AU/ACSC/179/1999-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

DYNAMIC RE-TASKING:

THE JFACC AND THE AIRBORNE STRIKE PACKAGE

by

Jeffrey M. Saling, Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Lt Col Raul Meza

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of

Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the

property of the United States government.

ii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................... ii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................................................. v

PREFACE .......................................................................................................................... vi

ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................vii

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1Statement of the Research Question ............................................................................. 1Background and Significance ....................................................................................... 2Limitations of the Study................................................................................................ 3Definitions and Assumptions........................................................................................ 4Preview of the Argument .............................................................................................. 5

JFACC AND THE JAOC ................................................................................................... 7Structure........................................................................................................................ 7

Major Components.................................................................................................. 8Personnel................................................................................................................. 9

Current Decision Making Process .............................................................................. 12Essentials............................................................................................................... 15Level of Control .................................................................................................... 17Timeline ................................................................................................................ 17

Technology Integration............................................................................................... 18Information Systems ............................................................................................. 19Real Time Command and Control Assets............................................................. 20

REAL TIME DECISION MAKING................................................................................. 21The Decision Making Process .................................................................................... 21Future Technology Integration ................................................................................... 23Automated Information Management......................................................................... 23The Future JAOC........................................................................................................ 24

EXPLOITATION OF THE PROCESS ............................................................................ 26History of Intelligence Indicator Manipulation .......................................................... 27

Fortitude South...................................................................................................... 27The Gulf War ........................................................................................................ 28

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Impact on Critical Decision Making........................................................................... 28Tactical Paralysis? ...................................................................................................... 30

WHERE CAN DYNAMIC RE-TASKING WORK? ....................................................... 32Preconditions for Success ........................................................................................... 32

Required Information............................................................................................ 33Critical Requirements ........................................................................................... 34

Impact of Dynamic Re-tasking ................................................................................... 35Missions Susceptible to Re-tasking ...................................................................... 35

CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 37

GLOSSARY...................................................................................................................... 39

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 41

iv

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1 Command and Control (source Concept of Future Joint Operations) .................. 3

Figure 2. Notional JAOC Organization (source Joint Pub 3-56.1) ..................................... 8

Figure 3. JFACC Responsibilities (source Joint Pub 3-56.1) ........................................... 10

Figure 4. Concept of Joint Air Operations (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)............................... 12

Figure 5 Air Tasking Cycle (source Joint Pub 3-56.1) ..................................................... 14

Figure 6 Notional 48 Hour Joint ATO Timeline (source Joint Pub 3-56.1) ..................... 18

Figure 7 Boyd’s OODA Loop (source Joint Pub 6-0) ...................................................... 22

Figure 8 Decentralized / Centralization ............................................................................ 38

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Preface

This paper on Dynamic Re-tasking is aimed at the role information technology has

on the future of the air war. It is to examine the relationship between the JFACC and the

warfighter in a strike package. It is meant to stimulate thought on the infusion of real

time intelligence to the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and its implication on the

centralized to decentralized execution continuum.

I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Lt Col Raul Meza, for his support and

comments leading to the completion of this paper. His guidance is much appreciated by a

fighter pilot whose ambition lies in the clouds.

Thanks also go to Dr Michael Grumelli for his attentive ear. Both in his office and

in long walks down the hall on the way to meetings. I could not ask for a better sounding

board.

Thanks go to my wife, Karen, and my four daughters, Maia, Katie, Lisa, and Diane,

for your sacrifice of time. Special thanks goes to my daughter Maia, whose perseverance

at homework made me attempt to be a role model.

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AU/ACSC/179/1999-04

Abstract

The explosion of information technology has enabled real-time intelligence to

become an invaluable tool to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). This

capability has led to an increased drive to allow the JFACC tighter control over airborne

assets, adding flexibility to the JFACC’s response options, but, in effect, “centralizing”

execution. What is the implication of this centralization on the decision making process

involving airborne missions? What is the appropriate level of control for the processing

of real time intelligence in future air operations? Does the responsibility lie within the

Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)? The primary purpose of this paper is not to answer

these questions, rather it is to pose them and other issues as items to consider for

operations and identify areas for future research. In doing so it examines the JAOC

structure, the relationship of information to the Master Air Attack Plan and methods of

distributing that information to the warfighter through the Air Tasking Order and

alternately through Dynamic Re-tasking. It briefly discusses the cognitive decision

making process, examines real time intelligence integration, and the possible results of

exploitation of that process. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of Dynamic

Re-tasking and a discourse on Centralized vs. Decentralized Execution.

vii

Chapter 1

Introduction

The capability of technology to alter organizational relationships may be invaluable or dysfunctional based on the effect it has on the organism.

—General Charles A Horner, Comments on EFX 98

The explosion of information technology on the battlefield has led to tremendous

strides in the ability to process and disseminate information on a large scale. Real-time

intelligence has become an invaluable tool to the Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC) and his ability to quickly make decisions. Airborne command and control

platforms with continuous links to both the JFACC and the strike package have the

ability to pass this information directly to the warfighter. Internal Data Modem (IDM)

capable aircraft bring the ability to pass thousands of bits of information securely through

the airwaves. These capabilities have led to an increased drive to allow the JFACC

tighter control over airborne assets after “wheels in the well,” adding greater flexibility to

the JFACC’s response options.

Statement of the Research Question

Real time intelligence integration in future air campaigns is inevitable. What is the

implication of this enhancement for the decision making process involving airborne

missions? How can this information be used to tailor the air battle? What is the

1

appropriate level of control for the processing of real time intelligence in future air

operations? Does the responsibility lie within the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)?

The primary purpose of this paper is not to answer these questions, rather it is to pose

them and other issues as items to consider for operations and identify areas for future

research.

