MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MiguelDeLim(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• ChrisHedges(UnitedKingdomBorderAgency–UKBA,London)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeonMigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

CONTENTS

Vol.IV,Number3,July-September2014

IOM conducts a Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) training in Estancia, Iloilo(26March).©IOM2014(PhotobyAlanMotus).

EDITORIAL BOARD

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IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Unaccompanied and separated minors: A call for a multidisciplined response to a humanitarian crisisKelly Ryan

A profile of African immigrants in the US labour market C. Omar Kebbeh

Migrant and refugee integration in global cities: The role of cities and businessesNava Hinrichs and Teressa Juzwiak

Mixed migration: Assessing the issues and implementing an effective humanitarian responseT. Craig Murphy

Publications

MPP Readers’ Survey

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Vol. IV, Number 3, July–September 2014MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

Welcome to the new issue of Migration Policy Practice. This issue is beingpublished at a time when policymakers

around theworld are increasingly concerned abouttheimpactofirregularmigration.InEurope,thereisarisingdeathtoll,withupto3,000migrantsmissingor dead in theMediterranean region this year.OneyearaftertheLampedusatragedy,whichclaimedthelivesofnearly400migrants, thenumberofmigrantdeathsintheMediterraneanregioncontinuestorise.A new international report entitled “Fatal Journeys:TrackingLivesLostDuringMigration”,tobereleasednextweekbyIOM(seethe“Publications”sectioninthis issue),showsthatthis isaglobalandlong-termproblem. Drawing on a wide range of data sourcesfromdifferent regionsaround theworld, the reportprovidesapictureoftheperilousjourneysundertakenbymigrantsaroundtheworld.

Thereportcallsforbetterdatatohelppreventdeaths.There are few detailed statistics, because collectingdata onmigrant deaths has not been a priority formost governments around the world. Althoughvast sums of money are spent collecting migrationand border control data, very few governmentscollectandpublishdataonmigrantdeaths.Dataonmigrant deaths tend to be scattered, with a rangeof organizations involved in tracking fatalities, oftenemploying different definitions of border-related death.Mostavailableinformationcomesfrommediareports and NGO sources, but these data can beincomplete. Comparing data for different regions oftheworld,thereportshowsthatoverthelast20years

thehighestnumberofrecordedmigrantdeathswasinEurope.Furthermore,whilethenumberofdeathshasbeenrisingsharply inEuropeoverthe lastyear,therehasbeenadecreaseinthenumberoffatalitiesinsomeotherregionsoftheworld.

Minors represent an important share of migrantscrossingtheMediterranean,withanestimated14,000childrencrossingintoItalyin2014.InNorthAmerica,the growing number of unaccompanied childrenleavingCentralAmericaandtravellingnorthtoMexicoandtheUnitedStatesofAmericahasbecomeamajorpolicy concern. The US Government has predictedthat asmany as 70,000 unaccompaniedminorswillarrive in theUnitedStates this year.KellyRyan, theCoordinator of the Intergovernmental ConsultationsonMigration,AsylumandRefugees(IGC),addressesthiscomplexpolicyquestioninthefirstarticleofthisissue.Shecallsforanewpolicyframeworkbasedontheprinciplethatunaccompaniedchildrenshouldbetreatedfirstandforemostaschildren.

The second article in this issue also focuses on theUnitedStates,buttacklesaverydifferentissue–thesituationofAfrican immigrants intheUnitedStates.Written by C. Omar Kebbeh, an economist for theBureauof EconomicAnalysis of theUSDepartmentofCommerce,thearticlecomparesthelabourmarketoutcomesofAfricanimmigrantsintheUnitedStatestothoseofthenative-bornand,whererelevant,theforeign-born population in general. It shows thatAfrican-born immigrants intheUnitedStateshaveahighlabourforceparticipationratebecausetheyaregenerallymorehighlyeducatedthanthenative-bornpopulation.

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOMHeadquartersinGeneva.Theyaretheco-editorsofMigration Policy Practice.

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The third article in this issue focusesoneight citiesaround the world and their efforts to promote theintegration of migrants and refugees. The article,writtenbyauthorsworkingfortheHagueProcessonRefugees andMigration, particularly focuses on theroleoftheprivatesector,andtheinnovativewaysinwhichbusinesseshelptopromoteintegrationincitiesasdiverseasAuckland,BuenosAires,Chicago,KualaLumpur, Lisbon, Nairobi, Rotterdam and Sao Paolo.ThearticleisbasedonresearchconductedbytheUNUniversity–MaastrichtEconomicandSocialResearchInstituteonInnovationandTechnology(UNU-MERIT).

The final article in this issue again focuses on thesubject of irregular migration and, especially, theconcept of “mixed migration.” T. Craig Murphy, anIOMofficialbased inKenya, reports inparticularonthe trend inmigrantdeaths in theRedSeaand theGulf of Aden. He shows that, contrary to the trendintheMediterranean,thenumberofliveslostintheGulfofAdenandtheRedSeadecreasedfrom2008to2013.Murphypresentsapolicyframeworktoaddressmixedmigrationflowsconsistingofthreecomponents–prevention,responseandpost-responsemeasures.He argues that the complexities of contemporarymixed migration flows require a coordinated andstrategicapproach.

WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practice andencourage readers to contactuswithsuggestionsforfuturearticles.Wefurtherinvitereaders to spare a couple ofminutes to participatein a survey which we are launching this month inorder to help us identify our readers’ profiles, theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,please click here.n

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In the past decade, there has been risinginternationalinterestandattentionpaidtominorson the move who are unaccompanied by their

parentsorlegalguardians.2Flowsofunaccompaniedminors, particularly those seeking asylum, haverecurrentlyaffectedEuropeanStates since theearly

2 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child(Article 1) defines child as follows: “A child means everyhumanbeingbelowtheageofeighteenyearsunless,underthe lawapplicable to the child,majority is attainedearlier.”IOM defines unaccompanied children or unaccompanied minors as “children who have been separated from bothparentsandotherrelativesandarenotbeingcaredforbyanadultwho,bylaworcustom,isresponsiblefordoingso.”

Unaccompanied and separated minors: A call for a multidisciplinary response to a humanitarian crisisKelly Ryan1

1 Kelly Ryan is the Coordinator of the IntergovernmentalConsultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC).The IGC is a regional consultative process (RCP) and is aninformal, non-decision-making forum for intergovernmentalinformationexchangeandpolicydebateonissuesofrelevanceto the management of international migratory flows. TheIGC brings together 16 participating States, the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees, the InternationalOrganizationforMigrationandtheEuropeanCommission.

2000s, with significant peaks in applications madein certain countries such as theNetherlands (6,705applications in2000and5,951 in2001), theUnitedKingdom(5,945in2002;3,300in2008;and2,991in2009),andSweden (3,852 in2013and2,493 in thefirstsixmonthsof2014).3

3 Moredatacanbefoundin:IGCSecretariat,Asylum Procedures: Report on Policies and Practices in IGC Participating States (Geneva, 2012). Available from http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=972.

Total quarterly asylum applications by unaccompanied minors in European IGC participating States, first quarter 2000 to second quarter 2014

Source: IGC Database on Unaccompanied Minors.

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AccordingtotheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR), the uptrend is occurringworldwide–thatis,the“numberofunaccompaniedor separated children (UASC) seeking asylum onan individualbasis ison the rise.More than25,300individualasylumapplicationswerelodgedbyUASCsin 77 countries in 2013.”4 This, of course, does notgive a sense of the real number of unaccompaniedchildrensincemanydonotseekasylum.

This phenomenon is not new, nor is it unique toEuropean countries. This past year, the subject ofunaccompanied children and adolescents leavingCentralAmericaandtravellingnorth,byfoot,car,busandtrain,toMexicoandtheUnitedStateshasmadeheadlines.TheUSGovernmenthaspredictedthatasmany as 70,000 unaccompanied minors will arrivein theUnited States in fiscal year 2014– amassiveincrease over the past three years. Children andadults primarily come from El Salvador, Guatemalaand Honduras. There are a number of reasons fortheirflight, includingviolence,persecution,poverty,trafficking and family reunification. Adults andfamilies from these countries also move internallyin much larger numbers to escape generalizedviolence, which is a push factor largely ignored inthe broader discussion.5 More recently, minorsrepresentanimportantshareofmigrantscrossingtheMediterraneanindramaticconditions,withasmanyas14,000childrenwhohavearrivedinItalysofarthisyear,accordingtoUNHCR.6

4 UNHCR,War’s Human Cost: UNHCR Global Trends (UNHCR,Geneva, 2014). Available from www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html page 29. Note that these numbers do not includeapplicationsmadeintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.

5 “Whatisnotyetproperlyappreciatedinthecurrentdebateisthattheseviolentcriminaldynamicsaregeneratingstartlinglevelsof internaldisplacementwithinthesecountries. Ifwetake El Salvador as an example,wewould see that in 2012some3,300SalvadorianchildrenarrivedintheUnitedStatesand 4,000 Salvadorians claimed to fear returning home. Bycontrast,surveydatafor2012indicatesthataround130,000people were internally displaced within El Salvador due tocriminal violence in just that one year.” – Professor DavidCantor, Director of the Refugee Law Initiative, School ofAdvanced Study – University of London in “Gangs: the real‘humanitariancrisis’drivingCentralAmericanchildrentotheUS”, The Conversation,22August2014.Availablefromhttp://theconversation.com/gangs-the-real-humanitarian-crisis-driving-central-american-children-to-the-us-30672.

6 P. Maigua, “Record number of migrants die crossing theMediterranean Sea”, United Nations Radio, 26 August2014. Available from www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/08/record-number-of-migrants-die-crossing-the-mediterranean-sea-2.

Experts around the globe are calling for immediateaction: “Children on the move constitute ahumanitarian emergency that calls for immediateremedies.”7 The displacement of unaccompaniedminorsand itsconsequences isaglobal issuewhichhasnotyetbeenfullyandsystematicallyaddressed,although work has begun. Ensuring children aresafe,assistedandprotectedandthattheirindividualsituations are examined by a series of competentofficials in an appropriate manner is a challengethroughouttheglobe.

Unaccompaniedminorsareparticularlyatriskbecauseof their age and circumstance.8 IOM, internationalagencies and NGOs encounter unaccompaniedchildreninavarietyofsettings,suchasrefugeecamps,irregular migration flows, return and reintegrationprogrammesandrefugeeresettlement.Itisarguablethat unaccompanied minors are present in everyUNHCR operation worldwide and likely in all IOMoperationsinvolvingmixedorforcedmigration.

The emergence of a child-centered approach

A child-centered approach is the goal and not thepresent reality, especially because many receivingcountriesdonothaveproceduresinplacetoaddresstheneedsof suchchildren. Inorder tobeeffective,many experts observe that the United States andother governments should take a child-centeredapproach when developing policies and designingmeasures.Thereshouldbeachangeinhowchildrenareviewed–from,principally,asanimmigration,law

7 Holy See, Statement of Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi,PermanentObserverof theHoly See to theUnitedNationsand Specialized Agencies in Geneva at the Twenty-fifthOrdinarySessionoftheHumanRightsCouncilontheHumanRights of Migrants, (13 June 2014), L’Osservatore Romano,27 June 2014. Available fromwww.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2014/documents/rc-seg-st-20140613_tomasi-migranti_en.html.

