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Martijn van der Steen

Jorren Scherpenisse

Mark van Twist

Erna Ovaa

Wim van den Boogaard

Netherlands School of Public Administration

Early signals,

Timely strategyThe Early Warning system

at the Dutch Rijkswaterstaat

About the authors

Dr Martijn van der Steen is deputy dean and deputy

director of the Netherlands School of Public Administration

and director of its think tank.

Jorren Scherpenisse MSc is researcher and lecturer at

the Netherlands School of Public Administration.

Prof. Dr Mark van Twist is professor of Public Admini-

stration at Erasmus University and is executive dean at the

Netherlands School of Public Administration.

Erna Ovaa MSc is programme leader Early Warnings &

Strategic Explorations at Rijkswaterstaat and laid the

foundation for the Early Warning system in 2008.

Wim van den Boogaard MSc is senior strategy

advisor at Rijkswaterstaat. Since 2010 he has been working

on the improvement of the Early Warning system and the

expansion of the system to the entire working field of

Rijkswaterstaat.

Early signals,

Timely strategy

The Early Warning system

at the Dutch Rijkswaterstaat

Dr Martijn van der Steen

Jorren Scherpenisse MSc

Prof. Dr Mark van Twist

Erna Ovaa MSc

Wim van den Boogaard MSc

An essay by the Think Tank of the Netherlands School for

Public Administration

2013

isbn 978-90-75297-30-0

Netherlands School of Public Administration

Early signals, Timely strategy 3

Table of contents

1. Introduction 5

2. Preparing for the unknown 8

3. Dilemmas in foresight 14

Balancing continuity and discontinuity 14

Different forms of usage and effect 18

Different types of signals 20

4. Findings: analysis of the Early Warning system 22

The origins and principles of the Early Warning system at rws 22

The method of the ew-system at rws 23

Some examples from the practice of rws 24

5. Analysis: the paradox of professionalization 26

The dilemma of variety 26

The dilemma of quality 27

The paradox of professionalization 27

6. Conclusion: early signals, timely strategy 31

Endnotes 34


1 Introduction

There are many ways to look ahead. It may not be a science, but it is defi-

nitely a skill practised in many workplaces1. The academic community has

taken foresight beyond the stereotypical portrayal of gazing into a crystal

ball: scenario studies, technology assessments, stress tests, causal layered

analysis, horizon scanning and trend analysis are some of the many

accepted and proven methods to systematically look ahead.2 Strategists

and policy-makers wanting to remain ahead of current developments

have a large toolkit at their disposal.

One method for looking ahead is to organize and prioritize so-called early

warnings.3 Early warnings herald possible future developments that may

present risks or opportunities for an organization. Early warnings are the

present indicators of an emerging future development; they are not neces-

sarily the development itself but indicate something else, or something

larger. A signal is not necessarily ‘significant’, but serves as a pointer to-

wards something that is of importance for the near or distant future of the

organization. That is the essence of the early warning method for looking

ahead; it is an indirect approach to thinking about the developments that

will shape the future of the organization.

Early warnings come in a variety of forms. A signal can be an early or a

minor version of a development that grows dramatically in time; or a first

step in a chain of events that eventually changes the landscape of the

organization. Many variants predict imminent change when the organi

zation expects it the least. They warn of possible and plausible shifts, of

trends and disruptions the organization cannot afford to ignore; and be-

cause the warning comes early there is time to respond. Successful early

warnings can improve an organization’s alertness to change, initiate

measures to prevent crises and allows the organization to be a step ahead

of competitors and the external conditions.

Logical as it may seem to look ahead, it is not an everyday practice in orga-

nizations to systematically look ahead and invest in capacity of early

warnings for upcoming change. Evaluations of crises show that – in hind-

sight – there were plenty of signals that heralded the ‘unexpected’ event.4

In part, this is a matter of retrospective coherence and what historian

Barbara Tuchman calls the ‘wisdom after the event trap’.5 Hindsight

6

reveals the chain of events that led to an unforeseen event: an event has

to occur in order to be able to recognize the build-up towards, and the

actions that caused the event. Looking back, it seems evident, but it takes

knowledge of the effect to recognize its causes.

A famous example of retrospective coherence is the report by the United

States Senate ‘9/11 Commission’.6 The report provides a detailed overview

of the numerous minor actions that accumulated into the attacks. The

report provides insight into the precise knowledge that security agencies

had of those actions, which automatically raises questions about the lack

of warning by them. After the event it is almost inconceivable that the

information did not lead to the early arrest of the hijackers or to other

pre-emptive measures. Why was it so easy to enter a plane carrying a

knife? Why was the cockpit so easily accessible for passengers? How could

the secret services with all the intelligence they had not identify the more

than twenty conspirators? In other words, why did the analysts at the in-

telligence agencies not ‘connect the dots’? Retrospective coherence provides

an uncomfortable answer; in an abundance of information the dots only

become visible after an event takes place. The signs are on the table, but

cannot be connected until the plot has unfolded. Analysts are unable to

make sense of what is in front of them, even though everything they need

is hidden somewhere in their data. Analysts need an interpretative frame

work to know what they have in front of them7; they only know what

they see once they know what they are looking at. Making sense of early

warning looks easy in hindsight but is very complex before events unfold.

The question is how retrospective coherence can be turned into meaning

ful warnings before events take place or critical developments emerge.

Are there methods to escape the boundaries of retrospective coherence

and the frequent predominance of the present? Will these methods be

able to turn disparate bits of information into advice about an organiza-

tion’s strategy? And if so, how can they be integrated into an organizations’

strategic repertoire?

This essay looks for answers to these questions. We have utilised an

empirical case study of the Dutch Rijkswaterstaat1 to analyse how an early

warning system was set up, how it works in practice and how it relates

to strategic management decisions at Rijkswaterstaat. We looked at the

dilemmas of collecting potential warnings, and analyzed how this type of

1 Dutch Rijkswaterstaat: The Dutch Directorate-General for Public Works and Water

Management


information was used in strategic deliberations at the organization’s board

level. We did not only study the process of looking ahead itself but also took

into account the interaction between warning signs and decision-making.

For us, warning is both a noun – a warning –, and a verb. In other words, it

is the interaction between an actor issuing a warning and another actor

who may or may not take that warning seriously. We have taken the latter

– more interactive – approach of warning-as-process as the basis for our essay.

