ModernEurope,ed. Anthony Pagden(Cambridge,1987), 99-119;Tuck,Phi-

losophyand Government,1572-1651 (Cambridge,1993), 172-76.12Norberto de Sousa, "Cicero on the Themes of Necessity and Public Utility,"unpub-

lishedpaperpresented o the Seminar,"The Politics of Necessity andthe Languageof Reason

of State,"King's College, Cambridge,22 January1993.

13 RichardTuck, TheRights of Warand Peace: Political Thoughtand the International

OrderfromGrotius to Kant (Oxford, 1999), 18-23, 29-31.

14 Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty:An IntellectualHistory of Political Economyin

Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge,1996), 196.15 John Dinwiddy, "Utility and Natural Law in Burke's Thought:A Reconsideration,"

Studies in Burkeand His Time,16 (1974), 107, 123-25.

620







EdmundBurke

anism nquestionwas of thisconsequentialist ind.The assertion hat"thenatu-

ral-law radition ndconsequentialism reopposedatavery deeplevel" s there-

forenottrueof all formsof naturalurisprudence revenof consequentialism;16

noris it necessaryto choose betweenthemto characterizeBurke'spoliticalor

internationalhought.Burke'sreason-of-state heorycould be appliedequallyto theinternalcon-

stitution and the externalrelationsof a state. In this way its scope extended

beyondthe internalpoliticaldeterminationsaid downby Ciceroto the interna-

tionalrealmtreatedby the "moder" theoristsof natural aw like Grotius.Rea-

son of state was thus Janus-faced ike its conceptualnear-neighborsn earlymoder political thought,sovereignty,andthe balanceof power.7 Like them,

reasonof state crossed the boundarybetweenpolitical theory,defined as the

theoryof legitimacyanddistribution f powerwithinthestate,and nternational

theory.Inbothspheresreasonof stateacknowledged hecompulsionsof neces-sity; its particular heoreticalconcernwas thereforewith the contingent,the

extraordinary,ndthe unforeseeable."Ahigh degreeof causalnecessity,"ar-

guedMeinecke,"which heagenthimself is accustomed o conceiveas absolute

andinescapable,and to feel most profoundly, s partof the very essence of all

actionpromptedby raisond 'etat."'8 incenecessityhasno law(necessitasnon

habetlegem),reasonof statecouldnotbe codifiedorlegislated.Reasonof state

alonecouldnotdeterminewhich circumstancesweretrulycases of extremene-

cessityandhencewhichpreciseoccasionscouldpermit heoverriding f custom

and law. It could only lay down norms fromwhich such exceptionscould be

derived,andmoregenerally tprovidedaconsequentialistmeansof applying he

normsof natural aw. In these regardsreasonof statewas close to resistance

theorywhich alsodealtwithextremityandoverwhelmingnecessity.Resistance

theorydid, however, aydownstringent onditionsunderwhichrebellionmightbejustified,even if only in retrospect,and offereda widerrangeof agentsthe

possibility of making udgmentsof necessity,even to the pointof democratic

agency.The compulsionof necessity demanded n reasonof statetheorywas

assumed o beuniversallyrecognizablebutonlyunderparticular ircumstances

by specific,usually sovereign,agents.Theconditionswhichwouldmakeneces-

sity bothevident andcompellingcould neverbe definedwith any precision; t

thereforedemandedprincelyor consiliardiscretionfor its application.These

requirements lacedit firmly amongthe arcana imperiiandleft it open to the

16Pace Joseph Boyle, "NaturalLaw and InternationalEthics,"in Traditionsof Interna-

tional Ethics, eds. Nardinand Mapel, 119;compareCarlFriedrich,ConstitutionalReason of

State: The Survivalof the ConstitutionalOrder(Providence,R.I., 1957), 31-32.

17F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty(Cambridge,19862),chs. 4-5; M. S. Anderson,The Rise ofModernDiplomacy,1450-1919 (London, 1993), 150-54.

18Meinecke, Machiavellism, 6

621







DavidArmitage

charge especially rom hosewhowere excluded rom udging) hat t wasmerely

subjective,arbitrary,ndunconstrainable.

Because reason of state,whethermunicipalor international,was morally

ambivalent, wotypesmightlegitimatelybe inferred,onenatural ndhence us-

tifiable,the othermerelyputativeandhencereprehensible.19heEnglishWhigtraditionwhichprecededBurkeanduponwhichhe drewcontainedexamplesof

these two strainsof reasonof state. Forexample,theMarquisof Halifaxarguedin 1684 that"there s a naturalreasonof State,an undefinable hinggrounded

upontheCommongood of mankind,which is immortall,andinall changesand

RevolutionsstillpreservethtsOriginallrightof savingaNation,whenthe Let-

ter of the Lawperhapswoulddestroy t."20 ReallNecessity,"he lateraffirmed,

"isnotto bee resisted,andpretendednecessity is not tobee alleadged."21ince

politiciansstill allegednecessity nonetheless,it would be distrustedas simply

one of the"Arcana mperii," omplainedJohnToland n 1701,"when nrealityReason of State s nothingelse but therightreasonof managing heaffairsof the

Stateat homeandabroad,according o the Constitution f theGovernment, nd

withregard o theInterestor Powerof otherNations."22 hedifficultyofjudg-

ing whether reason of statewas naturalanddirected egitimatelytowards the

interestof thecommunity,or contrived or the benefitof therulersalone,made

it bothcontestableandopento apparently pposingconstructions, ven within

thethoughtof a single theorist.As Burkehimselfnotedin his ThirdLetteron a

RegicidePeace (1796-97), "Necessity,as it hasno law,so it has no shame;but

moralnecessityis not like metaphysical,or evenphysical.In thatcategory, t isawordof loose signification,andconveys different deasto differentminds."23

Burke'sengagementwith the languageof reason of stateranfrom his first

publishedpoliticalwork,the Vindication f NaturalSociety(1756), to the last,

the ThirdLetter on a RegicidePeace. In this he remarkedn passingthat"rea-

son of state and common-sense are two things";24hirty years earlier, n the

Vindication,he had satirizedcontemporary onsequentialismalong the same

lines:

19MaurizioViroli,FromPolitics to Reasonof State: TheAcquisitionand Transformation

of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge,1992), 273-74.20

GeorgeSavile,Marquisof Halifax,The Characterof a Trimmer1684), in The Works f

GeorgeSavileMarquis of Halifax, ed. MarkN. Brown(3 vols.; Oxford, 1989), I, 191.21

Halifax, "Prerogative" 1685-88?), in Works f GeorgeSavile Marquisof Halifax, ed.

