duties to endangered species

8/8/2019 Duties to Endangered Species

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Encyclopedia o fEnvironmentalBiology, vol. 1 (Academic Press, 1995), pp. 517-528

Duties to Endangered Species

Holmes Rolston IIIColorado State University

I . Ethical Duties and Biological SpeciesII . The Threat of Extinction

I I I . Questions of Fact: What Are Species?IV . Questions of Duty: Ought Species Be Saved?

V. Species in EcosystemsVI . Natural and Human-Caused Extinctions

VII. Respect for Rare Life

Whether humans have duties to endangeredspecies is a significant theoretical and urgentpractical question. Few persons doubt that wehave some obligations concerning endangeredspecies, because persons are helped or hurt bythe condition of their environment, whichincludes a wealth of wild species, currentlyunder alarming threat of extinction. The U.S.Congress, deploring the lack of "adequateconcern [for] and conservation [of]" species,has sought to protect species through theEndangered Species Act. Congress has alsoentered into a Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species. The UnitedNations has negotiated a BiodiversityConvention, signed by over 100 nations.Taking or jeopardizing endangered species (atleast the listed ones) is illegal and, many think,immoral.But these might be all obligations to personswho are benefited or harmed by species asresources. Is there a human duty directly tospecies, in addition to obligations that humanshave to other humans, fellowmembers oftheirown species? This would be part of aninterspecific environmental ethics, andinvolves a challenging mix of science andconscience. An answer is vital to the more

comprehensive question ofthe conservation ofbiodiversity, how humans can achieve asustainable relationship to the natural world..

I. ETHICAL DUTIES ANDBIOLOGICAL SPECIESA rationale for saving species that centers ontheir worth to humans is anthropocentric, inwhich species have instrumental values; arationale that includes their intrinsic andecosystemic values, those values theymayhavein themselves or in their functions inecosystems, in addition to or independently ofpersons, is naturalistic. Some say there are noduties to endangered species, only duties topersons. The preservation of species, by theusual utilitarian account, is commended onlyinsofar as human beings have or might haveinterests at stake. This includes duties to futurehuman beings, duties derived from ourstewardship role as keepers of the planet forlater people. Any duties concerning specieswill then be a matter of finding out whateverhuman values are at stake with the loss ofspecies and of applying classical duties topersons to protect these values. [See MASS


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humans, when out of a sense of duty anindividual defers to the values of fellowhumans. But it is true interspecifically, since,under this rationale, Homo sapiens treats allother species as "rivets," resources, studymaterials, or entertainment.

Ethics has always been about partners withentwined destinies. But it has never been veryconvincing when pleaded as enlightened selfinterest (that one should always do what is inone's intelligent self-interest), including classself-interest, even though in practice altruisticethics often need to be reinforced byself-interest. To value all other species only forhuman interests is rather like a nation's arguingall its foreign policy in terms of nationalself-interest. Neither seems fully moral.

Nevertheless, those who try to articulate adeeper environmental ethic often get lost inunfamiliar territory. Natural kinds, if that iswhat species are, are obscure objects ofconcern. Species, as such, cannot be directlyhelped or hurt, although individual tokens ofthe species type can be. Species, as such, don'tcare, although individual animals can care.Species require habitats, embedded in ecosystems that evolve and change. Ninety- eightpercent ofthe species that have inhabited Earthare extinct, replaced by other species. Naturedoesn't care, so why should we? All of thefamiliar moral landmarks are gone. We havemovedbeyondcaringabout humans, or culture,or moral agents, or individual animals that areclose kin, or can suffer, or can experience anything, or are sentient. Species are not valuerswith preferences that can be satisfied or frustrated. It seems odd to say that species haverights, or moral standing, or need our sympathy, or that we should consider their point ofview. None of these elements has figuredwithin the coordinates of prevailing ethicalsystems.In fact, ethics and biology have had uncertainrelationships. An often-heard argument forbidsmoving from what is the case (a description ofscientific facts) to what ought to be (a prescription of moral duty); any who do socommit, it is alleged, the naturalistic fallacy.On the other hand, if species are of objective

value, and ifhumans encounter and jeopardizesuch value, it would seem that humans oughtnot destroy values in nature, at least notwithout overriding justification producinggreater value. We might make a humanisticmistake if we arrogantly take value to lieexclusively in the satisfaction of our humanpreferences. What is at jeopardy and what areour duties?II. THE THREAT OF EXTINCTIONAlthough projections vary, reliable estimatesare that ~ 2 0 % of Earth's species may be lostwithin a few decades, if present trends go unreversed. These losseswill be about evenlydistributed through major groups of plants andanimals in both developed and developing nations, although themost intense concerns are intropical forests. At least 500 species, subspecies, and varieties of fauna have been lost inthe United States since 1600. The natural ratewould have been about 10. In Hawaii, of 68species of birds unique to the islands, 41 areextinct or virtually so. Half of the 2200 nativeplants are endangered or threatened. Coveringall states, a candidate list of plants containsover 2000 taxa considered to be endangered,threatened, or of concern, although relativelyfew of these have been formally listed. A candidate list of animals contains about 1800entries. Humans approach, and in places haveeven exceeded, the catastrophic rates ofnaturalextinction spasms of the geological past.