Background and Significance

There have been great strides recently, in information technology, which has allowed

the processing of near-real time and real time intelligence in the JAOC of tomorrow.

Recent exercises and experiments have dedicated time and defense dollars to analyzing

the significance of information innovation. War games designed to test air commanders’

flexibility to change have increasingly relied on simulated real time inputs into the

decision process. 1

Increased flexibility, however, does not come without the ability to stretch. How

much is too much? What information is important to focus on real-time and how can it

be incorporated into decisions that must be made within seconds of its arrival? Since the

volume of information available may be too large to process, a certain amount of the

decision tree would most likely be automated.2 How vulnerable will this automation be

to a smart enemy who knows what indicators to change in order to shape our actions?

Once the decision is made, what information must be passed to the airborne assets and

what are the options of execution? Finally, how much increase in centralized control can

occur before it becomes detrimental to decentralized execution?

2

Figure 1 Command and Control (source Concept of Future Joint Operations)

Figure 1 from the Concept of Future Joint Operations, illustrates the predicament

facing the JFACC. It shows the degree of control exercised historically and the impact

information technology may have on the face of future battlefields. Information may

allow for more informed and empowered troops or it may turn back time to a more

centralized command system. This paper’s main aim is to address this predicament and

look at what level of control is appropriate for effective execution of the air phase of a

theater campaign.

Limitations of the Study

This study only addresses the impact of information technology advancements on the

airborne strike package. In doing so it paints a picture of the current JAOC structure, the

JFACC’s decision making process, and the possible impact of future technology

3

integration in the command and control process. It is not intended to be a complete

portrayal of the JFACC and JAOC roles in the air phase of a theater campaign, rather it is

to provide a cursory view of the targeting process and the impact of change on that

process. Additionally, due to the desire to discuss command and control process rather

than specific platform capabilities, all discussion will be kept at the unclassified level.

Platform specifics will not be discussed.

Definitions and Assumptions

For the purpose of this paper, Dynamic Re-tasking is the ability of the JFACC to

effect changes in targeting and mission to an airborne strike package, or portions of that

package, while in the execution phase. It involves command and control elements

actually stopping the execution of airborne assets and redirecting those assets to other

targets. It may also involve the coordination of other assets not associated with the

airborne strike package in order to complete the mission. It is assumed the re-tasked

assets have no prior knowledge of their newly assigned target (i.e. that it is not a

preplanned alternate target). Information passed at the re-tasking is the first information

the airborne asset has on their new target. Re-tasking is the result of some change in the

enemy order of battle or the emergence of a higher priority target that requires, in the

eyes of the JFACC, immediate response.

Additionally, this paper discusses the impact of information technology on the level

of execution. As depicted in figure 1, the dilemma presented in the conduct of future

operations is whether or not information technology will enable more decentralized

execution, as in the era of blitzkrieg maneuver warfare, or, will command become even

more centralized. This paper differentiates this increased level of centralized control as

4

the “centralization” of execution. Centralized execution occurs when control of

operations, that in the past were left to the mind of the commander in the field, are now

under direction of a centralized command structure, in this case the JAOC. In effect, the

centralized command element maintains control of the execution phase, rather than

delegating the authority to act to the field commander.

Preview of the Argument

The JFACC is charged by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to prosecute the air

portion of the theater campaign. In this respect the JFACC establishes the JAOC and his

staff to build the Master Air Attack Plan. This plan is disseminated to geographically

separate units via the Air Tasking Order (ATO).3 The ATO process is long and involved.

It incorporates a substantial analysis of intelligence information. Information technology

integration is rapidly changing the ability for the JFACC to observe real time what is

happening in the battlespace. Recent exercises have demonstrated this technology push

may lead to a revolution in military affairs.4 This revolution deals with the conflict

between centralized and decentralized execution. Centralized execution and real time

intelligence over a theater-sized battlespace requires a large amount of cognitive thought.

The detail required for centralized execution may not be adequate to the time and demand

placed on the JAOC for the prosecution of the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP).

Automation may not be the answer to the time and demand problem due to its

susceptibility to exploitation. Details must be worked at the execution level.5 Enhanced

interoperability is required to enable Dynamic Re-Tasking. The JFACC must transmit

the big picture to those in the battlespace. Dynamic Re-tasking can work only if those

involved have near complete battlespace awareness.

5

Notes

1 Maj Gen (Retired) John C Corder, “EFX-98 Good News Story,”C2 Earlybird: Special Edition EFX 98 Lessons Learned, Volume 1, Special Edition Issue 1, December 1998, 9.

2 Lt Col Robert W. Cone, “Command and Control in Joint Vision 2010: Micro-Management of Decision Exploitation?” (Naval War College paper, 16 May 1998), 12-13.

3 Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994, IV-6 – IV-12.

4 James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs”, Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1998, 90-97.

5 Peter M Senge et al, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization, (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 530.

6

Chapter 2

JFACC and the JAOC1

This section outlines the command and control organization of the Joint Air

Operations Center. It addresses the structure of the JAOC, outlines roles and

responsibilities of JAOC members, lists the current targeting decision-making process,

and speculates the impact of future information technology on that process.

Structure

The Joint Force Commander will normally designate a Joint Force Air Component

Commander who will in turn set up a Joint Air Operations Center to fulfill all of the

JFACC’s responsibilities. JFACC organization may differ due to operational

requirements but the basic layout remains the same. The organization depicted in Figure

2, from Joint Pub 3-56.1, outlines a notional organization of a Joint Air Operations

Center.

7

Figure 2. Notional JAOC Organization (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)

Major Components

What follows is a brief discussion of the major components of the JAOC structure.