Brown,II,41.22 [JohnToland,]TheArtof Governingby Partys (London, 1701), 93-94.23

Burke, ThirdLetter on a Regicide Peace (1796-97), in Writingsand Speeches, ed.

McDowell, IX, 344.24

Burke,ThirdLetter on a RegicidePeace, in Writings nd Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,

300.

622







EdmundBurke

All Writerson the Science of Policy are agreed,andthey agreewith

Experience, hatall Governmentsmustfrequentlynfringe he Rulesof

Justice to support hemselves;thatTruthmustgive way to Dissimula-

tion;HonestytoConvenience;andHumanitytselfto thereigningInter-

est.TheWhole of thisMysteryof Iniquity s calledtheReasonof State.It is a Reason,which I own I cannotpenetrate.What Sortof a Protec-

tion is this of the general Right, that is maintainedby infringingthe

Rightsof Particulars?What sortof Justiceis this,which is inforcedbyBreaches of its own Laws? ... For my part, I say what a plain Man

wouldsayon such anOccasion.Icanneverbelieve, thatanyInstitution

agreeable oNature,andproper orMankind, ouldfinditnecessary,or

evenexpedient nanyCase whatsoever o do,whatthebestand worthi-

est Instinctsof Mankindwarn us to avoid.25

The publicationof Bolingbroke'sdeistic writings in 1754 andof Rousseau's

second Discourse in 1755provided he immediate argets or theVindication's

ironicattempt o undermineargumentsn favorof natural eligionby reducing

equivalentargumentsor natural ocietyad absurdum.26owever,Burke'star-

get inthispassageof the Vindicationwas neitherBolingbrokenorRousseaubut

Hume. In the Treatiseof HumanNature(1739-40) Humehadarguedthat the

laws of nationsdidnot supersede he laws of nature.Both personsand bodies

politic were boundby the same duties to upholdpropertyandpromises;how-

ever,theobligation s weakerforprinces hanforprivatepersons:"themoralityof princeshas the same extent,yet it has not the same orce as thatof private

persons," n proportion o the advantages o be gainedby nationsrather han

individuals romsecurityof property,headministrationfjustice, andtheadju-

dication of equity,he argued.27When Hume returned o this question in the

EnquiryConcerning hePrinciplesofMorals (1751), herestated hedistinction

inthelanguage freasonof stateandprovidedheimmediate ccasion or Burke's

satire n the Vindication:

25 [Burke,]A Vindicationof Natural Society (1756), in The Writingsand Speeches ofEdmundBurke,ed. T. O. McLoughlinand JamesT. Boulton, I, TheEarly Writings Oxford,

1997), 154. Cf. Rousseau's almostexactly contemporaneousemarks n "The State of War" c.

1755-56), in Rousseau: The Social Contractand OtherLater Political Writings,ed. Victor

Gourevitch(Cambridge,1997), 163: "accordingto the ideas of princes abouttheir absolute

independence, orcealone,speaking o citizens in theguise of lawandforeigners n theguiseof

reasonof state, deprivesthe latter of the power and the formerof the will to resist, so that

everywherethe vain name of justice only serves as a shield for violence."

26 J. C. Weston, Jr.,"The Ironic Purposeof Burke's VindicationVindicated,"JHI, 19

(1958), 435-41; Burke:Pre-RevolutionaryWritings, d. Ian Harris Cambridge,1993), 4-6.27 David Hume, A Treatiseof HumanNature (1739-40), L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H.

Nidditch(Oxford, 19782),567-68 (III. ii. 11,"Ofthe laws of nations").

623







DavidArmitage

The observance fjustice,thoughusefulamong[nations],s notguarded

by so stronga necessityas it is amongindividuals;andthe moralobli-

gation holdsproportionwith the usefulness.All politicianswill allow,

and most philosophers,thatREASON OF STATEmay, in particular

emergencies,dispensewith therulesofjustice,and nvalidateanytreatyor alliance,where the strictobservanceof it wouldbe prejudicial, n a

considerabledegree, to either of the contractingparties.But nothingless than the most extremenecessity, it is confessed, canjustify indi-

viduals in a breachof promise,or an invasionof thepropertiesof oth-

ers.28

Burke's ironicrecension of Hume left thetheoretical oundationsof this argu-mentforactingin accordancewithreasonof stateunscathed.Onlyif civil soci-

ety itself were illegitimatewould such reasonof state be unconscionable. f, asBurke aterargued ntheReflections,governmentwas anecessary"contrivance

of human wisdom to providefor humanwants" andif "menhave a rightthat

thesewants shouldbeprovided orbythiswisdom," tfollowedthatgovernmentwas empowered o providefor those wantsby any necessarymeans:the indi-

vidualmembers of civil society hadalreadyresignedto the government heir

"rightof self-defense,thefirst aw of nature," ndhadtherefore ededadjudica-

tions of necessityto theirgovernors.29Even within the municipalsphere,Burkeargued,any law might be sus-

pended, houghonlyunder hecompulsionof extremenecessityand n the inter-est of the preservationof the political community.ConorCruise O'Brienhas

