durkheim's evolutionary conception of time

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Durkheim's Evolutionary Conception of Social ChangeAuthor(s): Roscoe C. HinkleSource: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1976), pp. 336-346Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105955 .

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The Sociological Quarterly 17 (Summer 1976): 336-346

Durkheim'sEvolutionaryConception

of Social ChangeROSCOE . HINKLE,TheOhio State University

Using criteria derived from several recent inquiries into the nature of classical socialevolutionismof the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies, his studyhas endeavored o deter-minewhat Durkheim's omprehensiveiews on evolutionary hangewere. Durkheimappears ohave remainedprevailinglyand persistentlya social evolutionistthroughouthis sociologicalcareer. He acceptsthe usualview of classicalsocial evolutionism egardinghe macro-or large-

scale character f thesocial unitsundergoing hange i.e., totalsocietiesorentire nstitutions),heorganismand its changeas exhibited n growthas an appropriate nalogy,and the comparativemethodas the recommendednvestigative rocedurealbeitwith a somewhatunique echnique oinsurethe similarityof the social contextsof the itemsstudied).Hisconclusionat the endof hiscareer hatchange s naturallybothslowandrapid n its rate,relativelyimitedor unlimited n itsinitial scope, and smalland largein scale is apparentlywithoutparallel.His multiplanal,mul-tilinear,and arborescent otion of thedirectionality f changehasseemingly nlyone parallel inSpencer).Finally,he agreeswithsocial evolutionists enerallyhat thecausesof socialchangeare

prevailinglynternal,necessary,and uniform n nature.

I

CERTAINLY,he almost

unparalleledminencewhich Durkheim

enjoystodayas a

founding fatherof modernsociology, the revival of a generalinterestin macro-dynamics,efforts to reformulate n acceptable ocial evolutionismaccompaniedbyan acknowledgement f indebtedness o Durkheim n at least one case, alongwithoccasionalargumentshathe wasmoving"awayfromevolutionism,"was a residualevolutionist,or that he seemsto have been aninconstantorinconsistent volutionistseem to recommendan inquiryinto Durkheim'sviews on social change generallyand on social evolutionparticularly.' t is the objectiveof thispaper o provide ustsuch an investigation.

However evident and undeniableDurkheim's structuralcontributionsmay be,

changeis-as Giddenscontends

1972:41)-the"central ssue

informing"all fourof

his majorvolumes,thoughonly TheDivision f Labor nSociety seemsobviousandis commonly so construed. In Durkheim's own view, the significanceof Suicide

(1951:367-92)s that it studiesa phenomenonwhoseincreasingmagnitudeor "risingtide" stems from a morbid or pathologicalsocial condition of modern French

society under the impact of abnormallyrapid and extensivesocial change. The

ElementaryFormsof theReligiousLife(1968:20,fn) ndeavors o discoverthe more

elementary,simple, and thus primitive or primordial) omponentsof religion,its

originsin so far as the "most simplesocialcondition...[canbe] actuallyknown orthatbeyondwhich we cannotgo at present."Finally,such basiccomponentsof The

Rulesof SociologicalMethodas thenotionsof socialcauseandfunction, hesocially

Reprintsof this articlemaybe obtainedby writingRoscoe C. Hinkle,Department f Sociology,TheOhio State University,ColumbusOH 43210.

'See Parsons'acknowledgementf indebtedness o Durkheim 1971:102-4, 06-7, 114, 125, 127, 138).Gouldner(1970:120, 130), Lukes (1972:456),and Nisbet (1974:239-56) ffer somewhatdifferent n-

terpretations f Durkheim'srelationship o social evolution.



Durkheim'sConception f Social Change 337

normal and pathological,the comparativemethod, and the typology of societalspecieshave a particularmethodological elevance orthestudyof socialgenesisandchange.

More specifically,the frequencywith which such words or phrasesas "socialevolution, " "collectiveevolution," "evolutionarytrend," "the evolution of thepatriarchalamily"and otherinstitutional orms,the "stagesthathumanity ucces-sively traverses,"and "particular ocieties" with their "variousevolutions"occurthroughouthis various nquiries uggestshis adherence o the tenetsof socialevolu-tion. To assertthat anexplanationof a socialphenomenonrequires"goingbacktoits moreprimitiveandsimpleform,"accounting or "thecharacteristics y whichitwas markedat that time,"andthenindicating"how it developedandbecamecom-plicatedlittle by little,"and finallyshowing"how it became that whichit is at themoment in question" is to pose causation in evolutionaryterms (Durkheim,

1968:15).Furthermore,Durkheim certainly did consider his interests in bothdiachronic-evolutionary ausation and synchronic functionality, which he ex-poundedin TheRules,as mutuallycongruentand complementary.