Throughout the Endangered Species Act,from the title onward, the mood is one ofdanger. The Act laments the irretrievable extinction of any species, climaxing in a "nojeopardy" clause. That clause has proved thetoughest partofthe Act, where nearly all ofthelitigation has arisen. This instructs all federalagencies to take whatever action is necessary"to insure that actions authorized, funded, orcarried out by them do not jeopardize thecontinued existence ofsuch endangered speciesor threatened species." Existence is at stake,both of species and ofhabitats that are criticalfor them.It maybe thought that, although the terms are


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maleficent, humans are not in jeopardy; onlythe plants and animals are. Humans haveimportant, but not life-jeopardizing, benefits tobe gained from saving species. Congress didwant to protect values at stake to the nation andits people. Yet, in the snail darter case(Tennessee Valley Authority versus Hill), theU.S. SupremeCourt found in the Act "repeatedexpressions ofcongressional concern overwhatit saw as the enormous danger presented by theeradication of any endangered species."Although Congress has not said that humanshave duties to species (such an ethicaljudgment might not be the prerogative ofCongress), the Court insisted "that Congressintended endangered species to be afforded thehighest of priorities." All of this suggestsconsiderable peril, and responsibilityproportionate to the peril.Nor is this simply an Act for the utilitariancon servation ofimportant economic resources.

Congress declared that species have "esthetic,ecological, educational, historical, recreationaland scientific value" but refused to put on thelist that value that has since become the onemost often given: economic value. Rather,revealing what Congress thought was at stake,economic value is sharply set opposite to theseothers. Congress laments "economic growthanddevelopment untemperedby adequate concern and conservation," and it has consistentlyrefused to allow the economic benefits or costsof the preservation of a species to be one ofthecriteria that determine whether it is listed.Since economic concerns must sometimes becon- sidered, Congress I I I the 1978amendments au thor ized a high-levelinteragency committee to evaluate difficultcases, and, should this committee deem fit, topermit economic development at the cost ofextinction of species that impede suchdevelopment. But it clearly places a highburden of proof on those who wish to putspecies at peril for development reasons.III. QUESTIONS OF FACT:WHAT ARE SPECIES?There are problems at two levels: one is about

facts (a scientific issue-about species), one isabout values (anethical issue-involvingduties).It is difficult enough to argue from an is (that aspecies exists) to an ought (that a species oughtto exist). Matters growworse if the concept ofspecies is troublesome to begin with, and thereare several differing concepts ofspecieswithinbiology. Perhaps any concept is arbitrary, conventional-a mapping device that is only theoretical. Darwin wrote, "I look at the termspecies, as one arbitrarily given for the sake ofconvenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other." Is there enough factualreality in species to base duty there? [SeeSPECIATION.]No one doubts that individual organismsexist, but are species discovered? Ormade up?Indeed, do species exist at all? Systematistsregularly revise species designations androutinely put after a species the name of the"author" who, they say, "erected" the taxon. Ifa species is only a category or class, boundarylines maybe arbitrarily drawn, and the speciesis nothing more than a convenient grouping ofits members, an artifact of the classifier'sthoughts and aims. Somenatural properties areused-reproductive structures, bones, teeth, orperhaps ancestry, genes, ecological roles. Butwhich properties are selected and where thelines are drawn are decisions that vary withsystematists.Botanists are dividedwhetherIliamna remota,the Kankakee mallow in Illinois, and Iliamnacorei in Virginia, which are both rare, aredistinct species. Perhaps all that existsobjectively in the world are the individualmallowplants; whether there are two species orone is a fuss about which label to use. Aspecies is some kind of fiction, like a center ofgravity or a statistical average. Almost no oneproposes duties to genera, families, orders, andphyla; biologists concede that these do notexist in nature, even thoughwe may think thattwo species in different orders represent morebiodiversity than two in the same genus. Ifthisapproach is pressed, species can becomesomething like the lines of longitude andlatitude or like map contour lines, or time ofday, or dates on a calendar. Sometimes en-


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EXTINCTION, BIOTIC AND ABIOTIC.]Persons have a strong duty not to hann others

(called a duty of nonmaleficence) and aweaker, though important, duty to help others(called a duty of beneficence). Manyendangered species-which ones we may notnow know-are expected to have agricultural,industrial, andmedical benefits. Relativelyfewplants have been tested for their usefulness.Loss of the wild stocks of cultivars leaveshumans genetically vulnerable, so it is prudentto save native materials. According to thisreasoning, theprotection ofnature is ultimatelyfor the purpose ofthe enlightened exploitationof nature. Norman Myers urges "conservingour global stock."