takensuch an admission to be "one of those distressingmatters,abounding n

theBurkeanuniverse, orwhichsomearrangementf veils wasnormallyappro-

priate."30 owever,theprincipleseems to have causedBurke ittledistressand

wouldhardlyhavebeen a revelation o him.As he toldtheHouseof Commons

in 1780,thegreatpatentoffices intheExchequer ouldnotbe sweptawayin the

nameof EconomicalReformbecause,as officesheldforlife, theywereaspecies

of propertyandonlynecessitycould override heprincipleof legitimateposses-

sion."Thereareoccasionsofpublicknecessity,so vast,so clear,so evident,"he

neverthelessadmitted,"that hey supersedeall laws. Lawbeing madeonly for

the benefit of the community,no law can set itself up againstthe cause and

28 David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), ed. Tom L.

Beauchamp Oxford, 1998), 100 (Section IV,"OfPoliticalSociety").29

Burke,Reflectionson theRevolution nFrance, in Writings ndSpeeches,ed. Mitchell,

VIII, 110;andsee lain Hampsher-Monk, Burkeand the Religious Sourcesof SkepticalCon-

servatism," n TheSkeptical TraditionAround1800. Skepticism n Philosophy,Science, and

Society, ed. JohanVanderZandeand RichardH. Popkin(Dordrecht,1998), 235-59.

30Conor CruiseO'Brien, TheSuspectingGlance (London,1972), 34-35.

624







Edmund Burke

reason of all law."31Only such overmastering compulsion, defined in accor-

dance with public necessity (the Ciceronian utilitas publica or utilitas rei

publicce), could justify an appeal to reason of state. On the same grounds, he

charged that the Protestant Association's opposition to Catholic relief, which

they "dignified by the name of reason of state, and security for constitutions andcommonwealths" was a mere "receipt of policy, made up of a detestable com-

pound of malice, cowardice, and sloth," and hence not a legitimate invocation of

the principle.32Because the appeal to necessity was only justifiable for the ben-

efit of the whole community and ultimately the preservation of society itself, the

occasions on which it could legitimately be invoked had to be extraordinaryand

overmastering: as Burke argued consistently during the impeachment of Warren

Hastings, it could therefore not be raised into a regular principle of govern-

ment.33

Burke arguedthatonly the Glorious Revolution fulfilled these exacting con-ditions in recent English history and hence provided a reliable standardagainst

which to judge later claims of public necessity. Richard Price's assertion that

1688 had made cashiering kings a regular principle of the British constitution

forced Burke to refine this theory of state necessity. Against Price, Burke argued

that the Revolution had been "an act of necessity, in the strictest moral sense in

which necessity can be taken," and that it could not therefore be erected into a

constitutional precedent. The extremity of the situation showed that it was pos-

sible "to reconcile the use of both a fixed rule and an occasional deviation" and

that this was the only way to remedy such an emergency without a complete

dissolution of government.34This argumentresuscitated a Torymeans to defend

the Whig doctrine of the ancient constitution in the aftermathof 1688; by adopt-

ing it Burke was also following the lead of the nervous Whig prosecutors of

Henry Sacheverell in 1712.35This particular argument from necessity had first

been employed as a justification of the Revolution by Tories such as Edmund

31 EdmundBurke,"Speechon Presenting o the House of Commons,a Planfor the Better

Securityof the Independenceof Parliament,and the (EconomicalReformationof the Civil and

OtherEstablishments"1780), in TheWorks f theRightHonourableEdmundBurke(16 vols.;London,1803-27),III,308-9.

32 EdmundBurke,"Speechat the Guildhall n Bristol,Previousto theLate Electionin that

City,Upon CertainPointsRelativeto his ParliamentaryConduct" 1780), in Works f Edmund

Burke,III,418.

33Carl B. Cone,EdmundBurke and the Natureof Politics (2 vols.; Lexington,Ky., 1957-

64), II, 205-7; W. H. Greenleaf,"Burke and StateNecessity: The Case of WarrenHastings,"Staatsrdson.StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegriff,ed.RomanSchnur Berlin,1975),

549-67; FrederickG. Whelan,EdmundBurke andIndia:Political Moralityand Empire(Pitts-

burgh,1996), 188-93, 199-202.

34 RichardPrice,A Discourse on the Love of our Country(London, 17893),34; Burke,

Reflectionson theRevolution n France, in Mitchell(ed.), Writings ndSpeeches,VIII,68, 72.

35MarkGoldie,"ToryPoliticalThought,1689-1714"(PhDdiss., Cambridge,1978),328;

J. G. A. Pocock, TheAncient Constitutionand the Feudal Law: A Reissue with Retrospect

(Cambridge,1987), 381.

625







DavidArmitage

BohunandThomasLong,as well as by the Whig CharlesBlount,who had all

relieduponGrotius ojustify a limitedrightof resistance,as haddefacto theo-

ristslikeAnthonyAschamearlier n the seventeenthcentury.36n Book I of De

lure Belli ac Pacis (1625) Grotiusadmitted hat even some of the laws of God

carrieda tacitexceptionin cases of extremeand imminentperil, thoughin nocase would thisbe defensibleif considerationof the commongood were to be

abandoned.On suchminimalistgroundsresistancewouldbejustifiedagainsta

rulerwho hadrenouncedhis governmentalauthority, lienatedhis kingdom,or

otherwisemadehimselfanenemy o thepeople.37tripped f itsexplicitlyGrotian

roots, thoughmaintaining he appealto self-preservation, his argumentpro-vided theWhigmanagersof Sacheverell's mpeachmentwithjust theweapon

theyneededto combat hedoctrineof non-resistancewithoutraising hespecterof a generalandunrestricted ightof rebellion.38 urkequotedthetranscript f

the Sacheverell trial at length in the Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs

