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Lucid Words

A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom by 15

Candrakīrti

Translated by J.D. Dunne & S.L. McClintock DRAFT TRANSLATION (8/22/01)

Not for Citation 20

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© John D. Dunne and Sara L. McClintock All Rights Reserved

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1 Critique of Causation ............................................................................................................1

2 Critique of Motion ...............................................................................................................12

3 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties ...........................................................................................25

4 Analysis of the Aggregates ..................................................................................................27 5

5 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus).......................................................................................28

6 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous ...................................................................................29

7 Analysis of the Conditioned ................................................................................................30

8 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object.................................................................34

9 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action]................................................................35 10

10 Analysis of Fire and Fuel ................................................................................................36

11 Analysis of Beginning and End.......................................................................................38

12 Analysis of Suffering........................................................................................................40

13 Analysis of Saṃskāras......................................................................................................42

14 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga)...............................................................................43 15

15 Analysis of Svabhāva........................................................................................................45

16 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation ..............................................................................47

17 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect ....................................................................50

18 Analysis of the Self...........................................................................................................56

19 Analysis of Time...............................................................................................................78 20

20 Analysis of Collocation ....................................................................................................80

21 Analysis of Origination and Extinction .........................................................................82

22 Analysis of the Tathāgata................................................................................................85

23 Analysis of Error..............................................................................................................87

24 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths ...............................................................................89 25

25 Analysis of Nirvāṇa..........................................................................................................93

26 Analysis of the Twelve Links ..........................................................................................95

27 Analysis of View...............................................................................................................97 30

1 Critique of Causation

Homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī!

He has destroyed the indwelling in the dwelling of the twin extremes; he has won birth in the ocean of awakened wisdom.

Out of compassion he spoke the deep meaning (bhāva) of the true dharma’s ocean in 5 the way he had truly fathomed it.

Even today his philosophical flames burn like wood the notions of those who espouse something else, as they burn too the mental darkness of the world.

The flood of arrows that are the words from his peerless wisdom pierces the entire army of saṃsāra, bestowing on him glorious rule over the three dimensions of the world to be 10 disciplined, along with the gods.

To him, Nāgārjuna, I bow, and on his verses I will now write an exegesis, one that is bound with extended, properly composed statements; unshaken by sophistic winds, it is clear.

In this regard, the treatise to be discussed is that one that begins, “Not from self, nor from other; 15 not from both….” And first of all, one might ask, “What is its subject matter? What is the purpose? What is the relation [between the two]?” [We say] that, as in the explanation given in Guide to the Middle Way, Ārya Nāgārjuna first created the cause for the wisdom of a Tathāgata; that is, he produced the initial awakening mind, which is adorned with nondual wisdom and preceded by great compassion. Having practiced in such a way, Ārya Nāgārjuna, who had understood the correct interpretation of the 20 Perfection of Wisdom, compassionately composed a treatise so that others might understand. And this, [his composition of such a treatise in such a fashion], constitutes the relation [between purpose and subject matter] of the treatise:

It controls (śāsti) all your enemies that are your afflictions, and it protects (saṃtrāyate) you from bad rebirth and saṃsāra. Since it controls (śāsanāt) and protects (trāṇāt), it is 25 a treatise (śāstra). Those two [qualities] are absent in others’ thought.

Moreover, the Master (ācārya) himself wished to demonstrate the entire subject of the treatise that he would speak, as well as its purpose. Demonstrating this, he wished to proclaim the Tathāgata’s greatness in terms of his correct elucidation of that [subject]. Thus, he wished to compose, as a motivation (nimitta) for engaging with the treatise, a stanza of homage to the Tathāgata, the highest 30 guru, who is not excluded from having such a nature. Desiring to do so, he said:

[Verse of homage]: I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers, who taught that interdependent origination involves no cessation, no production, no annihilation, no eternality, no plurality, no unity, no coming and no going; he taught that it is peace, the calming of conceptual structuring. 35

Here, the treatise’s subject is interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) qualified by eight qualifications, beginning with noncessation. The treatises purpose is shown to be nirvāṇa,

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characterized as peace, the calming of all conceptual structuring. The homage is, I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers. Such, first of all, is the overall meaning of the two stanzas.

Now, however, I will discuss the detailed meaning. … 5 {LVP55.11} At this point, some thinkers make the following objection. «You have had an indubitable

cognition (niścaya) that “things are not arisen.” But does this indubitable cognition come from an instrument of knowledge or not? If it does come from an instrument of knowledge, then you should say which instruments of knowledge you have used. What, moreover, are their characteristics? What are 10 their objects? Are those instruments of knowledge arisen from themselves, or from something else, or from both, or causelessly? If, on the other hand, you maintain that your indubitable cognition does not come from an instrument of knowledge, then that cannot be correct because [as Dignāga has said], knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge. This is so because, without instruments of knowledge, it is not possible to know an object that one has not yet known. 15 Hence, if the object cannot be known because one lacks the instrument of knowledge for doing so, then how can your belief that things are not arisen truly be an indubitable cognition? Thus, it is not correct to say that all things are not produced. Or else the very reason due to which you think that things are not arisen is exactly the reason due to which I think that all things exist. And the way in which you indubitably know that all elemental things are not arisen will be exactly the way in which I indubitably 20 know that they are arisen. On the other hand, if you do not have an indubitable cognition that things are not arisen, then it is pointless to compose your treatise, since you cannot make others understand what you yourself have not indubitably cognized. Therefore, all things have not been refuted.»

In response we say the following. If we were to have some indubitable cognition, then it would come from an instrument of knowledge or not. But we don’t have an indubitable cognition. Allow me 25 to explain why. In this regard, if a dubitable cognition were possible, then, in dependence on that, its opposite—an indubitable cognition—could occur. But if for is there not even a dubitable cognition, then how could there be an indubitable cognition that stands in opposition to it? [I ask this] because it would have to be independent of that to which it is related, like the shortness and longness of a donkey’s horns. Thus, there is no indubitable cognition, and if that is so, then we would conceptually 30 fabricate instruments of knowledge in order to justify what?

So, how many instruments of knowledge are there? What are their definitions and objects? Are they arisen be arisen from self, from something else, from both, or without causes? We do not need to state any of this.

«If you do not have any indubitable cognition at all, then why do have we come across your 35 statement that is in the form of something indubitably known (niścitarūpa), namely, “There are no things at all that have arisen from themselves, from something else, from both, or without cause.”»

We respond that it is by the world that this phrase is indubitably known through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by the world, but such is not the case for the Noble Ones.

«So the Noble Ones do not employ rational arguments?» 40 Who has said that they do or they don’t? The ultimate is noble silence. Therefore, how in that

case could conceptual fabrications such that there would be rational argument or the lack thereof? «If the Noble Ones do not give rational arguments, how then will they awaken the world to the

utlimate?»

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The Noble Ones do not give rational arguments by means of worldly conventions. Rather, in order to awaken others, they provisionally accept (abhyupetya) those rational arguments that are commonly accepted from a worldly perspective. Having provisionally accepted those rational arguments, they then use them to awaken the world. For example, the body is impure, but lustful persons, being filled with confusion, do not see that this is the case; instead, they impute the image of beauty [onto the body 5 in question]. Doing so, they become caught up in negative mental states. To remove those persons’ lust, a deity or an entity emanated by the transcendent one might say, “There are hairs on this body!” Saying this, they would reveal to those persons the faults of the body that had been hidden by their belief that it was beautiful. Thus freed from their belief in the body’s beauty, they would become free of lust. Such is also the case in regard to the present issue. That is, the Noble Ones do not perceive any 10 essence in things whatsoever. Nevertheless, because their intellect’s eye is impaired by the cataracts of ignorance, ordinary persons impute a false essence onto things, and in some cases they also impute some particular quality. Through such imputations, they become even more caught up in negative mental states. Now the Noble Ones awaken them through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by them. For example, it is accepted that, in the case of producing a jar from clay and so on, 15 one does not do so with a jar that already exists. Likewise, one should realize that there is no production of something that exists prior to its production precisely because that thing already exists. And to give another example, it is accepted that a sprout does not arise from things that are essentially different from it, such as flames and burning coal. Likewise, one should realize that a sprout does not even arise from those things that are intended [to be its causes], such as a seed. 20

Someone might object: «This is our experience [i.e., that sprouts arise from seeds].» This is also incorrect because experience itself is false because it is experience, just like the case

where a person with cataracts experiences two moons and so on. Thus, since [the truth of] experience is equally in need of proof, it is not reasonable to refute us by appealing to it.

Therefore, [Nāgārjuna] said, “Things are not produced.” In this way, the first chapter was 25 composed first of all to counteract the imputation of a false essence. Now, the remainder of the treatise is composed so as to refute some [additional] qualifications which are imputed in some cases. That is, the rest of the treatise is composed so as to demonstrate that every single qualification for dependent origination—such as being the agent of motion, the locus of motion, or the action of motion—does not exist. 30

Someone might object: «The convention that governs an instrument of knowledge and its object is worldly (laukika), and this is what is explained by the treatise.»

What would be the point in explaining that? «By stating distorted definitions, Sophists have destroyed (nāśita) the worldly convention

concerning instruments of knowledge and objects. We have stated the correct definition of them.» 35 This is also incorrect. If a distortion in the definiendum—namely, the world—resulted from the

sophists’ statement of a distorted definition, then it would be useful to make an effort for the purpose [of refuting] that. But that is not the case.

Moreover, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, [Nāgārjuna] pointed out a flaw in the section that begins, “if knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge, then what is it that 40 determines those instruments of knowledge?” Since the opponent has not rebutted this criticism, it is not the case that they present a correct definition [of instruments of knowledge and their objects].

LVP59.7 45

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… When āryas see that interdependent origination is the way things really exist, conceptual

structuring defined as “the signified,” “the signifier,” and so on, is completely stopped. Hence, he says that it is the calming of conceptual structuring, since all conceptual structuring about it ceases. Furthermore, mind and mental events do not function with regard to it, and the convention of 5 “knowing” and “thing known” does not occur with regard to it. That being the case, it is devoid of all problems, such as birth, sickness and death; hence, it is “peace.”

1.1 There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself, something other than itself, both itself and something other than itself, or neither itself nor something other than itself. 10

1.2 There are only four kinds of causal conditions: the primary cause, the supporting condition, the preceding condition, and the controlling condition. There is no fifth condition.

In accord with the definition, “a primary cause brings about something,” one thing is the primary cause of the is that support or basis by means of which a thing that is being produced is produced. 15 [Before the effect arises, the cause ceases]; this immediately preceding cessation of the cause is a condition for the production of the effect. For example, the immediately preceding cessation of the seed is the condition for the production of the sprout. [If] one thing comes into existence when another thing exists, [then] that latter thing is the controlling condition for the former. These are the four causal conditions. Other conditions, such as the pre-production, simultaneous, and post-production conditions 20 [mentioned by certain Buddhist philosophers] are included in these four. Conditions such as a Creator God and so on are not possible. To rule out such conditions, he says “There is no fifth condition.” Thus, “production from something other than itself” means production of things from these conditions, which are other [than the thing produced].

1.3 The essence of any thing does not exist in its conditions and such [prior to its 25 production]. If the essence [of those things which are effects] does not exist [in their causes], then there is no production from that which is essentially other [than the effect]. [In addition to this last sentence, one can also say:] if the essence [of the effect] does not exist [at the time of the cause], then there is nothing that is essentially other (parabhāva) [than the effect such that it could serve as its cause]. 30

Suppose that some thing, an effect, existed prior to its production in the aggregated, individual, or individually aggregated collection of the primary cause and other causal conditions, all of which are other than that thing which they produce. If that were the case, then that thing would arise from those causal conditions. But it is not possible for any thing to exist prior to its production. If it were to so exist, then it would be apprehended; moreover, “production” would be meaningless [since the thing 35 already exists]. Therefore, the self-essences of things do not exist in their conditions. And if there is no self-essence, [then the conditions are not] essentially “other” [because “other” requires “self” or “self-essence,” which has been shown to be unreal]. A “thing” is something that has an essence; it is something coming into being, and as such, it is something of which there is production. The term “essentially other” can thus mean “production from another.” That does not exist. Therefore, it is 40 incorrect to say that things arise from that which is other than those things.

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Or [one can read as follows]: things such as sprouts that are effects do not have an essence when their causes, such as seeds, exist without changing because one would have to conclude that [those effects] are uncaused.

Now, on what does the “otherness” of the conditions depend? Two presently existing things, such as the people Maitreya and Upagupta, are “other” with respect to each other. But such simultaneity is 5 not the case for a seed and the sprout it produces. Therefore, if the essence of the effect does not exist, the essential otherness of the seed and so on does not exist. Since there is no use for the word “other,” there is no production from that which is other than the effect. ...

He has thus refuted those who claim that the effect is produced by the conditions. Now, someone who claims that the effect is produced by a process thinks the following. “The conditions, such as the 10 eye and the material form, do not directly produce ocular awareness. Instead they are called ‘conditions’ because they establish the process of producing ocular awareness. That process produces the awareness. Therefore, the process of producing awareness, which [is produced by the aforementioned] conditions, is itself the producer of awareness. The conditions are not the producers of the awareness. This is like the process of cooking rice; [that is, the fire, pot and so on do not cook the 15 rice; rather, the process that they create cooks the rice].”

We respond:

1.4 There is no process that has conditions. There is no process without conditions. There are no conditions without the process; nor are there conditions with a process.

If there were some process, then it would have as its conditions the eye and so on; as such, it 20 would produce awareness. But there is no process. Why? In this case, when claiming that there is a process, one claims that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced, has not yet been produced, or is being produced. It makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced because the process is what produces the thing [i.e., the awareness]. If the thing is already produced, what do you need the process for? As I have said in 25 Encountering Madhyamaka, “It makes no sense [to speak of] producing something that has already been produced.”

It also makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has not yet been produced because, as I have said, “production without an agent [that is being produced] is not reasonable.” 30

Nor is it possible for there to be a process when something is being produced because there is no “being produced” without “already produced” and “not yet produced.” [In other words, it is not possible for something to be neither “already produced” nor “not yet produced.”] As has been said:

Since a thing that is being produced is already produced, something being produced is not produced. Otherwise, everything would be being produced. (CŚ15.16) 35

Since the process of production is impossible in all three times [i.e., past, present and future], it does not exist. And so he says, “there is no process that has conditions.” For, as I have demonstrated in Encountering Madhyamaka, “There is no qualification without something that is qualified.” You cannot say, “[this man], the son of a barren woman, has cows.”

Opponent: “If that’s the case, then there should be a process without the conditions.” 40 This is also wrong, for “there is no process without the conditions.” If it does not exist as

something that has conditions, then how can it exist without conditions? How, in other words, can it be

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causeless? One cannot claim that a cloth is made from vīraṇa roots just because it makes no sense for it to be made from threads. Therefore, the process does not produce the thing.

Opponent: “If that’s the case, then the conditions themselves must be the producer of the thing.” In response, he says, “There are no conditions without the process.” If there is no process, how can

the conditions be the producer without the process; conditions without a process are conditions devoid 5 of a process; they are thus causeless conditions [one might translate this as: conditions that cause nothing].

Opponent: “Then the conditions with the process are the producer.” In response, he says, “Nor are there conditions with the process.” The negation [implicit in the

word “nor”] is applied [from the previous line] by context. The disjunction [i.e., “nor”] means that the 10 possibilities are exhausted.