Where they are not directly useful, wildspecies may be indirectly important for theroles they play in ecosystems-as part of thehuman life support system. Theyare "rivets" inthe airplane, the Earthship inwhichwe humansare flying, and one ought not to pop rivets inpeople's planes. The loss of a few species mayhave no evident results now, but the loss ofmany species imperils the resilience andstability of the ecosystems on which humansdepend. The danger increases exponentiallywith subtractions from the ecosystem, aslippery slope into serious troubles. Evenspecies that have no obvious or current directvalue to humans are part of the biodiversitythat keeps ecosystems healthy. [SeeECOLOGICAL ENERGETICS OFECOSYSTEMS.]

On the benefit side, there are less tangiblebenefits. Species that are too rare to play rolesin ecosystems can have recreational andaesthetic value-even, for many persons,religious value. Species can be curiosities. Therare species fascinate enthusiastic naturalistsand are often key scientific study species. Theymay serve as indicators of ecosystem health.They provide entertainment and new knowledge, regardless of their stabilizing or economic benefits. They can be clues to understanding natural history. Destroying species islike tearing pages out of an unread book,written in a language humans hardlyknowhow

to read, about the place where we live. This iscalled the Rosetta stone argument (named afterthe famous obelisk found at the town ofRosetta in Egypt in 1799, which enabled thedeciphering of forgotten languages of theancient past). Humans need insight into the fulltext ofnatural history. Theyneed to understandthe evolving world in which they are placed. Itis safe to say that, in the decades ahead, thequality of life will decline in proportion to theloss of biotic diversity, although it issometimes thought that one must sacrificebiotic diversity to improve human life.

Following this logic, humans do not haveduties to the book, the stone, or the species, butto ourselves-duties both of prudence andeducation. Such anthropogenic reasons arepragmatic and impressive. Theyare alsomoral,since persons are benefited or hanned. But arethere also naturalistic reasons? Can all dutiesconcerning species be analyzed as duties topersons? Many endangered species have noresource value, nor are they particularlyimportant for the other reasons given above.Beggar's ticks (Bidens spp.), with their sticktight seeds, are a common nuisance weedthrough much of the United States. However,one species, the tidal shore beggar's-tick(Bidens bidentoides), which differs little fromthe others in appearance, is increasingly endangered. It seems unlikely that it is either arivet or a potential resource to humans. So faras humans are concerned, its extinction mightbe good riddance.Are there completely worthless species-notgood for anything at all? If so, is there anyreason or duty to save them? Are thehumanistic reasons exhaustive? A primary environmental ethics answers that species aregood in their own right, whether or not theyareany good for humans. The duties-to-personsonly line of argument leaves deeper reasonsuntouched. The deeper problem with theanthropocentric rationale is that itsjustifications are submoral and fundamentallyexploitive and self-serving, even if subtly so.This is not true intraspecifically among


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dangered species designations have alteredwhen systematists decided to lump or splitprevious groupings. To whatever degree species are artifacts of those doing the taxonomy,duties to save them seem unconvincing.There are four main concepts of species: (l )

morphological, askingwhetherorganisms havethe same anatomy and functions; (2) biological(so-called), asking whether organisms caninterbreed; (3) evolutionary, asking whetherorganisms have the same lineage historically;and (4) genetic, asking whether they have acommon genome. But these concepts are notmutually exclusive; organisms that haveenough common ancestry will have a similarmor- phology and function; theywill be able tointerbreed, and they can do so because theyhave similar genomes.All of these concepts combine for a more

realist account than the artifact-of-taxonomysubjectivist account. A species is not jus t aclass that taxonomists decide on; it is a livinghistorical form (Latin: species), propagated inindividual organisms, that flows dynamicallyover generations. Species are dynamic naturalkinds, historicallyparticular lineages. A speciesis a coherent ongoing natural kind expressed inorganisms that interbreed because that kind isencoded in gene flow, the genes determiningthe organism's morphology and functions, thekind shaped by its environment. In this sensespecies are objectivelythere as livingprocessesin the evolutionaryecosystem-found, notmadeby taxonomists. Species are real historicalentites, interbreeding populations. By contrast,families, orders, and genera are not levels atwhich biological reproduction takes place. Sofar from being arbitrary, species are the realevolutionary units. This claim-that there arespecific forms oflife historicallymaintained intheir environments over time-is not fictional,but, rather, seems as certain as anything elsewebelieve about the empiricalworld, even thoughat times scientists revise the theories and taxawith which they map these forms.Species are more like mountains and rivers,phenomena that are objectively there to be

mapped. The edges of such natural kinds willsometimes be fuzzy, to some extent dis-

cretionary. We can expect that one species willmodify into another over evolutionary time,often gradually, sometimes more quickly. Butit does not follow from the fact that speciationis sometimes in progress that species aremerely made up, instead of found asevolutionary lines articulated into diverseforms, each with its more or less distinctintegrity, breeding population, gene pool, androle in its ecosystem. It is quite objective toclaim that evolutionary lines are articulatedinto diversekinds oflife. What taxonomists do,or should do, is, as Plato said, to "carve natureat the joints."G. G. Simpson concluded, "An evolutionaryspecies is a lineage (an ancestral-descendant

sequence of populations) evolving separatelyfrom others and with its own unitaryevolutionary role and tendencies." NilesEldredge and Joel Cracraft insist, with emphasis, that species are "discrete entities in timeas well as space." As convincing an account asany finds that species, though not individualorganisms, are another natural kind ofhistorical individual, each a unique event innatural history, and that species names areproper names. The various criteria for definingspecies (recent descent, reproductive isolation,morphology, and distinct gene pool) cometogether at least in providing evidence thatspecies are really there. What survives for afew months, years, or decades is the individualanimal or plant; what survives for millennia isthe kind as a lineage. Life is something passingthrough the individual as much as something itpossesses on its own. Even a species defendsitself; that is one way to interpret reproduction.The individual organism resists death; thespecies resists extinction through reproductionwith variation. At both levels, biologicalidentity is conserved over time.

