ealy warning report, nr.2, january-march 2010

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) „Viitorul”

EARLY WARNING

REPORT January - March 2010

Igor Munteanu Leonid Litra Veaceslav Berbeca Alexandru Fala


EARLY WARNING REPORTJanuary - March 2010

Igor MunteanuLeonid Litra

Veaceslav BerbecaAlexandru Fala

This report was prepared with financial support offered by BTD (Balkan Trust for Democracy) and Think Tank Fund al.

Expressed opinions are those of authors. Neither the Administration of IDIS „Viitorul”, nor the Administrative Council of the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives „Viitorul” bears any responsibility for the estimates and opinions presented in the very publication.

Any use of information or opinions of the author of this Study should make a reference to IDIS „Viitorul”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

REGIONAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER - A TEST FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF

THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA? VEACESLAV BERBECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FOCUS: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

OPINIONS OF EXPERTS AND POLICYMAKERS FROM UKRAINE AND THE

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ON THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER,

VEACESLAV BERBECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

POLITICAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2010: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS IGOR MUNTEANU . 28

ALARM SIGNAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

THE CONFLICTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMRAT AND CHISINAU AND

THE EFFECT OF ELECTIONS LEONID LITRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

ECONOMY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

THE “ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM” - AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ALEXANDRU FALA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

SOCIAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

SOCIAL SECTOR - DEVELOPMENTS WITH INCONCLUSIVE EFFECTS

ALEXANDRU FALA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

AUDIOVISUAL SECTOR IN MOLDOVA - BETWEEN CRISIS AND RENEWAL,

CORNEL CIUREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

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E A R L Y W A R N I N G R E P O R TJ A N u A R Y - M A R c h 2 0 1 0


ABSTRAcTIn the second publication of the Crisis Prevention Report, we

included articles that approach very topical subjects for the Republic of Moldova. The issue of borders between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the relationship between Chisinau and Comrat, establishment of a committee of scientists to convict the Communism, amendment of the Electoral Code and amendment of the Constitution, moral crisis of the audiovisual system and the economic recovery program of the Government - these are the topics mostly approached in this compilation. All these subjects were selected due to their crisis-generating potential and the stress they regularly induce into the society. The main objective was to describe the alarming situations, occurred in the Moldovan society and place the discussions within a rational framework as to help find proper solutions.

The crises we are talking about in this issue are different in terms of substance, but they risk dissolving the Moldovan society, whose skeleton is quite fragile. We also speak about the crisis in the negotiations between two neighboring countries, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, which could worsen significantly Moldova’s situation on the internal and external arena, and also about the crisis between center and periphery, generated by the tense state of the relationship between Chisinau and Comrat. At the same time, special attention is paid to the moral crisis arising in relation to communism conviction and the situation of the audiovisual. The stagnation in the social area also reaches the critical point and it can’t be ignored in the present compilation.

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REGIONAL:THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER - A TEST FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA? VeaceslaV BerBeca

The collapse of the USSR left a hard “heritage” to the former soviet countries related to the delimitation of their borders. During the existence of the Soviet Union, the borders between the union countries were mostly conventional, determining the jurisdiction of the local authorities over some localities or goods. After the USSR implosion, the newly independent states had to start a border delimitation and demarcation process. If the border between the Republic of Moldova and Romania is well-defined and doesn’t cause any intense internal debates, as the border between these to countries is the result of the territorial demarcation between the USSR and Romania, established by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, then the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border poses a series of issues. These problems are generated by the way how several infrastructure and other types of projects were developed and managed on the territory of the former soviet countries (Reni-Odessa highway, Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station). It is obvious that when these projects started, nobody took into account the possibility of USSR collapse and that is why they didn’t consider the place where they were located and built in order to streamline the implementation of the projects.

The Moldovan-Ukrainian border is 1222 km long, being divided into three sectors: from North-West, from Criva, Briceni raion, on Prut river it lasts for 300 km till East; then 450 km in the central sector, Transnistria sector; and subsequently it goes down from Palanca to Giurgiulesti - a 470 km long sector.1

Consequently, since their independence, Ukraine and the 1 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/, Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine: Vision of the Moldovan Diplomacy

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Republic of Moldova had to start the border demarcation process and adopt the legal regime on the recognition of the property of both states.

The demarcation of borders and establishment of the property legal regime has been a concern of all Governments since 1998. The border treaty was based on the negotiation protocol between the delegations of Ukrainian and Moldovan Government in 1998, at Kiev, signed by the Moldovan Prime-Minister Ion Ciubuc and his Ukrainian counterpart Valeriy Pustovoitenko. But we have recently seen strong debates on this topic between the ruling parties and the opposition. Unfortunately, we find out that the border demarcation, a technical process, turned out to be a topic with harsh blaming and accusation between the opposition and the ruling party.

This primarily refers to the sector of Reni-Odessa highway in the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca. There were developed and implemented almost all measures to regulate the legal status of this highway segment from Palanca locality.

The Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border was signed on 18 August 1999. This paper sets out the terms and principles underlying the establishment of state border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, an Additional Protocol to the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border was signed with respect to the transfer of the Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca, and the land it passes, under Ukrainian ownership and on the exploitation regime. Article 1 of the Protocol stipulates that the Republic of Moldova shall transfer the Odessa-Reni highway segment, in the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca, and the land it passes, under Ukrainian ownership.2 Article 4.1 provides that “the inhabitants of Palanca locality that drive vehicles on the territory adjacent to the transferred sector shall drive on the exit road to the mentioned sector at the km 57+400”.3 And Article 4.3 stipulates that “border, customs, and other types of controls, which are performed when crossing the state border, shall not be performed on the transferred sector”4

The Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on

2 AdditionalProtocoltotheTreatybetweentheRepublicofMoldovaandUkraineontheStateBorder,withrespecttothetransferoftheOdessa-RenihighwaysegmentintheregionoftheMol-dovanlocalityofPalanca,andthelanditpassesunderUkrainianownershipandontheexploitationregime.3 idem4 idem

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the State Border and the Additional Protocol, which is integral part of the Treaty, was ratified by Law no 348-XV of 12 July 2001 by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, with the votes of 73 MPs. The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova conditioned then the ratification of the Treaty on the state border on the signature of the Regulations on the Exploitation of the Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of Palanca locality, as well by Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada ratification of an agreement signed in 1994 on the mutual recognition of property situated on their territory, given the fact that the Republic of Moldova owns several objects on Ukrainian territory5.

The Republic of Moldova transferred on 11 February 2002 to the Ukraine the Odessa-Reni highway segment from km 51+200 until km 58+970 in the neighborhood of Palanca locality, plus the adjacent territory with the average width (including the road bed) of 23 m against the signature of the Minister of Transport and Communications during that period, Anatol Cuptov.6 It still has to be decided on the boundaries of borders and record it with the cadastre bodies.

As mentioned before, the border delimitation was a difficult process, which was needed because during USSR the borders between republics were conventional, i.e. some benchmarks were established, but the border wasn’t accurately established and wasn’t related to a certain locality. Thus, another debated topic for the parties is a plot of land of a few hundred meters that have not been demarcated yet in Giurgiulesti. All the discussions started with the idea where the border between countries should be established on this territory. The Ukrainian authorities, at all negotiation rounds, make reference to an Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 4 November 1940, which provides that Prut river is the point that separates the two republics. In this way, the Ukrainians prove that they do not agree with the requests of the Moldovan party, which, according to the Ukrainian officials, requested that Ukraine gave up on 1800 meters from the mouth of the Prut river, because in 1940 the mouth of the respective river and, respectively, the border between the countries, were situated at that point.7 According to the Ukrainians, 5 VictoriaBoian, inEvolutionof theExternalPolicyof theRepublicofMoldova (1998-2008),Chisinau,Cartdidact,2009,p.41.6 ActonthetransferbytheRepublicofMoldovatotheUkrainetheOdessa-Renihighwayseg-mentfromkm51+200untilkm58+970intheneighborhoodofPalancalocalitydated11February2002.7 DmitriyTkatch:“AlltheworkonthedemarcationoftheMoldovan-Ukrainianborderisbased

onacompromise”,http://zn.ua/1000/17535/

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the establishment of the border between the SSRU and SSRM in 1940 is confirmed only by the list of the main points where the border line passes, a decision that wasn’t supported by maps.8

Finally, after the working visit of the Moldovan premier Ion Ciubuc to Kiev, on 4 August 1998, a Protocol was signed on the negotiations between the Government delegations of Ukraine and Moldova. After negotiations, there was reached an agreement to establish the draft border line in Giurgiulesti on the existing line, using for delimitation the arable land until the channel of Danube River, passing through the point situated on the bank of Danube river, at 430 m distance from the border pillar no 1355/36.9 Although this agreement was reached more than 11 years ago, the parties have not yet agreed on the demarcation of the border in this area. According to the officials of the Republic of Moldova, “the most sensitive areas that are still unsettled include a segment of a few hundred meters not demarcated yet at Giurgiulesti and Palanca crossing point. We should find there compromise solutions and finish the demarcation process, so that - and it is very important - Moldova has the 430 m access to the Danube river, confirmed by border pillars, which is essential for the proper functioning of the Giurgiulesti port and terminal”.10

The demarcation process was almost finished in the North, except for the point of Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station and dam on the Nistru river, in Ocnita raion, Naslavcea village. For several years, the Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station has been a litigation subject between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In 1983, the construction of Dnestrovsk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant (PSHPP) had started on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In line with the Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic no 142-XII of 3 August 1990, the Dnestrovsk PSHPP was declared to be property of the Ukrainian people. After the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border, which finished in 1999, the border demarcation line was drawn in the middle of the water dam of the hydroenergetic center of the Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station, fact confirmed by the Ukrainian party within the joint Moldovan-

8 idem.9 NegotiationprotocolbetweentheUkrainianandMoldovanGovernmentdelegations,4August1998,Kiev

10 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/,RelationsbetweentheRepublicofMol-dovaandUkraine:VisionoftheMoldovanDiplomacy

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Ukrainian committee for border demarcation.11 The dispute concerns the legal status of the part of the Dnestrovsk hydro-energetic center water dam, claimed by Ukraine, which is situated on the right bank of the Nistru river, having a 17 ha area of the Republic of Moldova, which were offered by the MSSR to the USSR. In July 2003, the Republic of Moldova established a border post in the neighborhood of the Dnestrovsk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant and this annoyed Ukraine. This hydro-energetic center is very important for Ukraine, as it is expected to be the greatest station of this type in Europe, with an annual capacity of 2.7 billion kWh.12 This station must work for Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and, probably, for Russia.

After some discussion between the authorities of the two countries, it was concluded that the regulation of the ownership relations related to the Dnestrovsk station will be negotiated together with other issues related to the demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian state border.13

On 1 February 2010, the Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Vlad Filat, and the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Timoshenko, signed at Kiev a Protocol amending the Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Rights and Regulation of Ownership Relationships of 11 August 1994, a paper that, according to the two officials, started the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border on the Transnistria segment.14 Later there will exist other three protocols that will be related to particular cases, such as the Dnestrovsk problem.

All these three issues have the potential to generate crises. The problem related to the transfer of the highway and the land plot where it is situated in the region of Palanca caused the most acute debates in the society. There are many causes that generate these debates: constitutionality of the additional protocol on the transfer of the highway and the underlying territory, imperfection of the envisaged paper and anticipated elections in this year.

The Christian-Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) appealed the constitutionality of the border agreement with Ukraine in the

11 http://eco.md/article/6646/,InterviewwithHESergeyPirojkov:“TheUkrainianpartydoesn’tknowanythingabouttheexistenceoftheallegedrequirementsoftheMoldovanGovernmentrela-tedtotheprovisionofashareofDnestrovskPSHPP”12 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850/, Tatyana Parkhomchuk, Dnestrovsk PSHPP:Moldovan verslibresontheUkrainianenergetics,no11(791)20-26March2010.13 Victoria Boian, in Evolution of the External Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008), Chisinau, Cartdidact, 2009, p.44. 14 www.timpul.md/article/2010/02/01/6233

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Constitutional Court back in August 2001, resuming the appeal of this document in late 2009. The invoked reasons state that the “border agreement and the additional protocol to it infringe Article 3(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, which sanctifies the inalienable character of the national territory, as well as Articles 8(2) and 142(1) of the Constitution”. The Ombudsman Tamara Plamadeala, filed two cases (09.12.2009 and 15.01.2010) to the Constitutional Court on Palanca case. According to her, the fundamental right of the Moldovan citizens to move freely on the entire territory of the country was infringed by authorities by signing the Border Agreement with Ukraine, and the inhabitants of Palanca village, Stefan Voda raion, are discriminated, if compared to the other citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Mrs. Plamadeala says that the inhabitants of this locality must have permits to be able to go to their plot of land and that the highway is patrolled by Moldovan border guards who restrain the access of villagers.

Although the Moldovan officials explained that it is wrong to use the term concession of territory and that this sector is Ukraine’s property on the territory of the Republic of Moldova15, the transfer of the land plot crossed by this highway could generate internal discontents, invoking reasons of “conceding national territories” and “failure to promote the national interests of the Republic of Moldova”. Tension could arise in the society particularly because of the transfer of 8 km of highway in the region of Palanca village, perceived as a concession of “the national land”.

Secondly, the problems that could arise in relation to the highway segment near Palanca transferred to Ukraine depend on the interpretation of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border. The second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol provides that the “transferred sector shall be property of Ukraine on the territory of the Republic of Moldova”. This means that Ukraine can use its property, observing some conditions that result from the fact that it is situated on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. But Article 6 of the Protocol stipulates that “Ukrainian jurisdiction shall be applied on the transferred sector”. A different interpretation could mean application

15 EugenRevenco,JuridicalAspectsofBorderOrganization, in„NewBorders inSouthEasternEurope.TheRepublicofMoldova,Ukraine,Romania”–IPP,Chisinau,Stiinta,2002,pp.105-106

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of some measures that would disturb the Moldovan party. This article is interpreted in different ways by the parties and contravenes Article 1.2. To remove any form of non-understanding, probably the parties will have to agree on some amendments to the Protocol in the spirit of good neighborhood and to ensure comfort for the citizens of both countries. There was also launched the idea that the Republic of Moldova will lose a part of its sovereignty if it transfers to Ukraine the segment of highway and the land under it near Palanca village. The Moldovan officials’ point of view is that the transfer of this highway segment to Ukraine doesn’t imply a loss of the sovereignty, because the underground under and the air over the highway are not transferred.

These debates obviously have an electoral nuance. Even if the Agreement was negotiated by Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR) it was ratified by the communist majority in 2001. Speaking about consistency in passing and enforcing decisions, the CPRM, if they continued to rule, should have transferred to Ukraine the section of 7.78 km under Odessa-Reni highway, as provided by the inter-government agreements between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in 2006. In such a way the behavior of CDPP can be explained - during the time they were in alliance with the CPRM in 2005-2009, they left in shadow this subject, although the infringements they say are happening in Palanca village are not most recent. The measures undertaken by the current government to close the topic related to Palanca village are perceived by some parties as territorial concession. In an electoral year, this could be used against the current alliance. In this case, we should start with the idea that the solution to denounce the treaty is inadmissible because contravenes to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Or, the unilateral denouncement of the border treaty is a territorial claim.16

The Palanca highway case has negative effects over the external side, especially in the relationship with Ukraine. The Ukrainian officials and the public opinion, in particular, state that the Moldovan party distorts deliberately the border demarcation and this is not included into the good neighborhood concept, affirmed and sustained be the parties. The Ukrainians blame the Republic of Moldova for non-observance of the assumed commitments. Moreover, according to the Ukrainians, the Republic of Moldova became a maritime country 16 http://ape.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=183&id=945

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only because Ukraine transferred a plot of land at Giurgiulesti, needed to build a port. And the construction of the Giurgiulesti terminal is, according to several opinions in Ukraine, an economic and ecological threat for the Reni port and other Ukrainian localities in this region.

