earnings management using income classification shifting ... · managers engage in classification...
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Earnings Management Using Income Classification Shifting
– Evidence from the Korean IFRS Adoption Period
Minyoung Noh*
Doocheol Moon**
Andres Guiral***
Laura Parte Esteban****
May 2014
_______________________
*Ph.D. Candidate, School of Business, Yonsei University
50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 120-749, Korea
E-mail: [email protected]
**Professor, School of Business, Yonsei University
50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 120-749, Korea
E-mail: [email protected]; Phone: 82-2-2123-5458; Fax: 82-2-2123-8639
***Associate Professor, School of Business, Yonsei University
50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 120-749, Korea
E-mail: [email protected]; Phone: 82-2-2123-6567; Fax: 82-2-2123-8639
**** Associate Professor of Accounting, Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED), Spain
E-mail:l [email protected], Phone:3491 -398- 8966
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Earnings Management Using Income Classification Shifting
– Evidence from the Korean IFRS Adoption Period
Abstract
This study provides evidence of earnings management using income classification
shifting in the year of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) transition. While
the extant literature focuses on classification shifting of expense items, we investigate whether
managers engage in classification shifting using revenue as well as expense items. In the
Korean IFRS adoption period, managers are inadvertently allowed broad discretion to shift
other income and special expense items since Korean IFRS does not regulate the individual
items to be included in operating profits before the amendment in 2012. Using a methodology
similar to prior studies, we find that companies shift other income to other operating income
to increase operating profits. On the other hand, managers engage in classification shifting
using special expenses just to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We conclude that managers
opportunistically used other income in a general shifting practice but special expense items in
special cases to improve their operating performance in the Korean IFRS adoption period.
Our findings have implications in an international context that the introduction of IFRS
affects the strategic use of revenue and expenses to manage core earnings.
Keywords: Core earnings; Classification shifting; Special expense items; Other
operating income; Earnings benchmarks
JEL classification: M40, M41
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I. Introduction
The existing body of empirical evidence, supportive of classification shifting, centers on
expense items, such as extraordinary items (Ronen and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976),
income-decreasing special items (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011), and
expenses in discontinued operations (Barua et al. 2010) which should be classified as
operating expenses. Despite the prevalence of this form of classification management in the
United States, we know little about its use in other countries. Some exception is the studies of
Athanasakou et al. (2010) that focus on UK companies and Haw et al. (2011) that analyze a
set of East Asian countries. As Korean IFRS (hereafter IFRS) does not regulate the individual
components of the operating profits (losses) in 2011, companies disclose operating profits
based on their own standards, providing an exceptional setting to analyze the classificatory
shifting.
Operating profit numbers have been considered more important in Korea to gauge the
intrinsic viability of an entity.1 For instance, companies reporting operating losses for four
years in a row are designated as issues for administration2 and those for five consecutive
years are delisted according to securities listing regulation in the KOSDAQ (a Korea version
1Since managers have commonly disclosed different earnings figures, such as pro-forma earnings and
operating profits, in their financial information or earnings announcement, a wide number of studies have
investigated whether the use of these different earnings metrics is motivated by informative or opportunistic
reasons. Research shows that adjusted earnings measures better portray sustainable “core” performance relative
to GAAP earnings, which typically contain transitory or one-time items, and those measures are generally more
value relevant than GAAP earnings measures (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Doyle et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2007;
Brown et al. 2012). However, these studies also provide evidence that some managers opportunistically report
different earnings measures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and influence investor perceptions of future
firm performance (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and Marquardt 2004). That is the evidence that shows the
importance of alternative earnings metrics (EBIT, core earnings, etc.).
2Designation as an administrative issue has been adopted to protect investors by making them know the risk
of the company before delisting. The reasons for the designation includes sales less than KRW 3 billion in the
latest fiscal year, consecutive operating losses in four recent fiscal years, or loss from continuing operations
before taxes more than 50% of equity capital (and KRW 1 billion) for two of three most recent fiscal years. If
the company designated as an administrative issue cannot resolve the reasons for the designation for certain
period, it will be delisted in the market. Yum and Sohn (2013) show that firms with a higher propensity of being
delisted (including issues for administration) tend to manipulate earnings.
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of the NASDAQ) market. Even in the IFRS adoption year when managers have broad
discretion to compose core earnings, the stock market seems to respond to operating profits
regardless of their composition.3 As a result, credit rating agencies or other experts initiate to
disclose Korean GAAP (hereafter GAAP) based operating profits to provide consistent
information for investors using the footnote disclosure (The DongA News 2011.05.03; The
Financial News 2011.05.17).
In this study, we argue that managers wishing to inflate reported operating profits and
thus influence the market‟s perceptions in the IFRS adoption period use non-operating
income as well as special expense items for classification shifting. As an anecdotal evidence,
KSS shipping company marks turnaround to operating profits through classifying 14.5 billion
Korean won of gains on disposition of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) as other
operating income in the first quarter of 2011 (The Korea Economic Daily 2011.06.02). Also,
Sunkwang records operating profits of 77.8 billion Korean won through classifying huge
amount of equity income on investment as other operating income in the same period (Maeil
Business Newspaper 2011.05.17.). Gains on disposition of PPE and equity income on
investment should not be included in operating profits according to the GAAP before IFRS
adoption.
Using a research methodology similar to prior studies (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010) and
a sample of 1,230 Korean companies in 2011, we decompose operating profits into its
expected and unexpected components. We find a positive association between income-
increasing other operating income and unexpected operating profits, demonstrating that
classification shifting using other operating income occurs in the IFRS adoption year. On the
other hand, the results show a negative association between income-decreasing special
3For example, stock price for Samsungcard goes up with gains on sales of securities investment in 2011,
which is one-time transaction and should not be included in operating profits under Korean GAAP.
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expense items and unexpected operating profits, suggesting that performance-induced effect
is greater than classificatory shifting effect of special expense items.4 Therefore, companies
shift other income items rather than special expense items to increase operating profits in the
IFRS adoption year. Instead of using special items scrutinized by auditors and regulators,
managers seem to use other income as a common shifting practice. When managers consider
the possibility that they keep using the same classification scheme over other operating
income items for future financial reporting, they may have higher motivations for using this
new form of classification shifting.
To provide additional support of classification shifting, we conduct several tests
following Fan et al. (2010). First, we document that classificatory shifting of other income to
other operating income is more pervasive when managers are constrained in their ability to
manipulate current-period accruals because of prior upward accruals manipulation. Second,
we investigate the incentives to manage earnings through classification shifting, finding that
classification shifting using special expense items occurs just to meet or beat earnings
benchmarks (zero earnings, earnings in the prior year, and analysts‟ forecasts) whereas
misclassification of other income occurs in general and does not take place more to match
earnings expectations. Our supplementary tests also reveal that auditor characteristics and
firm characteristics are important dimensions to understand the pervasiveness of classification
shifting. Specifically, managers less engage in classification shifting using other income when
their auditor is a large accounting firm and as auditor tenure increases. Interestingly,
companies belonging to Chaebol (large business group) and companies with incentives to
4The overall relation between unexpected core earnings and special expense items includes both
classification shifting and a performance-driven effect (Fan et al. 2010). Performance-induced effect occurs
because the magnitude and frequency of income-decreasing special items are markedly higher among firms
experiencing poor performance (McVay 2006).
