editor's introduction

Editor's IntroductionAuthor(s): Malcolm E. JewellSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Feb., 1977), pp. 1-4Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439371 .

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Editor's Introduction

In recent years there have been a number of efforts to apply various theories of decision making to the study of legislative institutions. Among these have been organization theory, small-group theory, exchange theory, and several forms of coalition theory. Some of the theories derived from analyzing other types of institutions do not seem to fit legislative bodies very well, but the search continues to develop a suitable theory of decision making for legislatures or to adapt other theories to it. Some aspects of coalition theory, notably Riker's "minimum winning coalition," seem poorly suited to the legislative process. Nevertheless, it is obvious that legislators are constantly forming and reforming coalitions, bargaining, and trading votes. They must constantly make calculations about the potential payoffs and costs of decisions, including costs of acquiring information. In other words, it seems possible that a theory of legislative coalitions can be devel- oped that is realistic and logical, though it may differ from coalition theory that is appropriate for other institutions.

In several of her recent articles, Barbara Hinckley has been taking steps toward the development of a legislative coalition theory. In this issue she examines what she calls "stylized opposition" in the U. S. House of Representatives. She argues that patters of coalition behavior develop in legislative bodies between factions or "protocoalitions." When factions that have traditionally been allied confront issues that might create splits between them, one option each has is to become "inactive," that is, avoid taking a unified stand on the issue. Even when factional realignments occur on major issues, traditional partners may try to avoid taking opposing positions. Hinckley tests this theory by examining roll call votes on controversial issues in the U. S. House for the 85th through the 91st Congresses, and finds that the data are compatible with the theory. In addition to providing a test of one aspect of legislative coalition theory, the article provides a clear picture of shifts in the alignment of coalitions in the U. S. House during the 1960s. In short, the article is of interest to students of voting behavior as well as coalition theory in Congress.

It is probably no exaggeration to say that there have been more

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, II, 1, February 1977 1



Legislative Studies Quarterly

studies of United States congressional committees than of committees in every other legislative body in the world. One reason for this, of course, is that committees in the U. S. Congress are unusually powerful and independent. The importance of these committees is often emphasized by those who are trying to explain why Congress exercises so much more power than most legislatures. Some would argue that a committee system is essential if legislators are to acquire the skill, experience, and access to information necessary to give them any significant role in either the making or the implementing of policy. In a few legislative bodies outside the United States there are signs of efforts to strengthen the power and improve the capabilities of committees; there is plenty of evidence that such efforts face a variety of obstacles. There is also evidence of increasing scholarly interest in legislative committees, perhaps because committees are frequently perceived as important or even essential attributes of legislative policymaking and implementation (or oversight of the executive). Several years ago, for example, Malcolm Shaw and John Lees organized a conference on comparative legislative committees that resulted in a series of papers to be published by Duke University Press.

One major reason for the power of U. S. congressional committees is that congressmen are both able and willing to serve long enough on the same committee to develop expertise and become recognized by their col- leagues as experts. In many other legislative bodies that does not occur, for one or more reasons. There may be a high level of turnover in the legislature. Those who are reelected may not want to remain on the same committee or may be denied a chance to do so by party leaders. In some legislatures there is very little interest in committee membership and attendance. It is a vicious circle; if committees are very weak there is little incentive to serve on them, and if interest in committee membership is minimal they are likely to remain weak.

Harvey Kline examines the problem of committee membership turnover in the Colombian Congress, which is one of the stronger national legislatures in Latin America. He argues that strong committees are necessary for an effective legislature, and that stability of membership is a prerequisite of such strength. The data for seven sessions from 1960 to 1972 show that there is, in fact, a high level of turover in committee members, partly because of turnover in Congress membership and partly because reelected members often do not return to the same committee. Indeed, only a tiny fraction of members served on the same committee for more than three terms during the seven sessions.

Kline characterizes committee turnover as being "high," but it is difficult to judge how high it is because there is little basis for comparison. Similar studies in other legislatures would be useful and might help to deter-

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Editor's Introduction

mine how much stability of membership is necessary for a committee to have some impact on policy. (Kline notes that Agor's study of the Chilean Senate prior to the 1973 coup found higher stability of committee membership.)

There are many factors other than stability of membership that can affect the importance of committees in a legislature. For example, in his recent book on Influence in Parliament: Canada, Allan Korberg explores very carefully the levels of MPs' participation in the work of committees as well as their attitudes toward committee work. Komberg concludes that the committee system in the Canadian Parliament, which has recently been revitalized, is serving a number of purposes, including providing an outlet for MPs who are interested in policymaking but who do not hold (and often are unlikely to hold) front-bench positions in Parliament.

The British Parliament, like the Canadian one, has made minimal use of committees until very recently. The leaders of both major parties in Britain have believed that to give parliamentary committees any significant influence over the making or implementing of policy would undermine the strict party discipline that is fundamental to operation of the British parliamentary system. It would be more difficult to maintain strict party discipline in committees, and if committees recommended major amendments to bills or criticized the Goverment's policies, the Government could be seriously embarrassed. Despite these concerns, the British Parliament has moved gradually to establish a number of specialized select committees.