The presence of these issues on the agenda of the bilateral relationships could cause many problems to the Chisinau Government on the central sector, i.e. in the Transnistria region. Kiev could play an important role in this problem from several perspectives. First of all, the role of Ukraine is fundamental to demarcate the border on this segment, process which started in January 2010 by mounting of the first border sign by the Petr Proroshenko and Iurie Leanca in the central sector of the border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in Bolshaya Koshnitsa village, Vinnytsia region. Because the Moldovan authorities do not control this segment and the separatist regime from Tiraspol refuses to participate in these works, the border demarcation on this sector can be performed exclusively on the Ukraine’s territory. Secondly, the Moldova’s European integration process can be affected if the Transnistrian conflict is not settled. Ukraine could get involved more actively in this issue. For instance, Ukraine does not allow the entry of goods from Transnistria to its territory with the old customs stamp. According to the Ukrainian press, this causes great economic losses to Ukraine, which supports the Chisinau politics. Moreover, several opinions in Ukraine say that the Republic of Moldova wants to settle the Transnistrian conflict with Kiev’s efforts, but this contradicts the interest of this state in the region where “one hundred thousand Ukrainian citizens” live. A major problem could appear here, namely conditioning the support on the Transnistria issue on the settlement of the Palanca case.

The attempt to force Chisinau to honor its obligations by means that are not acceptable for the Republic of Moldova could generate potential tensions. The Ukrainian experts state that there are a number of tools to achieve this goal: from banning the exports of some energy resources towards the Republic of Moldova to closing the border for Moldovan merchandise that transit Ukraine. The possibility to implement these measures means an economic collapse for the Republic of Moldova.

The situation is different in case of Giurgiulesti port. Although there are a number of people saying that the Republic of Moldova

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had access to Danube17, the Ukrainians don’t recognize this, making reference to an Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 4 November 1940, which provides that Prut river is the point that separates the two republics. This was invoked every time by the Ukrainian party in the negotiations on border demarcation. It is impossible to state the opposite in the absence of cartographic proofs. In the Giurgiulesti case, although the border has not been demarcated yet, a potential risk exists. The Ukrainians state that they kept their word and transferred to the Moldovan party the over 400-meter segment needed for the proper functioning of the port from this locality. As a response, Kiev could undertake several measures we mentioned above, in order to determine the Republic of Moldova to honor its obligations.

Finally, with respect to the Dnestrovsk station, its operation could be a huge danger for the Moldova’s population, as this hydro-energetic station is obsolete. Other claims of the Republic of Moldova towards Ukraine relate to the impact of this station over the environmental state of the region. It is interesting that in Ukraine there are also signals related to the danger of this water accumulation energetic plant.18 This system has been under construction for almost 30 years and there are informal geologic researches that confirm the existence of certain cracks in the dam. Because of the obsolete equipment there are fears that after an accident the water could flood the localities situated lower than the dam, if there are no barrages. If in Ukraine Yampol and Mohyliv-Podilskyi towns are threatened by such floods, in the Republic of Moldova this danger threatens the localities situated lower than the dam, for example Soroca. The high voltage lines also cause health problems for the villages in the vicinity of this system.19

Finally, we can bring some examples from the European countries with respect to territorial exchanges - called border adjustments - aimed at settling the ownership or territorial problems between the countries. The first example is the case of Czech Republic and Slovakia who signed on 4 January 1996 an agreement that stipulated the transfer of the line to adjust it to the infrastructure 17 http://zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul 18 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850/, Tatyana Parkhomchuk, Dnestrovsk PSHPP: Moldovan vers libres on the Ukrainian energetics, no 11 (791) 20-26 March 2010.19 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850/, Tatyana Parkhomchuk, Dnestrovsk PSHPP:Moldovan verslibresontheUkrainianenergetics,no11(791)20-26March2010.

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system existing between the countries. There were performed 18 exchanges at the Czech-Slovak border, which meat an exchange of 425 ha of land based on severe mutuality.20 The border adjustments needed a special bilateral treaty to be signed and a special constitutional act to be passed by the Czech Republic.

Poland and Slovakia carried out in 2002 several border adjustments. Both parties made transfers of 2 969 m2 between them.21 These property transfers included real estate, equipment, installations, and machinery.

France and Switzerland signed on 25 February 1953 three conventions that affected their common border. The extremely small adjustments introduced by the convention aimed at aligning the border, removing dual jurisdiction from some roads or ways and place only in one country some associated buildings or institutions.22 They also changed the principle used for the creation of border on Geneva lake, from a median line to a series of straight lines, harmonizing the original median line.

20 http://isp.org.pl/files/3057934520561074001118043909.pdf21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_border_conflicts22 International Boundary Study No. 11 – October 18, 1961, France – Switzerland Boundary (Coun-try Codes: FR-SZ). The Geographer Office of the Geographer Bureau of Intelligence and Research

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Conclusions

Although more than 8 years passed since the ratification of the Treaty 1. between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border, the border between these two countries hasn’t been demarcated yet. There are several sensitive points - Dnestrovsk, Palanca, Giurgiulesti and the Transnistrian sector - because of which the demarcation hasn’t been finished yet.The border demarcation takes place under a great internal pressure 2. caused by the results of the arrangements between the states with respect to the legal regime of the Odessa-Reni highway in the region of Palanca village and of an over 430 m strip of land near Giurgiulesti. The border demarcation is too politized, although this should be a technical process;The public opinion in Ukraine criticizes the Moldovan authorities 3. for their failure to fulfill the obligations assumed by signing the Treaty on Border and the Additional Protocol. Because of this, some severe measures are proposed against the Republic of Moldova to make it honor its commitments.The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova conditioned the 4. ratification of the Treaty on the state border on the signature of the Regulations on the Exploitation of the Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of Palanca locality, as well by Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada ratification of an agreement signed in 1994 on the mutual recognition of property situated on their territory, given the fact that the Republic of Moldova owns several objects on the Ukrainian territory. But a significant part of the Moldovan property on the territory of Ukraine was already privatized.The listed problems, especially the Dnestrovsk and Palanca cases 5. have potential to generate crises for the Republic of Moldova. We mean political, economic, ecological and humanitarian problems.The Moldovan authorities should start a dialog with the society 6. in order to depolitize the border demarcation, because it damages this performance. The “zero-sum game” approaches should be excluded from the discussions. Even if Ukraine is an important actor to solve the Transnistrian conflict and demarcate the border in the central region, the negotiations should take place

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in the atmosphere of good neighborhood and mutual respect and this means avoiding intransigent approaches under the border demarcation by problems having major importance.

Recommendations

The Republic of Moldova has to fulfill the commitments 1. assumed by signing the Treaty on Border and the Additional Protocol in order to avoid potential disagreements with Ukraine. But the transfer of the ownership over the portion of highway near Palanca locality should be conditioned on the demarcation of the border at Giurgiulesti in the favor of the Republic of Moldova. With respect to the Palanca problem, the Chisinau Government 2. must explain the situation related to the transfer to Ukraine of the land under the highway. Because the Treaty on Border and the Additional Protocol are interpreted by the parties in different ways, it is necessary to introduce more details in the Intergovernmental Agreement on the exploitation of the Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of Palanca village, as well of the underlying land. In particular, to decrease the tension related to this issue, the authorities should satisfy the desires of Palanca inhabitants and eliminate the barriers so that they could cross the highway and have access to the plots of lands that belong to their village.There could also be specified what portion of the land under 3. the highway is transferred to the Ukrainian party, for them to be able to repair the road. The transfer of this segment doesn’t mean the transfer of the underground, which belongs to the Republic of Moldova. The central authorities should explain to the society what is the factual state of things in Palanca case. The Government must explain what is transferred, under what terms and which are the risks of non-performing the assumed commitments.It is necessary to create comfortable conditions for Palanca 4. inhabitants when crossing the highway to their plots of land. It

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relates, in particular, to establishing a speed limit for the motor vehicles on the highway.Given the fact that there are several commercial objects along 5. this highway and the welfare of Palanca inhabitants depends on them, it is necessary to ensure their existence and development after the settlement of the Palanca issue.The border demarcation in the area of Dnestrovsk dam 6. should be performed only when an environmental impact and construction’s safety assessment is conducted. There are concerns that the operation of this station will have a negative impact on the water of the Nistru river. There is also the risk of flooding the localities situated lower than the Dnestrovsk dam. The Republic of Moldova could ask Ukraine to pay for continuing to use about 18 ha of land. The border demarcation and defining ownership relations in 7. the area of Dnestrovsk dam should be separated from border demarcation in Giurgiulesti, because the same issue should not be negotiated twice. The intergovernment protocol of 1998 approaches in package the highway segment in Palanca region and the land portion at Giurgiulesti. The subject must be approached depending on the legal status of the property of the Republic of Moldova on the Ukrainian territory.

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FOcuS: OPINIONS OF EXPERTS AND POLICYMAKERS FROM UKRAINE AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ON THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER VeaceslaV BerBeca

There are 3 types of news in the Ukrainian mass-media related to the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

First, these are the news whose primary goal is to provide information about the meetings and negotiation between the parties. As an example of the most recent news we can mention the one of 18 December 2009 on the beginning of the border demarcation process between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on the Transnistria segment.23 This news informs on the meeting of the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petr Poroshenko with his Moldovan counterpart Iurie Leanca in Chisinau 17 December 2009 on completion of the demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian border and starting the border demarcation on the central (Transnistrian) sector. News on installing the first border sign on the common border of both states is included to the same category. It refers to the installation of the first border pillar by Poroshenko and Leanca in the central sector of the border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in Bolshaya Koshnitsa village, Vinnytsia region.24 We also can remind the declaration of Petr Poroshenko of 11 February 2010 that the Palanca road segment will transferred in the near future.25 And the delay of this process is an infringement of the treaty on border by the RM.

The second type of news refers to the comments in the Ukrainian mass media on the content and results of the negotiation between parties. These are usually criticizing the Government for the way the 23 http://delo.ua/vlast/mezdynarodnaya-politika/ukraina-nachnet-demarkaciju-granicy-s-mol-dovoj-pridnestrovskogo-uchastka-135461/ 24 http://ukranews.com/ru/news/ukraine/2010/01/29/11054 25 http://gazeta.ua/index.php?id=326828

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Moldovan-Ukrainian border demarcation is managed and thought. The authors of these comments sometimes make harsh accusations against the negotiators. The accusations vary from incriminating lack of competence to inactivity to betrayal of the national interests. At the same time we can find in these comments serious accusations addressed to the Moldovan authorities for not observing the assumed commitments after the ratification of the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border in 2001. We can also see intransigent approaches that go beyond the limit of mutual respect. They refer to attitudes that stimulate to use blackmail tools against the Republic of Moldova. We will make reference just to some of them that are particularly interesting for Moldova due to how this issue is approached.

One of the first comments of this type is entitled “Ukraine-Moldova: pitfall for demarcators” is written by Alena Getmanchuk.26 This comment is a kind of response to the actions of the border guards of the Republic of Moldova of 17 July 2003 - installation of a border pillar on the territory of Dnestrovsk dam on the right bank of Nistru river. The main idea of the article is that the ownership claims of the Republic of Moldova authorities are unjustified and the establishment of a border guard point at this object contradicts the principles of good neighborhood between the countries. The author of the article states that the Republic of Moldova neither contributed to the funding of this enterprise, nor will it be able to provide material support to this object as it is too expensive for the RM budget.27

Another interesting comment is “Trojan horse from Moldova” published on 10 October 2006 by Alexander Manacinski. The author identifies political, economic and environmental risks related to the construction of the Giurgiulesi port.28

All these risks are the result of excessive amiability of the Ukrainian party with respect to the demarcation of the border with the RM, which obtained an important sector on the bank of the Danube; the Ukraine’s MFA, starting important maneuvers around NATO and EU lost totally the game to Chisinau.29

In the article “The Pre-Danube Region” of 20 January 2007

26 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/43477/27 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/43477/ 28 http://defense-ua.com/rus/hotnews/?id=2084329 http://defense-ua.com/rus/hotnews/?id=20843

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the author emphasizes the idea that RM started building the oil terminal at Giurgiulesti on a plot of land with uncertain legal status.30 Moreover, even during the negotiation process a decision was made to transfer to the RM a 24 ha land plot on a 430 m length on the Danube bank in the region of Giurgiulesti village in exchange for the Odessa-Reni highway segment in Palanca village of the Republic of Moldova. All actions undertaken by the RM in this region endanger the economic and environmental safety of the Reni port. All these take place because of Ukrainian Government’s inactivity in the issue of border demarcation with RM, which received a strategic land plot on Danube bank.31

Another interesting article is “How the Ukrainians gave to Moldovans a part of the Motherland and received nothing instead” written by Antonina Bondareva and Lana Samohvalova on 24 September 2007. The authors of the article claim that Ukraine, making a territorial exchange with the Republic of Moldova, besides conceding easily a part of its territory, opened to its neighbor access to sea obtaining nothing instead.32 The RM did not honor its obligations related to the transfer to Ukraine of Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca. And the Giurgiulesti port, due to its multifunctional character is a threat to the Reni port. In the end, the authors reach the conclusion that unilateral denouncement of the Treaty is impossible, but it is possible to force Chisinau to fulfill the assumed commitments. They explain that there are a number of tools to solve this goal: from banning the export of some energy resources to closing the border for Moldovan merchandise that transit the Ukrainian territory.

Another example relates to the response of councilors of Izmail City Council from Odessa region. They addressed the President, the Chaiperson of Verkhovna Rada with respect to the intents of the Republic of Moldova to receive some additional hectares from Ukraine in the water area of Danube to finish the construction of the Giurgiulesti complex. The Government is blamed for easy concessions and inactivity with respect to demarcation of the border with the Republic of Moldova, which obtained a strategic area of land on the Danube bank. 30 http://forum.proua.com/index.php?showtopic=378631 http://forum.proua.com/index.php?showtopic=378632 http://unian.net/rus/news/news-213615.html

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The result of the round table “What are we going to do with Moldova?” is very suggestive to understand the attitude of journalists and researchers towards the demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The round table was held on 5 May 2009 by “Glavred” publication and was attended by several experts took part. One of the participants in this round table, Vitaly Kulik, Director of the Research Center for Civil Society Problems, identified 3 problems in the territorial relationships between the Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova: a) the problem related to the exchange of territory at Palanca and Giurgiulesti, which wasn’t finished because of the Moldovan authorities; b) the problem related to the Novodnestrovsk power station, with respect to which the Moldovan authorities are not willing to reach a compromise with Ukraine; c) the refusal of the Moldovan party to perform the border demarcation together with Ukraine.33 According to Kulik, Kiev promotes a concession policy towards Chisinau and this concession practice results from the Ukrainians’ euro-idiocy. By this he meant that Ukraine introduced many severe measures against Transnistria in order to have a good image at Brussels. But these measures harm the economic and political interests of Kiev in this region. Another participant, Vladimir Lupashko, expert in the issue of the Republic of Moldova, qualifies the Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the neighbor, during the last years, as catastrophic and incompetent.34 His conclusion is that Ukraine should develop another type of relations with Transnistria and use this problem to solve the case of highway segment in Palanca.

