Eastern India and the Groundwater Paradox

Aditi Mukherji

Presented at GWP South Asia Workshop, Colombo

February 25, 2011

Based on synthesis of research since 2004

The irrigation story of India

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Canals Tanks & other sources Groundwater

Rapid rise

in GW

irrigation

Private ownership

On demand irrigation

Timeliness

Adequacy

Flexibility

Rising contribution of groundwater

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1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241

Districts

% of

Agr

icultu

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DP

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1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241

Districts

Perc

enta

ge to

Agr

icultu

ral G

DP

% contribution of SWI to Agricultural GDP % contribution of GWI to Agricultural GDP

1970-73

1990-93

BUT, depletion, scarcity

and over-exploitation have

emerged as serious problems

The Problem Statement

Are depletion and scarcity the only reality?

Are there pockets of under-utilization?

Can GW alleviate poverty in

these regions? Eastern Indo-Gangetic basin

has high

GW potential

Concentrated

Rural poverty

And dieselised

GW economy

“The energy squeeze”

Leading to economic

scarcity of GW in a land

of abundance

0 20 40 60 80 100

Madhya Pradesh

Haryana

Gujarat

Andhra Pradesh

Karnataka

Rajasthan (Transco)

Tamil Nadu

Punjab

Maharashtra

U.P (Power corp)

West Bengal

Bihar

Percentage

BRISCOE, 2005,

Electricity subsidy as percentage of state fiscal deficits Is low to non-existent in eastern India

Partly due to low

number of electric

tubewells

But also high

tariffs

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2160

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Punjab Haryana Gujarat Uttarakhand West Bengal

States

Rs/H

P/Y

ear

Flat rate tariff (Rs/HP/year)

Comparison of flat tariff in different states, 2006-07

West Bengal: A state that bucks the trend in

GW and electricity

Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat,

Tamil Nadu

West Bengal

Over-exploitation of GW Under- development of GW

(42% development)

> 60-80% electric pumps < 20% electric pumps

Free/very low flat rate Earlier highest flat rate in

India and now high

metered tariff

High fiscal deficits due to

electricity subsidy

Non-existent electricity

subsidy

Highly restrictive groundwater policies

The GW Act of 2005 and before that the SWID

regulation of 1999 which stipulates that electricity

connections cannot be given without certification by

SWID

Almost 50-60% rejection by SWID even in safe blocks

High cost of pump electrification (USD 2000-

3000) and long waiting period

Political ecology: government dominated by urban

intelligentsia, strong arsenic lobby and weak

farmers lobby co-opted by the state

Why is energy-irrigation nexus so different in

West Bengal?

Agricultural growth rate of around 1% and stagnation

High period of agrarian growth in mid 1990s coincided

with high GW use and increase in summer paddy

The latest MI Census shows an absolute decline in

number of WEMs and reduction in summer paddy (but

the GoWB is changing these numbers, I was told)

Declining quality of life , peasant unrest and Maoist threat

So what is happening on the agricultural front in

West Bengal?

12

Are there physical constraints to GW development in West Bengal?

As per the Ganges Water

Machine Hypothesis,

intensive GW use has

positive externalities

Not really. Pre-monsoon

decline in groundwater

table is fully recovered

during post monsoon

season showing high actual

recharge

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Testing the Ganges Water Machine hypothesis using panel data

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ positivere~y | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- apriltable | .8577282 .0145882 58.80 0.000 .8291239 .8863324 aprnovrain~l | .0003465 .0000814 4.26 0.000 .000187 .000506 decmarchra~l | .0019719 .0005453 3.62 0.000 .0009026 .0030412 _cons | -3.151964 .1539974 -20.47 0.000 -3.453918 -2.850009 -------------+----------------------------------------------------------------

sigma_u | 1.7284553 sigma_e | 1.3200953

rho | .63159102 (fraction of variance due to u_i) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

F test that all u_i=0: F(323, 2913) = 9.86 Prob > F = 0.0000

ittiitititiit recLAGRFnonmonRFmonsoonWDprerec 1,4321 ____

Data

• 16 years of groundwater level data from 403 monitoring wells (1990-1995)

• Block level rainfall data from 1990-2005

• Data on type of aquifer

Regression specification

• Panel data with well level fixed effects

• Keeps all time invariant factors (such as nature of aquifer) constant over time

• Exploits within-well variation

For every one meter of

additional drawdown in pre-

monsoon season, post-

monsoon recovery goes up

by 0.85 m

Far from negative “quantity”

externality, there are positive

externalities in terms of

reduction of rejected recharge,

lower flood intensity, cheaper

alternative to surface storage

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Predicted versus actual recovery: Shows good model fit -5

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10

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Lin

ea

r p

red

ictio

n

0 10 20 30pre_wd

Predicted recovery against pre-monsoon groundwater table at well-level

Predicted recovery in post monsoon

season

Actual recovery in post monsoon

season

15

6 arguments as to why arsenic should not be an obstacle to intensive GW use in Bengal

• Arsenic is a naturally occurring element in lower Ganga Basin. As soon as arsenic bearing layers

are exposed to oxygen, they release arsenic into water. Short of total ban on groundwater use,

nothing much that can be done about it

• But then, GW is the only resource at disposal to farmers that allows them to intensify their

cropping system and make a living out of stamp size land holdings. Ponds, tanks or canals does not

allow for such intensification and are at best supplemental sources of irrigation

• Arsenic is a pre-dominantly drinking water problem and several cost effective solutions to mitigate

this exists.

