Last Week: Japan-East Asia Security Relations

• Structure: From bipolarity to unipolarity . . Bipolar structure (and legacy of colonialism) prevented security links in Cold War, now emergence of multilateral institutions, and perhaps multipolarity . . but Japan remains bilateral;

• Agency: Yoshida school politicians, bureaucrats, LDP, brief reign of DPJ politicians, different party, same results?

• Norms: Cold War: anti-militarism, bilateralism. Post- Cold War: slow erosion of anti-militarism, development of internationalism – ultimate salience of bilateralism.

Unit 10 Challenges for Japan

Pinnacles Dispute, DPRK and Futenma base

Aim

To apply the concepts and theoretical approach

introduced to the primary international

challenges faced by Japan.

Objectives

(1) To identify the relative importance of structure, agency and norms in explaining the primary contemporary challenges faced by Japan;

(2) To demonstrate how structure, agency, and norms can be used to help explain and understand the nature and dynamics of these challenges;

(3) To assess the gravity of these challenges and their inter-related nature.

Introduction

• Why these challenges?

• Political, security and economic reasons;

• Apply the Structure, Agency and Norms approach we have used so far;

The Pinnacle Islands Dispute

Pinnacle Islands Dispute: Background

• Use as navigation aid prior to 1895 Sino-Japanese War (map wars);

• Occupied and incorporated 1895 by Japan – timing problematic, also Treaty of Shimonoseki (Art. 2b);

• San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan gets residual sovereignty?• 1968 Survey finds possible oil Taiwan and China make

claims, US declares neutrality;• 1978 Shelved . . Deng Xiaoping:

“It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this

question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all”

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Post Cold War Period

• Early-mid 1990s, China began to reassert its claim, but cautiously, Japan prioritised good relations; (e.g. 1996 Lighthouse recognition)

• Late 1990s/early 2000s China pushes harder, Japan giving ground (e.g. Prior Notification System)

• Koizumi Administration: Policy U-turn (e.g. leasing islands, recognising lighthouse)

• 2004 Protesters Arrest and 2010 Collision Incident;• Ongoing landings, fly-overs and posturing 2012-

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgVEu2hQ-BY

S.A.N. and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

• Structure: Weak China delayed, increasingly stronger China makes increasingly stronger claims/actions . . US and Japan vs China?

• Agency: Right-wing politicians and groups pushed a hardline on the dispute (and raised awareness) . . Koizumi administration took hardline;

• Norms: 1990s Asianism, Anti-militarism, Economism . . Leave the dispute alone, no need to antagonise China . . Today, nationalist norms, strong Japan or weak Japan?

• Proactive/Reactive?• Challenge: To maintain peaceful relations with China and

maintain control over the islands . . .

The Futenma Base Issue

• IMAGE OF BASE

The Futenma Base Issue: Background

• US occupation until 1972, still site of most US troops;

• Pros and Cons . . Ecomonic Benefits vs. Pollution, environment, crime, etc..

• 1995: 12-year old girl raped 85,000 people protested;

• 1996 Agreement to scale back . . Included Futenma, Marine airfield in Ginowan City.

Futenma Base Issue• A Marine Base in urban area with V-runway, helicopters,

planes (in use since 1945);• 2004 Helicopter crash at Okinawa International

University .. More anti-base protests;• 2006 Roadmap of Realignment . . Moving Futenma to

Henoko;• DPJ Pledge to lessen burden on Okinawa . . move Futenma

out of Okinawa, renegotiate the deal with the US;• Secretary of Defence Robert Gates visits in 2009;• Failure to find alternative site, Hatoyama reneges on

promise and resigns;

The Futenma Base Issue

Futenma Base Issue: S.A.N.• Structure: Relevance of the US-Japan Alliance in the post-

Cold War era – Alliance against whom? DRPK and China? (2010 Senkaku incident);

• Agency: MOFA, MOD, LDP, Media: pro-alliance; do not question Okinawa bases. DPJ “equal” relationship, control back from bureaucracy . . Anti-base protesters and Okinawa itself; LDP;

• Norms: Bilateralism – Hatoyama’s failure suggests questioning the status quo is dangerous. Anti-militarism and Economism;

• Challenge: To maintain strong bilateral alliance while maintaining support for alliance domestically (and in Okinawa).

DPRK and Normalisation

In 2006, 2009, 2013 North Korea announced successful nuclear weapons tests

The trajectory of the 2006 Taepodong Missile Launch

DPRK and Normalisation: Background

• Legacy of Colonialism and Cold War Bipolarity prevented normalization;

• Refusal to pay compensation, instead “economic cooperation”, 1960 Security Treaty included Korean Peninsula;

• Cold War Talks scuppered by events: KAL 858, Rangoon terrorist bombings, alleged abductions, Fujisanmaru detention;

DPRK and Normalisation• End of Cold Talks restart. Various issues prevent

normalisation;• MOFA “renkei” policy: Japan-DPRK relations determined

by ROK-DRPK and USA-DRPK relations;• 1994 Nuclear crisis, Agreed Framework• 1997/8: Talks begin . . Taepodong-1 launch, abductions

denied.• Sunshine policy vs. Axis of Evil• 2002 Koizumi surprise visit to Pyongyang, admission of

abductions• From 2002 on, abductions domestic key issue, public

opinion, media, strongly anti-DPRK

Dear Leaders

DRPK and Normalisation: Recent Events

• 2006 Missile and Nuclear Tests, UN resolution, tough bilateral sanctions;

• Domestic and International structural obstacles to normalisation: Missile and Abductions, 2008 New hard-line ROK administration, Bush/Obama positions fluctuated;

• 2009 Taepodong-2 Missile and Nuclear Tests;• Cheonan sinking, Yeonpyeong Island shelling;• 2012-13 Satellite/Missile Launch, Nuclear test.

S.A.N. and DRPK Normalisation Issue

• Structure: Cold War bipolarity, DPRK “hermit state”. Post-Cold War remains opposed to ROK and US, Japan’s key regional allies (renkei policy;

• Agency: Many agents. Cold War period: left-wing parties, LDP factions, MOFA, etc.. Post-Cold War: abduction groups, media, LDP/DPJ, other market actors (military industry in US and Japan etc.);

• Norms: Various norms such as Asianism, Economism, Developmentalism, etc . . . But all trumped by Bilateralism.

Conclusion: Inter-related Challenges• Same key factors in each dispute:

– Structure: Cold War bipolarity, Post-Cold War: Security Treaty, US Alliance, Bipolarity

– Agency: Maintain Alliance remains priority– Norms: Bilateralism trumps all others

• Inter-related nature of challenges: Inflation of DPRK risk/threat, Change of security focus from North (USSR) to Southwest (China), Futenma Base – Perceived need to keep US in Okinawa (2010 collision incident great timing!)

• Island dispute, DPRK, Futenma . . Also related to broader issue of “normalisation” or “remilitarisation”;

• Challenges: How to address? DPJ policy initially more balanced? DPJ policy failure – can Abe’s LDP succeed?