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avoid delisting use classificatory shifting of special expense items to increase operating
profits.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study extends the
classification shifting literature by providing evidence that revenue in addition to expense line
items are used to manage earnings. Most studies in the classification shifting literature have
focused on expense items. However, this paper focuses on other income items which are
allowed to be classified as other operating income items under IFRS, supporting the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)‟s concern of firms‟ classification shifting
behavior (Alfonso et al. 2012) using revenue as well as expense items.5 Second, given the
debate whether the SEC should mandate the use of IFRS in the US market, our study
provides timely evidence that shows a cost of IFRS adoption.6 In particular, we find evidence
that autonomy on composition of operating profits under IFRS affords the discretion to use
classificatory shifting of other income. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on pro
forma that documents that managers exercise discretion for opportunistic reasons
(Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Doyle et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2012). We provide
clear evidence on the motivations for the use of non-recurring items to influence investors‟
perceptions about core earnings.
Section II discusses institutional background of operating profits. Section III develops
hypotheses and section IV specifies research design. Section V describes the data collection,
and section VI reports results. Section VII concludes.
5The SEC states that they are concerned about account misclassification of financial statement line items
including improperly reflecting interest or investment income as product or service revenue. The SEC further
note that gains and losses on disposals of assets should be reported and disclosed separately in the financial
statement, consistent with SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101 and SAB Topic 5B, and in MD&A
(SEC 2000).
6While De George et al. (2013) quantify the directly observable cost of IFRS compliance by examining
audit fees incurred by firms for the statutory audit of their financial statements at the time of transition using a
comprehensive dataset of all publicly traded Australian companies, this study shows the direct effect of IFRS
adoption on earnings management, especially through classification shifting.
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II. Institutional Background of Operating Profits
Operating profits under GAAP
Conceptual framework of GAAP does not define operating profits (losses) directly;
however, GAAP No. 21, Presentation of Financial Statements, requires that income
statements should comprise of the following line items; sales, cost of goods sold, gross profits,
selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A expenses), operating profits (losses),
non-operating income, non-operating expenses, earnings before taxes for continuing operation,
tax expenses for continuing operation, earnings for continuing operation (after tax),
discontinued operations (after tax), net income (loss), and earnings per share (Paragraph 60),
as shown in Table 1, Panel A. Also, GAAP No. 21 regulates that operating profits should be
calculated by subtracting SG&A expenses from gross profits (Paragraph 70) and shows the
examples of accounts which are subject to SG&A expenses, non-operating income and non-
operating expenses.
As GAAP regulates the individual items which should be included in operating profits
(losses), non-operating income and non-operating expenses, all companies classify the same
accounts in the same manner. Standardized classification may not reflect economic reality
well as ordinary course of business could be different depending on companies‟ operating
activities. As several income and expense accounts such as gains (losses) on disposition of
tangible assets may incur in the ordinary course of business, it would be questionable that
operating profits (losses) excluding those items in accordance with GAAP represent the
companies‟ operating activities. However, standardized classification in presentation of
income statements leads to better comparability that enables information users to identify and
understand similarities or differences among the different companies or different periods at
the expense of true and fair view.
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Operating profits under IFRS7
All listed companies in Korea are required to adopt the new internationally accepted
accounting standard, IFRS, from 2011 and early adoption is allowed from 2009. As IFRS No.
1001, Presentation of Financial Statements, does not mandate the disclosure of operating
profits (losses) in 2009, early adopters of IFRS do or do not disclose operating profits (losses)
and the way they calculate the operating profits (losses) is different even for the companies
which disclose operating profits (losses). Therefore, disclosure of this information brings
more confusion to investors (Moon 2013).
In 2010, IFRS mandates the disclosure of operating profits (losses) on statement of
comprehensive income or footnote as shown in Table 1, Panel B. In addition, all listed
companies should disclose items included in operating profits on footnote if the items are
different compared with those under GAAP (Paragraph 138.2). Although disclosure of
operating profits is required, comparability issue still remains as the companies could choose
the items included in operating profits.
7IFRS does not prescribe a detailed format for the presentation of the income statement, although many
national standards that are previously applied does provide formats. IAS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements,
omits the requirement in the 1997 version to disclose the results of operating activities as a line item in the
income statements (BC55), and only requires that the income statement contains the following line items;
revenue, financial costs, share of the profit or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted for using the equity
method, tax expense, a single amount for the total of discontinued operation, and profit or loss (Paragraph 82).
Conceptual framework of IFRS mentions that income and expenses may be presented in the income
statement in different ways so as to provide information that is relevant for economic decision-making. It is
common practice to distinguish between those items of income and expenses that arise in the course of the
ordinary activities of the entity and those that do not. This distinction is made on the basis that the source of an
item is relevant in evaluating the ability of the entity to generate cash and cash equivalents in the future. For
example, incidental activities such as the disposal of a long-term investment are unlikely to recur on a regular
basis. When distinguishing between items in this way consideration needs to be given to the nature of the entity
and its operations. Items that arise from the ordinary activities of one entity may be unusual in respect of another
(Paragraph 4.27). IFRS places autonomy on presentation of line items in income statements supporting
accounting reporting flexibility; however, IFRS does not mandate the disclosure of operating profits (losses).
It has been argued that the adoption of IFRS as a domestic accounting standard around the world is one of
the most significant regulatory changes in accounting history (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Byard et al. 2011). The
introduction of a uniform set of accounting standards is expected to ensure greater comparability and
transparency of financial reporting. To date the evidence on mandatory IFRS application suggests that their
impact on value relevance, persistence and earnings quality depends on local business environments, institutional
frameworks and incentives for transparent financial reporting (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Byard et al. 2011; Ahmed
et al. 2013).
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As all listed companies adopt IFRS in 2011, comparability issue receives attention again
from information users and regulators. IFRS No. 1001 is amended to disclose operating
profits on statement of comprehensive income, not on footnote. However, managers still have
discretion on how they compose the operating profits. In 2012, IFRS mandates the scope of
operating profits so that all listed companies follow the same criteria in calculating operating
profit numbers as they do under GAAP as shown in Table 1, Panel C. However, IFRS No.
1001 allows them to disclose adjusted operating profits on footnote if they could reflect the
companies‟ business performance better by adding the other operating income and expenses
to adjusted operating profits (Paragraph 138.4), which affords them to manage adjusted
operating profits.
We take the advantage of unique institutional setting to conduct the research in order to
provide insights into the issue of international convergence of accounting standards. This
paper focuses on this specific period when discretion is given to managers in composing
operating profits, and applies classification shifting used by prior studies (McVay 2006; Fan
et al. 2010) to other operating income as well as special expense items. The evidence sheds
some light on managers‟ choice preference on classification shifting in the IFRS adoption
period. This question is a matter of considerable interest and importance to the financial
reporting community.