Another interesting comment also belongs to Vitaly Kulik “Ukraine-Moldova: relationships taking account of elections” of 14-20 November 2008 in the „Зеркало недели” (Mirror of the Week) weekly newspaper. The author concludes that the Moldovan authorities, despite the assumed commitment to solve the difficult issues at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, delayed and obstructed this process.35 The failure to settle the Palanca case and Novodnestrovsk power station prove that Ukraine has bad experience in solving “packages” of problems with the Moldovan party.36 At last, the most recent comment of Tatyana Parhomchuk “Dnestrovsk Storage Power

33 http://ukrrudprom.ua/digest/CHto_nam_delat_s_Moldovoy.html?print 34 http://ukrrudprom.ua/digest/CHto_nam_delat_s_Moldovoy.html?print 35 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/67735/ 36 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/67735/

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Station- Moldovan vers libres on the Ukrainian energetics”, no 11 (791) 20-26 March 2010 in „Зеркало недели” (Mirror of the Week) weekly newspaper presents a non-dissembled position with the hope that the forces that dispute the ownership over Dnestrovsk hydro-energetic center will find enough arguments to influence the position even of an independent country (the Republic of Moldova).37

Finally the third type of information is the one focusing on certain aspects of the activity of institutions enabled to negotiate the border demarcation. It also refers to the response of these institutions to accusations of incompetence or betrayal of the Ukraine’s national interests. This kind of news usually belongs to Ukraine’s MFA. We can take for instance the interview “All the work on demarcation of Ukrainian-Moldovan border is based on compromise” of Dmitry Tkaci, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for the weekly newspaper „Зеркало недели” of 25-31 July 1998. Thus, Tkaci explains that the border demarcation takes place as a result of the fact that during the USSR, the borders among republics had a conventional character.38 In other words, some benchmarks were established and the border was not well-defined and not related to a certain locality. Tkaci states that “all the work on demarcation of Ukrainian-Moldovan border is based on compromise; it is a mutual concession process, as it was in case of Basarabeasca settlement”.39 As a conclusion, he stated that “even if those who do not know all nuances of diplomacy and demarcation process think that this is, first of all, a political exercise, actually it is a very delicate process, but bearing a technical character”.

Another material of this kind is the response of Ukrainian MFA towards the accusations incriminating that they don’t take into account the national interests when demarcating the border with the RM. In their answer, the Ukrainian MFA stated that the activity of committee on border demarcation with RM in 1995-1999 resulted in a clarification and demarcation of border on the basis of mutual concessions and compromise in cases where divergences arose, especially in the region of Palanca and Giurgiulesti localities.40 According to this press release, Ukraine met all its obligations, while

37 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850 38 http://zn.ua/1000/17535/ 39 http://zn.ua/1000/17535/40 http://unian.net/files/1190812895.doc

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the Republic of Moldova has not solved yet the issue of transferring the highway sector in the region of Palanca.

It is interesting that the mass media of both parties criticized seriously the Governments of their country. Although the discontent and vituperation of the Ukrainian and Moldovan Governments by mass media has different causes, but the same conclusion - the national interest are not protected. The Moldovan authorities are blamed for concession, alienation of the Moldovan territory. It is usually incriminated the infringement of the constitutional norm related to the inalienability of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The authorities are also accused that were not able to prove that the Republic of Moldova had access to Danube on an almost 1000-meter segment and the phrase exchange of territory in case of Giurgiulesti is flummery. It is more of an emotive approach. The criticism addressed by Ukrainian mass media to the central Government has a more pragmatic approach. The Kiev authorities are accused that after the exchange of territory, Ukraine obtained nothing because the Government of the Republic of Moldova did not respect the assumed commitments. The Government is also criticized for the fact that, by transferring to the Republic of Moldova the 430-meter segment at the Danube, it transformed Moldova into a maritime country. And the construction of the port and oil terminal in Giurgiulesti would endanger the economic and environmental status of this region of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government is also blamed for making several concessions to the Republic of Moldova in the Transnistra case, harming the national interests of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government is also accused of too easy concessions made to the Republic of Moldova.

Opinions of policymakers and journalists from the Republic of Moldova

The opinions of the Moldovan elite regarding the demarcation of the state border are divided into three parts. On one hand we have the representatives of the current Government, who is negotiating with Ukraine to finish the border demarcation. On the other hand,

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we have the opinion of the opposition that criticizes vehemently any action of the Government. At last, the third group is represented by experts in Law, journalists, who opt for a freezing or renegotiation of the Additional Protocol.

The official position of the current Government is to implement the commitments assumed by signing and ratifying the treaty and its additional protocol. Prime-minister Filat mentioned several times that “Moldova must observe the agreements previously signed”. The Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs states that “in relation to the Palanca case, we should find compromise solutions and finish the demarcation process, so that - and it is very important- Moldova has the 430-meter access to Danube river, confirmed by border pillars, which is essential for the proper functioning of the Giurgiulesti port and terminal”.41

The most bitter critics are the CPRM representatives, who, in fact, ratified the Treaty and the Additional Protocol. But the critics are made without offering any solutions. Generally, the accusations refer to “concession of Moldova’s territory” or that the actions of the Government would harm the interests of the Republic of Moldova. For example, the former First Deputy Prime Minister, former Minister of Economy, Igor Dodon, thinks that if Vladimir Filat signs the Protocol recognizing the Ukrainian ownership over the Novodnestrovsk hydroelectric power station, which is also situated on Moldova’s territory, it will be very difficult to protect our own interest in the demarcation of border in Giurgiulesti.42 Grigore Petrenco, communist MP, does not know “if ti is good and necessarily needed to amend the Additional Protocol to the Treaty” but he is certain that “the documents ratified by the Parliament in 2001 foresee the transfer into Ukraine’s ownership only of the highway, not also of the land under it - this is what Ukraine wishes now and the current Government is going to do. The concession of land under the highway means in fact annulment of Moldova’s sovereignty over this territory”.43 Vlad Cubreacov, member of CDPP states that “the Border Treaty with Ukraine contradicts the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, principles on the integrity and inalienable nature of the national land’.44

41 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/,Relationsbetween theRepublicofMoldovaandUkraine:VisionoftheMoldovanDiplomacy42 http://.omg.md/Content.aspx?id=6821&lang=1 43 http://.zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul44 http://politicom.moldova.org/news/vlad-cubreacov-filat-da-palanca-ucrainei-204612-rom.

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The third category are those who opt for the preservation or renegotiation of the Additional Protocol. Thus, Anatol Petrencu, historian, states that “we should concede nothing. The declarations that the concessions at Palanca are a reward for Ukraine for the 430-meter at Danube are pure speculations. The Ukraine adopted the principle “ask for impossible in order to obtain the maximum” against Moldova. What Lucinschi and then Voronin did is a crime, because they signed and ratified a concession of property that belongs by law to the Republic of Moldova. And if the current Government signs the Transfer-Acceptance Statement, they will become accomplices of the same crime. The Protocol still can and must be renegotiated”.45

The editor Petru Bogatu says that “the attempt of the current Government to transfer fast into Ukraine’s property the land plot adjacent to the 7.77 km segment of the Odesa-Reni highway bears huge risks. A conflict of interests is involved and it cannot be solved now. Under these circumstances the problem should be frozen. Any other solution will have a high cost for the Alliance and democracy in the Republic of Moldova”.46

As a conclusion, we can say that the attitude of the Government is to find a compromise with the Ukrainian party and observe the commitments assumed with respect to the signed documents. There are also opinions that opt for the renegotiation of the Treaty and Additional Protocol. But this can happen, according to article 9 of the Protocol, only with the mutual agreement of the parties. In this case we can say that the renegotiation of the Treaty depends on Ukraine’s attitude towards such a process. With respect to the preservation of the existing situation, it should be mentioned that such an attitude bears some risks. Ukraine could resort to some measures of economic constraint or could be reticent with respect to the Transnistrian issue. Such an approach should be discussed with Ukraine.

html45 http://.zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul46 http://bogatu.voceabasarabiei.net/

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POLITIcAL:POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2010: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS Igor Munteanu

The Political Crisis as a Litmus Paper for the Rule of Law in the RM

Several Western authors regard the political parties as the weakness of democracy47, stating that namely their internal weaknesses, low capacity and inactivity worsened during the last 2 decades the major deficiencies of the political transition: from the state party, socialist or soviet regime towards the pluralist democracy. In the Republic of Moldova the parties also had these deficiencies as birthmarks. The deep agitation and political conflicts of 2009 affected the political parties, who previously complained to the European institutions on the difficult environment they have to cope with and the barriers they face. During the past 5 years they brought the following examples: the provisions of the Electoral Code on the too high threshold for the electoral competitors and the multiple oppression exerted by the authorities (Police, Ministry of Justice) that are loyal to the ruling party (CPRM). In 2008, the Parliament took a decision to introduce new amendments to the electoral legislation, passing in January 2008 the interdiction to form electoral blocks and raising the electoral threshold from 4% to 5% without an impact analysis and any proper internal or external consultations. The arguments presented by the policymakers who promoted the amendment to the Electoral Code in 2008 convinced neither the political opposition of that time, nor the European authorities, who recommended even at the end of 2007 to diminish the electoral threshold and introduce more flexibility in the rigid provisions.

47 ThomasCarothers,ConfrontingtheWeakestLink:AidingPoliticalPartiesinNewDemocracies,WashingtonDC,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2006

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Nevertheless, only at the end of April 2009, PACE passed a new resolution on the functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova (Resolution no 1666), stimulated by the harsh confrontations between CPRM and the opposition in April, marked by outrageous cases of violence and torture. In its Resolution, the PACE appraised accurately the electoral process, marked by incidents and extreme violence, restrictions to the freedom of expression and assembly, which prevented the opposition from communicating its ideas and programs to the electorate. The Resolution urges the local authorities to investigate judicially the events and to call to account the guilty persons, but also urges authorities to resume reform the electoral legislation, in co-operation with the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), in order to lower the electoral threshold for political parties, thus opening up the political process for more pluralism; freedom of expression and immediately review the voters’ lists in order to establish them definitively, introducing an obligation for regular review for the CEC, and improve them until they can abolish in future supplementary lists; put in place mechanisms and procedures enabling the many Moldovan citizens residing abroad to exercise effectively their voting rights. The difficult transfer of power to the AEI created some deficiencies in the fulfillment of the aforementioned priorities in the Government Program, i.e. the restoration of the political relationship with the Council of Europe authorities, especially taking into account the fact that the Committee for the investigation of violence of April 2009 did not manage to finish by the end of 2009 the report requested by the Parliament. The first 100 days of the new Government overlap with the first frictions between the initial plan and the cruel reality of concurrent priorities for the Government. Some of the AEI leaders think that they should search for a solution to amend the RM Constitution, in particular Article 78, which provides for the dissolution of the Parliament if the head of the state is not elected after the 2nd ballot, while others would like a strengthening of the held positions, with or without elections. The waves of MPs’ defection from the CPRM stimulated the AEI leaders to agree upon a common position related to the constitutional reform. In December 2009, the current President of the RM, M.

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Ghimpu, issued a Decree to set up a Committee responsible for preparation of proposals for a wide amendment of RM Constitution, constitutional reform. The establishment of this Committee creates the illusion of an ideal technical solution at the first stage, but leaves open all possible options of the type of the political regime promoted by the new Constitution. The indecision and more and more visible differences among the 4 components of the AEI nourished a certain doubt of the public and of the European partners related to the fact that this constitutional reform could have positive results for the Republic of Moldova48, taking into account the fragility of the democratic institutions from Chisinau, after the transfer of power in September-November 2009, but also the extremely short period for the proper organization and information of the public on the stakes of this referendum. The Venice Commission insists on amending Article 78, which could be possible settled in the RM Parliament, but with few chances to succeed in the context of the bipolar relationship between the CPRM and AEI, interwoven with a thin segment of independent candidates. Although it doesn’t refer exactly to the constitutional text, prepared by the Commission, we can suppose that the European authorities (CoE) will insist on implementing the provisions that oblige the RM President to initiate the Parliament dissolution procedure as a result of the repeated failure to elect the head of the state, but within a reasonable period. However, the comment of the Venice Commission cannot be treated only in negative terms because, although it asks the Parliament to be more reserved towards a constitutional referendum, the main message is rather sustaining the general effort related to a comprehensive constitutional effort, ensuring the Moldovan authorities with all the support they could need during the upcoming months. Taking into account all pros and cons presented during the numerous debates on this topic, the arguments of the Venice Commission count a lot for the liberal-democratic Government, that can’t afford the risk to obtain the approval of a new Constitution with the price of burning the bridges to the European political institutions. This generates hesitations, contradictory discussions and influence of some underwater current on the actions and responses of AEI, as well as the people’s attitude

48 VeniceCommissionadoptsopiniononwhentodissolvetheparliamentofMoldova,Strasbo-urg,15.03.2010

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towards the direct election of the head of state or their resistance to a return to presidential system of Government. But there are also other sensitive problems and issues for the RM political parties, such as those that compromised the rightfulness of the electoral process in 2009. With respect to this, we should mention the bifurcation of a list of problems, depending on the observer’s system of references: the parties are now interested more in the electoral threshold, elimination of the ban to form electoral blocks, even in the absorption of the overseas votes, while the civil society seems to be much more concerned with the transparency of the political funding, reflection of the electoral campaigns in mass media, use of administrative resources, but also with the accuracy of electoral lists. These dissonances, justified somehow by the interests and mandates of organizations, could be noticed quite clearly in March, during some public discussions.

Intentions to amend the Electoral Code and related expectations

On 10 March 2010, a special Committee for the improvement of the electoral legal framework, in cooperation with the Central Electoral Commission and UNDP support made public a series of proposals on amendments and addenda to the Electoral Code, in line with the Parliament Decision (no 39-XVIII of 15 October 2009). Thus these proposals meet a number of recommendations and resolutions of the CoE, OSCE/ODIHR, as well other international and local organizations. Among the most important news proposed by the authors of the Electoral Support to Moldova Project, the following could be identified:

Annul the ban on electoral blocks;-

Introduce special regulations on overseas voting (open -

additional polls);Annul some restrictions of the right to elect and to be -

elected;Provide specialized training for the electoral staff by means of -

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an Ongoing Training Center;Create the voter registers and electoral lists, under authority -

of CEC;Limit the use of administrative resources during the electoral -

campaign;Regulate more accurately the rights and duties of electoral -

observers;Electioneering and reflection of elections in the mass media;-

Adjust the regulations on the organization and conduct of -

referendums (national and local).