IV. QUESTIONS OF DUTY: OUGHTSPECIES BE SAVED?Why ought species be protected? Beyond ahumanistic set of answers, when we confrontthe objective history of speciation and


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evolution of speCIes, IS there somenonhumanistic reason to save endangeredspecies? One reply here is that nature is a kindofwonderland. As curiosities and relics of thepast, even species that are presently not goodfor anything in particular can be given anumbrella protection by saying that humansought to preserve an environment adequate tomatch their capacity to wonder.But nature as a wonderland introduces thequestion of whether preserving resources forwonder is not better seen as preserving aremarkable natural history that has objectiveworth-an evolutionary process that hasspontaneously assembled as its products millions of species. Valuing speciation directly,however, seems to attach value to the evolutionaryprocess (the wonderland), notmerelyto subjective experiences that arise whenhumans reflect over it (the wonder). It will bebetter, beyond our pragmatic self-enlightenedstrategies for conservation, beyond our obligations to other humans, beyond even ourwonder, to know the full truth of the humanobligation, to have the best reasons for savingspecies, as well as the good ones.We might say that humans ofdecent characterwill refrain from needless destruction of allkinds, including destruction of species.Vandals destroy ing art objects do not so muchhurt statues as do they cheapen their owncharacter. By this account the duty to saveendangered species is really a matter ofcultivating human excellences. It is philistineto destroy species carelessly; persons ofcharacter will not do it. It is uncalled for. Butsuch a prohibition seems to depend on somevalue in the species as such, for there need beno prohibition against destroying a valuelessthing. Is there not here some insensitivity to aform of life that (unlike a statue) has anintrinsic value that places some claim onhumans?Why are such insensitive actions "uncalledfor" unless there is something in the speciesitself that "calls for" a more appropriateattitude. If the excellence of character reallycomes from appreciatingsomethingwonderful,then why not attach value to this other, so full

of wonder? It seems unexcellent-cheap andphilistine-to say that excellence of humancharacter is what we are after when wepreserve these endangered species. We wantvirtue in the human beholder that recognizesvalue in the endangered species. Excellence ofhuman character does indeed result, but let thehuman virtue come tributary to value found innature. An enriched humanity results, withvalues in the species and values in personscompounded-but only if the loci of value arenot confounded.A naturalistic account values species andspeciation intrinsically, not as resources or as ameans to human excellence. Humans ought torespect these dynamic life forms preserved inhistorical lines, vital informational processesthat persist genetically over millions of years,overleaping short-lived individuals. It is notform (species) as mere morphology, but theformative (speciating) process that humansought to preserve, although the process cannotbe preservedwithout some of its products, andthe products (species) are valuable as results ofthe creative process. An ethic about speciessees that the species is a bigger event than theindividual organism, although species arealways exemplified in individual organisms.Biological conservation goes on at this leveltoo, and in a sense this level is moreappropriate formoral concern, since the speciesis a comprehensive evolutionary unit but thesingle organism is not. [See SPECIES DIVERSITY.]A consideration of species is both revealingand challenging,because it offers abiologicallybased counterexample to the focus on individuals-typically sentient animals and usuallyindividual persons-that has been so characteristic in Western ethics. As evolution takesplace in ecosystems, it is notmere individualitythat counts. The individual represents (re-presents) a species in each new generation. It is atoken of a type, and the type is more importantthan the token. Though species are not moralagents, a biological identity-a kind of value-ishere defended. The dignity resides in the dynamic form; the individual inherits this, exemplifies it, and passes it on. The evolutionary


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history that the particular individual has issomething passing through it during its life,passed to it and passed on during reproduction,as much as something it intrinsicallypossesses.Having a biological identity reasserted genetically over time is as true of the species as ofthe individual. Respecting that identity generates duties to species.When a rhododendron plant dies, another onereplaces it. But when Rhododendron chapmanii-an endangered species in the U.S.Southeast-goes extinct, the species terminatesforever. Death of a token is radically differentfrom death of a type; death of an individual,different from death of an entire lineage. Thedeaths of individual rhododendrons inperennial turnover are even necessary if thespecies is to persist. Seeds are dispersed andreplacement rhododendrons grow elsewhere inthe pinewood forest, as landscapes change orsuccession shifts. Later-coming replacements,mutants as well as replacements, are selectedfor or against in a stable or changingenvironment. Individuals improve in fitnessand the species adapts to an altering climate orcompetitive pressures. Tracking itsenvironment over time, the species isconserved, modified, and continues.With extinction, this stops. Extinction shuts