II

A defensibleanalysismustdo more thanmerelycite or considerscatteredpiecesofevidence. It is necessaryto examine Durkheim's views on social evolutionismsystematicallyand comprehensively.For thispurpose,a device or paradigmof therecognized, ypicalfeaturesof classicalsocialevolutionism s required.Fortunately,the

revivalof socialevolutionism n sociologyduring he 1960'swasaccompaniedbyan investigationof the genesisand developmentof the ideas of the older,classicalevolutionismof the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies.Althoughboth Britishand American sociologists have contributedto the delineationof evolutionaryantecedentsandcomponents,the work of the late FrederickJ. Teggartand his stu-dents has beenespeciallyuseful.'On the basis of these analyses,a paradigmof sixfundamental features of social evolutionism has been constructed and itscharacteristics onstitute the majorcriteriafor assessingDurkheim's nclinationstoward the orientation: he conceptionof the social unit undergoing hange;use ofan appropriateanalogy;a methodof study;a particularnotion of rate,scope, and

magnitudeof change; he natureof its directionality; nd a causalnotionor viewofthe modusoperandiof change.3Eachcriterion s representednthe sixpointsbelowsummarizing he evidenceon Durkheim'sviews towardsocial change.

1. In accordancewithclassicalsocialevolutionism,Durkheimacceptscomprehen-sive or macro-socialunits such as (total) societies and (entire)institutions as ap-propriate or thestudyof socialchange.Butunlikemanyof itsadherents-for exam-ple, Comte-Durkheim conspicuouslyrejects(1938:77,78, 19) any conceptionof

'Forcontributions f English ociologists o theanalysesof the antecedents f socialevolutionism, eeGinsburg 1957),Burrow 1966),andSmith 1973).ForAmerican ontributions, onsult:Teggart 1941),

Hildebrand's Introduction"o Teggart 1949),Bock inCahnman ndBoskoff 1964),andNisbet(1969)and in McKinneyand Tiryakian 1970).3Each f themajor eaturesof theTeggartianraditionandSmith'sanalysisareincluded nthescheme:

totalsocialwholesas the "socialunitsundergoing hange;"heorganicanalogyandGreekphysis n"useof an appropriate nalogy;"comparativemethod as "a method of study;"continuity-gradualismn "aparticularnotion of rate,scope andmagnitude f change;"direction, umulation, rreversibilityn "thenatureof its directionality;"ndnaturalness, ecessity, mmanence, nduniformitarianismn "a causalnotion or view of the modusoperandiof change."



338 THE SOCIOLOGICAL UARTERLY

specificsocietiesas particularsn or representatives f the evolution of mankind,human society in general,or "a singlepeople" or "singlesocial species,"that is,humanity.Historicaldevelopment"breaksup. . . into a multitudeof fragments

which,because heyspecificallydiffer romoneanother,cannotbejoined together na unifiedmanner"(1938:78).? ascal's amousmetaphors untrue.Human societiescannot be drawn ogetherand"joined ike the identicalsections of a straight ine in

geometry" 1938:78).Durkheim nsiststhat socialreality s constitutedof a pluralityof social species,each qualitativelydistinctfromthe others.

Unfortunately,other passagesfrom Durkheim'sworksdo not consistentlysup-port his repudiationof a unitarynotionof humansociety.Theunbrokencontinuityof social evolutionin TheDivisionof Labor,the birth of all societiesfrom "othersocieties without a break in continuity,"the "stagesthat humanity successivelytraverses,"and the temporalsequence n the typologyof societalspeciesfrom the

"preceding"moresimpleto the"succeeding"morecomplexforms ogically mplyacomprehensive ocialunityamongallconcretesocietiesandtheirclassificationntobasic types of species(1938:105,85, 87, 117, 139, 140).

