economic exchange in india

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Two Systems of Economic Exchange in Village India1EDWARD B. HARPER

Brqn M a w and Havnford CollegesINTRODUCTION

HIS paper will summarize the jujmani system which regulates the eco-T omic interdependence of various castes in m any ru ral areas of India, andwill then describe th e types of relations hips between oc cupatio nal groups foundin a par ticu lar a rea of S outh India. Following a compa rison of these two sys-tems, one based upon t he growing of a subsistence crop, th e other upon a cropsold for cash, an explanation is proposed as to why the system found in asmall area of Ind ia cannot conform to th e more dominant Ind ian patte rn.CASTE AND OCCUPATION

Th e Ind ian caste system is in p art based upon occupational specialization.T he extent of the correlation between occupation and ca ste has been the sub -ject of a controversy i nt o which I do not wish to enter a t this time, but I willmake a few general state m ents abo ut th is association which, I believe, will beaccepted by most stu de nts of Ind ian society.(1) For a n y given occupation there usually ca n be found several (or numer-ous) castes who claim it as their occupation. Ho wever, these castes, except forthe agriculturalists, tend to occupy adjacent territories, or, if they are geo-graphically associated, they often have a few idiosyncratic modifications oftheir speciality.

(2) M embers of mo st, if not a ll, cas tes think of them selves as hav ing onlyone or a t most a few prescribed occupations, and consider certain other occupa-tions a s being m ore or less str ict ly proscribed. To make this statemen t moreforcefully-members of m ost Indi an castes feel th at there is one occupation(or a few) which they can an d should follow, and th at there are ot he rs whichthey should not or cannot practice. I t can also be said tha t some castes aremore occupationally specialized, others more occupationally generalized. Inaddition, there is often a nebulous group of occupations which are open tonearly all castes, and may be un dertake n in conjunction w ith or in lieu of thedesignated caste occupation.

(3) Mem bers of the rura l Hin du caste com mun ities speak an d ac t as if eachcaste has a traditional occupation which the castemen follow, and often feelthat there is higher association between caste and occupation than is sup-ported by empirical investigation. This expresses a judgment about whatshould exist, and changes of this pa tte rn , althoug h often adm itte d to be ac-counted for by valid circum stances, are nevertheless looked upon a s deviationsfrom the tradition al functioning of t he total sy stem .(4) I n general, the association between ca ste and occu pation (a) is stronger

760


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762 A merican A nthropologist 161, 1959...These fixed rate s [of pa ym en t made b y a jajm an for goods and services] show littlesign of chang ing throug hou t th e course of ye ars (p . 63).I n descr ibing the s y s t e m in a n o t h e r U.P. vil lage, Opler and Singh (1948)give the fol lowing account:M an y of the work arrangemen ts of the village are regulated by th e purjan-jajmanor h ereditary workm an-customer relationship. Purj ans are castes of workmen or serv-ants who are called upon to provide certain services because of an understanding,lasting over m any generations, between th e families involved. I t is the d uty of th epurjan to meet th e reasonable needs of his customer, to cut his hair and trim his nailsif he is a barber, to plow his fields if he is a n agricultural laborer, to provide him w ithclay vessels if he is a potter. It is th e obligation of the customer to call upon the purjan

an d no one else for th e specific service, If the pur jan is not used, he must neverthelessbe compensated.. .. he purjan-jajman tie is supported b y the influence an d action of regional casteassemblies; the interests of Senap ur villagers are defended by th e caste assemblies towhich they belong. If a purja n complains to his caste assembly tha t he has been ignoredor mistreated by his hereditary customer, the assembly may very well forbid othermem bers of the caste to render service to the offender. I n a society where many spe-cific tasks can be performed only by particular functional groups or castes, such aruling brings th e most powerful landowner quickly t o terms (pp. 494-95).No villager, no ma tte r how low his social sta tus , cu ts his own hair or shaves him-self (p. 480).Dube, in his Ittdiun Village (1955) , descr ibing a v i l l a ge in Hyde r a ba d ,

br ief ly mentions a sys tem which in te r re la tes th e var ious cas tes :. ..With a few exceptions, mos t of th e castes have to accept a basis of rec iprocity indischarge of their functions. Tradition ap proves of such a n arrangem ent, an d m utualtru st a nd inter-dependence ensure its continuity . Where this arrang emen t is accepted, asystem of atta ch m ent of some families t o certain other families naturally follows. .. .I n Sham irpet some family affiliations da te back t o th e time of the found ation of thevillage.. .. Occupational castes have a developed trade unionism, and their code of profes-sional ethics an d etiq uette too is very rigid. T he dismissed person will be protected bythis professional etiquette. No one else would be willing to a ct as a substitute, for fearof being penalized by the caste punclroyat (pp. 59-60).

For M y sor e S ta t e , S ou th I nd ia , S r in ivas ( 1955) , in descr ib ing t he economics y s t e m of a vi l lage which he s tudied , h as this t o say:

Th e stab ility of caste monopolies is enforced by family inheritance. That is, theright to serve a particular family-the right of making plows for it, or of periodicallyshaving th e heads of it s male mem bers, or of wash ing it s clothes-is tre ate d as a herit-abl e and d ivisible right. Thus he partitioned brothers of a Barber family divide amongthemselves the families which they were all jointly serving before partit ion (p. 15).In the traditional economy of ths area, m oney seems to have played a minimalpart. ...Within the village of Ram pura th e usual way of paying for services was and is ingrain, or in land, t he source of grain. Th e various kinds of paym ent m ay be arranged in


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in In dia 763a hierarchy of prestige, with payment in land a t the top. , ..Prestige is also attachedto grain payments, though their prestige is less than the prestige which is attached topayments in land. .. . Grain payments also imply enduring relationships, and en-during relationships are valued. . . .Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy of prestigeare payments in cash (p. 11).