Concerning this line, it has already been stated that the process does not exist; how then can there be a process that pertains to the conditions? One should know that other processes, such as a hyper-process, are discussed in the same way that the process of producing awareness has been discussed. Hence, there is no production from a process. The signifier “production” is therefore empty of meaning 15 [or “devoid of an objective referent”].

At this juncture someone else objects, “Your analysis of the [theories concerning the existence of] the conditions with the process, and so on, is irrelevant for us. It is irrelevant because things such as consciousness are produced in dependence upon causal conditions, such as the eye. Therefore, the eye and so on are causal conditions, and awareness and so on are produced by those conditions.” 20

This is also incorrect, for:

1.5 It is alleged that these are conditions because [the effect] is produced in dependence upon them. But why are they not non-conditions as long as [the effect] is not produced?

If the eye and so forth are called “conditions” because awareness is produced in dependence on them, why then are the eye and so on not non-conditions as long as the effect, “awareness,” is not yet 25 produced? [The question is rhetorical]; the author means that they are not conditions. [The effect] does not come from things that are not the conditions, just as sand does not produce oil.

In response, one might think, “Before [the effect arises] they are not conditions, but they become conditions in dependence on some other condition.” This does not make sense. Another condition is thought to be the condition for that thing which is not yet a condition. But that other condition is a 30 condition for that [thing which is not yet a condition to become a condition only] if [that thing which is not yet a condition] is [already] a condition. The same concern thus pertains to that [other condition], and this idea is therefore incorrect.

Furthermore, the eyes and so on are thought to be the conditions for awareness, but are they considered to be conditions for something that is already existent or for something that is not yet 35 existent? Neither option makes sense. He expresses this by saying:

1.6.1 A condition for either an already existent thing or a not yet existent thing does not make sense.

Why?

1.6.2 A condition for something already existent is a condition for what? And what 40 would be the purpose of a condition for something that already exists?

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How can there be a condition for something that does not exist, meaning something that is not now existing? One might object that it should be called [a condition] because the effect will come into being. But I have explained the problem with this position in Encountering Madhyamaka:

You assert that the appellation, [“condition,” is appropriate] because [the effect] will come into existence; but lacking the capacity [to causally impinge on things in the present], the future existence 5 of the [effect] does not presently exist [and is thereby insufficient reason to call something a ‘condition’].

In addition, it is pointless to think of something as a condition for something that exists -- meaning something that is presently existing.

He has thus far pointed out that the conditions as a group are not conditions because they are 10 incapable of producing the effect. Now he shows that the individual conditions are not conditions.

At this point someone objects, “Although the conditions are [allegedly] impossible the conditions are established to exist because their definitions are stated. For example, the primary cause, is defined as follows: ‘a primary cause is a producer.’ And it makes no sense to state a definition for something that is not presently existing, just as it makes no sense to describe the son of a barren woman.” 15

In response he says that the primary cause would exist if it had a definition. But since,

1.7 Neither an existent thing, nor a nonexistent thing, nor a thing that is both existent and non-existent is produced; that being the case, how can it be correct to say that the primary cause is a producer?

Here, “producer” means “generator.” If some thing to be produced were produced, then the 20 primary cause, being the generator, would produce it. But it is not produced because there is no thing to be produced that is existent, non-existent, or both. Concerning these possibilities, an existent thing is not produced because it already exists currently. A non-existent thing is not produced because it does not presently exist. A thing that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no unitary thing that has mutually contradictory [properties] and because all the above stated problems 25 with the first two possibilities would apply. Since there is no production of the effect, the primary cause also does not exist. This being the case, the above statement, “The primary cause exists because it is possible to give a definition,” is incorrect.

Now, in order to refute the supporting condition, he says:

1.8 [You] teach that an existent thing that has no support [is supported]; if the thing is 30 unsupported, how can there be a support?

In the scriptures it says, “What are the supported things? Mind and all mental functions.” The supporting condition of mind and mental functions is that suitable support, such as material form, by means of which mind and mental functions or produced. [Form and so on] are thought to be the supporting condition either for mind and mental functions that currently exist or that do not currently 35 exist. Concerning these possibilities, a supporting condition for something that already currently exists is meaningless. For something is thought to be a support in order for the thing to be produced, and the thing is already existent before the support. Or, if the thing is established to exist by itself, then what is the use of thinking that it is related to some support? Hence, an existing thing, meaning a currently existing thing, such as the mind and so on, has no support, but, due to your own expectations, you say 40 that it has a support. There is not, however, any relationship between a support and the thing.

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On the other hand, one might think of something as a support for a thing that does not currently exist. This also makes no sense because it just has no support, nor any other [condition]. That is to say, something that does not currently exist has no connection to a support. So, the verse says, “You teach that a thing that has no support is supported.” The words “you” and “supported” should be supplied. “If the thing is unsupported, how can there be a support?” The word “if” indicates a question. The 5 word “how” indicates the reason. The meaning is as follows. If the thing is unsupported—that is, if the thing, being non-existent, does not now currently exist—then how much more so should the support [be considered non-existent]? The idea is that the support is non-existent because the supported thing is non-existent. How then can mind and mental functions have supports? There is no problem if one says that the definition [of a support] is given in terms of conventional reality, not ultimate reality. 10

Now, in order to refute the preceding condition, he says:

1.9 Cessation does not make sense for things that have never arisen. Hence, the preceding [condition] is not capable of being what has ceased. And if it had ceased, what would be the condition?

In the second half of this verse one should note that the word order is inverted. The word “and” is 15 out of order and should be read, “and if...” By doing this, one gets the following reading: “And if it has ceased, what is the condition? The preceding condition is therefore incorrect.” He stated the verse the other way for the sake of composition.

The preceding condition is defined as the immediately preceding cessation of the cause, and that cessation is a condition for the production of the effect. I analyze this in the following manner. It is not 20 reasonable for the cause, such as a seed, to have ceased when the things that are effects, such as the sprout, have not yet arisen. When the sprout and so on have not yet arisen, the cessation of the cause has not yet occurred; therefore, what would be the preceding condition for the sprout?

One might claim that the seed has ceased even though the effect has not yet arisen; if that were the case, then when the seed has ceased—which means that the seed is non-existent—what is the condition 25 for the sprout? Moreover, what would be the condition for the cessation of the seed? Both would have to be causeless; therefore, he says, “If it has ceased, what would be the condition?” The word “and” refers back to “not yet arisen.” Hence, it means the following: “If one claims that there is the cessation of the seed and so on when the sprout has not yet arisen, then both would have to be causeless; therefore, the preceding condition does not make sense.” 30

Or one can give the following interpretation. Production has already been refuted with the third verse, “There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself, something other than itself….” With this in mind, he says, “If things are not [ever] produced, cessation is not reasonable. Therefore, the preceding condition makes no sense.” Moreover, “If it were ceased, what would be the condition?” On this reading, this latter phrase would be interpreted as above. 35

Now, in order to refute the controlling condition, he says:

1.10 Since things without essence have no existence (sattā), it is not correct to say, “When this exists, that exists.”

In this context, a controlling condition is defined as follows: “One thing is the controlling condition for another in that when the one thing exists, the other thing exists.” And if all things lack an 40 essence because they are all interdependently produced, then how can there be something defined as a cause with the phrase, “When this exists.” How can there be something defined as the effect with the

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phrase, “that exists.” Therefore, one does not prove by reason of the definition that there is a controlling condition.

Here someone objects, “Having perceived that things such as cloths come from things such as threads, one says that the threads and so on are the causal conditions for things such as cloths.”

In response, we say that the production of an effect, such as a cloth, does not intrinsically 5 [svarūpataḥ] exist; how then can one prove that the conditions are conditions? To establish the way in which there is no production of an effect such as a cloth, he says:

1.11 The effect of the [conditions] does not exist in the conditions, either individually or conglomerated; how can that which does not exist in the conditions come from the conditions? 10

The cloth does not exist in the individual conditions, such as the threads, spreader, loom, shuttle and peg, because it is not perceived there and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that there would be many effects, since there are many causes. The cloth also does not exist in the conglomerated conditions, such as the threads, because it does not exist in any of them individually and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that the effect would arise piecemeal. 15 Therefore, since the effect does not exist, the conditions do not essentially exist.

Someone might think,

1.12 “What if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist [in them]?” Why then would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions?

The effect also does not exist in things that are not its causal conditions, so why should a cloth not 20 arise from things that are not its causal conditions, such as vīraṇa grass? Thus, there is no intrinsic production of the effect.

At this point someone says, “If the effect were one thing and the causal conditions something else, then one could have the qualm, ‘Does the effect exist in the conditions or not?’ But there is no effect separate from the conditions; instead, the effect has the same essence as the conditions.” 25

1.13 “The effect has the essence of the conditions.” But the conditions do not have the essence of being themselves. How can an effect that comes from conditions which are not in essence themselves have the essence of the conditions?

If one asserts that the effect has the essence of the conditions, which means that it is a permutation of the conditions, then [one’s position] is not correct. It is not correct because the conditions also do 30 not have the essence of being themselves, which means that they have the essence of [their own causes] which are not the conditions; [in other words, the conditions have the essence of things that are not the conditions]. You say that the cloth has the essence of the threads. [In other words, the cloth does not have its own essence; instead, it partakes of the essence of the threads. In short, the cloth is essentially the threads]. There would thereby be a cloth if the threads were established by virtue of their own 35 essence. But they have or partake of the essence of their atoms. In other words, they are simply a permutation of their atoms; [therefore], the threads are not established by virtue of their own essence [because, as effects, they too must have the essence of their causes]. So how can an effect, namely the cloth, which comes from threads that themselves do not have their own essence, have the essence of the threads? As it says in the Śūnyatāsaptati [Seventy Verses on Emptiness]: “The cloth is established 40

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through its cause; the cause is established through some other cause; how can something which is not established through itself produce something else?”

1.14.1 Therefore, [there is no effect] that has the essence of the conditions.

“There is no effect” is supplied from below. Suppose then that effect has the essence of something other than the conditions? 5

1.14.2 There is no effect that has the essence of something other than the conditions.

If there is no cloth that has the essence of the threads, how can there be a cloth that has the essence of vīraṇa grass?

Now someone says, “Very well, there is no effect. But there is a definite rule for establishing what is and is not a condition. You yourself say, ‘if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does 10 not exist in them, then why would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions?’ The conditions, such as threads or vīraṇa grass, would not be conditions if there were no effect, namely a cloth or a mat. Therefore, the effect also exists.”

In response, we say that there would be an effect if there were things that are conditions and things that are not conditions; for if there were an effect, then one could say, “these are its conditions, but 15 these are not its conditions.” But when analyzed, the effect does not exist. Hence, he says:

1.14.3 Since there is no effect, how can there be conditions and non-conditions?

[In the original Sanskrit] the compound conditions/non-conditions means “conditions and non-conditions.” Therefore, there is no production of things by virtue of their own essence. As it says in the āryaratnākārasūtra [“The Holy Sūtra of the Jeweled Source”]: 20

For one who knows emptiness, no thing exists anywhere, just like the path of a bird in the sky. That which does not essentially exist anywhere will never have something else as its cause.

Something of which the essence is never reached has no essence; how can other things be its conditions? What essenceless thing would the other thing produce? The Buddha 25 taught this reasoning.

All things are unmoving, firm and stable; they are unchanging, trouble-free and peaceful; they are unaware, like the paths of the sky. The unknowing world is confused about this.

Things can never be shaken, like an unshakable stony mountain. They do not cease, 30 nor do they arise. The Victor taught that reality is this way.

It also says:

Introducing hundreds of beings to this [reality], the Buddha, the leonine human, taught that a thing is that which is not produced, does not arise, does not cease and does not age. 35

That which does not have any essence at all is not obtained by anyone through the

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essence of something else. Nor is it obtained internally, nor externally; the Lord introduces [the world] to this.

The Sugata said that this state is peaceful, and no state whatsoever is obtained; liberated from states, there you will live, thinking, “Free, I will free many beings.”

5

2 Critique of Walking

At this point, someone says, «By negating production, you have established that interdependent origination has the quality of not being ceased and so on. Nevertheless, in order to prove that interdependent origination has neither coming nor going, you must state an additional argument to refute the action (kriyā) that is going to and fro (gamanāgamana), which is commonly accepted in the 5 world.»

In response, we say that if going (gamana), exemplified by the action of walking,1 were to exist, then one would necessarily conceive of walking in relation to the spot on the path where one has just walked; or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one has not yet walked; or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one is currently walking. But none of this makes sense. So 10 he says:

2.1. First of all, it is not the case that one is now walking where one just walked; one is also not walking where one has not yet walked; and without the spots where one already walked and where one has not yet walked, one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot; the currently walked upon spot is thus not being walked upon.2 15

Here, “where one just walked” expresses that part of the path on which the action of walking has just ceased. That which is now affected by the action of walking is expressed by, “one is now walking.” It is incoherent to speak of “where one just walked”—meaning the place where the action of motion has just ceased—with the phrase “one is now walking,” which expresses a connection with a presently existing action of walking. Therefore, it is incorrect to say, “One is walking where one just 20 walked.” The phrase “first of all” indicates the order in which the various possibilities are negated.

So too, “one is not now walking where one has not yet walked.” The phrase “where one has not yet walked” expresses a part of the road where a future action of motion has not yet occurred. The phrase “one is now walking” expresses a present action of motion. Therefore, since the future and the present are completely distinct, it does not make sense to say, “One is now walking where one has not 25 yet walked.” If one has not yet walked upon it, how can one be now walking on it? And if one is walking on it, how can it be a spot where one has not yet walked?

Furthermore, there is no action of walking on the currently walked upon spot because “without the spots where one has already walked and where one has not yet walked, the currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known.” 30

In this context, the spot that the walker has traversed is for him a walked upon spot; and the spot that he has not yet traversed is for him a not yet walked upon spot. But in isolation from the walked upon spot and the not yet walked upon spot, we do not see any third spot that would be “the currently 1 The phrase, “which is exemplified by walking,” is added here because we will be interpreting the verb “to go” (√gam) as “to walk.” Our motivation for doing so is twofold. First, it is clear that Candrakīrti understands the action of “going” (gamana) here to be best exemplified by the action of walking. Quite possibly he is thinking of the practice of walking meditation along a caṅkrama, a short walkway dedicated to that purpose. Second, it is nearly impossible to arrive at a clear and readable English translation of this chapter if one translates all forms of √gam as “to go” or even as “to move.” This is in part due to the complicated nature of the argument, which is based upon the peculiarities of Sanskrit grammar (see the introduction, 0000). Hence, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, and so as to reflect Candrakīrti’s interpretation, the forms of √gam have been translated as “walking,” etc. 2 Throughout this chapter, Candrakīrti will at various points pun on the dual meaning of the Sanskrit verb √gam, namely, “to walk” (or literally, “to go”) and “to know.”

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walked upon spot.” And since that is the case, “one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot.” Here, na gamyate (i.e., “is not being walked upon”) is taken to mean “is not known.” Therefore, since one has no knowledge of it, there is no currently walked upon spot. Hence, that spot is not affected by the activity of motion; that is, it is not currently walked upon. Hence, there is also is no action of walking even in the currently walked upon spot. 5

But someone might say, «There is a spot that is tread upon by the feet of the walking walker. That is the currently walked upon spot!»

This is not the case because the mover’s feet are a conglomeration of atomic particles. The area behind an atom located on the tip of the toe is included in the spot already walked upon, relative to that atom; but the spot in front of an atom located at the back of the heel is included in the spot not yet 10 walked upon, relative to that atom. Feet cannot exist without the atomic particles of which feet are composed. Therefore, there is no currently walked upon spot without being either a spot already walked upon or one not yet walked upon. And just as one analyzed the feet, so should one analyze the atomic particles in terms of the relation between their front and back parts. Moreover, if someone says that the currently walked upon spot is the spot that one has halfway walked upon, then one uses the 15 answer that has been given in the analysis of production.3 Therefore it is established, “The currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known.”

