editor's introduction

Editor's IntroductionAuthor(s): Malcolm E. JewellSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 161-164Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439458 .

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Editor's Introduction

One of the significant legislative developments of 1979 is the first supranational direct elections to the European Parliament. It will be interesting to see what differences, if any, direct elections make in the operation of that body and in the types of members who are elected to it and the roles that they play. For such comparisons to be possible, of course, it is necessary to study the European Parliament and its members before the advent of direct elections. That is the goal of the study by Hagger and Wing, which is based on interviews with a sample of members in April, 1977. The authors were interested in discovering variables that would have some effect on representational, legislative, and decisional style, and orientations toward the European Parlia- ment, as well as orientations toward various clienteles. They hypothesized that these roles, as well as the level of participation in committee work of the Parliament, might be affected by differences in nationality, party membership, and also by the length of service in the European Parliament and several measures of interest in and commitment to the principles of European cooperation. One of the broad purposes of the study was to determine the extent to which the European Parliament has become institutionalized and has a socializing effect on its members.

The authors found that the variable of nationality had the greatest impact on dependent variables. It was particularly noteworthy that there were substantial differences of viewpoint, along nationality lines, about the functions of the European Parliament. Partisan differences, on the other hand, had little impact, suggesting that members who come from different countries but from similar parties do not have consistent attitudes and orientations. Those with seniority or strong commitments to the European Parliament were more likely to have a supranational focus rather than being oriented toward particu- lar clienteles. Finally, the authors found that some of the role orientations helped to predict the level of activity in committees of the European Parlia- ment.

Legislative Studies Quarterly, IV, 2, May, 1979 Copyright 1979 by the Comparative Legislative Research Center 0362-9805/79/0402-0161 $00.20 161



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The study by Wood and Pitzer is a comparison of parties, coalitions, and cleavages in the 1932-1936 French parliament during the Third Republic and the 1951-1955 parliament during the Fourth Republic. The authors challenge the assertion that there was a fundamental similarity and continuity in the patterns of coalition formation and conflict found in the parliaments during the two periods. The authors in fact find some significant differences. While the center groups served as the anchor-point for coalitions in both parliaments, the reliable center was larger and more cohesive during the latter period. During the 1951-1955 parliament there was already evidence of the greater stability of parliamentary majorities and the higher party cohesion that became apparent during the Fifth Republic. In other words, the Fourth Republic may have served as a transition between the party anarchy of the late Third Republic and the party discipline of the Fifth. What distinguished the Fifth Republic was a level of party cohesion great enough so that party leaders could commit their parties to effective coalition participation without fear of repudiation by dissident blocs.

In an article in the August, 1978 issue of this Quarterly, Andrews surveyed the constitutional changes adopted in 1958 that were designed to give French governments greater control over the parliamentary process. He concluded that the effects of these changes were less dramatic than had often been believed, and that their effectiveness depended on the size of the Gaullist majority in parliament. The findings of Wood and Pitzer seem to mesh closely with his. What distinguished the Fourth from the Fifth Republic may have been less an immediate change in constitutional procedures than a more gradual political trend, foreshadowed during the Fourth Republic, toward more stable parliamentary majorities.

LeLoup's study of the Committee on the Budget and Frantzich's study of the growing utilization of computer technology both describe insti- tutional changes in the U.S. House of Representatives. What these studies have in common is that they both concern efforts by members of the House to increase their capability: to cope with increasing demands on time and resources, to meet the growing need for information, and to gain greater influence over the decisions made by the executive branch. It is because these problems are of concern to members of most legislatures that these studies should interest a wider range of persons than just congressional specialists.

The House Committee on the Budget was established by the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the major step taken by Congress to coordinate its highly decentralized procedures for budgetary review and there- by increase its influence over the allocation of appropriations. Because that task of Congress is so difficult and so important, and because organizational change is so difficult to accomplish in Congress, the new budgetary process

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deserves the extensive review it has been getting from scholars. LeLoup is also interested in comparing the House Budget Committee with other congressional committees, using Fenno's familiar conceptual scheme.

LeLoup finds that the House Budget Committee is less autonomous than most committees; it operates in a highly conflictual, ideological, and partisan environment; and it has not attained a high level of self integration. Nevertheless, it has succeeded in winning House passage of its budget reso- lutions. Although the Committee lacks some of the attributes of influence enjoyed by other committees, it enjoys formal power because of its crucial legal role in the budgetary process. The Committee, like its counterpart in the Senate, must be able to maintain and develop its influence if the new budgetary process is to work. Consequently, the detailed description of how the Committee operates and what perceptions its members have provides some valuable insights into the operation of the budgetary process and strengths and weaknesses of this important component of the budgetary machinery.

I suspect that most readers will be surprised to discover, in reading Frantzich's article, how much computer technology is now being used in the United States Congress. In the past Congress has moved relatively slowly to make use of the computer, even for relatively simple chores like keeping track of bills, scheduling committee meetings, and recording roll call votes. In recent years, however, there has been a rapid acceleration of computer utilization. Frantzich deals both with the advantages and with the limitations and problems of bringing Congress into the computer age.

One of his most interesting findings is that congressmen have found the computer to be particularly valuable in improving service to constituents: keeping track of mail, handling casework, and compiling various kinds of information about constituents. This emphasis is a response to the large increase in mail and calls from constituents, but it also reflects the growing importance of constituency service for re-election. The computer enhances the congressman's ability to maintain contact with constituents.

Frantzich also notes that computer technology may affect the distri- bution of legislative power because of its impact on access to information. One source of power for party leaders and committee chairmen has been their control over information, a control that may become diluted when each member of Congress has a computer terminal. Moreover, computer technology opens up the possibility that congressional committees and individual congressmen may be able to get information from the executive branch without being dependent on the good will and cooperation of bureaucrats. Of course a computer in the hands of a congressman does not guarantee access to information. One consequence of the introduction of computers in Congress may be to change the arena of legislative-executive conflict, as members of

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Congress demand access to the information stored in computers of the executive branch.

One of the most interesting electoral trends in recent years has been the growing independence of presidential and congressional elections in the United States, and the increasing ability of congressmen to survive national trends and presidential coattails that would seem to benefit their opponent. It is often suggested that this growing independence undermines the president's ability to get his program passed in Congress. In order to determine whether this is happening, we need to begin by measuring the relationship between presidential and congressional election results, and support for the president's program in Congress. This relationship may take two forms. A president's coattails may help to elect more members of his party to Congress, providing more potential supporters for his program. In addition, individual members of Congress may be more likely to support programs of a President who demon- strates electoral strength in the congressman's district. It is this latter possibility that Harmon and Brauen examine in their study, which covers each Congress elected in a presidential election from 1952 through 1972.

Their study, which builds on several earlier ones, concludes that there is a positive correlation between a president's electoral strength, relative to the congressman, and the congressman's support for the president's program in Congress. The relationships are stronger for Democratic presidents, and apply to congressmen in both the administration and the opposition parties. There are some variations by region, competitiveness of district, and seniority. There are various reasons why these relationships may exist. We need congressional survey data to determine to what extent congressmen are consciously voting for a president's program because of his political strength in their district relative to their own. If congressmen make such a conscious choice, we need to know why, whether they are motivated by a mandate theory of representation or believe that there are electoral risks in opposing the president. The fact that congressmen may be growing independent of the president does not make it any less important to lear why and under what conditions they have been dependent on him.

-Malcolm E. Jewell

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