The authors of amendments indicated sincerely some visible flaws they could not approach due to costs or unclarity of the political will. Thus, the assurance of electoral participation by electronic vote is a nice and attractive goal, but too expensive in CEC opinion. Before the contrary is proven, the initiative on amendment and addenda to the Electoral Code does not include any cost assessment or exact proposals on implementation of digital signature and remote voting (electronic or by mail) in the electoral process. The package of proposals doesn’t even include special references on the change of the current electoral system and this is because the relevant policymakers from the Parliament of the RM did not decide unanimously on some major changes of the electoral process, whose choice is one of the most important decisions in a democracy. The new amendments aim at allowing the opening of new polls on the premises of diplomatic missions, as well as in other places, depending on the needs assessed in advance by the Government. At the same time, the authors suggest to keep the voting restrictions with respect to the people convicted to imprisonment by definitive court ruling for particularly or exceptionally severe crimes, who execute their sanction, as well as people deprived by this right by a definitive court ruling (Article 13), obliging the candidates to declare, when registering, that they have no restriction to be employed in positions of highest importance. The package of suggestions also contains the idea, which CEC likes mostly, to create an ongoing training center in electoral area (Article 26/1), which would educate the resources needed nationally when forming sector or district electoral sections

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in due time; as well as amendment of the Electoral Code with some provisions related to the development and management of the State Voter Register (Article 38/1), update the electoral lists (Article 39) on the basis of the respective register, which thus becomes an exclusive authority of the CEC. The proposals also envisage the tools intended to limit the use of administrative resources, i.e. by including deputy-ministers in the list of persons that stop their activity since are registered as candidates and the establishment of restrictions on the use of public goods during electoral campaigns. For sure, these provisions will not stop the temptation of any ruling Government to use what they control, respectively every additional interdiction should be accompanied by proper sanctions and monitoring by the public and stakeholders. The amendment package also includes the suggestion to diminish the participation threshold for the organization and conduct of referendums, implementing thus the specific recommendations addressed to the Moldovan authorities and taking account of the provisions of Code of Good Practice on Referendums (doc. CDL_AD-2007-008), Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National Level adopted by the Venice Commission at its 47th Plenary Meeting (6-7 July 2001), because the current threshold contained by the Electoral Code is considered to be an excessive demand for validating the results of a referendum and the number of votes is considered to be disproportionate in relation with the opportunity to consult the population on diverse matters of national or local interest. Thus we can state that in 2010, CEC and the Special Parliamentary Committee plans to redress many of the accumulated flaws of the current electoral legal framework, but to a lesser extent in relation to political parties and essence of the electoral system. Obviously, this finding does not diminish the expected impact of the steps suggested by the authors focused on the improvement of general regulations on elections, reacting thus to the criticism addressed to the RM by various international organizations, by eliminating certain practices and conditions that can distort the essence of the open, secret and freely expressed vote. It is necessary to make some clarification regarding the suggestions to diminish the electoral threshold: The authors of the suggestions for Electoral Code amendment

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recommend to diminish the threshold from 5% to 4% for a political party, from 3% to 2% for independent candidates, raising the threshold to 4% for electoral blocks. We should mention that the ban on the electoral blocks eased the toughness of the restrictive provisions that were establishing the electoral threshold depending on the number of component parties. The European legal practice proves clearly that there is no perfectly proportionate system. A certain number of votes will always be needed to qualify a candidate or party as representative of most votes expressed for the general or local elections and this is called exclusion threshold and it exists in any electoral system. However, most countries prefer a proportionate or joint system, ranging from 0.67% on Netherlands up to 10% in Turkey, 7% in Georgia, and 6% in RM. The CoE states that have a joint electoral system use the 4 and 5% threshold and the countries with proportionate system - threshold between 3 and 5%. Many countries use the exclusion threshold only at electoral sector level (Spain) and others only at the national level (Poland), or Sweden that applies them in both cases. On several occasions, PACE expressed its position related to the electoral threshold; e.g. the Resolution 1547 (2007) on state of human rights and democracy in Europe, wherein it states that the threshold higher than 3% during parliamentary elections cannot be justified. The reason is that in a democratic country it is necessary to encourage the expression of as many as possible opinions and restriction of some groups of people in their inalienable right to be represented contradicts the values of a democratic society. Further, the Resolution 1547 recommends to the member states to diminish the thresholds that exceed 3% for parliamentary elections. The CoE Monitoring Committee in its 2008 report also formulated specific recommendations saying that particular countries should diminish the electoral threshold. Besides this exclusion threshold established artificially by the electoral law, there are natural thresholds, also called masked, effective or informal. These thresholds depend on the number of representatives elected in a certain electoral district, but also on the mandate assignment formula (d’Hondt, Saint-Lagu?, Hare), which affect to the same extent both the small parties in obtaining their legal representation and the legally established thresholds. Though, if the amendments proposed with respect to the

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electoral blocks and too high thresholds, training of electoral staff and opening of new (itinerant) polls abroad have now a quasi-general approval, it can be expected that the too strict regulation of broadcasting time (Articles 64 and 64/1), including on some private channels, will be qualified as inconvenient or even bad. Despite the stipulations of the Informative Note on the draft law, some associations stated that they will review them again, including with respect to: remote voting, reflection of the campaign in mass media, regional parties, and monitoring of the political resources. It is interesting to notice the quite cold response of the parliamentary factions to the proposal to annul the restriction to form electoral blocks; only the small parties or those having major problems lately had enthusiastic attitude towards it. But it is to be expected that this enthusiasm will burn down if the Parliament decides to keep the 6% threshold for electoral block formed of 2 and more constituents. It is enough to mention now that only Our Moldova Aliance (OMA) leader proposed publicly in March to its AEI partners to form a single electoral block in case of future parliamentary elections.

Committee to study and evaluate the soviet regime crimes: a beginning of lustration?

On 14 January, the Acting President of the RM set up a Commeette to study and evaluate the totalitarian communist regime in the Republic of Moldova, mandated to “evaluate the crimes of the totalitarian regime” - a major backlog of the political class of the Republic of Moldova. The Decree sets 1 June 2010 as the deadline when the Presidential Committee shall submit a complete report on the occurrence, functioning, and severity of communist regime crimes, commuted made during 1917-1990, particularly based on some papers preserved in the secret archives of the institutions of those times (SIS, Ministry of Home Affairs, and CPSU archives). The relatively short period and the possible political-legal consequences kept alerted the mass media and a significant part of the political parties, some of which used this pretext to accuse the Acting President Mihai Ghimpu of trying to “destroy certain political competitors” (CPRM) or “capitalize the political influence

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on a purely academic matter”. The latter state that the totalitarian regime crimes are known for a long time, even the Communist Party ordered to break away from the crimes made by the famous secret report of the General Secretary of CPSU N.S. Khrushchev, presented during a secret meeting of the CPSU CC, before the XXth Congress of the CPSU (25 February 1956), which meant the beginning of the Thaw after the regime of Joseph Stalin. Later, this thaw helped Khrushchev to remove the stalinists who outlast Stalin (Beria was executed in 1953, V.Molotov and Gh.Malenkov were isolated by the party management). The complete report appeared in mass media only during M.Gorbachev’s perestroika, in March 1989, in Izvestia, being noticed in 2007 by The Guardian as one of the few public speeches that rocked the XXIst century. As a response, others could mention for instance the Armenian genocide during the I Wold War, whose adepts succeed after almost 100 years to convince the Western countries (USA, Sweden, Netherlands, France), who accept the term and, implicitly, its legal effects related to Turkey. Though it would be inaccurate if we describe the creation of the Committee as covered with gratitude signs from political actors. The CPRM ideologists published in mass media they control furious attacks against some members of this Committee49. Another category of critical responses to the Commission relates to the attitude towards some Committee members, territorial coverage of the Committee (Transnistria is not included, as integrated region after the formation of MASSR, in 1924, into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), the time frame (the period before the establishment of the soviet regime is not included), and finally the selective character of the evaluated period (exclusively the soviet regime, not taking into account the crimes during the CPRM ruling). Certainly, the context in which the Committee was set up and the time concurrence with other political processes (failure to elect the head of state, State Committee to review the Constitution, initiative to adopt a new Constitution through a referendum) resulted in a certain distortion of this measure’s message. There were many who blamed the Committee as if it copied what had happened many decades ago in other countries, calling the access to security archives as elements that describe the beginning of a lustration and 49 Timpul,24February2010,WhoisdisturbedbyCojocaruCommittee?

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healing process, needed for the entire society. Other voices told that the value of this evaluation exceeds the strictly scientific frame and that in both RM and Ukraine a political-legal qualification of the old regime consequences is needed, which would underlie a speedy and necessary desovietization in moral and political terms. Those who welcomed the establishment of this Committee mentioned the tardiness of this initiative - almost 2 decades after the Baltics finished this chapter and almost 5 years after Ukraine included the Holodomor into the most horrible crimes against the Ukrainian ethnicity, committed by the stalinist soviet regime. Our intention is to analyze the legal and political effects of some decisions, which will crown the 6-month mandate of the Committee, from the perspective of early elections in 2010. The issuance of the Decree on the Committee to Study and Evaluate the Totalitarian Communist Regime coincides with the change of the political regime and termination of the almost immovable hegemony of CPRM, whose leaders never abandoned the rhetoric and their (ideological and political) succession of the soviet regime. Objectively, the Parliament’s Evaluation Report will clear even more the muddy waters of the transition from the unipersonalism of PCRM leaders to the cohabitation of AEI leaders. The report submitted by the Committe will become the first act of supreme legislative authority related to the poisonous USSR heritage, which was rejected by the Declaration of Independence, but further tolerated by the successive implants of leaders and practices borrowed from that regime. Although we know why the Committee was created, it is not that clear yet what the final report will bring. Thus, if in Romania the model of anti-communist revolution was the Latvian 1989 revolution, the solution found were oriented towards denying any form of rightfulness for the soviet regime, in Ukraine the authorities adopted acts through definitive court rulings, convicting the leaders of soviet regime J. Stalin and V. Molotov of genocide, mobilizing itself in the effort to promote an UN resolution which would recognize the 1932-33 famine as a form of genocide against the Ukrainian people. It is obvious that any report developed by the current Committee needs an open and well-intentioned political partner to assimilate the academia’s conclusions.

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What institutional effects the Committee’s Report could generate?

The Committee’s Report cannot objectively stop at validating or re-validating posthumous the statistics of the victims or summary procedures by which the soviet regime exterminated violently the local population. The Committee will recommend to the authorities some actions by means of which they could prevent the phylo-soviet revisionism in schools and universities, in politics and administration, i.e. in the public life, whose players should learn the lessons of the past. In this respect, the (acting) RM President will repeat the pattern of other presidents who summarized similar reports50 and approved these conclusions through a political statement of RM Parliament. An example of this kind is the Latvian legislator, which passed on 15 May 2004 a Declaration on Condemnation of the Totalitarian Communist Occupation Regime, Instituted in Latvia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, the political reality of RM is more fluid and predictable under these circumstances that in other states, which could serve as useful references from this perspective. It is enough to relate the actions started by the Cojocaru Committee to the time frame marked for the upcoming months by the constitutional crisis, by the possible announcement of the early elections date, by the possible negotiations in Parliament on the amendment of Article 78 of the Constitution, etc. in order to understand that RM is far behind the states that condemned the totalitarian regimes. The Commission members could open the access to secret archives, creating a strong precedent against excessive classification and preservation of some institutions in the style of soviet KGB. Although, only the RM Parliament could decide on a wide lustration, justified by the evidence collected by the Committee and accepted by politicians. Another RM paradox relates to the fact that one of the active actors of the system of political parties - CPRM - is the legal successor and continuator of the soviet system logics, envisaged in the Committee’s Report. Recognizing the direct or indirect responsibility of CPRM for the soviet regime crimes, as a measure to rehabilitate the political victims, culminating with the possible approval of a Lustration

50 ReportofPresidentialCommission for theStudyof theRomanianCommunistDictatorship(TismaneanuReport),presentedintheRomanianParliamenton18December2006.

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Law, which would sanction diverse elements of the old regime and attract particular legal consequences. Hence, the declassification of some secret service archives or approval of lustration norms can be forwarded to the ECtHR even by persons who are now affiliated to the CPRM, who could hope to use the current set of European norms and conventions in order to protect themselves or avoid any legal or moral accountability for the crimes committed many decades in a row by an inhuman system. It should be mentioned with respect to this that the lustration, as official policy against the attempts of anti-democratic revenge had many forms and generated diverse responses. Certain elements or distinct models of lustration were previously applied in most countries from Central Europe, with the purpose to disqualify the participation in the public life of those who committed abuses during the old regime, especially: informers, high-ranking activists, as well as certain administrative officials. Some lustration forms were harsher than others. The specialized literature draws our attention to the more radical character of some decommunization reforms applied by Czech Republic and Germany in comparison with more permissive variants applied by Poland or Romania. For instance, in Poland the communist crime concept is applied to actions committed by employees of the communist state between 17 September 1939 (date when the USSR invaded Poland) and 31 December 1989 (collapse of the communist regime), and it refers to the repression or infringement of human rights, either speaking of a person or a group, or to other crimes defined in this way by the Criminal Code. After 1989, this concept was actively used since 1998 by the Foundation for Investigation of the Communist Crimes51, replacing the term stalinist crimes, also used previously by the Jaruzelski military regime. We’d like to mention that the respective Foundation was established to investigate the crimes committed by authorities against Polish people and nation, a concept that is similar to Nazi crimes term52. The Polish Sejm established restrictions and limitations, starting with 1 August 1990, for 40 years in murder cases and 30 years for other crimes, qualifying them as crimes against

51 Ustawa z dnia 18 grudnia 1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi PolskiemuPDF(299KB).Article2.1..Retrievedasof8May2007.52 GenowefaRajman,ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTYCZNE W KONCEPCJI POLSKIEGO PRAWA KARNEGO,WojskowyPrzeglądPrawniczy,Number1z2006r.

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humanity, peace and war crimes, and they cannot be affected by amnesty. The crimes committed by the communist regimes are numerous and include: eradication of persons declared as class enemies, eradication of the bourgeoisie, and repression of people belonging to non-proletarian classes or to national groups considered to be unfaithful to the regime. In the specialized literature, these actions were qualified as deliberate murders of non-combatant groups during peaceful times, applying the politicide term, which defines thus the eradication of political or economic groups through mass murders (for instance, the recorded number of 50,000 deaths caused during 5 years or fewer). Frank Wayman and Atsushi Tago argue that depending on the use of democide (murders generated by state-supported policies) or politicide term (eradication of groups perceived as political enemies) by differentiating criteria, the further qualification may generate different results53. Helen Fein called the repressions committed by the soviet regime genocide and the murders in Cambodia - democide54. Some authors use the term of red holocaust to define the extent of soviet repressions. The mass deportation of counter-revolutionary elements from MSSR and MASSR, called enemies of the nation, the moving of huge population groups to concentration camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan, mass execution by firing squad and extermination of national elites, making people die of famine and political persecutions are qualified to both aforementioned terms. Moreover, if the researchers test the forced russification, followed by persecutions and expropriation of former owners, this could impose the need to review the legislation on retroceding the property taken by the soviet regime, meaning a justice and victim rehabilitation act.

What political effects can the Committee generate?

The decree issued by the President M. Ghimpu makes clear references to a series of PACE resolutions on measures to dismantle the heritage of 53 Wayman, Frank; Tago, Atsushi (2005), “Explaining the Onset of Mass Killing:The Effect of War, Regime Type, and Economic Deprivation on Democide and Politicide, 1949–1987”, International Stu-dies Association54 Fein, Helen (1993). Genocide: a sociological perspective. Sage Publication. p. 75. ISBN 9780803988293. http://books.google.com/books?id=n4TaAAAAMAAJ&q=%22Soviet+and+Communist+Genocides%22&dq=%22Soviet+and+Communist+Genocides%22&client=firefox-a&cd=1.