The JFACC Staff provides the JFACC with representation from the various

components of the joint force. This representation will be in the form of experts in each

of the weapon systems available to the JFACC. Their expertise is used by the JFACC to

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plan and execute all of the JFACC’s responsibilities assigned by the JFC. Two areas are

common to all JAOCs, Combat Plans and Combat Operations

Combat Plans has the responsibility of planning all future combat operations. It

contains experts in air strategy and ATO production and development. Combat Plans

drafts joint operations plans to support the Joint Force Commander’s campaign or

objectives and produces the daily ATO that is disseminated to all forces at the JFACC’s

disposal.

Combat Operations is charged with the daily execution of the joint ATO. It

contains elements of technical war fighting expertise in the form of mission experts who

know the workings of the forces made available by components of the joint force. Also

located in Combat Operations are elements representing Weather, the Joint Search and

Rescue Center, and other operational support elements. Combat Operations closely

follows the daily operation of joint air assets and makes adjustments in targeting and

schedules as required. This is accomplished through the airspace command and control

structure of the JFACC.

Integral to both Combat Plans and Combat Operations is Intelligence. Intelligence

personnel assist both planners and current operations through a thorough understanding

of the battlespace. Intelligence monitors enemy activity and provides assistance in

targeting, weapon and platform selection, battle damage assessment, and status of priority

targets.

Personnel

Joint Force Component Commander. The role of Joint Force Component

Commander is normally assigned by the JFC to the component commander who has the

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preponderance of air assets and the ability to plan task and control joint air operation in

the JFC’s area of responsibility. The JFACC may change during the course of the

campaign based on deploying forces or the changes in the campaign situation (i.e.

transiting from a sea-based phase to a land phase). The JFACC is assigned operational

control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) over military forces made available for

tasking. Mission receipt from the JFC is commensurate with authority to conduct

operations in accordance with the JFC’s intent.

Figure 3. JFACC Responsibilities (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)

Figure 3, from Joint Pub 3-56.1, lists the responsibilities that are normally associated

with the designation of the JFACC. Important responsibilities of note to this paper are

those of providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities of

available forces, controlling execution of joint air operations, and coordinating joint air

operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or

supporting the JFACC. If circumstances require the JFACC to change the planned joint

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air operations during the execution of the mission, the JFACC will notify the affected

commanders and the JFC as appropriate.

Component Liaisons. Senior Component Liaisons represent their component

commander and work with the JFACC and staff. They act as conduits for direct

coordination between the JFACC and the component commanders. They have the

authority to act as their component commander on time-sensitive and critical issues, and

represent the component perspective and considerations for planning and executing joint

air operations.

Coordination Elements. Coordination Elements are liaison elements normally

supplied by the components to work within the JAOC providing competent planning and

tasking expertise and coordinating. These elements aid in the integration and

coordination of their respective component participation in joint air operations. The

number of coordination elements will normally differ depending on the size and

complexity of the operation. They typically consist of the Battlefield Coordination

Element, the Special Operations Liaison Element, the Space Liaison Element, the Naval

and Amphibious Liaison Element, the Air Mobility Element, the Strategic Liaison Team,

and the Air Force Liaison Element. There are no set numbers for the composition of each

element.

Functional Area and Mission Experts. Functional Area and Mission Experts may

be part of the elements listed above or they may be separate entities. They provide the

necessary expertise to support, planning, and execution functions appropriate to the

employment scenario. They also provide the expertise to plan and employ forces made

11

available by the components. They work at all levels of command and in all areas of the

JAOC.

Current Decision Making Process

Figure 4, from Joint Pub 3-56.1, illustrates how the JFACC develops the Master Air

Attack Plan from the concepts presented in the Joint Force Mission from the JFC.

Figure 4. Concept of Joint Air Operations (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)

The JFACC’s Master Attack Plan and supporting orders flow directly from the Joint

Force mission statement from the JFC. It incorporates an accurate estimate of the air

situation that flows from the JFC’s strategic appreciation and objectives, includes the

component objectives, and develops a congruent air operations plan. The joint air

operations plan documents the JFACC’s plan for integrating and coordinating joint air

operations, and is part of a five-phase process.

The first phase of the planning process is operational environment research. In this

phase information is gained about friendly and adversary capabilities and intentions,

12

doctrine, and the environment in which operations will take place. This phase is

primarily the intelligence preparation of the battle and the gaining of knowledge of the

operational environment. During this phase, intelligence data is gathered and analyzed.

Additionally logistic information and command relationships are gathered and developed.

The second phase of the planning process deals with objective determination. This is

where clear and quantifiable objectives are laid out congruent with JFC guidance.

The third phase is strategy identification, the product of which is a defined joint

strategy statement. The joint air strategy states how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air

capabilities to support the JFC’s objectives. This joint air operations plan is how the

JFACC communicates this strategy to the joint air forces under his operational and

tactical control.

Phase four is the identification of Centers of Gravity. During this phase all

intelligence information is carefully examined and analyzed to identify centers of gravity

to focus the air portion of the campaign against.

The final phase is the development of the Joint Air Operations Plan. This plan

integrates the efforts of joint air forces to accomplish the JFC’s objectives. It identifies a

priority for targets and objectives. It accounts for current and potential adversary

offensive and defensive threats. It lays out timing for joint air operations to phase in

capabilities as needed. It conducts target analysis to identify specific targets for reattack.

Target analysis and the art of targeting is key to the understanding of the Dynamic

Re-tasking problem. As stated in 3-56.1, “Targeting is the process of selecting targets

and matching the appropriate response to them.” It occurs at all levels of command. It is

complicated by “the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or

13

different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets

with other components of the joint force.”2

Targeting currently is a six stage cyclical process. The first stage begins with an

evaluation of the commander’s objectives and guidance. From this evaluation, target sets

are identified, a weaponeering assessment is accomplished, as well as force application.