8 “Affirmingthatchildren,becauseoftheirage,socialstatusandphysicalandmentaldevelopmentareoftenmorevulnerablethanadultsinsituationsofforceddisplacement;recognizingthat forced displacement, return to post-conflict situations,integration in new societies, protracted situations ofdisplacement,andstatelessnesscanincreasethevulnerabilityof children generally; taking into account the particularvulnerabilityofrefugeechildrentobeingforciblyexposedtotherisksofphysicalandpsychologicalinjury,exploitationanddeathinconnectionwitharmedconflict;andacknowledgingthatwiderenvironmental factorsand individual risk factors,particularlywhencombined,canputchildreninsituationsofheightened risk….” See: United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR), “Conclusion on Children at Risk,” 5October 2007, No. 107 (LVIII) - 2007. Available fromwww.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/471897232.html.

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enforcement, traffickingor refugeematter, to beingchildren first. Because of their age, social status,physicaldevelopmentandmentaldevelopment,theyare more vulnerable to situations of displacement;often, unaccompanied minors experience violence,or fear of violence, before, during and post-arrival.Theymaybeexploited,abusedorabandonedononeormoreoccasions. Their vulnerability is heightenedbecause they may have encountered enforcementimperatives (identification, age determination, etc.).Finally,acomprehensivesystemofprotectionrequirespersons in authority – especially, child advocates,persons with legal expertise, social workers,guardians, educators andhealth-careproviders – tomakedecisionsaboutachild’scare,custodyandlegalstatus. But how best to approach this complicatedchallengeandthemultiplefacetstobeconsideredinthedisplacementofminors?

Challenges in identifying comprehensive effective solutions

In October 2008, the US Government held theimportant international Conference on Protectionof Unaccompanied and Separated Children, invitingexperts from around the globe to discuss how toaddress these issues.9 IOM and UNHCR were keycontributors to the conference and have been atthecuttingedgeofthis issuefordecades,especiallyin the policy and operational responses to theneeds of unaccompanied minors worldwide.10 Theconferenceillustratedenormousinterestfromawidevariety of actors in developing appropriate policiesand taking action. These actors included manygovernmentsfromaroundtheworld(includingthoseof sendingand receiving countries, aswell as thosewho encounter children primarilymoving within ortransitingthroughtheircountries),UNpartners,NGOs

9 “ConferenceonProtectionofUnaccompaniedandSeparatedChildren,”webpageontheGeorgeMasonUniversitywebsite.Availablefromhttp://childalone.gmu.edu.

10 See,forexample:IOM,Unaccompanied Children on the Move (IOM, Geneva, 2011). Other useful tools and interventionsinclude:UNHCR,Heightened Risk Identification Tool (UNHCR,Geneva, 2010); the Child Advocate Program (supported bythe US Government) at the Young Center for ImmigrantChildren’s Rights at the University of Chicago; Inter-agencyStanding Committee, Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,an inter-agency toolkit available from www.unicef.org/protection/IAG_UASCs.pdf; Interagency Working Group onUnaccompaniedandSeparatedChildren, Alternative Care in Emergencies Toolkit (SavetheChildrenFund,London,2013),available from http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/library/interagency-working-group-unaccompanied-and-separated-children-2013-alternative-care.

and academics. Action has taken different forms: aclearerunderstandingof thenatureanddimensionsoftheproblems;astrongerpoliticalcommitmenttoconfrontthem;developmentofprotectionstandardsand better return and reintegration measures; andundertakings to implement these standards andmeasures. In order to have an effective responseto the needs of unaccompanied and separatedchildren, the approach requires several steps andpolicy considerations involving actors fromdifferentdisciplines.

This endeavor is complicated and daunting. Often,bothgovernmentofficialsandadvocatesfearmakinga judgment or decision in a child’s case because oftheenormityofthechoices involved. Itcanbe life-changingforthechildandhisorherfamily.Itcancreatea dangerous situation on the one hand, and safety,including family reunification and/or internationalprotection,ontheother.Existingcasestudiesillustratemanyofthecomplications.Casesdonotalwayslendthemselvestounambiguoussolutions,andtherearemany gaps in the system. Protection entails manyfactors that require continuous evaluation as thechildmatures and his or her circumstances change.Eachcase–eachchild–presentsmanyrelevantfacts(someasbasicasage,someaselusiveasthechild’sstateofmind)thatareoftendifficulttodiscover.

Aneffectivesystemmustaskandansweranumberofdifficultandcomplexquestions.

(a)Whoarethesechildren?

(b)What circumstances produce their separationfromfamily?

(c)Whoisresponsibleforprotectingthem?

(d)Howdowe analyse andmeet their protectionneedsconsistentwiththeirbestinterests?

(e)What role does targeted and generalizedviolenceplayinthefamily’sdecisionsregardingmovement?

These types of questions have been raised inmanyforums, but much work remains to achieve realanswers.

Therearecleargapsinoursystemsofprotection–legalgaps,gapsincommunicationamongdifferentactors,andgapsintheassignmentofrolesandresponsibilities.There are identified unmet needs – for advocates,caregivers,guardiansandrepresentation.Whilethere

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areexistingtoolsandinterventions,thefactremainsthat unaccompanied children often negotiate thesystemtheyhavelandedinaloneorwithoutpropercareandattention.Certainly,wearefar fromglobalagreement on how to systematically address thesevariouschallengesandwhoisresponsible.

Attheoutset,thereisoftenaquestionastowhatlawsapply,andtensionsbetweeninternationalstandardsand domestic legal provisions can complicate theproblem.Astheparticipantsatthe2008ChildAloneConferenceagreed,itseemsclearthat:

Domesticlegalframeworkshavenotkeptpacewithinternational lawas itrelatesto[the]rightsofthechildandchildprotectionissues.Inaddition,thereis a disconnect between domestic child welfarelawandindividualcountries’immigrationlawsandpolicies.Asaconsequence,children’sbestinterestsareoftensecondarytoproceduralnorms.

Recently, best interest determinations (BID) haveemerged as a preferred strategy for protectingchildren’s welfare. The BID process is significantbecauseitischild-centricandensuresthatchildren’srightsarenotsubjugatedtoadultswhoseinterestsareoftennotbenign.TheBIDprocessensuresthatnotonlyaretheneedsofthechildconsideredbutthevoiceofthechildisheard.

The international community must be vigilantagainst child labour and sexual exploitation,including trafficking in persons. It is essentialto continue to create and reform institutionalsystems to bemore responsive to themanners inwhich children canbeexploited. This includes thepromotionofconceptsandideassuchastheuseofguardiansad litem,mandatinglegalrepresentationforchildreninallproceedings,insistingonstandardsintradeagreements,andeffectivelypunishingthosewhowouldcauseharmtounaccompaniedminors.

Governmentsandthehumanitariancommunityneedtoensurethatsufficientresourcesandappropriatelytrained staff are available to meet identificationand documentation needs domestically and inhumanitarian emergencies, as well as in mixedmigration movements. This can be a significantexpenditureifthegovernmentispayingforallaspectsof thechild’scare. Forexample, theUSHealthandHuman Services (HHS) budget skyrocketed fromUSD376milliontoUSD868inthepastthreeyearstosupport the increasednumberof childrenunder itsmandate.AstheHHSBudgetJustificationexplains:

By law, HHS/ACF [Administration for Children andFamilies]takescustodyofallunaccompaniedalienchildren (UAC) who file claims to remain in theUnitedStatesunderimmigrationlaw.Thesechildrenreside in state-licensed shelter facilities until ACFcan place them with sponsors, usually parents orotherrelatives.TheannualnumberofarrivingUAChasincreasedfrom6,560inFY2011toanestimated60,000 in FY 2014. Reasons for this increase arecomplex but a key factor is the rising levels ofviolenceinCentralAmerica,theplaceoforiginformostUAC.

ACFhasstreamlineditsplacementprocess,reducingthe average amount of timeunaccompanied alienchildrenspendinshelters.Throughtheseandothermeasures, ACF is able to accommodate a 53,000annual increase in UAC with a 9,000 seasonalincrease in shelter beds. Despite these efforts,totalUACcostshave increasedsignificantlyduetotherisingnumberofUAC.AsdirectedbyCongress,ACF ismeetingwithother government agencies –this has included the Departments of HomelandSecurity, State, and Justice– in aneffort tobetterunderstand the reasons for the increase in thenumber of UAC arrivals and develop strategiesformanaging risingUAC costs.Due to the volatilenatureofthisprogramandongoingdiscussionsofalong-termpolicysolution,theAdministrationisnotabletoreliablypredictthenumberofUACwhowillarriveinFY2015atthistime.11

Sowhat are themost pressing needswithin such aframework?Creatingasystemwithmultipledecisionpointscertainlycomeswithrisks.Amistakemadeatanyofthedecisionpointscancauseseriousdangerorevendeath.Thisistrueinanychildwelfarecontext,of course. But, often, unaccompanied minors mayexperience a far different government responsefromthatofchildrenwhoarenative-bornorlawfullypresentwho,forexample,havebeenplacedinfostercarebecauseofabuse,neglectandabandonment–although some countries integrate foreign nationalunaccompanied children into their foster careprogrammes.12 Each child requires the same basic

11 HHS,Fiscal Year 2015 Budget in Brief: Strengthening Health Opportunity for All Americans(HHS,Washington,D.C.,2014).Availablefromwww.hhs.gov/budget/fy2015/fy-2015-budget-in-brief.pdf.

12 See individual country reports in: IGC Secretariat, Asylum Procedures: Report on Policies and Practices in IGC Participating States (IOM, Geneva, 2012). Available fromhttp://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=972).

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things,butanunaccompaniedminorcomingfromaculture different from that of the host countrymayface additional challenges, such as the inability tocommunicateandsocialbarriersthatcancomplicatethetaskofidentifyingandmeetingthoseneeds.

What would such a system entail?

Identification, age and needs assessment

A coordinated system which permits earlyidentificationandaholisticandmultidisciplinaryageand needs assessment is critical. States, the UnitedNations,partnersandallrelevantactorsmustputinplacesystemsforearlyandcontinuousidentificationto ensure that children are properly identified,documented and protected, and that situationsinvolving children at heightened risk are addressed.Keytothisendeavorisdevelopingafullunderstandingofthecapacityofthechildandcraftresponsesbasedonthechild’sdevelopmentalabilities.Suchasystemmust respond to imperatives such as effectiveness,practicability, ethical considerations and reliability.As identified during the IGC Workshop on AgeAssessment of Unaccompanied Minors in June2011, this aspect would benefit from the followingimprovements:

(a)Improving evaluations of age assessmentmethods and exchange of information onoutcomes, in particular, medical methods andexaminations;

(b)Examining improvements of techniques andrelatedaspects, interalia,analysing theresultsgenerated, expressing the level of precisionand types of uncertainties, and looking at thepotentialofnewtechnologiesfordatacapture;

(c)Foster a multidisciplinary cooperation andexchangeofexperiencesbetweenthedifferentactorsconcernedwithageassessment;

(d)Developing better frameworks and referencematerials, in particular concerning referencedataandmaterials, themergingof informationand the pooling of data (e.g. meta-analysisand validation models), and improvingmethodologiesand tools forcaseworkers (e.g.defining an acceptable level of uncertainty,developingcommonproceduresandguidelineson the interpretation of results and thepresentationtocaseworkersandcourts).