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former communist totalitarian systems (1096 of 1996) and on need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes (1481 of 2006). There are also some older PACE recommendations, including: Recommendation 325 (1962) on methods of communist colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe (this paper was passed on 20 September 1962 on the basis of Doc. 1494 - Report of the Committee on Non-represented Nations) and Recommendation 357 (1963) on contacts with peoples of Central and Eastern Europe under Communist rule (this paper was passed during the session of 8-9 May 1963, on the basis of Doc. 1529 of the Committee on Non-represented Nations). Of the newest relevant acts in this area, we can mention the Resolution of the European Parliament of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism55, Prague Declaration on European Consciences and Communism of 3 June 200856 passed by the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as well as the Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly with respect to condemnation of Stalinism and Nazism (3 July 2009)57.

The synthetic effect of many of these resolutions equalizes the Stalinism with Nazism, which are equally guilty of genocides, unprecedented violations of the human rights and freedoms, war crimes and crimes against humanity, urging the member states to stop xenophobia and aggressive nationalism, asking for more respect towards the integrity of human rights and civil freedoms. It is also important that in all these cases, most signatories of these political condemnation papers recommend to the CoE and OSCE member states to align against all totalitarian regimes, regardless of the ideology they promoted, to stop giving glory to totalitarian regimes, including the performance of public demonstrations in order to glorify the Nazi or Stalinist past. It is easy to suppose that in case of the RM, the political appraisal of the crimes and atrocities committed by the communist regime will also hit directly the CPRM as political actor, who still hopes to get back ruling in future without paying the cost of its previous and recent illegalities. The RM Parliament will approve the report submitted by

55 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN56 PragueDeclarationonEuropeanConsciencesandCommunism,June3,2008,SenateoftheParliamentoftheCzechRepublic-http://praguedeclaration.org/ 57 ThecompletetitleoftheOSCEDeclarationisDividedEuropeReunited,whichwasadoptedon29 JuneatVilnius.Outof theabout320membersof theOSCEParliamentaryAssembly,320membersoftheParliamentparticipatedinit;only8votedagainsttheresolutionandonly4ofthemabstained.

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the Committee, investing a symbolic and moral recovery value into this gesture, which could further lead to regular efforts to desovietize the institutions and the society. Though, the Committee is not a law court and the report it will submit to the RM Parliament in June 2010 will only establish a political and moral assessment of some previous crimes of the soviet regime, and culminate with a declaration on the condemnation of the totalitarian regime and, implicitly, of all those who inspire themselves from and have ideological roots in the structure of that horrible political regime. Nevertheless, the political-legal assessment of the soviet regime crimes can rise suggestions on the abolishment of some parties that practice extremist ideologies, but this can happen only if the claimer could bring evidence that a certain party, by its activity, infringes the norms and principles guaranteed by European conventions and ECtHR. A clarification is needed in this respect, related to the European practice and precedents of outlawing extremist parties, the single tool able to guide the actions of competent political authorities that observe the rule of law. The European institutions are generally very cautious with respect to interdiction of political parties. On the one hand this is explained by the protection ensured by the European Convention on Human Rights for political and civil freedoms and, on the other hand, by the risk of providing some lawless regimes with serious tools to limit the political pluralism. Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests and (2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, police or Government administration58.

But there are also another type of cases. In February 2010, a

58 ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,adoptedon01November1950,Publishedontheofficialedition“InternationalTreaties”,1998,volume1,p.341.TheConventionenteredintoforceon3September1953anditisinforceforRMsince12September1997.

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law court decided the abolishment of the Laborers’ Party (LP) because of racist actions expressed by xenophobe and anti-Semite marches. The reason for the interdiction of the party was the plea of an expert who compared the symbols and vocabulary used by the LP with those of Hitler’s nationalists, collecting as examples of extremism tens of documents and video records with violence scenes against Roma population committed by the party supporters. The plaintiff accused the party that it posed a threat to democracy, cooperated with neo-Nazi groups and promoted a totalitarian regime. In 2009, Hungary also interdicted a political party, called Hungarian Guard, a party with paramilitary groups associated to the Jobbik party, which is known for its anti-Roma and xenophobic behavior. The practice to interdict some political parties is also exemplified by the decisions of the European Court for Human Rights, particularly regarding the Freedom and Democracy Party (Ozdep). The Court found the violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, being disproportionate, establishing that Ozdep was punished only because it exerted the freedom of expression59. It was found out that the self-determination and recognition of linguistic rights (Kurds) principles could not serve as basis for the dissolution of a party. The ECtHR decision reaches the conclusion that if the implementation of these principles is a support for terrorists, then the possibility to approach these issues within democratic debates would be significantly limited, because in this case these issues would be monopolized exclusively by military and violent groups. In other case, related to the Prosperity Party of Turkey, ECtHR found that the dissolution of this party did not violate Article 11, because this party was promoting the establishment of a multi-justiciary system based on Islamic law, whose members referred to jihad as political means. Because the Prosperity Party neither clarified, nor contradicted the reports according to which some party members promised to resort to force, the public order was exposed to risks. We have to mention that in this case the Constitutional Court of Turkey dissolved the Prosperity Party taking the parliamentary immunity of some MPs from this party, while 152 of the MPs of the Grand National Assembly continued the legislative exercise.

59 cithttp://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/IJNL/vol2iss2/cn_2.htm.

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Conclusions:

Officially, the Leninist type communism died in 1989 by the revolutions that changed the mental and political map of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. After these revolutions (velvet ones or with violent confrontation with the official representatives of the contested regimes), most countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe won their freedom by definitive and total abnegation of totalitarian parties. Only a few of them survived biologically those times of changes and revolutions, hiding themselves, particularly in the soviet area, under exotic names: nostalgic statists, gathered around Vornin, Lukashenko, or a Putin, or state-parties crystallized in a sultanic hierarchy like Nazarbayev or Aliev, each of them each own perception of origins of power in a state. In RM only the decay of CPRM hegemony after two successive elections contributed to the creation of a pluralist ruling alternative. The constitutional reform, as well as the communist crimes investigation project heated the atmosphere, bringing to forefront of public debates the painful lessons of the past, but also priorities that cannot be adjourned or canceled because of some electoral or ideological pretexts that would further preserve the soviet regime positions. The new political authorities of the RM must hurry slowly when choosing the ways to waking up the European memory and national conscience by efficient means, by consistent and sincere public education, building values and respect for the European principles promoted by the EU according to the European Platform on Memory and Conscience, rejecting the methods and temptation of the totalitarian model.

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ALARM SIGNAL: ThE cONFLIcTuAL RELATIONShIP BETWEEN cOMRAT ANd chISINAu ANd ThE EFFEcT OF ELEcTIONS

leonId lItra

Since the new Government of the Republic of Moldova took office, the attitude towards the main directions of Filat Government changed several times; many local initiatives were launched and they do not always coincide with the policies promoted by the central authorities.

When discussion started with respect to the constitutional reform, the President Ghimpu asked Gagauzia to submit its proposals on Constitution amendment. In this context, the Gagauzia baskan, Mihail Formuzal, submitted several proposals, the most important being presented below: 1) create a federation, formed of three constituents: Chisinau, Tiraspol, and Comrat; 2) declare Russian as an official language; 3) offer 5 MP mandates for Territorial Autonomous Unit (TAU) Gagauzia; and 4) if the Republic of Moldova changes its statute, Gagauzia assumes the right to external self-determination60. These proposals met little enthusiasm at Chisinau. Valerii Ianioglo, the deputy baskan, states that if these proposals are not included, this could generate more responses from Gagauzia, including referendum boycott61.

In fact, the baskan presented these ideas several times, including during the communist ruling by means of the organization United Gagauzia. On this background, we should mention that there are so-called “moderates” and “radicals” in TAUG. The difference between them, both in their visions and speeches, relates to Gagauzia as a subject of a federal Moldova. If the moderates organize their speech 60 http://www.protv.md:8080/stiri/politic/mihail-formuzal-vrea-limba-rusa-drept-limba-oficiala-iar-moldova.html61 http://ava.md/03-gagauziya/03640-valerii-yanioglo-o-problemah-gagauzii-i-predlozheniyah-po-sovershenstvovaniq-konstitucii.html

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asking for more prerogatives within the autonomy (issuance of licenses, etc.), then the radicals plead for independence within Moldova and obtaining all attributes an independent state can have.

These separatist frames of mind are not perceived as good by the political class, but also by the Gagauz society, where, according to the surveys, 73% of population is against federalization. Generally, the Gagauz people also have other preferences with respect to foreign policy. For example, the trust into European Union and its perception as a whole is usually lower than at Moldovans by 7-30%, depending on different aspects of the EU.

The contradictory views of Chisinau and Comrat add one more issue to the list the Government faces now, but now it is one that endangers the authority of Chisinau Executive.

Why did these issues arise now?

The political processes from Gagauzia must be looked upon from the perspective of baskan elections planned or December 2010. Although almost one years is left before elections, the political positioning and fight become more and more obvious. According to some local sources, Russia’s support, including the financial one, is determinant for the future elections, taking into account that trust in Russia and Russophil spirits is still very popular in this region. Another thing to add here is that these proposals were submitted at the suggestion of Kremlin, in order to prevent Moldova from coming closer to EU62 and this idea is frequently confirmed by mass media. The most annoying aspect of this idea is that it gets public support in TAU Gagauzia, especially if it is combined with other “dangers” like unification with Romania.

The issue of Greater Romania

Another factor that equally nourishes the pro-Russian spirits is the fear of unification with Romania. This policy was initiated by the previous communist administration, which stimulated the

62 http://www.timpul.md/articol/ce-doreste-formuzal-6426.html

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TAUG decision-makers to take measure against “Romanization”63. Despite the fact that the baskan Mihail Formuzal had a remarkable lucidity and refused to align to the CPRM initiative, qualifying it as communist challenge64, the myth of Greater Romania still exists in the Gagauz society. The fears are expressed both by the Comrat officials and common people, internauts from TAUG, etc.

The political spectrum from TAUG or “United Gagauzia” vs “New Gagauzia”

As we get closer to the electoral campaign, the political coalitions get outlined. Besides the conflictual Chisinau-Comrat relationship, there is a conflict of local political forces that from institutional point of view are represented by the conflict between the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia (PAG) led by Ana Harlamenco and the baskan Mihail Formuzal. Until now, the unofficial duel takes place between the organization United Gagauzia that promotes Mihail Formuzal’s interests and the organization New Gagauzia led by the Comrat Mayor, Nicolae Dudoglo and his sister, PAG speaker, Ana Harlamenco.

If in case of Formuzal it is clear that he will be the candidate for the next mandate, then on the other side is not that clear who is going to be main opponent. Currently, several candidates want to be supported by the CPRM. The list is significant, it contains persons who already are important in TAUG politics, such as Comrat Mayor Nicolae Dudoglo, the communist MP Irina Vlah, the communist deputy-speaker of PAG Damian Caraseni, and the MP and former Mayor of Copceac, Oleg Garizan. According to the local mass-media65, the CPRM will stake on Oleg Garizan. He seems to be most appropriate because of the “deficiencies” the other candidates have. Damian Caraseni has a good economic status and could be able to fund the campaign on his own, and subsequently he won’t be very loyal to CPRM and it is possible that he will run as an independent candidate. Irina Vlah seems to be a good candidate, but taking into account the patriarchal views of the Gagauz community, she did 63 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1167251.html64 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1167251.html65 http://www.gagauzlar.md/libview.php?l=ru&idc=295&id=1045

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not obtain the support of CPRM. And the opponent of the current baskan, Nicolae Dudoglo, has already shown his abilities in 2006, when he was deceived by Formuzal in the second election round, even if in CPRM circulates the idea that if he goes to the second round together with Formuzal, then Dudoglo will be supported by the CPRM. Nicolae Dudoglo enjoyed the support of several parties. In 2006 he was supported by the Democrat Party and in the 2009 campaign - by the Social-Democrat Party and by the Centrist Union of Moldova. With respect to the support offered to Formuzal, there are opinions that he will be supported by the Liberal Democrat Party66. This assumption is partially confirmed by an increased activism of the executive in the TAUG, especially of the liberal-democrat component; the premier Vlad Filat visited Gagauzia twice, the Minister of Health Vladimir Hotineanu and Minister of Home Affairs Victor Catan, but also other Ministers like Valentina Buliga and Valeriu Cosarciuc visited it one time each. Like Dudoglo, Formuzal worked with several parties, being supported in 2006 by the Popular Republican Party, Ravnopravie (Equal rights), and Patria-Rodina (Motherland), while in 2009 they say he was supported by Our Moldova Alliance.

The joint Gagauz-Bulgarian front

To strengthen the capacity of promoting the interests of the “South”, the idea of a cooperation between the Gagauzians and Bulgarians from the Southern Moldova has been discussed quite often recently. The supporter of this idea, Ivan Grec, argues that during the last ten centuries, the Gagauzians and Bulgarians had common values and the issued can be easier solved together. The author himself proves in his article that all common initiatives failed, but at the same time he suggests that now would be the suitable moment to unify these peoples and promote common interests.67 This process would cause troubles to the Chisinau Government, taking into account that a strong Gagauzia would endanger even more the relationship between Chisinau and Comrat. In the same context, we recall the electoral slogans of PAG in 2008, when United Gagauzia was promoting the idea that TAUG

66 http://meridian-info.com/v2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=782&Itemid=5367 http://ava.md/030-obshestvo/03683--obshaya-sudba-i-obshie-problemi-gagauzov--i-bolgar-moldovi.html

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should become a separate subject, as well as the declaration of PAG in 2008, which recognized the independence of Southern Osetiya and Abkhaziya.

The war of regional initiatives and parties

After the letter with baskan’s proposals on Constitution amendment was submitted, one more problem appeared in the series that already exists. Ana Harlamenco said she was perplex because the baskan got beyond his authority by sending these proposals, taking into account that the right to submit proposals on behalf of TAU Gagauzia belongs to PAG. The local political commentators identified another problem generated by Formuzal’s proposals. According to them, the baskan’s proposals were a pitfall for communists because they will be presented in Parliament for approval, but CPRM will not vote for them, even if some of them would favor them, because they are submitted by Formuzal, who never misses the possibility to criticize the CPRM. On the other hand, some of them state that Formuzal’s proposals are fictitious. The opinion leader, Dimitri Uzun, stated in a public letter68 addressed to Formuzal, published in the newspaper of the nationalist editor Leonid Dobrov, that the baskan’s initiative is a provocation and an attempt to create divergences between Gagauzians and Moldovans and motivates his statement by the question why Russians don’t propose to give Russian the status of official language?

The creation of regional parties was a intrigue subject in this region. Although there existed regional parties until 2006, which were registered with the Justice Division of TAUG, their activity was suspended before the baskan elections in 2006. According to the chairman of the Independent Journalism Center, Stepan Piron, the activity of regional parties was stopped because the United Gagauzia organization, under the auspices of Mihail Formuzal, intended to transform itself into social-political movement, thus creating a greater competition in the political fight of 2006. Currently, both the baskan and the PAG president plead for offering this right to TAUG. However, we need the opinion of the Constitutional Court Whether this provision will not violate the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.

68 http://meridian-info.com/v2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=761&Itemid=53

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The creation of regional parties will offer even more autonomy to the region, which is considered to be a part of the political decentralization of Moldova. On the other hand, strengthening the region from political point of view could finally lead to other claims from TAUG, for instance federalization. Some people claim that federalization is unavoidable; if not now, then in ten years time.