At this point, someone objects, «One is indeed walking on the currently walked upon spot, which is known! This is so because

2.2. There is walking (gati) where there is physical movement, and there is physical 20 movement in the currently walked upon spot. There is no physical movement where one already walked or where one has not yet walked. Therefore, there is knowledge (gati) of the currently walked upon spot.»4

In this verse, “physical movement” refers to the raising and lowering of the feet. The objector states that the action of walking occurs only in the spot where there is the physical movement of the 25 moving walker. It is not possible for one’s physical movement to be occurring at the spot where one has already walked, nor can it occur where one has not yet walked. Therefore, “there is knowledge of the currently walked upon spot.” That is, the currently walked upon spot is where on observes the action of walking, and that spot is affected by the action of walking. Therefore, the currently walked upon spot is known, according to the objector. In this verse, one instance of the word gati means 30 “knowledge”; the other means “motion toward another area.”

Even if one thinks that the above is the case, the currently walked upon spot is still not walked upon or known. Thus, the author says:

2.3.1. How could it make sense for there to be the action of walking at the currently walked upon spot. 35

He gives the reason:

2.3.2. if “the currently walked upon” is unintelligible without the action of walking? 3 Candrakīrti is referring to CŚ15.16, which he cited in his commentary on MMK1.4. See above (5). 4 The translation of the last phrase follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation, but it could be rendered: “the action of walking is at the currently walked upon spot.”

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Here, when he says, “the currently walked upon,” he means that it “is being walked upon.” And “without the action of walking” (vigamana) means that the action of walking is absent. It is absent because one action of walking is connected with “the currently walked upon,” and there is no second action of going. The idea here is that, if the phrase, “is being walked upon” is not intelligible without the action of walking, then the meaning of the statement, “the currently walked upon spot is being 5 walked upon” is incomplete.5 One can only say “the currently walked upon.” Since there is no second action of walking, one cannot say, “is being walked upon.”6

One might, however, claim that the action of walking is related only to “is being walked upon.” If this were the case, then the verbal action would have no relation to the term, “the currently walked upon.” Hence, the meaning of the sentence would again be incomplete. Nāgārjuna says: 10

2.4. If one accepts that walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot, then it would follow that there would be a currently walked upon spot even in the absence of the action of walking. This would be so because the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.

A theorist might hold, “walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot.” That theorist 15 maintains that the action of walking is the basis for the designation “currently walked upon,” even though that which is so designated is devoid of the action of walking. For someone who holds such a position, it follows that there is the “currently walked upon” even in the absence of the action of walking. That is, the “currently walked upon” would be devoid of the action of walking. This would be so because for him “the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.” In the verse, the particle hi 20 means “because.” For that theorist, the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking, and yet it “is being walked upon.” This so because the action is linked to “is being walked upon.” Hence, it follows that the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking.

One might, however, claim that the action is connected to both “currently walked upon” and “is being walked upon.” Even so, 25

2.5. If walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot, then it follows that there are two actions of walking. One is the walking in relation to which that spot is “currently walked upon,” and the other is that which is the “walking” there.

Through its relation to an action of walking, that spot on the path gains the designation, “currently walked upon.” That is one of the actions of walking. The second is the walking that has that currently 30 walked upon spot as its locus; by virtue of this second action of walking, that spot on the path “is being walked upon.” Such are the two actions of walking that ensue when walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. 5 That is, one cannot given an adequate account of how the sentence could mean what it appears to mean. 6 The grammatical issue here is that the action of walking (gamikriyā) is at least part of the warrant (pravṛttinimitta) for the term “the currently walked upon spot”(gamyamāna). Since, however, it is already acting as a warrant for that term, that verbal action cannot also act as a warrant for the verbal phrase, “is walked upon” (gamyate). If it were to act as a warrant for that as well, then on the opponent’s realist approach to semantics, the sentence “the currently walked upon spot is walked upon” does not have a clear meaning, inasmuch as the same entity (namely, the action of walking) serves as a warrant for both the patient (gamyamāna) and the verb (gamyate). Clearly, part of the argument here is that there is an exclusive relation between the action and what it warrants. In any case, if one presupposes that the various grammatical and referential relations entail absolute connection, then there must be two activities of motion. For more on this issue, see the introduction (0000).

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«Very well, let there be two actions of walking? What’s wrong with that?» There is a problem, since

2.6.1. If it follows that there are two actions of walking, then it also follows that there must be two walkers.

Why must there be two walkers? Nāgārjuna says, 5

2.6.2. because in the absence of the walker, the action of walking makes no sense.

An action necessarily depends upon its own means of accomplishment (sādhana), whether that be a patient (karma) or an agent. And the action of walking, being located in the agent, depends upon the agent. But when there is only one agent such as John Doe who is walking, there is no second agent. Hence, since there are not two agents, there are not two actions of walking. And therefore, it is not 10 intelligible to say, “The currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.”

Someone might try a different approach saying, «Suppose that John Doe, standing still, is speaking and also seeing something. In that case, it is observed that a single agent is involved in multiple actions. In this way, two actions might pertain to a single agent.»

This is not so. The capacity (śakti) is what serves as a contributing factor (kāraka) for the 15 occurrence of the action; the substance does not do so. And due to the difference in the actions in question, the capacities that are the means for accomplishing those actions must also be different. John Doe is not a “speaker” by virtue of his action of standing still.

«But there is just one substance [that is John Doe].» Let us suppose that this is the case. Even so, the substance is not a contributing factor for the 20

action; instead, the capacity is, and it differs when the action differs. Moreover, it has not been observed that a single person acts simultaneously as the contributing factor for two similar actions. Therefore, two actions of walking do not pertain to one walker.

At this point, someone objects, «That may be so, but as is demonstrated by the statement, “John Doe is walking,” walking is still observed in relation to John Doe as the walker. Therefore, walking 25 does indeed exist because the locus of walking—namely, the walker—exists.»

We respond as follows. This would be the case if there were a walker who served as the locus of walking. But there is no such walker. How so? Nāgārjuna says:

2.7. If walking makes no sense when the walker is negated, how can there be the walker if there is no walking? 30

We have said that without a walker, walking would have no locus, and as such, it would be nonexistent. Therefore, walking does not exist when the walker is negated—that is, when the walker’s existence is denied. If that is the case, then, if there is no walking, how can there be the walker, for whom there would be no warrant. Therefore, walking does not exist.

Here, someone responds, «Walking does exist because the one possessed of walking7 is called 35 such due to the walking. In this case, the walker is related to walking, and as a result of being so 7 The term “possessed of” translates the possessive suffix –vat. This suffix is often used in connection with a particular theory concerning the relationship between a distributed entity such as a universal and the entity, such as a particular, in which that distributed entity is instantiated (see Dunne 2004a). This relationship, often called the “relation of the container to the contained” (ādhārādheyasambandha) is one typical strategy employed by South Asian realists to overcome the

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related, he is walking. If walking did not exist, then in the case of some John Doe who is possessed of walking, one could not apply the expression, “is walking,” to him. This is like the case where, in someone has no staff, one cannot apply the expression, “staff-bearer,” to him.»

We answer as follows. There would be walking if “is walking” were indeed an [intelligible] expression. But that is not the case. 5

2.8. The walker, first of all, is not walking; a non-walker also is not walking; and what other, third [agent] which is neither walker nor non-walker is walking?

The walker is so-called because he is walking. But, first of all, he is not walking, and the way that he is not walking will be shown by the next three stanzas. The non-walker also is not walking. Indeed, a non-walker is devoid of the action of walking, and the phrase “is walking” is employed for that 10 which has a relation to the action of walking. Therefore, as one who is a non-walker, how is it that he “is walking?” Or, if he “is walking,” then he is not a non-walker.

«One who is neither “is walking.”» This is not so, and here is why: what third agent—one who is neither a walker nor a non-walker—

is there such that you think that he “is walking?” Therefore, there is no walking. 15 At this point, someone objects, «The non-walker is not walking, nor is the one who is neither.

Instead, just the walker is walking.» This is not so. Why? Because:

2.9. How is it intelligible to say, “The walker walks,” if the walker is unintelligible in the absence of walking? 20

In the statement, “the walker is walking,” there is only one action of walking, and due to the presence of that action one uses the expression, “is walking.” However, for warranting the expression, “walker,” there is no second action of walking. Therefore, without walking, the walker, who is not walking, cannot be the “walker.” That being the case, it is not reasonable to say, “The walker is walking.” So let us grant that one can say, “is walking.” Nevertheless, it is not possible to speak of the 25 “walker,” so it is not reasonable.

On the other hand, the walker might be qualified by the action of walking because he is related to that action. Nevertheless, since there is no second action of walking, one would not use the expression, “is walking.” Nāgārjuna says,

2.10. One who holds that “the walker walks” must conclude that there is a walker 30 without the action of walking, since he claims that the action of walking pertains to the walker.

A theorist might hold that there is a “walker” because he is connected to the action of walking. That theorist asserts that walking pertains to the walker, and for him the expression “walker” is related to the walking. Hence, for him “the walker is walking” without walking. This is so because there is no 35 second action of walking. Therefore, it is not correct to say, “the walker is walking.” In the verse, there is the phrase, “there is a walker without the action of walking.” In this phrase, the word “walker” is used to mean “is walking.” problems of identity and difference that plague such relations.

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One might then claim that the action of walking is related to both “walker” and “is walking.” Even so,

2.11. If, on the other hand, the walker walks, one must conclude that there are two activities of walking: one is the walking through which someone is characterized as the “walker”; the other is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking.” 5

Due to a connection with the action of walking, someone is characterized or called the “walker.” That is one action of walking. The other is the action of walking that the walker is doing, i.e., it is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking.” In this way two activities of walking absurdly follow from the opponent’s position. Hence, one should state a critique along previously mentioned lines, namely, that from this it follows that there should be two walkers. Therefore, [on the opponent’s 10 theory,] there is no expression, “is walking.”

Someone might say, «Even so, the expression, “John Doe is walking,” does exist! Therefore, the action of walking exists.»

This is not the case because the following qualm is focused on John Doe: is it that, as a walker, he is walking? Or as a non-walker? Or as something distinct from both a walker and a non-walker? None 15 of these possibilities make sense. So much for that objection.

At this point, someone objects, «Walking exists because its beginning exists. John Doe eliminates the state of standing still and begins to walk. One does not begin things that do not exist, such as a robe made from tortoise hairs.”

We respond that walking would indeed exist if it had a beginning. But: 20

2.12. One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked, nor on a spot where one has not yet walked; one also does not begin to walk on the currently walked upon spot, so where does one begin to walk?

If walking had a beginning, one would have to begin it either on a spot where one has just walked, or on a spot where one has not yet walked, or on a spot where one is currently walking. Concerning 25 these possibilities, one does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked because the action of motion has ceased on a spot where one has just walked. If walking were to begin on that spot, then since the past and the present are mutually exclusive, it would not be a spot where one just walked. Walking also does not begin on a spot where one has not yet walked because the present and the future are mutually exclusive. Nor does one begin walking on the currently walked upon spot for three 30 reasons: that spot does not exist; one would be forced to conclude that there are two actions of walking; and one would be forced to conclude that there are two agents of walking. In this way, one does not observe anywhere a beginning to the action of walking; hence, Nāgārjuna says, “So where does one begin to walk?”

To demonstrate the way that walking is not possible, he says: 35

2.13. Prior to the beginning of walking, there is no currently walked upon spot, nor is there a spot where one just walked such that either of them could be the spot where one begins walking. And how could there be walking where one has not yet walked?

When John Doe is standing still, he is not beginning to walk. And before he begins to walk, there is no spot where he is currently walking, nor is there a spot where he has just walked such that either 40

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spot is where he begins walking. Therefore, since there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the spot where he just walked, the start of walking is not at either either of those spots.

Someone might claim, «Although, prior to the beginning of walking, there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the just walked upon spot, there is the spot where one has not yet walked; walking begins there.» 5

We respond by asking, How can there be walking where one has not yet walked? The spot where one has not yet walked is a spot where one’s activity of walking has not yet occurred, which is to say that it is a spot where the activity of walking has yet to begin. It is incoherent to say that walking begins at that spot. Hence, Nāgārjuna asks, “How could there be walking where one has not yet walked?” 10

«Even though there is no beginning to walking on either the walked upon spot, the not yet walked upon spot, or the currently walked upon spot, those spots nevertheless do exist. And if walking were nonexistent, it would not make sense for them to exist.»

We respond as follows. Walking would indeed exist if they existed. This is so because one would think that the walked upon spot was the spot where the action of walking ceased, given that it had 15 already begun. And the currently walked upon spot would be where that action was currently occurring. So too, the not yet walked upon spot would be where the action had not yet occurred. However, if there is no beginning to the action of walking, then,

2.14. If the action of walking is not discovered at all, does one think that some spot is already walked upon? Does one think that some spot is currently walked upon? Does 20 one think that some spot is not yet walked upon?

If no beginning of walking is found at all, then why would one falsely think of those three spots? And how could the action of walking be the warrant for those three expressions? It would make no sense.

Now someone objects, «Walking does exist because its opposite exists. And if something has an 25 opposite, then it exists, as is the case with light and darkness, far and near, and doubt and certainty. The opposite of walking exists—it is “standing still.”8

In response we say that walking would indeed exist if its opposite, “standing still,” existed. But how can one conceive of a walker, a non-walker, or something else as “standing still.” This does not make any sense at all. 30

2.15. First of all, the walker does not stand still; the non-walker does not stand still; and what third kind of agent—someone who is neither the walker nor the non-walker—is there that is stands still?

The next stanza will explain how it is that the walker does not stand still. The non-walker also does not stand still because he is already standing still. Why would he need another action of standing 35 still? If he did, then due to one action of standing still he would be a “non-walker,” and due to the other one would say that he “stands still.” Since one would have to conclude that there were thus two actions of standing still, one would also be forced to accept that there are two agents of that action. The 8 The term here is sthāna, which literally means “standing” as in “standing still.” However, in the argument that follows, sthāna will at points also mean to “stop.”

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problem is as stated previously. Likewise, there is no third type of agent who is neither a walker nor a non-walker.

Here someone says, «The non-walker does not stand still, nor does one who is other than both a walker and a non-walker. Instead, it is the walker himself who stands still.”

This is not so, since: 5

2.16. If the walker without walking does not make sense, how then would it make sense to say, “The walker stands still?”

When one says, “He stands still,” then the action of walking, which is the contrary of standing still, does not pertain to him. And in the absence of the action of walking, one does not apply the expression “walker.” Therefore, it is unintelligible to say, “The walker stands still.” 10

Here, someone says, “Walking does exist because stopping exists. And in this regard, the one is stopping the action of walking begins the action of standing still. But if walking were nonexistent, then how could one stop doing it?»

We respond that walking would exist if stopping to walk existed. But it does not, since

2.17.1. One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot, nor on the 15 spot just walked upon; nor on a spot not yet walked upon.

As for this verse, the walker does not halt and stand still on a spot where he has just walked because there is no action of walking there. He also does not halt and stand still where he has not yet walked, and this is also the case because there is no walking there. So too the walker does not halt and stand still on the currently walked on spot because such a spot is not found, and also because there is 20 no action of walking there. Hence, there is no stopping the action of walking.