down the generative processes, a kind ofsuperkilling. This kills forms (species)-notjustindividuals. This kills "essences" beyond"existences," the "soul" as well as the "body. "This kills collectively, not just distributively.To kill a particular plant is to stop a life of afew years, while other lives of such kindcontinue unabated, and the possibilities for thefuture are unaffected; to superkill a particularspecies is to shut down a story of manymillennia and leave no future possibilities.A species lacks moral agency, reflective self

awareness, sentience, or organic individuality.Some are tempted to say that specific-levelprocesses cannot count morally. But eachongoing species defends a form of life, andthese forms are, on the whole, good kinds.Such speciation has achieved all the planetaryrichness of life. All ethicists say that in Homosapiens one species has appeared that not only

exists but ought to exist. A naturalistic ethicrefuses to say this exclusively of a late-cominghighly developed form and extends this dutymore broadly to the other species-although notwith equal intensity over them all, in view ofvaried levels of development.

The wrong that humans are doing, or areallowing to happen through carelessness, isstopping historical gene flow in which thevitality of life is laid, and which, viewed atanother level, is the same as the flow ofnaturalkinds. A shutdown of the life stream is themost destructive event possible. Although allspecific storiesmust eventuallyend,we seldomwant unnatural ends. The difference betweennatural extinction andhuman-caused extinctionis something like that between death bynaturalcauses and murder. Humans ought not to playthe role ofmurderers. The duty to species canbe overridden, for example, with pests ordisease organisms. But a prima facia dutystands nevertheless. [See EVOLUTION ANDEXTINCTION.]What is wrong with human-caused extinction

is not just the loss ofhuman resources, but theloss ofbiological sources. The question is not,What is this rare plant or animal good for? But,What good is here? Not, Is this species goodfor my kind, Homo sapiens? But, Is Rhododendron chapmanii a good of its kind, a goodkind? True, we are censuring insensitivity inpersons, but we are appreciating an objectivevitality in the world, one that precedes andoverleaps our personal or cultural presence. Tocare directly about a plant or animal species isto be quite nonanthropocentric and objectiveabout botanical and zoological processes thattake place independentlyofhuman preferences.Never before has this level of question beenfaced. Previously, humans did not have muchpower to cause extinctions, orknowledge aboutwhat they were inadvertently doing. But todayhumans have more understanding than ever ofthe natural world they inhabit, ofthe speciatingprocesses, morepredictivepower to foresee theintended and unintended results of theiractions, and more power to reverse theundesirable consequences. Increasingly, weknow the natural histories of flora and fauna;


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we find that, willy-nilly, we have a vital role inwhether these stories continue. The duties thatsuch power and vision generate no longerattach simply to individuals or persons but areemerging duties to specific forms of life.A consideration of species strains any ethic

fixed on individual organisms, much less onsentience or persons. But the result can bebiologically sounder, although it revises whatwas formerly thought logically permissible orethically binding. When ethics are informed bythis kind of biology, it is appropriate to attachduty dynamically to the specific form of life.The species line is the more fundamental livingsystem, the whole, ofwhich individual organisms are the essential parts. The species too hasits integrity, its individuality; and it is moreimportant to protect this than to protectindividual integrity. The appropriate survivalunit is the appropriate level ofmoral concern.V. SPECIES IN ECOSYSTEMSA species is what it is inseparably from theenvironmental niche into which it fits. Aspecies is what it is where it is. Particularspecies may not be essential in the sense thatthe ecosystemcansurvive the loss ofindividualspecies without adverse effect. But habitats areessential to species, and an endangered speciesoften means an endangered habitat. Speciesplay lesser or greater roles in their habitats.Integrity in the species fits into integrity in theecosystem. The species and the community arecomplementary goods in synthesis, parallel to,but a level above, the way the species andindividual organisms have distinguishable butentwined goods. It is not preservation ofspecies that we wish, but the preservation ofspecies in the system. It is not merelywhat theyare, but where they are that we must valuecorrectly.This limits the otherwise important role thatzoos and botanical gardens can play in theconservation of species. They can provide research, a refuge for species, breedingprograms,

aid on public education, and so forth, but theycannot simulate the ongoing dynamism ofgeneflow over time under the selection pressures in

awild biome. They only lockup a collectionofindividuals; they amputate the species from itshabitat. The species can only be preserved insitu; the species ought to be preserved in situ.That does move from scientific facts to ethicalduties, but what ought to be has to be based onwhat can be.Neither individual nor species stands alone;both are embedded in an ecosystem. Plants,