(1791) to show (in RobertWalpole'swords) thatonly "theutmostnecessity

ought ... to engage a nation, in its own defense,for thepreservationof the

whole."39

Duringthedebateon the FrenchRevolution,reasonof statein the Grotian

traditionprovidedBurke with an argumento show thatthe events of 1688 (in

England)and 1789 (in France)were similar in that each presenteda case of

imminentdanger hat ustifiedarmed ntervention ndhencefulfilledthe condi-

tionsof"necessity."ThisargumentromnecessitytherebysuppliedBurkewith

aweaponagainst hoseEnglishJacobinswho assimilated he FrenchRevolutionto the GloriousRevolution,and it helpedhim to show that 1789 was indefen-

sible forjust the samereasonsthat 1688had beenjustifiable.Burkecouldthen

arguethatthe FrenchRevolution was uniquelythreatening,because itjeopar-

dized the true interests of the states of Europewhich were the basis of their

natural easonsof state.On thesegrounds,acrusadeagainst heFrenchRevolu-

36 MarkGoldie,"EdmundBohun andJus Gentium n the RevolutionDebate, 1689-1693,"

TheHistoricalJournal, 20 (1977), 569-86;JohnM.Wallace,DestinyHis Choice. TheLoyalism

of AndrewMarvell(Cambridge,1968), 32-35. AnthonyAscham,A Discourse: Whereins Ex-

amined What s ParticularlyLawful during the Confusionsand Revolutionsof Government

(London, 1648) was republishedas A SeasonableDiscourse..., in 1689.

37 Hugo Grotius,De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625), I. 4. 7-14, cited for exampleby [Charles

Blount,]TheProceedings of the PresentParliamentJustifiedby the Opinionof the MostJudi-

cious and LearnedHugo Grotius(London, 1689); [ThomasLong,] TheHistorian Unmask'd

(London, 1689), 22, 35.

38 Geoffrey Holmes, The Trialof Dr Sacheverell(London, 1973), 139; Peter N. Miller,

Defining the CommonGood:Empire,Religionand Philosophyin Eighteenth-Century ritain

(Cambridge,1994), 79-87.

39 Burke,An Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs(1791), in Daniel E. Ritchie (ed.),EdmundBurke,FurtherReflectionson theRevolution n France (Indianapolis,1992), 131;for

Burke's use of the trial see ibid., 124-44.

626







EdmundBurke

tion would be "themost clearlyjust andnecessarywar,thatthis or any other

nationever carriedon,"40 n accordancewiththeprinciplesof thelaw of nations

laid downby the SwissjuristEmerichde Vattel. ForBurkethe crucialdistinc-

tion was thatEnglandbefore 1688 was like Franceafterandnot before 1789.

Though heEnglishJacobinswanted o seethe French epublicans s theequiva-lentof theWhigs, forBurketheywere not only theequivalentof theJacobites

butwere in factmorelike LouisXIV in theirdesirefor universalmonarchy.

Burke'sappeal o necessityrevealedtheconceptualdifferencebetweenthe

Glorious Revolutionand the FrenchRevolution.Theformerhad been limited,

strategic,andconstrained reciselybytheprincipleofsaluspopuli; thelatter et

fairto unleash llimitableconsequencesas a resultof its unprincipled nd unre-

strictedreasons of state that would endanger he integrityof all states.This, at

least,was thedirectionof Burke'sargumentn theyearsfollowing thepublica-

tion of theReflectionsand markeda shift in his conceptionof reasonof statebetween 1790 and1793.However,thefundamental rgument,derived romne-

cessity andbaseduponvestiges of the Romanandneo-Roman heoryof reason

of state,was contained ntheReflections tself.The GloriousRevolutionandthe

FrenchRevolutioncould bedistinguished ccording othetrueandfalseappealsto necessity each hadinspired.Withinthe termsof the iusgentiumEngland n

1688andFranceafter 1793 becameconceptuallyequivalentbecauseeach state

was internallydivided,eachwas threatened y or itself threatened n imminent

danger,and hence each couldjustifiably necessitatearmedintervention.The

distinction ay in the fact that Franceafter1793 (under hemilitant,oppressiveandoutwardlyaggressive Directory)was equatedwithEngland n 1688(under

the rule of thetyrannicalJamesII).As Burkeputit in a startlingpassageof the

Reflections,thick with classical allusions and foundedupon an argument or

conquestthatwas originallyTory,notWhig:

Laws arecommanded o holdtheirtonguesagainstarms;andtribunals

fall to thegroundwiththepeacetheyare no longerableto uphold.The

Revolution of 1688 was obtainedby a just war, in the only case in

which any war,and much more a civil war,can be just. "Justabella

quibus necessaria."41

Burkehere alluded o two of the mostfrequently-cited lassicalmottos us-

tifying force over law -Cicero's maxim silent leges interarmas(ProMilone,

IV.11)andthespeechof Pontius he Samnite n whichheargued hat heRoman

40Burke,A Letter to a Noble Lord(1796), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,

168.41 Burke,Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell,

VIII,80.