Harris Miller's study deals with a related development in Parliament, the establishment in both the Lords and Commons of select committees to review proposed regulations, so called "secondary legislation," in the Euro- pean Communities. British entry into the European Communities has given the Parliament an opportunity to review and discuss these proposals before they are adopted by the European Communities and (unlike regular legislation) before the British Government has taken a position on them. The select committees review the proposals, gain information about them, and recom- mend which ones ought to be debated on the floor.

Miller's detailed and sensitive study shows both the possibilities and the limitations on committee influence within the framework of the British parliamentary system. He concludes that, despite some apparent advantages over other parliamentary committees, these committees do not have any direct influence over the policies adopted by the Government regarding proposals pending in the European Communities, and he describes the norms and political realities that preclude such influence. At the same time he concludes that the committees do have some indirect influence on policymaking, because they open up channels of communication and give the Goverment and high-ranking civil servants an early warning about reactions

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Legislative Studies Quarterly Legislative Studies Quarterly

of MPs to proposed regulations. Miller's study suggests the risks of drawing conclusions about British parliamentary committees without carefully scruti- nizing their work and realistically measuring their influence. It provides a model for the analysis of institutional change that could be usefully repli- cated in other legislative bodies. It reminds us not only that it is difficult to change long established parliamentary practices, but that reform efforts often produce results unanticipated by those who initiated them.

The final article in this issue, a review article by the editor, has two goals. The first is to survey some of the recent books on the U. S. Congress, particularly those dealing with reform and change in Congress, and to discuss the problem of developing research strategies for assessing the consequences of legislative reform. It is interesting that while the Canadian and British parliaments are taking cautious steps toward greater utilization of committees, the American Congress-particularly the House-is seeking to reduce the independent authority of committees and their chairmen, though not entirely through centralizing power. The second goal of the review article is to set an example, to encourage others to submit review articles that assess recent literature in some segment of legislative studies. It would be helpful if pro- spective authors of review articles would contact the editor in advance to discuss proposed topics.

We are also very interested in getting good manuscripts. It obviously takes time for any new journal to attract scholarly attention and to develop a strong enough reputation so that scholars are eager to publish in its pages. We can offer authors a number of advantages that some journals can not: readers who share an interest in legislative studies, relatively prompt and thorough evaluations of manuscripts, and (for the time being) the absence of a backlog. We also welcome suggestions for topics that would be appropriate for an entire issue, and we welcome any suggestions for making the Legislative Studies Quarterly more useful to its readers as it begins its second year of publication. -Malcolm E. Jewell

Correction

A correction should be made to "The Impact of Party Recruitment Activity Upon Legislative Role Orientations: A Path Analysis" which we published in this Quarterly (vol. I, no. 4, November, 1976). Professor Thurber indicates that he inadvertently omitted acknowledgement to Richard Boyd and David Hadley for the loan of their data on legislative role orientations, legislator's perceived strength of party organization, and legislator's perceived primary competitiveness for legislative seats, from their 1969 study of the Indiana House of Representatives. Professor Thurber also thanks Professor Boyd for the development of the role orientation scale from the 1969 study.

of MPs to proposed regulations. Miller's study suggests the risks of drawing conclusions about British parliamentary committees without carefully scruti- nizing their work and realistically measuring their influence. It provides a model for the analysis of institutional change that could be usefully repli- cated in other legislative bodies. It reminds us not only that it is difficult to change long established parliamentary practices, but that reform efforts often produce results unanticipated by those who initiated them.

The final article in this issue, a review article by the editor, has two goals. The first is to survey some of the recent books on the U. S. Congress, particularly those dealing with reform and change in Congress, and to discuss the problem of developing research strategies for assessing the consequences of legislative reform. It is interesting that while the Canadian and British parliaments are taking cautious steps toward greater utilization of committees, the American Congress-particularly the House-is seeking to reduce the independent authority of committees and their chairmen, though not entirely through centralizing power. The second goal of the review article is to set an example, to encourage others to submit review articles that assess recent literature in some segment of legislative studies. It would be helpful if pro- spective authors of review articles would contact the editor in advance to discuss proposed topics.

We are also very interested in getting good manuscripts. It obviously takes time for any new journal to attract scholarly attention and to develop a strong enough reputation so that scholars are eager to publish in its pages. We can offer authors a number of advantages that some journals can not: readers who share an interest in legislative studies, relatively prompt and thorough evaluations of manuscripts, and (for the time being) the absence of a backlog. We also welcome suggestions for topics that would be appropriate for an entire issue, and we welcome any suggestions for making the Legislative Studies Quarterly more useful to its readers as it begins its second year of publication. -Malcolm E. Jewell

Correction

A correction should be made to "The Impact of Party Recruitment Activity Upon Legislative Role Orientations: A Path Analysis" which we published in this Quarterly (vol. I, no. 4, November, 1976). Professor Thurber indicates that he inadvertently omitted acknowledgement to Richard Boyd and David Hadley for the loan of their data on legislative role orientations, legislator's perceived strength of party organization, and legislator's perceived primary competitiveness for legislative seats, from their 1969 study of the Indiana House of Representatives. Professor Thurber also thanks Professor Boyd for the development of the role orientation scale from the 1969 study.

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editor's introduction

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