2. Also in concert with conventional social evolutionism,Durkheimfinds the

organismanditschangeasmanifestedngrowtha strategicallymportantanalogy nhisendeavor o studychangenaturalisticallyn large-scaleocial units.Thatanalogybeganwith Greekphilosophicnaturalismwhich-both in its intital formulation n

hylozoismand its laterexpression n Aristotle-construed all objectsin natureornaturalobjects(includingsocial entities)as endowed with a physisor growth-liketendency to change. Certainly,this view of dynamicsanticipatesevolution, for

changestems from internalcauses,"begins n a seed-likeorigincontainingallpoten-tialitiesfor futurestructure,"s exhibited n "successiveand denotablestages" ikethose in the life-cycle,and achieves"anend or final formthatgives meaningor pur-poseto thewholeprocess" Nisbet, 1965:90-1).Buttheorganism-growthnalogyas-sociatedwithphysisalsoanticipates volution n implying heappropriatenessf the

studyof change n largescale,holistic,or totalisticsocialunits; henaturalness,nor-

mality,and necessityof the change process; ts relativelyslow rate, limitedscope,and minimallyperceptiblemagnitude;and its continuous successiveor sequentialdirectionalcharacter.

The organismic-growth nalogy s undeniably vident n Durkheim'sanalysis.He

remarks(1938:83)that "the horde is the seed from which all social species havedeveloped."As is apparentbelow, he acceptsthe evolutionarynotion of a typicalrate, scope, and amount of change.He refers(1938:138,140)to the evolution ofsocial institutionsas "growth"andto their certainstages n appropriate rowthter-

minology, for example,"youth".The causes(causalprocessesor mechanisms)of

changealso have the characteristics f the causesof growth: heyareprimarilyand

substantiallynternal,necessary,and uniform.But even this evidencedoes not ex-haust the documentationof Durkheim's acceptanceof the organismic-growthanalogy.'

4Notethat henceforth nyparticular nidentified eferencewithonlya date of publications to be con-sidereda citation to one of Durkheim'sworks.

'Society,for instance, s referredo as a socialorganism, ocialsolidarity s likened o a spontaneousconsensusof partsof organisms,mechanicalandorganicforms of solidarity tem fromnotions about

organisms, he conceptsof the sociallynormal and pathologicalhave a biological nspirationas doesDurkheim'sclassificationof societies into social species.He does use other forms of analogybut theorganicor organismic s probably he most pervasiveand basic. See Lukes(1972:35).




True,Durkheim'srecognition hat"amonghumansocietiestherearemanywhichare content to remainindefinitelystationary" 1938:109)seems to contradicttheconsistencyand ubiquity of change as signified in the analogy. Apparently,he

regards hese societies as the exceptionsand they receiveno furtherconsideration.For Durkheim,changeis natural,necessary,andnormalbecause t is construedas

growth,whichis natural,necessary,and normal-and because t is also construed oeffectadaptation,as required or survivalunderalterable-alteringonditionsof col-lective existence.

3. Durkheim'sconviction that "thecomparativemethod is theonly one suitedto

sociology" and is especiallyimportantfor the study of (macro-)social change isfurtherevidenceof his associationwith socialevolutionism 1938:125).ComparisonpervadesDurkheim'smethodologicalprocedure. t is importantn determing"com-mon" elementsin the diversityof forms and for separatingout the "permanent"

from the "transient," he "principle" rom the "secondary,"and the "essential"from the"accessory"1968:17).Manifestly, he level andrangeof comparative tudyrequireddependson the nature of the phenomenon nvolved(1938:126-39).Somesocial phenomena,such as "social currents,"are relativelydistinctiveof a givensociety.Others,suchas "aninstitution,a legalormoralregulation,or an establishedcustom,"exist in severalsocieties of the same species.And still otherphenomenahave been received"ready-maderompreceding typesor species]of societies"andthus are common to severaltypes of societies. For each of the threetypes, a par-ticularrangeof comparisonis required, east extendedfor the first and most ex-tendedforthe third.It is, of course,comparisonassociatedwith the thirdwhichcon-

stitutesthegenuinegeneticmethodand whichpermitsdetermination f the "condi-tions on which [the evolutionary]. . .formation [of elements or constituents]depend[s]" (1938:139). The establishment of causation requires comparison(1938:125).