Lewis and Barnouw (1956) describe the working of the jajmani system in aNorth Indian village as follows:. . . each caste group within a village is expected to give certain standardized servicesto the families of other castes. . . . Each man works for a particular family or groupof families with which he has hereditary ties. His father worked for the same familiesbefore him, and his son will continue to work for them, the occupation or service beingdetermined by caste. ...I t is characteristic of this system to operate without much exchange of money. Forit is not an open-market economy, and the ties between jajman and kamin [the re-ciprocalof jajman] are not like those of employer and employee in a capitalistic system

Jajmani rights, however, which link one to certain families, may be regarded as aform of property passing from father to son. Like land property, it is equally appor-tioned among brothers when they separate. . (p. 67).From these descriptions, i t is possible to abstract certain underlying prin-

ciples of the jajmani system.(1) Most members of the Indian village community have an agreementwith other members who perform different services or produce different goods,whereby these groups are enabled to exchange the products which they control.

In these descriptions, either some or all members of some or all castes areinvolved in the system, but the authors emphasize the relationship of artisanand service castes to members of the landowning or farming castes.

(2) Jajmani alliances are between families, not between castes, but thefamily alliances are heritable at the lineage level; that is, the descendants offamily A which had an alliance with family B inherit their lineages alliancewith members of lineage B. Thus the alliance operates between families, but itscontinuity is in the lineage.(3 ) Although the alliances are between families rather than castes, it is a tthe caste level that they are maintained and enforced. If family A wants t obreak its traditional relationship with family B, other members of Bs castewill support their casteman by boycotting A so that i t cannot obtain from othersources the type of services supplied by B .

(4) One of the enforcing mechanisms of the system is the assumption thatfamily A needs the services of family B, as i t cannot or will not perform thesefunctions itself. The system is based upon the further assumption tha t certainoccupations impinge upon concepts of ritual purity, and this supplies a ra-tionale for the ranking of caste-occupation groups. For instance, some servicescan be performed only by members of high castes (e.g., certain religious duties),while others (e.g., leather-working), if performed by a member of a high-rank-ing caste, might result in his exclusion from his caste.

(P. 66).


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764 American Anthropologist [61, 1959(5) Paym ent for goods an d services received un der the jajman i system gen-erally is not in cash, but in other goods and services, grain, rent-free land, or

other nonm onetary benefits. T he rem uneratio n for goods and services suppliedto an y given family appears to remain more or less constant from generationto generation, and presumably is propo rtionate to th e size or needs of the re-ceiving family. (Now here in the litera ture is there a n analysis of precisely howpayments are determined.)INTERGROUP ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN TOTAGADDE

I should like next to describe briefly a few of the interc aste economic rela-tions in Totag adde, a village in th e M alnad (hilly region in th e Western G hatsalong the w est coast of In dia) of M ysore Sta te, South India, an d from thisthere will emerge a picture that is quite different from the jajmani system. Ishall stress particularly the relationship between artisan and service castes andlandowning or cu ltivating castes.T he village of Tota gadd e h as an are a of more t ha n 1000 acres an d, like othervillages in the region, is contained in a small valley surrounded by rolling,forested hills. I n this p ar t of In dia economic ties frequen tly cu t across villageboundaries. Th us , if the s ystem is described a s viewed from t he stan dpoin t of asingle village, it should be fairly represen tative of the system in a larger geo-graphic al area. On the basis of evidence supplied b y earlier observers (e.g.,Buchanan 1807;Government of Bombay 1883), I believe tha t th e character ofthe economic relationships which I describe for To taga dde holds true for theentire Malnad in the districts of Shimoga, No rth R ana ra, and South K ana ra,which before the recent S tat es Reorganization Act were in t he sta tes of Mysore,Bombay, and Madras, respectively.About 20 percent of the land in Tota gadde is under cultivation, and theremainder is accounted for by forests, grazing fields, house sites, and twoartificial lakes used for irrigation. Over thre e-quarters of th e cultivated landgrows pa dd y; this yields an am ount of grain insufficient to meet th e dem ands ofthe village, so supplementary supplies must be imported. Most of the remain-ing cultivated l a n d 4 2 acres, or abo ut four percent of the total village area-su pp or ts an intensively cultivated areca (betel) nut garden, which is the heartof the village both geographically and economically. The importance of th eareca nut garden is indicated by t he fact tha t th e price of this land is ten tofifteen times th at of pa dd y land. Th ose who control these gardens, which alsogrow pepper, betel leaves, card am on and plant ains , com ma nd the wealth of th evillage.Areca nu ts are consumed in nearly all pa rts of India, bu t are cultiva ted inonly a few areas (38 percent of the to tal In dia n areca nu t crop comes from thewest coast of South India, while 61 percent is grown in Bengal and Assam[Governm ent of I nd ia 1949:9]). Virtually all of the Tota gadde cro p is sold forcash to merchants in nearby towns, and from there it en ters into the greaterIndian economy. The price obtained for the areca nuts depends upon the


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in India 765economy of In di a as well as th a t of Sou theast Asia, and fluctu ates from da y today and from year to year. For example, in a six-year period a t Sagar, an im-po rtan t areca nu t marke t town near Totag adde, th e average of the maximummon thIy wholesale prices for a comm on grad e of areca nuts for the years 1940-45 (the only ye ars for which statistics were available) w ere Rupees 27; 41; 45;111; 95; and 84, respectively (Government of India 1949:81) .T h e 480 residents of Tota ga dd e belong to e ight castes* an d live in six sepa-ra te hamlets. I n approxim ate order of their ritual ranking these castes are:Havik Brahmins, Lingayats, Kotte Okkaligas, Divarus (Halepaika), Potters(RumbBra), Hasluru, Barber (Hajfima), and Untouchables (Adi Karnatika).Besides these eight castes, there a re members of other castes who do notreside permanently in the village but nevertheless have an important part inits economy. Some are migratory laborers and artisans whose permanent resi-dence is some distance from Totagadde bu t who live and work in t he village forperiods ranging from a few day s to m ost of the y ear; some, agriculturalists andlandless laborers, reside permanently in surrounding villages but work forTotagad de fam ilies; finally, some are mem bers of ar tis an castes, such as theWasherman (Madivala), Carpenter (Badigi) and Goldsmith (Sonagara), whoserve Totagadde families but who reside permanently in neighboring villages.Residents of th e village ar e grouped not o nly according to their casteaffiliation but also by their occupation. Some people grow areca nu ts (Bggsyat-diirs); some farm padd y land (Ry ots); some make po ts (R um baras); others arehired laborers (Kiilis) or are indentured se rva nts (Manealus).These terms, designating a n occupation or profession, may or m ay not im-ply th e caste af li at io n of the practitioner. For example, since members of manycastes farm pa dd y land, Ry ot does not indicate a mans caste, bu t in To tagaddewhere only Haviks own areca nut land, to say th at a man is a Bggayatdgr is t osay tha t he is a Brahmin. This is not tru e in other Malnad villages, where mem-bers of different castes farm these plantations.W ith the im por tan t exceptions of Ry ot and Riili, occupational categoriesgenerally designate either a single caste or a grou p of castes occupying similarpositions in th e caste hierarchy.To tu rn this around-a caste name may or may not indicate a persons pro-fession. I n th e case of K um bar a, which literally translates as Pott er, acaste nam e directly st at es th e traditional usu al occupation of mem bers of thecaste. T he same is true of caste names of other Artisan groups-Barber, Wash-erman, Goldsmith, and Carpenter-Ironsmith. Caste names of non-Artisans,e.g., Divaru, Lingayat, Havik Brahmin, or Hasluru, do not in the same waydirectly imply occup ation, althoug h to those w ith knowledge of this regionthey indirectly may do so.Th us, in those instances where the sam e term is used for caste an d occupa-tion, it m ay be used in two senses. For example, a R um bar a is (1) a man whoworks in clay, or (2 ) a member of a specific caste whose traditional occupationis pot-making. Bu t if a R um bgr a by caste farms paddy land, h e is by occupa-