Short- and long-term care

Underacontinuous identification/caremodel, therewould be several considerations as to whether thechild is with an appropriate caregiver who is not aparentorguardian.Decisionsaboutandarrangementsfor the child could change as the child’s situationunfolds or evolves. Separation from traffickers orotherpersons seeking toexploitorhurt thechild isanobviouspoint,butoftentheinitialchildplacementdecisionisnotrevisited,andresourcesmaylimittheabilityofthegovernmentorinternationalorganizationreviewingtheinitial(ordefacto)decision.Fromtheperspective of children’s best interests, there maybe difficulties with both short- and long-term care,including attachment. Children have a right to bereunifiedwithparents,andtheparentshavearightand a duty to care for their children. Often, familytracing is passive, requiring the child to demand it.This, of course, ignores the parents’ rights underinternational and domestic laws. Passive tracingalso makes the often-unwarranted assumption thatthe child has the capacity to assert his or her ownright.ThecaseofaCubanboy,ElianGonzalez,whowitnessed hismother’s death in the AtlanticOceanandwasrescuedfromtheoceanandbroughttotheUnitedStates(beforebeingreunitedwithhisfather,who returned with him to Cuba), illustrates thedifficultyofdeterminingparentalandchildrights,andevaluatingissuesofcapacityandchildwelfare,aswellasquestionsofasylum.13

13 Gonzalezv.Reno,212F.3d1338(11Cir.2000):Whilethe11thCircuitupheldtheUSGovernment’spositionwithrespecttoitsdecision to rejectanasylumapplicationfileonbehalfofthesix-year-oldCubanboybyhisfamilyintheUnitedStates,itpointedoutthatchildren’sdesiresshouldnotbe ignored:We,however,donotmeantosuggestthatthecoursetakenbytheINS[theU.Sagencythenresponsiblefordeterminingunaccompaniedminors’ legal status] is theonlypermissibleapproach.AlthoughtheINSisnotrequiredtoletsix-year-oldchildren speak for themselves about asylum, neither is theINS required to ignore the expressed statements of youngchildren. Even young children can be capable of having anaccurate impression of the facts about which they mightspeak.Toobtainasylum,wedoubtthatitisessentialforachildtobeabletodebatethemeritsofMarxism–Leninismagainstthe merits of Western-style democracy. Some reasonablepeoplecouldconcludethatitshouldbesufficientforachildtobeabletospeakabouthisfearsandtorecountthefactsthat support his fears about returning to another country.Not infrequently, the law does permit six-year-old children(andevenyoungerchildren)tospeakand, infact,doesgivetheirwordsgreateffect.See,forexample,Pocatellov.UnitedStates,394F.2d115,116–17 (9thCir.968) (affirmingdistrictcourt's admission of a five-year-old's testimony); Miller v.State,391So.2d1102,1106 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (affirmingdecisionoftrialcourttopermitfour-year-oldtotestify);Bakerv.State,674So.2d199,200(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996)(affirmingtrialcourtdecisionadmittingtestimonyandstatementsofsix-year-oldvictim).

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While the identification and placement process isbeingpursued,criticalquestionsmustbeaddressed:Whoisresponsible?Whohasjurisdiction?Whatlawapplies? There can be and there often is a conflictbetweengovernments’immigrationlawsandachild’sbest interests. Reunification with family may be inthebestinterestsandmaybedifficulttoaccomplish.Many countries, including the United States, haveno assisted voluntary return or reintegrationprogrammes available to children returning to theirhomecountries.

Aneffectiveframeworkforprotectingunaccompaniedminorsmustoperate in lightofall thesechallenges,initialcarearrangementswouldincludethepossibilitythat the reunificationprocessmustbeongoing, theplacements should be documented, and caregiversshouldideallybescreenedandmonitored.Clearly,theplacementshouldbeinkeepingwithinnationallaws.Ideally,siblingsshouldbekepttogether.Expertsagreethatthechildshouldhaveavoiceinthedecisionandthatfamily/community-basedcareispreferred.

Whilea“mini’’bestinterestdeterminationisessentialfor initial care arrangements, health interventionorfamilytracing,abestinterestdeterminationregardingthechild’s future isalsoakeycomponentof suchaframework.Thisisdifficultinsomerefugeeandmixedmigration settings,not justbecauseof thenumbersofchildrenrequiringsuchattention,butalsobecauseit is critical to have competent authorities withexperienceinchildwelfareprinciples.Becauseabestinterestdeterminationcanconflictwiththeavailableremediesininternationalordomesticlaw,thereisnoguaranteethatitcanbefollowed.Itisalsotruethatdomesticchildwelfareandprotectionlawscanbeintensionwithimmigration,asylumandrefugeelaw.

Best interest determinations and length of procedure

Best interest determinations (BIDs) can be difficultand complicated. As MariaWojten, the Director ofthe Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rightsin Chicago, has pointed out: “BIDs are particularlynecessary in situationswhere the child’swishesarecontrarytosafety;whenachildisseparatedfromhisfamilyagainstthechild’sorthefamily’swishes;whenachildisatriskofbeingreturnedtounsafeconditionsin his home country; when an attorney involved inthe case is not representing or taking into account

thechild’sinterests;or[in]casesinvolvingpermanentseparationofthechildfromfamily.”14

Timing is a key aspect to consider in creating aframework to address theneedsof unaccompaniedminors. The window in a child’s development ismuch shorter than that in an adult’s. Time is alsoperceivedmuchdifferently.Leavingachild in limbo,withoutlove,securityandsafety,canbepermanentlydamaging. In the United States, an unaccompaniedminor may be involved for several years in animmigration procedure without a decision on apermanentcarearrangement.Inemergencysettings,this is also true. Forexample, inMarch2004, therewere 107 unaccompanied minors left behind afterUNHCRrepatriationoperationshadbeencompletedfor Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea in December2003. The International Rescue Committee (IRC)created a Durable Solutions Committee, a group ofexperts that includes UNHCR, the GuineanMinistryofSocialAffairs,UNICEF,theInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossandIRC.Thecommitteeestablishedcriteriaforreviewingchildren’scasesinwhichfamilyreunionwasnotavailable in the foreseeable future.The committee made each decision based on thechild’swishes, aswell ashisorher identity,history,current needs, and educational and employmentopportunities. The committee made the followingrecommendationstoguidefuturecases:

(a) Put theBIDprocess inplaceat thetimeof anemergency;

(b)CompletetheBIDprocesswithintheframeworkoftracingandregistration;

(c) EnsurethattheBIDprocessisinfluencedbythedatacollected.

Regarding the establishment of committees inrefugee settings, it is important that UNHCR leadthe committee, that the correct host governmentministry be involved, and that all parties receivecapacity training if it is lacking. It is important toclarify each party’s role and responsibilities. Othercircumstances inwhichtheBIDprocesscanbeused(i.e. child soldiers, childrenwith siblings, andadultswithdisabilities)shouldbeexplored.

14 M. Wojten, Director of the Young Center for ImmigrantChildren’s Rights, “Best Interest of the Child,” presentationattheIGCinauguralPartnersinProtectionLecture,7January2014.

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International and regional efforts

Governments, regional consultative processes,civil society and international organizations havealready taken steps to work together towardssuchanapproach.A recentexampleof this typeofcooperationistheRegionalConferenceonMigration’sadhocGrouponMigrantChildren,whichjusthelditsfirstmeeting.ThismeetingresultedinanactionplantobeimplementedbytheRCMcountries.Thatsaid,whilevariousaspectsofsuchaframeworkareunderdevelopmentorconsideration,afullyoperationalizedframeworkisnotyetrealized.

Inmany cases, the best interest of a child is to bereunitedwithhisorherfamilyintheirhomecountry.However, government structures, including those intheUnitedStates,makeitdifficulttospeedilyreuniteachildwithhisorherfamilyintheirhomecountry–theonlylarge-scaleexceptionintheUnitedStatestothisruleisifthechildisaMexicannational.ThereisnoformalsystemintheUnitedStates,forexample,toconductoverseashomestudies tofindoutwhetherthe child can be returned to his or her family orshould, barring a remedy in the United States, bepresentedtothenationalauthorities.Further,therearenoreturnandreintegrationprogrammesforsuchchildren.

Conclusion

In sum, an unaccompanied children’s frameworkshould include, in both the destination countryand, as much as possible, in other situations,continuingeffortstomake: (a)proper identification;(b) appropriate short-term care arrangements;(c) best interest determination, to be used bycompetentauthorities;(d)speedyaccesstothelegalsystem;and(e)adeterminationoflegalquestions.Itwouldalsorequirecarefulconsiderationastowhetherthe competent authority believes that the childshould be protected under its asylum, trafficking orhumanitarianprogrammes,anyofwhichmayrequirepermanent family separation. For children who aretobereturnedtotheirfamilies,ahomestudyshouldideally be conducted if questions of abuse, neglector abandonment are triggered. While work mustaccelerate inthisarea, itseemsclearthatthere isagrowinginternationalconsensusthatunaccompaniedandseparatedchildreninmixedmigrationflowsneedto be considered children FIRST AND FOREMOSTand protected from further harm, regardless of theultimatelegaloutcomesintheircases.Thisconsensuscan form the basis of the required cooperationamongthekeyplayersandleadtoacomprehensivemultidisciplinaryresponse.n

“In order to have an effective response to the needs of

unaccompanied and separated children, the approach requires

several steps and policy considerations involving actors

from different disciplines.”

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Introduction

Immigration to the United States of America hasincreased markedly in the past four decades.Between 1970 and 2010, the foreign-born

populationinthecountryincreasedbyover300percent–fromlessthan10milliontoalmost40million.One group that has contributed to this growthcomprises the foreign-born from Africa. Between1970and2010,thenumberofAfricansintheUnitedStatesincreasedbyalmost2,000percent–fromlessthan100,000toover1.6million.

Therapidincreaseintheforeign-bornpopulationandtherecenteffortsbytheObamaadministrationtogranta pathway to citizenship to an estimated 11millionundocumented immigrants in theUnited States haspromptedpolicymakers,employers,thenewsmediaand the general public to refocus interest on theimpactof immigrationonUSeconomyandsociety.2OneparticularareaofinterestforpolicymakersishowthelabourmarketoutcomesofimmigrantscomparetothoseofUSnatives.