Following this, execution planning is accomplished, forces execute the plan and finally a

combat assessment is accomplished which then factors into the commander’s guidance

for the next round. The JFACC accomplishes this targeting cycle currently through the

process of the air tasking cycle in the development of the ATO.

Figure 5 Air Tasking Cycle (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)

The joint air tasking cycle is analytical and systematic in its approach to the

development of the air tasking order. It is heavily reliant on up to date intelligence

information and the analysis of that information to ascertain its effect on the JFC concept

14

of operations. There are usually three ATOs in the works at any one time, one in

execution, one in production, and one in planning

Essentials

The development of a coherent air attack plan is heavily dependent on the quality of

information gathered and the analysis of that information. During the target development

phase, the JAOC combat plans section identifies, prioritizes, and selects specific targets

that meet the JFC objectives and guidance. Targets are selected from the joint target list

(JTL), component requests, intelligence recommendations, and electronic warfare input.

As a product of a process, the JTL is normally constructed by the unified command and

begins before the deployment or the onset of hostilities. Its early stages begin during the

development of the OPLAN or CONPLAN that will govern operations. Inputs from the

Joint Staff and other government agencies are incorporated into the list, and maintenance

of the list is conducted by the JFC staff based on inputs from the JFC and information

from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the theater joint intelligence centers

(JICs). The product of the target development phase is a list of approved targets that are

included in the ATO and assigned to combat forces through the weaponeering and ATO

development phases.

During the weaponeering and allocation phase, targeting personnel take the joint

integrated priority target list (JIPTL) developed from the targeting phase and detail

recommended aimpoints, numbers and types of aircraft and weapons, weapon fuzing,

target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats and

probability of destruction for each target. The final list is included in the MAAP, which

forms the basis for the joint ATO. During this same phase, the JFACC staff determines

15

the total number of sorties required by aircraft and weapon type available for each

operation. From this determination, air support requests and allocation requests are

made. These include the total number of joint air sorties to be flown and the request for

any additional air support beyond the capability of the air component.

After the MAAP is approved, the Combat Plans section continues the production of

the joint ATO, special instructions (SPINS), and the airspace control order (ACO).

Components may submit change requests to targets and assets during the final stage of

ATO development.

Once the joint ATO is approved and distributed the JFACC directs the execution.

Components execute the ATO as tasked or request changes through the JAOC. The

JAOC is responsive to changes required due to results from in-flight reports and initial

battle damage assessments and may redirect capabilities or forces before launch or once

airborne. During execution the JAOC is charged with coordinating and deconflicting

changes with the appropriate control agencies or components. Ground or airborne

mission control commanders may be delegated the authority from the JFACC to redirect

sorties to higher priority targets if necessary.

The final phase of the cycle is the combat assessment phase. It is during this phase

that the JAOC evaluates the results of the executed ATO’s missions and determines if

they had the desired effect. It is the phase during which the JFACC takes the day’s

results and weighs them with future enemy courses of action and capability to

recommend future targeting. Combat assessment marks the end of the targeting process,

but as figure 5 indicates, it also represents inputs for the beginning of the next air tasking

cycle.

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Level of Control

Of primary emphasis is the level of control for the execution phase listed above. As

noted, the JFACC is charged with controlling the execution of joint air operation to

include making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking. During normal operations

the JFACC delegates TACON for risk assessment purposes to the commanders in the

battle space. Changes from the JFACC typically are limited to pre-planned changes or

options to the plan that have been pre-briefed and coordinated. Changes based on

intelligence indicators are limited to variation of target location, or defensive response to

enemy actions. Seldom are complete target sets changed or the efforts of a coordinated

attack redesigned while airborne. Some target sets require extensive planning and

coordination to attack and require more time than a simple redirection. Risk assessment

is trained in airborne mission commanders through formal weapons school courses and

other mission commander training, such as PACACES in the Pacific Air Forces, and the

Tactical Leadership Program (TLP) in Europe. What level of TACON should the JFACC

exercise over airborne missions and who should be responsible for its execution? The

preface of Joint Pub 3-56.1 places the onus on the commander in stating “this doctrine

will be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, exceptional

circumstances dictate otherwise.” (Emphasis added)

Timeline

Figure 6, from Joint Pub 3-56.1, outlines a typical ATO timeline. As indicated, a

notional joint ATO takes 48 hours to produce and execute. Intelligence inputs to the plan

are made throughout the process, however as the plan approaches completion, it is less

resilient to change. Once approved and fielded the plan proceeds to the component

17

forces for tactical execution. Specific tactics and risk assessments involved with the

attack are planned at this level.

Figure 6 Notional 48 Hour Joint ATO Timeline (source Joint Pub 3-56.1)

Technology Integration

Future innovative technology integration in the JAOC has been highlighted in recent

exercises such as Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX) and Joint Suppression of

Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD).3 Both exercises integrated new information system

technology in the command and control function. Displays and computer systems

18

indicating real time intelligence were available to the JFACC giving a “big picture” view

of the battlespace.

Documents such as Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) and Air Force Basic Doctrine

(AFDD-1) depicts technological innovation and information superiority as the enablers of

Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional

Protection leading to Full Spectrum Dominance. AFDD-1 paints a new picture of

conflict and touts the speed, range, and flexibility of air power as having the capability to

bring a decisive halt to a potential adversary’s aggression. Information operations

provide the JFACC this flexibility through real time intelligence in the JAOC.

Information Systems

Information Systems currently available to the JAOC come in many forms. Links to

national assets through the DIA can provide a big picture of events in the theater.

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aspects of platforms such as Rivet

Joint, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems (J-STARS), space based systems,

and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) among others provide feeds into the system as

well. In the past, this information was fed to the Intelligence section of the JAOC from a

variety of systems such as the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), Sentinel

Byte, Combat Information System (CIS), Constant Source, Multi-mission Advanced

Tactical Terminal (MATT), Intra-theater Imagery Transmission System (IITS), and the

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).4 It is clearly evident, a

multitude of systems exist for the dissemination of information. This information is

filtered into the ATO cycle during the development of the MAAP discussed previously.