Manifestly,Durkheim'scomparativemethod does differsignificantly rom the

comparativemethodof classicalevolutionismbecause t is pursuedwithexplicitat-tention to social or societal contexts, both concretely and abstractly. Anyphenomenonmust be related to its context and thus "cannot be understoodwhendetached from it" (1968:113). Explanation requires generalization but two

phenomenaor two facts cannotbe

compared(and potentiallygeneralized)merely"because heyseem to resembleeachother"(1968:113-4).Theymust also be derivedfrom societieswhich are alike;that is to say, they must be "varietiesof the same

species" (1968:114).6 Accordingly,Durkheimarguesthat a classificationof social

types or speciesmust be developedto facilitatecomparison.Yet he constructshis social types or species by rational fiat rather thanby em-

piricalinquiry.Because he first of histypesis irreducibly impleandhomogeneousand each of the others is symmetrically, step-by-step, more complex and

heterogeneous,he total seriesasenvisagedalbeit ncomplete)presupposeshe same

parallelism between social simplicity-complexityand temporal primitivity-

modernityas did

Comte'sstagesn his

comparativemethod. Durkheim's cheme or

comparison nvolves an abstractuniversalismmore like Comte'sthan Durkheim s

6Certainly,Durkheim egardedhis studyof the Australianprimitive ocietiesascomplyingwiththere-

quirementor the use of thecomparativemethod: hey"allbelong o onecommon ype"orspecies,whichis organizedon the "basis of clans"(1965:96).But consult Gouldner(1970:120,130).



340 THESOCIOLOGICAL UARTERLY

aware or would desire.7Whetherhis own version of the methodreally rejectsthe

implicationof the "directionof humanevolutionin general"as a classicalpracticeentailed is also less certain than Durkheim magined(1938:125).

4. Throughouthis career,Durkheimadhered o the characteristic iew of socialevolutionism hatchangeis naturallyandnormallyslow in its rate,initially imitedin scopeand small in amount.Under thiscircumstance,hesocialequilibriums not

likelyto be fundamentally r drasticallydisturbed.Adjustment o minorvariationscan be achieved more easily. Rules can be more readilymodified.AccordingtoDurkheim(1965:291),the "common conscienceis constitutedvery slowly and ismodified n the sameway."Whatconstitutesanappropriate djustmento theslightshift in the conditions of existencewillbe ascertained pontaneouslyf the relationsarerepeated, f variationandgropingdiminishandgeneralityandcrystallizationn-crease, and if uniformityand consensusgraduallyemergeas the "Truenature of

things" becomes apparent-for all of which the passage of time is essential(1965:368-9,377).

In evolutionary ransformation,he segmental ype of structureoses "moreandmore ground as societiesdevelop"(1965:187).Local customs"join togetherandunite" little by little, and later,partitions n social life "lose theircohesion, [and]become progressively effaced. . ." (1965:187). Standing alone or nearly so at first,mechanical solidarity "progressively loses ground and . .. organic solidaritybecomes, little by little, preponderant"1965:174).

Conversely, rapid, less limited, and large-scalesocial changes tend to dis-

equilibraterelations.Anomieresultsas rules becomeindefinite.Old ones lose their

obligatorinessand new ones have not had sufficient time to acquiresupport.A"societycannotchangeits structure uddenly" 1951:369). ndeed for Durkheim nhis earlier career (1951:369), any "grave and rapid . . . alteration must be morbid,"abnormal,or pathological.Socialchange s normallyandnaturally"a successionofslow, almost imperceptible modifications. . ." (1951:369).

Onlylater(during he last decadeof hissociologicalwork)didheactuallyconsidera rapid,accelerated,eap-by-leap ateof change n perceptible,moreencompassing,largeamounts,which occur"onlywhensocietyis passing throughsome abnormalcrisis"or a beneficentbut abrupt ransition 1951:251-2)-perhaps romone speciesto another.Involvinga "creativefermentor effervescence," uch changeis not a

mere alteration of "shades and degrees"but a transformation f kind or quality(1968:241). The whole society undergoes a revolution, renewal, or creativereconstruction e.g., the birth of Scholasticism n the twelfth and thirteenthcen-turies,theperiodof the RenaissanceandReformation,he FrenchRevolution nthe

eighteenth century, and the Socialist upheavals of the nineteenth century[1953:91-2]).

5. Like the classical social evolutionists,Durkheimdid construechangein such

large-scaleandenduring ocialunitsas(total)societiesand(entire) nstitutionsas ex-

7BothDurkheim'sconceptionof a taxonomyof societal types or species and Comte's notion ofhumanityor the humanrace(ingeneral)-both of which areemployed orconstruingheempiricalmul-

tiplicityof humansocieties as a generalizedequentialunity-are similarlyabstractrational ictionsorconstructs.Comteis commendably xplicit n acknowledginghe derivation f his ownprocedure romCondorcet's ational iction"of supposinga singlenation o whichwemayreferall theconsecutive ocialmodifications ctuallywitnessedamongdistinctpeoples" Comte,1893,11:69).Whethera singleunitaryconcept as inComte'sandCondorcet's ases)or a multipledifferentiated otion asinDurkheim's ase),each is equallya rationalabstract ictionor construct.