While there is abundant literature on the labourmarketoutcomesofimmigrantsintheUnitedStates,thereisnonethatfocusessolelyontheforeign-bornpopulation from Africa.Most papers on the labourmarket outcomes of the foreign-born population inthe United States focus on the overall foreign-bornpopulation, and, in some instances, the foreign-born populations from popular sending countrieslikeMexico,ChinaandIndia(DávilaandMora,2005;Phillips and Massey, 1997; Sum and Khatiwada,2004). This article examines the labour marketoutcomesofAfricanimmigrantsintheUnitedStatesrelativetothoseofthenative-born.Whererelevant,we also compare the labour market outcomes ofAfricanimmigrantstothoseofthetotalforeign-bornpopulation.

2 The terms “foreign-born” and “immigrant” are usedinterchangeablyinthispaper.

A profile of African immigrants in the US labour marketC. Omar Kebbeh1

1 C.OmarKebbehisaneconomistfortheBureauofEconomicAnalysis(BEA)oftheUSDepartmentofCommerce.

ThenextsectiongivesabriefperspectiveofAfricanimmigrants in the United States by outlining theirnumbers,geographicdistributionandorigins.Wethenhighlighttheirlabourmarketoutcomesbyexaminingtheir labour force participation rates, occupationaland industry distributions, and earnings. We alsoexamineseveralfactorsthataffectthelabourmarketstatusofAfricanimmigrants,includingtheirlevelsofeducationandEnglishproficiency,andthe lengthoftimetheyhavelivedintheUnitedStates.Finally,thispaper concludes that while African immigrants arehighly educated, their earnings are relatively lowerthanthoseofthenative-bornpopulation.

Data for this paper comes primarily from the 2012American Community Survey (ACS) Public UseMicro Samples (PUMS). In some cases, historicalinformation from other sources, such as the 2000decennial and earlier censuses, were used. TheACS is an important source of data on the historicaltrends, size, growth, labour market outcomes andsociodemographic characteristics of the foreign-bornpopulation in the United States because it offers awide range of information about this group. (NOTE:The terms “immigrant” and “foreign-born” are usedinterchangeably throughout this paper.) The foreign-born (or immigrants)arepersons living in theUnitedStateswhowerenotUScitizensatbirth.Theyincludenaturalized US citizens, lawful permanent residents(green card holders), undocumented immigrants andpeopleonlong-termtemporaryvisas,suchasforeignstudentsandguestworkers.

Size, distribution, origins and destinations for African immigrants in the United States

African immigrants are fairly new to the UnitedStates, with the majority (56%) entering thecountry no earlier than 2000. In comparison, only37 per cent of the total immigrant population arerelativenewcomers(i.e.arrivingin2000orlater). In2012anestimated1.7millionAfricans,accountingfor4percentofthetotalforeign-bornpopulation,werelivingintheUnitedStates.Africanimmigrantsremainasmallgroupcomparedtoimmigrantpopulationsfromotherregions,despitethesteadyincreaseinAfricanimmigration to the United States during the pastfewdecades.This steady increasehasmadeAfricanimmigrants one of the fastest-growing immigrantgroupsintheUnitedStates.

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Figure 1: African immigrants in the United States of America, 1960–2012

Sources: US Census Bureau decennial censuses; 2006–2012 American Community Surveys (ACS).

Of the continent’s regions,WestAfrica is themajorsource of African immigrants in the United States.In 2012 West Africans accounted for one third ofthetotalnumberofAfricanforeign-born.EastAfricafollowscloselyat29percent.NorthAfricaaccountsfor 17 per cent, while Southern and Central (orMiddle) Africa account for about 5 per cent each.In termsofgrowth,CentralAfricansare the fastest-growingAfricanpopulationintheUnitedStates,withan average rate of 200per cent between2000 and2012. The East African population increased at anaverageof122percentfrom2000to2012.

AmongAfricancountries,Nigeriacontinuestobethelargest source of foreign-born African immigrantsin theUnited States. In 2012 an estimated 243,258Nigerians, representing 14 per cent of the totalAfrican immigrant population, were living in theUnited States; Nigeria has been the largest sourcesince2000.Ethiopiawasthesecondlargestsourcein2012,accountingfor11percentofthetotalAfricanimmigrant population, followed by Egypt, with apopulationof173,679.

Table 1: Top 10 countries of origin of African Immigrants in the United States of America, 1980–2012*Country 1980 1990 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Nigeria 25,528 55,350 134,940 197,489 185,787 206,604 209,908 219,309 228,953 243,258

Ethiopia 7,516 34,805 69,531 126,748 134,547 137,012 148,221 173,592 163,407 191,123

Egypt 43,424 66,313 113,396 136,931 136,648 129,970 138,194 137,799 156,149 173,679

Ghana 7,564 20,889 65,572 103,051 104,842 108,802 108,647 124,696 135,822 133,864

Kenya 6,250 14,371 (na) 79,111 80,595 83,489 87,267 88,519 102,235 98,858

SouthAfrica 16,103 34,707 63,558 79,472 78,571 79,585 82,339 77,985 92,571 83,775

Somalia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 89,474 71,474

Liberia 3,728 11,455 n.a. 64,100 72,125 65,373 72,111 66,089 71,943 70,986

Morocco 9,896 15,541 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 58,283 63,165 62,761 62,338

Sudan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 40,649 44,445 44,210

Africa Total 199,723 363,819 881,300 1,375,676 1,419,317 1,435,996 1,492,785 1,606,914 1,664,414 1,706,953

Sources: Author’s tabulations of the US Census Bureau’s decennial censuses in 1980, 1990 and 2000; 2006-02012 American Community Surveys.NOTES: *Rank by 2012; n.a. Not available.

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Unlike the overall immigrant population, which ismostly concentrated in three states, the Africanimmigrant population is spread throughout theUnited States, with New York, California and Texashavingthelargestconcentrations.Closeto30percentof all African immigrants live in these three states.LargenumbersofAfrican immigrantsarealsofoundinMaryland,Virginia,NewJerseyandMassachusetts.

Labour market outcomes

Thedecisiontomigratefromone’snativecountrytoanother is influencedbyanumberof factors.Theseincludethecostoftravel;familyinfluence;restrictionson leaving one’s country and entering another; andthe differences between the origin and destinationcountries in terms of their economic, political andreligious environments. For many, the decision tomigrate is influenced by their expected economicopportunities in the new country. The primarywayinwhichimmigrants,likenatives,cantakeadvantageofsuchopportunitiesisbyparticipatinginthelabourforce.

In this section, we examine the labour marketoutcomesofAfricanimmigrantsintheUnitedStatesrelative to those of the native-born by comparingtheir labour force participation rates, occupationalandindustrydistributions,andwagesandsalaries.

Labour force participation

Anumberof factors appear to influence the labourforceparticipationrateofimmigrants.3Theseincludeeducational attainment, length of stay in the hostcountry,languageabilityandlegalstatus.

The labour force participation rate of Africanimmigrants in the United States was 75.1 per centin 2012, compared to 63.2 per cent of the native-born. The labour force participation rate of Africanimmigrantswas alsohigher than that of theoverallforeign-born population in the same year. Thelabourforceparticipationratewas81.5percentforAfrican immigrantmen, compared to 67.4 per centfor their native-born counterparts. Among femaleAfrican immigrants,68.2percentwere labour forceparticipants,comparedto59.1percentofnative-bornwomen. An analysis of the factors behind the high

3 The labour force participation rate is the labour force as apercentageofthepopulation.

labourforceparticipationrateofAfricanimmigrantsispresentedbelow.

Educational attainment. One of themeans throughwhichimmigrants,likenatives,canimprovetheirlabourmarketoutcomesisformaleducation.Throughformaleducation,immigrantsgainskillsandknowledgethatincrease their overall job opportunities, potentiallyresultinginhigherearnings.Toexaminetheeffectofformaleducationonearnings,thispaperfocusesonindividuals25yearsandolder.Theanalysisdoesnotinclude 16- to 24-year-olds because many of theseindividuals are not likely to have completed theirformaleducationyet.

AsFigure2shows,AfricanimmigrantsandUSnativesaged25andolder in2012wereaboutequally likely– 89 per cent and 90 per cent, respectively – tohavecompletedat leasthighschool. Incomparison,69 per cent of the overall foreign-born populationfinishedatleastthissameeducationallevel.Similarly,AfricanimmigrantsandUSnativeswereaboutequallylikely to have not completed or even reached highschool,at12percentand10percent,respectively.Instarkcontrast,31percentoftheoverallforeign-bornpopulationdidnotcompletehighschool.

NearlyaquarterofAfricanimmigrantshadcompletedfouryearsofcollege. Incontrast,19percentofthenative-born and 16 per cent of the overall foreign-populationshadcompletedfouryearsofcollege.

African immigrants were more likely to havecompletedamaster’s or ahigherdegree than theirnative counterparts and the overall foreign-bornpopulation. Master’s and higher degree holdersaccounted for 17 per cent of African immigrants,comparedtoapproximately12percenteachforthenative-bornandtheoverallimmigrantpopulations.

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Figure 2: Educational attainment of the civilian, non-institutional population aged 25 and over, 2012

Source: Author’s tabulations of the 2012 ACS Public Use Micro Samples.

The labour force participation rate of Africanimmigrantsaged25andolderwashigher than thatof their native counterparts across all educationallevels, with the rate rising with each successiveeducationallevelforbothgroups.Forexample,whiletheparticipationratesofAfrican immigrantsandUSnatives with at most a high school education wereonly76percentand57percent,respectively,thoseofAfricanimmigrantsandUSnativeswithbachelor’sdegreeswere82percentand76percent,respectively.

Length of residence in the United States. As is thecasewithimmigrantsfromotherpartsoftheworld,theparticipationofAfricanimmigrantsinthelabourforce increased with the number of years theyhad lived in the United States. African immigrantswho arrived between 1980 and 1999 had a labourforce participation rate of 82 per cent, while thosewho arrived after 1999 had a lower labour forceparticipation rate of 73 per cent. This suggests thatittakessometimeforrecentlyarrivedimmigrantstoassimilateintothenewcountrybyparticipatinginthelabourforce.

English language ability. Although educationalattainment and length of residence in the UnitedStatesare importantdeterminantsof labourmarketparticipation, the ability to communicate in Englishis also an important factor. Immigrantswho cannotspeakEnglishare likely to facechallenges in theUSlabour market. The English proficiency of Africanimmigrants is much higher than that of the overallforeign-born population. This could be due the factthat themajority of African immigrants come fromcountries where the official language is English. OfthetotalnumberofAfricanimmigrantswhospokealanguageotherthanEnglish,62percentspokeEnglishverywell,comparedwith41percentfortheoverallforeign-born population. Only 3 per cent of Africanimmigrants couldnot speakEnglish, comparedwith11per cent for theoverall foreign-bornpopulation.Amongworking-ageAfricanimmigrants,80percentwho spoke English very well participated in the USlabour market. Of those who spoke English well,74percentparticipatedinthelabourforce,comparedto 23 per cent of those who could not. Theseresultsare in linewiththetheorythattheabilitytocommunicate in the host country’s language affectsthelabourmarketoutcomesofimmigrants.