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766 American A nthropalogisl (61, 1959tion a R yot. However, in a ritual or sta tus context, the term used designatesa mans specific caste affiliation rather than his occupation. Thus Kumbsra,relative to the situation, means either occupation or caste.Fo r the te rm Ry ot, no such contextual discrimination need be made, for ina ritu al situa tion it is never used; instead, the actu al caste or var na (e.g.,Sud ra) nam e will be employed.On t he other han d, it is crucial to note th at in economic relationships, oc-cupation, not caste, is the important category. For example, there is in thevillage a large group of migran t laborers who have come from South K ana ra. Aresident villager calls all these men ShEregBrglu and exhibits just one type ofbehavior when working with them , despite the fact th at the y belong to ten ortwelve different castes. The fact that some occupations are correlated orsynonymous with caste tends to obscure the fact that in the economic realmoccupation is more im portan t th an caste.Th e m ost im porta nt occupational categories in T otag adde are Horticul-turalist, Agriculturalist, Contractor, Artisan, Laborer, and Servant, Some ofthese are functionally an d linguistically subdivided . With th e exception of th eterm Artisan, all are native conceptual and linguistic categories. The termArtisan is used here to group together certain occupations which function ina similar manner in th e village economy, although m embers of th e comm unityrefer to the m b y their specific designations.

Hortimliuralists (BiigiiyatdBrs).A t th e top of th e village ritual, economic,and political hierarchy are the Havik Brahmins; they are the largest caste inthe village, with nearly 40 percent of th e tota l population. Ha viks own allthe land upon which areca nut p alms are grown, and in addition are lessors of aconsiderable amount of paddy land. Havik families generally purchase paddyfor their own consumption, as he ren t in kind which they receive is not suffi-cient to meet their needs. H av ik s are th e sourceof most of th e money used i nthe village; they are important moneylenders, and usually pay cash for theproducts and services they receive. Horticulturalist, which in Totagadde issynonymous with Havik Brahmin, is the only occupational group that hasstrong economic ties with all other occupational groups; non-Horticulturalistsare to a greater or lesser degree dependent upon one or several Bggayatdsrfamilies. Horticu lturalist s are emplo yers of serva nts an d skilled and unskilledlaborers, purchasers of agricultural pro ducts , pa tro ns of artisan s, and lenders ofmoney. Their small areca-nut estates require extensive hired labor, bu t muchof this work, if postponed one or several years, affects the annual yield onlyslightly. Durin g the years of high prices for their produc t Horticu lturalis ts com-Pete with one another for laborers, while in years of low prices only thosewealthy enough to have a cash reserve can afford to avail themselves of therelatively cheaper labor supply.

Agriculturalists (Ry ots). M ost families in four of the cas tes ar e wholly or inpar t farm ers of pad dy fields, a s are some members of most other castes.Divarus, whose primary caste occupation is agriculture, are th e second largestcaste (29 percent) in th e village, and own or lease the choicest paddy fields. T h e


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in India 767two Lingayat families now eke out a marginal existence by farming paddylands, b ut the y a re descendants of a family which a t one time owned areca-nut garden land. Rotte Okkaligas and Haslurus traditionally have worked asspecialized laborers in areca-nut gardens; during the last century they haveconsciously atte m pte d an d partially succeeded in becoming Agriculturalists, al-though some are full or part-time ind entured laborers to H avik g arden owners,and most have to supplement their income b y working as laborers on areca-nutestates. A griculturalists are seldom employers of wage laborers except a t timesof padd y planting an d harvesting, and ev en then accomplish most of th e workby a system of cooperative labor exchange (muyy i ) . I n addition, Agricultural-ists never have indentured servan ts but m ay hire itinerant laborers to build ahouse or d ig a well.Hired Laborers (Ktilis). The occupation of Hired Laborer corresponds butlitt le to caste affiliation. Som e mem bers of most castes (including the poorestHaviks) work as laborers for Horticulturalists, either as (1) independent daylaborers, who are generally paid i n cash just before or soon after they have donetheir work; or (2) as obligatory laborers, who have borrowed money fromBiig&yatd&rs nd have promised to work off their deb t when their help is mostneeded, which is generally during th e seasons when labor is greatly in demand.For this reason obligatory laborers, who have already con tracted their wage,are paid a t a lesser ra te th an are independent laborers, who are in a position tocommand th e higher wages prevailing a t such seasons.Between H ired Labo rers an d individual employers there is no necessarilypermanent alliance; instead, its duration depend s upon th e needs of the em-ployer, t he employees need for income, an d the existing good will. As this isan area of In dia in which there is a chronic labor shortage and a constan t supplyof labor that is not committed to a single employer, the employer-employeerelationship is characterized by intense bargaining and by instability ofpermanent ties. AIthough Hired Laborers usually work for Horticulturalists,during the season when both areca nuts an d paddy a re harvested, it is afamiliar sight to see Horticultu ralists as well as Agriculturalists busily search-ing for laborers and vying with one another by offering increasingly higherwages. On he other hand, during slack seasons independent laborers go fromhouse to house seeking employm ent.Indentured Seroants (Manealus). Indentured Servants, who perform worksimilar to th at of Hired Laborers, may b e either permanently or temporarilyindentured. T he traditional caste occup ation of U ntouchables is perm anentindentureship, a s ta tu s tha t the y are now rejecting. Untouchables who aspireunsuccessfully to be Agriculturalists most often work as Hired Laborers ortemporarily Inden tured Servants. I n the traditional system of perm anent in-dentureship th e alliance between a H avik master (yejmanru) and an Untouch-able servant (maneti/%) s inherited patrilineally by b ot h; th e master does notpa y cash wages, bu t instead gives food, clothing, a nd othe r nonmo netary gifts.Temporarily Indentured Servants generally come from poor families i nseveral castes who prefer the occupation of farming. Money is loaned to the in-