627







DavidArmitage

rejectionof the Samnites'conciliatoryoverturesafterthe battleof the Caudine

Forks ustifiedthem ingoingto war ongroundsof necessity:iustumest bellum,

Samnites,quibusnecessarium(Livy,Histories, IX. 1. 10). In De lure Belli ac

Pacis Grotiushadsimilarlyargued hatonly themunicipal aws of a particular

communityare "silent .. inthemidst of arms"while thenaturalawremains nforce.Grotius urtherargued hatanyonewho has given anotherust cause for

war cannot claim to be actingdefensively when they are attacked;ust so the

Samniteswerejustifiedin attacking heRomansafterthe battleof the Caudine

Forks.42When Romanimplacabilitydemandedextrememeasures n response,warbecameanecessity,andarmsbecame awful forthosewhoweredeprivedof

all otherhope. In just such terms,Burkeconcludedthatthe intransigenceof

JamesIIhadbeen a similar"case of war,and not of constitution,""an extraor-

dinaryquestionof state,andwholly outof law."43

Externalntervention,nthis casebythe ProtestantPrinceof Orangeandhisarmy,had beenjustified in England's nternalaffairs,as a civil waroutsidethe

bounds of municipal aw became a publicwar betweentwo princesunderthe

principlesof the ius gentium.In such a contestvictory generateda legitimate

appeal o conquest.On thesegrounds twas possibleto see William's nterven-

tion in 1688 as an exampleof ajust warand his victoryoverJamesas a legiti-mate actof conquest.44t is possible thatBurke herewas thinkingprimarilyas

anIrishman: heWilliamiteWarof 1689-91 thatmarked he Irishphaseof the

Glorious Revolutionwas indeeda war of conquest,as the bloodless standoff

between JamesIIandthe futureWilliamIIIhadhardlybeeninEngland.45 ow-

ever, more easily documented s Burke'sdebthere to Vattel.In Le Droit des

Gens (1758) Vattelarguedthatevery foreign power had a rightto aid an op-

pressedpeople if insupportable yrannyhad driventhem to rebellion,just as

"[t]heEnglishjustly complainedof JamesII"in 1688. "Whenevermattersare

carriedso faras to producea civil war, foreign powers may assist thatparty

which appears o them to havejustice on its side,"moreover,"everyforeign

powerhas aright o succouranoppressedpeoplewho implore heirassistance."

On these groundsWilliamof Orangehadjustly intervenedon the side of the

injuredparties, hepeopleof England.46

42 Grotius,De lure Belli ac Pacis, "Prolegomena"6; II. 1. 18;andsee DavidJ.Bederman,

"Receptionof the ClassicalTraditionn InternationalLaw: Grotius'sDe Jure Belli ac Pacis,"

Grotiana,16/17 (1995/96), 32.43Burke,Reflectionson the Revolution n France, in Writings nd Speeches,ed. Mitchell,

VIII,80.44MartynP.Thompson,"TheIdea of Conquest n the Controversiesoverthe 1688Revolu-

tion,"JHI, 38 (1977), 33-46; MarkGoldie, "CharlesBlount's Intention n WritingKing Will-

iam and QueenMary Conquerors 1693),"Notes and Queries,223 (1978), 527-32.

45 The argument hatBurke's divided Irishness nflectedthe whole courseof this political

thinking s the burdenof Conor CruiseO'Brien,The GreatMelody:A ThematicBiographyandCommentedAnthology of EdmundBurke(London, 1992).

46 Emerichde Vattel,Le Droit des Gens(Neuchatel, 1758), II. 4. 56; III. 18. 296.

628







Edmund Burke

Vattel's use of the Glorious Revolution to justify intervention by foreign

powers and Burke's argument that the Revolution presented a case of just war

were in fact the same argument, each with the conclusion that 1688 had been a

just war precisely because intervention from outside had been justified accord-

ing to Vattel's criteria. Burke used just this argument, with direct support fromVattel, in Thoughts on French Affairs (1791) to show that "[i]n this state of

things (that is in the case of a divided kingdom) by the law of nations, Great

Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part she pleases." "For this,"

he had earlier counselled his son, "consult a very republican writer Vattell."47

This appeal to Vattel harked back to an earlier debate on the morality of war,

when -in the case of British capture of the Dutch island of St Eustatius in 1781

during the American War- Burke had invoked "Vattel as being the latest and

best [exponent of natural law], and whose testimony he preferred;because, be-

ing a modem writer,he expresses the sense of the day in which we live."48In thecase of the French Revolution, however, the question ofjustice was more vexed

and controvertible. According to Vattel, it was "a very celebrated question, and

of the highest importance"whether the aggrandisement of a neighboring power

could be a sufficient andjust reason for war.49Although Grotius and later Wolff

had specifically argued that it could never be ajust grounds for war "to take up

arms in order to weaken a growing power" simply because it might become a

source of danger,50Vattel disagreed, andprovided Burke with just the reason-of-

state argument he needed to justify a holy war against the Directory. Vattel ar-

gued that the safety of a state could be so threatened by a looming neighbor that

it would be just to anticipate aggression in the interests of the liberty and order

of the whole of Europe, as had been the case during the War of the Spanish

Succession.5'

He argued further that modem Europe was now a kind of republic in which

all of the formerly separate nations were bound together by the ties of common

interest. The balance of power was the safeguard of those common interests and

provided the means of guaranteeing liberty for Europe. A purely utilitarian cal-

47 EdmundBurke, Thoughtson FrenchAffairs (1791), in Ritchie (ed.), FurtherReflec-tions on the Revolution in France, 207; Burke to RichardBurke,Jr.,5 August 1791, in The

Correspondence f EdmundBurke:VIJuly 1789-December1791, ed. AlfredCobbanandRob-

ertA. Smith (Cambridge,1967), 317.48 EdmundBurke, "Speech on the Seizure and Confiscation of PrivatePropertyin St

Eustatius,"14 May 1781, in TheParliamentaryHistoryof EnglandfromtheEarliest Times o

1803 (36 vols.; London,1806-20),XXII, col. 231; and see RonaldHurst,The GoldenRock.An

Episodeof theAmerican Warof Independence:1775-1783 (London, 1996).49Vattel,Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42.

50Grotius,De lureBelli ac Pacis, II. 1. 17;II. 22. 5;ChristianWolff,Jus GentiumMethodo

ScientificaPertractatum 1749), ?? 640, 651-52;AlfredVagtsandDetlev F. Vagts,"TheBal-

ance of Powerin InternationalLaw: A Historyof an Idea,"AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw, 73 (1979), 562; Tuck,Rightsof Warand Peace, 189-90.