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Figure 3: English language ability of the foreign-born in the United States, 2012

Source: Author’s tabulations of the 2012 ACS Public Use Micro Samples.

Occupational and industry distribution

Occupationaldistribution.AfricanimmigrantscanbefoundinalltypesofoccupationsintheUnitedStates.However, themajority work in service occupations,whichincludesuchjobsasfoodpreparation,childcareandjanitorialservices,amongothers.OveraquarterofAfricanimmigrants,comparedwith18percentofthenative-born,work in serviceoccupations.About12 per cent of African immigrants and 14 per centofthenative-bornpopulationwork inmanagement,businessandfinance,whichgenerallypaymorethanserviceoccupations.

Industry distribution. African immigrants are highlyconcentrated in the educational services, health-careandsocialassistance industries.OverathirdofAfrican immigrants worked in this industry in 2012–afiguremuchhigherthanthe23percent forthenative-born and19per cent for theoverall foreign-bornpopulation.LikeUSnatives,about12percentofAfricanimmigrantsworkinretailtrade.Asimilarshareof African immigrants and the native-born are alsoconcentratedinprofessional,scientific,management,administrativeandwastemanagementservices.

Earnings

The differences in occupational demographicsbetween the native-born and African immigrantsare manifested in their earnings. Overall, Africanimmigrants earn slightly less than the native-born and slightly more than the overall immigrantpopulation. In 2012 themedian annual earnings ofAfricanimmigrantswhoworkedfulltime(35ormorehours aweek) as wage and salary employeeswereUSD39,923.Thiswas93percent (USD43,136)and114percent(USD34,954),respectively,ofthemedianearningsofthenative-bornandoftheoverallforeign-bornpopulation.

The median annual earnings of African immigrantmenwereUSD43,946;native-bornmen,USD49,913;andtheoverallforeign-bornpopulation,USD36,067.Africanimmigrantwomenearnlessthantheirnative-born counterparts, USD 34,943 versus USD 37,974,andmorethantheiroverallforeign-borncounterparts,whoearnanaverageofUSD31,956peryear.

Africanimmigrants’earningsdifferfromthoseoftheirnative-born counterparts because of many factors,including African immigrants’ occupational andindustrydistribution,citizenshipstatusandlengthofresidenceintheUnitedStates,amongothers.Africanimmigrants who arrived in the United States priorto 1990 earn almost twice as much as those who

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arrivedin2000orlater.Moreover,themedianannualearningsofAfrican immigrantswhoarrivedprior to1980werehigherthanthoseofUSnativeswhilethemedianincomeofthosewhoarrivedin1980andlateris less than those ofUS natives. Like all immigrantsin the United States, the ability to communicate inEnglish affects the earnings of African immigrants.Assuch,AfricanimmigrantswhospeakEnglish“verywell”earntwiceasmuchasthosewhospeaklittletono English,USD44,773 versusUSD21,894. In 2012themedianearningsofAfrican immigrantswhoarenotnaturalizedUScitizenswere46percentlessthanAfricanimmigrantswhoarenaturalizedUScitizens.WhiteAfrican immigrants earned 10 per centmorethan native-born white Americans. However, theearnings of black African immigrants and theirnative counterparts were similar. Education hascleareconomicbenefitsforbothimmigrantsandthenative-born. For both immigrants and the native-born, earnings increase with education (see Figure

4).In2012Africanimmigrantsaged25andoverwithlessthanahighschooleducationearnedUSD24,672a year, while thosewith bachelor’s degrees earnedabouttwotimesasmuch–USD49,926ayear.Amongthe native-born, those with bachelor’s degreesalsoearnedabout twiceasmuchas thosewith lessthan a high school education – USD 55,171 versusUSD26,972peryear.AmongbothAfricanimmigrantsandthenative-born,thosewithmaster’sdegreesorhigher earned about three times asmuch as thosewithlessthanahighschooleducation.Whilenative-bornAmericanswithbachelor’sdegreesearnslightlymorethantheirAfricanimmigrantcounterparts,thegap inearningsclosesathigher levelsofeducation.For instance, African immigrants with high schooldiplomas (but no college education) earn only81.5percentasmuchastheirnative-borncounterpartsdo.Ontheotherhand,Africanimmigrantsandnative-bornAmericanswithmaster’sdegreesorhigherhaveessentiallythesameearnings.

Figure 4: Earnings of civilian noninstitutional population aged 25 and over, by educational attainment, 2012

Source: Author’s tabulations of the 2012 ACS Public Use Micro Samples.

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Conclusion

In this article, some insights into the labourmarketoutcomesofAfricanimmigrantsintheUnitedStatesvis-à-vistheirnative-borncounterparts,andinsomeinstances the overall foreign-born population, wereaddressed.

The results show that the labour forceparticipationrate of African immigrants is much higher thanthose of the native-born and the overall foreign-bornpopulations. Several factors influence thehighlabourforceparticipationrateofAfricanimmigrants,mainly,therelativelyhighlevelofeducationofAfricanimmigrantsand theirability tocommunicatewell intheEnglishlanguage,amongothers.

Another finding is that the earnings of Africanimmigrants are slightly lower than theirnative-borncounterparts.However, incomparisontotheoverallforeign-born population, African immigrants earnedmore.n

References

Sum,A.,N.FoggandI.Khatiwada2004 Foreign immigration and the labour force

of the U.S. Center for Labour MarketStudies,NortheasternUniversity.Availablefrom http://zfacts.com/metaPage/l ib/ immigrants-employment-report-northeastern.pdf.

Dávila,A.andM.T.Mora2005 Changes in the earnings of Arab men in

theUSbetween2000and2002. Journal of Population Economics,18(4),587–601.

Phillips,J.A.andD.S.Massey1997 The new labour market: Immigrants and

wages after IRCA. Paper presented atPopulation Association of America AnnualMeetings,WashingtonD.C.

USCensusBureau,PopulationDivision1999 HistoricalCensusStatisticsontheForeign-

Born Population of the United States:1850 to 1990. Working Paper No. 29, USGovernment Printing Office, Washington,D.C. Available from www.census.gov/popu l a t i on /www/documentat i on /twps0029/twps0029.html.

2011 NativityofthePopulationandPlaceofBirthof the Native Population: 1850 to 1990(last revised October 31, 2011). Availablefrom www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab01.html.

2013 American Community Survey Public UseMicro Samples (PUMS), 2006 to 2012.Availablefromwww.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/pums_data.

“Among both African immigrants and the native-born,

those with master’s degrees or higher earned about three times as much as those with less than

a high school education.”

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Migrant and refugee integration in global cities: The role of cities and businessesNava Hinrichs1 and Teressa Juzwiak2

Thisarticlepresentsaselectionofresultsfromthe research project, “Migrant and RefugeeIntegration in Global Cities”, an initiative by

The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration, incollaboration with the United Nations University –Maastricht Economic and Social Research Instituteon InnovationandTechnology (UNU–MERIT)and itsSchoolofGovernance(seefullreporthere).

Theproject’saimwastoascertainhowbusinessesandgovernmentsineightglobalcitiesarecontributingtothe integrationofmigrant and refugee populations,either through outreach, specialized programmes,the provision of services, or targeted funding ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), and towhat extent these contributions can be deepenedor expanded. The eight selected case studies –Auckland (New Zealand), Buenos Aires (Argentina),Chicago (United States), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia),Lisbon (Portugal), Nairobi (Kenya), Rotterdam (TheNetherlands) and São Paulo (Brazil) – represent adiversity of immigration experiences, each withtheir own distinct immigration histories and policyframeworks.

Migration: Global phenomenon, local matter

Over the past decades, migrants have contributedto the growth of numerous cities worldwide.Fast population growth and the concentration ofgroups from different cultural, social and religiousbackgrounds pose challenges for local governmentsregarding infrastructure, resources and socialcohesion (Hamberger, 2009; OECD, 1998). Suchintense changes must be integrated in a way thatdevelopsandenhancestheassetsofnewcomersforthebenefitofsocietyasawhole.

Local-level governments are not the traditionalstakeholders considered in migrant integration, asmigration policies are still frequently attached tothenational level.However,wheneffectivenationalpolicies are absent, local authorities are forced toresorttobothtraditionalandinnovativemethodstoaddressmigrantintegration(Alexander,2012).

Through the inclusion of immigrants in communitylife, cities can develop long-term goals to increasesocial cohesion and promote sustainable urbandevelopment (Brenner, 2009; UNESCOCAT, 2010).Morespecifically,localauthoritiescandevisestrategiesto provide adequate housing and jobs, access toeducationalandwelfaresystems,aswellasways toaddressthereactionsoflocalpopulations(Alexander,2012;Penninx,2005).Theauthorities’statusasactorswhoareclosetolocalrealitygivesthemthecapacityto tailor policies to their communities’ needs, asopposed to national “standardized” policies. Localgovernmentsarealsotheprovidersofmanyservicesthat directly affect integration, and therefore havetheabilitytocoordinateothernon-Stateactors,suchas businesses and NGOs, to achieve better socialcohesion and better integration of migrants andrefugees(Penninx,2009).

In order to strengthen the capacity of local levelstakeholders, collaboration is highly desired. Public–private partnerships represent an important toolthroughwhichcitiescanimprovemigrantandrefugeeintegration policies. According to the InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)(2006),“partnershipsbetween the private sector and governments areinstrumental in identifying challenges and solutionsintheeconomicandlabourdimensionsofmigration.”

The role of businesses

Businesses are increasingly viewed as a functioningpartofsociety,withresponsibilitiestowardsthecom-munity, and are increasingly held accountable fortheir treatment of migrant workers (IBLF, 2010). Itis thereforeadvocatedthatbusinessesplayabiggerrole in the migration agenda; more specifically,in the integration of migrants and refugees. Few

1 NavaHinrichsisManagingDirectorofTheHagueProcessonRefugeesandMigration.

2 Teressa Juzwiak is Coordinator of Research at The HagueProcessonRefugeesandMigration.

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companieshavefocusedontheissuethusfar,mainlyduetoitshighlypoliticizedandcontroversialnature;however,companiesoftenfaceconcernsaboutbrandprotection and a lack of competence on the topic,aswell as difficultywith allocating specific funds tothisissue,amongsomanyothersofsocialrelevance(Cavicchio,2008).

As businesses have an important stake in theintegration of migrants and refugees, a changein rhetoric is needed. Among the reasons thatmakemigration a topic of direct interest is the factthat diversity can lead to a stronger workforcewhere individuals can share and learn from eachother, which, in turn, will boost competivenessand innovation among employees. Not only arebetter-integrated migrants more successful dueto higher motivation and productivity, they alsodisplay greater loyalty towards their employers,which results in less turnover and absenteeism(Koser, 2013). Additionally, migration is believed toenhanceglobalcompetitivenessandallowscompanies

toaddresslabourshortagesandspecificskillsneeds.Migration also represents an expanded consumerbaseandoftencreatesnewmarketopportunitiesforbusinessestothrivein(Cavicchio,2008).