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768 American Anthropologist [61, 1959denture d in dividua l or to his family, for which he w orks either for an agreed-upon length of tim e or for a m onthly wage th at is deducted from his totalde bt; in add ition, he receives cash and/or food an d clothing during th e term ofhis indenture.

Contracl Laborers (Sh&eg&r&]us).Contract L aborers come in work gangs,generally from th e neighboring district of S outh K an ara , under a con tractor(Sheregar) to w hom th ey a re indebted . Sheregfirs, whose men work primarilyfor Ho rticulturalists bu t occasionally for Agriculturalists or A rtisans, usuallymake a verbal co ntrac t specifying the ty pe and qua ntity of work to be accom-plished and th e amo un t of m oney to be paid. T otagad de h as several Sheregarsduring th e season of heavy work, and altoge ther these may em ploy as manyas 60 or 70 laborers. I n term s of th e total am oun t of work done in th e village,they are probably of equal or greater importance than the Hired and Inden-tured Laborers combined.Once a Bfigayatdar agrees to employ a p articular Sheregfir, he canno tco ntr ac t with a diflerent one during t he season. Th e following year he is freeto negotiate a new contract with a different Sheregar, or to do without theservices of a ShCregir and a tte m pt to get his work done by local Hired L aborersor Ind en tur ed Serva nts. Sheregars refuse to w ork for employers who have con-tracted with oth er Sheregfirs. Much of the heavy w ork in the gardens, such ascarrying manure, leaves, and earth to th e areca nut trees, and heavy work o ut-side of th e garden , such as building o r repairing roads, houses, and artificiallakes, is ordinarily contracted with Sheregfirs.In addition, there are migratory skilled laborers, carpenters, well diggers,brick cu tte rs or roofers, who work by contrac t. T he contract m ay be madewith a Sheregar to whom the workers are indebted, or with a group of inde-pendent workers who divided the proceeds among themselves.Arlisans. I am here using the term Artisan to include both handicraftcastes (e.g., Potters) an d service castes (e.g., Washerm an), bu t A rtisans are alsodivided anothe r w ay: itinerant Artisans who travel from village to village, re-maining a s long as there is a demand for their services, and pe rma nent Artisanswho serve one or more villages in the area in which they reside.No mem bers of n on-A rtisan castes perform for a livelihood an y of theArtisan task s; no mem bers of one Artisan caste perform the duti es of an ot he r;most members of a n Artisa n cast e derive p ar t or all of thei r income from theircaste occupation; some members of several Artisan castes supplement theirincome by farming p ad dy land or, less frequen tly, by working for wages.Itin era nt Artisans generally come from qu ite dist an t areas, and for the mostpa rt perform services not available from local Artisans-for example, copper-smithery, tattooing, or cotton carding.In Totagadde there are five local Artisan castes; two, the Barber andPotter, live in the village, and the others, the Goldsmith, Washerman, andCarpenter-Ironsmith, reside in neighboring villages but serve residents ofTotagadde.


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HARPER] Economic Exchange i n I nd ia 769Characteristic Artisan Alliances

T he re are two cha racteristic types of alliance which Artisans m aintain w i t hmembers of other castes. As representative of these types I shall use the exam-ple of th e Barb er an d th e G oldsmith castes. When discussing Artisans, all ofwhom pe rform ri tu al as well as functiona l services, th e social un it of c aste is ofeconomic importance. Some Artisans will refuse the ir services to a person be-cause of h is position in th e caste hierarch y, regardless of th e occupation fol-lowed by the potential client.Barber caste. M embers of middle and high castes con stan tly use the servicesof the Barber (H ajam a). Each large village in the Malnad has a residentBarber; smaller villages combine to sup por t one. Th e Barber in Totagadde cutsth e hair and shaves th e faces of all bu t th e two lowest (Ha sluru and Untouch-able) castes, and also serves th e middle and high cas te mem bers of two smallneighboring villages. Eac h of th e lower cas tes which are refused service containsseveral individuals who cu t th e hair of their fellow castemen ; they receive nopay, and the role does not differentiate th em in s ta tu s from other members oftheir caste.The village Barber is paid on a yearly basis. Horticulturalists pay him incash, and i n 1955 the ra te was three rupees a year for each m arried male andone rupee for each widow. (Brahmin widows may not remarry, and a sign oftheir status is a shaven head.) The specific amount varies from village tovillage and from year to year, and prices are not fixed by the B arber panch ayat.Agriculturalists who are served by th e Barb er pay him a fixed qua nt ity ofpaddy per married male in a family. This rate is fairly well standardizedthroughout the area and does not appear to change markedly from generationto generation.T o exemp lify th e Barbers relationship w ith mem bers of other Artisancastes: the Potte rs generally pay th e Barber in pad dy a n amount equal to th atgiven by th e Agriculturalists and do not pay i n pots. They may an d sometimesdo pay in cash, bu t usually prefer to use pa dd y as a medium of exchange asthey often have a surplus which has been paid to them by Agriculturalists,the main consumers of clay pots. (Horticulturalists can afford metal vessels.)When pa dd y is exchanged for pots, t he precise qu an ti ty of one to the o ther isonly approximately standard ized. I n years of exceptionally high or low paddyprices the ratio is changed by bargaining, and a new am ou nt of pa dd y is settledupon. M inor fluctuations in th e price of p ad dy do not cre ate a new exchangeratio.T he B arber does not charge for cu ttin g th e hair of unm arried boys, bu tfamilies are indebted to him for this service and often make him gifts-some-times by request, sometimes voluntarily. Characteristically, Horticulturalistsgive areca nu ts and betel leaves, Agriculturalists give vegetables, and Po tte rsgive pots. T he Tota gadd e B arber rarely has to purchase these commodities.I n addition to shaving an d cu tting hair, the Barber performs several cere-monial roles, the most notable of which is in a young S udra or Brahm in boys