Vox populi or who writes what on forums

If we read very fast the comments to news posted on the Gagauzia and Chisinau news websites, we’ll see the spirit, especially of the youth, with respect to the political developments in the country. On the Chisinau websites, a very harsh response is shown to the baskan’s initiatives related to federalization and Russian language. The following are among the most frequent comments: go to Russia if you need Russian language, don’t claim for anything because you’re guests on this land, etc. For instance, the news with baskan’s requests placed on PRO TV gathered about 60 comments, out of which 53 comments are harsh with respect to Formuzal and Gagauzia and only 3 are balanced from the perspective of the expressed position.69 All these opinions reflect mostly the hostility of the Moldovan internauts towards the TAUG ambitions to have more privileges than the existing ones.

The Gagauzian internauts are not very different, although sometimes their messages refer more to internal conflicts than to the relationship with Chisinau. One of the messages promoted on the on-line publications by internauts refers to the unification of Gagauzian political forces in matters associated to the relationship with Chisinau, insinuating that Chisinau uses the divide et impera tactics with respect to Comrat. Besides the federalization ideas expressed on the TAUG forums, there are some separatist tendencies that refer to the existence of peoples’ right to self-determination, statehood of Gagauzia, and even threaten with violence similar to the early ‘90ies, because only in this way Chisinau would take into account the grievances of TAU Gagauzia.

69 http://www.protv.md:8080/stiri/politic/mihail-formuzal-vrea-limba-rusa-drept-limba-oficiala-iar-moldova.html

Conclusions

Finally, we have to mention that probably in autumn they will show down who supports whom and the direction of the official speeches of the TAUG actors. On the background of political perturbations in Chisinau and elections that seem to be unavoidable, the political actors from TAUG will have a greater space for maneuver and they will afford inconvenient statements for Chisinau, who won’t respond very trenchantly to them, as the political actors from Chisinau will need the support of those from TAUG for the early elections.

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EcONOMY:THE “ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM” - AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS,alexandru Fala

In the context of the slow revival both on world and regional level, Moldova shows signs of recovery. In 2009 the GDP decreased by 9%. For 2010, the “State Budget Law for 2010” stipulates a 1.5% increase in GDP70. For the first half of the year we anticipate a 1.07% GDP increase, if compared with the similar period of the previous year - such a development fits the 1.5% economic growth scenario. On the background of the problems accumulated in 2009 and of a low dynamics of the world economy, the national economy will slowly move on an ascendant trajectory.

The world recession generated a decrease in the foreign invest-ment and exports. Nevertheless, the greatest problem for Moldova relates to the decrease of remit-tances, which had a nominal decrease by 30% in 2009. Sub-sequently, the private consump-tion also diminished, a significant share of it being funded from re-mittances and which is the basic component of the GDP, having a share of over 90% of it.

The general reduction of the 70 Informative Note on the draft State Budget Law for 2010 (summary), p.5. Available at: http://www.politik.md/?view=articlefull_parlament&viewarticle=996

On the background of the problems accumulated in 2009 and of a low dynamics of the world economy, the national economy will slowly move on an ascendant trajectory.

Figure 1. Quarterly evolution of the Gross Domestic Product (MDL million) during 2004-2010

Source: developed by the author

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economic activity generated a large budget deficit, amounting to MDL 5346.3 million, that is 9% of the GDP. In 2009, besides the serious economic problems, the transfer of political power took place in Moldova. The new governmental team got a difficult task - to recover the functionality of the national economy. The development and approval of the “Economic Stabilization and Recovery Program of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011” is a first step needed to accomplish this task. This program is an attempt to respond properly to the bad economic developments and expresses the vision of the Government on promotion of medium and long-term economic policies. The program contains some contradictory measures. Such an approach is conditioned by the existing economic reality. To ensure a budgetary balance under circumstances of low income collection, they will limit or even cease some non-priority expenses. There is also foreseen the increase of some taxes. There will be also implemented economic stimulation measures, especially by diminishing the tax and administrative burden for economic units.The Program has 3 basic priorities:

Stabilization and streamlining of public finance;1. Economic recovery;2. Securing an efficient and fair social protection.3. 71

The 2010 State Budget Law - a paper inspired from the Economic Stabilization and Recovery Program - comes with a set of

austere measures designated to stabilize the public finance. The 2010 State Budget is foreseen to have a 4.47 MDL million deficit, which should account for 7% of GDP, a value that is lower than in 2009. As a source for budget income accumulation they resorted to

71 “DecisionapprovingtheEconomicStabilizationandRecoveryProgramoftheRepublicofMoldovafor 2009-2011no790of01December2009”.Availableat:http://gov.gov.md/www.gov.md/file/Doc_politici/Pr_stab_ro.pdf

Figure 2. Annual money transfers from abroad performed by individuals through the banks from the Republic of Moldova (USD million) during 1999-2009

Source: developed by the author on the basis of “Money transfers from abroad performed by individuals (resident and non-resident) through the banks from the Republic of Moldova. Annual dynamics” available at: http://www.bnm.md/md/external_operations_via_banc_system

“Economic Stabilization and Recovery Program of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011” is a first step needed to accomplish this task. This program is an attempt to respond properly to the bad economic developments and expresses the vision of the Government on promotion of medium and long-term economic policies.

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increasing some categories of taxes. The following categories of taxes were amended:

individual income tax;- Value-Added Tax;- excise tax;- real estate tax;- local taxes;- road taxes;-

The authorities tried to increase the taxes that affect a lower number of taxpayers or that don’t have a major social impact. In the 2010 State Budget, reductions were planned for most categories of expenses; increases are provided only for social and economic expenses.

A c c o r d i n g to the forecasts, in the first quar-ter of 2010, the budget income will amount to MDL 11.5 billion and budget expenses will amount to MDL 13.3 billion. Taking into ac-count that both in-come and expenses are 45-50% per-formed in the first half of the year, the end-year budget deficit will amount to about MDL 4.5 billion - a value that is compara-ble with the defi-cit planned by the Government. It seems that

Table 1. Evolution of budget expenses during 2009-2010

2009 2010

Amount of expenses (MDL

million)

Share in GDP

(%)

Amount of expenses (MDL

million)

Share in GDP (%)

State services with a special purpose 1454.5 2.4 1385.7 2.1

Maintenance of public order, state defense and

security1797.2 3 1511.7 2.4

Social expenses 19438.6 32.7 20948.3 32.6Economic expenses 2618.5 4.4 3409.3 5.3

Debt servicing 838.5 1.1 841.3 1.3Science and innovations 378.2 0.6 371.1 0.6

Other areas 1289.3 2.2 983.9 1.5Total 27814.5 46.7 29451.3 45.8

Source: Informative Note on the draft State Budget Law for 2009 (summary), p.9. Available at: http://minfin.md/ro/actnorm/budget/projectact/

Table 2. Evolution of national public budget parameters

ExpectedPlanned

(according to 2010 State Budget Law)

I Quarter II Quarter I Semester Annual AnnualNational public budget income(MDL million)

5497 5992 11489 24976.7 24977.5

National public budget expenses(MDL million)

6150 7130 13280 29485.7 29451.3

National public budget deficit(MDL million)

653 1138 1791 4509 4473.8


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the budget deficit will be kept within the established limits until the end of the year, with some deviations. An argument pro this hypothesis relates to the receipt of a large external financial support, amounting to USD 293 million, which will be directed to cover the budget deficit.

72 The problem of public finance sustainability will remain open in the medium run. A small economic growth in the medium run can generate problems related to budget receipts. In case of such an evolution, the presence of high deficits could become a chronic problem for Moldova. The second component of the program refers to economic liberalization measures and covers most of the paper. This shows the increased interest of the decision makers towards some changes that could revitalize the national economy. According to the paper, the economic recovery must be secured by reaching 3 major objectives:

Reduce the administrative and fiscal burden on doing 1. business;Facilitate the access of businesses to financial means for 2. launching, developing or recovering businesses;Stimulate public and private investments.3. 73

The highest risks will occur particularly when implementing the reforms aimed at supporting the business environment. The history of the national economy has no great successes with respect to promotion and support of the business environment and the change of this direction is an extremely hard task. We can take for instance the experience of the regulatory reform (also called the Guillotine). Only the first stage of the Guillotine Law was implemented successfully, while the implementation of the second stage was delayed and this is not a good sign for the business environment. Thus, several streamlining projects remained on paper and were not entirely implemented or even not put into operation. The business climate of Moldova continues to be less favorable than in many countries from this region.74 The main factors that can reduce significantly the implementation speed include the following:

Bureaucratic inertia;

72 Informative Note on the draft State Budget Law for 2010 (summary), p.18. Available at: http://www.politik.md/?view=articlefull_parlament&viewarticle=99673 D e c i s i o n approving the Economic Stabilization and Recovery Program of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011, no 790 of 01 December 2009, Official Gazette no 174-176/874 of 04 December 200974 Analysis of labor markets in the Black Sea region. Moldova: Country Report, 2009, p. 92. Availa-ble at: http://www.meda-ete.net/pubmgmt.nsf/(getAttachment)/3FD1911197EA07A8C12575C20036F5A5/$File/NOTE7SEDRA.pdf.

It seems that the budget deficit will be kept within the established limits until the end of the year, with some deviations.

The problem of public finance sustainability will remain open in the medium run.

The highest risks will occur particularly when implementing the reforms aimed at supporting the business environment.

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Corruption;Inefficiency of state bodies functioning.

The political instability is also a negative factor and it seems that it won’t disappear during 2010 and will prevent the investors, especially the foreign ones, from initiating new projects in Moldova. Unfortunately, these deficiencies bear systemic character and became chronic for the national economy. Under these circumstances, it is necessary that the implementation of the economic recovery program is accompanied by the public administration reform, in order to establish a new way of functioning for the state institutions and this would ensure a better implementation of reforms. The third priority of the program relates to the social sector. These sector continues to have a high priority, the truth of this statement is confirmed by the increase of social expenses in 2010 in comparison with 2009, and this allowed to keep the same share in GDP for this category of expenses (see Table 1). Although, in order to find some saving sources, they had to resort to measures that have bad social influence. Thus, the following was provided to optimize the staff expenses:

decrease the number of staff in the budget sector - by 5 per - cent;decrease staff expenditures on account of temporary inaptness - to work leaves by 2 per cent;decrease the material aid provided to some categories of - employees from 2 salaries per year to one salary per year.75

An important measure in this sector relates to the social assistance system reform. The nominal compensations system will be replaced with the social aid system. Such a measure is a rational one; the nominal compensation system was not very efficient and this is also mentioned in the National Development Strategy, approved in 2007: “The nominal compensations system is recognized as being directed inefficiently towards the poor people, its benefits cover equally all revenue quintiles.” A major risk for the social sector comes from the retirement system. There several reasons that rise questions on the future national retirement system:

Population aging; - 75 Informative Note on the draft State Budget Law for 2010 (summary), p.15. Available at: http://www.politik.md/?view=articlefull_parlament&viewarticle=996

Unfortunately, these deficiencies bear systemic character and became chronic for the national economy.

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High degree of tax evasion, with respect to the thoroughness - of the individual income tax, by using the practice of “wages in the envelope”, thus diminishing the basis for collection of income to the national public budget (including the social insurance budget);Slow development of private pension funds.-

Such a range of reasons can pressure significantly stress the national public finance system. The State Social Insurance Budget already had periods when it finished the budgetary year with deficit.

In 2007 it amounted to MDL 87.4 million;- In 2009, MDL 823.87 million from the State Budget were - transferred to cover the deficit of the State Social Insurance Budget.For 2010, the Law on the State Social Insurance Budget - provides expressly the amount of MDL 941.4 million, which will be used as transfer from the State Budget, to cover the deficit of the State Social Insurance Budget.76

The reform of the retirement system becomes a necessity for the Republic of Moldova . The postponement of a deep transformation of the retirement system could generate serious constraints both for the public finance system and for the social sector . It is too early to state now the opinion on the success of the “Economic Stabilization and Recovery Program of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011” The economy assimilates with a certain delay the effects of the economic policies promoted by the state . The results of this attempt to reform the economy will be felt by the society after a longer period of time .

76 InformativeNoteonthedraftStateBudgetLawfor2010(summary),p.5.P.17.Availableat:http://www.politik.md/?view=articlefull_parlament&viewarticle=996

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SOcIAL:SOCIAL SECTOR - DEVELOPMENTS WITH INCONCLUSIVE EFFECTS,alexandru Fala

The crisis had significant adverse effects on the living standard of the population from states with poor economic performances, due to reduction in their financial inflows. The crisis has deeply affected Moldova as well, by reducing remittances, which has considerably affected the household budgets (remittance is the second major source for households after the income from employment). Since the second quarter of 2008 until the third quarter of 2009 the share of remittances in individuals’ disposable income fell from 21.3% to 13.6%.77 As long as Moldova has an economic model based on consumption, the modest increase in remittances will have a negative impact on the entire economy. A low volume of remittances affects the living standards of the population and does not stimulate consumption that, in its turn, results in low revenues for economic units and lower budgetary revenues from indirect taxes. On the other hand, the wage increase was good even for a year of recession. In 2009, if compared to 2008, the average wage rose by 8.6% - yet at a lower increase rate than during the pre-crisis period. Thus, the average nominal wage augmented by 25.6% in the period of 2000 - 2008. This evolution was possible due to the wage increase in the budgetary area - the average nominal wage of the budget-funded employees increased by 22.8% , if compared to 2008.78 This wage modification was non-uniform for different categories of employees. Thus, the teachers have enjoyed an average monthly salary increase of 4.3% over January-December 2009.

77 Disposable income per capita (2006-2009)availableon:http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=338&id=235478 According toThe evolution of average nominal monthly salary (2000-2009)” available at: http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=338&id=2354

As long as Moldova has an economic model based on consumption, the modest increase in remittances will have a negative impact on the entire economy.

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The nominal wage of the employees in this real sector, which was mostly affected by the economic crisis, has increased only by 4.5%, if compared with 2008. But certain sectors witnesses wage cuts:

The sharpest decrease has occurred in the construction; in - 2009 the wage was cut by 11.5% as compared to 2008, which shows that this sector was strongly affected by the crisis;In extractive industry the salary decreased by 9% as against - 2008.

According to forecasts a nominal monthly salary increase of nearly 4.65% is expected in the budgetary sector during the first half of 2010. Such a development is due to seasonality present in the monthly salary distribution. Thus, in the first four months of the year, the salary modifications will be insignificant - a situation created by wage freeze in the budgetary sector. A sharp increase will occur in May and June - when the holiday period begins in the budg-etary institutions and remunerations of budget-funded employees are supplemented by additional payments: holiday pay and material aid. The monthly increase of the salary in the non-budgetary sector will be on average of 1.5% in the first half of 2010. Such a modification is larger than the monthly increase in salaries in the same period of 2009, when it was recorded a level of 0.9%. Owing to a slight economic recovery in the first half of 2010 the monthly aver-age wage will in-crease on average by 2.5%, which is a slight increase compared to the same period previous year, when the monthly increase was 2.2%.