Private sector entities may also contribute tointegration efforts initiated by city governmentsthrough the provision of knowledge of the locallabourmarket,recruitmentdecisionsandbydevisingeducational and vocational training policies tailoredtolabourmarketneeds(IOM,2008).

Mapping the initiatives

A total of 263 initiatives for migrant and refugeeintegrationweremapped in theeightcitiesstudied.Overall, thedimensionwiththemost initiativeswassocial, followedbyeconomic, and cultural/religious.The political and the legal dimensions had fewerinitiativesoverall,asFigure1shows.

Figure 1: Mapping of integration initiatives per dimension

Social dimension.Someofthemainissuesaddressedunderthisdimension,asmappedinthestudy,includehousing,educationandhealth care. Such issuesareofteneasiertoaddressatthelocallevel.

Cultural and religious dimension. The importanceof the cultural and religious dimension may beoverrepresented due to the decision to includelanguageasaculturalpolicy.Other initiativesunderthe cultural dimension, such as cultural festivitiescelebrating diversity and intercultural workshops ortraining,haveshowntobeextremelycommonacross

the board. Specifically, local city governments arelargelyinvolvedinthisdimensionofintegration.

Legal dimension. In cities like Kuala Lumpur andNairobi, where migrants and refugees are notproperly recognized within the legal and policyframeworks, the legal dimension acquires specialimportance in migrant integration. In cities wheremigrantsandrefugeesareaffordedequalrightsunderthelawdespitelackingaccesstocitizenship,thelegaldimensionmaybeviewedasalesspressingissue.

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Political dimension.Thisdimensionof integration ispoorly explored by all stakeholders,which could bedue to the fact that the lack of political privilegesgrantedtomigrantsisoftenassociatedwithnationalpolicy,which local actors have little or no influenceon.Additionally, political rights areoftenassociatedwith citizenship rights and, therefore, stakeholdersmightfindtheseparationofbothredundant.

Economic dimension. The economic integrationof migrants is considered essential, as seen in thenumber of initiativeswith this goal. Businesses and

NGOshaveshowntobegenerallymoreactiveintheeconomicdimensionthanlocalauthorities.

Partnerships for integration

Atotalof121partnershipswere foundoperating inthevariouscities,withtheaimoffacilitatingtheinte-gration ofmigrants and refugees. Figure 2 presentsan overview of the different types of partnershipsencounteredinthestudy.

Figure 2: Overview of types of partnerships encountered in the study

Overall, the largest number of partnerships foundoccurs between third actors (such as internationalorganizations, religious institutions, civil societyorganizations and NGOs) and public institutions,followedbythirdactor–privatepartnerships.However,despite the potential benefits of public–privatepartnerships, relatively few examples were identi-fied;only10ofthosepartnershipswereestablishedbetweenabusinessandapublicstakeholder.Itmustalsobenotedthatnotallpublic–privatepartnershipsoccur at the city level, but also with nationalgovernment institutions. Nonetheless, businessesoftenconstitutelocalactorsandtheimpactsoftheirinitiativesaremostlikelyfeltatthelocalratherthanthenationallevel.

The group “other” refers to partnerships betweensimilarstakeholders(i.e.betweenthirdactors,public–public and private–private). The study found thatthird actors aremuchmore active in engagingwithbothbusinessandgovernmentsectors.Thus,existing

networksofthirdactorsmaybeausefulresourcetotapwhenidentifyingopportunitiesforpublic–privatepartnerships.

Challenges and opportunities

Cities find themselves in different stages ofdevelopment and commitment regarding themanagement of migration. Despite significantdifferences, a few contextual elements of anintegrationpolicywere identified. First, theneed toprovide language courses inorder tobreakbarriersinallaspectsof integration(Hamberger,2009; IOM,2008)wasnotwidelyrealizedinanyofthecities.Forinstance, citieswhichhave traditionallyexperiencedmigration flows originating from neighbouringcountries that share the same languageandcultureor from former colonies, as in Lisbon, tend to notplace great importance on language, hindering theintegrationofothercommunities.

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Thesecondcommonchallenge,whichwasreportedinmostof the cities, ishousing and includes issuesrelating to both access and segregation. In BuenosAires, for example, foreigners and nationals alikeface structural problems in accessinghousing – thisbeing an extra problem for immigrants as they aremore vulnerable than local populations. Unplannedurban growth resulting partially from large flows ofimmigrants has led to situations of social exclusioninwhichmigrants and their families have settled inthe peripheries, often forming shantytowns andghettocommunities.InChicago,forinstance,migrantconcentration marks the city landscape and maybecomeanissuetobeaddressedinthefuture.

Finally, the third most common challenge refers tothediscrimination present invaryingdegrees inthesocietiesofallthecitiesstudied.Inmostofthecities,conflictingperceptionsofthisissuewerefoundamongstakeholders; seldom was it recognized officially bycityofficialsandtackledbythemunicipality.However,in Rotterdam, a civil society organization fundedmainlybythelocalcitygovernmenthasbeenactiveintacklinginstitutionalizeddiscrimination.

Common challenges in relation to stakeholdersand their functioning were also identified. Access to funding is a crosscutting problem, hindering thecapacity of stakeholders to deliver services andprogrammesformigrantsandrefugees.Thisissuewasreportedbymunicipalandcivilsocietystakeholders,butnotbybusinesses.InAuckland,forexample,thefinancialcrisishasledtotheshrinkingofpublicsectorbudgets,whichhasmeantthatsome“soft”servicesformigrantsettlementhaveshrunkordisappeared.

Anotherimportantdeficiencyidentifiedbythestudy,butnotnecessarilyperceivedbyallstakeholders,isthelack of capacity to carry out efficient monitoring and evaluation processes of the projects, programmesand services implemented. This challenge wasfound throughout all types of stakeholders, oftenaccompanyingdifficultiesinassessingtherealitiesofthemigrationcontextinthecities.EstimatingtherealnumberofmigrantswasspecificallymentionedasachallengeinSãoPaulo,andthecityisnowseekingtocommissionaprojecttomapmigrationpatterns.

Another challenge that hinders the existence ofpartnershipsandthecreationofsupportivenetworksisthelack of communication and knowledge-sharing among various stakeholders in a given city. Thepracticeofsearchingforgoodideasoutsidetheowncitycontextwasseldomreported.

Asimilarsituationwasfoundwhenquestioningthirdactors and municipal agencies about the inclusionof businesses in the provision or implementationof their services or programmes. There is a greatlack of awareness in the role played by businessesandhowtheyareoftenalreadyinvolvedinthefieldof migrant and refugee integration. When probedaboutthepossibilityofestablishingpartnershipswithbusinesses,mostoftherespondentsshowedinterest,butthere isa lackofknowledgeonhowitcouldbedone.

Finally, there is controversy in the terms used to identify different groups of migrants. During theinterviews, some of the respondents stated thatlackofknowledge inrelationtorefugeescould lendnegativeconnotationstoanassociation.

Actionable measures

Inviewofthechallengespresentedabove,thestudyproposes a number of actionable measures thatcould be taken to improve collaboration betweenlocal authorities and businesses for migrant andrefugee integration.TheHagueProcessonRefugeesand Migration is looking into proposing actionablemeasuresratherthanrecommendationsasawaytodevelop concrete solutions to existing challenges.Localstakeholdersshould:

(a) Establish networksandforatoshareexperiencesand identify potential partners bothwithin andbetween cities. Learn from experience ratherthanapplypredefinednotionsofwhatapartner-shiplookslike.Withincitiesthereisoftenalackof understanding of what other key actors aredoing.Bysharingthisknowledgeandexperience,opportunities forpartnershipscanbe identified,promoting the transfer of good practiceswithinandbetweencities.

(b) Learn each other’s language: Integrationand migration are “loaded” terms which varyaccordingtotheframeofreferenceofeachcityand stakeholder. Thepractical reality uncoveredhere is that the portfolio of services thatbusinesses and cities provide to their residentsand employees often functions as integrationsupport without specifically being labelled assuch.Bybroadeningourvocabularywecanbettercommunicatewith each other and identify newandimprovedwaysofmanagingissueslinkedtourbandevelopment.

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(c) Acknowledge diversity while rec ognizing commonality: There was clear variation in theservices available to different migrant groups(e.g. expats and refugees) in the practicesidentified by the study. Yet most migrants,regardless of their category, share commonneedswhenmovingtoanewcity:Theyneedtoregularizetheir legalstatus,findhousing,accesshealthcare,findschoolsfortheirchildren,andsoforth.Thus,lessonscanalsobelearnedbybetterunderstandingtherangeofservicesalreadybeingprovided within a city to identify areas wheregood practices could be replicated for othermigrantgroupswithinthecity.n

References

Alexander,M.2012 Cities and Labour Immigration: Comparing

Policy Responses in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv.AshgatePublishing,Farnham,UnitedKingdom.

Brenner,C.T.2009 Structures and strategies for immigrant

integration: Evidence from localgovernmentsinthenewLatinodestinationsin the United States. Journal of Public Management and Social Policy,15(1):31.

Cavicchio,C.2008 Council perspectives; Immigration and

corporate philanthropy. Retrieved fromwww.conferenceboard.org/pdf_free/councils/ImmigrationReport.pdf.

Hamberger,A.2009 Immigrant integration: Acculturation and

social integration. Journal of Identity and Migration Studies,3(2).

InternationalBusinessLeadersForum2010 Business and migration: From risk to

opportunity. Available from www.gbsnonline.org/resource/collection/C 6 8 3 3 B C 0 - 0 2 C 0 - 4 2 E 2 - 8 8 0 4 -5FAB1D3B217B/BusinessAndMigration.pdf.

InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)2006 International dialogue onmigration 2006:

Partnerships in migration – engagingbusiness and civil society. IOM, Geneva.Availablefromwww.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/policy_documents/MC-INF-283.pdf.

2008 Migrants and the Host Society: Partnerships for Success (Vol.11,InternationalDialogueonMigration).IOM,Geneva.Availablefromhttp://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/IDM_11_EN.pdf.

Koser,K.2013 The Business Case for Migration.

World Economic Forum, Geneva.Available from: www.gcsp.ch/content/download/13921/168340/download.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment(OECD)

1998 Immigrants, Integration and Cities:Exploring the links. OECD, Paris. Availablefrom www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issuesmigration-health/immigrants- integrat ion-and-cities_9789264162952-en.

Penninx,R.2005 Integration of migrants: Economic, social,

cultural and political dimensions. In: The New Demographic Regime: PopulationChallenges and Policy Responses (M.Macura,A.L.MacdonaldandW.Haug,eds.),pp. 137–152. Available fromwww.unece.org/fi leadmin/DAM/pau/_docs/pau/PAU_2005_Publ_NDR.pdf.

2009 Decentralizing integration policies:Managing migration in cities, regionsand localities. Policy Network, London.Retrieved from www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=3460.