hibitinga directionalitywhichis generallyandbroadly inear.Suchdirectionalitysevident n his acceptanceof a trendfromprimitive, imple,rudimentary, ndifferen-

tiated, and segmentaltypes of society to modern,complex, elaborated,differen-

tiated,andorganized ypesor speciesof society.Yet,heexplicitlydisavowsany rigiduniplanal,unilinearand rectilinear iew(a la Comte)for a multiplanal,multilinear,and arborescentconceptionwhich he regardsas manifestin his own typologyofsocietal species(1938:19,78, 118, 120).

Nevertheless, he confidenceof his oppositionwhich is expressed n TheRulesisunderminedby other passagesin the same work and in the later TheElementaryForms.In the latter and latest of his monographs,he refers 1968:13-21)o primitiveand modernsocieties n a varietyof termsbut so interrelated s to suggestcontinuityon and within the sameplane. Evenin TheRules,he claims(1938:134,105, 84-85,138-40)that "Social life. . . is an uninterrupted eries of transformations,""all

societies are born of other societieswithout a breakin continuity,"and that thesocietal species are derivable mmediately rom one anotherin a gradationfrom

simplicity o complexity simplepolysegmentalo compoundanddoublycompoundpolysegmental)uch thatthe formerarethe"preceding" nd thelatter"succeeding"societalspecies.Furthermore,Durkheim'smethodologicalprescriptionsor assess-

ingthe directionof change n a givensocialphenomenonas it presents"moreor lessor equal complexity"at thegiven stagein the current ocietalspecies n comparisonwith the samestagein preceding pecies-and thus canbe said to progress,regress,or maintainitself-tends to place all societiesin the same seriesand on the same

plane (1938:139-40).Consequently,both his commentsand his analyticalpractice

contradicthis professedrejectionof the uni-recti-linearityf the directionof socialevolution.

6. Finally, Durkheim concurs with the view of social evolutionismthat social

changestems froma modusoperandior causalmechanism hatis immanent,neces-

sary,and uniform.He (1938:121) s unmistakably xplicitin his assertionthat the"causesof social phenomenaare internalto society"itself. Presumably,he meansthat social phenomenaexist sui generisand that the causes of social changeresidewithinsociety itself, especiallywithin the characterof its internalmilieu,and par-ticularly ts substratum 1938:116).Furthermore,he causes are necessarybecause

theyreflect or correspond o the verynatureof the socialmilieuandthe conditionsof collectiveexistence.As Durkheimremarks 1938:97), ociallife tendsto involvea

correspondencebetweenthe internaland externalsocial milieux.Finally,a set ofcausesis uniform n that it existsandhas a determining ndcorrespondingffectso

long as and wherevera particularstructureof social relations(i.e., a particularmilieu)endures.The sameset of causestends to persist nvariablyhrough imewiththe same effectbecauseit (1938:117)"canexpressonly one singlenature."It is thesubstratum specially hatprovides he constantsourceof the causalbond;thecon-comitantconditionsfor assertinga causalexplanation.

What this declarationmeans s thatpresenteventsof sociallifeoriginaten(orare

caused by) the present state or condition of society. The "principalcauses ofhistoricaldevelopment"are to be found "amongthe concomitantcircumstances"

and not in the past (1938:117). Patently,the "stagesthat humanitysuccessivelytraversesdo not engenderone another"(1938:117).A sequenceof stages is onlyhistoricalor chronological:a ivenstageis not itselfthe causeof the followingone.In Durkheim'sview, a sequenceof stages must be linked to a particularsocial



Durkheim's Conception of Social Change 343

tiationandspecializationdivisionof labor).Of all the adducedprimary auses,the

morphologicalchanges producingchanges in moral density appear to be mostcrucial.Yet, Durkheimsuggeststhat all factors,both primaryand secondary,are

necessary.Onlywhen oined together n theappropriateausalbond do theybecomesufficient to producethe effect, the divisionof labor.9