51 Vattel,Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42-44.

629







David Armitage

culationwould notbe enoughtojustify preventiveaggression,andonly a pre-

emptiveresponse o athreatenednjurycouldbe sufficient ustificationfor war.

Confederaciesmightbe thebestmeans of defendingagainstsuchinjuries,butif

theyfailed,anevidentlyaggressivepowerwhich threatenedhe libertiesof Eu-

rope shouldbe opposed andweakenedin the interestsof the greatcommon-wealthand in accordancewithjustice andprobity.52MichaelWalzerhas taken

Burke o be theopponentandVattel heproponentof interventiono upholdthe

balanceof powerthatmaintained hestabilityof theEuropean"republic"; ow-

ever,whateverBurke'sviews mayhavebeen in 1760,by 1793he had come to

agreewith Vattel hat suchintervention n defense of the balanceof powerwas

justifiable.53Vattel'skeyhistoricalexampleof such ustifiableprecautionwastheWarof

the SpanishSuccession. In thatwar, as Whigs had arguedat the time and as

Vattelagreedhalf a century ater,LouisXIV hadpresenteda direthreat o thewhole Europeanorderby his designs foruniversalmonarchy.54ecauseBurke

similarlysaw 1789 inthelightof 1688,hejudgedtheWaragainst heDirectoryto be conceptuallyequivalent o the Warof the SpanishSuccession.TheTreatyof Utrecht hathad ended thatwar enshrined he balanceof poweras the central

regulatingprincipleof the international rder n oppositionto the threatof uni-

versal monarchyfrom a power such as Louis XIV's France.Reason of state

after 1713 thereforemade preventive aggressionjustifiable in defense of the

balanceagainstaspiringuniversalmonarchs.TheWhiggishidiomof universal

monarchyand the memoryof the warsthat had spawnedit clearlylay behindBurke'swarning n theLetters on a RegicidePeace that"France,on hernew

system, means to form a universalempire,by producinga universalrevolu-

tion."55This was the logical successor to Burke'sargument n theReflectionsthattheFrenchRevolution andits aftermath houldbe seen in lightof theGlo-

riousRevolution.Theanalogywas usefulpreciselybecausethecommonmax-

ims of European ivilizationandsecurityso menacingly hreatened y the"new

52Vattel,Droit des Gens,III. 3. 44, 47-49.53 MichaelWalzer,Just and UnjustWars New York, 19922),76-80, quotingBurke's An-

nual Register,3 (1760), 2; and see GaetanoL. Vincitorio,"EdmundBurkeandthe FirstParti-

tion of Poland: Britain andthe Crisis of 1772 in the 'GreatRepublic,"'Crisis in the "Great

Republic":EssaysPresentedto Ross J. Hoffman,ed. GaetanoL. Vincitorio(New York,1969),33-42.

54JohnRobertson,"UniversalMonarchyandthe Libertiesof Europe:DavidHume'sCri-

tiqueof anEnglishWhig Doctrine,"Political Discourse in EarlyModernBritain,ed. Nicholas

Phillipsonand QuentinSkinner(Cambridge,1993), 356-68.55 EdmundBurke, ThirdLetter on a Regicide Peace, in McDowell (ed.), Writingsand

Speeches,IX, 340. ThomasL. Pangleand Peter J. Ahrensdorf,JusticeAmongNations:On the

MoralBasis of Power andPeace (Lawrence,Kan., 1999), 184, arguethat"it is in his loathing

of universalempirethatBurke standsfurthest, n his conceptionof internationalelations,fromhis otherwise favoriteauthority, he RomanpatriotCicero,"though this fails to distinguishbetween differingconceptionsof "universalempire"(on which see, for example,Cicero,De

Officiis,II. 27).

630







EdmundBurke

system"of the Frenchandupheldby Vattel.56 attel'sargumentwas partlythe

productof theopeningphaseof the Seven Years'War,andin it he assumed as

Bolingbroke,Hume, Robertson,and Gibbonalso did57- that the balanceof

power as enshrined n the Treatyof Utrechtwas the basis of the international

order.Burkereturned o thesameoriginto argue hat,"[i]fto preventLouistheXIVth fromimposinghis religionwas just, a warto preventthe murderers f

LouisXVIth fromimposingtheirirreligionuponus is just."58

TheRevolutionaryWarswould in due course shatter heEuropeanbalance

of power and, as Paul Schroederhas argued,therebyirreversibly ransform

Europeanpolitics.59Burkewas theprophetof thetransformation, ndhe fore-

sawitwiththehelpof Vattel, n accordancewithpost-Utrecht easonof state. In

theRemarkson thePolicy of theAllies (1793) he cited Vattelto show thatthe

right o intervenebecameadutyincertaincircumstances, ccording o "whether

it be a bonafide charityto a party,and a prudentprecautionwith regardto

yourself."As Burkeshowed with anappendixof extracts romVattel, nterven-

tion againstFrancewould be a "prudentprecaution" or all Europeanstates

preciselybecausethe Frenchrepublicpresentedanunprecedentedhreat o their

natural easonsof state their interests, heirsecurity,andaboveall theirshared

political maximsas partnersn the commonwealthof Europe.60 roximity,vi-

cinity,andlegitimateapprehension f danger hereforeustifiedintervention: s

Burkecrisplysummarizedhispositionin 1796,"Ishouldcertainlydreadmore

from a wild cat in my bed-chamber, han from all the lions that roar in the

desertsbeyondAlgiers."61

56 See J. G.A. Pocock,BarbarismandReligion,I: TheEnlightenments f EdwardGibbon,

1737-1764 (Cambridge,1999), 109-13, 133-34, 138-39,andBarbarismandReligion,II:Nar-

ratives of Civil Government Cambridge,1999), 170, 219, 275-77.57Bolingbroke Defence of the Treatyof Utrecht,ed. G. M. Trevelyan Cambridge,1932);

David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power"(1752), in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Hume, Essays:

Moral,Political andLiterary(Indianapolis,1987),338-41; FrederickG. Whelan,"Robertson,

Hume,andthe Balanceof Power,"HumeStudies,21 (1995), 315-32; JeremyBlack, "Gibbon

and InternationalRelations,"Edward Gibbon and Empire,ed. RosamondMcKitterickand

RolandQuinault Cambridge, 1997), 225-28.58 EdmundBurke,First Letteron a RegicidePeace (1796), in Writingsand Speeches,ed.