UNESCOCAT2010 Creating better cities for migrants:

Urban policies and practices to buildmore inclusive cities. Brochure for localauthorities, UNESCO, Barcelona. Availablefrom www.logiqo.com/easycontact/ec/british/opencities/jul10/creating_better_cities_for_migrants.pdf.

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Contemporary irregular human migratorymovements are marked by growingsophistication, scale and risk. The criminal

trafficking and smuggling networks that allowwidespread irregular migration, often withgovernment complicity, are highly organizedunderground businesses. Migrants’ demand for theservicesofferedbythesenetworksisextremelyhighand generates significant revenue in countries withlimited economic prospects. The demand for suchservices is evident through regular media coverageof the loss of life at sea and on land of migrantsattempting to reach another country for a varietyof reasons. IOM data shows that at least 2,400migrants perished seeking better lives or reprievefrom oppression in 2013 – theworst on record formigrantdeaths(Brian,2013:22).Humanmobilityhassignificantly risenwith the relative easing of travel,globalizationof theflowsof informationandgoods,and reinforcement of the perception that a better,more stable life exists elsewhere. Humanmigrationremains a rational choice by individuals seeking tosafeguardtheirpoliticalandeconomicwell-being.

Thistypeofunregulatedhumanmovementisknownas “mixed migration,” defined by IOM as “complexpopulation movements including refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants, and other migrants.”TheUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) has a similar interpretation:“Persons with different objectives move alongsideeach other using the same routes and means oftransport or engaging the services of the samesmugglers” (UNHCR, 2011:8). Both definitionsinclude important and complementary componentsfor understanding and responding to this type ofmigration.

The interface between managing mixed migrationand refugee protection is crucial. Migrants andrefugees are treated differently under internationallaw,asmigrantstypicallychoosetomovevoluntarily,

whilerefugeesare forcedtomovetopreservetheirlives. This technical dichotomy traditionally fedinto humanitarian agency mandates for assistance,resultingingapsandinefficiencies.Theestablishmentof the mixed migration paradigm is partly arecognition that providing humanitarian assistanceto people on the move has become increasinglycomplex, and that individual legal categorizations(e.g. migrants and refugees) and agency expertisemustbemergedintoacoordinated,holisticresponse.The concept acknowledges that although migrantschoosetomove,thecircumstancesoftheirjourneysrarelyprecludethemfromabuse.Similarly,themixedmigrationpolicy regimedoesnot limitprotectiontorefugees and asylum-seekers, but, rather, enhancesit. Mixed migration is a necessary expansion andmerging of concepts and humanitarian responsesto keep pace with the dynamic nature with whichpopulationsmove.

Migrant deaths in the Red Sea and Gulf of AdenYear Number of deaths2008 1,056

2009 529

2010 19

2011 131

2012 98

2013 6

2014(JanuarytoJuneonly) 121

Mixed migration in the Horn of Africa

Contrarytotheglobaltrend,thenumberofliveslostintheGulfofAdenandRedSeadecreasedfrom2008to2013 (RMMS,2012:35). (In thefirsthalfof2014,however, the number of deaths increased and wasreportedat121(UNHCR,2014).)Theoveralldeclineindeaths is likely the resultof trainingprogrammesdelivered to coast guards and other officials inYemen, which led to Yemeni authorities to allowmigrantboats to reachthecountry’scoasts, insteadof forcing migrants – who may not know how toswim – into the water (Brian, 2013). The RegionalMixedMigration Secretariat believes the process of“migrant commoditization” (i.e. migrant kidnapping

Mixed migration: Assessing the issues and implementing an effective humanitarian responseT. Craig Murphy1

1 T.CraigMurphyisProgrammeManagerforMixedMigrationatIOMKenya.

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for ransom) has also contributed to this decline indeaths,asthevalueofensuringthatmigrantsarrivealiveismoreprofitable(RMMS,2013).Thiseconomicdynamichasledtotheuseofsturdierboatsthataremechanicallymorereliableandtosmugglersallowingmigrants,mostofwhomdonotknowhowtoswim,todisembarkontheshoreinsteadofintocoastalwaters.However,thedecreaseinmigrants’lossoflifeatseadue to their commoditization is linked to increasedkidnappings and the abuse of migrants for ransomoncetheyareonshore.

ThesmugglingofmigrantsfromtheHornofAfricatoYemenisagoodcasestudy.Inthisnotoriousmaritimeroute across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,economic migrants, refugees, internally displacedpersons, asylum-seekers, rejected asylum-seekersand unaccompanied minors, mostly from Ethiopiaand Somalia, are always found congregatingaroundthe coastal village ofObock,Djibouti. Theywait forhumansmugglerswhowouldfacilitatethenextstageoftheirjourneytoYemenbyboatthroughpayingfortheservicesofhumansmugglers.Thereasonsforthejourneyarevaried;legalcategorizationsaredifferent;and intentions at the final destination are diverse,but the migration route and means of travel usedand the risks faced by these people are the same.Thisscenarioembodiestheessenceofcontemporarymixed migration and is replicated on a daily basisin North Africa, Southern Europe, South-east Asiaand the Caribbean. While travel by sea occupiesa prominent role, movements, however, are notexclusivelymaritime. Large numbers of people also

crossmultiple landborders under similar dynamics,facing a multitude of risks, including suffocation inshipping containers, road accidents and abuse fromofficialsandunscrupuloussmugglers.

State policy and mixed migration: A look at Saudi Arabia and Israel

Saudi Arabia

Anearly2013reformofthedomesticlabourmarketin Saudi Arabia mandated the regularization ofundocumented migrant workers or for them toleave the country. In linewith the new policy, KingAbdullah granted sevenmonths’ amnesty for theseworkerswhichexpiredon3November2013.Whenthe amnesty period was over, an unprecedentedcrackdownonirregularmigrantsledtoviolentround-ups and mass deportations by security forces. ByJanuary2014,anestimated1millionmigrantworkershadeither leftvoluntarilyorhadbeendeported.Ofthese, 160,000 were Ethiopians and 23,000 wereSomalis (RMMS, 2014: 10). Word travelled quicklyamongmigrantcommunities,andbytheendof2013,asadirect resultof thenewstatepolicyon foreignworkersinSaudiArabia,thenumberofmigrantsusingtheRedSea–YemenandGulfofAden–Yemenroutestoreachthekingdomdroppedsharply.Thisisillustratedinthefigurebelow,whichshowsmonthlyarrivals inYemenofmigrantstransitingtoSaudiArabiabetween2012and2013.

Monthly arrivals in Yemen from Horn of Africa, 2012–2013

Source: UNHCR / RMMS.

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InOctober2013thenumberofmigrantsusingYemenasatransitpointtoSaudiArabiabegantodeclineintherun-uptotheexpiryoftheamnesty.Amere2,018migrantsarrivedinYemeninNovemberofthesameyear,comparedto9,090inNovember2012.AnevenmoredramaticdropwasrecordedinDecember2013,withonly450migrantsarriving,comparedto7,912inDecember2012.ThedownwardtrendcontinueduntilFebruary2014,whenthenumberofmigrantarrivalsinYemenstartedtoincreaseagain.

Israel

In January 2012 Israel’s Knesset passed anti-immigration legislation (termed “Anti-InfiltratorLaws”).Thelegislationlimitstheasylumprocessandallowsauthoritiestoindefinitelydetainmigrantsinafacility in the remoteNegevDesert,often foryears,pending their asylum claims. The Regional MixedMigration Secretariat reports, “[D]ue to new Israeliimmigration measures implemented in 2012, thenumberofAfricanmigrantscrossingtheborderfromSinai to Israel has dropped to almost zero in 2013”(RMMS, 2014:69). At the time of this writing, mid-2014,AfricanmigrationtoIsraelisstillnegligibleduetothesestatepolicies.

TheexamplesofSaudiArabiaandIsraelsuggestthatstatepolicycanstopmigration.However,asdatafromthefirsthalfof2014shows,theissueismorenuanced.After a period of decline,migrant arrivals in Yemenstarted to rebound inFebruary2014,and therehasbeenageneraluptrendfromthenuntilthepresent.Whilemigrationto Israel is still restricted,Eritreans,whopreviouslyplied this route,arenowturningupinunprecedentednumbersinNorthAfricaandItaly.From January to August of 2014, migrants arrivingin Italy from Tunisia and Libya exceeded 100,000,surpassingnumbersattheheightoftheArabSpringin2011.Thesechangingmigrationdynamicsarelinkedtopolicies,policingandbrutality.Migrantsrationallychoose a more viable route where the chances ofreaching their final destination are perceived to behigher.

Reactionary state policies to control migration aretransient at best. Analysing the examples of SaudiArabiaandIsrael,itisclearthatstatepolicycanquicklyanddramaticallyimpactmigrationpatterns,withtheimpactcharacterizedlargelyasa“shift”ratherthana“cessation.”

Regional and interregional dialogue

Regionalmultilateralstatedialogue,withsupportfromhumanitarianactorssuchasIOMandUNHCR,makesupan important componentof themanagementofmixedmigrationflowsfromtheHornofAfrica.Aseriesofmeetingshavetakenplacetoaddresstheseissuesover the last seven years. InMay 2008UNHCR andtheMixedMigrationTaskForceofYemenconvenedthe“RegionalConferenceonRefugeeProtectionandInternationalMigrationintheGulfofAden”inSana’a,Yemen.2 In September 2010 the United Republic ofTanzaniahostedasimilarmeeting,butfocusedontheso-called “Southern route” ofmixedmigration. ThemeetingwascarriedoutwiththesupportofIOMandUNHCR.3Afollow-upmeetingtothe2008conferenceinSana’atookplaceinNovember2013andresultedintheSana’aDeclaration.4

A separate but related government dialogue, theRegional Committee onMixedMigration, has beensupported by IOM since 2010. The committee iscomposedofgovernmentdelegationsfromtheHornof Africa and Yemen, andmeets annually to reviewprogress, challenges, and trends related to mixedmigration. The committee also promulgates andendorsesasetofrecommendationsthatservesasaroadmapforinfluencingstatepolicy.

Additionally, a network of task forces on MixedMigration was set up in 2008. The task forces areorganizedat thecountry levelandarecomposedofhumanitarian actors from civil society, the UnitedNationsandnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),as well as government representatives. The taskforces are co-chaired by representatives from IOMandUNHCRandserveascoordinatingmechanismsintheresponsetomixedmigration.Morerecently,and

2 UNHCR, summary report from the Regional Conference onRefugee Protection and International Migration, Sana’a,Yemen, 19–20May 2008. Conference report available fromwww.unhcr.org/48808b1a2.html.

3 UNHCR, “Refugee protection and internationalmigration: Areview of UNHCR’s role inMalawi,Mozambique and SouthAfrica,” Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 6–7 September 2010.Conferencereportavailablefromwww.unhcr.org/4c7fa9b89.html.

4 UNHCR, Sana’a Declaration at the Regional Conference onAsylumandMigration,Sana’a,Yemen,11–13November2013.Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/531dbb246.html.