For us, warnings are not something organizations have; rather they are

something individuals in organizations do.8

Outline of this essayChapter 2 looks at the different ways in which organizations are able to

look ahead and how the Early Warnings (ew) system at Rijkswaterstaat

(rws) fits within that typology. Furthermore, we describe the characteris-

tics of the Early Warning system at Rijkswaterstaat, as well as the design

and implementation choices that are made within it. Chapter 3 looks into

the various dilemmas affecting foresight in organizations, particularly the

struggles by organizations to escape the predominance of the present

when looking at the future. We describe how the professionals at Rijks-

waterstaat attempt to look beyond continuity and grasp discontinuity in

their warnings and signals. Chapter 4 discusses the role of the ew system in

the strategic discussions by the Board of Rijkswaterstaat to assess whether

or not the early warnings were incorporated in strategic decisions at board

level. In chapters 5 and 6 we reflect on our findings and suggest next steps

for organizations and professionals intending to set up an early warning

system for looking ahead at the future.

8

2 Preparing for the unknown

The most natural thing in the worldOrganizations and individuals constantly collect signals of what is hap-

pening around them. They look for signs of opportunities in the market,

spot imminent changes, and scan for possible risks that may occur.

Foresight and looking ahead are perfectly normal acts of everyday life.

Everyone anticipates and ‘reacts’ to potential events. In that sense, future-

oriented practices are the most natural thing in the world. In fact, it is

impossible not to look ahead.

But extremely difficultHowever, there is another side to the normality of anticipation. Although

organizations and individuals attempt to act ahead of anticipated events

and be as prepared as possible, there are important fundamental, self-

imposed and practical problems in doing so. The future is often expected

to be a continuation of the present; a continuation of today’s circumstances

in a period distant in time. The future, we assume, will appear more or less

the same as the present, with perhaps some minor variations. Even within

deliberate efforts at anticipation it is difficult to look beyond the present

and beyond continuity.9

Looking ahead is a constant balancing act with the present. The degree to

which the future is taken as a guideline for present actions varies. Organi-

zations and individuals might use foresight practices, but also weight anti-

patory information against other resources, many of which with shorter

time-horizons. Individuals and organizations may anticipate a (proximal)

future, although they are living in the immediate present. The present

remains the dominant logic in strategic actions by organizations and indi-

viduals.10 Even intentional future-oriented measures such as investing in

sustainable energy and CO2 reductions by vehicles like electric transport

are often strongly motivated and constrained by today’s circumstances.

Future-oriented plans and projects first have to survive the present condi-

tions: new and innovative technologies may hold promise for the future,

but will only succeed if they survive beyond the first few years. Anticipa-

tion is one thing; acting to succesfully confront anticipated events and

developments is another.


Looking ahead systematicallyLooking ahead and anticipating future events is a normal activity for indi-

viduals and organizations. However, a more systematic approach to antici-

pation and foresight requires careful organization.11 We refer to systematic

foresight as an organized, planned, and structured way of looking ahead

where future developments are translated into implications for current

strategies. In other words, it is not just about looking ahead, but also link-

ing those insights to organizations current repertoire. Systematic foresight

is more than just an activity: it also delivers products, such as written

reports, action plans, lists of trends and other input for organizational

strategy. There are several important choices to be made in order to link

these products to present-day strategic cycles, running procedures for

decision-making, and strategic discourse within the organization. We will

briefly discuss the most important ones here: time horizon and the object of

foresight.

Variety: time horizon and object of foresightA first important choice in the design of an early warning project is the

time horizon: how far does a study look ahead? What is considered ‘far

away enough’, and how far away can the future be interpreted in a way

that is still meaningful for this particular organization? There are no fixed

criteria for defining the time-horizon.12 However, as a general rule of thumb,

long-term outlook should stretch beyond the current cycle by at least one

and possibly several cycles.13 A reasonable definition of the future is char-

acterized by the scope of the current cycle. To punters in the stock market,

a current cycle is a day or perhaps even a few hours; the longer term may

then be a week. They take positions in order to sell within the same day

and start afresh the next. For them, the future is everything further ahead.

To pension funds trading on the same stock market, the long term has a

completely different meaning. They focus on the balance of their current

positions and entitlements. Their long term is a period of 30 or 40 years

– or even longer. For the Dutch ‘Deltacommissaris’ – who oversees and

coordinates the efforts to adapt to rising sea and water levels caused by

climate change – the long term is 100 to 200 years. In each case the ques-

tion is how much further beyond the present an outlook can go without

drifting too far from what is still a meaningful and foreseeable period.

This is the key question for each systematic foresight. What is the furthest

meaningful period for looking ahead given the particular goal and process

of the organization, taking into account the objective of the foresight ac-

10

tivities, and provided the current conditions of the organization? Table 1

summarizes the most important strengths and risks of different time-

horizons for foresight.

Table 1: Time horizon of foresight.

Time horizon of foresight

Strengths of this time horizon

Risks of this time horizon

Directly beyond the

operational cycle

For example:

• the next Cabinet

(4 years)

• the next Strategic Plan

(3 years)

• the next eu budget

round (6 years)

Allows sharp analysis, as the

future is relatively ‘nearby’ and

fairly predictable.

Signals are recognizable and

familiar to audiences, as many of

them are already partly available.

Easier and more natural linkages

to the current strategy, as signals

will often relate to current the-

mes or topics.

Proximity in time results in a

relative dominance of the present;

the future as an extended variant

of the present.

Predominance of the present

makes it difficult to foresee

discontinuity and projects more

fundamental change.

The more recognizable signals

become, the less surprising they

will be.

Looking at the very near future or

just beyond the present reduces

the response-time to signalled

trends.

Further beyond the first

cycle

For example:

• Future Scenarios for

rws in 2020

• Scenarios for the role

in infrastructure of the

eu in 2040

• Analysis of consequen-

ces of Climate Change

for Water Works in

2100

Strategic conversation is easier

because the issues are far away

and less politicized.

The long term is less burdened

with present-day political positi-

ons and less locked in the current

repertoires of the organization.

The possibility to put the existing

agenda in a different perspec-

tive. Discussions about a faraway

future allow conversations about

present-day taboos in policy.

Because the lead-time is very

long, the organization is able to

respond to even very large trends.

The distance from current themes

makes it difficult to connect possi-

ble futures to present-day agendas.

Lack of evidence enhances the

speculative image of foresight;

is it more than fantasy?

Themes can be so big that they can

hardly be translated into strategic

actions.

Long-term issues often transcend

current organizational boundaries,

e.g. directorates, departments or

current agreements. It is hard to

find the proper stakeholders or

audience to address.


A second important variable in the design of systematic foresight is what

cumulative efforts hope to achieve. In other words: what is the object of

foresight? Is the analysis looking for a coherent image of future conditions,

or more for an incoherent but interesting set of potentially meaningful

trends? Is the system looking for future developments or for unexpected

present-day events that precede long term changes? There are many

choices to be made when designing an early warning system.