Table 3. Forecast of the evolution of average nominal monthly salary in the budgetary sector for the first half of 2010 (MDL)January 2010 February 2010 March 2010 April 2010 May 2010 June 2010

2375.2 2342.8 2455.2 2490.8 2716 2947.5Source: developed by the author

Table 4. Forecast of the evolution of average monthly nominal salary in the non-budgetary sector for the first half of 2010 (MDL)January 2010 February 2010 March 2010 April 2010 May 2010 June 2010

2899 2880.4 2993.2 3080.3 3077.3 3135.6Source: developed by the author

Table 5. Forecast of the evolution of average nominal monthly salary per economy for the first half of 2010 (MDL)

January 2010 February 2010 March 2010 April 2010 May 2010 June 2010

2699.5 2703.2 2798.1 2818.8 2950.2 3045.6Source: developed by the author

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The delicate situation of public finances, related to the presence of the risk of budgetary imbalance, generates certain concerns related to the ability to make the social payments. This hypothesis seems unlikely - a provision in this respect was included in “The State Budget Law for 2010” to protect the budget-funded employees. According to this provision, the expenditures for the payments intended for salaries, scholarships, pensions, allowances, compensations and state debt service will not be froze for purposes of maintaining the approved budgetary deficit.79 In this context, the salary dynamics in the budgetary sector seems not to be disturbed by the likely difficulties arising from budgetary imbalance.

In spite of the crisis, the evolution of pension has been positive. During 2002-2009 the pension increased on average by 25%, from 135.8 MDL to 646.8 MDL. The age pension was set at MDL 837.7 for 2010.

In the first half of the year there are no circumstances that could disrupt the regular payment of salaries and pensions . The risks could arise later and are related to the delay in reforming the pension system

and to the persistence of slow economic growth rates, which will make it difficult to maintain budgetary balance and may impact negatively the social payments . The unemployment rate in 2010 will be 5.5%, representing a decrease as against 2009, when this indicator had a value of 6.3%. However the unemployment in 2010 will be over the values of this indicator registered in the last pre-crisis years, so in 2007 the unemployment rate was 5.1% and 4% in 2008.

79 State Budget Law 2010, Article 19 i. Available at: http://www.politik.md/?view=articlefull_parlament&viewarticle=996

Figure 3. The evolution of the average monthly salary per economy, average monthly salary in the real sector and average monthly salary in budgetary sector in 2007-2010 (MDL)


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Evolution of the minimum subsistence level in normal param-eters for this period of the year. Usually in the first quarter, an increase in the minimum subsistence level occurs as a result of the seasonal rise in food prices. Another factor that may influ-ence the increase in the minimum subsistence level is related to the prise rises in public util-ities.

In the first quarter of 2010 the living subsistence will increase both for the working-age people and pensioners, due to the augmentation of the prices for foodstuff and public utilities.

Yet, the price rise in the first two months of 2010, by 2.3% in January and by 2.1% in February, is a quite high one. If this trend is kept until the end of the year then the prices can exceed 10% in 2010.

For popu-lation the increas-es in food prices, housing and pub-lic utilities are par-

Table 6. The evolution of average monthly age pension in 2002-2010 (MDL)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010The age pension 140.3 166.9 217.9 336.7 397.2 457.5 565.8 666.3 837.75


Table 7. Evolution of unemployment rate in 2007-2010

Unemployment rate in the 1st quarter (%)

Unemployment rate in the 2nd quarter (%)

Annual rate of employment (%)

2007 5.7 4.2 5.1

2008 5.5 3 4

2009 7.7 6.1 6.32010

(Forecast) 6.9 4.9 5.5


Figure 4. Evolution of the quarterly living subsistence for working-age people and pensioners in 2008-2010


Table 8. Forecast of the evolution of living subsistence in the first two quarters of 2010

I Quarter 2010 II Quarter 2010

Living subsistence for working-age population (MDL) 1488.7 1587.2

Living subsistence for pensioners (MDL) 1186.3 1261


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ticularly sensitive. The payments for the consumption of this group of goods and serv-ices is a signifi-cant increase in the expenditures of households and respectively the price rises in these

products affect negatively the living standard of the population. In case of unfavorable weather conditions we can expect a high rate of in-flation in the third quarter. A drought-afflicted summer will lead to a reduction in the supply with food products and respectively to the in-crease in their prices. The possibility of rising prices for public utilities persists throughout the year, however, they are expected to be higher in

the cold season.

The coverage of the subsistence minimum by p o p u l a t i o n s ’ income in the first half of 2010 is comparable with the same period of the previous year. The increase in the subsistence minimum and the modest increase in the income of the population in the first two

Table 9. Forecast of the evolution of price index in 2010

January 2010

February 2010

March 2010

April 2010

May 2010

June 2010

Monthly inflation

%2.3 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.3 0.6

12- month inflation (%) 2.9 6.2 8.9 10.5 11.7 12.7

Annual inflation (%) >10

Average annual

inflation (%)>10


Table 10. Evolution of the ratio of population’s income to the living subsistence

Ratio of the average salary of an

employee in non-budgetary sector to

the living subsistence for working-age population (%)

%

Ratio of the average salary per budgetary

employee to the living subsistence for working-age population (%)

%

Ratio of age pension to living subsistence for

pensioners %

I Quarter 2007 193.7 137.5 54.6

II Quarter 2007 196.9 159.5 50.4

III Quarter 2007 217.6 154.3 51.8

IV Quarter 2007 215.0 147.4 46.9

I Quarter 2008 183.8 129.3 50.4

II Quarter 2008 189.3 148.6 47.5

III Quarter 2008 219.3 145.2 52.7

IV Quarter 2008 215.0 149.5 49.1

I Quarter 2009 198.1 156.9 58.6

II Quarter 2009 225.6 191.5 62.9

III Quarter 2009 261.6 209.0 71.7

IV Quarter 2009 243.4 203.4 64.3I Quarter 2010

(Forecast) 197.3 160.6 70.6II Quarter 2010

(Forecast) 199.1 171.3 66.4Source: developed by the author

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quarters of 2010 will imply a slow augmentation of these indexes. Although there is a slight improvement in some social indicators, the increase in living standard of population is very slow. 2009 economy drop made the incomes of population to return to the indicators similar to pre-crisis period more difficult. Such a conclusion comes from the analysis of the evolution of real incomes per capita, which accounts for the consumption capacity of the population. A similar situation is present in the case of per capita incomes denominated in U.S. dollars. In 2010, this indicator is expected to decline, of course, this will be influenced by the depreciation of the national currency. If compared with other countries in Europe, the living standard in Moldova is the lowest. With EUR 46.29 per month the minimum gross wage in Moldova remains the lowest in Europe, being almost 34 times lower than that of employees in Luxembourg, which holds the first position in a ranking conducted by the Federation of European Em-ployers. A relatively level similar to the minimum wage in Moldova is record-ed in the countries as Montenegro (Euro 55.00) and Ukraine (68.21 Euro).80 The structure of consump-tion expenditure denotes also that the population lives in poverty. In Europe, as regards the living standard, Moldova is part of “the group of losers”, along with Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania, followed, at a significant distance, by Ukraine, and Belarus. A critical situation concerning the poverty is also showed by the ratio of disposal income per capita to the living subsistence. According to this indicator a citizen of Moldova can hardly cover the living subsistence.

Although the evolution of certain indicators regarding the social sector show a slight increase in 2010, the living standard in

80 IstheRepublicofMoldovaapoorcountry?,http://www.eco.md/article/5238/

Although there is a slight improvement in some social indicators, the increase in living standard of population is very slow. 2009 economy drop made the incomes of population to return to the indicators similar to pre-crisis period more difficult.

Table 11. Evolution of population’s income in 2005-2010

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(Forecast)

Nominal GNP per capita (MDL) 10488 12497 14955 17649 16260 17670

Real GNP per capita (MDL)

(MDL, expressed in prices of 2000)

6294 6613 6828 7379 6542 6677

GNP per capita (MDL)(USD)

832 952 1232 1699 1463 1410


In Europe, as regards the living standard, Moldova is part of “the group of losers”

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Moldova will remain unsatis-factory. A slight improvement in the situation is expected in the medium run, but an obvious im-provement in the living standard can come only after achieving major economic performance.

Table 12. Quarterly ratio of disposable income per capita to the living subsistence over 2007-2010

Quarterly ratio of disposable income per capita to living

subsistence%

Quarterly ratio of disposable income per capita to living

subsistence%

I Quarter 2007 54.6 IV Quarter 2008 49.1II Quarter 2007 50.4 I Quarter 2009 58.6III Quarter 2007 51.8 II Quarter 2009 62.9IV Quarter 2007 46.9 III Quarter 2009 71.7I Quarter 2008 50.4 IV Quarter 2009 64.3

II Quarter 2008 47.5 I Quarter 2010(Forecast) 70.6

III Quarter 2008 52.7 II Quarter 2010(Forecast) 66.4


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AUDIOVISUAL SECTOR IN MOLDOVA - BETWEEN CRISIS AND RENEWAL,cornel cIurea

INTRODUCTION

The broadcasting sector in Moldova is a continuous battle field, a place where the law, politics and economics clash sharply. The games often are performing behind the curtain and that makes it difficult to clear up and diagnose the cases correctly. The existence of political and economic interests is often obscured by a rhetoric of alleged democratic flavor meant to divert attention from important issues for the benefit of some insignificant details. Because of this climate of generalized suspicion the most actions taken in this sector are suspected of bias, nepotism and favoritism. This article aims at putting up for discussion the recent cases of this kind in Moldovan audiovisual sector. The political intervention in itself must not necessarily be treated as a negative factor, although the liberal ideology does not welcome the cohabitation of politics with media. The political interference with the media often turns out to be a positive factor, buying for mass media the sources needed for the survival and setting the needed standards for a proper functioning (this factor is valid, especially for the case of the public audiovisual). But the obscure and clandestine way in which the policy makers try to influence radio stations and television channels and the lack of transparency that surrounds this area arises often legitimate reproaches. If in the period of 2001-2009 there was a quasi unanimity regarding the defective way in which the political factor ensured the freedom and objectivity of the media, then the coming into power of IEA announces a major change of paradigm, favoring a more positive approach to institutions in audiovisual sector. However, the alternation of power has also conditioned an intensification of confrontations in the audiovisual sector, confrontations that could generate new political and social crises.

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AUDIOVISUAL - UNDER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

All conflicts and divisions in the audiovisual sector are settled through interpretation of the Audiovisual Code, so that justice often decides on the winner and loser in these disputes. Before the Alliance for European Integration came into power, the most important conflicts have been settled in court, the final verdict being often suspected of political interference. In September 2000, Cairo NGO called on ACC to withdraw the broadcasting license for eight radio stations and three television stations for the reason they did not broadcast 65% of total transmission in the state language under the legal provisions of those times. Winning more than one case, CAIRO made the Parliament to retroactively apply the law, reducing these provisions only to local production, thus allowing the Supreme Court to overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision on the withdrawal of licenses of the targeted stations and demonstrating that the media law and legislators are not neutral in terms of the identity profile of media in Moldova. But the case brought to court also triggered conflicting reactions from many Russian-language journalists. Another example of biased interpretation of the Audiovisual Code took place in 2007, when the ACC withdrew the broadcasting license of TVR TV channel, because of an existing debt, which caused a major political scandal. The case is currently on trial at the ECHR. Another scandalous case occurred in 2006, when through an abusive and deliberately politicized interpretation of Article 66 paragraph 2 of the Audiovisual Code, two public stations belonging to local public authorities (Euro TV and Antena C) were subjected to reorganization, a procedure that was not applied to other radio broadcasters. As a result, the respective stations went to some groups of intermediaries under the control of Government allies: CDPP and CPRM. Another dispute over the inadequate interpretation of the Code by the ACC falls under Article 40(4) that requires to justify all the ACC decisions. But it is often noted that the broadcasting frequencies are distributed in an arbitrary way without the Coordinating Council have ever tried to offer plausible explanations for these decisions. The Audiovisual Code contains also numerous ambiguities that allow ACC members to provide questionable interpretation, such as the lack of a clear distinction in Article 2 between its own and the local

67


production or Article 11(3) regarding the obligation to broadcast in the state language only informative and analytical programmes. All these shortcomings, placed and often maintained intentionally make Moldovan audiovisual processes to take place in conditions of severe lack of transparency, each decision being largely dictated by arbitrary reasons.

This non-transparency and legal vacuum was noticed especially during the 2009 parliamentary elections, being subsequently maintained. PRO TV case was a symbolic example of mixing politics with the judiciary. Requesting under the Article 24 of the new Code its license extension, PRO TV channel fell at the same time under the ACC old code and status that said only licenses issued after 2006 are extended. Being threatened by certain politicians, PRO TV was afraid to put up for contest its own license despite the soothing assurances of ACC, and sued asking for the license extension by right. Having lost two cases during the communist government, the Pro TV channel managed to win the license in the Supreme Court of Justice after the political change in Moldova. Even if this decision is questionable under the legal aspect, it shows that political factor may change the court decision in favour of the sympathized party.

Moreover, the decision on PRO TV created a precedent from which Serebrenii dojdi radio station has benefited. Having obtained the license before 2006, this radio station refused to participate in the contest after the license expiration, asking to extend it by right as well. Currently this case is on trial, the Serebreanii dojdi radio station continued to broadcast despite an earlier decision taken by the ACC on cessation of broadcasting. This precedent will not have lasting legal effects because of the small number of broadcasters with licenses issued before 2006, but it shows how arbitrary can be the decisions in this sector, as well as the fact that decisions of an authority can be ignored.

Another important chapter including biased and inconsistent approaches falls under the Article 38 of the ACC “The sanctions”. The most important case in this respect is the case of NIT, a channel that was subjected to a maximum fine of 5800 lei, after receiving a warning for violating pluralism of opinion. This principle of gradual sanctions is not consistently applied. The NIT channel was earlier

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liable to such penalties (especially during election campaigns along with other channels), but it was treated leniently by the same ACC, whose composition did not changed essentially. This inconsistency affects the credibility of the sanctioning decisions of the ACC in spite of their legitimacy and leads to protests that often are of political nature.

The case of ceasing the Top News programme, carried out by Omega on REN TV channel, is also debatable. Beyond the ins and outs of this case, we have to consider ACC interventions as very late, which allowed the broadcasting of this programme for a long period without being provided for the REN TV broadcasting schedule. This sudden change of ACC’s viewpoint shows a political interest and a reaction based on conjectures and alternations in the Government. The return to normality through a legal inconsistency demonstrates the malleability of ACC and weakens moral value of the decision.

The cases on redistribution of frequencies are also carried out in the conditions of an almost absolute non-transparency and lack of grounds for the decisions. In this sector, it seems, the ACC is guided by political compensation law, providing frequencies to broadcasters wronged by the former Government. The Fresh FM case is paradigmatic in this respect. Eight of the 16 available frequencies were withdrawn in favour of other radio stations closer to the new Government. Interpreting the concept of network abusively, applying it only to national networks, ACC practically disassembled the Fresh FM network.

In conclusion, we can say that the Audiovisual Coordinating Council takes decisions in a context in which political influences are not missing. Many of its decisions can be suspected of occult agreements and willingness to compensate through voluntary actions the broadcasters that earlier have been damaged. There are also ACC members who consistently act in favour of the interests of a single political party, but such actions are incompatible with membership of this organisation. Even if these decisions can be understood, they reveal a selective enforcement of law and a recurrence to the principle of double standards. In these circumstances, any more controversial case is adapted to multiple interpretations, and the law is no longer a guarantor of correctness and equity.