McDowell, IX, 238; compareBurke,A Letterto a Memberof theNationalAssembly 1791), in

Writings ndSpeeches,ed. Mitchell, VIII,306: "Theprincesof Europe, n thebeginningof this

century,didwell not to suffer themonarchyof France o swallowuptheothers.Theyoughtnot

now, in my opinion,to suffer all the monarchiesandcommonwealths o be swallowedup in the

gulphof this pollutedanarchy."59 Paul W.Schroeder,TheTransformationf EuropeanPolitics, 1763-1848(Oxford,1994).60 EdmundBurke,Remarkson the Policy of theAllies (1793), in Writings nd Speeches,

ed. Mitchell, VIII, 474; the "Appendix"of extractsfromVattel is inexplicablyomittedfrom

this edition. For a fragmentof Burke'sworkingnotes on Vattel see Sheffield City Libraries

WentworthWoodhouseMuniments,10/27, (passagetranscribed rom Vattel,Droit des Gens,

II. 12. 196-97,printed n Burke,Remarkson thePolicy of the Allies [London,1793],207-9).61 Burke,First Letter on a RegicidePeace in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,

259 (arguingagainstCharlesJamesFox's claim that the Frenchrepublicshould be toleratedon

the same groundsthatjustified keeping a consul in Algiers).

631







David Armitage

Burkeargued n the Thoughtson FrenchAffairs(1791) that,thoughthere

hadbeenmany nternal evolutionswithin hegovernments f Europe,none(noteventheGloriousRevolution)hadeffectsbeyondtheirown limitedterritories.

However,he added:

ThepresentRevolution n Franceseems to me to be quiteof another

character nddescription;andto bearlittle resemblanceor analogyto

anyof thosewhichhave beenbroughtabout nEurope,upon principles

merely political.It is aRevolutionof doctrineandtheoretickdogma.It

hasamuchgreater esemblanceothosechangeswhichhave beenmade

uponreligiousgrounds,nwhich a spiritof proselytismmakesanessen-

tial part.The last Revolutionof doctrine andtheorywhich has happened n

Europe, s theReformation .. [the]effect [of which]was to introduceother interestsinto all countries, than those which arosefrom their

locality and naturalcircumstances.62

Tointroducealieninterests,as theReformationhaddoneandas theRevolution

threatened o do, and in particular o introducealien interestswhich claimed

universalapplicability, uch asjustificationby faithor the rightsof man, dis-

solved thenecessaryconnectionbetweena state'snatural ituationandthe idi-

omatic nterests tgenerated.Thereby,"iftheydidnotabsolutelydestroy, they]

at least weakenedand distracted he locality of patriotism"63nd with it the

determinative, rganicreasonsof state.

Throughouthe 1790s andparticularly uring heopeningyearsof thewar

against heDirectoryBurkemaintained hatBritainandits allies wereengaged

againstFrance n a "religiouswar,""a moralwar"against he"armeddoctrine"

of "asect aimingatuniversalempire."64 f coursehe was not alone in arguingthatthe waragainst heDirectorywas a warof religion;suchargumentswere a

staple of Anglican polemic duringthe early years of the war.This "new and

unheard-of cheme of conquestandaggrandizement.. the totalsubversionof

every lawful government,of all order,of all property,and of all established

religion"couldonly be resistedby a "justandnecessarywar,"arguedWalker

King at Gray'sInn in 1793. "The nationwith whom we areat war,"Charles

62 Burke,Thoughtson FrenchAffairs,in FurtherReflectionson theRevolution n France,

ed. Ritchie, 208 (Burke'semphases).63

Burke,Thoughtson FrenchAffairs,in FurtherReflectionson theRevolution n France,

ed. Ritchie, 209.

64Burke,Remarkson thePolicy of theAllies (1793), in Writings ndSpeeches,ed.Mitchell,

VIII,485;FourthLetterona RegicidePeace (1795-96),in WritingsndSpeeches,ed.McDowell,IX, 70; First Letteron a RegicidePeace (1796), in Writings nd Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,

199;Second Letter on a RegicidePeace, in Writings nd Speeches,ed. McDowell, IX, 267.

632







EdmundBurke

MannersSutton old themembersof theHouse of Lords n the following year,"is professedly a heathennation;and unless it shall please God to sparehis

people, our laws, and liberty,and religion, are inevitably lost." Such "a war

againstall Religion, carriedon in the very centerof Christendom,by a people

hithertonumberedamongthemostenlightenedof nations,"GeorgeGordon n-formedhis audience in Exeter on the same day, "is a novelty in history"; o

oppose twoulddemand"awarof ster necessity,andconsequently f thestrictest

justice."65However,Burke'schargeof universalempirehintedthatthe French

republicwas as greata threat o the commonmaximsof the greatrepublicof

Europeas Louis XIV had been almost a centuryearlier.In his international

theoryas in his politicaltheoryBurkeremained rue to the ideological inherit-

anceof EnglishWhiggismnotleastbecausehe drewso heavilyonVattel,whose

anglophiliawasdecidedlyWhigincomplexion66ndwhosedoctrinesof thelaw

of nationsweredirected o the sameend as Burke's, hat s, to the defenseof theEuropeanbalanceof powerandthenew internationaleasonsof stateoriginally

guaranteedby theTreatyof Utrecht.