The first mode of anticipatory analysis constructs integral and coherent

images of future circumstances, for instance by drawing up environmental

scenarios. Analysts collect large quantities of signals, trends and develop-

ments and integrate and interpret them into certain wholes by determin-

ing, for example, scenarios that portray possible external environments

the organization may have to operate in. These illustrations revolve

around the circumstances within which the organization or policy will

have to operate. These may be economic, or may also include more cul-

tural or social circumstances. Environmental scenarios help to answer

the strategic questions of today by placing them in the potential worlds

of tomorrow: how will our organization or policy perform in potentially

different future environments? What is necessary today, to prepare for

the possible environments of the future?

Another way of looking ahead is not to focus on the circumstances but

rather on the specific task or field itself. Researchers do not look for a

whole environment: they focus on the conditions in and around a specific

field. For instance, what will social security look like in the future, what

types of infrastructure might emerge, and what are the expectations and

possibilities for future generations of transport? These more specific

analyses are called sectoral scenarios. Foresight focuses on the task or the

object that the organization or the policy is involved in.

Other methods do not revolve around a coherent image of a whole envi-

ronment – general or specific – but rather around a specific development.

Technology assessment, for instance, focuses not on the complete picture

of the market but concentrates on specific elements of new technology,

such as timing, direction, and the range of the developments. The indi-

vidual development is central to the analysis, not the overall picture. This

permits a precise description of the development with room for detail and

expertise. The analysis shows how the technology may impact the organi-

zation, and whether and how the organization may benefit from it. For

instance, domestic robots may be analysed as an individual technological

trend, but taken into account with population ageing and epidemiology,

they become a potential solution for rising problems in the care sector.

The previous three methods all look for coherent developments; for more

or less ‘whole’ pictures of general environments, conditions in specific

12

domains or at the long-term development of trends. Methods that look for

early warnings and weak signals take a different approach. They do not look

for coherent patterns of whole images, but for independent, unique,

strange, out-of-bounds and often unclear signs of something unknown.

These methods do not look for coherence, but rather at signals that devi

ate from what is generalizable or what is predictable. Another important

distinct characteristic of early warnings or weak signals is that the sign

itself is not the underlying trend; a signal is a pointer referring to an im-

portant development. What the sign indicates – and what other develop-

ment it points towards – is unclear and open to interpretation. For example,

the fact that technology company Philips cuts its Dutch production of tel-

evision sets and sells the division to a Chinese brand in order to focus more

on medical technology may be an indication of many different developments

– geopolitics (‘rise of the rest’), changes in media usage (‘less television,

more Internet’), weakening of the company (‘losing the battle with Sam-

sung’), or of a changing market (‘health is a growth market with much

larger margins’). To take note of the signal is one thing, to interpret it is

another. Systematic foresight requires both. Incidentally, the extent to

which we look for out-of-the-box signals, use expertise as a criterion, and

include other domains may vary. We will discuss this later on. Table 2

summarizes the strengths and risks of the different options.

Object of foresight

Strengths Risks

Integral, Focused on the environ-ment

Environmental scenarios paint a coherent picture of what a future world may look like.

Environmental scenarios com-bine a set of developments into one coherent picture of a possible future.

This type of scenario is very well translatable into compelling pro-ducts for audiences to envisage and ‘live’ the future; e.g. ‘a day in the life’, images, sketches, virtual worlds.

Details cannot be integrated into holistic scenarios.

The (two) scenario-axes become very dominant in scenarios and discourage more nuanced projections of the future. Envi-ronmental scenarios become ex-tremes that span the boundaries of thinking but may easily be ignored as unreal caricatures.

Descriptive and imaginative power sometimes also enhances the speculative image. Scenarios become ‘fun’ and creative and thereby less serious and not strategic.


Integral, Focused on the field of work

Different developments around the specific sector (social activity) are brought together into integral pictures of a specific field (that currently is recognized as a coherent field of work).

Sectoral scenarios may be power-ful in the debate and can serve as a basis for the discussion on the possible design variants of a certain policy or structure of the field.

Because the study looks at fields of work it is difficult to integrate developments in other fields into the picture.

The current boundaries of fields of work are projected on the future, which limits the range of possible futures.

‘Real’ surprises often occur at the crossing of previously separate domains or disciplines, instead of within isolated fields.

Trend-wise The object of foresight is not a specific field or domain, but indi-vidual trends and developments that may cut across fields. For instance: technology, economic development, or social develop-ment.

Trends often fit nicely into existing fields of knowledge and expertise and it is relatively easy to use current state-of-the-art knowledge.

A focus on specific trends limits the attention to potential inter-actions between different trends and the impact of trends on specific fields.

Incident- driven

This approach does not look for the development, but for unique and meaningful incidents that might contain information about underlying patterns. The starting point for the exploration is not a development but rather an event. This makes the exploration very specific and imaginable for audiences.

The question is what an incident actually signals. It is difficult to see the underlying patterns and distinguish one-off incidents and signs of deeper develop-ments.

Requires expertise to see the correct events, but also creativity to see beyond their current limit and present-day meaning.

Table 2: Object of foresight.

14

3 Dilemmas in foresight

The ew method is built on the idea that imminent and unpredictable

changes are recognizable beforehand in early signals and that the signals

can be intercepted and interpreted. It is impossible to see the future, but it

is possible to more or less systematically collect and analyse possible indi-

cators of future developments. The ew method is aimed at tracking chang-

es as ‘early’ as possible. These could be changes in a faraway future that

have not begun yet, but may also be developments that are already hap-

pening to a small degree. Signals are often referred to as weak: they are

vague and ambiguous and it is rarely clear where they lead to. Weak as

they are, they remain meaningful; early warnings allow the organization

to adapt early, forward-thinking change strategies, in order to gain com-

petitive advantages.

Balancing continuity and discontinuityLooking back at critical incidents and crises it is often almost unbelievable

that early signals were not noted, or that the predictable outcome was not

foreseen. As we have already discussed, it is hard to ‘see’ the important

signs without retrospective coherence to point at what is important. Sig-

nals do not present themselves with accompanying warning-signs, but

need to be collected and interpreted. This leads us to the three core elements

of every analysis of weak signals requiring a balancing of continuity and

discontinuity:

A Collecting the relevant signals;

B Interpreting the range of signals against the background of underlying

developments;

C Linking signals and warnings to existing repertoires, procedures and

strategies in the organization.

A. Collecting signals

Collecting signals involves questions such as: where the signals are re-

trieved, how they should be sought, and who should be involved in the

search? The system requires signals and signs beyond the continuity of

the present; they need to be different from what is already common

knowledge in the system. The question is where to find these signals?