19

Real Time Command and Control Assets

Command and Control is exercised by the JFACC through multiple sources. The

initial form of command and control is in the development of the ATO where the

JFACC’s master plan is disseminated to the forces. After the ATO leaves the JAOC the

JFACC can still control its execution through landlines and other communications with

the operations centers of geographically separate units. As the mission is in progress,

however, the JFACC has to work through other assets to control operations real time.

Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) are ground-based tactical control hubs and have

communicative capability with airborne missions depending on the phase of the

operation. Airborne assets for control include E-3B Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS), J-STARS, and occasionally EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command

and Control Center (ABCCC). These assets communicate with the airborne strike

package either by voice, or, in some instances, data link through Internal Data Modem

(IDM) capable aircraft.

Notes

1 Joint Pub 3-56.1, All information regarding JFACC responsibilities and JAOC organization are with reference to Chapters II, III, and IV.

2 Joint Pub 3-56.1, IV-1. 3 “Modeling and Simulation After Action Report,”C2 Earlybird: Special Edition

EFX 98 Lessons Learned, Volume 1, Special Edition Issue 1, December 1998, 6-8. Gregory Hadynski and Richard Simard, “Point Paper on Joint Suppression of Enemy

Air Defenses (JSEAD),” July 1998, n.p,; on-line, Internet, 3 February 1999, available from http://www.rl.af.mil/div/IFE/IFEC/pointPapers/PPsimardJSEAD.html.

4 Maj James P. Marshall, Near Real Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield: The Requirement for a Combat Information System, Research Report No. AU-ARI-92-6, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University Press, January 1994, 11-26.

20

Chapter 3

Real Time Decision Making

While fighting is a physical act, its direction is a mental process.

—B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy

The ATO, once published, is the order tasking the component forces to accomplish

elements of the MAAP.1 Changes must be made to that plan based on analysis of

information that has changed since its inception.

The Decision Making Process

John Boyd conceptualized the decision making process as a nodal loop consisting of

four phases (Figure 7). The premise is that commanders observe, orient, decide, and act.

At this point commanders return to the beginning of the cycle and begin the process

again.2 Boyd calls this process the OODA Loop and likens it to a turning fighter

engagement. The idea is that if one can turn inside their adversary they can defeat them.

He postulates that the commander who can make observations, determine their meaning,

decide among courses of action, and then act on those courses of action quicker than their

adversary, will gain the upper hand.

21

Figure 7 Boyd’s OODA Loop (source Joint Pub 6-0)

This is accomplished in the JAOC through the processing of information to the ATO

cycle, and in real time control of the current day’s ATO. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint

Operations, portraits a cognitive hierarchy for information flow. Data received must first

be collected and transported from intelligence sources. This is the phase during which

initial filtering occurs. Following this it is processed, which refines the data into

information. It is then fused, filtered, and further manipulated with other information in a

cognitive process that results in knowledge. Finally, an evaluation of this knowledge

based on experience is accomplished, which leads to understanding. This understanding

can then be acted upon to effect change to the battle plan.3 The aim of technology

integration in C4I systems is to accelerate the transformation from data to understanding,

thereby making the commander’s OODA Loop as small as possible.

22

Changes to the MAAP occur as a result of this understanding. The process however,

currently exceeds the capability to drastically change while in the execution phase.

Complex command and control structures, geographically separated units, differing

communication systems capabilities, and differences in component doctrine, tactics and

jargon, all hinder change. Coordination requirements for current operations are such that

changes to a plan are either manifested in preplanned alternate targeting or in mission

cancellation.

Future Technology Integration

Great strides are planned for future integration of technology as an enabler for the

JFACC to exercise command and control real time in a Dynamic Re-tasking of airborne

assets. The creation of a global C4 infrastructure will dramatically increase the data

available to the JAOC. The push for standardization and interoperability among joint

force systems and doctrine as well as multinational systems will provide the JFACC the

communicative means to effect change.4 Having the data available and a means of

communication however do not complete the picture. The data must be transformed into

understanding before it can be used to effect execution.

Automated Information Management

During EFX-98, the JAOC employed the Theater Battle Management and Control

System (TBMCS) to host all intelligence and operation information. Through TBMCS

the staff of the JAOC was connected to the virtual battlespace and received real time

changes to the tactical situation. Processing over 2,500 intelligence messages per day

and producing an average of 2,106 mission updates per day, the Situation Awareness and

23

Assessment (SAA), as well as the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) modules of the TBMCS

allowed the JAOC staff to monitor and access missions real time.5

The Future JAOC

EFX 98 experimented with new and untested command and control devices,

processes and organizations. Using the TBMCS as mentioned above, the JFACC was

presented a virtual world in which to operate. Split headquarters, Forward and Rear

JAOCs, were set up and connected through the TBMCS using a worldwide info-sphere.

In theory this would allow the JFACC to have less of a forward presence footprint and

enable greater connectivity to national information assets.6 Presented with the big picture

real time, the JFACC can make decisions based on real time intelligence processing. The

size of the Forward JAOC need be only that required to maintain connectivity to the

fielded forces. This concept allows for a reduction in size of advanced headquarters with

concomitant benefits in reduced airlift requirements, fewer personnel exposed to enemy

fire, and more centralized staffs.7 Presumably, increased communicative conductivity

with fielded forces combined with understanding of real time intelligence information

will allow the JFACC of the future to tailor the air battle to the evolving tactical

environment. Changes no longer will dictate cancellation of missions in the daily ATO;

they may instead be redirected, more effectively shaping the air portion of the campaign

to combat enemy courses of action.