Here, someone says, «So, walking does not exist because its opposite, “standing still,” does not exist. But if that is the case, then in order to establish that there is walking, we prove that there is standing still. And walking is proven when standing still is proven. Therefore, standing still does indeed exist because its opposite exists. This is so because the opposite of standing still is walking, and 25 that exists. Therefore, standing still also exists because its opposite exists.»

This is also not right, because:

2.17.2. Walking, beginning, and stopping—each case is the same as in the action of walking.

In this regard, the “walking” that is mentioned so as to prove that there is the action of “standing 30 still” is the same as in the action walking—in other words, it has the same problems as the action of walking. For example, in the verse that begins, “First of all, the walker does not stand still…,” Nāgārjuna levels a critique against the action of standing still that is adduced as evidence to prove the action of walking. Likewise, here as well one should apply the same critique to walking when it is adduced as evidence to prove the action of standing still. One does so by restating the two stanzas with 35 the appropriate changes, as in, “The one standing still is not walking…” and so on (MMK2.15-16). And thus, as shown by this critique, there is no walking, and since it does not exist, its opposite—namely, standing still—also does not exist. It is in this way that, first of all, walking is explained to be the same as in the action of walking.

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But suppose someone says, «Standing still does exist because its beginning exists. That is, by suppressing walking, one begins standing still. And how can that which is begun not exist?»

We respond as follows. One should say that beginning the action of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. That is, previously the verse that began “One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked…” (MMK2.12) refuted the beginning of walking.” Likewise, in this case as 5 well,

One does not begin to stand still on a spot where one just stood, nor on a spot where one has not yet stood; one also does not begin to stand still where one is currently standing still, so where does one begin to stand still?

In this way, by making the appropriate changes to the three stanzas, one should make it clear that 10 the beginning of standing still is the same as in the action of walking.

One might object, «The action of standing still does exist because its cessation exists. That is, John Doe, who is standing still, stops standing still and begins to walk. If there were no action of standing still, then one could not stop that action.»

We respond that the action of standing still would exist if the stopping of that action existed. 15 However, it does not exist, since it is “the same as in the action of walking.” That is, one should make it clear that stopping the action of standing still is the same as in stopping the action of walking. In the case of stopping the action of walking, a critique of walking was stated by the line that says,

“One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot; nor on the spot just walked upon; nor on a spot not yet walked upon.” (MMK2.17.1) 20

Likewise, in the case of stopping the action of standing still, the critique is the same as in the action of walking:

One does not depart walking on the currently stood upon spot; nor on the spot just stood upon, nor on the spot not yet stood upon.

Thus, the critique as the same as in the action of walking. Thus, those who hold that the opposite 25 of walking—namely, standing still—exists have no proof for the action of walking because standing still does not exist.

Moreover, if walking were to exist, then it would have to exist either in exclusion from the walker, or not in exclusion from the walker. Neither case is at all possible for those who examine the issue. Nāgārjuna says: 30

2.18. It does not make sense to say, “The walker is himself the action of walking”; nor does it make sense to say, “The walker is different from the action of walking.”

Why does it not make sense?

2.19. If the walker were himself the action of walking, then one would be forced to accept that agent and activity (karman) are identical. 35

If the activity of walking does not exist in exclusion from the walker—that is, if it is not different from the walker—then agent and activity (kriyā) would be identical. Hence, there would be no

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distinction between the two, such that one could say “This is the agent” and “This is the activity.” Indeed, the activity of cutting is not identical to the cutter. Therefore, it is not correct to say, “The walker is himself the action of walking.”

To show how there is also no difference between the walker and the walking, Nāgārjuna says:

2.20. If you think that the walker is something different from the action of walking, 5 there would have to be the walking without the walker and the walker without the walking.

If the walker and the walker were different, then the walker would exist independently of the action of walking. So too, the walking would be apprehended independent of the walker. It would be established as distinct, just as a cloth is distinct from a jug. But it is not the case that the walking is 10 apprehended distinct from the walker. It also makes no sense for the walker to be something other than the walking, as has already been shown. This being the case,

2.21. There is no proof whatsoever that these two exist as either identical are different; how then can there indeed be any proof of these two at all?

There is no proof for these two—the walker and the action of walking—as being either identical or 15 different. And except for those options, in what other way could they be proven to exist? And so, Nāgārjuna asks, “How can there indeed be any proof of these two at all?” His intention is that there is no proof for the walker and the action of walking.

At this point, someone says, «A statement such as, “John Doe, the walker, is walking,” is commonly established for the world (lokaprasiddha). That is, it is established just in the way that these 20 are established: “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action.” Thus, the walker “is walking” —i.e., is engaged in—that activity of walking through which he is characterized as the “walker.” The aforementioned critiques do not hold.»

This is also not the true, since:

2.22.1 . The walker does not engage in the walking by virtue of which he is 25 characterized as “the walker.”

John Doe does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the walker. That is, he does not achieve that action; in other words, he does not do it. This is so

2.22.2. because he is not the walker before walking.

“Before walking” means prior to the action of walking. If the walker were established prior to the 30 action of walking, then he would engage in that walking. This is so

2.22.3. since someone engages in some walking.9

9 In the commentary on this verse, Candrakīrti appears to suggest that this line should be read, “Someone walks to some destination.” However, the point being made here is simply that an agent is by definition one who is engaged in some action; thus, a “walker” is engaged in walking. In order for the “walker” to exist prior to the action of walking, the walker would have to already be engaged in that action, which is not yet existent. This is most likely the point that Candrakīrti means to make with his example of walking to a destination; that is, that by definition an agent is someone engaged in the

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It is observed that someone such as John Doe walks to some village or city, which is other than himself. Such is not the case here; that is, the prior to that action of walking due to which he is called the “walker,” that walker who engages in that action does not exist.

At this point, someone says, «The walker does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker.” Rather, he engages in another action of walking.» 5

This is also not true since

2.23. The walker does not do an action of walking that is different from that walking by virtue of which he is characterized as the “walker” because when there is only one walker, it does not make sense to have two actions of walking.

The walker does not engage in an action of walking that is different from the one due to which he 10 is characterized as the “walker” because two actions of walking would absurdly ensue. One would be the action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker,” and the other would be the action of walking that he engaged in—these are the two actions of walking that would absurdly follow. And as has already been explained, two actions of walking cannot apply to one walker. This dispels the objection based on statements such as “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action.” 15

2.24.-2.25.1. In three ways, a real walker does not do the walking. An unreal walker does not do the walking in three ways. A walker that is both real and unreal does not do the walking in three ways.

In this verse, the term “walking” means “that action of walking which is engaged in” (gamyata iti gamanam). And in this regard, a real walker is connected with the action of walking, an unreal walker 20 is devoid of the action of walking, and one that is both real and unreal has the nature of both possibilities. One should know that the walking can also be related to the action of walking in three ways. That is, a real walker is not engaged in real walking, unreal walking or walking that is both real and unreal. This will be explained in the “Analysis of Factors of Action and their Object” (MMK8). So too, an unreal walker is not engaged in any of these three kinds of walking, nor is a walker who is both 25 real and unreal. This also will be explained in that same chapter. Thus, the agent of walking does not exist, nor does the object of that action, nor yet the action itself. Since that is the case,

2.25.2. Therefore, neither the walker, nor the action of walking, nor that which is being walked upon exists.

As the Teachings of Akṣayamati says, “Venerable Śāriputra, ‘coming’ is a state of moving inward. 30 “Going,’ venerable Śāriputra, is a state of moving outward. Where there is no state of moving inward of outward, there is no coming or going. Such is the gait (gati) of the Āryas: it is without coming or going.” 10 action in question. The main problem of translation here is that both the destination and, in Nāgārjuna’s usage, the action can occur in the accusative as that objects of the verbal construction, “is walking.” To make matters worse, the term gati, which Candrakīrti has interpreted heretofore as “the action of walking,” can also mean “destination.” The complexities—and the pun involved—cannot be fully rendered in English, but the current translation captures the main point of the argument. 10 The full flavor of this passage is difficult to render into English because it involves a deliberately ambiguous use of two key terms pada and gati. The first of these has been rendered as “state,” although its numerous other meanings include

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If the seed itself were to be transferred into the sprout, then that would be a seed, and not a sprout; the fault of eternalism would also ensue. But if, on the other hand, the sprout were to come from something else, then the fault of being uncaused would ensue. And production does not pertain to causeless things, such as a donkey’s horns. Hence, the Blessed One said:

The sprout of an existent seed is not itself the seed, nor is it something other than that; 5 nor is the seed that. In this way, its nature (dharmatā) is to be neither annihilated nor eternal.

And:

A seal is seen in its impression, but the seal itself is not seen to be transferred there; nor is the impression in the seal, nor yet does it come from something else. In this way, 10 conditioning is neither annihilated nor eternal.

Likewise, he said:

When children see an ornamented female face on the surface of a mirror or a pot of oil, they feel desire for that face, and desirous, they urgently seek to get it. But if there is no transfer of the face into the image, the face will never be reached. In this way, confused 15 beings develop desire; know that all things are like that.

Likewise, in the King of Samādhi Sūtra it says,

The faultless Victor with Ten Powers uttered this best of meditative states: “the world of existence (bhava) is like a dream; no one is born here, and no one dies.

No being is encountered here, no living thing or human. Things are like froth or a 20 plantain tree. They are like illusions, the same as a flash of lightning in the sky. They are like the moon in water, akin to a mirage.

In this world no human dies, nor does anyone pass on to the next world or go there. Yet karma is not wasted once it has been done; it will give a black or bright result for the one cycling in saṃsāra. 25

It is not eternal, but it is not annihilated. There is no accumulation of karma, nor perdurance. Yet, having done it, one will not fail to encounter it again, nor will one experience what another has done.

There is no transference [to the next life], nor arrival [from the last life]. It is not the “place” and “word.” Indeed, the Tibetan translators take it to mean “word,” but then one would have to argue that there is no coming and going because there is no word for coming and going, which is wholly unconvincing. Nevertheless, the interpretation of pada as “word” is not wholly implausible as part of a vague play on words. As for gati, it is formed from the verbal root √gam, which is the basis for the terms “coming” (āgati) and “going” (gati). It is the verb that has been translated throughout the chapter as “to walk.” Here, we have translated it as “gait” in the sense that it is the way that the Āryas proceed. However, it can also mean “state,” “abode,” “destiny,” and “understanding,” all of which may again be part of a deliberate if vague play on words.

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case that all exists, nor does it not exist. Here there is no purity of view, state or place. There is no place where beings become tranquil through their actions.

The three realms of saṃsāra are like a dream, they have no core. They quickly fluctuate and are impermanent like an illusion. It is not that something has come here, nor will something go elsewhere. [Mind-] streams are always empty and signless. 5

Unarisen, peaceful, a signless place—such is the realm of the Sugatas, such are the qualities of the Victors. Power, spells, and the Ten Powers’ strength—such is the supremacy of the bull-like buddhas: a myriad of excellent, positive qualities and character; supreme power of good qualities, wisdom and spells; supreme in magic and miraculous action; they have the best way to obtain the five superpowers. 10

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3 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties

3.1. The six sense-faculties are sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and the mind. Their objects are the visible and so on.

3.2. Sight does not see itself. How will that which does not see itself see something else itself? 5

3.3. What might say that fire burns itself, but we respond: The example of fire is not suitable for proving that sight sees itself. By means of our analysis of the being traversed, the already traversed, and the not yet traversed, we have already responded to claims about the reality of fire’s burning along with the act of seeing.

Modifying the first verse in chapter 2, one can critique seeing as follows: 10

First of all, one is not seeing what has been seen; one is not seeing what has not yet been seen; and without what has been seen and the not yet seen, the “being seen” is not seen.

3.4. If there is no seeing of what is not “being seen,” how can it make sense to say, “seeing sees?” 15

3.5. Seeing does not see, nor does non-seeing see. And due just to this analysis in these four verses of seeing, one must admit that the seer is also explained to be impossible.

3.6.1. When seeing is excluded, there is no seer; when seeing is not excluded, there is no seer.

Here, we ask: if there were some seer, would he depend upon seeing or not? In this regard, 20 suppose that the seer is asserted to be dependent on the seeing—that is, if seeing is not excluded. If that is the case, then does dependence on seeing apply to something already established to exist or not yet established to exist? Concerning these possibilities, a seer who is already established does not depend upon seeing. What would dependence upon seeing do for an already established—that is to say, existent—seer? This makes no sense because that which is already established is not established again. 25 On the other hand, if a not yet established seer depends upon seeing, then since it is not yet established, the seer is like the son of a barren woman; as such, a not yet established seer does not depend upon seeing. In this way, then, a seer not excluded from seeing does not exist. And has as been stated before, a seer excluded from seeing also does not exist, since it does not depend upon seeing. In this whether or not seeing is excluded, there is not seer. Thus: 30

3.6.2. How can there be seeing and the object seen if there is no seer?

3.7. It is said a child is born in dependence (pratītya) upon mother and father. Likewise, it is said that visual awareness arises in dependence upon the eye and visible matter.

3.8. And since there is neither the object of seeing nor seeing, the four factors in the twelve links starting with awareness also do not exist. Hence, how can there be 35

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appropriation and such?

3.9. One should realize that, just by the critique of seeing, we have explained hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking; and one should realize that, just by the critique of seeing, we have also explained the objects and agents, such as the hearer and the heard. 5

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4 Analysis of the Aggregates

4.1. Visible matter is not perceived separate from the causes of visible matter; and separate from visible matter, the causes of visible matter are also not seen.

4.2. If there were visible matter separate from the causes of visible matter, visible matter would be causeless, and there is no causeless thing anywhere. 5

4.3. However, if the causes of visible matter existed separate from visible matter, the causes would have no effects, and there is no cause without effects.

4.4. If visible matter already exists, the cause of visible matter makes no sense. If visible matter does not yet exist, the cause of visible matter does not make sense.

4.5. Causeless visible matter? No, no, it does not make sense. Therefore, one should not 10 invent any concepts at all that have to do with visible matter.

4.6. It does not make sense to claim, “The effect is similar to its cause.” It does not make sense to claim, “The effect is not similar to its cause.”

4.7 . The same sequence of arguments applies in all ways to sensation, mind, recognition, conditioning, and indeed to all things. 15

4.8. When torn apart by emptiness, one who utters a defense does not defend anything; all that he offers as proof has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove.

4.9. When explained away by emptiness, one who responds with criticism has not criticized anything at all; all that he offers as proof of his criticism has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. 20

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5 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus)

5.1. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic; if it were prior to its defining characteristic, it would have no defining characteristic.

5.2. There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. If there is no thing without a defining characteristic, then to what does a defining characteristic 5 apply?

5.3. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic, nor does it apply to what already has a defining characteristic. Nor does it apply to something other than what has or does not have a defining characteristic.

In the verse above the verb “to apply to” can be translated as “to be present in.” 10

5.4. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present, then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized. If the characterized does not make sense, then the defining characteristic is not possible.

5.5. Therefore, the characterized does not exist, and the defining characteristic does not exist. And an existent (bhāva) does not exist without what is characterized and the 15 defining characteristic.

5.6. If there is no existent (bhāva), then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)? And [if] the analyzer that has neither the quality of existing nor not existing, how does he know either the existent or the nonexistent?

5.7 . Therefore, space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent; it is neither the 20 characterized nor the defining characteristic. And the other five elements are the same in this regard as space.

5.8. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do not see peace, which is the quieting (upaśama) of what is to be seen.