Burkewasmorethan ustaconspiracy heoristof theRevolution thoughhe

didsympathizewiththose, like theAbbeBarruel,who saw free-thinkers,Free-

masons,andJews behind heevents of 1789andthereafter);67e was also more

thansimplythemost franticandprominent pologist orAnglicanism n theface

of Frenchrevolutionary theism though here s truth n thatview, too).Hewas

in fact a classic earlymodem theoristof reasonof statewithinthe natural-law

traditionrevived by Grotiusand revised by Vattel.Reason of state made theinternaland externalrealmsof statepolicy mutuallyintelligible for Burke;it

providedhim withanargumento ensuresecurity nextremitywithoutdestroy-

ing security,property, rlaw;anditprovided hemostpersuasiveanalysisof the

collapse of the European tatesystem,the failureof thebalanceof power,and

thedesperateneedforself-preservation ompelledby theFrenchRevolution.68

ThisstrainwithinBurke'spolitical thoughtshowedthat reasonof statehadnot

65 WalkerKing, TwoSermons,Preachedat Grays-InnChapel;OnFriday,April 19, 1793

(London, 1793), 12, 10-11; Charles MannersSutton,A SermonPreached Before the Lords

Spiritualand Temporaln theAbbeyChurchof St. Peter, Westminster,n Friday,February28,

1794 (London,1794), 14;GeorgeGordon,A Sermon,Preachedin the CathedralChurchof St.

Peter,Exeter,On Friday, February28, 1794 (Exeter, 1794), 10, 26.66 See Vattel,Droit des Gens, I. 2. 24; I. 4. 39; I. 6. 76; I. 8. 85, 87, etc.67 J. M. Roberts,"TheOriginsof a Mythology:Freemasons,Protestantsand the French

Revolution,"Bulletinof theInstituteof HistoricalResearch,44 (1971), 78-97;Amos Hofman,

"TheOriginsof the Theoryof the Philosophe Conspiracy,"FrenchHistory,2 (1988), 152-72;

DarrinM. McMahon,Enemiesof the Enlightenment:TheFrench Counter-Enlightenmentnd

the Originsof the EuropeanRight, 1778-1830 (Oxford,forthcoming).68 Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf,Federal Union,Modern World:The Law of Nations in

an Age of Revolutions,1776-1814 (Madison, 1993), 8-9, 188-89.

633







David Armitage

lost its rational basis long before 1789 (pace ReinhardKoselleck);69it also dem-

onstrated that it was not a necessary consequence of reason-of-state theory that

it should separate a state's domestic maxims from its foreign policies (pace

Meinecke);70 and it proved, to Burke's satisfaction (as it no doubt would have

been to Vattel's, too), that reason of state was not by definition the enemy of"law or innate moral principles" (pace almost everybody).71

However, Vattel and Burke stood at the end of this tradition of reason of

state. After all, it was in the context of the same late eighteenth-century wars

that Kant and Bentham produced their respective plans for perpetual peace,

each of whom attemptedto conceive cooperative, transparent nternationalnorms

and institutions thatwould rendersuch reason of state inoperable and obsolete.72

Both also questioned the Whiggishly self-congratulatory account of the Glori-

ous Revolution on whose historical foundations Burke's theory rested, Kant be-

cause it exemplified both a "monstrous" appeal to "a right of necessity" (ius incasu necessitatis) and a tacit, standing right to rebellion without restriction,

Bentham because he could not see it as beneficial for the interest of the nation

(ratherthan to the "particularinterest of the aristocratical leaders in the revolu-

tion").73The Kantian categorical imperative and Bentham's greatest happiness

principle provided competing but equally fatal alternatives to this tradition of

reason of state;their anathematizationof it opened up thatgulf between morality

andpolitics out of which Meinecke's instrumentalistaccount-and, consequently,

almost everyone else's-emerged. To place Burke on one side or the other of this

argumenthas always risked distortinghistorical accounts of his thought, whether

in the political sphere or the international realm; it has also sharpened the dis-

tinction between these two arenas in ways which neither early moder theorists

of reason of state nor Burke himself would have recognized. Burke's place in the

history of international thought should therefore be assimilated more closely to

his position in the traditions of political thought, as a standing reproach to

procrustean taxonomies and overhasty appropriations.

Columbia University.69 ReinhardKoselleck, Critiqueand Crisis: Enlightenment nd thePathogenesisof Mod-

ern Society,Eng. tr.(Cambridge,Mass., 1988), 17, 39.70

Meinecke,Machiavellism,13.71 Inthis case, Boucher,"TheCharacter f theHistoryof Philosophyof InternationalRela-

tions and the Case of EdmundBurke,"135.72 ImmanuelKant,"PerpetualPeace:A PhilosophicalSketch"(1795), in Kant:Political

Writings,d.Hans Reiss(Cambridge,19912),93-130;JeremyBentham,"Pacification ndEman-

cipation" (1786-89), BenthamMSS XXV, UniversityCollege London,printed(in a heavily

edited version) as "A Plan for an Universal and PerpetualPeace;"in The Worksof Jeremy

Bentham,ed. JohnBowring(11 vols., London,1843), II, 546-60; StephenConway,"Bentham

versus Pitt: JeremyBenthamand British Foreign Policy 1789," TheHistorical Journal, 30

(1987), 803-9.73 mmanuelKant,"On he CommonSaying:'ThisMaybeTrue nTheory,But it Does Not

Apply in Practice"' 1793), in Kant:Political Writings, d. Reiss, 81, 83-84; JeremyBentham,

"TheBook of Fallacies"(1818), in Bowring(ed.), Works f JeremyBentham,II, 447-48.

634

edmund burke and reason of state

Documents