Notes

1 Joint Pub 3-56.1, xii. 2 Maj Arden B. Dahl, Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War, Maxwell

Air Force Base, Alabama, May 1998, 23-25.

24

Notes

3 Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, 30 May 1995, I-3, I-4.

4 John H Tilelli, Jr., “Ulchi-Focus Lens ’97: Putting JV 2010 into Practice,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1997-98, 76-80.

5 “Modeling and Simulation After Action Report,” 6.6 Gen (Retired) Charles A Horner, “Comments on Expeditionary Force Experiment

98,”C2 Earlybird: Special Edition EFX 98 Lessons Learned, Volume 1, Special Edition Issue 1, December 1998, 2

7 Horner, 2.

25

Chapter 4

Exploitation of the Process

“I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong . . . I conceal my tracks so that none can discern them; I keep silence so that none can hear me.”

— Sun Tzu The Art of War, c. 500 BC

Sun Tzu’s principles in the Art of War are as appropriate today as they were 2,500

years ago. Deception across the gamut of military operations from strategic to tactical

has been the bane of many commanders in the past. Confidence in knowing the

adversary, their next move, and redirection of forces to counter that move is the crux of

great captaincy. Lack of knowledge can be overcome by planning for what one does not

know. Changing a plan based on false information, however, can be fatal. The intent of

this chapter is not to discredit real-time intelligence; rather, it is to point to the fact that

not all intelligence is what it first appears to be and that occasionally, a more thorough

examination (i.e. time consuming analysis) must be accomplished to discern true

meaning.1

26

History of Intelligence Indicator Manipulation

Fortitude South2

The Allied landing on the beaches of Normandy in 1944 was greatly aided by a

masterfully planned set of intelligence manipulation code named Fortitude South. The

Germans concluded early in 1944 that the Allies would invade the continent; however,

when and where this invasion was to occur was not known. The most probable location

for a landing was speculated to be at Pas de Calais due to its short distance from points of

embarkation to debarkation and the threat a breakthrough in that region would do to the

German war effort. With this predisposition of thought the stage was set for Fortitude

South.

The basis of Fortitude South was the concept that the Allies had amassed enough

resources to conduct a diversionary landing in addition to a main assault along the coast.

The overall plan used element of camouflage, signal discipline, restricted zoning and

other security schemes to conceal the real invasion force. Information was fed to German

intelligence through double agents that bolstered the Pas de Calais idea in intelligence

circles. Six supporting operations contributed to intelligence indications supporting a Pas

de Calais invasion. Quicksilver I was a fictional plan for a cross channel assault at Pas de

Calais by the First United States Army Group (FUSAG). Quicksilver II was a radio

deception that simulated army group traffic for the fictional FUSAG. Quicksilver III was

the visual demonstration of landing craft along the eastern coast of England. Quicksilver

IV was actual bombing of Pas de Calais fortifications. Quicksilver V was bombing

operations aimed at communications networks behind Pas de Calais beaches. Quicksilver

VI was an elaborate light scheme operation that simulated numerous port and assembly

27

facilities on England’s eastern and southwest coast while concealing operations at the

actual sites. The Allies knowledge of German High Command’s thinking, due to the

breaking of the Enigma code, allowed the Allies to adjust their deception to obtain the

desired results. This deception was so strong that, even after the Normandy invasion,

German command thought Normandy was a diversion for a main invasion still to come

six weeks later at Pas de Calais.

The Gulf War3

During the Gulf War deception was a major item emphasized to conceal the

intentions of the coalition forces. The deception involved convincing the Iraqi forces the

main push of the coalition invasion was going to come from an amphibious assault on the

coast of Kuwait. The positioning of Marine and Naval units in the Gulf led to this

deception. Marine landing exercises along the Gulf and in Oman helped sell this

deception as did timing and placement of air attacks. The lack of aerial attack on some

targets in the west added additional indication that the attack would come from the east.

In effect these actions fixed Iraqi forces in the east allowing the well know left hook, that

cut off the Iraqi route of retreat, to occur with little resistance.

Impact on Critical Decision Making

These are but two examples of deception in action to shape the response of the

enemy. In Fortitude South, the Allies were aware the Germans were focusing on

communication interception, human intelligence, and visual cue (equivalent of today’s

Electro-optical reconnaissance). The German command saw what their predisposition

also told them they wanted to believe, that is, a massing of force for an assault at Pas de

28

Calais. How much of a parallel is this to what a potential adversary may do? For

instance, if a potential adversary understood a deep routed fear of weapons of mass

destruction, they could preposition dummy launchers and electronic signal generators that

would demand attention and the possible redirection of force. This force may be

redirected from real targets that would survive to inflict damage of their own. If an

adversary can fix the actions of an opponent, they make their opponent predictable. A

predictable opponent can be defeated.

This example placed over the ATO cycle process may result in recognition by the

intelligence section that these are actually dummy sites and signals, or the combat plans

section realizing the number of launchers targeted do not equal the preconception of

enemy capability. Real time reaction in the form of Dynamic Re-tasking, however, may

not pick out the discrepancies. The Dynamic Re-tasking environment differs from the

ATO cycle by a factor of time. Entin and Serfatay describe “time pressure” as a

component of overload, which is one of the attributes of stress. Additionally, secondary

tasks increase stress in that they cut deeply into residual capacity, provide a sense of

uncontrollability, and are intrusive and distracting to the performance of the primary

task.4 Wearing the hats of ACA and AADC, in addition to promulgating the air portion

of the campaign, both current and days in advance, leaves little doubt the JFACC has

many secondary tasks. Under stress, people experience a tremendous amount of

cognitive constriction that disrupt the normal thought processes. Reaction to real time

intelligence input has little room for error.