• Limited and patchy evidence that arsenic is taken up by some leafy vegetables. Create awareness so

that farmers do not use arsenic rich water for anything but paddy. Arsenic uptake by paddy grains is

negligible and can be taken care of by cooking

• Finally, uptake of arsenic in human body is positively linked with poor

nutritional status and providing nutritional supplements like folate is a better

deterrent than blanket ban on groundwater

• High agricultural growth is directly linked to poverty alleviation and better nutrition status. In

Indian context, all states with high agrarian growth are also groundwater dependant

Linking these 6 arguments shows that

discouraging GW use is counter-productive

because in the absence of any other

alternative sources of reliable irrigation&

livelihoods, farmers in the region will become

nutritionally poorer and even more

susceptible to arsenic poisoning.

The best anti-dote to arsenic is overall socio-

economic development. GW offers the best

hope for rapid agricultural and overall socio-

economic development in WB

Hi-Tech Metering Technology

Tamper proof TOD meters

Remotely read

New law against

tampering

Reduces corruption

collusion

Findings

Same hours of self pumping – Less electricity bill

Less hour of selling water – Higher or same revenue

Higher bargaining power vis-à-vis water buyers

Win – win situation

Pump owners:

Largely winners

Findings

Water buyers: Losers

Increase in water charges by 30-50%

Lesser hours sold by pump owners

Adverse terms & condition of buying water

19

3 Change in hours of pumping and water sold (2004 and 2010 compared)

Pump owners are pumping less and selling even less

Type of WEM Difference in

hours of

pumped

Difference in

hours of self

irrigation

Difference

in hours of

water sold

ES (N=41) -1094.0 (44%) -50.7 -776.9

EC (N=50) -636.6 (40%) -154.5 -476.0

DC (N=39) -75.1 (20%) -35.6 -36.4

KC (N=4) -104.3 (23%) -48.7 -56.1

All types of WEM owners are pumping less than before –

the electric tubewell owners more so than the diesel and

kerosene owners. Even more importantly, they are selling

less than before. Overall contraction in pump rental

markets and irrigation economy

ES = Electric submersible; EC= Electric centrifugal, DC= Diesel centrifugal, KC = Kerosene centrifugal

Overall contraction in

irrigation economy of

West Bengal and it will

have negative

livelihood implications

Findings

Groundwater

use efficiency: Winner

Increased adoption of plastic pipes for

conveyance

Better maintenance of field channels

Construction of underground pipelines

But will it save water? And is it important?

Explaining the GW paradox

The political ecology perspective

GW policies

Agrarian politics GW resources

Policy recommendation

Rapid electrification of tubewells to

encourage competitive GW markets (Bihar?)

Relaxation on issuance of SWID certificate

for new TW installation

Give capital cost subsidy for installation of

tube wells – target small & marginal farmers

Panchayat (village council) intervention in

regulating water prices if needed

Pilot a scheme of ICT enabled diesel

subsidy voucher (a la Bangladesh)

Thank You

References

• Mukherji, A; Villholth, K. G.; Sharma, Bharat R.; Wang, J. (Eds.) 2009. Groundwater

governance in the Indo-Gangetic and Yellow River basins: realities and challenges.

London, UK: CRC Press. Taylor and Francis group. 325p. (IAH Selected Papers on

Hydrogeology 15)

• Mukherji, A., B. Das, N. Majumdar, N.C. Nayak, R.R. Sethi and B.R. Sharma (2009),

Metering of agricultural power supply in West Bengal, India: Who gains and who loses?

Energy Policy: 37 (12): 5530-5539.

• Mukherji, A. (2008), Spatio-temporal analysis of markets for groundwater irrigation

services in India, 1976-77 to 1997-98, Hydrogeology Journal, 16(6): 1077-1087.

Mukherji, A. (2007), „The energy-irrigation nexus and its impact on groundwater

markets in eastern Indo-Gangetic basin: Evidence from West Bengal, India‟, Energy

Policy, Vol. 35(12): 6413-6430.

• Mukherji, A (2007), „Implications of alternative institutional arrangements in

groundwater sharing: Evidence from West Bengal‟, Economic and Political Weekly, 42

(26): 2543-2551

• Mukherji, A. (2006), Political ecology of groundwater: The contrasting case of water

abundant West Bengal and water scarce Gujarat, India, Hydrogeology Journal

14(3):392-406.

• Mukherji, A. & Shah, T. (2005). Groundwater socio-ecology and governance: a review

of institutions and policies in selected countries. Hydrogeology Journal, 13(1): 328–345.

ISI ranked.