Organizations work in established networks of knowledge and expertise,

are part of stakeholder coalitions and, therefore, have many potential


signals and transmitters in their direct vicinity. However, most of these

partners produce signals that represent the status quo or the current con-

tinuity. Using that particular environment is functional at best and merely

renders an incomplete picture of potentially relevant signals. In order to

involve more discontinuous signals in the sample, other parties and net-

works should be included in the system as well. ‘Major developments’ can

come from outside the institutionalized networks. Many of the most dis-

ruptive innovations do not come from within a sector but originate from

the combination of formerly unrelated partners, networks and technolo-

gies. Finding surprising and discontinuous signals demands that the early

warning system looks beyond the limits of the present domain.

However, that is easier said than done. Which neighbouring domains

should researchers watch and which can they choose to ignore? How dis-

tant can relevant signals be? An interesting source for weak signals is the

world of bloggers and somewhat obscure newsgroups, as opposed to regu-

lar popular news media; but which ones, and who knows them? Which

individuals should be invited to expert sessions focused on collecting

weak signals and unearthing surprise data. We should not only invite the

‘usual suspects’ and known experts, but also people from other areas, with

unknown skills and an uncertain reputation. Where can we find these

people and how can we know whether they have something useful to say?

A look outside existing frameworks and beyond continuity immediately

confronts the early warning system with the inherent uncertainty and

ambiguity associated with analysing unknown territory.

B. Interpreting signals

Continuity is often the guiding process in the interpretation of signals. This

is the result of cognitive bias – it is difficult to think about something that

is not yet present – as well as organizational mechanisms. Signals are

viewed from the perspective of the existing order. They are viewed as an

addition to, or deviation from, the current path. Signals reveal that some-

thing is happening, however that ‘something’ is interpreted within the

context of the existing knowledge and current repertoire. Prior to ‘9/11’,

terrorism and airplanes were already strongly linked concepts, but were

always viewed in the context of bombs or hijacking. Hijacking a plane to

turn it into a flying firebomb did not fit the available, pre-existing narrative.

It was only after 9/11 that security services ‘saw’ the new combination of

elements. That poses a dilemma. On the one hand, interpreting signals

from the perspective of continuity blurs the potential discontinuity. On

the other hand, it is difficult in practical terms to interpret signals from

16

a discontinuous perspective; the essence of discontinuity is that it funda-

mentally differs from the existing order and is therefore hard to imagine.

Discontinuous interpretation often sounds strange, looks extremely specu-

lative and is often barely credible – even if it proves indisputable later after

the event.

C. Linking signals to strategy

A third core element of every analysis of weak signals is to link the pro-

spective signals to the organization’s existing repertoire, including links

between current objectives, on-going policies, existing programmes and

projects, current routines, and established organizational units. How can

signs of discontinuity be properly linked to existing repertoire in the or-

ganization? Not all signals are by definition discontinuous, but those that

are need to find their way to decision-makers and leaders in the organiza-

tion operating in a context of continuity. How can discontinuous views

– that are ‘strange’ or even out of order – be brought into strategic discus-

sions within the present organization which itself is a representation of

continuity? If a signal deviates too much from the existing order it could

be easily rejected as nonsense or irrelevant; decision makers and the or-

ganizations’ leadership may no longer believe the signal is credible and

could even dismiss the entire system. Discontinuity often sounds bizarre

and useless, even if it is ‘right’. In contrast, if signals deviate too little, they

will not provoke action; they may be taken up within the existing reper-

toire, while actually a new repertoire is required.

Therefore, introducing weak signals in ongoing strategic discussions

requires balancing, moderation, and framing. Balancing does not mean

that the signals should be introduced ‘pain-free’. On the contrary, the

empirical research on which this essay is based actually suggests the op-

posite: signals must come with a certain degree of discomfort, and must

be difficult to banish from someone’s thoughts. This poses a dilemma for

weak signal systems: if signals are too remote from the actual experience

they will not hit their mark, yet when they are too close they will be simply

dismissed and quickly forgotten. Good weak signals systems moderate the

discomfort to a level that motivates decision-makers just enough to look

beyond current strategies and worldview, but not to a level where the

signal itself is rejected.


Dilemmas of continuity and discontinuity

Collecting How should we look beyond existing institutionalized frames, from within those same existing frames?

Early warnings and possible futures are deeply connected to current interests and the present-day balance of power in the organization or its field: how can we collect signals beyond established views and values of the present?

Expertise needed to collect signals is often organized around current beliefs and todays’ insights; looking ahead also requires a look beyond present-day meaning.

Interpreting Understanding and interpreting the signals collected takes place within the context of the existing path: is a signal a gradual – more or less far-reaching – deviation from the existing order or is it a sign of something com-pletely different?

Power plays a role in the interpretation: connected to the existing paths are interests which also affect the interpretation. Signals should be framed in line with the positions that have already been taken.

It is difficult to see ex ante what exactly a signal repre-sents: What underlying development does it signal? Whatever seems logical in hindsight is difficult to foresee. This is the case cognitively and analytically, but also because imagination is lacking. Discontinuity is difficult to foresee.

Follow-up What are the next steps after interpreting a signal? How should we translate a signal into strategic action? Early signals are uncertain and inconclusive, the often do not point towards one obvious direction for follow-up action.

Following up on signals requires a translation of signals and warnings in terms of the existing themes on the strategic agenda of the organization. It is difficult to maintain the discontinuous nature of possible trends whilst linking them to the current organization.

Table 3: Dilemmas of continuity and discontinuity.

1818

Different forms of usage and effectCollecting weak signals is not about the collection itself, but about the

effect on the repertoire of actions and thinking within the organization

and its leadership. It is not about the analysis of early warnings, but about

what is done with them. However, it is important not to attach too narrow

a meaning to the notion of usage. The use of early warnings concerns more

than only the direct translation of a signal into a strategy. Sometimes a

signal initiates immediate visible actions, but more often something else

happens: people become aware of the limits of their own thinking, of long-

term relevance and the relativity of the status quo. As a result, the organi-

zation increases its own resilience and adaptive powers. These are invis-

ible effects that only become noticeable in time; perhaps not until the next

time a signal appears or when the organization is faced with an unfore-

seen development. Effects of early warning can have different meanings.

We make a conceptual distinction between two types of effects of foresight

on the organization’s repertoire: (1) a direct and instrumental effect, and

(2) an indirect and conceptual effect.

The direct instrumental effect of early warnings suggests that the analysis

provides information, signs or clues that are immediately translated into

strategic actions by the organization. An analysis of early signals leads the

organization to anticipate developments, change course, research specific

new opportunities or stop investing in particular policies. An early warn-

ing may provide insight into opportunities and risks that require action by

a department in the organization. Signals might also point at weaknesses

in communication, missed opportunities in strategy, or even at current

successes that previously remained unnoticed. In this interpretation of use,

signals are articulated and laid down in a report, which leads to immediate

and often very specific actions that answer to the described signals.

