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Walter Rauschenbusch

“History is never antiquated,

because humanity is always

fundamentally the same.”

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“GUNS AND GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPE

AND JAPAN”

Title: “Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan”

Written by Stephen Morillo Published by Journal of World History, Vol. 6,

No. 1 Copyright 1995 by University of Hawaii Press

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REFLECTIONS Ultimately, to read is to think And for every reader, there is a different

perspective What follows is a selection of passages that

captured this humble reader’s attention

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What role does technological innovation play in shaping historical change in the premodern world?

Gunpowder weapons developed slowly in Europe over the course of several hundred years, but arquebuses and cannon of a developed type were introduced in Japan at a precisely identifiable time: the year 1543

The Japanese case suggests that stronger government, not the introduction of guns, was the key force behind the military revolutions

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In European history, the term military revolution denotes the developments in warfare from about 1450 to 1800 that steadily created a military advantage for western European powers compared to much of the rest of the world

A tactical revolution returned massed infantry formations to a battlefield dominance they had not held since the age of Rome, at the expense of heavily armored cavalry

This battlefield phenomenon was accompanied by rapid changes in fortification and siege tactics that further emphasized infantry over cavalry

These stimulated the next change: steady growth in the size of armies

Inevitably, the greater scale and intensity of warfare led to greater effects of war on society

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The real challenge is to explain why these changes took place

Two major lines of explanation dominate the debate

On the one hand, there are what may be characterized as technological determinist arguments

In this view the introduction of gunpowder weaponry is seen as the primary causal engine of change

On the other hand, critics of technological determinism have advanced several specific objections to the technological explanation, attempting to achieve a more complicated, multicausal account of events

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But William H. McNeill’s account of the age of gunpowder, though it still focuses on technology as an important factor, shows that the effect of the introduction of such technology varied greatly according to the social and institutional context into which it was introduced

And McNeill is only one of many to show that disease played a huge role in the establishment of European dominance in the Americas

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In fact, European dominance in the world, especially in a military sense, is really a product of industrialization and thus appears in the nineteenth century and not before

Therefore, the author contends that armies and military practices are shaped by the societies and institutions that produce them

Of course, the effectiveness of an infantry formation depends on its size, its cohesion, and its mobility

And naturally, a larger formation may be harder to keep together and will certainly be harder to move

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In a conflict between infantry and cavalry, cohesion is crucial

In hand-to-hand shock combat, horsemen have the potential advantages of height and mobility

But against a solid formation of foot soldiers, horsemen can only bring about hand-to-hand fighting by creating gaps and breaks in the formation

Creating such gaps is in fact the function of the classic cavalry charge, and the charge achieves this end psychologically

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The potentially terrifying sight of a charging line of horses is designed to cause some members of the infantry formation to break ranks and run, opening the gaps necessary for the cavalry to break in and use their advantages

If the formation maintains its cohesion, the horses will “refuse” in the face of an object they can neither jump over nor go around, and an indecisive standoff will probably result

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What, then, can give masses of infantry cohesion?

The answer is deceptively simple: trust Each man in the formation must trust his

neighbor not to run away Normally, an infantry unit gains cohesion through

drill and through experience And drill can only be instituted where there is a

central authority strong enough to gather sufficient numbers of men to make an infantry formation and rich enough to maintain them while they are trained

In effect, strong infantry depends on strong government

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The same is not true of cavalry Mobility is cavalry’s great advantage Cavalry can be effective in smaller numbers than

infantry, and so may require less training in large groups

On the other hand, making a horseman requires much more individual training from an earlier age than making a foot soldier, and an individual horseman is much more expensive to maintain than an individual foot soldier

As a result, cavalry in the traditional world was very often the product—the natural arm—of social elites

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Sons of such classes were raised to the military lifestyle, trained in small groups built from the social connections within the class, and taught to exercise military force in the interest of maintaining their own position in the hierarchy of power

Although a central authority could often harness the skills and energies of such an elite to its own military and policy ends, it could just as easily find itself at odds with such an elite, especially over the form and distribution of power

The elite (and thus effective cavalry) could therefore easily exist outside the context of a strong central authority