III. Hypothesis Development
Classification shifting has recently received a greater degree of attention (e.g., McVay
2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011). This earnings management tool simply moves certain
revenues, expenses, gains and losses to different line items on the income statement (Ronen
and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Barua et al. 2010). McVay
(2006) provides the first study providing evidence that managers opportunistically engage in
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classificatory shifting. Specifically, McVay (2006) investigates whether managers engage in
classification shifting by reclassifying ordinary operating expenses as special expense items
and concludes that managers opportunistically shift core expenses to inflate current core
earnings, resulting in a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and income-
decreasing special expenses. Fan et al. (2010) provide broad support for McVay (2006)‟s
conclusion that managers engage in classification shifting using quarterly data, as opposed to
annual data in McVay (2006). They find that classification shifting using income-decreasing
special items is more prevalent in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. They also find
evidence of classification shifting for companies that just meet or beat analysts‟ forecasts,
one-year-ago same-quarter earnings, and zero earnings. Barua et al. (2010) investigate
whether managers use classification shifting to manage earnings when reporting discontinued
operations. Using a methodology similar to McVay (2006), they find evidence consistent with
the hypothesis that companies shift operating expenses to income-decreasing discontinued
operations to increase core earnings.
The existing body of empirical evidence centers around expense items: special expense
items or expenses in discontinued operations.8 However, this study investigates whether
other operating income in addition to special expenses is used for classification shifting in the
IFRS adoption year. Our study is motivated by prior research suggesting that managers are
opportunistic when reporting operating profits under IFRS. Cheon (2011) examines company
characteristics that are likely to affect companies‟ decision on the disclosure of operating
income using early adopters of IFRS in 2009 and 2010 and finds that companies tend to
include all items except investment revenue and financial costs in operating income when
GAAP operating income is low and other expenses are small.
8Expenses in discontinued operation are not used in our analyses because only about 2% of companies (8%
in Barua et al. 2010) report discontinued operations in our sample, resulting from the limited sample period.
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Shifting other income to other operating income increases core earnings, operating
profits, which are widely believed to be good indicators of company performance and to be of
primary interest to investors. This type of classification shifting is not expected to raise red
flags by outside monitors as IFRS does not regulate the individual items of operating profits
until 2012‟s amendment in IFRS. In addition, other operating income is reported on the
income statement in an aggregated form and detailed components of other operating income
are disclosed in footnotes. Because of these several reasons, we predict a shifting of other
income as well as special items. Considering that special expense items have been scrutinized
for classification shifting, we expect that managers are more likely to abuse their discretion
by classifying other income as other operating income to ensure the benefits of retaining this
shifting for future financial reporting. This leads to the following hypothesis stated in
alternative form:
Hypothesis 1: Managers engage in classification shifting using other operating income and
special expenses to increase operating profits in the IFRS adoption period.
Fan et al. (2010) show that classification shifting using special expense items provides
the better alternative when the ability to manage earnings using accruals upward is
constrained. They measure companies‟ previous earnings management as the beginning level
of net operating assets based on Barton and Simko (2002), who find that companies with
higher net operating assets are less likely to report earnings that just meet or beat analysts‟
forecasts. Therefore, classification shifting using other operating income and special expenses
is more likely to occur in the IFRS adoption year when managers are constrained in their
ability to manipulate current-period accruals because of prior upward accrual manipulation.
This leads to our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Managers engage in classification shifting using other operating income and
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special expenses more when the ability to manipulate accruals is constrained.
Prior research provides evidence of companies managing earnings to meet or beat three
earnings benchmarks: zero earnings, prior year‟s earnings, and analysts‟ forecasts. For
example, prior studies document a discontinuity in the earnings distribution, with more
companies reporting income just above these benchmarks than companies reporting income
below these benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Song et al.
2004). The evidence in McVay (2006) suggests that the strategic classification of special
items is most pronounced when companies are close to earnings benchmarks. Fan et al. (2010)
also show the results which support classification shifting for companies that just meet or
beat earnings benchmark using quarterly data. Consequently, managers in the IFRS adoption
period might shift other income and special items more to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.
Therefore, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Managers engage in classification shifting using other operating income and
special expenses more when reported earnings meet or narrowly beat earnings
benchmarks.
IV. Research Design
Measuring Unexpected Operating Income
The empirical analyses test whether companies increase operating profits by shifting
other income and special expenses. We employ Fan et al. (2010)‟s model, which extends
McVay (2006)‟s methodology to measure expected and unexpected operating profits by
dropping current-period accruals and including additional controls for performance, stock
returns for current and prior periods. Fan et al. (2010) use current year‟s returns to control for
current performance and prior period returns as the market may detect deteriorating
performance and decrease its expectations of core earnings prior to it being reported in the
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current year. To estimate unexpected operating profits, we use the following expectation
model:
OI = β0 + β1OIt-1 + β2ATO + β3ACCRUALSt-1 + β4△SALES + β5NEG_△SALES +
β6RETURNS + β7RETURNSt-1 + ε (1)
where:
OI = operating profits disclosed in financial statements under IFRS, scaled by sales.
ATO = asset turnover ratio, defined as Sales/((NOA+NOAt-1)/2)
NOA = net operating assets
= operating assets – operating liabilities
= (total assets–cash and short-term investments) – (total assets–total debts-
book value of common and preferred equity)
ACCRUALSt-1 = operating accruals, calculated as (net incomet-1–cash flowst-1)/Salest-1
△SALES = percentage change in sales, calculated as (sales-salest-1)/(salest-1)
NEG_△SALES = percentage change in sales (△SALES) if △SALES is negative, and 0 otherwise
RETURNS =12-month market-adjusted returns corresponding to the fiscal year
We measure the expected value of operating profits for company i using the predicted
value from Equation (1). We estimate this equation by industry, excluding company i from
the estimation. Unexpected operating profits are the difference between the actual and
predicted value of Equation (1). IFRS is enacted for all public companies from 2011 in Korea;
however, the individual components of operating profits are regulated from 2012. Therefore,
only data for 2011 are available for our analyses.
Classification Shifting Using Other Operating Income and Special Expenses
We follow McVay (2006) in designing our regression models to test whether companies
increase operating profits by using classification shifting of other income and special
expenses when IFRS is adopted in 2011. We modify her equation by adding a variable, other
operating income (%OOI), as shown in the following equation:
UEOI = β0 + β1%OOI + β2%SI + ε (2)
UEOI is unexpected operating profits, which are calculated as the difference between
reported and expected operating profits from Equation (1). The variable of interest, %OOI, is
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other operating income scaled by sales. %SI is non-operating expenses scaled by sales.9
Under IFRS, special items are not disclosed separately; instead, non-operating income, non-
operating expenses, and financial costs are disclosed as separate line items. We use non-
operating expenses comparable to special items in US, specifically income-decreasing special
items used by McVay (2006)10
, to maintain comparability with prior studies (McVay 2006;
Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011). To be consistent with Hypothesis 1, we predict a positive
association between unexpected operating profits and other operating income (i.e., β1 > 0). To
test whether managers engage in classification shifting using special items, we again predict a
positive relation between unexpected operating profits and special items (i.e., β2 > 0).