which are autotrophs, have a certain independence that animals and other heterotrophsdo not have. Plants need only water, sunshine,soil, nutrients, and local conditions of growth;animals, oftenmobile and higherup the trophicpyramid, may range more widely, but in thisalternate form of independence depend on theprimary production of plants. Every naturalform of life came to be what it is where it is,shaped as an adaptive fit, even when speciesacquire a fitness that enables them to track intodiffering environments. (Aproblemwith exoticspecies, introduced by humans, is often thatthey are not good fits in their alienecosystems.) The product, a species, is theoutcome of entwined genetic and ecologicalprocesses; the generative impulse springs fromthe gene pool, defended by information codedthere. But the whole population or speciessurvives when selectedby natural forces in theenvironment for a niche it can occupy.In an ethic of endangered species, we want toadmire the evolutionary or creative process asmuch as the product. This involves regularspecies turnoverwhen a species becomes unfitin its habitat, goes extinct, or tracks a changingenvironment until transformed into somethingelse. On evolutionary time scales species tooare ephemeral. But the speciating process isnot. Persisting through vicissitudes for 2.5billion years, speciation is about as long-continuing as anything on earth can be.VI. NATURAL AND HUMANCAUSED EXTINCTIONSIt might seem that for humans to terminatespecies now and again is quite natural. Speciesbecome extinct all the time in natural history.But although extinction is a quite natural event,


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there are important theoretical and practicaldifferences between natural and anthropogenic(human-caused) extinctions. Artificial extinction, caused by human disturbance or encroachments, is radically different from naturalextinction. In natural extinction a species diesout when it has become unfit in habitat, andother existing or future species appear in itsplace. There are replacements. Such extinctionis normal turnover in ongoing speciation.Although harmful to a species, extinction innature is seldom an evil in the system. It israther the key to tomorrow. The species isemployed in, but abandoned to, the largerhistorical evolution of life.

By contrast, artificial extinction typicallyshuts down future evolution because it shutsdown speciating processes dependent on thosespecies. One opens doors, the other closesthem. Humansgenerate and regenerate nothing;they only dead-end these lines. Relevant differences make the two as morally distinct asdeath by natural causes is from murder.Anthropogenic extinction differs fromevolutionary extinction in that hundreds ofthousands of species will perish because ofculturally altered environments that areradically different from the spontaneousenvironments in which such species evolvedand in which they sometimes go extinct. Innatural extinction nature takes away life, whenit has become unfit in habitat, or when thehabitat alters, and typically supplies other lifein its place. Natural extinction occurs withtransformation, either of the extinct line orrelated or competing lines. Artificial extinctionis without issue.From this perspective, humans have no duty

to preserve rare species from naturalextinctions, although they might have a duty toother humans to save such species as resourcesor museum pieces. No species has a "right tolife" apart from the continued existence of theecosystem with which it cofits. But humansdo have a duty to avoid artificial extinction.Over evolutionary time nature, though extinguishing species, has provided new species ata higher rate than the extinction rate, hence theaccumulated global diversity. There have been

infrequent catastrophic extinction events, a-nomalies in the record, each succeeded by arecovery of previous diversity. Althoughnatural events, these extinctions so deviatefrom the normal trends that manypaleontologists look for causes external to theevolutionary ecosystem-supernovae orcollisions with asteroids. Typically, however,thebiological processes that characterizeEarthare both prolific and with considerable powersofrecovery after catastrophe. Uninterrupted byaccident, or even interrupted so, they steadilyincrease the numbers of species.An ethicist must be circumspect. An argumentmight commit what logicians call the geneticfallacy to suppose that present value dependedon origins. Species judged today to haveintrinsic value might have arisen anciently andanomalously from a valueless context, akin tothe way in which life arose mysteriously fromnonlivingmaterials. But in an ecosystem, whata thing is differentiates poorly from thegenerating and sustaining matrix. Theindividual and the species havewhat value theyhave to some extent inevitably in the context ofthe forces that beget them. There is somethingawesome about an Earth that begins with zeroand runs up toward 5-10 million species inseveral billionyears, setbacks notwithstanding.Were the sole moral species, Homo sapiens, toconserve all Earth's species merely as resourcesfor human preference satisfaction, we wouldnot yet know the truth about what has been, is,or ought to be going on in biological conservation.VII. RESPECT FOR RARE LIFEDuties to endangered species will be especiallyconcerned with a respect for a rare life. Suchrespect must ask about the role of rarity ingenerating respect, if this differs from a moregeneral respect for common life. Rarity is not,as such, an intrinsically valuable property infauna and flora, or in human experiences (eventhough people take an interest in things justbecause they are rare). Certain diseases arerare, and we are glad of it. Monsters and othersports of nature, such as albinos, are rare, and


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of no particular intrinsic value for their rarity(curiosities though they sometimes become).Indeed, if a species is naturally rare, thatinitally suggests its insignificance in anecosystem. Rarity is no automatic cause forrespect. Nevertheless, something about therarity of endangered species heightens theelement of respect, and accompanying duty.Naturally rare species, as much as common orfrequent species, signify exuberance in nature;each species presents an actual uniqueexpression of the prolific potential driving theevolutionary epic. A rare species maybebarelyhanging on, surviving by mere luck, and wehave already noticed that there is no duty tosave species going extinct naturally. But a rarespecies maybe quite competent in its niche, notat all nearing extinction if left on its own; it isonly facing extinction when made artificiallymore rare by human disruptions. The rareflower is a botanical achievement, a bit ofbrilliance, an ecological problem resolved, anevolutionary threshold crossed. The endemicspecies, perhaps one specialized for an unusualhabitat, represents a rare discovery in nature,before it provides a rare human adventure infinding it.