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In this view, the rise of stronger governments in late medieval Europe caused the appearance of effective infantry formations, such as had not been seen since the decline of the imperial Roman government and its legions

As gunpowder technology spread, it could be taken up by armies already developing along organizational lines compatible with its use—that is, armies composed of masses of infantry raised under the stimulus of a central authority and decreasingly dominated by a mounted warrior elite

And Japan in the Sengoku age (roughly 1477–1600) can be used as a comparative “control” case

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It is similar enough in important respects to Europe to make comparison useful, yet differing in one crucial way: the date of the introduction of gunpowder weapons to Japan is known precisely – 1543

The development of Japanese armed forces over the next hundred years was similar enough to the European experience that it seems safe to assume similar stimuli were at work

The period of Japanese history in question extends roughly from 1477 (the end of the Onin War) to 1600 (the beginning of the Tokugawa era)

It was a period of division, competition, and constant, intense warfare

The developments of the Sengoku (Warring States) age stimulated by this warfare laid the foundations of the unified Japan that followed

The Onin War effectively brought to an end the system of rule that had characterized the Ashikaga shogunate in the fifteenth century

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The Ashikaga polity before the Onin War was based on a delicate balance among the shugo, or military governors, who resided for the most part in Kyoto where the shoguns exercised their influence in maintaining the balance and thus their own position

During the Onin War, the shugo self-destructed The shogunate retreated into political

insignificance, and power devolved upon the military families based in the provinces

Their close connection to the lands, villages, and rural warrior class—the effective bases of power—gave the leaders of the provincial warriors, the daimyo, a firm foundation from which to build their power

In the earlier Kamakura bakufu or military government (literally “tent government”), Kyoto-based civil authorities and Kamakura-based military authorities worked together (in theory) in governing the country

But Kamakura regional military leaders were hampered by the mostly effective control the bakufu exercised over regional appointments

Shugo could be transferred from province to province, and this hindered the shugo from creating firm local power bases

So, Kamakura regional leaders were insecure in their holds both over their own followers and over their provinces

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The Ashikaga shugo were as ineffective at establishing firm local power bases as the Kamakura leaders had been

But the biggest problem for Ashikaga shugo was that the shoguns required them to reside in the capital at Kyoto

This separated them both from their land bases in the provinces and from the local bands of warriors who could exercise power in the provinces on the shugo’s behalf

Thus, the presence of a central, “national” government with some real power again hindered rather than promoted effective local governance

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Both the Kamakura and Ashikaga governments therefore appear as fairly extensive but not very intensive polities, reaching far across the land but not very deep into society

But the Sengoku daimyo who rose to prominence after the Onin War were able, through plan or circumstance, to deal with each of the limitations that had hindered their predecessors and to establish more effective control over their domains—in fact, to create domains

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The foundation of the success of Sengoku daimyo was tight control over their followers, the ability to maintain effective discipline and loyalty

The early Sengoku period thus saw the abandonment of formal ties of family and presumptive loyalty in favor of pseudo-contractual ties of man to man based on service, usually military, to the daimyo in exchange for protection by and income from the daimyo

Though actual land grants made up this income in the early stages of the Sengoku period, the pressures in favor of close control of vassals and ease of administration soon led the daimyo to begin granting income to their followers in rice instead of in land

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This trend was accompanied by the increasing tendency of daimyo to gather their followers in castle-towns under the daimyo’s eyes, whenever possible, rather than planting them on their own estates

Was this system “feudal”? Functionally, what developed was a professional

mercenary relationship dressed up in and reinforced (somewhat) by the moral language of bonds of personal dependence

Daimyo in effect created standing armies of paid professional soldiers through what continued, at least for a time, to look like feudal mechanisms

Such ties were more effective than the old ones This is because they were based on

unambiguous use of force, reward, and punishment, and not on moral obligation

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A cash-based army led Sengoku daimyo to take greater interest in the development of public works and the encouragement of agricultural productivity than earlier rulers had, because such projects benefited them directly

This also accounts for the common practice by Sengoku daimyo of founding (or encouraging) commercial districts around their main castle

The tax income generated by commerce and industry was gained without the danger of geographic overexpansion faced by earlier rulers