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6 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous

6.1. If the desirous, in exclusion from desire, existed before desire, then desire would exist in dependence on the desirous such that when the desirous existed, there would be desire.

6.2. How could there be desire without the desirous? This same analytical procedure 5 applies to the desirous in the case where there is or is not desire.

6.3. It is not possible for desire and the desirous to arise simultaneously because desire and the desirous would then not depend upon each other.

6.4. And if they were identical, they would not arise together (sahabhāva) because a thing cannot occur with itself. And if they are different, how can they arise together? 10

6.5. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are identical, then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion (sahāya; grogs). If co-occurrence can occur even if they are different, then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion.

6.6. If desire and the desirous, while different, arise together, then do they arise together 15 because they are established separately?

6.7. If desire and the desirous are established separately, then why do you imagine that they arise together?

6.8. You expect them to arise together because you think that they are not established separately. And yet, to establish that they occur together, you again claim that they are 20 separate!

6.9 . Since they are not established to exist separately, their co-occurrence is not established. Which exists separately such that you assert that they arise together?

6.10. Thus, desire is not established either with the desirous or without the desirous. And as with desire, none of the elemental things (dharmas) are established either 25 together or separately.

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7 Analysis of the Conditioned

[NOTE: This chapter is based upon a particular theory found within Abhidharma philosophy. According to this theory, some things (dharmas) are “conditioned” (saṃskṛta) in that they are produced by causes and conditions. Moreover, if a thing is conditioned, then it is necessarily qualified by three characteristics, namely, occurrence (jāti or utpāda); perdurance (sthiti), which is a thing’s 5 continuity over a series of distinct temporal instants; and cessation (vyaya, bhaṅga, etc.). One of the oddities of this theory is that occurrence, perdurance and cessation are themselves considered to be conditioned things; hence, they too must be qualified by occurrence, perdurance and cessation, and this leads to the invention of things (dharmas) such as “occurrence-occurrence” (jātijāti), “perdurance-perdurance” (sthitisthiti), and “cessation-cessation” (vyayavyaya). These oddities are in part what 10 Nāgārjuna critiques.]

7.1. If the production [of things] were conditioned, then the three characteristics would be conjoined to it. On the other hand, if production is not conditioned, then how can it be characteristic of the conditioned?

7.2. The three [characteristics] starting with occurrence are not individually capable of 15 acting as characteristics for the conditioned; and how can [those three characteristics] together apply to one [thing] at the same time?

7.3. If there is another characteristic of the conditioned for occurrence, perdurance and cessation, then an infinite regress [ensues]. If such is not the case, then they are not conditioned. 20

7.4. “Occurrence-occurrence is the occurrence of only the first-order occurrence. The first-order occurrence in turn produces [its] occurrence-occurrence.”

7.5. If, according to you, occurrence-occurrence is what causes the occurrence of the first-order occurrence, then on your view, how would it cause the [first-order occurrence] to arise if it has not [yet] been produced by the first-order [occurrence]? 25

7.6. If, according to you, the [occurrence-occurrence] causes the first-order [occurrence] to arise [after] having been produced by the first-order [occurrence], then [inasmuch as] the first-order [occurrence] has not yet been produced by the [occurrence-occurrence], how does it cause the [occurrence-occurrence] to arise?

7.7 . Of course (kāmam), while being produced the [first-order occurrence] could 30 produce the [occurrence-occurrence], if the [first-order occurrence, even though] not yet produced, were capable of producing the [occurrence-occurrence].

7.8. “Just as lamplight illuminates [both] itself and what is other than it, likewise occurrence produces both itself and what is other than itself [i.e., occurrence-occurrence].” 35

7.9. Darkness is not present inside of lamplight, and it is not present where there is lamplight. Since light is [defined as] what eliminates darkness, what would lamplight

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illuminate?

7.10. And how could darkness be eliminated by lamplight in the process of arising? [Such cannot be] because while lamplight is in the process of arising, it does not reach any darkness.

7.11 . On the other hand, if darkness that is not reached [by the lamplight] were 5 eliminated by the lamplight, then the lamplight located here would eliminate the darkness of the whole world.

7.12. If lamplight eliminated [both] itself and [darkness,] which is other than itself, then darkness also would undoubtedly obscure [both] itself and [lamplight,] which is other than itself. 10

7.13. How could occurrence, which is not yet arisen, produce both itself and something else, [namely, occurrence-occurrence]? And if an occurrence that has already arisen produces [them], then why would [occurrence], being already produced, [need to] be produced again?

7.14. The currently arising does not arise, nor does the already arisen; nor does the not 15 yet arisen. This has been explained in the case of the not yet moved, the already moved, and the currently moving.

7.15. It does not make sense (na kramate) [to say,], “In relation to occurrence, this is that which is arising.” How, then, can one speak of “the arising” in dependence on occurrence? 20

7.16.1. Whatever exists dependently is essentially (svabhāvataḥ) pacified (śānta).

[Candrakīrti’s comments:] You, sir, maintain that any thing that exists has a svabhāva—in other words, in and of itself, [the thing] contains its own changeless essence (svabhāva). Since that [essence] exists, it does not depend on anything else, nor is it produced. Hence, if you admit that things have essences, how can you maintain that they are dependently arisen? Thus, by admitting that things have 25 essences, you have contradicted interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) in every way. Moreover, you have thereby contradicted the highest Dharma, namely, the Buddha’s philosophy, as [described] in the scriptural passage: “One who sees interdependence sees the Dharma; one who sees the Dharma, sees the Buddha.”

I, on the other hand, have shown the following: any thing, such as a sprout, that arises in 30 dependence on some [other] thing, such as seed, is an effect; the sprout is the cause. Both are “pacified,” that is, they are devoid of essence [and] interdependently arisen. Having shown this, I have explained entirely the Blessed Tathāgata’s mother, namely, interdependent origination.

7.16.2. Therefore, both that which is arising and occurrence itself are pacified.

7.17. If some not yet arisen entity (bhāva) existed somewhere, then it could arise, but if 35 no such entity exists, how can it arise?

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7.18. If an occurrence that was in the process of arising were to cause [some entity] to arise, then which occurrence would cause that occurrence to arise?

7.19. If another occurrence produces this [occurrence], then occurrence is an infinite regress. And if something without occurrence is arisen, then everything arises [anywhere at any time]. 5

7.20. The occurrence of the existent does not make sense, nor does the occurrence of the nonexistent. Nor can such be the case of what both is existent and nonexistent. This has been previously demonstrated.

7.21. The occurrence of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense, but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the 10 process of going out of existence.

7.22. An entity that has already continued to exit [over some period of time] does not continue to exist; an entity that has not yet continued to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. An entity that is in the process of continuing to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. And in any case, what unarisen [entity] 15 continues to exist?

7.23. The continued existent of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense, but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence.

7.24. Among all things that have the qualities of decaying and dying, which ones, 20 lacking those qualities, always continue to exist?

7.25. There is no occurrence of occurrence by virtue of [an occurrence] that is identical to it or different from it Likewise, it does not make sense [to theorize] the continued existence of continued existence by virtue of a continued existence other than continued existence or by virtue of that [continued existence] itself. 25

7.26. An entity that has already ceased to exist does not cease; an entity that has not yet ceased does not cease. An entity that is currently ceasing to exist does not cease. And in any case, what unarisen [entity] ceases?

7.27. The cessation of an entity (bhāva) that is continuing to exist does not make sense, but it does not make sense [to speak of] the cessation of an entity that is not continuing 30 to exist.

7.28. [This is so] because a state of existence does not cease by virtue of that very state of existence, nor does a state of existence cease by virtue of some other state of existence.

7.29. If, in the [aforementioned] manner, the occurrence of any entity does not make 35 sense, then likewise, the cessation of any entity does not make sense.

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7.30. First of all, the cessation of an existent entity does not make sense because, if [existence and nonexistence applied to] the same [entity], neither existence nor nonexistence would make sense.

7.31. Also, the cessation of a nonexistent entity does not make sense, just as one cannot decapitate [a human] for the second time. 5

7.32. There can be no cessation either by virtue of a thing itself or by what is essentially other [than that thing], just as there can be no occurrence by virtue of a thing itself or by something essentially other [than that thing].

7.33. Since occurrence, continued existence and cessation are not established, there are no conditioned entities. And if the conditioned is not established, how can one establish 10 the unconditioned?

7.34. Like an illusion, like a dream, like the city of the elves — such is occurrence, such is continued existence, such is cessation. [This is what the Buddha] has said.

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8 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object

8.1. A real factor (kāraka) acts on a real object (karman). [You] do not accept an unreal entity as a factor, nor do you accept an unreal entity as an object.

8.2. Action does not belong to a real [factor], and [if the factor were real], there would be an object without any agent. Action does not belong to a real [object], and [if the 5 object were real], there would be an agent without any object.

8.3. If an unreal factor acts on an unreal object, an object would have no [semantic] cause (hetu) [due to which one calls it an “object”]; an agent would have no cause [due to which one calls it an “agent”].

8.4. If there is no cause (hetu), then there is neither effect nor cause (kāraṇa). If there is 10 neither [cause nor effect], then neither action, nor agent, nor object exists.

8.5. If action and so on are impossible, then there is neither the virtuous (dharma) nor the nonvirtuous (adharma). And if there is neither the virtuous nor the nonvirtuous, the effects that arise from those [kinds of actions] do not exist.

8.6. If there is no effect, then a path to liberation does not make sense, and a path to 15 heaven does not make sense. Likewise, one would have to conclude that all actions are pointless.

8.7. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on [an object] that is both real and unreal because, since the real and the unreal are mutually contradictory, how can they [occur in or] as the same [entity]? 20

8.8. An unreal [object] is not acted upon by a real agent, nor is a real [object] acted upon by an unreal agent because all of the flaws [stated above] would ensue in that case.

8.9. For the reasons stated above, a real factor does not act on an object that is unreal or both real and unreal. 25

8.10. For the reasons stated above, an unreal factor does not act on an object that is real or both real and unreal.

8.11. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on an unreal object, nor on a real object. One should understand this for the aforementioned reasons.

8.12 . The factor occurs in dependence on the object, and the object occurs in 30 dependence on the factor. I see no other way to establish [them].

8.13. Since object and agent have been refuted, one should realize that such is also the case for reliance & appropriation (upādāna). All remaining entities are explained by [the analysis of] object and agent.

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9 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action]

9.1. Indeed, some do say the following: “There are [Perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing, and there is also the sensation [that accompanies them]. The one who comes before them exists.

9.2. How can seeing and such pertain to an entity that does not exist? Therefore, the 5 entity that exists before them is established.”

9.3. Well, then, by what means does one identify the entity that is established before [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]?

9.4. If that [entity] is established without seeing and such, then there is no doubt that 10 those [perceptual acts and such] would also be established without that [entity].

9.5. Some [enjoyer] is made evident by some [act], and some [act] is made evident by some [enjoyer]. How can some [enjoyer] be made evident without some [act]? How can some [act] be made evident without some [enjoyer]?

9.6. “There is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing. [Rather, 15 the enjoyer] is made evident by one among [the possible perceptual acts], such as seeing. At another time, it is made evident by another [of the acts].”

9.7. If there is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing, then how can there be one that exists prior to the individual [acts], such as seeing?

9.8. If the agent of seeing were himself the agent of hearing and himself the agent of 20 sensation, then he might exist before the individual acts. This, however, makes no sense.

9.9. [Suppose]on the other hand, that the agent of seeing is one [entity] and the agent of hearing is another; so too, the agent of sensation is yet another. In that case, the agent of hearing would exist while the agent of seeing was still present, and the Self would be 25 multiple.

9.10. The [enjoyer] also does not exist even at the time of those element (bhūta) from there are [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them].

9.11. If there is [enjoyer] to whom pertain [perceptual actions] such as seeing and 30 hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them], then they also do not exist.

9.12. The [enjoyer] who is before seeing and such does not exist then, nor now, nor later. In regard to him, the concepts “he is” [and] “he is not” have ceased.

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10 Analysis of Fire and Fuel

10.1. If fire is fuel, then the agent and the object [of the act of burning] would be identical. If it is other than the fuel, then fire would exist even without the fuel.

10.2. [Fire] would burn always, and it would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. To start [a fire] would also be pointless, and that being the case, it would have no object 5 [that it burns].

10.3. Since it does not depend (nirapekṣa) on anything else, [fire] would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. And inasmuch as it would always burn, starting it would pointless.

10.4. In this regard, one might think, “fuel is what is burning from the [fire].” But if 10 [fire] is nothing more than merely that [burning of fuel], then what burns the fuel?

10.5. [Fire,] being other [than fuel], would not touch it. What is not touched [by fire] would not burn. Not burning, the fire would not go out. Not going it, it would remain with its own mark (liṅga).

10.6. “Fire, while other than fuel, still touches it, just as a woman closely touches a 15 man, and a man closely touches a woman.”

10.7. We would admit that fire, while other than fuel, still touches the fuel, if fire and fuel were to exist in mutual exclusion.

10.8. If fire [exists] in dependence (apekṣya) on fuel, and if fuel [exists] in dependence on fire, then which, being established first, is that on which fire or fuel depends? 20

10.9. If fire exists in dependence on fuel, then [fuel] would establish [the existence] of what has already been established [to exist]. And if such were the case, fuel would exist without fire.

10.10. If that in dependence on which a thing is established is itself established in dependence on that very thing, then what is established in dependence on what? 25

10.11. A thing that is dependently established is not yet established; how then can it depend [on some thing]? If, being already established, it depends [on that thing], then its dependence makes no sense.

10.12. It is not the case that, depending on fuel, fire exists . It is not the case that, without depending on fuel, fire exists. It is not the case that, depending on fire, fuel 30 exists. It is not the case that without depending on fire, fuel exists.

10.13. Fire does not come from something else. Fire does not exist in fuel or when there is fuel. In relation to fuel, the remaining [critiques] have already been stated through [the analysis of] the [part of the path] being moved over, the [part] already moved over,

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and the [part] not yet moved over.

10.14. Fire is not fuel, and in relation to something other than fuel, there is no fire. Fire does not possess the fuel; fuels do not exist in fire, nor does it exist in them.

10.15. Through [the analysis of] fire and fuel, all procedures [for allegedly establishing] the Self and appropriation have been completely explained. Such is also the case for 5 jugs, cloths, and so on.

10.16. Some point to identity and difference in regard to the Self and in regard to things. I do not think that they have understand the meaning of the Teaching.

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11 Analysis of Beginning and End

At this point, someone objects, “The Self (ātman) exists because saṃsāra exists. If the Self were nonexistent, what would cycle compulsively through the coming and going that is the continuum of birth and death? Indeed, the Blessed One said:

Monks, the cycle of births and deaths has neither beginning nor end. Hence, no 5 beginning point is discerned for beings that cycle in saṃsāra, obscured by ignorance, fettered with thirst, bound with thirst’s tether.

Thus, according to the Buddha’s teaching, saṃsāra exists. If that is the case, then the one cycling in saṃsāra exists. And that one is the Self.”

[In response] we say this. There would be a Self, if saṃsāra were to exist. How so? Since 10

11.1. the Great Sage said, “Its starting point is not known, nor is its ending point.” He said so because saṃsāra is beginningless and endless; it has neither start nor finish.

The following are synonyms: point, part (bhāga) and locus (deśa). Starting point means “starting locus.” If saṃsāra were to exist, then there would necessarily be that which is prior to it and also that which is after it, as is in the case of a vase. However, the Blessed One said, “Monks, the cycle of birth, 15 aging and death is beginningless; it is endless.” Since it has neither beginning nor end, he said that saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. Hence, has the Blessed One not clearly taught that saṃsāra itself does not exist? Therefore, the following remains the case: saṃsāra does not exist because neither its starting point nor its ending point are perceived, as in the case of a torch-wheel.