Through his career, Durkheim apparentlyadhered to the view that social

evolutionarychangewas typicallyand normallyslow, gradual,and small scale in

character,as can be exemplifiedby his analysisof changingrules in relationto thedivisionof laborin emergingorganizedsocieties.The milieuxof such societies are

complexand unstable.Accordingly,some "breakof equilibrium,or some innova-tion is alwaysbeingproduced" 1965:333).Specializedandmutuallydependentoc-

cupationsalreadyexist.Rulesareevidentlygeneratedas membersof these different

occupationsinteractdirectlywith one anotherand respondto what have become

"general, constant conditions of social life" (1965:366).Because some of theirresponsesare "veryconformable o the natureof things," they "arerepeatedveryoften and become habits" (1965:366).As these habits acquire force, they "aretransformed nto rules of conduct"(1965:366).A "certainsortingof rights andduties. . .is establishedby usage and becomes obligatory"(1965:355).(Note the

adaptiveallusions o "conditionsof sociallife" and the "natureof things"assignify-ing the existingconditionsof collectiveexistence).

Yet, Durkheim's ater writings, especiallyhis "Judgmentsof Valuesand Judg-ments of Reality" in 1953)and TheElementary orms, ndicateboth thepossibilityof andcausalmechanismsn more

rapid,comprehensive,ndlargescalesocio-moral

change. Precipitatedby somegreatcollectivecrisis,upheaval,or shock,this typeof

changeproduces"creativeeffervescence r ferment."Durkheimuses the term"col-lectiveeffervescence"or "ferment")o refer o the causalprocessbywhicha certainmaximalfrequency,range,duration,and especially ntensityof associationor in-teractioncreatepsychicchange n thesociety.Out of theincreasinglytronger ensa-tions induced,passionsaroused,vitalenergiesreleased,and the emotionalwarmth,enthusiasm,and exaltationengendered,a newconsciousnessof the wholedevelops.Egoismandthe commonplaceareexcluded;men see moreanddifferentlyhantheydo in normalcircumstances;hey feel transformed.The new life which has beenawakenedis

portrayedn new collective

representations.Societyitself is

morallyrecreatedby a reformulation, eformationand redefinitionof the very"idea. .. ofitself" (1968:470).

To declarethat suchchangesare not merelyalterationsof "shadesanddegrees,"quantitative hanges, s to suggestthattheyarequalitative hanges,changesof kindor type. Presumably, hey signifya transformation f the basic form or generaof

society (e.g., fromsegmental o organized ypes)or perhapsonly a transition romone species to another (e.g., from simply compoundedto doubly compoundedpolysegmental). See pages 10- 11aboveand LaCapra 1972:209).]Unfortunately,

9Caused rimarilyby increasingmoraldensitywhicheventuatesn a heightened truggle orexistence,the divisionof laboris pursuedby society"because hecourse...previouslyfollowedwas. . . barredandbecause hegreater ntensityof the struggle,owingto the moreextensive onsolidation f societies,mademoreand more difficult he survivalof individualswhocontinued o devotethemselves o unspecializedtasks"(1938:93).But,presumably,he secondary actorsexplainwhysuch other outcomesof material-moraldensityas emigration, olonization,suicide,resignation, r crimeare not extensivelypursuedand

whythe divisionof labor s thepreponderant,ffective,andnecessary utcome 1965:286: 938:93).Fora

generalexpositionof Durkheim's omplicatednotion of a cause-effectbond, see Alpert(1966:80-111).




Durkheimhimself s not entirelyexplicit.Once createdout of effervescence,he newcollectiverepresentationsin thiscase,new values or ideals),which as a category n-

itiallyoriginatedas an effect of thesocialmilieu,nowseeminglybecomea cause and

affect the milieu.Just what the relationshipof the precipitating risis is to alteredconditionsof existencein the excitationof "collectiveferment" s not explained.Durkheim, however,did refuseto acceptan explanationof accelerated,more en-

compassing socio-moralchange that is stated only in terms of adaptatationto

physical-organic onditionsof survival(1953:91,93).

III

Analysisof the most extensiveexpositionof collectiveeffervescencen TheElemen-

taryFormsreveals hat Durkheimwaspreoccupiedn that workwith theproblemof

the originsofsocial

phenomenaand confirmsthe

generalconclusionof this

paperthat he remainedprevailinglya social evolutionist until the end of his career.