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The collapse of the prestige of the shogunate and the decline of Kyoto as a political center after the Onin War also meant that there was little temptation for daimyo to jump prematurely from their local bases to a “national” political stage, because such a stage no longer existed

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In terms, then, of top-down forces for more effective government, daimyo managed to establish discipline and control among their followers, carve out compact territories, create effective “public” administrative systems, and raise revenue productively

All these developments are visible before 1543, and they made possible bigger and better military forces, forces that could make effective use of gunpowder weapons when they appeared

But the daimyo’s efforts worked hand in hand with forces for change emerging from the lower levels of society

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The disorders of the early Sengoku period encouraged villages in the direction of self-help in protecting themselves against the depredations of local warriors

At the same time, economic development stimulated greater stratification among the peasantry, as some farmers responded more successfully than others to a growing market, and also led to greater mobility of labor

Both trends contributed to the creation of a growing class of armed villagers

Daimyo found the existence of these armed villagers much to their advantage, and they increasingly recruited from among this class for larger and larger bodies of troops

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The daimyo’s desire for troops and the villagers’ desire for protection against local lords created a natural alliance that both sides made use of

More important, perhaps, the connection between aggressive villages and aggressive daimyo put pressure on local warriors from above and below simultaneously, rendering them more dependent themselves on the favor and power of daimyo

And the class of samurai grew tremendously, for it included all the soldiers in a daimyo’s service and not just the mounted elite warriors who counted as knights in Europe

The near total lack of social mobility in Tokugawa Japan should not obscure this important feature of the Sengoku age

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Social mobility was both symptom of and contributor to the systemic flux of daimyo domains, and it provided human resources to rulers anxious to expand their military power

Indeed almost all the military changes had begun long before 1543 and continued in the same trajectory after that date and the new technology it brought

Daimyo were making more efficient use of their resources and drawing soldiers from a broader segment of the population

And this increase, already so visible by the 1540, predates the introduction of gunpowder

It was dependent, however, on more efficient government, a change that was already in progress before 1543

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Inevitably, as army size grew, military careers opened up to increasing numbers of low-born soldiers

With this shift came changes in the tactical composition of armies

There was a move away from reliance on cavalry—the mounted samurai bearing sword and bow

Instead, daimyo relied increasingly on masses of infantry wielding spear and bow (and later, musket)

Sengoku forces became increasingly infantry dominated

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But the shift in the social composition of armies therefore reflected deeper changes in authority structures and the ruling class

Since horses are expensive both to raise and to maintain, this certainly accounts for part of the shift to unmounted troops who had to fight as infantry

And traditional mounted samurai were expensive not only because of their horses but also because of their social prestige, which demanded suitable levels of compensation

Finally, the shift to unmounted troops was encouraged by the increasing importance of sieges in warfare, as control of territory became the crucial measure of a daimyo’s power

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In fact, control of territory came increasingly to depend on control of the castles that appeared in greater numbers in this period

A cavalry charge could not take a castle In the centuries when mounted samurai

dominated battlefields, battles were stages for individual heroics by noble warriors

But when war became a matter of carving out and holding compact territorial domains, noble warrior tactics proved inadequate

A hundred spearmen could defeat a single noble swordsman and accomplish real military gain

Such an outcome in the earlier ages would have brought little honor to the winner, so there was little incentive to raise masses of spearmen

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Leaving ranks to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, formerly a chief means of gaining glory and praise, now became a breach of discipline punishable by death

In short, Sengoku battles came to be shaped more by science and less by art

It should be obvious that only a central authority firmly in control of its military could impose on noble warriors unwilling to give up their traditions the sort of discipline such battles demanded

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In terms of effects on the battlefield, it is clear that the introduction of muskets into Japan simply reinforced trends already apparent before their arrival

And from the very beginning muskets were bought, and later manufactured, at the behest of strong daimyo who saw their utility

The arms were then distributed to armies already in place and accustomed to obeying commands

The introduction of muskets thus tells from another angle the story of the rise of strong daimyo states and changing social structures before 1543

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Perhaps most tellingly, the supposed key to the European developments – the cannon – had little influence on military developments in Japan