At this juncture, on might think, “If the Blessed One has refuted both the beginning and end of 20 saṃsāra, then how could he have said this: ‘Therefore, monks, you should train yourselves, thinking, ‘Let us practice so as to put an end to saṃsāra.’”

We respond as follows. [the Buddha] applies the following specification [in the aforementioned statement]: “beings …obscured by ignorance,” and so on. Hence, it is only for them that saṃsāra is cognized to be beginningless and endless. However, such is not the case for those in whom the wind of 25 the wisdom of suchness has uprooted the tree that is ignorance’s obscurations. The whole tree that is the root and imprints of all their afflictive mental states has been incinerated by the fire that is the wisdom of a transmundane path. For such [persons], it is known that [saṃsāra] does indeed have an end.

… 30 Someone now objects, “Although saṃsāra has neither beginning nor end, it nevertheless has a

middle because [a middle] has not been refuted. Therefore, saṃsāra exists because its middle exists. In other words, that which does not exist does not have a middle, as in a tortoise’s pelt.”

You are being ridiculous. Good sir, consider this:

11.2.1. If something has neither start nor end, how can it have a middle? 35

A start is a beginning. It is called “what comes before” or “the first.” An end is a termination; it is called an “ending point” or “extinction.” The beginning and end of saṃsāra have been refuted, so how could it have a middle? The idea, then, is that saṃsāra is just a mere label (saṃjñā) [intended for] those whose minds are under the influence of error (viparyāsa); it is just a label because it is devoid of

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beginning, middle, or termination, as is the case with space and a torch-wheel. Moreover, the idea is that, since saṃsāra does not exist, the Self also does not exist. In this fashion, saṃsāra has no beginning, middle or termination, and for this very reason, saṃsāra does not exist. Therefore, in the case of birth, aging, death, and so on, there is no sequence [whereby one is] before, after, or simultaneous [with the other]. Thus, [Nāgārjuna] said: 5

11.2.2. Therefore, in this case it does not make sense for them to be in a sequence [such that one is] before, after or simultaneous with [another].

Demonstrating how it is that it does not make sense, he said:

11.3. If birth were first, then aging and death would be later. Birth would be devoid of aging and death, and an immortal would be born. 10

11.4. If birth were afterward, then aging and death would be first. How can there be the causeless aging and death of one who is unborn?

11.5. Also, birth cannot reasonably occur (***) with aging and death. The one being born would die, and both would be causeless.

11.6. The sequence of being before, after, or simultaneous with [aging and death] 15 cannot possibly apply to birth. So why would they conceptualize it as birth? The sequence of being before, after or simultaneous with [birth] cannot possibly apply to aging and death. So why would they conceptualize it as aging and death?

11.7. - 11.8. It is not just that saṃsāra has no starting point. Rather, there is no starting point for any [such] things, whether they be causes and effects, definitions and what 20 they define, feelings and the one who has them, or any [other such things that seem to occur in sequence].

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12 Analysis of Suffering

At this point, someone objects, “The Self does exist because the suffering related to it exists. In this regard, the five appropriative aggregates are called “suffering,” and it exists. Moreover, that suffering should pertain to something; it should not lack a locus (āśraya). Therefore, there is a locus of suffering, and it is the Self.” 5

We respond as follows. If suffering were existent, then there would be a Self. And if suffering were to exist, it would be produced by itself, by something other than itself, by both, or else causelessly. And in whatever way one asserts [its production], there is no suffering that could be produced [in any of such fashion]. Demonstrating this, [Nāgārjuna] said:

12.1. Some maintain that suffering is produced (kṛta) by itself, by something else, by 10 both, or else that it is causeless. And it is not possible for the [suffering posited in this fashion] to be caused.

In this regard, some theorists are of the opinion, “Suffering is produced by itself.” Others maintain, “It is produced by something else.” Yet others claim, “It is produced by both [itself and something else].” Some hold the opinion, “Suffering has arisen causelessly.” But being posited in any of these 15 ways, suffering cannot be what is produced or made. It is merely theoretical (pratijñāmātraka). Establishing this, he said:

12.2. If it were produced by itself, then (tataḥ) it would not be the case that the [present suffering aggregates] arise in dependence (pratītya) on [the previous suffering aggregates], since (hi) the aggregates [that are coming into existence] arise in 20 dependence on those aggregates [of the previous life].

12.3. If these [aggregates to be born] were different from those [that are dying], or if those [that are dying] are different from these [that are to be born], then suffering would be produced by something other [than itself]; these aggregates [to be born] would be made by those [aggregates that are dying], which are other [than those to be born]. 25

… Or someone might object (atha syāt), “We are not saying that suffering is ‘self-made’ because

suffering itself creates suffering. Instead, the suffering is made by that person himself (svapudgala); it has not been given [to the present person] after having been made by some other person. It is in this sense that we say, ‘Suffering is made by itself.’” 30

In response, we say

12.4. If suffering is made by its own person, then without suffering, what ‘own person’ is there such that the suffering has been made by that person itself.

What is conceptualized here is that this human suffering, defined as the five appropriative aggregates, is made by the person himself. What must also be conceptualized is the person by whom, 35 on his own (svayam), that suffering is made. [The point,] first of all, is that suffering is made by that person that the suffering indicates (prajñapyate). If that is the case, then one must state distinctly, “This is its suffering, and this is the maker of that [suffering].” Well, if the person who is appropriating

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suffering of human has made the suffering of a god, then that [suffering] has not been made by its own person; rather, it has been made by another person. One might assert that, while there is a difference in terms of the appropriation [of either human or divine suffering], the persons are not different. However, this is not the case because it is not possible to demonstrate a person who is distinct from the appropriation [of suffering]. That being the case, suffering is not created by its own person. 5

12.5. If suffering is arises from another person, then without suffering, how is there one to whom that suffering, having been made by another, would be given?

12.6. If suffering arises from another person, then without suffering, what ‘other person’ is there who, having made the suffering, would hand it over to another?

12.7. First of all, suffering is not self-made because that [suffering] is not made by that 10 same [suffering]. And if something else is not self-made, how can suffering be made by something else?

12.8. Suffering would be made by both [self and other] if it were made by each. And how could there be causeless suffering that is not made either by itself or by something else? 15

12.9. It is not just that the fourfold [establishment of] suffering does not exist; rather, the fourfold [establishment of all] external things does not exist.

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13 Analysis of Saṃskāras

13.1 . The Blessed One has said, “What has a deceptive quality is deceptive. All saṃskāras have deceptive quality. Hence, they are all deceptive.”

13.2. If that which has a deceptive quality would be deceptive, then about what is it deceptive? Rather, the Blessed one stated this as [a means to] indicate emptiness. 5

13.3 . Things are essenceless because it is observed that they change. Due to the emptiness of things, there is no entity that is or has a non-essence.

13.4. “If there is no essence, then of what is there change?” If there were an essence, of what would there be change?

13.5. Change does not pertain to a thing itself, nor to something other than that change 10 because the youth has not become aged, nor has the aged one become aged.

13.6. If change pertains to a thing itself, then yogurt would be milk. On the other hand, what other than milk becomes yogurt?

13.7. If there were some [entity that is] the non-empty, then there would be some [entity that is] the empty. There is no non-empty; how could there then be the empty? 15

13.8. The victors have said that emptiness is the death of all views, but they said that, for those whose view is emptiness, there is no cure.

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14 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga)

14.1. The [object] to be seen, the [action of] seeing, and the one seeing—these three do not enter into binary conjunctions with each other, nor do they all together enter into conjunction with each other.

… 5 Just as there is no binary or group (sarvaśaḥ) conjunction in the case of the seen, seer, and seeing,

likewise,

14.2.1. one should see that this is also the case with desire, the desirous, and [the act of] desiring.

There is no conjunction of desire with the desirous, and there is no conjunction of desire with 10 desiring. Also, there is no simultaneous conjunction of the three. As in the case of these [three], so too,

14.2.2. in these three forms (traidhena), the remaining afflictive mental states and the remaining media (āyatana)

do not enter into mutual conjunction. The remaining afflictive mental states are anger, confusion and so on; in these three ways—as anger, the angered and [the act of] being angry—[do not enter into 15 mutual conjunction]. And [the media]—as ear, hearer and sound—[do not enter into mutual conjunction].

Why is there no conjunction of them? [Nāgārjuna] said:

14.3. Conjunction is of one thing with another that is other than it, and that otherness does not exist in the case of the seen [object] and so on. Hence, they do not enter into 20 conjunction.

14.4. And it is not just in the case of the seen [object] and so on that otherness does not exist; rather, the otherness of any thing from any other thing does not make sense.

14.5. One [thing] is other in relation to (pratītya) another; that one thing is not ‘other’ without the other. And it does not make sense for one [thing] to be other than to which 25 it is relating.

… Here, someone objects, “If a cloth is different from a vase, and if in relation to that separate

(pṛthagbhūta) cloth, the vase is also other, then what is the problem?” We respond: 30

14.6. If one thing (anyad) were other (anyad) than another (anyasmād), then it would be ‘other’ even without that other [thing]

One [instance of the word] “other” (anya) stands for what is being pointed out, and another [instance] refers to what is other [than the aforementioned thing]. Yet another [instance] expresses the usual sense [as in “other” or “different”]. Thus, there are three uses of the word “other.” If a real thing 35

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called a “vase” were other than another—i.e., a cloth—then the thing called a “vase” would be ‘other’ even without that other thing, the cloth. And if that were the case, then there would be the otherness of a solitary vase, which is without any dependence & relation to a cloth. This is so because that which is ‘other’ than the other is established without that other [thing]. To be specific, the vase itself does not depend on that other thing, the cloth, for the establishment of its reality (svarūpa). In this way, if the 5 vase were ‘other’ even without that other thing, the cloth, then the vase, independent of the cloth, would be ‘different.’ However, we do not see any ‘otherness’ of a vase independent of [something else, such as] a cloth. Therefore, in saying, “It is other,” one must clearly accept that the one that is ‘other’ in relation to the other is not other than that other thing.

… 10 Here, someone objects, “If the cognition of one thing (padārtha) as ‘other’ were dependent on

some other thing, then there would be this flaw, namely, “The one is not other than the other.” But this is not what we are saying. Rather, otherness is a specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa); the thing (padārtha) in which it adheres is called “other” even without any dependence on or relation to another thing. Therefore, the problem that you have discussed is not applicable to our position.” 15

We respond as follows. This would be the case, if there were [that specific universal,] otherness. That is, when conceptually constructing this otherness, it must be conceptually constructed either in relation to what is other, or in relation to what is not other, and it does not make sense either way. Demonstrating this, [Nāgārjuna] said:

14.7.1. Otherness does not exist in what is other, nor does it exist in what is not other. 20

This means the following (tatra). [If] one has the notion, “There is otherness in what is other,” then what is the point of conceptually constructing otherness? That is, you conceptually construct otherness for the purpose of establishing the application of the term ‘other’ (anyavyapadeśa). But that application of the term ‘other’ is established without otherness since otherness is being conceptually constructed for a thing to which one has already applied the term ‘other.’ 25

…

14.7.2. And if otherness does not exist, then neither the ‘other’ nor that [thing] itself exists.

14.8.1 . The conjunction of a [thing] with that [same thing] is not reasonable (na…yujyate), nor is the conjunction of one thing with another. 30

…

14.8.2 . Also, the [act of] conjoining, [the object] conjoined, and the agent of conjunction do not exist.

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15 Analysis of Svabhāva

15.1.1. The origination of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) through causes and conditions is not reasonable.

15.1.2 . An intrinsic nature originated through causes and conditions would be manufactured. 5

15.2.1. Indeed, how could an intrinsic nature be manufactured?

15.2.2. And an uncreated [i.e., innate] intrinsic nature would have no relation to or dependence on what is other than it.

15.3. If there is no intrinsic nature, how can there be extrinsic nature? For the intrinsic nature of what is by nature other is called ‘extrinsic nature.’ 10

15.4. Moreover, without extrinsic nature and intrinsic nature, how can there be [any] existence (bhāva)? [There cannot be] because existence is established when there is intrinsic nature or an extrinsic nature.

15.5. And if existence is not established, how could there be nonexistence, say that nonexistence [means that] existence becomes something else. 15

15.6. They who see intrinsic nature, extrinsic nature, existence and nonexistence do not see the reality in the Buddha’s teaching.

15.7. In his discussion with Kātyāyana, the Blessed One, who discerns the existent and the nonexistent, refuted [the positions], “It exists,” “It does not exist,” and both.

15.8.1. If existence applied to [some thing] essentially, then nonexistence would not 20 [ever] apply to it.

15.8.2. [This is so] because it never makes sense for an essence to change.

15.9.1. If its essence does not exist, of what would there be change?

15.9.2. And if its essence does exist, of what would there be change?

15.10.1. [To think], “[The essence] exists” is to be eternalist; [To think,] “It does not 25 exist,” is an annihilationist view.

15.10.2. Therefore, the discerning do not resort to either existence or nonexistence.

15.11. “It is not the case that what exists by its own intrinsic nature does not exist.” Thinking this, one is forced into the [belief that things are] eternal. “Now it does not exist, but it existed previously.” Thinking this, one is forced into [the belief in] 30 annihilation.

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16 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation

At this point, someone objects, “The essence of things does exist because saṃsāra exists. The saṃsaraṇa [of the aggregates] i.e., [their] flowing together (saṃsṛti)—[their] movement from one realm of existence to another—is called ‘saṃsāra.’ If things do not have an essence, then of what would there be saṃsāra? Of who or what would there [this] flowing together? It is not observed that 5 the [mental] conditions (saṃskāra) of a barren woman’s son are flowing together. Therefore, saṃsāra must exist; hence, things’ essence does indeed exist.”

We respond as follows (ucyate). If saṃsāra were existent, then things would indeed have an essence, but it does not exist. That is, if saṃsāra were existent, then it would necessarily be [the flowing together] of [mental] conditions or of a being (sattva). What comes of this? Well, there is a 10 problem with either [possibility]. Hence, Nāgārjuna said,

16.1. If [mental] conditions flow together, then it is not the case those conditions that are flowing together are permanent, nor are they impermanent. The same steps [of this argument] apply to the being.

In this regard, if one believes, “Mental conditions are flowing together,” then do they flow 15 together as permanent [things] or impermanent [things]? Among these [possibilities], permanent [things] do not flow together because they are inert (niṣkriya), and impermanent [things] are observed to be active (skriya). What, then, if impermanent things [are what is flowing together]? Well, those [things] that are impermanent are destroyed immediately after arising. And since, like a barren woman’s child, they do not exist, how can impermanent [mental conditions] go to any [next realm of 20 existence]? Thus, there is also no flowing together (saṃsāra) of impermanent [mental conditions].

…

16.2. “The person undergoes saṃsāra.” When it is sought in five ways in relation to the aggregates, media and elements, it does not exist. What would undergo saṃsāra?

… 25 Moreover, this Self,

16.3. flowing from substratum (upādāna) to substratum, would be without samsaric existence (vibhava); without samsaric existence, lacking any substratum, what is this thing that would flow?