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STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION Of AUDIOVISUAL COORDINATING COUNCIL

Political contests in society are also reflected on the internal life of ACC, if though it was initially conceived as a neutral and impartial institution. Moreover, political interference is caused by a falsehood and a legal fiction set in the Audiovisual Code from the first. Under the Audiovisual Code, ACC members are elevated by public associations, in theory they are not supporters of a certain political party. In reality, ACC members belong to these associations only formally. In general, they protect the interests of the parliamentary parties.

At the same time, ACC remains in the captivity of the constraints that limit freedom of action and forces the authority often to take decisions marked by subjectivism and conjuncture. These dilemmas require limits regardless of the structure and composition of the ACC, being characteristic of spirit of the time - the dilemma of granting a limited number of frequencies to a large number of claimants versus the need to build certain national networks; the dilemma of supporting local production versus lack of means of the broadcasters for achieving this objective; dilemma of supporting the state language versus society’s preference for the Russian language; the need to impose certain broadcasts and programs (e.g. children channel MiniMax) versus the high costs that the broadcasters charge for retransmission. For this reason, many decisions of ACC are the result of compromises between ACC legal requirements and harsh conditions which do not allow the plenary meeting to meet the law provisions.

In fact, the ACC structure often reflects the political configuration of the Parliament. Currently, this configuration is not reflected in a ratio of one hundred percent because of discrepancies between the tenure as a member of the ACC (6 year) and parliamentary mandates (for 4 years). Certain ACC members represent parties that are no longer one of the Parliament, while others show no earlier loyalty. In these circumstances, the ACC acts very cautious applying the law of compensation and refraining from taking radical measures. Due to this fact, we can conclude that the degree of politicization of the ACC has prominently decreased as compared to previous years. At the same time, the strategy of playing at both sides of the table of

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ACC, raises suspicions and dissatisfactions both from the government coalition and from the Communist Party. The recent simplification of the decision-making procedure within the ACC, by going to a simple majority system, is an indubitable attempt to make the Council more workable.

The issue of ACC reform is often debated within the Private Public Council, the Parliamentary Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, Research, Sports and Media. There are two elements that could come into the sight of these institutions in the near future. One factor is related to the principle of irremovability of ACC members, a fact that bans from their dismissal, except the cases stipulated by the law. Signals have already been launched with the intention of introducing the principle of individual and collective responsibility of the ACC members, a fact that hypothetically could allow their selective removal or in a body. Discussions on this intention are an evidence of existing a political willingness to get rid of certain ACC members.

The second lately circulated factor relates to tightening up parliamentary control on ACC. This increased supervision is necessary because of the proliferation of controversial cases related to decisions taken by the ACC, as well as of the often inconclusive interpretations that ACC gives to articles of the Audiovisual Code. Under these conditions we can expect a new rebuilding of the relations between the political factor and the Audiovisual Coordinating Council. This fact may also generate dissatisfactions on the part that will consider it is affected by such a reconfiguration.

LOCAL MASS MEDIA SEPARATION BY LINGUISTIC CRITERIA

In a 2003 study, Mrs Tamara Caraus made a reference to specific features of the mass media from the Republic of Moldova: 1) mass media separation by linguistic criteria, in the Romanian mass media and the Russian mass media; 2) the mass media system acts as a tool for creation and consolidation of various identity-related options (Romanian, Russian, Soviet, communist, Gagauz); 3) the market economy mechanisms do not function in the mass media system of Moldova, as investors are interested in achieving the power rather

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than the profit. In our view this diagnosis is still true today, while these specific features represent generators of crises in the Moldovan society. Yet, we should recognize that the diagnosis expressed by the aforementioned author results in stagnation of the media market and maintenance of an artificial polarization on the basis of linguistic and cultural-political criteria to the detriment of the appropriate information and public education.

The linguistic separation has become a focus of public attention once again, especially after the declarations made by the director of a radio station, Veaceslav Tibuleac, at the Assembly of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova in 2009, who said that “It is not Army Division14, deployed at the left bank of Nistru river, not Tiraspol that pose the highest threat to the existence of the R. of Moldova, it is the Russian media institutions from Chisinau, which systematically, day after day, strangle the future of the R. of Moldova. The R. of Moldova is under the most sever occupation known in the world - the informational occupation of Russian Federation.” Beyond the somehow pathetic and exaggerated tone of this statement, we cannote the reanimation of an old subject of the Moldovan audiovisual environment - the disproportional amount of Russian media and programmes re-broadcast from Russian Federation in the RM, the phenomenon that affects the informational space of the state and the subject which caused a crisis, including the political one, in Chisinau in 2000, when the Parliament considered appropriate to amend retroactively the law to save some radio broadcasters from cessation of their broadcast in the case of CAIRO. However, Mr Tibuleac’s declarations were underlain by a less political leitmotif, ignored when it was expressed, - the need of supporting the local producer, who broadcasts in Romanian (according to legal provisions), to the detriment of the re-broadcast channels in the Republic of Moldova (mostly Russian ones).

In practical terms, the intention to increase the number of programs in Romanian language and to protect the local radio broadcasters refers mainly to the amendment of certain provisions of Article 11 of the Audiovisual Code (or the compliance with the existent ones) and introduction of some amendments in the Law on Advertising of the Republic of Moldova of 1997. First, the question

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is about the compliance with the provisions on dubbing, subtitling and sound recording of the programs broadcast in a foreign language, clarification of the notion of own production and raising the quota of broadcasting in Romanian language for local production, removal of the requirement on compulsory broadcasting in the state language of only informative and analytical programs. Second, the supporters of a more strict legislation insist on amending Article 13 of the Law on Advertising, through the introduction of the provision according to which all advertisement in the audiovisual shall be posted only in local production, which would favor financially considerably the producers which include a greater share of programs produced in Moldova.

These interventions made in quite trenchant and ultimative terms provoked the reaction of the Russian press (Serebrjannyj Dozhd) but also the representatives of Russian Federation (the ambassador of Russia, Priznanie Foundation, etc.). Nonetheless, the initiative to protect the state language and national radio broadcasters fall within the rationale adopted by most countries in the world, including by Russia and Ukraine, by which they try to respond the idea of political and informational unity of the population, at the same time providing their citizens the possibility to chose depending on personal preferences. Suffice to say that in 2000, Russian Federation passed the Information Security Doctrine, meant to ensure the protection of Russian informational space from external and internal threats and in 2005, Vladimir Putin signed the federal law “On State Language of the Russian Federation”, which described in details the scope of Russian language in Russian mass media except for the channels established with a view to broadcast in the state language of the republics.

DECOLONISATION Of TELERADIO-MOLDOVA IPNA COMPANY

Appointment of the new administration of Teleratio-Moldova IPNA company, which includes persons from the civil society, reanimated the hopes of the democratization of this institution, often accused of political partisanship and ossification in old patterns of thinking. In its intention statement, Angela Sirbu, the new director of this company stated: “The appointment of a director that does

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not belong to any political affiliation, former or current, knows the democratic journalism standards,... can serve as a minimal warranty that the chance for the reform, emerged through the appointment of a new administration itself, to start at Moldova 1 will not perish.” 81

However, getting rid of the old management of the company did not go without ambiguities and application of double standards. Even if the excessive politicizing of Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company was proved many times, the ACC began applying punitive actions only after the change of the governance. For instance, the tender book of Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company by the ACC was declined only in September 2009, although the controlling institution of the audiovisual had a very favorable attitude towards Teleradio-Moldova during the electioneering period, which was noted by the ex-member of the ACC, Vlad Turcanu.82 Besides, the Parliament’s approval of the budget for Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company before the approval of the tender book was an action which did not fall entirely within the limits of the law and this was susceptible to certain political constructions.

Despite these alleged infightings, we can say that the activity of Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company was restarted, and now it is carried out under more democratic conditions. The new management begins its activity in a context of optimistic expectations, but at the same time it has to confront almost insurmountable. Further we will briefly list the main challenges the new management is going to encounter.

First, the political problem can not be taken from the agenda. The new management of the company, educated in the style of BBC textbooks, has no experience in communication with policy makers, who, finding no resistance, will try to promote their own interests. The experience of the East Europe states, such as Poland, Hungary, Serbia and even Czech Republic, do not allow us to state that the reforms of public televisions have lead to their total de-politicizing.83 On the contrary, the political factor manages further to keep the control over these institutions both at the management and the observers’ level.

Second, the problem of identity of Moldova 1 channel persists. In the intention project, Angela Sirbu insists on the professionalism 81 www.hotnews.md„Sirbu’sRevolutionatMoldova1”82 www.stireazilei.md„ValentinTodercan:wantstobedismissedbyCorinaFusuandnotbyMarkTkaciuk”83 AlinaMungiu-Pippidi„StateintoPublic:TheFailedReformofStateTVinEastCentralEurope”,WorkingPaperseries,HarvardUniversity

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and correctness of news. Nonetheless, often the professionalism and correctness are not enough to assert oneself on the media market, since in the “dual system” the public TVs give ground to the commercial ones. Until not so far, Moldova 1 was practically a quasi monopolist on the market, but currently the competition has become much more frenzied.

Third, an important issue relates to the financing the public TV. This financing is running low, although the television becomes an increasingly expensive business. The potential development projects could be blocked owing to the lack of funds and the increase in the budget appropriations for

Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company could be determined politically.

Fourth, there is still the problem of the human resources management. The public television is an institution which never employed people on the basis of efficiency, even though in the 2000s it was considerably streamlined (which actually transformed in political purge). At the television management level a revision of the staff policy is wanted, but this issue is extremely sensible and may easily be used for political purposes.

All these problems indicate clearly to the difficulty of the task to reform Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company. Even if Moldova 1 could escape the political pressure, it risks to succumb in the confrontation with the economic factor.

ESCAPING THE ITALIAN INfLUENCE? COMMING UNDER BERLUSCONIZATION?

All states from the region have underwent the so called “colonization” and “Italian influence” over the press and particularly over public televisions. Having escaped the Soviet State control, the television, now public, continued to be controlled by the state during the governance of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (CPRM), while commercial televisions were subject to a colonization process by various political parties. Thus, the NIT was controlled hundred-per-cent by the Communist Party of Moldova, while Antena C and EURO TV were fostered at the beginning by

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Serafim Urechean, being transferred afterwards under the supervision of Popular Christian Democratic Party (PCDP) of Iurie Rosca.

The rise to power of the Alliance for European Integration changed the data of the problem, announcing the attempt of a new approach. This related first to Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company, which escaped (for the time being) the constrains of the severe control from the state, getting under the baton of some managers from civil society, who may not be suspected of obscure political partisanship. Is this transfiguration a genuine “revolution” of Moldovan audiovisual or just a short intermezzo, which will be followed by the state’s revenge, this time in a “soft” version? It remains to be seen. So far we can only say that the changes announce an unprecedented modification of public television, change which proved to be of an extremely short length in other states of East Europe (suffice to mention just two years of governance of Alina Mungiu-Pippidi at the TVR Romania). At the same time, the colonization of the commercial televisions from Moldova becomes increasingly less obvious. Only NIT remains openly controlled by a political party, while other televisions endeavour to get rid of the image of some channels anchored in a political formation. The phenomenon is similar to the one that occurred to the local press in early 2000s, when the party newspapers tried to escape (never completely) the protective tutorship of politicians.

At a closer scrutiny one can find that the evolution trajectory of the local audiovisual does not differ too much from the way the mass media from Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine has developed. The only issue to mention is that changes in Moldova occur much slower and we lag behind the states listed before. The next phase, following the historical cycle, would be Berlusconization of the public and commercial televisions, which would mean taking and creating them by barons with exorbitant resources, willing to establish the agenda of the subjects discussed in the society, to raise and to relegate politicians and, ultimately, to control the flow of events in the country. In Romania such magnates are Vintu, Voiculescu and Patriciu, while in Russia, currently - Berezovski, Gusinski and oil barons. The berlusconizated televisions are characterized by a tabloid spirit, always in chase of sensational, providing programs of poor quality, talk shows, soap operas and showing distinct political loyalties.

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There are already signs that the Moldovan audiovisual may tend to this direction. The advent of two news televisions - Jurnal TV (with a rather mild style) and Publica TV (that announces an unprecedented journalistic aggressiveness), whose funding sources and reserves do not seem to have economic coverage, reflect gradual rooting of a new journalistic style in the local audiovisual. The fact that Moldovan society discusses the affiliation of these two channels and does not seem to be too credulous in respect to their political “virginity”, is indicative of such a berlusconization.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Audiovisual Coordinating Council takes decisions in a 1. context which does not lack political influences, with many of its decisions susceptible of being suspected of obscure agreements and will to compensate, through voluntary actions, the radio broadcasters that have previously been damaged. Under those conditions any case that is more controversial is susceptible of multiple interpretations, the law failing to serve as the warranter of the correctness and fairness. In this case it is necessary to homogenize the interpretations, the situation in which similar cases should be construed similarly. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council, as an autonomous 2. institution, must be held accountable before the citizens for the decisions it takes. Very many of them lack unbiasedness and are dictated by compensatory trends in respect to those it has previously treated in an unjust manner. Making it accountable may be done in two ways - through exact reflection in the ACC of the parties acceding in the Parliament (thus, obtaining a true representation of the political options from the Parliament) or through the creation of an independent, yet further subordinated to the Parliament, ACC. The main objectives of the Parliamentary control relate to obliging the ACC to explain the reasons for its decisions, monitor the programs and apply sanctions exactly, while the public hearings could be the main tool. At the same time, a mechanism of holding the members of the ACC accountable could be developed.

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Through the advent of some press trusts apparently supported 3. by oligarchs, the Republic of Moldova slides towards a berlusconizated regime of the press in which political interests are hidden behind the economic ones. These trusts will dramatically change the landscape of the local audiovisual, making even more difficult the task of protecting the informational space from malignant influences of the commercialization and tabloidization. The assignment of counterbalancing the effects of berlusconization will belong to Teleradio-Moldova IPNA company, which should develop itself in two directions - 1) the one relating to preserving the generalist nature providing useful and not necessarily spectacular information; 2) the one relating to the performance, daring to start innovative and rating raising projects.The intention of the authorities to protect local programs in the 4. official language is explainable. But the limitations should not deepen even more the linguistic separation of the audiovisual. That is why it is necessary to implement this reform gradually, offering a period of grace to radio broadcasters. At the same time, it is necessary to change some provisions of Article 11 of the Audiovisual Code (or to comply with the existent ones) and to introduce some amendments in Law on Advertising of the Republic of Moldova of 1997. First, the question is about the compliance with the provisions on dubbing, subtitling and sound recording of the programs broadcast in a foreign language, clarification of the notion of own production and raising the quota of broadcasting in Romanian language for local production, removal of the requirement on compulsory broadcasting in the state language of only informative and analytical programs. Second, Article 13 of Law on Advertising could be subjected to a gradual amendment through the introduction of the provision according to which all advertisement shall be placed only to the local production.

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NOTE

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IDIS „Viitorul” is a research, training and public initiative institution, which works in several fields related to: economic analysis, governance, political research, strategic plan-ning and knowledge management. IDIS acts as a common platform that brings together young intellectuals, concerned with the success of transition to market economy and open society in the republic of Moldova.

Institute for Social Initiatives and Development (IDIS) „Viitorul” is the lawful successor of the Viitorul Foundation, and preserves traditions, objectives and principles of activity of the foundation, such as: building democratic institutions and develop the spirit of responsibil-ity amongst politicians, public servants and citizens of our country, consolidate civil society and the spirit of criticism, promote liberties and values of an open, modernized and pro-European society.

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