An indirect and conceptual effect means that the organization does not take

immediate action, but does become aware of upcoming changes. Early

warning is not just for informational purposes, but helps organizations to

be mindful of emerging changes. Signals themselves are not necessarily

‘taken up’ by the organizations’ leadership, but are useful nonetheless

because they allow them to look at their organization and environment

differently. As a consequence, the findings themselves – e.g. the report

– matter less; the real question is whether or not the early warning system

triggers strategic thinking about the organization’s future and the chang-


ing conditions it may face. Reports still matter, but the process of ‘search-

ing’ – of collecting signals, discussing relevance, brainstorming about

possible meaning – is just as important. That is why process-design is

extremely important in a system that aims for an indirect and conceptual

effect. Are decision-makers included in the process, do they feel commit-

ted to the result, and were they inspired by it? Even if signals are poor in

terms of content, a good process may nonetheless provide significant im-

pact on the organizations’ strategic capacity. This is an important distinc-

tion between the direct and the indirect effect: in terms of the direct effect,

a process is considered beneficial if it produces good quality signs.

For many, the indirect effect represents a secondary and inferior effect to

the direct, instrumental use of the early warning systems’ output. It is not.

Mindfulness of emerging changes is an extremely valuable quality in

times of turbulence, as it greatly enhances the organization’s capacity

for resilience.14 When the environment becomes more unpredictable, it is

more important for an organization to be prepared to cope with imminent

and unexpected change. Seen from this perspective, the benefit of an early

warning system is not to have better knowledge of what may happen, but

to be better and continuously aware of possibly emerging trends. An early

warning system is just as much an actionable input for strategic decision-

making as it is an intervention into an organization’s culture.

Instrumental Conceptual

Direct Signals lead to instant and clear-cut measures; e.g. adaptation of strategy, inclusion in risk control, or additional investigation.

Words, frames, and images from the strategy become an explicit part of the discourse within the organization: people take over the words and frames of the study.

Indirect Signals do not lead to direct action, but become part of the repertoire of the organization. The question as to what ‘this means on the longer term’ beco-mes a more frequently used and natural question when conside-ring the measures that need to be taken.

There is more room in the organi-zational discourse for the future and for longer-term considera-tions. It becomes more normal to think about the future.

Table 4: Impact, usage, and effect of early observations.

20

Different types of signalsThe early warning system deals with different types of signals. Firstly, we

distinguish between triggers and signs (Splint & van Wijck, 2012).15 A sign is

a mark of a certain development; often it is a small-scale example of the

underlying and upcoming development, or a part of that broader develop-

ment where the latter is recognized within and as part of the sign. The

sound of a train and the closing barrier are signs of a train approaching,

even though the train itself is not visible yet. And the arrival of the loco-

motive itself is a sign of more to follow. An early sign allows preparation

for the larger development that follows from it. Pedestrians can clear the

crossing, drivers stop their engines, and bystanders are not surprised by

the noise of the train.

A trigger is a very different kind of warning. A trigger is an event that is

expected to cause another development. It is not part of the underlying

development itself, but is a cause for the development to take place. Many

emerging developments are triggered by much smaller and earlier events.

An earthquake underneath the ocean floor is the trigger for a tsunami, just

like police-violence sometimes provokes riots. The violence is not part of

the riot, but in hindsight it did ignite the process. The trigger is often not

the main cause, but the catalyst that triggers for certain behaviour within

the system.

Apart from these, we also distinguish a third slightly different category of

signals: symptoms. Formally, symptoms are of a different class, because

they represent a current development rather than a future development.

Nevertheless, symptoms are often regarded as an early warning because

they draw attention to previously unrecognized or underestimated devel-

opments. It is difficult to determine in practice whether an incident is a

symptom of a current development or a signal of a future development.

Often, symptoms reveal that something is more painful, serious, promis-

ing, or expansive than we initially thought; we knew the underlying devel-

opment, but symptoms signal that the consequences of it may be greater

than we expected.

Early warnings can be about different types of signals; there is no neces-

sary ratio between triggers, signs, and symptoms for a proper early warn-

ing analysis – just as there is no standard for the ratio between signals

concerning the own organization or the outside world. Signals can point

towards concrete existing issues – already high on the attention list of the

organization –, but also towards broad and still vague social developments.

A signal can be a sign of something evolving into something ‘slightly’


more, but also towards a vicious or virtuous circle that leads to something

entirely new and different. Triggers can signal an increase in volume, but

also the emergence of a new domain or new perspectives. Many technolo-

gies make life easier, while some fundamentally change the way we live.

The art of early warning is to see the difference.

22

4 Findings:

analysis of the Early Warning system

In the previous chapters we discussed the possible characteristics and

choices to be made when designing an early warning system. In this chap-

ter we look at how a ‘real’ system of early warning works in practice; we

analyse how the process of early warning plays out, look at the dilemmas

that emerge in the process, and see how the actors in our case-organiza-

tion dealt with those dilemmas. We learn from the early warning system

at the Dutch Rijkswaterstaat (rws) and attempt to generalize those find-

ings to broader relevance for other organizations that want to build an

early warning system.

The origins and principles of the Early Warning system at rwsThe rws organization deploys various instruments and techniques to

enhance foresight. The Early Warning system is one of several techniques

applied towards foresight in the organization. In its Early Warning system,

rws collects weak signals that provide insight towards developments in 3

networks (national motorway network, national waterway network, and

main water system) as well as in the rws environment. The object of the

system is to look beyond what is already known within the organization

and is therefore designed to not only look at the longer term, but also

look from the outside in, across current issues and beyond the boundaries

of existing dossiers. The ew-system is designed to enhance the strategic

capacity of the organization and the ability to adapt early to changing

conditions and emerging trends.

The instrument was developed in 2008 as part of the new Strategic Explo-

rations programme of the Centre for Water Management – a Directorate of

rws. At the start, the deputy director-general used the following illustra-

tion to plea for the introduction of a system of early warning:

“If, under the current legislation, it will no longer be possible in 10 years time to

extract sand from the North Sea, the rws Board wants to hear it now. We need to

ask these questions early, and have to know what we are facing, so we have time

to develop new and improved responses. What are the possible alternatives? Can

we still round the problem? Must we adapt to it? Early Warning is about long-

term developments that we have to foresee now in order to act in time.”


In order to mobilise that strategic long-term view, the Centre of Water

Management set up a network of so-called ‘correspondents’ comprised

mostly of senior staff members and some external experts. They were

asked to periodically report their most important observations on their

field, which they believed to be of pertinence for rws. Their most urgent

observations – referred to as signs – were recorded in an Early Warning

Memo, which was submitted to the Board of rws. The Board selected the

signals that they considered important for follow-up study (the so-called

Strategic Exploration) and for a subsequent Board Recommendation by the

team responsible for the early warning system. In March 2009 the rws

Board decided that the Early Warning System was to be adopted by the

entire Directorate-General instead of only the Water Division. To organize

this, the ew-team was founded as a staff unit of the rws. In June 2010, the

first rws-wide Early Warning Network Letter was published, with signals and

warnings beyond the current time-horizon, collected from the outside-in,

and above and beyond the running projects and dossiers at rws.