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770 A merican A nthropologist [61, 1959first hair cutting ceremony. For his part in this life-crisis rite, the Barber isgiven a gift (maryade, respect) which may consist of a small am oun t of cash,a piece of cloth, and ingredients for a m eal. T he exact content a nd q ua nt ityof this gift is neither standardized nor bargained over, bu t depends upon thewealth an d whim of the giver-though th e Ba rber ha s ways of expressing hisdispleasure should th e am oun t of respect be inade qua te.I n 1955, the T otaga dde Barber ha d been in the village for abou t 15 years,and had been recruited in a manner common in the area. After the death of theprevious Barber, who died without issue, the important Havik men, as rep-resentativ es of th e whole village, began a search for a new Barber. T hey foundan unmarried Barber boy whose parents agreed to allow him to come to thevillage and work for the Horticulturalists without wages for a period of fiveyears; in re turn , he was given 600 rupees with which to finance his marriage.T h e agreement was in the form of a written contract. Although theoreticallyth e agreemen t of mem bers of no n-Brahm in caste s should have been obtained ,in practice they were merely toId who the new B arber w as to be an d agreementfollowed automatically. T he 600 rupees was raised b y taxing Ho rticulturalistsproportionately to the am ou nt of land they owned.For th e first five years the new Barber lived on th e padd y pay me nts madeto him b y all the non-H orticultural castes th at he served. After completing hisperiod of in den ture, th e Barb er bargained w ith Havik s for a money wage. Sub-sequently, he ha s twice asked for wage increases. Each time t he Haviks havereluctantly agreed instead of choosing th e alternative-finding, con tractin gwith, an d bringing to th e village a new Barber.T h e position of village Barbe r is not h ered itary. A Barbers son ma y con-tra ct his services with some or all of his fathe rs patro ns, or he may co ntrac twith members of oth er villages. Once a n agreement is reached, either p art y isfree to cancel the relationship a t an y time. H owever, this freedom is limited bythe fact that a Barber who leaves his employers without good reason wouldhave d i5 cu lt y finding a new village willing to accept him, an d m embers of avillage who capriciously dismiss him would have difficulty in persuading an-other Barber to serve them unless they offered him unusually high wages.Contracts between a B arber a nd his cIients are verbal, unless the y involvethe advance of a large sum of cash; they continue from year t o year unlesscancelled or renegotiated by either party. The contract can be broken easilyonly a t the time of pad dy and areca-nut harvests, when the Barber is paid thepa rt of his yearly wage which previously h e had been unable t o collect.Although the cont ract is between a single Ba rber a nd a grou p of individualsnot all mem bers of th e group need participate. I n Totagadd e two H avikfamilies have quarreled w ith th e Barber, do not now em ploy him, an d do notpay him, Both families have arranged for a Barber from a neighboring villageto come periodically to their houses, and for th is service he is paid slightlyhigher wages tha n usual. T he village Barber cann ot prohibit an outsider fromworking in Totagadde, nor does he appear to desire to do so. In addition,several young married m en patronize the town barbershop in order to get fash-


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H A R P E R ] Economic Exchange in India 771ionable haircuts, although oth er members of their family patronize and paythe village Barber. T he T ota ga dd e Barbe r, however, does perform ceremonialfunctions for th e children of these men. T he two Hav ik families who patronizean outside Barber have these ceremonial services performed by this outsider.Goldsmith caste. Goldsmiths (Sonagara) mak e jewelry from both gold andsilver. Several Goldsmiths serve the residents of Totagadde, and they differgreatly in their popularity. I n th e las t two decades two Goldsmiths have livedin Totagadde, and although they now live in nearby villages they are stillpatronized b y some residents of Totagad de. O ne lives in an adjacen t village inwhich there are five Goldsmith families; in addition to practicing their casteprofession, three of th e la tte r run sm all snack an d illegal liquor hotels (th eEnglish term is used), and several farm pad dy land. If residents of Totagaddepatronize any Goldsmith in this group, they generally go to the one whoformerly lived in Totaga dde. Th is m ans business has declined considerably inthe last decade; informants state that he is dishonest, unreliable, and a me-diocre craftsman. T he next Goldsmith who lived in To tag ad de sta ye d only afew years, du ring w hich time he did most of th e work required in th e village.H e still is conveniently located and patronized by some residents of Totaga dde.At present the Goldsmith who does the largest am ou nt of gold and silver workfor To tag ad de is a recent immigra nt from a neighboring area, and belongs to adifferent endogamous Goldsmith group. His workmanship is considered su-perior (t o a large exte nt because he is skilled in th e increasingly popular moderndesigns), his work is usually completed by the promised date, and he has areputation for honesty.The most important ritual function performed by Goldsmiths is to pierceth e ears of children and th e noses of y oung girls. T he services of an y convenientGoldsmith m ay be requested, for no particular Goldsmith family has the rightor duty to act in these capacities for any other family. Goldsmiths servemem bers of all castes, high or low. Their co nt ra ct s are with the individu als forwhom they are working; their services traditionally have been, and still are,paid for either in cash or in an equivalent am oun t of pa dd y by members of alloccupational groups. Any person desiring to have jewelry made, remade, orrepaired may choose any available Goldsmith with whom he can reach anagreement. G oldsmiths do not have hereditary clients, a restricted geographicalarea in which to practice, or enduring economic alliances with members ofother castes.Generalizalions concerning permanent Artisans. Mem bers of Ar tisan castesin the Malnad generally serve several villages and occasionally extend, con-tra ct, or change th e geographical area from which they draw their clients.When an Artisans service (as distinguished from his product) is paid forin produce, wages tend to be relatively stable; when it is paid for in cash,the rate fluctuates. When an Artisans product (jewelry, pots, and so on) ispaid fo r in pad dy instead of cash, the specific qu an ti ty of pad dy is roughlycalculated as if i t were money.Each Artisan caste h as one or more ceremonial roles which it may perform