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asa response to the surge inmixedmigration fromNorth Africa to Southern Europe, IOM establishedtheMigration Task Force forNorth Africa andHornof AfricaMTF–NOAH in November 2013. This bodymirrors the shift to an interregional response andrepresents improvements in coordination betweentherespectiveregions,aswellasbetweenindividualcountriesoforigin(i.e.intheHornofAfrica),transit(inNorthAfrica)anddestination(inEurope).

Prevention–response–post-response (PRP) model for mixed migration

The complexities of contemporary mixed migrationflows require a coordinated and strategic approach.Theprevention–response–post-response(PRP)modelisanattempttoconsolidatethemyriadofinitiativesbeingcarriedoutbygovernments,theUnitedNations,internationalorganizationsandNGOs.Thereisvalueinaconsistentresponsethatstilltakesspecificregionaldynamicsintoconsideration.ThetworeportsandtheSana’aDeclarationearliermentionedechothemainprinciplesofthePRPmodel.

PRP model for mixed migration flows

1. Prevention

1.1 Awareness-raising

1.2 Legislationdevelopment

1.3 Lawenforcement

1.4 Dataanalysisandinformation-sharing

1.5 Regionaldialogues

1.6 Labouragreementsforregularmigration

2. Response

2.1 Migrationresponsecentres

2.2 Capacity-building

2.3 Civil–militarycoordination

2.4 Migrant/Refugeeprofiling

2.5 Referralforassistance

2.6 Protectionscreening

3. Post-Response

3.1 Psychosocialsupport

3.2 Asylum/Refugeestatusdeterminationprocess

3.3 Assistedvoluntaryreturnandreintegration

3.4 Familytracingandnotification

Stage1–Prevention–correspondstothestagepriortomigrants’departure.Atthisstage,migrantsmaybetermed“potentialmigrants,”astheyarestillweighingtheiroptions,thatis,decidingonwhethertomigrateor not, and if so, which route to take. Steps 1.1 to1.6arekeytoinfluencingthesepotentialmigrantstomake safer decisions and combating the smugglersandtraffickersthatsupportirregularmovements.

Stage 2 – Response – is what is required whenmigrantsencounteraproblem,whichmayrangefrominjury, illness,vehicularorboataccidents,detentionorabuse.Steps2.1 to2.6aremeasures toorganizeand implement effectivehumanitarian assistance tomigrantsandrefugeesinneed.

Stage 3 – Post-Response corresponds to whenirregularmigrantshavealreadypassedthroughstage2,thatis,life-savingmeasureshavebeencarriedout,but the migrants remain stranded and in need oflonger-termcareandadurablesolution(s).

The PRP model can facilitate the transition frompolicytopracticeforrespondingtotheneedsofbothmigrants and governments negatively impacted bymixedmigrationflows.Continuedattentionofthesecritical issues by the international community willmakestridestowardsreducingthenumberofmigrantsoptingtomigrateirregularly,whileminimizinggapsinprotection,andsavinglives.n

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References

Brian,T.2013 Death at the border: The challenge of

documenting lives lost during migration.Migration Policy Practice, Vol. III, Number6, December 2013 – January 2014.Availablefrom:http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MigrationPolicyPracticeJournal14_30Jan2014.pdf.

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Regional MixedMigrationSecretariat(RMMS)

2012 Desperate Choices: Conditions, Risks &Protection Failures Affecting EthiopianMigrants in Yemen. DRC and RMMS.Available from: www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/featured%20articles/RMMSbooklet.pdf.

2013 Regional Mixed Migration 1st Quarter2013TrendsAnalysis.Availablefromwww.regionalmms.org/index.php?id=55&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=58&cHash=d63c4c422e72b4e50bc3947dad77f68f.

2014 TheLetteroftheLaw:Regularandirregularmigration in Saudi Arabia in a context ofrapid change. Mixed Migration Research Series (Explaining People on the Move)Study 4, RMMS. Available from www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_publications/RMMS_Letter_of_the_Law_-_Saudi_Arabia_report.pdf.

2014 Going West: Contemporary mixedmigration trends from the Horn of Africato Libya & Europe. Mixed Migration Research Series (Explaining People onthe Move) Study 5, RMMS. Availablefrom www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/rmms_publications/Going_West_migration_trends_Libya___Europe_final.pdf.

InternationalOrganizationforMigration2014 “IOM condemns people smugglers who

send migrants fleeing hardship to theirdeaths in the Mediterranean.” Pressbriefing note, 1 July 2014. Available fromwww.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2014b/pbn-listing/iom-condemns-people-smugglers-wh.html.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR)

2011 Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration:The 10-Point Plan in Action, 1st edition,February 2011. Available from www.refworld.org/pdfid/45b0c09b2.pdf.

2014 “Red Sea tragedy leaves 62 people deadin deadliest crossing of the year.”UNHCR News Stories, 6 June2014.Available fromwww.unhcr.org/5391c1e56.html.

“Persons with different objectives move alongside each other using the same

routes and means of transport or engaging the services of the same smugglers”

– UNHCR, 2011:8

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Publications

Enhancing Capacities of Policymakers and Practitioners on Migration, Environment and Climate Change in sub-Saharan Africa (Summary Report of the Regional Training Workshop)2014/22pagesEnglish(AvailableforPDFdownload)

The training course, “Enhancing Capacities ofPolicymakers and Practitioners on Migration,Environment and Climate Change in Sub-SaharanAfrica”,washeldinMoshi,UnitedRepublicofTanzania,from11 to 13March 2014. This training built uponthe success of previousmigration and environmenttraining courses delivered by the InternationalOrganization forMigration (IOM) in the Republic ofKorea and the Republic of Colombia in 2013. Thisevent is also part of IOM’s global capacity buildingprogramme on environmentalmigration, developedfollowing the recommendations of the global IOMInternational Dialogue on Migration event held inGeneva in 2011. The Summary Report provides anoverviewofthepolicyrecommendationsformulatedbypolicymakersduringtheworkshop.

Fatal Journeys: Tracking lives lost during migration2014/EnglishForthcoming

In October 2013, over 400 migrants died in twoshipwrecks near the Italian island of Lampedusa.Sadly, these tragedies were not isolated incidents.IOMestimatesthatduring2013and2014nearly6,000migrantslosttheirlivesinborderregionsaroundtheworld.Thesefiguresonlyrevealpartoftheproblem.Manymigrantdeathsoccurinremoteregionsoftheworldandareneverregistered. Officialdataonthenumberofmigrantdeathsisscarce.Thevastmajorityof governments do not publish numbers ofmigrantdeaths,andcountingtheliveslostislargelylefttocivilsocietyandthemedia.

Drawingupondatafromawiderangeofsourcesfromdifferentregionsoftheworld,thisfirstglobalreportonmigrantdeaths,takesacloselookattheavailablestatistics on this subject. Obtaining reliable data tocountandrecordborderrelatedmigrantdeaths,isanessentialstartingpointforanydiscussiononhowtopreventsuchtragediesfromoccurring inthefuture.Throughimprovedrecordkeepingofmigrantdeathsaroundtheworld,wecandrawgreaterattentiontothesetragedies.

Each chapterof this report focusesonanumberofkeyquestions.Howmuchandwhattypeofdataarebeing collected ? Who is responsible for collectingdataonmigrantdeaths?Howreliablearethesedata?Howisthedatabeingused?Whatmeasurescouldbe taken to improvedata collection ?What lessonscanbelearnedfromdatapracticesinoneregionandappliedinanotherregion?

Vol. IV, Number 3, July–September 2014MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 29

2012 Prevalence of Child Migration from Karamoja’s Napak and Moroto Districts2014/64pages/English(AvailableforPDFdownload)

For centuries, Uganda’s north-eastern region ofKaramojahasbeeninhabitedprimarilybypastoralistswhoselivelihoodsystemisbuiltuponprotectingandproviding for their livestock. Within this context,basic survival for many Karimojong households hashistoricallymeantregularlymigratingwiththeircattlein response to changing climatic and geographicconditions.Thisstudyisrootedintheideathatchildmigration from Uganda’s Karamoja region to thecountry’s urban centres is part of a larger adaptivelivelihood strategy employed by various Karimojonggroups during intense periods of cultural andeconomicchangeandduress.

Aspartofabroaderefforttounderstandthenatureand causes of child migration from Napak andMoroto districts, IOM conducted a survey of over700 households in 2012 designed to: (a) measuretheprevalenceofoutmigrationand, specifically, therural–urban outmigration of children; (b) identifythemajorpushandpullfactorscontributingtochildmigration;and(c)provideinsightintotheperceptionof and attitudes towards child migration amongvulnerable communities. The overall objective ofthe survey was to contribute to research on childmigrationfromNapakandMoroto,withthespecificgoalofidentifyingpotentialareasofintervention.

Child Migration from Karamoja2014/72pages/English(AvailableforPDFdownload)

Overthelastdecade,migrantchildrenfromUganda’snorth-eastern region of Karamoja have becomeincreasingly common in the streets of Kampala andother urban centres in Uganda. These children arehighlyvisible,vulnerableandclearlylivinginextremepoverty.Publicperceptionof thesemigrantchildrenis informed by an understanding of the drivers ofpoverty in the districts of Napak and Moroto inKaramoja, where the majority of these childrenmigrate from. As a consequence, attitudes towardsthesechildrenrangefromsympathytohostility,andthesolutionstotheirproblemscanbevariouslyseenaspolitical,economicorsocial.Aspartofabroadereffort to understand the nature and causes of childmigration fromNapak andMoroto, IOM conductedextensive qualitative research in over 20 vulnerablecommunities in 2012 to identify the underlyingreasons why children migrate, especially to urbancentres;addresswhysomechildrenmigratewithouttheirparents;understandwhymostchoosetomovetourbanareas;explorewhymanytravelfurtherthanpreviousgenerations;andexplainwhythebehaviourismostprominentamongtheBokoracommunity.

30 Vol. IV, Number 3, July–September 2014MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice was launched almost three years ago and theeditorswouldnowliketo invitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeof this survey,whichcanbe takenanonymously, is tohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Thankyou.

IOM-MPI Issue in Brief No. 10 – Integrating Migration into the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda2014/12pages/English(AvailableforPDFdownload)

By September 2015, the Member States of the United Nations will havenegotiatedasetofsustainabledevelopmentgoals(SDGs)andsubsidiarytargetsandindicators.ThesegoalswillframeanewinternationaldevelopmentagendatoreplacetheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),whichexpireattheendof2015.

InIntegratingmigrationintothePost-2015UnitedNationsDevelopmentAgenda,afterexaminingtheroleofmigrationasadriverfordevelopment,authorLars

Lonnbackarguesthatmigrationcanbeintegratedintothepost-2015UnitedNationsDevelopmentAgenda.Todoso,threeareasrequirespecificattention-(1)fosteringpartnershipstopromotedevelopment,(2)promotingandprotectingmigrants’rightsandwell-beingand(3)reducingthecostsofhumanmobility.