In particular, changes in the size and composition of armies – supposedly in Europe a response to changes in siege warfare brought about by cannon – preceded changing castle design in Japan, as they preceded the introduction of gunpowder weapons

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Basically, the collapse of national political systems of legitimacy and the virtual elimination of higher level rulers (shugo and shogun) as political forces unleashed competition at a lower level among the daimyo

The daimyo quickly discovered that such competition was most effectively carried on through the conquest and effective governance of compact territorial bases, which required them to control their followers effectively

And out of these states emerged a military revolution

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Technological innovation seems not to have played a primary causal role in the creation of these changes

In Japan, better government preceded guns

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The unification of Japan begun by Nobunaga, completed by Hideyoshi, and turned into a stable polity by Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successors removed overt military competition and constant life-and-death warfare from the political map of Japan

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The closing of Japan to outsiders in 1640 simply exaggerated the new character of political Japan – What had been a system of warring states and a society in flux had become a peaceful, balanced polity set over a managed society

Given the political environment, it should not be surprising that gunpowder technology developed no independent momentum and that the rapid development of military technology and practice that characterized the Sengoku age virtually came to a halt

Change was no longer in the interest of the rulers of Japan

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In other words, Tokugawa Japan’s ruling elite succeeded in using new administrative techniques, new styles of warfare, and new technology just enough to establish a stable power structure

They then used the power structure they had built to contain the disruptive, anti-traditional effects of the new techniques and technologies they had developed

It was a remarkable accomplishment, revealing the control politics and power could exercise over technology

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In conclusion, administrative changes took precedence over the introduction of gunpowder weapons

Better government preceded and provided a context for the successful use of gunpowder weapons in Europe

And these weapons certainly affected the course of historical change once they were introduced

But their introduction, style of use, and even their effects were made possible and shaped by the political-institutional and economic context into which they were introduced

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Interestingly, Japan at least temporarily established a stable political structure along traditional lines

Europe, on the other hand, never achieved the unity Japan did

It thus continued to compete within itself and carry that competition to ever more distant parts of the globe

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The end of the dominance of the heavily armored knight on the battlefields of Europe, like the decline of the armored and mounted samurai in Japan, had little to do with the introduction of new technology

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Instead, the decline of the armored knight had much to do with changes in the economic, social, and institutional structures

A natural corollary to this conclusion is that the age of cavalry did not have a technological beginning any more than it had a technological end

Strong government – effective central authority – makes for strong infantry

The rise and fall of administrative capacity is the real key to the rise and fall of infantry skills and thus to the military patterns of medieval Europe and medieval Japan

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And it is important to not that deemphasizing technology as a causal factor does not similarly deemphasize warfare

Military competition was a central feature of both Sengoku Japan and transitional Europe

What stands out about the sort of political-military environment and warfare that dominated these two cases is that it proved conducive to widespread and significant social and institutional change

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That cannot be said of most periods of warfare, and it suggests the notion of “warring states” periods as a useful comparative type

In the Warring States era of Chinese history, from roughly 480 to 220 B.C., the warfare of this period forged the foundation of the Chinese imperial bureaucratic system – the scribe-dominated society that was perhaps the most successful and fully integrated traditional civilization on record, and certainly one of the longest lasting

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The second occurred in Europe between 1450 and 1815; though not named the Warring States era, it certainly was one

From the warfare of this period was forged the foundation of the modern world, for this period eventually gave birth to the industrial revolution and the modern state

The third was the Sengoku or Warring States era in Japan, which arguably continued in the 1850s after a 250-year hiatus

From the warfare of this period was forged the foundation of both the Tokugawa shogunate and, in certain fundamental ways, Japan’s uniquely successful response to the challenge of Western industrial imperialism in the nineteenth century

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In summation, the “effects” of technology are shaped by the context into which the technology is introduced

Even the same technology will have different effects in different social, institutional, and political settings

This conclusion is especially to be emphasized for traditional civilizations

Stable traditional civilizations were built to resist change

The rapid spread of new technologies, especially those with apparently revolutionary consequences, such as may be observed in transitional Europe and Sengoku Japan, is probably a symptom of a deeper breakdown in the civilization adopting the new technology