The method of the ew-system at rwsThe ew-system works with what the ew-team itself calls a funnel method.

First, the Early Warning team retrieves signals from a great number of in-

ternal and external correspondents. About a quarter of these correspond-

ents are ‘regulars’ who are invited to submit signals at least once a year.

The signals are often retrieved in interviews of team-members with corre-

spondents, but sometimes also through email or in written documents

sent by correspondents to the Early Warning-team. After that, the signals

are written down in more detail and included in a long list of 60 to 80 sig-

nals. Up until this point in the process, no selection takes place. Every sig-

nal from the invited correspondents is included in the list, without addi-

tions or editing by the team.

After compiling the long list, the next step is to narrow down the number

of signals. The long list is presented to a selection committee (of senior civil

servants in the organization) that reduces the total to a short list of no

more than ten signals, to be submitted to the Board. The short list does not

go directly to the Board; first, the early warning team researches each sig-

nal, so that the Board is presented with a thorough description of each

signal. After this, the signals are included in the Network Letter and sent to

the Board. The Network Letter is part of the strategic cycle of the Board and

is in that sense an embedded and recurring topic on the agenda of the

Board.

24

The Board discusses the signals in the Network Letter and decides which

signals (usually 2 or 3) require further elaboration or follow-up. The Board

asks for deeper research into the essence of the signal and the possible

strategic consequences, and a subsequent recommendation of what to do

with the signal. These selected signals are fed into the management system

which ensures the signal receives follow-up actions and that signals will

be formally dealt with and concluded within a given period of time. From

that point, the signal becomes an element in the management control

system of the Board and requires handling over the months following. If

not, the management support system produces ‘red lights’ that indicate

the Board has to take action. This ensures that follow-up occurs and that

agreed upon actions are taken on time.

The signals on the short-list that were not selected for further research

and advice are sent back into the organization; some are sent to the rel-

evant departments with the request to organize follow-up, others are

merely labelled as ‘good to know’ – without required further action. How-

ever, the ew does continue to monitor the steps taken by departments to

follow-up on signals. Additionally, the correspondents also receive feed-

back from the ew-team, about how ‘their signal’ was handled and received

by the Board, even if it did not lead to a direct response or follow-up. Cor-

respondents receive detailed feedback on their signals as well, for instance

about possible weaknesses or doubts that board members or ew-team

members themselves had about the signal. In some cases the signal itself

is recognized as helpful or ‘correct’, but is already being dealt with within

the organization – which ‘outside’-correspondents would not be aware of

in many cases. The provision of detailed and personal feedback to corre-

spondents is part of the cyclical ambitions of the ew-system; team-mem-

bers claim that it helps improve the overall-quality of signals and keeps

the contributors connected to the system. Since the system is reliant on

the willingness and effort of correspondents – many of them from outside

the organization without a direct interest in signalling – the team regards

it as extremely important to maintain close ties with them. This is especially

important, as team members say, because of the cyclical nature of the ew-

process; shortly after the cycle ends another one begins. If correspondents

receive good and tailored feedback from the recently completed round of

signals, they will be more inclined to participate in the next round.

Some examples from the practice of rws Like every organizational and strategic system, the ew-system must prove

itself in practice with identifiable success: signals that, in hindsight, proved


worthwhile and proactively used to the organization’s advantage – and can

be claimed by the ew-system. Such successes are of great importance to

maintaining the legitimacy of the exercise on an appropriate scale. In our

interviews, respondents mentioned several and we have included two of

them below.

From 1 to 1 replacements to a replacement strategy for installations rws manages hundreds of installations (sluices, dams, bridges, pumping

stations). As a rule these are replaced when they have reached the end of

their technical lifespan, one-to-one, at the same location that was chosen

some hundred years ago. The ew system warned that many installations

were built in the 1920s and 1930s, and that rws was to be faced with an

extensive replacement task as of 2020. Signals also warned that the hund-

reds of millions of euros needed for replacements each year were not re-

served and would require massive political mobilization to raise new funds.

Furthermore, major replacements would also significantly interfere with

regional development and the role of rws in that. The rws Board put the

issue on its agenda and came up with a more programmatic approach to

the replacements, which connected the state of the installations, the re-

quired functionality in the longer term, and the political-administrative

situation in the region. Thanks to the early observations, rws is currently

working on a programme for the replacement task.

Phosphate: from a waste product to a valuable goodPhosphate is a waste product that leads to eutrophication problems for rws

and other water managers. However, it is also an indispensable food subs-

tance. In an Early Warning it was noted that the global phosphate supply

is running out, while the finite supply is in the hands of politically unstable

countries. What is currently a hazardous waste product would represent

great value in the future. Private companies were already interested in

developing methods for reclaiming phosphate. Thanks to the early signals,

rws had the opportunity to take on a facilitating role for the industrial

parties that were developing new technology for reclaiming phosphate

and allowed them to gain practical experience with reclaiming phosphates

out of the water system managed by rws. That gave an impulse to the

reclamation of phosphate and the position of the Netherlands in the inter-

national market for phosphates.

26

5 Analysis:

the paradox of professionalization

Over the years the ew-system at Rijkswaterstaat has developed into a

well-embedded instrument for recognising early warnings. A great number

of parties – internal and external – participate in the system and are sup-

portive of it. Board members, network partners, employees and individual

correspondents are positive about the system. Most interviewees say that

the working method is appreciated as open, transparent, professional, and

carefully managed by the team. It is not a collection of random signals,

but a systematic effort to collect the signals that are most relevant for the

future of rws.

Furthermore, interviewees say that the ew-team adds significant value

and many mention the efforts of team members as a crucial factor; team

members steer and supervise signals without harming the open and inter-

active nature of the process. What is important - interviewees claim - is

that the ew-system delivers on its promise to push signals ‘up’ into the

organizations’ system. Correspondents feel that the Board is taking their

contributions seriously. Many interviewees, from inside and outside the

organization, say that the system has developed into a ‘product’ that could

also be deployed outside rws; for instance by partner organizations or

other Ministries. In a general sense, our interviewees conclude, all is well

within the ew system. However, the current success comes with two impor-

tant dilemmas that we will discuss below.