Our second hypothesis is that managers engage in classification shifting more when the
ability to manipulate accruals is constrained. Following Fan et al. (2010), we measure
managers‟ accrual manipulation constraint using net operating assets (NOA) at the beginning
of the year scaled by sales. Fan et al. (2010) find that companies with higher NOA use
classificatory shifting of special items more because these companies are more constrained in
their ability to manipulate accruals. We classify companies into four groups with respect to
their NOA for the industry they belong to. To test whether the classification shifting behavior
is more pervasive for companies with high NOA, we add an indicator variable for being in
the highest NOA quartile, HighNOA, and interactions of HighNOA with %OOI and %SI, as
shown in the following equation:
UEOI = β0 + β1%OOI + β2%OOIHighNOA + β3%SI + β4%SI HighNOA + β5HighNOA + ε (3)
9Special items in the US literature are not formally GAAP-specified line items in the income statement;
instead, they are Compustat-defined items consisting of certain non-recurring items identified from the income
statement and the accompanying notes (Chen and Wang 2004). The scope of non-operating expenses examined
in this study is similar to special items in the US literature in that those expenses do not occur from the
companies‟ ordinary operating activities.
10
McVay (2006) uses income-decreasing special items (income-increasing special items are set to zero) to
test classification shifting of special expense items. Therefore, we use non-operating expenses only.
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To be consistent with Hypothesis 2, we predict that the coefficients on %OOIHighNOA
and %SIHighNOA are positive (i.e., β2 > 0 and β4 > 0).
Hypothesis 3 predicts that classification shifting in the IFRS adoption year occurs more
when the company has greater net benefits from classification shifting; specifically, when the
classification shifting allows managers to meet or narrowly beat earnings benchmarks. To test
this hypothesis, we group companies based on reported operating profits relative to three
targets: positive operating profits, last year‟s operating profits, and analysts‟ forecasts. Just
meeting or narrowly beating earnings are defined as indicator variables which equal to one if
(1) reported operating profits scaled by total assets are between 0% and 2% (JustMBZ), (2)
changes in operating profits divided by total assets are between 0% and 2% (JustMBP)11
, or
(3) the difference between reported annual operating profits and the median analyst forecasts
for six months as fiscal year-end, deflated by total assets, is between 0% and 0.05%
(JustMBF). If these conditions are not met, the indicator variables are set to zero. The
observations meeting these criteria include approximately 11.95 percent and 21.38 percent of
our sample companies for zero-profit and last year‟s earnings benchmarks, and 11.03 percent
of our sample companies with analyst forecast data for analysts‟ forecast benchmark.12
To
test whether classification shifting in the IFRS adoption period occurs more to meet or beat
earnings targets, we estimate the following regression:
UEOI = β0 + β1%OOI + β2%OOIJustMBZ(JustMBP/JustMBF) + β3%SI + β4%SI
JustMBZ(JustMBP/JustMBF) + β5JustMBZ(JustMBP/JustMBF) + ε (4)
To be consistent with Hypothesis 3, we expect β2 and β4 to be positive.
11
Prior studies suggest that earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks occurs in broader
interval in Korea than that in US (Song et al. 2004; Kim et al. 2008; Park and Yoon 2008). Therefore, we use the
interval between 0% and 2% to define just meeting or beating zero earnings and last year‟s earnings.
12
Fan et al. (2010) consider companies that report an operating income per share between $0.00 and $0.04,
a change in reported operating income per share between $0.00 and $0.03, and earnings forecast error between
$0.00 and $0.01 as just meeting or beating earnings benchmarks; those subsamples constitute approximately 9%,
17% and 26% of quarterly observations, respectively.
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V. Data
We obtain financial data and auditor information from the KIS-value13
of Korean
Information Services (KIS) and collect analysts‟ forecast data from FnConsensus of FnGuide.
To determine whether the companies are included in Chaebol or not, we obtain the annual list
of Chaebols and the member companies from the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). To
estimate unexpected operating profits as shown in Equation (1), comparable data based on
IFRS for both adoption and previous years are needed. Therefore, we use the numbers
disclosed in 2011 financial statements in comparison form for the previous year‟s data. We
eliminate banks and financial institutions to enhance comparability. Finally, we require a
minimum of 15 observations per industry14
to ensure a data pool that is sufficiently large to
estimate the expectation model in Equation (1). Thus, a total of 1,230 observations for the
year 2011 are used in the analyses.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. Sales are
skewed with a mean (median) value of KRW 729.897 (112.849) billion. The mean (median)
of unexpected operating profits deflated by sales (UEOI) is 0.1% (0.3%). The mean (median)
of operating profits scaled by sales (%OI) is 4.9% (4.9%), substantially larger than the 0.07%
(0.11%) in McVay (2006). The mean (median) of other operating income as a percentage of
sales (%OOI) is 2.7% (1.0%). The mean (median) of special expense items as a percentage of
sales (%SI) is 5.5% (2.3%), which is again larger than 2.7% (0.0%) reported in McVay (2006).
Table 3 provides Pearson correlation matrix between SALES, UEOI, %OI, %OOI,
and %SI for the full sample. The primary relation of interest is for the variables included in
13
The KIS-value database in Korea provides both financial data and auditor information for companies
listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and KOSDAQ markets.
14
Companies are classified into 17 industry groups based on KSIC-9 (Korea Standard Industry Code) from
KIS-value.
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Equation (2). UEOI is positively correlated with %OOI (0.067), but negatively correlated
with %SI (-0.063), indicating that unexpected operating income is associated with larger
(smaller) other operating income items (special expense items). The correlation
between %OOI and %SI is low at 0.200.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here]
VI. Results
Test of Hypothesis 1
Table 4 reports regression results of unexpected operating profits on other operating
income (%OOI) and special expenses (%SI). When we include only %OOI in Model (1), the
coefficient on %OOI is positive and significant (0.111, t=2.38). This result suggests that
classification shifting takes place in the IFRS adoption year as companies report more other
operating income in operating profits. Economically, classification shifting using other
operating income appears to be a viable method of misrepresenting corporate performance.
Other things remaining constant, a typical company with a mean sales of KRW 729.897
billion grows its unexpected operating profits by KRW 1.62 billion (=0.111 0.020 KRW
729.897 billion) as %OOI increases from the first quartile to the third quartile. When we
include only %SI in Model (2), the coefficient on %SI is negative and significant (-0.063, t=-
2.21). Our results indicate that, when income-decreasing special expenses increase,
unexpected operating income actually decreases. That is, firm performance rather than
classification shifting is the dominating effect for special items. This is consistent with
evidence in Fan et al. (2010). They contend that a performance-driven relation between core
earnings and income-decreasing special items is in accordance with prior research findings
that firms incurring large write-offs or corporate restructuring charges tend to be poor
performers (Elliott and Shaw 1988; DeAngelo et al. 1994; Carter 2000).
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When we include both %OOI and %SI in the same regression, the coefficient on %OOI
remains positive and significant (0.137, t=2.89), while the coefficient on %SI also remains
negative and significant (-0.079, t=-2.75). Overall, our findings in Table 4 indicate that
companies in the IFRS adoption period use other operating income items rather than special
expense items in general shifting practice to inflate core earnings. When managers have the
discretion to compose operating profits, they may consider the benefits of using other
operating income for classification shifting. These income items are largely ignored by
auditors and regulators and so relatively easy to justify this first account reclassification being
more closely related to underlying economic activities. Furthermore, managers might
contemplate the possibility of keeping the same classification scheme over operating income
items to calculate operating profits for future financial reporting.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Test of Hypothesis 2
Table 5 reports regression results for Equation (3) that examines classification shifting,
conditional on the ability to manipulate accruals. HighNOA represents accruals manipulation
in prior year and is an indicator variable for companies whose net operating assets scaled by
sales at the beginning of the year are in the highest quartile for the industry. When we include
only other operating income in Model (1), the coefficient on %OOIHighNOA is positive and
significant (0.229, t=2.26), consistent with more pervasive classification shifting in companies
with high net operating assets. However, when we include only special items in Model (2), the
coefficient on %SIHighNOA is positive but insignificant (0.045, t=0.69), indicating that
managers‟ constraints on accruals management do not affect the relation between unexpected
operating income and special expense items.