In this regard, [the Self], going from a human substratum to a divine substratum, would either go 30 on to the divine substratum after having abandoned the human substratum, or else it would do so without having abandoned the human substratum. First of all (tāvat), if [you] say, “It goes on after having abandoned [the previous substratum], then since it has abandoned the previous substratum, and since it does not yet have a new substratum, it would be without any substratum in between those times. [In the verse, the Skt. term] vibhava [without substratum] means to be devoid (vigata) of samsaric 35 existence (bhava). Samsaric existence is the five substratal aggregates; [the Self] would be devoid of those [aggregates]. That which has no samsaric existence—i.e., that which has no substratum—would be devoid of aggregates; hence, it would not have the cause that is the substratum of a name (prajñaptyupādānakāraṇarahita), so it would be causeless. And that which has no substratum lacks

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any indication [of its existence]; it is unmanifest, and as such, it is causeless. What [kind of] thing is that? It is not anything at all. In other words, it does not exist.

…

16.4. In no way is it possible for mental conditions to obtain nirvāṇa; in no way is it possible for a being to obtain nirvāṇa. 5

16.5. As in the previous [argument], mental conditions, which have the quality of ceasing [when they] arise, are not bound, nor are they liberated. Nor is a being bound or liberated.

… Here, someone objects, “Although there is no bondage of either mental conditions or a being, 10

desire and such, which are called ‘the substratum’ (upādāna), do exist. And since that [substratum] exists, bondage should also exist.”

We respond as follows. The substratum would itself be the binding if it bound something, but it does not bind [anything]. Demonstrating how it is that [the substratum] does not bind anything, Nāgārjuna said: 15

16.6. If the substratum were the binding (bandhana), then that which possesses the substratum would not be bound. And that which has no substratum is not bound. So in what state is [anything] bound?

16.7.1. Indeed, the binding would bind [that which is to be bound] if it were to exist before that which is to be bound, but it does not [exist before it]. 20

As for the remaining problems in this context, one should know

16.7.2. the remaining [faults] which have been stated through [the analysis of] that which has moved, that which has not yet moved, and that which is now moving.

By changing the reading of the verse [in chapter 2], one should apply it as follows:

[The binding] does not bind that which is already bound; nor does [it] bind that which is 25 not yet bound; and without that which is bound and that which is not bound, that which is currently being bound is not bound.

[The verse in chapter 2] should be applied in this manner, and so forth. …

16.8. That which is bound is not liberated, and that which is not bound is not liberated. 30 If that which is bound were being liberated, then bondage and liberation would be simultaneous.

16.9. “Devoid of the substratum, I will pass into nirvāṇa [i.e., extinction]; [then] will I have obtained nirvāṇa.” Those who grasp [onto nirvāṇa] in this fashion grasp tightly to the substratum. 35

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16.10. Where nirvāṇa is not imputed and saṃsāra not denied, what notion is there of nirvāṇa, what notion of saṃsāra?

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17 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect

At this point, someone objects, “Saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result. In this regard, the mental conditions or Self flows in saṃsāra (saṃsaraṇa) through an uninterrupted continuum that is the sequence of birth and death, which is [their] occurrence in the relation of cause and effect. If the Self or mental conditions were to flow in 5 this fashion, then there would be a relation between karmic action and [its] result. However, if there were no saṃsāra as described here, then since the mind would cease immediately after arising, and since there would be no ripened [karmic result] when [rebirth] is projected by karma, there simply would be no relation between karmic activity and [its] result. If, however, saṃsāra exists, then a karmic action that has been committed would be related to a ripened result even in another rebirth. 10 Hence, it would not be contradictory for karmic actions to have a relation to [their] results. Therefore, saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result.”

“What are those karmic actions? And what is the result? With the intention of stating the difference between them, [these objectors] say the following:

17.1. “The state of mind (cetaḥ) that holds oneself back, the state of mind that cares for 15 others, and a kind & loving (maitra) state of mind are [each] Dharma. It is the seed of an effect in a future rebirth and/or here [in this life].

17.2.1. “The highest sage said that there is karma that is intention (cetanā) and karma that follows intention (cetayitvā).

17.2.2. “The various types of karma are widely known. 20

17.3. “It is recorded (smṛta) that among these, the karma called ‘intention’ is mental [karma]; and the one that is said to follow intention is corporeal and vocal [karma].

17.4 .-17.5 . “Speech and motion; also, the non-dispassionate [karmic form] named ‘undemonstrative’ and likewise the other undemonstrative [karmic forms, namely,] those recorded to be (smṛta) dispassionate; the merit that has continuity with use and the 25 non-merit of that type; and intention. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be manifestations of karma (karmāñjana).

“Concerning these [verses], speech is the enunciation of clear & manifest syllables. Motion is movement of the body. In this regard, all speech, virtuous or unvirtuous—i.e., establishing & motivating (samuthāpika) an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is 30 in general terms called, “speech.” Likewise, [all motion], virtuous or nonvirtuous—i.e., establishing & motivating an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms apprehended to be motion.

“As in this twofold classification of demonstrative [karmic forms], the undemonstrative is also [thus classified], as in the following (iti kṛtvā): undemonstrative [karma] defined as non-dispassionate, 35 and undemonstrative [karma] defined as dispassionate. Among these, an example of undemonstrative [karma] defined as not dispassionate is as follows. [One] thinks, “From today forward I will kill beings and steal [from them]; that is how I will make my living.” From the moment that one decides to [engage in] sinful (pāpa) karma, undemonstrative [karmic forms], whose cause is that decision to

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engage in nonvirtue, arise ceaselessly, even when one is not doing that [unvirtuous act]. Also (ca), starting with the time that fishermen and such engage in deeds such as setting their nets, undemonstrative [karmic forms] arise in them even when they are not engaged in those [deeds]. These undemonstrative [karmic forms discussed in these two examples] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a non-dispassionate character.” Just as there are these [types of undemonstrative karmic 5 form], likewise [undemonstrative karmic forms], there are also the other undemonstrative [karmic forms] that, having a dispassionate character, are by nature virtuous. For example, [suppose that one engages in] the demonstrative [acts] of body and speech, [consisting in the ritual of reciting the formula], “From today forward, I completely refrain from taking life and so on.” Starting with the completion of those demonstrative acts of body and speech, undemonstrative [karmic forms] that are 10 by nature accumulating merit arise in one, even when one is intoxicated and so on. These [karmic forms] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a dispassionate character.” Although they are by nature form (rūpa) and action (kriyā), unlike demonstrative [forms], they do not demonstrate & indicate [anything] to others. Hence, they are undemonstrative.

“So too, there is [karma that has] continuity with use; this means the merit—the virtue—that is 15 continuous with use. ‘Use’ (paribhoga) is the employment (upabhoga) on the part of the Saṅgha and such of an item that has been given away (parityakta). [With that employment this karma has] continuity (anvaya)—in other words, there is a continuation (anugama) arisen in the continuum (santāna) of the giver, [and that continuation] is an accumulating of virtue. And [there is] the non-merit of that type—i.e., that has continuity with use. An example is the construction of a temple where 20 beings are killed. From the use of that temple in such ways that beings are killed there, there arises in the continuum of those who built it the non-merit continuous with use. In this way, there is also non-merit of that kind.

“And there is intention, defined as the mental karmic act of conditioning the mind. “In sum, these are the seven types of karma: virtuous and nonvirtuous speech; virtuous and 25

nonvirtuous motion; the virtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative; the nonvirtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative; merit that has continuity with use; non-merit that has continuity with use. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be karmic manifestations; that is, they are indicated & made manifest as karma—they are defined as karma (karmalakṣaṇa).”

At this point, some [philosophers] object as follows. This karma that [you] have stated to be of 30 various types, does it remain until it matures? Or does it not remain because it ceases immediately upon arising? If, first of all,

17.6. karma remains until it matures, then it would be permanent. If it has ceased [before the maturation], then having ceased, how does it produce an effect?

… 35 At this point, some [Buddhists] from another tradition present another response. “[For others’

theory of karma, there is] a problem in that the mental conditions are impermanent because of ceasing immediately upon occurrence; [but this problem] does not apply to us. And you have said, ‘If it has ceased [before the maturation], then having ceased, how does it produce an effect?’ We respond to this as follows: 40

17.7. “The result comes from a continuum beginning with the sprout that proceeds from the seed. And without the seed, that continuum does not occur.

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“In this [verse it says the following]. Even though the seed is momentary, it is by nature the cause of a continuum that has the distinctive capacity to produce a distinctive future effect of the same type; as such, it is a continuum that bears the names “sprout,” “shoot” (kāṇḍa), “stalk” (nāla), “leaves” and so on. The seed, having become that cause, then ceases. And from the continuum starting with a sprout that proceeds [from the seed], a vast host of effects arise from the cause [i.e., the seed], although it is 5 small; this host of effects arises provided that the supporting conditions are not incomplete. Moreover, without the seed, that continuum starting with the sprout does not occur. This being the case, [the result] occurs when there is [the seed], and it does not occur when there is no [seed]; therefore, [for those two reasons], it is demonstrated that the seed is the cause of a result which is the continuum starting with the sprout. 10

17.8. “From the seed comes a continuum, and the result comes from that continuum. Therefore, the effect is preceded by the seed, and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal.

17.9. “Therefore, the mental continuum proceeds from a state of mind [involving an intention], and from that [continuum] comes the [karmic] effect. And without that state of mind (citta), the effect does not occur. 15

17.10. “From the state of mind comes a continuum, and the effect arises from that continuum. Therefore, the effect is preceded by karma, and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal.

17.11. “The ten forms of pure karmic action are the means to accomplish Dharma. Dharma’s result is the five objects of sensual desire (kāmaguṇa) in this [life] and the 20 future.

… Such is the way that some answer the objection [that a ceased entity cannot have a karmic effect].

Others, however, regard to those [who have just given the above answer], raise problem[s] and offer [their own] answer to the objection. They say, 25

17.12 . “There are numerous and severe problems, if one were to have this idea (kalpanā) [about karma]. Therefore, this idea does not make sense in this context.

17.13. “I will tell you the idea that is applied here, the one described by the buddhas, pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas.

“And what is that idea? We say, 30

17.14. “The imperishability (avipraṇāśa) is like a contract, and karma is like a loan. In terms of realms, it is of four kinds, and by nature it is karmically neutral (avyākṛta).

“In this regard, [when] a virtuous karmic act is committed, it goes out of existence immediately after occurring, but it does not follow that, inasmuch as it has gone out of existence, its result would also be nonexistent. [This does not follow] because when that karmic act is committed, at that very 35 time there arises in the karmic agent’s continuum an unassociated entity (viprayukto dharmaḥ) which is called that karmic act’s “imperishability.” It is like the contract for a loan. That is, one should know

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that the imperishability is like a contract. And one should know that the karma—of which that entity called “imperishability” has arisen—is like a loan. Through establishing a loan contract, the creditor does not lose his investment even if [all of the lent] wealth has been used. [Rather], that [creditor] is connected to a sum of wealth with compounded interest [to be paid at] another time. Likewise, although the karmic act has ceased, through establishing [by that karma] another entity called 5 “imperishability,” the karmic agent is connected to the result caused by that [karmic act]. Moreover, [when] a loan contract has made the lender receive his payment and been consummated (nirbhuṅkta), it cannot cause another payment, regardless of whether or not [the contract] still exists. Likewise, as in a consummated contract, a [karmic act’s] imperishability, having given [its] matured [effect], cannot connect the karmic agent to another matured effect (vipāka), regardless of whether or not that 10 [imperishability] still exists.

“Furthermore, this “imperishability,” which we have stated here, is stated in other sūtras to be of four kinds in accord with the realm [of the karmic agent]—that is, in terms of the distinction of being [an agent] acting in the desire, form or formless realms, or [one who is of the] uncontaminated [realm].

… 15

17.15.1. “It is not abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]; rather (vā), it is only to be abandoned [on the path of] cultivation.

“The imperishability is not [on of the afflictions] to be abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. The karmic actions of an ordinary person are abandoned through the path of seeing, but even āryas have the karma of an ordinary person. Therefore, the imperishability is not abandoned 20 through the path of seeing, even though the karmic act of that [kind of imperishability] is abandoned. Instead, there is rather the abandoning of the imperishability through the path of cultivation. The word “rather” (vā), used in the sense of an alternative, means that [an imperishability] is to be abandoned only after transcending the realm [in which its karmic act was performed]. This being the case, an imperishability is not destroyed even though the karmic act has been destroyed. 25

17.15.2. “Therefore, karmic acts’ effect arises through [their] imperishability.

17.16. “If [the imperishability] were to be abandoned through the abandonment [on the path of seeing] or through the progression (saṃkrama) of [its] karmic act, then the faults of karmic dissipation and such would absurdly ensue.

17.17. “When connecting across lives (pratisaṃdhi), a single [imperishability] arises for 30 all of the [committed] karmic acts of the same cosmological level, whether [those committed karmic acts] be similar or dissimilar.

17.18. “For all [karmic acts], which are of two kinds, an [imperishability] arises in the current life for each respective act. Even though [the effect] has ripened, the [imperishability might] remain. 35

17.19. “An [imperishability] ceases through the transcending of a result [on the path] or through death. One should classify an imperishability as either contaminated or uncontaminated.

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17.20. “[In terms of this theory of karmic actions’ imperishability], emptiness [makes sense], but annihilationism does not. Saṃsāra [makes sense], but eternalism does not. Moreover, the Buddha taught that imperishability of karma is an elemental thing (dharma).”

… 5 At this point, we say the following. …

17.21. Karma does not arise. Why? Because it is essenceless. And since it is unarisen, it does not cease.

17.22. If karma [existed] essentially, then without any doubt it would be eternal. Karma 10 would also be unmade (akṛta)], since the eternal is not made (kriyate).

17.23. If karma were unmade, then there would be the fear of experiencing [karmic results] for something that one has not done. And the fault of not living as a brahmacarin would also absurdly follow for this [position].

17.24 . There is no doubt that [through your view of karma,] all conventions are 15 contradicted, and any distinction between those who do good (puṇya) and those who do evil (pāpa) is impossible.

17.25. If karma has an essence because it is established (vyavasthitha),then the ripened result of a [karmic action] would again be ripened.

17.26 . Karma is of the nature of afflictive mental states, but they are not truly 20 (tattvataḥ) afflictive mental states. Since these [alleged afflictive mental states] are not truly afflictive mental states, how can karma be truly [karma]?

17.27. Karma and afflictive mental states are said to be the causal conditions for bodies. If karma and afflictive mental states are empty, what despite will there be about [the emptiness of] bodies? 25

17.28. “A being, obscured with ignorance and fettered with thirst, is the agent that experiences [karmic effects]; that being is not different than the agent who did [the karmic act], nor is he the same as that [karmic agent].”

17.29. There is no karma arisen from conditions, nor is there karma established without conditions. Therefore, there is also no agent that commits karmic acts. 30

17.30. If there is neither karma nor agent, then how could there be an effect arisen from karma? And if there is no effect, how could there an agent who experiences it?

17.31 . Through his perfection of miraculous power, the Teachers may emanate a [buddha] emanation, and that emanated emanation may again emanate another emanation. 35

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17.32. Likewise, the karmic agent is like the emanation, and as for the karma that it did, it is like another emanation emanated by an emanation.

17.33. Afflictive mental states, karmic acts, bodies, karmic agents and effects — these are all like

18 Analysis of the Self

At this point, someone objects, «Afflictive mental states, actions, embodiments, agents, and effects—all of these are not ultimately real; nevertheless, although they are not ultimately real, they appear to childish beings as if they were ultimately real, like the cloud-city of the Sprites and so on. But if this is the case, then what is ultimately real? Moreover, how does one encounter the ultimately 5 real?»