The dilemma of varietyThe first risk of the current method and process is the possibility that the

variety that exists after the first round is eventually reduced to the signals

that make it into the Network Letter. A wide variety of signals are collected

in the first phase, but very few make it to the Board. The Early Warning

Team and correspondents see all of the signals, but the decision makers see

only a few. Moreover, they only see the selection of signals that others

have anticipated as the probable preferences of the Board. This causes a

sense of waste, but also holds the problem of biased attention; ideas disap-

pear and the Teams’ biases are reproduced in the short list. Correspond-

ents understand that the system needs to be selective, but many corre-


spondents indicate that it would be nice if the other signals could be put

to more use. Otherwise the organization may be missing important signals

and the correspondents’ efforts may be in vain. Interviewees in our re-

search all agree that not all signals can make it into the Network Letter,

but they think it would be good if the intrinsic value of the initial variety

could be somehow used. The necessary filtering of signals now leads to

waste. An appropriate solution for this problem may be the recently devel-

oped ‘after-care route’. It is now common practice to also bring the unse-

lected signals to attention within rws so that they may be used as well.

The dilemma of qualityClosely connected to the issue of variety is the uncertainty about the quality

of the signals. This problem is inherent to the method of rws, since to

allow maximum variety of the initial sample it should not, in principal,

exclude signals. However, maximum variety may come at the expense of

the total quality of the sample. A signal is always ‘allowed’ into the system,

even if it does not add to existing knowledge. The wide variety is desirable,

but could weaken overall quality and accuracy. The question remains which

qualitative selection is appropriate. Recently, the ew-team started with

some low-key selection. Prior to the selection committee’s meeting, the

team selects an A and B list; the signals in the B list do not meet a number

of set quality criteria. However, the members of the selection committee

remain free to prioritise any of the signals in the B list. Furthermore, the

Team has added a phase of expert examination; after the initial selection

by the committee, experts check whether the signal is accurate, new and

whether an organizational unit may already be working an that signal.

The paradox of professionalizationThe ew system has developed into a running practice within the rws

organization that is considered valuable and is firmly embedded in the

strategic cycle of the Board. People are familiar with, stakeholders value

it, and there are few complaints about the current process or its output.

However, if we look more closely at the development of the system, an

interesting transformation has occurred. The ew-system started out as

a tool to collate signals from the outside in and across the institutionalized

problem definitions, all for the purpose of strategic deliberation on the

position of rws in the network. The system was designed to provide input

for strategic debate, but also to ensure quick and effective action from the

organization towards upcoming challenges.

28

In recent years, the ew-process has further professionalised; the system has

become more thought-out, more institutionalized, and the process is de-

signed to be more professional and interactive. There is now a network of

regular ‘correspondents’, and in every cycle new correspondents inside

and outside the organization are also interviewed. Correspondents are

more committed to the system than before, and the process is more inter-

active and communicative. In terms of the content, signals now have a

high level of quality. It is no longer a biannual or annual project, but a con-

tinuous cycle that runs throughout the year, as a standard process in the

strategic cycle of the organization. Also, the translation of the signals into

strategic actions has received increasing attention from the ew-team. Sig-

nals that are not put to the Board are as much as possible brought to the

attention of departments, programmes, or other actors in the organization

who may then take them into consideration. The ew-team monitors the

follow-up of signals and urges departments to take actions. In that sense,

the system is now a recurrent feature of the organization and is deeply

embedded; where it used to be a somewhat solitary practice in the organi-

zation aimed at a select audience, it is now widely known and commonly

accepted step in the annual strategic cycle. It has gained ‘institutional

weight’ and is currently a given element in the strategic cycle.

However, at the same time it appears that in the process of formalizing and

normalizing the ew-system something important was lost. The more the

system was further developed and embedded in the organization, the less

exciting and sensitive the signals became to the Board. Early warnings be-

came one signal besides many others; a ‘normal’ type of management infor-

mation instead of a highly important signal. Partly due to its new normality,

the weak signals lost some of their speciality and ability to produce urgency

for early warnings. The early warnings became more of a habit for the Board

members that could quickly be handled – like any other management infor-

mation. Interviewees say that there are several reasons for this.

Firstly, signals are less surprising now than when the system was intro-

duced. This is partly because the organization became more accustomed

to thinking beyond current boundaries and has grown used to looking

further ahead in time. Signals are less experienced as ‘nagging’ and more

as possible dots on the horizon. People take notice, but are not as excited

by them as they used to be in the early years of the system.

Secondly, the system has gradually developed from an ad hoc wake up call

to the Board towards a regular management information system for the

organization. The system is seen more as an explorative tool than an ur-

gent case for the strategic agenda; it is listened to and dealt with, but the


system and the signals themselves have lost a bit of their confrontational

power. The ew system became more about content and cognitive arousal

– new ideas, development people did not now of before –, but has become

less normative, reflexive, and ‘explosive’. The development of the ew sys-

tem has focused on more signals ‘from the outside to the inside’ in order to

get a better idea of the organizations‘ blindspots: the involvement of more

external experts, such as market parties that colla borate with rws, partner

organizations, trainers, and scientists, make it possible to collect ‘new’ or

‘other’ insights and points of view. However, unexpected insights and views

are not the same as undesired insights and views. It is often easier to keep

these insights at a distance (mentally) than the signals from nearby that

directly touch upon the (organization of the) operations. ‘Good to know’

or ‘I didn’t know that’ are then the usual responses – informative, but not

painful. They expose a little of what the Board was not (fully) aware of, yet

the pressure to be reflective is not so great. They provide a different per-

spective, but do not necessarily cause any discomfort.

And that, interviewees claim, was one of the most important features of

the system. It caused a deeply felt discomfort of knowing about possible

trends and development, which kept nagging in Board members minds

and forced reflection, deliberation and action. The early warnings used to

be like a splinter in the foot; uncomfortable, but creating an urgency to do

something about it. Over time, as the system professionalized, the splinter

is not in the foot anymore but is now presented on a plate. The splinter is

still there, but the discomfort is gone – and that proves to be an important

aspect of early warning: uncomfortable as it is, it is good to know what

may be coming.

Thirdly, the professionalisation of the ew-system increases the predicta-

bility of the ew route. The value of the ew system partly lies in its ability to

sound an unwelcome message that is difficult to follow up with concrete

action; it is supposed to be difficult to deal with signals, not easy. Good

early warnings cannot be easily be ‘managed away’, while in order to pro-

fessionalize and streamline the system the organization has invested in

integrating the system into the present management systems. As a result,

the system has become more instrumental and less strategic. That is the

struggle that many strategists and strategic instruments face. At first,

there is a fight to be taken seriously and become a normal and regular

element of the strategic cycle. However, once it has become normal the

instrument becomes an issue like any other, without the special attention

it requires to add value. It becomes an instrument of the specialists, rather

than a stimulus for strategy at the level of the Board. The Board takes no-

30

tice of strategic signals, but does not ‘live’ them anymore. They know the

signals, but hardly lay awake at night from them.