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7 72 A merican A nlhropologist [61, 1959for mem bers of other castes. Th ese ritual services ar e paid for independentlyof regular services, and a pa tron is able to obtain one without the other. T hepatrons relative wealth is thus an im po rtan t element in determining the typeand qu an tit y of goods and/or services th a t he requests. For instance, some-times a poor Horticultu ralist or Agricu lturalist requests th e ritual services of aWasherman a t a wedding bu t does not patronize him otherwise; sometimes aneven poorer family dispenses with a ll of th e W ashermans services.The re are tw o general type s of economic ties between the A rtisan castesand o ther castes. On the one hand, B arbers and Washermen, both of w homsupply a service rath er th an a comm odity, have contractual relations w ith agroup of individuals within a geographical area , bu t lower castes in both in-stances are excluded. The contractual relationship is on a year-to-year basis;i t is nonhereditary, and there is no requirement th at all members of a givengroup (family, caste, or village) need p articipate.Second, there are two Artisan c raftsman castes (P otter s and Goldsmiths),the m em bers of which opera te more or less by a sys tem of individu al agree-me nts for a specific am ount of work. Such craftsm en sell their wares and ser-vices to all castes, and the mem bers of these Artisan castes are in direct com-petition w ith each other.T he Carpenter-Ironsmith (Badiga) is in an interme diate position. H e con-tracts with some Agriculturalists to supply and repair plows and some otherfarming implem ents, and is paid a yearly wage in paddy . Poorer A griculturalistssometim es pay half the usual yearly wage an d m aintain th e wooden pa rts oftheir plows, asking the Carpenter-Ironsmith to do only the iron work. SomeAgriculturalists have these services performed on a piece rate rather than ayearly basis, and p ay either in cash or its equivalent. Th e C arpenter-Ironsmithalso works for non-Ag riculturalists and he is paid according to what he does.Those who have a yearly contractual relationship with the Carpenter-Iron-smith may, a nd frequ ently do, patronize others if they desire to have additionalwork performed beyond the contracted amount. Unlike the Barber andWasherman, the Carpenter-Ironsmith extends his services to all members ofall castes.

THE MALNAD SYSTEMEconomic arrangem ents in th e Malnad do not form as coherent or easilydefinable a system as do those in the jajmani type of arrangement, but somegeneralizations can be made concerning the interdependence of occupationalgroups in th e M alnad.I n the M alnad , man y of the intercaste economic relations do not requirespecialized skills. At th e cente r of th e village economy ar e the Ho rticulturalists,who require a great deal of unspecialized labor which can be provided by

mem bers of m any other castes, regardless of their own caste occupa tion.Th e degree to which a family within any given caste turns to unskilled andsemiskilled employment depends in large part upon its income from other


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in Ind ia 7 73sources rather than its caste affiliation; wage work is available for those whodesire it.

Malnad villages do not approach economic self-sufficiency. Employer-employee, artisan-client, lessor-lessee, master-servant relationships are not re-stricted by village boundaries. The type of economic arrangements describedfor Totagadde apply to a region in which the growing of areca nuts forms thebasis of the economy, and in which villages are small and not comparable intheir caste or occupational composition (e.g., one village may contain no Un-touchables while a neighboring one may have a large Untouchable populationwho work in the surrounding villages).In the Malnad, economic transactions most typically are paid for in cashor its equivalent. With the exception of the system of permanent indenture-

ship, economic ties are not hereditary nor are they conceived of as enduringfor the lifetime of the individuals involved. Some of these ties (for instance,those between clients and a Barber, employer and a Contractor) are semiper-manent; once put into effect they continue for a jo b or a season. I n all relation-ships there are alternatives, i.e., there are other tenants, landlords, employ-ees, artisans, or clients available to those seeking these services.However, many alliances between employer and employee have almost nopermanence beyond a days work. Some members of many castes go regularlyor irregularly in search of a day or two of work and employers often search forlaborers, Depending upon the season and the amount of work required, one orthe other predominates in taking the initiative, and the party who does notinit iate the action has an economic advantage. In these types of relationships,which form a significant part of the villages economic transactions, bargainingis intense.Although I have emphasized the flexibility and short duration of economicties, partly because they are potentially this way, and part ly because membersof the villages conceive of them as being this way, in practice many persistentrelationships exist. This is due to such factors as the pattern of advancingwages, satisfaction from a previous relationship, proximity, and personal qual-ities. Furthermore, complete randomness of choice is limited by the conceptof obligation or indebtedness. For example, Horticulturalists do many favorsfo r others, such as lending money without interest, helping in litigation, givingbuilding materials (areca palm logs, thatching) and fruits and nuts from theirgardens, lending tools, and so on; in return, the recipients are expected to helptheir benefactors during periods of labor scarcity. Those who agree t o work forreasonable wages during such times are preferentially hired during slack pe-riods when there is a surplus of available labor. In the Malnad, the concept ofobligation gives a greater measure of stability and permanency to economicrelationships than otherwise might exist.

The Iwo systems compared. Two contrasting methods of economic exchangein caste-stratified, agrarian-based Indian villages have been presented. Forpurposes of expediency, I have called one the jajmani system and the other the


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714 American Anthropologist (61, 1959Malnad system (as I believe the system described for Totagadde prevailsthroughout much of t he South India n Malnad area).