When we include both other operating income and special expense items in the same
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regression, the coefficient on %OOIHighNOA remains positive and significant (0.227,
t=2.23) while that on %SIHighNOA also remains positive and insignificant (0.025, t=0.38).
In short, the results suggest that when managers‟ ability to manipulate accruals is constrained
classification shifting using other operating income occurs more than using special expense
items.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Test of Hypothesis 3
In Table 6, we present tests whether misclassification is more prevalent when it allows
companies just to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. For the zero or last year‟s targets, we use
the full sample of 1,230 observations. The sample for analyst forecasts is reduced due to the
availability of analyst forecasts data and consists of 281 observations.
In Panel A with the zero-profit benchmark, the coefficient on %OOI in Model (1) is
positively significant (0.115, t=2.19). However, the coefficient on %OOIJustMBZ is not
significant (-0.029, t=-0.25), demonstrating that classificatory shifting using other operating
income does not occur more for companies with just avoiding losses. On the other hand, the
coefficient on %SI in Model (2) is negative and significant (-0.107, t=-3.38), while the
coefficient on %SIJustMBZ is positive and significant (0.206, t=2.88). The results suggest
that classification shifting using special expense items occurs for companies that just meet or
beat the zero earnings threshold, while performance-driven relation (i.e., negative relation
between UEOI and %SI) is still dominant for other companies. When we include both other
operating income and special expense items in Model (3), the coefficient on %OOIJustMBZ
is still insignificant (-0.103, t=-0.87) whereas the coefficient on %SIJustMBZ remains
positive and significant (0.215, t=2.93). Therefore, different from the findings in Tables 4 and
5 that other operating income items are used as a general shifting tool, managers appear to
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shift core expenses to special items just to avoid losses.
Similar to the results using zero earnings threshold in Panel A, Panel B using last year‟s
earnings benchmark shows the negative but insignificant coefficient on %OOI X JustMBP
and the positive and significant coefficient on %SI X JustMBP. For instance, in Model (3), the
coefficient on %OOIJustMBP is -0.088 (t=-0.73) while the coefficient on %SIJustMBP is
0.163 (t=2.46). Again, our results suggest that classification shifting using special expense
items occurs to avoid the decrease in operating profits, while classificatory shifting using
other operating income occurs in general but not just for meeting or beating last year‟s
earnings. We also find similar results using analysts‟ forecasts benchmark in Panel C. When
included in the same regression, the coefficient on %OOIJustMBF is not significant (0.235,
t=0.30) whereas the coefficient on %SIJustMBF is positive and significant (0.835, t=2.42).
The results show the effect of special expense items on just meeting or beating analysts‟
forecasts benchmark.
Furthermore, we consider three earnings benchmarks jointly following Fan et al. (2010).
That is, we test for classification shifting of other operating income and special expense items
when companies just meet or beat any of the three earnings thresholds. The sample size for
this test reduces to 281 observations as we need data for all three earnings benchmarks.
Results in Panel D are consistent with those in Panels A, B, and C. JustMB is an indicator
variable that equals one if any of JustMBZ, JustMBP, and JustMBF is equal to one. In Model
(3) of Panel D, the coefficient on %OOIJustMB is not significant (-0.340, t=-0.80), while the
coefficient on %SIJustMB is positive and significant (0.690, t=2.36). In summary, overall
results from Table 6 show that classification shifting using special items occurs for just
meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, whereas misclassification of other operating income
occurs as a common practice to inflate core earnings. Special expense items have been
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scrutinized by auditors and regulators and this increased scrutiny may reduce the benefits of
classification shifting using these items (Barua et al. 2010). That is why managers tend to use
special items in special cases including meeting or narrowly beating earnings targets.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Sensitivity Analyses
Auditor Characteristics (BIG 4, Auditor Tenure)
Prior studies show that earnings management activities are negatively associated with the
choice of quality auditors since external auditors with high quality perform a corporate
governance role (Fan and Wong 2005; Francis and Wang 2008; Haw et al. 2011). Regarding
classificatory shifting in East Asian countries, Haw et al. (2011) show that the
misclassification decreases when a company hires a BIG 4 auditor, demonstrating that BIG 4
auditors play an effective monitoring role in reducing classification shifting. Further, this role
would be more effective with longer auditor tenure as auditors with short tenure are
associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or
low balling. Consistent with this view, Myers et al. (2003) report that longer auditor tenure is
associated with a lower dispersion in the distributions of discretionary and current accruals.
Therefore, we examine whether the auditor characteristics (i.e., BIG 4 and auditor tenure)
affect the extent to which the classification shifting occurs.
Panel A in Table 7 shows the regression results to examine whether the earnings
management via classification shifting occurs less when companies have BIG 4 auditors.
When we include only other operating income in Model (1), the coefficient on %OOI is
positive and significant (0.215, t=2.93). However, the coefficient on %OOIBIG 4 is negative
and significant (-0.170, t=-1.78), demonstrating that companies with BIG 4 auditors less
engage in classificatory shifting using other operating income. On the other hand, when we
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include only special expense items in Model (2), the coefficient on %SI is negative and
significant (-0.087, t=-2.45), while the coefficient on %SIBIG4 is not significant (0.057,
t=0.97). When we include both other operating income and special expense items in Model
(3), the results remain the same. The coefficient on %OOIBIG4 and %SIBIG4 are -0.179
(t=-1.84) and 0.057 (t=0.93), respectively. These findings indicate that clients generally
engage in classificatory shifting using other operating income, and BIG 4 auditors seem to
restrain this kind of earnings management more than non-BIG 4 auditors.
Panel B in Table 7 reports the regression results to test whether managers more or less
engage in classification shifting as the auditor tenure gets longer. When we include only other
operating income in Model (1), the coefficient on %OOI is positive and significant (0.269,
t=3.17), while the coefficient on %OOITenure is negative and significant (-0.181, t=-2.28),
suggesting that companies having the relationship with their auditors for longer period less
engage in classification shifting using other operating income. However, when we include
only special expense items in Model (2), the coefficient on %SI is negative and significant (-
0.102, t=-1.78), and the coefficient on %SITenure is not significant (0.036, t=0.72). The
results remain the same when we include both other operating income and special expense
items in Model (3). The overall results indicate that high quality auditors with longer tenure
limit classification shifting using other operating income. Therefore, our findings in Table 7
support our earlier argument that special items have been scrutinized by auditors and this
increased scrutiny leads managers in the IFRS adoption period to use this form of
classification shifting only in specific situations; however, the alternative form of
classification shifting through other operating income is used in the common practice of
earnings management, but the extent of this shifting behavior is affected by the auditor
characteristics.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
Firm Characteristics (Chaebol, Delisting)
The business groups in Korea called Chaebol, multinational conglomerates of public and
private companies from a broad range of industries and largely controlled by wealthy
founding families, can exercise more control rights than their cash flow rights, which might
generate the agency problem between majority owners and minority owners. Prior studies find
that managers of Chaebol companies might not be free to make decisions against majority
shareholders and might be more involved in manipulating reported earnings to cover majority
owners‟ expropriation (Ahn 2004; Kim and Yi 2006; Jung et al. 2009; Haw et al. 2011).