Rhododendron chapmanii is a particularevolutionary achievement. Though rare, it is asatisfactory fit, well placed in its niche in thetransition zone between the dry longleaf pineforests and the moist Cyrilla thickets. Millionsof years of struggle lie behind it; the results ofthat history are now geneticallycodedwithin it.Rare species-if one insists on a restrictedevolutionary theory-are random accidents (asare the naturally common ones), resulting froma cumulation ofmutations. But this mutationalfertilitygenerates creativity, and, equallyby thetheory, surviving species must be satisfactoryfits in their environments. Sometimes they liveon the cutting edge of exploratory probing;sometimes they are relics of the past. Eitherway they offer promise and memory of an inventive natural history. Life is a manysplendored thing; extinction of the rare dimsthis luster. From this arises the respect thatgenerates a duty to save rare lives.This respect for life is sometimes expressed in

terms of rights. Aldo Leopold, advocating respect for the fauna and flora on the landscape,says"A land ethic ofcourse cannot prevent thealteration, management, and use of these'resources,' but it does affirm their right tocontinued existence, and, at least in spots, theircontinued existence in a natural state." They"should continue as a matter of biotic right."Charles S. Elton, an ecologist, reports a beliefthat he himself shares: "There are millions ofpeople in the world who think that animalshave a right to exist and be left alone." Thisappeal to a biotic right must be taken asevidence ofthe strength ofconviction that thereare duties to species. Nevertheless, manyphilosophers have concluded that thevocabulary ofrights, though useful rhetorically,is not the most appropriate categoryofanalysisfor values at the species level. "Rights" is bestdeveloped as a category for protectingpersonalvalues; rights are not objectivelypresent in thenatural world. But endangered species areobjectivelyvaluable kinds, good inthemselves;theydo have their ownwelfare. Respect for lifeought to be directly based on this value.The seriousness of respect for rare life isfurther illustrated when the idea approaches a"reverence" for life. As noticed earlier, whenthe U.S. Congress declared that species havemultiple values, it left economic value off thelist. Another notable omission is religiousvalue. Congress would have overstepped itsauthority to declare that species carry religiousvalue. Nevertheless, for many, Americans andothers around the globe, this is the mostimportant value at stake. Species are thecreation itself, the "swarms of living creatures"(biodiversity) that "the earth brought forth" atthe divine imperative; "God saw that it wasgood" and "blessed them." Noah's ark was theaboriginal endangered species project; Godcommanded, "Keep them alive with you."God's name does not appear directly in theEndangered Species Act but nevertheless

occurs in connection with the Act. The highlevel interagencycommitteemaypermithumandevelopment at the cost of extinction ofspecies. In the legislation this committee isgiven the rather nondescript name "The En-


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dangered Species Committee," but almost atonce it was nicknamed "the God Committee."The name mixes jest with theological insightand reveals that religious value is implicitlylurking in the Act. Humans are trustees ofcreation and ought to "play God" with extremecare. Any who decide to destroy species take,fearfully, the prerogative ofGod. When one isconserving life, ultimacy is always nearby.Extinction is forever; and, when danger is ultimate, absolutes become relevant. The motivation to save endangered species can andought to be pragmatic, economic, political, andscientific; deeper down it is moral, philosophical, and religious. Species embody a fertility on Earth that is sacred.This genesis is, in biological perspective,

spontaneous and autonomous; and biologistsfind nature to be prolific, whether or not theGod question is raised. Whether the convictionrises to a reverence for life or not, the respectfor life injeopardybecomes intense. Life is thepeculiar value on our planet, among the rarephenomena in the universe, indeed, not yetelsewhere known. Natural history is a vastscene of birth and death, sprouting, budding,flowering, fruiting, passing away, passing lifeon. Biologists know, better than others, thatEarth has brought forth the natural kindsexuberantly over the millennia. Ultimately,there is a kind of creativity in naturedemanding at least that one spell nature with acapital N, ifone does not pass beyond nature todetect some deeper sacred presence.Biologists today are not inclined, nor shouldthey be as biologists, to look for explanationsin supemature, but biologists meanwhile find anature that is superb! This commands a deeprespect. Science, many think, eliminates fromnature any suggestions of teleology, but it isnot so easy for science to dismiss genesis.What has managed to happen on Earth isstartlingby any criteria. ErnstMayr concludes,"Virtually all biologists are religious, in thedeeper sense of the word, even though it maybe a religion without revelation. ... Theunknown and maybe unknowable instills in usa sense of humility and awe." "And if one is atruly thinking biologist, one has a feeling of