It is imp ortant to note th at for both systems I am c oncentrating upon idealeconomic relationships; I assume t h at th e principles of th e two system s arefurth er ap ar t th an is their actual operation. Opler and Singh (1948) and Dub e(1935) have stated that jajmani relationships in a village may exclude somecastes, so it should no t b e surprising to find in these villages some flexible eco-nomic relationships characteristic of th e Ma lnad ty pe of economy.Some of the salient co ntr ast s between the tw o system s are:(1) In the jajmani system, intercaste economic ties ideally are permanentan d hereditary; the Ma lnad sy stem is characterized b y easily established andeasily broken alliances between em ployers and employees, and between pa tronsand artisans (the relationship between master a nd his permanently indenturedservant is a notable exception).(2 ) I n th e jajman i system, paym ent for goods and services is most char-acteristically m ade in produce, use of land , or other no nm one tary un its; in th eM alnad system, paym ent for goods and services is most characteristically m adein cash.(3) I n the jajmani system, wages or prices for services and goods remaincom paratively consta nt; in the M alnad system, they fluctuate considerably.(4) I n th e jajmani system there is little bargaining over wages and prices;

in the M alnad system bargaining is vigorous.(5) I n th e jajmani system , caste panc ha yats are concerned with protectingthe rights of their members to serve their patron s; in the Malnad system theyare not .( 6 ) The jajmani sys tem is in large part based upon the economic inter-dependence of castes, whereas occupational groups are comparatively moreim po rtan t in the M alnad economic structure.There is no evidence thal either type of system is a recent innovation. O n thecontrary, both appear to be traditional form s of economic organization i n dijer entareas of India.

coNcLusIoNsTh e question with which I am now concerned is: W hy d o the two systemsdiffer? or, to rephrase it, Are there, despite a pan-Indian communicationsystem operating through village proximity, functional reasons which haveprevented the two economic systems from developing along the same line (ifthey stemm ed from a common tradition ), or from converging (if they deveIopedfrom different traditions)?I n a tt emp ti ng t o answer, it is im po rtan t to note th at Ma lnad villages havea different economic basis th an do villages with th e jajmani arrangeme nt. I n

either system, produce from th e land is th e m ajor source of wealth, bu t invillages with the jajmani system the main or dominant crop is a subsistencecrop, whereas the Ma lnad villages grow primarily a cash crop. I n th e jajm anisystem, crops grown in the village ar e used extensively as the medium of ex-


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in In di a 775change for goods and services supplied me mbers of one caste by mem bers ofanother. I n the Malnad system most of the m ajor crop, areca nu ts, is sold out-side of th e village, an d th e cash for which it h as been exchanged has becomethe stan dar d for economic transactions.T he value of grain in relation to hu m an needs is constant or relatively so ,provided production an d population remain stable (and for In dia there is somereason to assume th at until recently they haves). Th us, wages and prices, ifgiven in kind (grain, goods, and services) may remain co nstant an d it is thenpossible for a subsistence economy to opera te in terms of permanen t andritualized alliances. Moreover, in a n economic system which specifies th at anemployer and employee, or patr on a nd artisan, m ust deal with hereditarily de-termined counterparts, bargaining is not possible as that would require thatthere be substitutes from whom the sam e goods and services can be obtained.T he value of cash does not hold this con stant relationship. If the purchasingpower of money varies, th e same stan da rd of living cannot b e m aintained un-less wages and prices also change prop ortionate ly, an d th is requires a mecha-nism for bargaining, a fact which precludes perm anent and heritable economicalliances. Inasm uch a s the dom inant economic product of the M alnad is anitem traded internationally, i t is necessary for the villages to operate funda-mentally on a cash basis.T he crux of th e argum ent is not t ha t differences in th e two typ es of eco-nomic arrangements stem from the typ e of crop tha t is grown; instead, it isth at in one type there is a stable medium of exchange and in t he other t hemedium of exchange fluctuates in value. T herefore this analysis helps to explainwhy I nd ian villages in which a subsistence crop is used as a medium of ex-change ar e able to ha ve stable a nd long-lasting relationships between occupa-tional groups. I t does not, however, explain the historical question of why theydo have t he m ; th e growing of a subsistence crop is a necessary bu t not a suffi-cient cond ition for the existence of the jajm ani system . If in the M alnad arecanuts always sold at the same price and the purchasing power of money re-mained constan t, there w ould be no logical reason why a jajm ani sy stem couldnot exist.T o retu rn to th e economy of Tota gadd e, it is now possible to explain whyAgriculturalists do not, like the Horticulturalists, need to bargain over wageswith all of t he occ upation ally specialized group s who serve them . For instanc e,Agriculturalists pay th e Barber in produce, and the amount remains constantfrom year to year. They would probably be satisfied to have the Barbersposition hereditary, b ut they form pa rt of a society whose economic system isdominated b y H orticulturalists who have cash rathe r tha n produce with whichto pa y th e Barb er. As this medium of exchange varies in its purchasing power,both they a nd th e Barber m ust be able to bargain, and therefore neither de-sires an hereditary alliance. I n sho rt, the fact th at the dom inant occupationalgroup participates in a money economy se ts the p att ern for flexible and non-her edita ry economic ties between m em bers of m ost occupa tional groups.If th e analysis presen ted here is correct, a typ e of inter cas te relationship


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776 A merican A nthropologist [61, 1959comparable t o the M alnad s ystem should be found in other villages which havetraditionally grown a cash crop th at is sold on t he commercial market. Also,traditional hered itary intercas te ties in villages with th e jajman i system shouldatt en ua te wherever those villages substitu te a cash for a subsistence crop.Although I have been unable to find adeq uat e supportive information forthe form er point, for th e la tte r there is some evidence. For a village in Rlaha-ras tra , Orenstein (n.d.: 1) describes a jajm an i type system , called in t ha t areath e baluta system: The traditional economic activities in the village . . . n-volve fixed relations among the cas tes of the c om mu nity, by which goods andservices are regularly exchanged for agricultural products. Orenstein (n.d.:5-6) ends his analysis by sta ting th at T he system is, in fact, decaying. . . .Alarge number of cultivators are insisting that baluta payments need not bemade if the farm er does not wish to mak e them . Although O renstein is notconcerned w ith why the s ystem is declining, he gives a clue in anothe r p aperconcerning th e same village: A s compared with many other villages in In dia ,Gaon is quite well off, for the introdu ctio n of irrigation (abo ut sixty yea rs ago)gave its inha bit an ts sufficient water to raise sugar cane in large quantities. T hemoney re tu rn from raising sugar cane is quite high. . . . 1956: 1).Th us we see th at a t least in one village with a jajmani typ e economy, tradi-tional hereditary alliances began to loosen after the village began to changeits economic basis from a subsistence to a cash crop. This is in contrast toTo tagadd e, for which there is no evidence of a comparable change. On t he basisof limited historical docum ents from th e 14th cen tury on, it appears th at theRlalnad h as for more tha n 600 years been involved in th e raising of an exp ortcash crop.If my analysis is correct, in the occupationally diversified Indian societyan economy of th e jajmani typ e should be based upon, but is not caused by ,th e production of a subsistence crop. If in t he sa me society a cash crop replacesa subsistence crop, this sho uld be sufficient cause to effect changes tow ard theM alnad typ e of econom ic system . Despite t he widespread existence of vario usforms of the jaj m ani system , it is di 5c ul t to conceive of its existence in thosepa rts of Ind ia where the economy has for centuries been based upon the use ofa m edium of exchange such as money, which does not hav e a consta nt purchas-ing power.