The idea that technological innovation will be able to render information with such

clarity and accuracy that commanders will no longer have to deal with uncertainty in their

29

decisions fails to take this notion of intelligence indicator manipulation into account.

Commander Valentine, in his paper on operational art, warns if operational decisions

were based solely on the picture presented through automation, the risk is run of not

making a decision at all but merely fashioning a product of mathematical analysis and

logical conclusion based on perfect information.5 That is, if that information was truly

perfect.

Tactical Paralysis?

When presented with a large amount of data to process, the human mind must sort

this data, decide what data is valuable from that which is not, transform that data to

understanding as described in the previous chapter, devise courses of action, and then

choose to act on one of those courses of action. Colonel Littlefield points out “the art of

war has come a long way since the days of the Roman legions where commanders could

see the entire battlefield with the naked eye.”6 In those days the commander could see

nearly all from a vantagepoint on the high ground and act on it. Today, technology

integration is allowing that “standing on a hill” aspect of great captaincy to return,

however the valley has become the size of the entire theater and in some cases the world.

Data from the many sources discussed in Chapter 2 act as the looking glass for the

commander. This amount of information and a theater sized force structure allows the

JFACC freedom to form many alternate courses of action. This, combined with the time

pressure and secondary task stress noted above, may lead to a situation where the JFACC

is presented with too many courses of action to choose from in the allotted time. Peter

Senge indicates that an increased amount of information does not necessarily lead to

better, more timely decisions. This would be exaggerated by automated information in

30

that it may result in leaders paying attention to highly visible but misleading data. In fact,

increased information may overwhelm and paralyze decision-making.7 This paralysis is

defined in Douglas Coupland’s book Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture as

“option paralysis.”8 Option paralysis occurs when one has so many options to consider in

the selection of a course of action that none is selected before the allotted time expires.

In the JAOC this same phenomenon could result in “tactical paralysis.”

Notes

1 Senge et al, 529.2 Dahl, 41.3 Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 31 May 1996, IV-2. 4 Elliot E. Entin and Daniel Serfaty, “Information Gathering and Decision Making

Under Stress,” TR-454, (Alphatech, Inc., Burlington MA, January 1990), 10-11.5 Commander William D Valentine Jr., Leveraging technology: Using the Practical

Essence of Operational Art to Translate Information into Decisions, (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 16 June 1995), 4.

6 Col Thomas K Littlefield, The Military Decision Process --- Overlooked by the Revolution in Military Affairs, (United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 September 1998), 10.

7 Senge et al, 529-530.8 Douglas Coupland, Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture, (N.Y.: St.

Martin’s Press, 1991), 139.

31

Chapter 5

Where Can Dynamic Re-Tasking Work?

What the Warrior Needs: a fused, real time, true representation of the battlespace — an ability to order, respond and coordinate horizontally and vertically to the degree necessary to prosecute his mission in that battlespace.

—The C4I For the Warrior vision

Military leadership and great captaincy can overcome “tactical paralysis” if given the

right opportunity. The complexity of planning, coordinating, and executing individual

missions as described in chapter 2 must be taken into consideration. The role of the

JFACC and the duties assigned to elements of the JAOC may make Dynamic Re-tasking

unwieldy on a grand scale. Time critical accurate intelligence information that can be

incorporated in the current execution of a mission, however, may have the effect of

shrinking the OODA loop described in chapter 3. If the JFACC can indeed see the big

picture, then technology may mean a revolution in military affairs is in the works.

Preconditions for Success

For Dynamic Re-tasking to have the dramatic effect it is intended to a certain degree

of centralized execution must be exercised by the JFACC. Yet this centralized execution

must be at the same time decentralized. Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cone in his

paper Command and Control in Joint Vision 2010: Micro-Management or Decision

32

Exploitation?, likens war in the technology age to the game of chess. The commander

can see the entire battlefield but, despite knowledge of opponent’s pieces and location,

must still exercise cognitive processing of their meaning and the opponent’s intentions.1

This analogy falls short, in that, unlike chess, the pieces in war have their own OODA

loop that can contribute to the whole. They are not pawns or unthinking automatons.

They are closer to the battle and see nuances the commander may not be able to see. The

real battlespace is larger than 64 squares. Forces in that battlespace move and react with

the level of detail that allow them to maximize their effect. When orchestrated in

knowing concert they synergistically magnify their capability with others. Uninformed

they are merely fodder, no more effective than the armies of World War I charging out of

the trenches simply because they were told. For Dynamic Re-tasking to work, execution

must be centralized yet remain decentralized.

Required Information

To effect this centralized / decentralized execution, the fielded forces must be as one

with the JFACC. They must understand the concept of the required task, its implication,

and how it fits into the order of battle. All coordination must occur for synergistic

effects. For example if a strike package is re-tasked from their original targets to a

different target set, they must know key elements of information. The enemy disposition

of forces must be known for the new location. Threats to the strike package must be

identified and reduced. This may require, alternate routes of flight, timing changes, or

additional assets not organic to the strike package. If such is the case this information

must be provided so forces do not go blindly into the face of an overwhelming threat

without purpose. Abort criteria must be established. New target descriptions as well as

33

avenues of approach must be determined. Weaponeering changes in spacing and fuzing

of munitions may need to occur. The more complex the strike package, threat, target set

and coordination become, the less susceptible the mission is to Dynamic Re-tasking. The

effects of re-tasking must not only be determined on the current strike package but also

for subsequent packages that may have been depending on a previous mission obtaining

certain results. The entire JAOC planning cell must be involved. One change may effect

the entire plan.