responsibility for nature, as reflected by muchof the conservation movement." If anything atall on Earth is sacred, itmust be this enthrallingcreativity that characterizes our home planet.Species are a characteristic expression of thecreative process. The swarms of species areboth presence and symbol of forces in naturalsystems that transcend human powers andutility. Generated from earth, air, fire, andwater, these fauna and flora are an archetype ofthe foundations of the world. Earth is a fertileplanet, and in that sense the genesis on Earth isthe deepest valuational category of all, oneclassically reached by the concept of creation.Many find it impossible to be a conservationbiologist without a respect for life. Whateverbiologists may make of the mystery of life'sorigins, theyalmostunanimouslyconclude thatthe catastrophic loss of species that is at handand by our hand is tragic, irreversible, andunforgivable. That generates duties to endangered species.On the scale of evolutionary time, humansappear late and suddenly, a few hundred thousand years on a scale of billions of years, analogous to a few seconds in a 24-hour day. Evenmore lately and suddenly, they increase theextinctionratedramatically, in this onecenturyin several thousand years of recorded history.What is offensive in such conduct is not merelysenseless destabilizing, not merely the loss ofresources, but the maelstrom of killing andinsensitivity to forms of life. What is requiredis notprudence, but principled responsibility tothe biospheric Earth. Only the human speciescontains moral agents, but conscience oughtnot be used to exempt every other form of lifefrom consideration, with the resulting paradoxthat the sole moral species acts only in itscollective self-interest toward all the rest.Several billion years' worth of creative toil,several million species of teeming life, havebeenhanded overto the careofthe late-comingspecies inwhichmindhas flowered andmoralshave emerged. On thehumanistic account, suchspecies ought to be saved for their benefits tohumans. On the naturalistic account, the solemoral species has a duty to do something lessself-interested than count all the products of an


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evolutionary ecosystem as human resources;rather, the host of species has a claim to care inits own right. There is something Newtonian,not yet Einsteinian, besides something morallynaive, about living in a reference frame inwhich one species takes itself as absolute andvalues everything else relative to its utility.

GlossaryAnthropogenic extinction Extinction causedby human-introduced causes, as distinguishedfrom natural extinction.Catastrophic extinction Extinction at extremely high rates, differing from normal rates,at unusual periods in natural history.Instrumental value Value as a means to anend. Species have instrumental value for humans if they have medical, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other uses.Intrinsic value Value that is inherent in something, without necessary reference to its instrumental value. Intrinsic value in speciescla ims that natura l kinds are good in themselves, whethe r or not they are useful to humans.Natural extinction Extinction that takes placedue to natural causes, withouthuman causes, ashas occurred throughout evolutionary history.Naturalistic fallacy An alleged fallacy whenone argues from statements of fact in premisesto statements of duty in conclusions, fromdescriptions to prescriptions.

BibliographyCouncil on Environmental Quali ty and Department of State (1980). "The Global 2000Repor t to the President." U. S. GovernmentPrint ing Office, Washington D.C. [Includesprojections of impending losses of species.]Darwin, C. (1872/1968). "The Origin ofSpecies." Penguin, Baltimore, Maryland.

Ehrlich, P., Ehrlich, A. (1981). "Extinction."Random House, New York. [A comprehensivestudy of extinctions, with the rationale forsaving species.]Eldredge, N., Cracraft, J (1980). "PhylogeneticPatterns and the Evolutionary Process."ColumbiaUniversity Press, New York.Elton, C. S. (1958). "The Ecology of Invasionsby Animals and Plants." Wiley, New York.Ghiselin, M. (1987). Species concepts, individuality, and objectivity. Bio!. Phi/os. 2,127-144.Hull, D. L. (1978). A matter of individuality.Philos. Sci. 45, 335-360.Leopold, A. (1968). "A Sand CountyAlmanac." Oxford University Press, NewYork.Mayr, E. (1982). "The Growth of BiologicalThought." Harvard University Press, Camridge, Massachusetts.Mayr E. (1985). How biology differs from thephysical sciences. In "Evolution at aCrossroads" (J. Depew and B. H. Weber, eds.).MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.Myers, N. (1979a). "The Sinking Ark."Pergamon, Oxford, England. [Acomprehens ive study of species lossesworldwide.]Myers, N. (1979b). Conserving our globalstock. Environment 21(9),25-33.Norton, B. G., ed. (1986). "The Preservation ofSpecies." Princeton University Press,Princeton, NewJersey. [Oriented to policy andphilosophical issues.]Opler, P. A. (1977). The parade of passingspecies: A surveyofextinctions in theU.S. Sci.Teach. 44, 30-34.


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Rolston, H., III(1985). Duties to endangeredspecies. Bioscience 35, 718-726.Rolston, H., III (1988). Life injeopardy: Dutiesto endangered species. In "EnvironmentalEthics," TempleUniversityPress, Philadelphia.Simpson, G. G. (1961). "Principles ofAnimalTaxonomy." Columbia University Press, NewYork.U.S. Congress (1973). Endangered SpeciesActof 1973, 87 Stat. 884, Public Law 93-205.U.S. Fish andWildlife Service (1990). Reviewof plant taxa for listing as endangered orthreatened species. Fed. Regist. 55,(35),6184-6229.U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1991). Animalcandidate review for listing as endangered orthreatened species. Fed. Regist. 56,(225),58804-58836.

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