Specifically for classification shifting, Haw et al. (2011) show that misclassification increases
with the degree of control divergence (i.e., the disparity between control and cash flow rights)
in East Asia‟s family-controlled businesses. Therefore, we examine whether the classification
shifting using other operating income and special items occurs more for companies included
in these large business groups.15
Panel A in Table 8 presents the tests that examine whether the misclassification takes
place more for Chaebol companies. When we include only other operating income in Model
(1), the coefficient on %OOI is positive and significant (0.118, t=2.50), while that
on %OOIChaebol is not significant (-0.276, t=-0.85), indicating that classificatory shifting
using other operating income does not occur more for Chaebol companies. On the other hand,
when we include only special items in Model (2), the coefficient on %SI is negative and
significant (-0.079, t=-2.73), but the coefficient on %SIChaebol is positive and significant
(0.402, t=2.82). The results suggest that Chaebol companies engage in classification shifting
using special expense items. When we include both other operating income and special
15
We define Chaebol companies as in the largest four business groups, Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK, and
the Chaebol companies comprise 6.17 percent of all sample companies.
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expense items in Model (3), the coefficient on %OOIChaebol is still insignificant (-0.260,
t=-0.80) whereas that on %SIChaebol is positive and significant (0.418, t=2.93). Taken
together, Chaebol companies with the bigger disparity between ownership and control seem to
use both other operating income and special expense items to inflate core earnings in the IFRS
adoption year, while non-Chaebol companies use other operating income alone for
classification shifting.
According to securities listing regulation in the KOSDAQ market, companies reporting
operating losses for four years in a row are designated as issues for administration and those
for five consecutive years are delisted. Therefore, companies having consecutive operating
losses have strong incentives to turn into operating profits to avoid administrative issue or
liquidation. Therefore, we test whether the misclassification takes place more for companies
that have consecutive operating losses for the previous four consecutive years and operating
profits in the current year. After only including the companies listed on the KOSDAQ market,
which officially requires administrative issue or delisting upon operating losses, the sample
size reduces to 708 observations.
Panel B in Table 8 reports the regression results for testing whether classificatory shifting
occurs more for companies to be liquidated if they have operating losses in the current year.
ADELIST is an indicator variable that equals one if a company has operating losses for four
consecutive years just prior to the current year but has operating profits in the current year and
zero otherwise. When we include only other operating income in Model (1), the coefficient
on %OOI is positive and significant (0.199, t=2.84). However, the coefficient
on %OOIADELIST is not significant (0.025, t=0.16), suggesting that classificatory shifting
using other operating income does not occur more for companies having incentives to avoid
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delisting (constituting approximately 4.1 percent of our sample companies).16
On the other
hand, when we include only special items in Model (2), the coefficient on %SI is negative and
significant (-0.203, t=-5.14), whereas the coefficient on %SIADELIST is positive and
significant (0.375, t=3.35). The results suggest that classification shifting using special
expense items occurs for companies with strong incentives to report operating profits while
performance-driven effect is prevalent in other companies. When we include both other
operating income and special expense items in Model (3), the coefficient on %OOIADELIST
is still insignificant (-0.087, t=-0.53) while the coefficient on %SIADELIST remains positive
and significant (0.339, t=2.79).
[Insert Table 8 here]
High Other Operating Income and Special Expenses
Companies with high other operating income or special expenses have more opportunities
to classification shift. To examine whether the classification shifting behavior depends on the
amount of other operating income and special expenses, we define indicator variables, OOIH
and SIH, for other operating income and special expenses greater than 5% of sales,
respectively. Consistent with McVay (2006) who uses 5% of sales in identifying companies
with high income-decreasing special items, we also use 5% criteria when we define both
indicator variables. Then we include the main and interaction variables (e.g., OOIH,
SIH, %OOI OOIH and %SI SIH) into Equation (2).
Untabulated results show that the coefficient on %OOIOOIH is positive and significant
(0.649, t=2.36), and that on %SISIH is positive but insignificant (0.117, t=0.45). The results
indicate that classification shifting using other operating income is more pervasive in
16
Approximately 5.5 percent of our sample companies have operating losses for the previous three
consecutive years and operating profits in the current year and the results using these alternative sample
companies that have incentives to avoid administrative issue remain the same.
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companies with high other operating income, while the relationship between unexpected
operating income and special expense items does not vary with the amount of special
expenses.
Early IFRS Adopting Companies
The country-level enforcement, the incentives to engage in earnings management, the
culture of the country, and the period of adoption (early adopters vs. late adopters) play a
relatively greater role in shaping the IFRS outcomes.17
Especially, voluntary IFRS adoption
is not random; therefore, self-selection bias may occur when we include both early and late
adopters in our sample.18
To eliminate the effects of early adopters of IFRS, we conduct the
same analyses only for first-time IFRS adopters in 2011.
Excluding early adopters of 54 companies (i.e., adopting IFRS in 2009 or 2010), the
sample consists of 1,176 observations. Untabulated results show that when we include both
other operating income and special items in the same regression, the coefficient on %OOI
remains positive and significant (0.113, t=2.42) while that on %SI becomes insignificant (-
0.020, t=-0.82). These results indicate that classification shifting using other operating income
reported in earlier tables is unaffected by the omission of early IFRS adoption companies.
No Other Operating Income
17
Prior studies investigate the characteristics of companies voluntarily adopting IFRS earlier than others.
For instance, Barth et al. (2008) use a sample of early IFRS adopting companies to investigate whether early
adoption of IFRS improves accounting quality by deterring opportunistic earnings management and show that
early IFRS adopting companies exhibit less earnings smoothing, higher frequency of large losses, and slightly
lower (but insignificant) frequency of small positive earnings in the post-adoption period. However, subsequent
studies document that companies‟ incentives to voluntarily adopt IFRS, the local business environment, and
institutional frameworks can induce confounding effects when the adoption of IFRS is examined (Daske et al.
2008; Byard et al. 2011; Ahmed et al. 2013).
18
Selection occurs when observations are non-randomly sorted into discrete groups, resulting in the
potential for coefficient bias in estimation procedures such as ordinary least squares (OLS) (Maddala 1991;
Lennox et al. 2012). As only a few companies adopt IFRS earlier (approximately 4.4% of our sample) before
mandatory adoption of IFRS, it is not appropriate to implement the selection model to control for self-selection
bias in this study.
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Companies can be classified into two groups depending upon how they calculate
operating profits under IFRS. One group includes other operating income in operating profits.
The other group calculates operating profits in the same manner as GAAP by subtracting the
sum of cost of goods sold and SG&A expenses from sales revenues (Cheon and Ha 2011).