Althoughcollectiveeffervescence ppearsrecurrently,n this lastmonographof his,as the culminationof participationn riteswhich function o maintainor perpetuatethe fundamentalsymbolism(or religion)of Australiansocieties,it is actuallythebasic causeof the evolutionaryoriginof the most elementary, imple,fundamental

form(s)of religion,if not also of societyitself. (See the paraphrase f Durkheim'smaininvestigative bjective n TheElementary orms, seesectionI above).To insistthat Durkheim'sconcern with causalanalysisentailsan identificationof what was

evolutionarilymost elementaryor simpleis not to denythe equal necessityof func-

tional analysis.Once most social phenomenahaveoriginated, heymust"combinein such a way as to put societyin harmonywith itselfand with the environment x-ternalto it" (1938:97).Manifestly,both modesof inquiryare required.But it ap-pears that recently some sociologists have endeavoredto deny that he was anevolutionistmerelybecausehisexpositionof agivenfeatureof thesixmajor eaturesof social evolutionism s somewhatvariantor particularisticwithoutexplorationof

implicationsfor the generalcharacterof the given point or its relations to other

generalfeaturesof evolutionism.'0Certainly, hisanalysisdoesnot denythat socialevolutionistshad theirdistinctive

views. Durkheimdid divergefrom Comte in disavowingthe unity of all human

societyand the uniplanal,unilinearand rectilineardirectionality f its change.Buthe also agreedwith others(forexample,Spencer)n theappropriatenessf studyingchange n suchlarge-scale ocial units as (total)societiesand(entire) nstitutionsandin the characteristicmultiplanal,multilinear,and arborescentdirectionalityof the

changesexhibitedby such units.Perhaps he mostconspicuousandsignificantvaria-tion from classical socialevolutionismcamein Durkheim'sater life when he seems

"OGouldner'srgument1970:120,130),for instance, hatDurkheim'suse of the comparativemethod

represents "moveaway romevolutionism"gnores he fact thatDurkheim's istinctive evice orinsur-

ing the comparability f the contexts of items studied is a societaltypologywhich itself presupposesevolutionarydifferentiation.

AlthoughNisbet's morerecentcompactstudyof Durkheim 1974)certainlyrecognizesDurkheim's

developmentalism r social evolutionism,Nisbet seems to have been misled in his interpretation fDurkheim's ejectionof geneticcausality n thesequenceof stages.True,Durkheimdidnotconstrueone

stageasgeneratinghe next one(Nisbet, 1974:252-5). ut heapparently id conceiveof the substratum-on which the stages of a given speciesof society depend-as endowedwith an intrinsicorganismic-maturational-growthendency Nisbet, 1974:252-4;ee Durkheim,1938:139-40).




to haveacceptedbothslow, limited,small-scaleandrapid,encompassing,andlarge-scale social changeas virtuallyequally likely and natural.

GenerallyandpervasivelyDurkheimwas a social evolutionist:His basicsubstan-

tive concepts (e.g., the sui generis notion of the social and society, socialmorphology,the internalmilieu, collectiverepresentions,he sociallynormaland

pathological, he typologyof societalspecies,moral rules andinstitutions,anomie),his ideas of socialcausesand socialfunctions,hisdefenseand use of thecomparativemethod, and his conception of the fundamental and unifying problem for

sociological inquiryare all basicallyandinextricablydependenton and interwovenwith a broadtheoryof social evolutionarychange.Similarly,his specific nquiriesinto the divisionof labor,familyandkinship,suicide,religion,punishment,occupa-tions, the state, contract, education,morality,and knowledgeare cast in terms ofsocial evolution.1

Durkheim was persistentlya social evolutionist throughoutall of his majorworks-from his earliestDivisionof Labor, hroughTheElementaryForms,andupto andincludinghis contributionsafter 1912on the notion of civilization 1971:808-13),a reviewof Wundt'sElementederVoelkerpsychologie1909-1912:50-61),nd hisarticleon sociologyfor the San FranciscoExposition 1964:376-85).Certainlyhe didnot regardany of whatmight todaybe interpreted s his own distinctivevariationsfromthe generictenets of classical social evolutionismas sufficiently ignificant owarrant he rejectioneither of thetermor substanceof a socialevolutionarynotionof social change.

Perhaps the main obstacle to the recognition that Durkheim was a socialevolutionist-as much a socialevolutionistas he was a functionalist-residesin thefact that he is envisagedfromthe perspectiveof recentsociologyratherthan fromthe socio-intellectual ontext of his own era.His rise to eminence n contemporaryAmericansociology is associated to a considerableextent with the ascendanceofstructuralunctionalism n the 1940's,whichoccurredafteran earlier 1920's)periodof vigorousassault on the tenets of classicalsocial evolutionism.Presumably,his

(then) contemporaneouselevancyand his asserted dentificationwith functionalismwould havebeencompromisedby the admission hat he had insistedon both func-tional and causalexplanations,with the latter ntrinsically volutionaryncharacter.