Critical Requirements

Free information flow from the JFACC to the warfighter is a must to enable the

fielded force the ability to execute. True interoperability between weapon platforms is a

must for Dynamic Re-tasking to work. Platforms re-tasked must have connectivity to

other platforms in the original strike package. Additionally they must have connectivity

to the platforms in the re-tasked package for the case of split package re-tasking. Secure

IDM capability is required to pass more information quickly to all affected. Common

jargon and tactics are required for inter-service operations. Current target and threat

information is a must. Pre-conceived attack plans may be beneficial as a generic play

card to orchestrate the synergistic effect of different assets. These, however, must be

guarded for compromise.

A flattened command and control structure is needed to provide greater connectivity

to the JFACC.2 Communication links and data links must be streamlined. Commonality

of systems is a must. The JAOC may need to be restructured and expanded with systems

providing for greater control of current operations. At the same time more connectivity

34

of the warfighter to the “big picture” in the JAOC is critical for decentralizing the central

execution.

Impact of Dynamic Re-tasking

The impact of Dynamic Re-tasking, if accomplished correctly, will enable the

JFACC to tailor the air battle to the current situation. This will be done real time and

allow the JFACC the opportunity to work inside the opponent’s OODA loop. Combined

with the ATO process, Dynamic Re-tasking can create an ability for the JFACC to effect

change more rapidly by hitting critical nodes of the opponent at critical times, magnifying

their effect. The interoperability described previously can provide the JFACC with a

“thinking” chessboard. An interactive connected battlespace will allow separate

operations to occur as one.

Missions Susceptible to Re-tasking

Current capabilities limit the number and type of missions susceptible to Dynamic

Re-tasking. Communicative limitations already noted greatly reduce the effectiveness

that can be achieved from re-tasking. Currently, re-tasking should only occur on a

limited number of aircraft on relatively benign missions that do not involve great

knowledge of the battlespace peculiarities. Low threat and minimal coordination is a

must for re-tasking efforts today. Units re-tasked must be given targets that have the

same munition requirement as their originally planned targets. If the JFACC knows

ahead of time a particular mission will most likely be re-tasked and to what target or type

of target, that information must be transmitted to the unit prior to its execution. Any

coordination efforts that can be prebriefed as an option before execution should be. After

35

the mission is airborne, little coordination should occur of which the aircrew are not

aware.

Should change occur as discussed that dramatically increases the connectivity of all

warfighters in the battlespace, there is no limit to the type of missions that would be

susceptible to Dynamic Re-tasking. The “thinking chessboard” could implement the

JFACC’s Master Air Attack Plan with full knowledge of the effect on other warfighters.

Suppression of enemy air defenses could occur before the enemy had an opportunity to

react. Weapons of mass destruction could be identified and targeted prior to their use on

friendly troops. Land commanders could request changes that interdict enemy troop

movements at critical times. Battle damage assessments could be made prior to the last

aircraft across a target area and changes made ensuring priority targets are destroyed.

Dynamic Re-tasking employed in this manner with full connectivity would act as a force

multiplier, reducing the enemy’s capability while reducing the number of friendly sorties

required to complete the plan.

Notes

1 Cone, 14-15.2 Littlefield, 20.

36

Chapter 6

Conclusions

As technology advances, the conduct of operations will continue to change. Each advance in information technology will help leaders form a more complete picture of the battlespace, generate faster, higher quality decisions, maneuver more rapidly in time and space and increase a unit’s flexibility and agility. Nevertheless, this technology is only an enabling tool. Quality and well-trained leaders remain the true centerpiece to successfully planning and operating this increasingly digitized and automated information system of systems.

—FM 100-6, Information Operations.

Dynamic Re-tasking can be of benefit to the JFACC of the future. It will act as a

force multiplier to enable more efficient and effective use of air power. Dynamic Re-

tasking is a technological benefit of the information age that allows the use of

information integration in the JAOC to be translated to operations in the field. General

Horner points out, however,

“The lure of fancy graphics must not outweigh the need to improve our means of killing people and destroying things with air power.”1

The cognitive process involved in the ATO cycle through the incorporation of

intelligence information in targeting is an involved process. The JFACC has a plethora

of duties and concerns. The macro-view at times may not be the view from which to

execute. If this view is not transmitted to the warfighter during the execution phase, they

become nothing more than automatons, or pawns executing orders.

37

Figure 1 depicted the problem facing the JFACC pertaining to the integration of

information technology. Perhaps the real next step is as depicted in figure 8. Greater

connectivity is required across the spectrum of command and control to enable Dynamic

Re-tasking. If this can occur there may be little need for changes to originate from the

JAOC. Empowered, informed commanders in the battlespace may seize the opportunity

when time is critical. Decentralized knowledge of the centralized big picture may prove

to be the true benefit of information superiority.

Figure 8 Decentralized / Centralization

38

Glossary

Area Air Defense CommanderAirborne Command Control and Communication

AADCABCCCACAACOATOAWACS

C2C4I

CISCONPLANCRC

DIA

EFX

FUSAG

IDMIITS

JAOCJFACCJFCJICJIPTLJSEADJ-STARSJTLJV 2010

MAAPMATT

OODA LoopOPCON

Airspace Control AuthorityAirspace Control OrderAir Tasking OrderAirborne Warning and Control System

Command and ControlCommand Control Communications IntelligenceCombat Information SystemOperation plan in concept formatControl and Reporting Center

Defense Intelligence Agency

Expeditionary Force Experiment

First United States Army Group

Internal Data ModemIntra-theater Imagery Transfer System

Joint Air Operations CenterJoint Force Air Component CommanderJoint Force CommanderJoint Intelligence CenterJoint Integrated Priority Target List

Computers and

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air DefensesJoint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemJoint Target ListJoint Vision 2010

Master Air Attack PlanMulti-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act cycleOperational Control

39

OPLAN Operation Plan

SAA Situation Awareness and AssessmentSPINS Special Instructions

TACON Tactical ControlTBMCS Theater Battle Management and Control SystemTCT Time Critical Targeting

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

40

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Notes

1 Horner, 2

42