NOTES* The fieldwork upon which this paper is based was done between November, 1954, an dFebruary, 1956, and was made possible by a Ford Foundation Fellowship. I am indebted to mywife for having collected some of t he d at a upon which this paper is based and for having ma-terially contributed to its analysis.I wish to tha nk D avid Mande lbaum a nd the In stitu te of E ast Asiatic Studies, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, for malung it possible for me to w rite an earlier an d m ore extended analysisof the econom y of the v illage which we studied. Th e present paper is in part based upon this work(Harper 1958). I am grateful to Morris Opler fo r having read and commented upon an earlier

version of this paper, and to D oroth y Spencer, Sidney Gamble, Pauline M ahar, Michael M ahar,and Carl Webber for their numerous cogent suggestions.* Th e number of castes in Totagadd e appears t o be small in contrast w ith villages in many


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HARPER] Economic Exchange in India 7 7 7other parts of India which have a more elaborate system of occupational specialization. For in-stance, Wiser (1936: 12), in describing an unusually small U .P. village (population 754), lists 24castes.. . .Priest and teacher; Bard and genealogist; Accountant; Goldsmith; Florist, Vegetablegrower; Rice grower; Carpenter-Iron-worker; Barber; Water-bearer; Shepherd; Grain

Parcher; Seamster; Potter; Tradesman; Oil Presser; Washerman; Mat maker; Leatherworker; Sweeper and Cesspool cleaner; Mohammedan Beggar; Mohammedan Glass-BangleSeller; Mohammedan Cotton Carder; Mohammedan Dancing Girl.Th e problem is how to account for this difference. I n lieu of historical documentatio n, twopossible factor s can be suggested. One is the differing interpretatio ns of po llution concepts in thetwo areas. From the literature an d from discussions of t he sub ject with fieldworkers in NorthIndian villages, beliefs regarding ritual pollution in Totagadde appear to form a less flexibleand more absolute system than they do in the U. P. For instance, in the Malnad, high-castefamilies must perform some household duties themselves as to hav e them done by low-caste menwould result in ritual pollution. T o illustrate, orthodox Hav ik B rahmins would not accept drinkingor bathing water drawn by a mem ber of a n even slightly lower caste, nor would the y allow a low-caste sweeper to enter their houses. Th us the re are few household duties th at Haviks allow othersto perform. This difference may result from the combination of ritua l and economic dominancein one caste, a s happens in the Malnad, a s opposed to the more general Indian pattern in whicha caste a t the t op of one of these hierarchies generally is not a t th e top of the o ther.A second factor t ha t helps account for the differences in occupational specialization is com-parative village size. In t he U. P., villages of several thousand inhabitants are common, whereasin the Malnad the average village population is less than 300. In the M alnad the interaction ofterrain and economy prohibit the formation of large aggregates of population, which in turnwould be a prerequisite for the support of a large number of highly specialized trades.a Marked changes in both population and production in India appear to be recent. Indus-trialization is still incipient. D avis (1951:25) discusses the possibility th at the population of Ind iagrew but slightly between 300 B.C. and 1871 A.D. Thus it is probable th at both economic systemswere developed during a period in which the Indian population and productivity changed but

little.BIBLIOGRAPHY

BUCHANAN,RANCIS1807 A journey from M adr as through t he countries of Mysore, C anara, and Malabar,Vol. 111.London, W. Bulmer and Co.DAVIS,KINGSLEY1951 T he population of Ind ia and Pakistan. P rinceton, Princeton U niversity Press.DUBE, . C.1955 Indian village. London, Routledge a nd Kegan Pa ul Ltd .DUMONT,OUISAND D. POCOCK1958 Com mented summar y of th e first pa rt of BouglCs Essais. Contributions to IndianSociology 2:3144.

Gazetter of th e Bombay Presidency, Vol. XV, Par ts I and I1 (Kanara). Bombay,Government Central Press.1949 Agricultural marketing in India: repo rt on the marketing of arecan uts in India.Mark eting Series No. 63. Delhi, Manager of Publications.

HARPER,EDWARD.1958 Economic struc ture of a South Indian village. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University.LEWIS, SCAR nd VICTORBARNOUW1956 Caste and the Jajmani system in a North Indian village. Th e Scientific M onthly8 3 : 6 8 1 .

GOVERNMENTF BOMBAY1883GOVERNMENTF INDIA


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778 A merican A nlhropologist 161, 19591OPLXB,M o w s and RUDRADATTINGE1948 The division of labor in an Indian village. In A reader in general anthropology,

Carleton S.Coon, ed. New York, Henry Holt and Co.ORENSTEIN,HENRY1956 The role of leadership in the changing conditions of caste in an Indian village. Ms.n.d. T h e raditional economic system in a Bombay village. Ms.S a w r v ~ s ,M. N.1955 The social system of a M ysore village. I n Village India: studies in the little com-mun ity, McKim M arriott, ed. American Anthropological Association, Memoir No.

83.1936 The Hindu Jajmani system: a socio-economic system interrelating members of aHindu village community in services. Lucknow, Lucknow Publishing House.

WXSER,WILLIAMHENRICKS

economic exchange in india

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