While our analyses are conducted for the full sample including both groups, we also test
whether companies in the latter group engage in classification shifting using special expense
items in circumstances with no other operating income.
Table 9 reports the results from using 158 companies for which reported other operating
income is zero. The coefficient on %SI is negative and significant (-0.294, t=-6.79), thus
demonstrating that the companies which calculate operating profits according to old GAAP
do not engage in classification shifting using special expense items. The results indicates that
companies which do not use the discretion in composing the operating profits in the IFRS
adoption year also do not engage in classification shifting using special expense items.
[Insert Table 9 here]
VII. Conclusions
This study examines whether managers use other operating income and special expenses
for classification shifting to increase operating profits in the Korean IFRS adoption period. As
IFRS does not regulate the individual items of operating profits until the amendment of IFRS
in 2012, managers inadvertently have the discretion to compose revenue and expense items
for core earnings. Following a methodology similar to that employed by prior studies (McVay
2006; Fan et al. 2010), we find a positive association between unexpected operating profits
and other operating income and a negative relation between unexpected operating profits and
special items. We interpret these results as evidence that companies engage in classification
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shifting using other operating income in the IFRS adoption period and performance-driven
effect is more prevalent with respect to special expense items.
We also find that classificatory shifting of other operating income is more pervasive
when managers appear to be constrained in their ability to manipulate current period accruals
because of prior upward accrual manipulation. Further, we investigate the motivations to
manage earnings using classification shifting and find that classification shifting using special
items occurs to meet or narrowly beat earnings benchmarks, whereas misclassification of
other operating income occurs as a general shifting tool but not just for meeting or beating
earnings targets.
From a number of sensitivity analyses, we find that classificatory manipulation is more
prevalent in companies with high other operating income, consistent with prior researches
examining classification shifting using income-decreasing special items and discontinued
operations (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Barua et al. 2010). We also find that high quality
auditors (i.e., BIG 4 auditors or auditors with longer tenure) restrain classification shifting
using other operating income. We further find evidence that Chaebol companies with the
bigger control divergence engage in classification shifting using both other operating income
and special expenses while non-Chaebol companies use other operating income alone. In
addition, we document that classificatory shifting using special items occurs for companies
having incentives to turn into operating profits as these companies are liquidated if they have
operating losses in the current year. Our results are also robust to a sample of companies
excluding early IFRS adopters. We further find that companies not reporting any other
operating income do not engage in classification shifting using special expense items.
Given the ongoing debate by the SEC about whether to permit adoption of IFRS for US
firms, the findings of this study imply that accounting standards-setting bodies need to pay
attention to classification shifting of revenue as well as expense items when they adopt IFRS
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in the future. Furthermore, our study justifies the SEC‟s concern on improper classification of
line items in financial statements, especially revenue items.
Even after IFRS is amended to regulate the individual items of operating profits in 2012,
managers still have discretion in disclosing “adjusted operating profits” in footnote reflecting
their unique business environment. Considering that investors place a higher value on items of
income expected to be persistent in the future, “adjusted operating profits” disclosed in
footnote would be an important area of research in the future.
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Reference
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Table 1
Comparison of Income Statement under GAAP and IFRS
*Those items are not mandatory. **Disclosure of operating profits (losses) on statement of comprehensive income or footnote was not mandatory in 2009 but mandatory in 2010 and 2011.
***Operating profits (losses) should be disclosed on statement of comprehensive income, not allowed on footnote, and calculated as follows: Revenue – Costs of goods sold –SG&A expenses.
****Disclosure of adjusted operating profit (losses) is allowed on footnote.
Panel A: I/S Under GAAP
Panel B: I/S Under IFRS (2011)
Panel C: I/S Under IFRS (from 2012)
Sales Revenue Revenue
Cost of goods sold Cost of goods sold* Cost of goods sold
Gross profits Gross profits* Gross profits
SG&A expenses SG&A expenses* SG&A expenses
Operating profits (losses) Other operating income* Operating profits (losses)***
Non-operating income Other operating expenses*
Non-operating expenses Operating profits (losses)**
Earnings before taxes for continuing operation Financial costs Financial costs
Tax expenses for continuing operation Share of the profit or loss of associates and joint
ventures accounted for using the equity method
Share of the profit or loss of associates and joint
ventures accounted for using the equity method
Earnings for continuing operation Non-operating incomes* Non-operating incomes*
Discontinued operation (net of taxes) Non-operating expenses* Non-operating expenses*
Net income (Loss) Tax expenses Tax expenses
Earnings per share Earnings for continuing operation Earnings for continuing operation
Single amount for the total of discontinued operation
(net of taxes)
Single amount for the total of discontinued operation
(net of taxes)
Net income (Loss) Net income (Loss)
Other comprehensive income Other comprehensive income - subsequently reclassified
to current earnings
Other comprehensive income - subsequently not
reclassified to current earnings
Comprehensive income Comprehensive income
Adjusted operating profits (losses)****
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev.
SALES (KRW billions) 729.897 45.125 112.849 313.293 3,012.668
UEOI 0.001 -0.032 0.003 0.043 0.106
OI (KRW billions) 38.687 1.088 5.429 17.143 244.639
%OI 0.049 0.016 0.049 0.098 0.184
%OOI 0.027 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.065
%SI 0.055 0.010 0.023 0.050 0.106
Unexpected operating income (UEOI) is the differences between reported and predicted operating income, where the
predicted values are calculated using the coefficients from Equation (1), estimated by industry and excluding company i.
OI = β0 + β1OIt-1 + β2ATO + β3ACCRUALSt-1 + β4△SALES + β5NEG_△SALES + β6RETURNS + β7 RETURNSt-1 + εt (1)
OI is reported operating income in financial statements. ATO is the asset turnover ratio, defined as Sales/((NOA+NOAt-1)/2),
where NOA is Net Operating Assets. ACCRUALSt-1 is Operating accruals, calculated as (Net income–Cash From
Operations)/Sales. △SALES is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to t (Sales-Salest-1)/(Salest-1). NEG_△SALES is
△SALES if △SALES is negative, and 0 otherwise. RETURNS is 12-month market-adjusted return corresponding to the fiscal
year. %OI is operating income items scaled by sales. %OOI is other operating income items scaled by sales. %SI is special
expense items scaled by sales.
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Table 3
Pearson Correlation Matrix
Variable definitions are in Table 2. p-values are in parenthesis.
SALES UEOI %OI %OOI %SI
SALES 1.000 -0.032 0.005 -0.017 -0.052
(0.259) (0.855) (0.544) (0.066)
UEOI 1.000 0.653 0.067 -0.063
(<.001) (0.017) (0.027)
%OI 1.000 0.100 -0.123
(<.001) (<.001)
%OOI 1.000 0.200
(<.001)
%SI 1.000
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Table 4
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Other Operating Income and Special Expenses
Variable definitions are in Table 2. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.
