eac-requested vvsg research overview and status june 2008 mark skall chief, software diagnostics and...

EAC-requested VVSG Research Overview and Status

June 2008

Mark SkallChief, Software Diagnostics and Conformance

Testing DivisionNational Institute of Standards and Technology

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6/17/2008

Contents Overview of EAC-requested research

tasks NIST approach Status of each task Next steps

Additional research EAC requested that NIST conduct

VVSG-related research 6 items in response to Standards

Board/Board of Advisors resolutions from Dec 2007 meetings

Final results to EAC Sep 2008

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Overview of six items1. Alternatives to software independence2. Developing standards for ballot on demand

systems3. Impact of the VVSG on vote by phone systems 4. Ramifications of separately testing and certifying

components plus requirements for interoperability5. Impact of the VVSG on early voting or vote centers6. Developing alternatives to goal level requirements

in the VVSG

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The NIST role EAC, not NIST, makes decisions wrt VVSG

requirements NIST research will contain options as

appropriate, each with pros and cons NIST goal is to provide useful data for EAC

decision making: Provide complete set of options Include any ramifications to other EAC activities, e.g.,

certification, testing Think outside the box and be creative

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1. Alternatives to software independence

Should retain focus on security, verifiability, and auditability in the VVSG

Research should be conducted on what changes need to be made to the VVSG to accommodate each alternative

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Current analysis While various alternatives to SI exist, they all

have significant cons: Increased design and development costs Need for more rigorous and expensive testing Will take at least 3 years to develop:

Will require significant research Will require standardization efforts Need for funding or possible development incentives

Could be major ramifications to other areas of the VVSG that will need further study, e.g., usability, accessibility

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Approaches under consideration

Along with IVVR, conforming alternatives could include

End-to-end (E2E) cryptographic approaches Independent Verification (IV) Systems – also

known as IDV Secure Audit Port requirements Also, remove SI restriction from Innovation

Class

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Overall strategy

SI - Auditability

Innovation Class

IVVR

Auditability

SI

IVVRIV Audit Port

E2EInnovation Class

Current draft next VVSG: With inclusion of alternatives:

Overall strategy Make auditability, not SI, an overarching requirement Moves focus to the trustworthiness of audit records Allows some reliance on software based on trust in audit

records How is auditability achieved?

Software independent approaches: IVVR E2E systems

Independent verification systems Secure audit port Innovation class without SI restriction

E2E cryptographic approaches

What is an E2E system? Allows voters to verify votes cast as

intended, counted as cast Strength of crypto algorithm for

encoding/decoding ballots is proof of correctness

Audits can be much simpler, voters can self-audit own ballots

Usability and accessibility issues easier to address


PresidentGovernor

Receipt101001101010

Voting Stage


Receipt101001101010

Remote access

Home PC

Verification Stage

Pros: Generally considered to be software independent Election is verifiable by public Electronic audit records

Cons: Emerging technology Usability/Accessibility issues to be addressed Long-term effort (research, standardization,

implementation) No commercially available implementations


Independent Verification Systems

What is independent verification? Two or more devices record cast ballots Voter verifies that records match Alternatively, one of the devices is a trusted device


Voting Device

Witness Device

PresidentGovernor

PresidentGovernor


Pros: Electronic audit records Redundant independent cast vote records Usability/Accessibility potentially easier to address than

with IVVR Possibly an add-on technology to current voting systems

Cons: Software dependent Long-term effort (research, standardization,

implementation) Limited commercial availability Architectural building a trusted device Certification and interoperability issues

Secure audit port What is a secure audit port?

Similar to Independent Verification systems One-way communication May not be direct voter verification Records voter and machine actions to

construct voter choices- not necessarily cast vote records

Secure audit port

Audit Device

Voting Device

President

Governor

Secure audit port Pros:

Electronic audit records Allows for audit device innovation Allows choice of audit devices Similar to existing commercially available architectures

Cons: Software dependent Certification and interoperability issues Security dependent on audit device functionality No audit device specifications in VVSG Medium-term effort (standardization)

2. Ballot on demand BOD: device that can print ballots on

demand for use in elections Reduces need to pre-print and transport ballots

to polling place NIST to research the feasibility of including

BOD requirements in the VVSG Do election official needs require further

research before requirements can be written?

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Current analysis BOD not a mature product yet Earlier NIST research with EAC boards

identified diversity of opinions on what BOD should encompass A backup EMS application for emergencies A dedicated application possibly integrated

with an epollbook Somehow integrated with a DRE

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Feasible, but NIST would need to conduct more research to focus on specifics

VVSG impacts BOD in various ways Core: reliability, accuracy, misfeeds Security: ballot accounting, voter privacy,

forgery-proof paper Human factors: usability for voters and poll

workers, suitability for audit, accessibility

Current analysis (cont)

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3. Vote by phone systems VBP: voters use telephones and

guided prompts to place votes, electronic and paper ballots printed out at remote office

Does the VVSG, as written, prohibit VBP?

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Analysis Is feasible to permit VBP, but

Will require some reworking of VVSG device class structure

Will require strong cryptography and other communications security

Would need to research usability of guided prompts for voters

May not meet interpretation of HAVA regarding accessibility

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4. Separately certifying components, interoperability of

data format

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1. Develop a feasibility study of the ramifications of the EAC separately testing and certifying components

2. Research requirements for interoperability between systems and system components

3. NIST to research whether a specific standard for format of electronic election data can be required

Current analysis

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VVSG conformance testing does not address interoperability:

Adherence to a standard is alone not sufficient, implementations will still differ

A separate interoperability testing program would need to be contemplated

There is still a need to test the voting system as a whole, i.e., “The system is more than the sum of its parts.”

A voting system architecture would need to be specified to know what needs to be interoperable

Current analysis (cont)

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Premature to require a specific standard for the format of election data, more vetting needed Whatever chosen should natively support all

voting variations in the VVSG Should be vetted by U.S. voting system

vendors Interoperability should be demonstrated

5. Early voting & vote centers

Addresses questions as to whether VVSG prohibits or impacts use of voting equipment in early voting or vote centers

Especially of concern with regard to use of epollbooks

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No impacts seen, CRT requirements accommodate early voting and vote centers VVPAT requirements anticipated multi-precinct

use of equipment Electronic poll book requirements permit

network connections to central voter registration databases

Caveat: cannot network poll books to vote capture devices and databases at same time

Current analysis

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6. Goal level requirements Identifying goal level requirements

Requirements that can identify goals but are untestable

Requirements that could be tested but testing will be subjective and non-repeatable

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Why Goal Requirements? Some requirements express a goal

to be met by the vendor Is kind of a performance

requirement, but without clear performance measures

Often done to avoid constraining design requirements

Obvious examples Systems SHALL maximize integratability with

other systems and/or devices of other systems. Goal is for interoperability, but is untestable

The procedures for system setup, polling, and shutdown, as documented by the manufacturer, SHALL be reasonably easy for the typical poll worker to learn, understand, and perform.

Testing will be subjective It will be non-repeatable

VVSG has roughly 20-30 goal level requirements33

Could be deleted or included as informative text or as “should” requirements

Additional research could be conducted to make the requirements more specific Trade-offs exist as to amount of research Expert judgment may suffice in some cases

Current analysis

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Summary

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Snapshot of current analysis was presented Research is very preliminary NIST vetting is not complete Analysis could change by September

Final document due in September

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