But within the last decade and a half, Parsonshas developeda socialevolutionismfromthe foundationsof structural unctionalismand has acknowledgedDurkheimas one of the influences n his formulation 1971:102-4,106-7, 114, 125, 127, 138).Thus, belatedlyit should now be possibleto recognize n Durkheimthe mutuallycongruentassumptionsof social evolutionismand functionalism n generalwhichSmithhasonlyrecentlyanalyzed o lucidlyandcogently 1973).

"ConcerningDurkheim's volutionarynterpretation f institutions, onsultLukes(1972:chapters8,13, 19)and Wallwork 1972:chapters4, 5 [particularly p. 130-40]and 7 [especially,pp. 186-90]).




REFERENCES

Alpert,Harry1966 Emile Durkheim and His Sociology.

New York:Russell nd Russell.Bock, KennethE.

1964 "Theories of progressand evolution."

Pp. 21-41 in WernerJ. CahnmanandAlvin Boskoff (eds.), Sociology andHistory.New York:FreePress.

Burrow,J. W.1966 Evolution and Society. London:

CambridgeUniversityPress.

Comte, August1893The Positive Philosophy. Volume II.

Harriet Martineau (trans.). Lon-don:KeganPaul,Trench,Trubner.

Durkheim,Emile1909-Reviewof WilhelmWundt,Elements er1912 Voelkerpsychologie. 'Annee sociologi-

que 12:50-61.

1938The Rules of Sociological Method.SarahA. Solovayand John H. Mueller

(trans.).New York:FreePress.1951 Suicide. John A. Spauldingand George

Simpson(trans.).Glencoe, Illinois:FreePress.

1953 SociologyandPhilosophy.D. F. Pocock

(trans.).Glencoe,Illinois:FreePress.1964 "Sociology." Pp. 376-85, Jerome D.

Folkman trans.), n EmileDurkheim, tal., Essayson SociologyandPhilosophy.New York:HarperTorchbooks.

1965 The Division of Labor in Society.George Simpson (trans.). NewYork:FreePress.1

1968 The ElementaryForms of the ReligiousLife. Joseph Ward Swain (trans.).York:FreePress.

1971 "Note on the notion of civilization."Benjamin Nelson (trans.). SocialResearch38(Winter):808-13.

Giddens,Anthony1971Capitalismand Modern SocialTheory.

New York:Cambridge niversityPress.1972 "Introduction:Durkheim'swritingsin

sociologyand socialphilosophy."Pp. 1-50 in Emile Durkheim, Selected

Writings.New York:Cambridge niver-

sity Press.

Ginsberg,Morris1957 Essays in Sociology and Social

Philosophy. Volume I. London:Heinemann.

Gouldner,Alvin W.1970 The Coming Crisis of Western

Sociology.New York:BasicBooks.Hildebrand,GeorgeE.

1949 "Introduction." p. 3-30in Frederick .

Teggart(ed.), The Idea of Progress:ACollection of Readings.Berkeley:Universityf CaliforniaPress.

La Capra,Dominick1972 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and

Philosopher. thaca,New York:CornellUniversityPress.

Lovejoy,ArthurO.1960 The Great Chain of Being. New

York:HarperTorchbooks.Lukes,Steven

1972 Emile Durkheim:His Life and Work.New York:Harper nd Row.

Nisbet, Robert A.1965 Emile Durkheim. Englewood Cliffs,

New Jersey:Prentice-Hall.1969 Social Change and History. New

York:OxfordUniversityPress.1970"Developmentalism: criticalanalysis."

Pp. 167-204 n John C. McKinneyandEdwardA. Tiryakianeds.),Theoretical

Sociology. New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts.

1974 TheSociologyof EmileDurkheim.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Parsons,Talcott1971"Comparative tudies and evolutionary

change."Pp.97-139 n IvanVallier ed.),Comparative Methods in Sociology.

Berkeley and Los Angeles, Califor-nia:University f CaliforniaPress.

Smith,AnthonyD.1973 The Concept of Social Change.

Boston:Routledge nd KeganPaul.

Teggart,FrederickJ.1962 Theory and Processes of History.

Berkeley:Universityf CaliforniaPress.Wallwork,Ernest

1972 Durkheim: Morality and Milieu.

Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.

durkheim's evolutionary conception of time

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