Variables Dependent Variable = UEOI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Intercept -0.002 0.004 0.001
(-0.71) (1.22) (0.37)
%OOI 0.111 0.137
(2.38)** (2.89)***
%SI -0.063 -0.079
(-2.21)** (-2.75)***
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 0.38% 0.32% 0.91%
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Table 5
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Other Operating Income and Special Expenses: High
Net Operating Assets
Variables
Dependent Variable = UEOI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Intercept 0.004 0.006 0.006
(1.21) (1.73)* (1.64)
%OOI -0.015 -0.002
(-0.19) (-0.04)
%OOIHighNOA 0.229 0.227
(2.26) ** (2.23)**
%SI -0.078 -0.078
(-1.42) (-1.42)
%SIHighNOA 0.045 0.025
(0.69) (0.38)
HighNOA -0.025 -0.012 -0.021
(-3.33) *** (-1.47) (-2.41)**
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 1.19% 0.33% 1.35%
HighNOA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company has net operating assets scaled by sales at the beginning of the year being
in the highest quartile for the industry and 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are in Table 2. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.
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Table 6
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Other Operating Income and Special Expenses:
Earnings Benchmarks
Variables
Dependent Variable = UEOI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Panel A: Using Zero Operating Profit Benchmark
Intercept -0.003 (-0.96) 0.005 (1.41) 0.001 (0.52)
%OOI 0.115 (2.19)** 0.152 (2.86)***
%OOIJustMBZ -0.029 (-0.25) -0.103 (-0.87)
%SI -0.107 (-3.38)*** -0.124 (-3.85) ***
%SIJustMBZ 0.206 (2.88)*** 0.215 (2.93)***
JustMBZ 0.008 (0.87) -0.005 (-0.46) -0.003 (-0.27)
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 0.28% 0.95% 1.46%
Panel B: Using Last Year’s Operating Profit Benchmark
Intercept -0.007 (-2.08)** 0.001 (0.38) -0.002 (-0.53)
%OOI 0.123 (2.37)** 0.157 (3.00)***
%OOIJustMBP -0.032 (-0.28) -0.088 (-0.73)
%SI -0.105 (-3.21)*** -0.123 (-3.70)***
%SIJustMBP 0.156 (2.43)** 0.163 (2.46)**
JustMBP 0.024 (3.11)*** 0.014 (1.74)* 0.016 (2.01)**
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 1.06% 1.44% 2.03%
Panel C: Using Analysts’ Forecasts
Intercept 0.013 (2.60)*** 0.031 (5.27)*** 0.023 (3.76)***
%OOI 0.368 (3.55)*** 0.357 (3.49)***
%OOIJustMBF 0.000 (0.00) 0.235 (0.30)
%SI -0.361 (-2.82)*** -0.344 (-2.74)***
%SIJustMBF 0.807 (2.33)** 0.835 (2.42)**
JustMBF 0.008 (0.44) -0.017 (-1.01) -0.021 (-0.93)***
Observations 281 281 281
Adjusted R2 3.48% 2.50% 6.14%
Panel D: Using Composite Measure of Earning Benchmarks
Intercept 0.014 (2.55)** 0.035 (5.38)*** 0.025 (3.73)***
%OOI 0.381 (3.57)*** 0.358 (3.38)***
%OOIJustMB -0.266 (-0.63) -0.340 (-0.80)
%SI -0.400 (-3.01)*** -0.365 (-2.78)***
%SIJustMB 0.727 (2.49)** 0.690 (2.36)**
JustMB 0.001 (0.14) -0.026 (-2.11)** -0.017 (-1.32)
Observations 281 281 281
Adjusted R2 3.50% 2.76% 5.97%
JustMBZ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company has a reported operating income in the current year between 0% and 2% of
total assets, and 0 otherwise. JustMBP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company has the change in operating income in the
current year between 0% and 2% of total assets, and 0 otherwise. JustMBF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company has an
analyst forecast error between 0% and 0.05% of total assets, and 0 otherwise. Analyst forecast error is defined as actual operating
income as reported by FnGuide less the median of analyst forecast for six months as of fiscal year-end. JustMB is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if any of JustMBZ, JustMBP, and JustMBF is equal to one, and 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are in Table 2. t-
statistics are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.
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Table 7
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Other Operating Income and Special Expenses:
Auditor Characteristics
Variables
Dependent Variable = UEOI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Panel A: BIG 4 Auditors
Intercept -0.001 (-0.17) 0.010 (1.95)* 0.005 (1.01)
%OOI 0.215 (2.93)*** 0.242 (3.28)***
%OOIBIG4 -0.170 (-1.78)* -0.179 (-1.84)*
%SI -0.087 (-2.45)** -0.102 (-2.85)***
%SIBIG4 0.057 (0.97) 0.057 (0.93)
BIG4 -0.002 (-0.38) -0.010 (-1.55) -0.007 (-1.02)
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 0.58% 0.36% 1.14%
Panel B: Auditor Tenure
Intercept 0.006 (0.97) 0.021 (2.94)*** 0.014 (1.91)*
%OOI 0.269 (3.17)** 0.316 (3.65)***
%OOITenure -0.181 (-2.28)** -0.201 (-2.49)**
%SI -0.102 (-1.78)* -0.146 (-2.52)**
%SITenure 0.036 (0.72) 0.065 (1.27)
Tenure -0.008 (-1.41) -0.017 (-2.68)*** -0.012 (-1.88)*
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 0.28% 0.76% 1.76%
BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company‟s auditing firm is one of BIG 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Tenure is the natural
log of the number of years the auditor has been with the company. Other variable definitions are in Table 2. t-statistics are shown in
parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.
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Table 8
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Other Operating Income and Special Expenses: Firm
Specific Characteristics
Variables Dependent Variable = UEOI
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Panel A: Chaebol
Intercept -0.003 (-0.90) 0.004 (1.32) 0.001 (0.41)
%OOI 0.118 (2.50)** 0.151 (3.15)***
%OOIChaebol -0.276 (-0.85) -0.260 (-0.80)
%SI -0.079 (-2.73)*** -0.098 (-3.34)***
%SIChaebol 0.402 (2.82)*** 0.418 (2.93)***
Chaebol 0.013 (0.99) -0.010 (-0.77) -0.005 (-0.34)
Observations 1,230 1,230 1,230
Adjusted R2 0.31% 0.82% 1.47%
Panel B: Delisting
Intercept -0.004 (-1.06) 0.011 (2.42)** 0.005 (1.21)
%OOI 0.199 (2.84)** 0.245 (3.55)***
%OOIADELIST 0.025 (0.16) -0.087 (-0.53)
%SI -0.203 (-5.14)*** -0.220 (-5.57)***
%SIADELIST 0.375 (3.35)*** 0.339 (2.79)***
ADELIST 0.052 (1.90) 0.031 (1.05) 0.027 (0.91)
Observations 708 708 708
Adjusted R2 2.51% 4.96% 6.51%
Chaebol is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company belongs to Chaebol, which is a multinational conglomerate of public and
private companies from a broad range of industries, and 0 otherwise. ADELIST is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a company has
operating losses for previous four years and operating profits in the current year and 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are in
Table 2. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.
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Table 9
Regression of Unexpected Operating Income on Special Expenses: Zero Other Operating Income
Companies
Variables Dependent Variable = UEOI
Intercept 0.025
(3.41)***
%SI -0.294
(-6.79)***
Observations 158
Adjusted R2 22.34%
Variable definitions are in Table 2. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, for two-tailed test.