Fourthly, the ew system has acquired two functions that strengthen each

other, but cause interference. The one function is that of a system that

looks for blind spots and for opportunities and risks from possible future

developments. It is investigative and explorative. The other function is that

of a system that causes the Board productive discomfort, renders politi-

cally exciting signals, and provides the work floor with a mirror to hold up

to the Board. Here, it has a more strategic and agenda-setting nature – it

brings certain subjects to the attention of the Board that it cannot afford

to miss, whether they like it or not. The first is truer and closer to the idea

of foresight and looking ahead, the latter is more situated in the present

and in the organization and the network as it currently is. The Board

needs both, but it is difficult to mix both in one system.

The paradox of professionalization of the Early Warning system is that

the better the organization manages to anchor strategic foresight in the

organization and make it a more fixed element of the processes, the more

the system ‘normalizes’ and ‘instrumentalizes’. This probably goes for all

strategic processes: strategy increasingly becomes research, with more

emphasis on perfecting the exploration than on forcing through the urgent

message. It should however, remain a living process that continually seeks

out the chafing discomfort: to arrive at the relevant issues in a good pro-

cess and through good research and to also forcefully place them on the

agenda that governs the strategic processes of the Board. That requires the

system to deliver at the fixed moments, but perhaps also, and especially,

at other moments – in between, if it is not on their agenda, when the sig-

nal cannot wait or the time is ripe. In order to break out of the profession-

alization paradox the ew-system needs to regain the element of surprise;

in terms of content, but also during the process.


6 Conclusion: early signals, timely strategy

In this essay, we have addressed the ability of organizations to look ahead

systematically, especially for the purpose of signalling emergent develop-

ment early. As we have argued, it seems perfectly logical for organizations

to look ahead and attempt to remain on top of upcoming changes. The

future cannot be predicted, but a large and growing base of practical

evidence shows that it is possible to look ahead systematically and im-

prove the ability to anticipate meaningful events. We have shown that

such efforts may help the organization change its strategy directly, but

also can increase the overall and often more implicit capacity for resil-

ience; looking ahead helps the organization and its leadership to be more

mindful of emerging developments, partly because systematically looking

ahead learns them that the future is unpredictable and that surprises can

be expected to happen. Investing in the capacity to look ahead and catch

early signals can help the leadership of the organization to develop an

effective strategy.

Self-evident as the benefits of foresight and early warning systems seem,

we also pointed at several equally evident barriers; some cognitive, but

other institutional and procedural. Firstly, we have defined foresight as

looking beyond the first cycle of the organization. This is complicated cog-

nitively and analytically, as most evidence and information in the organi-

zation is based on the first cycle. To look beyond that requires the ability to

look for possible discontinuities and see patterns that have not yet fully

emerged. However, a second complication may be even harder to tackle.

The first cycle is not just dominant cognitively, but also defines the every-

day running of the organization; the first cycle is the basis of all its pro-

cesses and activities. Organizations have structured their planning, capac-

ity, support, housing, procurement, and finances in such a way that they

can execute the first cycle as effectively and efficiently as possible. This is

where they have to perform, where they are held accountable, where they

must deliver the quality that they strive for and – do not underestimate

this – where they make the visible and noticeable mistakes that may cause

major difficulties. Many of the issues beyond the first cycle cause an un-

welcome distraction and often contradict with what is necessary now.

Whatever is needed or seems important in the long term is often difficult

32

to realise in the short term. Furthermore, long-term considerations are

often difficult to fit in with existing processes and arrangements. They are

not only hard to integrate into operational plans and present-day views,

but are difficult to place in running procedures. Most organizations do not

have set meetings for thinking ahead, while they have plenty of processes

for planning the present-day operations. There are plenty of strategic

sessions, but in many of them participants are dragged into the present;

the urgent drives out the important. Organizations are aware of the im-

portance of looking ahead but experience the difficulties of doing it; not

because they do not want to, but because the logics of institutional proce-

dures are organized around the present instead of the future.

In this essay, we have addressed several choices that organizations can

make when designing early warning systems to support strategic decision

making. Partly the purpose of that is to make better strategic decisions,

but it may also serve the much broader purpose to increase the organiza-

tions’ strategic capacity. In orde to increase the strategic capacity, organi-

zations ideally apply different variants of foresight: environmental sce-

narios that help think about future circumstances, sectoral scenarios to

consider the developments in the field, and signal studies that allow them

to become aware at an early stage of any movements that might possibly

occur. For timely strategy it is necessary to invest in systematically collect-

ing, interpreting and linking signals to running agendas. Looking ahead

may seem a normal thing to do, but it is hardly an activity organizations

do without any organized and structured effort. Systematically looking

ahead requires discipline, systematization and institutionalization in order

to give the early warnings the weight needed to compete for the scarce

attention of the leadership of the organization.

However, as our case of the Dutch rws shows there is a paradox in play

with highly institutionalized systems of early warning; the better the or-

ganization manages to anchor strategic foresight in the organization, the

more the system ‘normalises’ and ‘instrumentalises’. By institutionalizing

the system it gains weight, but in order to be institutionalized the system

needs to relinquish some of the characteristics that give it relevance at the

decision making table. The system at rws lost some of its ability to sur-

prise as it streamlined the signals into well-researched and adequately

described signals. As the reports grew more impressive with references,

graphs and tables to support the signals and signs, some of the imagina-

tive power was lost. Furthermore, in the process of selection and interpre-

tation of the signals some of the real outliers came to be left out, whereas


they could have been important sensemakers for the organizations’ lead-

ership. Most importantly, the particular dynamics of organizing got hold of

the early warning system; as the system professionalized procedures were

agreed upon for following up on signals, and eventually they even became

part of the management information system.

When strategic foresight becomes a regular routine, normality interferes

with the discomfort and urgency of unwelcome and unpleasant warnings.

The splinter in the foot becomes a splinter on a silver plate. The next step

after the successful professionalization of the Early Warning system is to

make it more uncomfortable again.

34

Endnotes

1 Botterhuis, L., Van der Duin, P., De Ruijter, P. & Van Wijck, P. (2010). Moni-

toring the future. Building an early warning system for the Dutch Minis-

try of Justice, Futures, 42(5), 454-465

Leeuwen, C. van & Van Buuren, A. (2013). Connecting Time Spans in Re-

gional Water Governance: Managing Projects as Stepping-stones to a

Climate Proof Delta Region, in: Edelenbos, J., Bressers, N. & Scholten, P.

(eds.) (2013). Water Governance as Connective Capacity, Farnham: Ashgate,

191-210.

Rijkens-Klomp, N. (2012). Barriers and levers to future exploration in

practice: experiences in policy-making, Futures, 44(5), 431-439

Slaughter, R.A. (Ed.) (2007). The State of Play in the Futures Field: final report,

Foundation for the Future, October 2007.

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