In response, we say the following. In this context, the ultimately real is the utter cessation of the habitual sense of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra) and the habitual sense of ‘My’ (mamakāra), both internally and externally, through the nonperception of all things whatsoever, whether internal or external. As for encountering ultimate reality, Encountering Madhyamaka says: 10

Insightfully seeing through his intellect that all afflictive mental states and flaws arise from the belief that a transient assemblage is the Self, and having realized that the Self is the object of that belief, the yogi refutes the Self. (MAV 6.20)

Encountering reality should be understood in detail from this and other verses in Encountering Madhyamaka, but I will just discuss the position presented here.1 In this regard, consider the yogi who 15 wishes to encounter the ultimately real and who wishes to eliminate all afflictive mental states and faults; that yogi examines the situation by asking, “What is the root of saṃsāra?” Examining it in this way, he sees that its root is the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self, and he realizes that the Self is the focus of that belief. He also sees that through the nonperception of a Self, one eliminates that belief in a transient assemblage as the Self, and that by eliminating that belief, one stops all 20 afflictive mental states. Understanding that afflictive mental states are eliminated in this fashion, he first investigates the Self as follows: “What is this so-called Self, which is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’? And when conceiving of this object of the habitual sense of ‘I,’ does one think of it as essentially the aggregates, or as distinct from the aggregates?”

Here, one can raise these possibilities: (1) the Self is based on the aggregates as its foundation; (2) 25 the Self is the foundation for the aggregates, which are thus based on the Self; or (3) the Self is the possessor of the aggregates. These theories, however, can be subsumed under the theories that the Self and aggregates are identical or that they are different. And since Nāgārjuna wishes to state a concise argument, he intends to present a refutation of the Self only through these two theories, namely, that the Self and the aggregates are the same or that they are different. With this in mind, he says: 30

18.1 . If the Self were the aggregates, then it would partake in occurrence and destruction. If it were something other than the aggregates, then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics.

One might ask, «Why is it that elsewhere, in both the ‘Analysis of the Tathāgata’ (MMK 22) and the ‘Analysis of Fire and Fuel’ (MMK 10), five theories are presented, whereas here there are only two 35 theories?» The answer is that the five theories are already enumerated in those two contexts. Therefore, since they are enumerated elsewhere, he does not present them again here. Rather, he concisely presents the above two theories. 1 In other words, although MAV has a more extensive analysis, Candrakīrti will restrict himself to the portions of that analysis that are presented by Nāgārjuna in this chapter.

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In this regard, if one thinks that the Self is the aggregates, then it would follow that the Self would partake in occurrence and destruction—that is, it would become something that arises and ceases—since the aggregates partake in occurrence and destruction. And it is not accepted that the Self arises and ceases because various problems would absurdly follow, as Nāgārjuna will later explain when he says: 5

It is not the case that the Self, being previously nonexistent, arises. If it were to arise, then a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed, or else the Self would have arisen causelessly. (MMK 27.12)

And he will also say:

The Self is not the substratum; the substratum arises and ceases. In any case, how could 10 that which relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? (MMK 27.6)

Also, one should understand this position through the analysis presented in Encountering Madhyamaka in the section that begins,

If the Self were the aggregates, then since the aggregates are numerous, the Self would be numerous. Likewise, it would follow that the Self is a substance, and it would not be 15 incorrect for the term “Self” to refer to a substance.

The Self would necessarily be annihilated in cessation,2 and in every moment prior to cessation it would arise and cease.3 Since the karmic agent would thus cease every moment, there would be no karmic result for him, and the karma accumulated by one Self would be experienced by another. (MAV 6.127-128) 20

This position should be understood through studying this section of Encountering Madhyamaka, so I will not again offer any extensive elaboration now.

And so, in the first place, the Self is not the aggregates; but it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. For if the Self were something other than the aggregates, then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. For example, a horse, which is different from a 25 cow, does not have a cow as its defining characteristic. In the same manner, the Self, when it is conceived as different from the aggregates, would not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. Here, because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta), the aggregates arise from causes and conditions and their defining characteristics are occurrence, perdurance and decay.4 Therefore, if the 2 The term for cessation is nirvṛtti, which here refers to Buddhist nirvāṇa. The point is that, if one were to maintain that the Self were identical to the aggregates, then since according to Candrakīrti’s Buddhist interlocutor, the aggregates cease in Nirvāṇa, the Self would also cease. And since the opponent here accepts that the cessation of the Self in this fashion would amount to Annihilationism (ucchedavāda), it must be contradictory to maintain that the Self is the aggregates. See MAVBh (296a). 3 Candrakīrti here refers to the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). On this theory, any causally efficient entity—i.e., one produced by causes and thus capable of producing effects—necessarily endures for only an instant (kṣaṇa); hence, such an entity comes into and goes out of existence every moment. The aggregates are known to be causally efficient, and thus they endure only a moment; if the Self were identical to the aggregates, then it too would endure only a moment. 4 According the ontology of Vaibhāṣika Abhidarma, all conditioned entities (saṃskṛtadharma) are conditioned in part because they are subject to the causes and conditions that produce them. Being produced from causes, they have three defining characteristics: arisal (jāti), perdurance (sthiti), and cessation (nirodha). (See AK: 0000).

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Self does not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics, as you maintain, then the Self would not have occurrence, perdurance and decay as its defining characteristics. And in that case, the Self would either be like a sky flower, because it does not exist, or it would be like nirvāṇa, because it is unconditioned. As such, it would not be called the “Self,” nor would it be reasonable for it to be the object of the habitual sense of ‘I.’ Therefore, it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from 5 the aggregates.

Alternatively, here is another meaning of the statement, “If the Self were different from the aggregates, the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics.” These are the defining characteristics of the five aggregates: (1) malleability, (2) experience, (3) the apprehension of an object’s sign, (4) conditioning, and (5) representation of an object. If, just as consciousness is asserted 10 to be different from material form, the Self were asserted to be different from the aggregates, then the Self would be established with a distinct defining characteristic. As such, it would be apprehended as being established with a distinct defining characteristic, just as consciousness is apprehended as established with a defining characteristic distinct from material form. The Self is not, however, apprehended in that fashion; hence, there is no Self distinct from the aggregates. 15

Someone objects, «The Tīrthikas know of a Self separate from the aggregates, and they thus speak of its defining characteristics. Hence, this way of refuting the Self does not refute them. And the way that the Tīrthikas speak of a separate defining characteristic for the Self is stated in the following verse from Encountering Madhyamaka:

The Tīrthikas conceive of a Self that is by nature eternal; it is an experiencer without 20 being an agent; it is devoid of qualities and inactive. The Tīrthikas’ system has come to be further divided in terms of this or that distinction in the qualities predicated of the Self.» (MAV 6.142)

We respond as follows. It is true that the Tīrthikas state a defining characteristic of the Self separate from the aggregates, but they do not state its defining characteristic after having perceived the 25 Self in its actuality. Rather, through not properly understanding dependent designation, they do not realize, due to their fear, that the Self is merely nominal. Not realizing this, they depart even from conventional reality, and due to their false concepts, they become confused by what is merely spurious inference. Thus confused, they conceptually construct a Self due to their confusion, and they then state its defining characteristic. In the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (MMK 8), Nāgārjuna 30 says that the Self and its substratum are established in mutual dependence on each other; and by saying this, he refutes the above notion of Self in even conventional terms.

It is also said,

It is observed that, in dependence upon a mirror, there is an image of one’s face, but in reality it is not anything at all. 35

Likewise, it is observed that, in dependence upon the aggregates, there is the habitual sense of ‘I,’ but like the image of one’s face, it is not really anything at all.

Without relying on a mirror, the image of one’s face is not seen; so too, without relying on the aggregates, ‘I’ am not seen.

Since the above has already been stated, I will not labor to demonstrate this point here. 40

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Imbued with the error of ignorance, beings obsessively apprehend the Self, and the focus of that obsessive apprehension is that which is being just dependently designated. Those who seek liberation should examine that focus by asking, “The five aggregates appear to be its substratum; is it then defined by the aggregates or not defined by the aggregates?” Investigating the Self in every way, those seeking liberation do not perceive it in this manner in terms of some essential existence. Hence, for 5 them,

18.2.1. if the Self does not exist, how could the Self-owned (ātmīya) exist?

Since the Self is not perceived, one all the more easily does not perceive the Self-owned, the five aggregates, which are the basis for that designation. That is, if a chariot is burned, then its parts are not perceived because they have been burned. Likewise, when the yogis realize the essencelessness of the 10 Self, just then do they necessarily realize also the essencelessness of those Self-owned entities, the aggregates.

As Nāgārjuna said in the Ratnāvalī:

The aggregates arise from the habitual sense of ‘I’; the habitual sense of ‘I’ is ultimately unreal. How can anything whose seed is unreal be ultimately produced? Seeing that the 15 aggregates are thus unreal, one forsakes the habitual sense of ‘I.’ And since it has been forsaken, the aggregates do not arise again. (RV1.29-30)5

In the summer, the final month’s midday sun, wishing to climb to the middle of a cloudless sky, wavers slightly, and its blazing rays, intent on searing the rough and dry earth, are like the spouting flames of an intense fire. Perceiving the rays of the shining sun, and focusing on a rough and dry place, 20 people perceive a mirage that looks like water, due to their distorted vision. In those people who are far from it, the mirage induces a cognition, and in that cognition dark blue water appears. The mirage does not, however, induce such a cognition in those who are nearby. Likewise, false entities—namely, the imputations that are the Self and the aggregates—appear to be real to ordinary persons due to their ignorance; living in saṃsāra, they are far from seeing the suchness of the entities that are the Self and 25 the Self-owned in accord with the way those entities are established. To those, however, who dwell near the vision of those entities’ suchness, they do not appear to be real.

As the Master has said,

A form that is viewed from afar is seen clearly by those nearby; if a mirage is actually water, why do those nearby not see it? Those far away who view the world see it to be 30 real just as it is, but being signless like a mirage, it is not seen by those nearby. A mirage seems to be water; but it is not water, nor is it real. Likewise, the aggregates seem to be the Self; but they are not the Self, nor are they even real. (RV1.52-54)

Due to the non-perception of the Self and the Self-owned, the yogi dwells near the vision of the ultimate, and as such, necessarily 35 5 Note here the slippage between the truth value of a statement or belief (i.e., that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is a false belief) and the unreality of that statement of belief (i.e., that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is asat, thus, “unreal”). The problem is that, while it may indeed be the case that no thing can arise from an unreal seed, one might reasonably say that much can come from a false seed. Indeed, even though a series of statements might be false, they may still motivate action — they might even lead to a war.

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18.2.2. he is without ‘mine’ and without the habitual sense of ‘I,’ due to quieting the Self and the Self’s possessions.

The ‘Self’s possessions’ (ātmanīna) are that which aid the Self. In other words, they are the five aggregates, i.e., the Self-owned. The Self is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’; the Self-owned, the aggregates, are the objects of the habitual sense of ‘my’. “Quieting” them means that they do not arise, 5 that they are not perceived. As a result, the yogi becomes one who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’.

«But this yogi who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’ does exist, and inasmuch as he exists, his Self is established, as are his aggregates.»

This is not so, because:

18.3. He who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’ does not exist. If one sees he who 10 lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I,’ then one does not see.

In no way is the essential reality of the Self and aggregates perceived; that being the case, how could some other entity exist such that it would lack ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’? In contrast, one should realize that if one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I,’ then one does not see reality (tattva). As the Blessed One has said, 15

See that the internal is empty! See that the external is empty! Even the one who meditates on emptiness does not exist!

He likewise said,

One who ponders things, thinking, “They are extinguished, fully extinguished,” is a child following a faulty path. 20

Empty things are proclaimed through words: with words it is said, “They are beyond words.”

One who ponders things, thinking, “They are extinguished, fully extinguished,” is one whose mind has not arisen and does not exist.

All mental sophistry (cittavitarkaṇa) is conceptual structuring (prapañca), so know that 25 things are unthinkable.

The Blessed One also said,

The aggregates are essentially empty and void; the Element (dhātu) is essentially empty and void.

Even the one who practices is essentially empty: this is so for the wise, not the childish. 30

And hence,

18.4 . Internally and externally, when [the thoughts] “I” and “my” have ceased, appropriation (upādāna) ceases. Through the cessation of appropriation, birth ceases.

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According to the sūtras, the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self is the root of all afflictive mental states, it is their origin, their cause. Through the nonperception of the Self and the Self-owned, one eliminates the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. Through eliminating that belief, one eliminates the four kinds of appropriation, namely, the appropriation of desire, views, ascetic vows, and Self-oriented philosophies. And from eliminating appropriation comes the end of 5 birth, defined as repeated existence in saṃsāra (punarbhava). The process of stopping birth is established in this fashion, and therefore it is established that

18.5.1. through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation.

This is so because, when one has eliminated appropriation, there is no more saṃsāric existence, which has appropriation as its causal condition. And if saṃsāric existence has been stopped, how could 10 birth, decay, death and so on occur? Thus, it is established that through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation.

«What, then, is that thing due to the cessation of which karma and afflictive states also cease? You should say what it is.»

We respond: 15

18.5.2. Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptuality (vikalpa), and that comes from conceptual structuring (prapañca). Conceptual structuring, however, ceases in emptiness.

This is so because afflictive mental states such as desire arise in one who, as a childish, ordinary person, is improperly conceptualizing material form and so on. As Nāgārjuna will explain: 20

It is said that attachment, aversion, and confusion come from conceptuality because they arise in dependence on the beautiful, the ugly, and error. (MMK 23.1)

And it is also said in a sūtra,

Desire, I know your root: you are born from conceptuality. No longer will I conceptualize you, and thus, you will no longer be in me. 25

In this manner, karma and afflictive mental states, first of all, come from concepts. And the concepts arise from various kinds of conceptual structuring to which one has become conditioned throughout one’s beginningless saṃsāric existence. Those various kinds of conceptual structuring include: knowledge and the known object; linguistic referent and linguistic expression; agent, object, instrument and action; pot, lot, cot and tot;6 material form and sensation; female and male; gain and 30 loss; happiness and suffering; fame and obscurity; praise and blame; and so on. All of these worldly conceptual structures cease in emptiness; that is, they cease when one sees that all things are empty of essence. How so? Because the aforementioned web of conceptual structuring occurs [only] if one perceives a real thing. This is so because, for example, desirous men do not perceive a barren women’s daughter to be elegantly beautiful and youthful, and so they do not cause conceptual structuring to 35 6 The actual examples here are ghaṭa (“water-pot”), paṭa (“cloth”), mukuṭa (“diadem”) and ratha (“chariot). The point of this litany is simply that the words contain similar sounds in Sanskrit; thus, one form of mental elaboration consists merely in the association of sounds in one word with the sounds in another, or to put it another way, the babble of language.

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occur with her as an object. And without focusing conceptual structuring on that object, they do not focus distorted (ayoniśaḥ) conceptuality on that object. And without focusing a web of concepts on that object, those men do not produce the host of afflictive mental states, whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi, from the imagined determination of “I” and “My.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states, which have the nature of satkāyadṛṣṭi, they do not engage in virtuous, nonvirtuous or 5 immutable karmic actions. And without doing karmic actions, they do not experience the jungle of saṃsāra, that single web of the grief, wailing, suffering, distress and confusion that comes from birth, aging and death. In the same manner, Yogis in the state of seeing emptiness do not perceive an essential reality of the aggregates, extensions or elements. Not perceiving an essential reality of things, they do not cause conceptual structuring to occur with them as objects. And without focusing 10 conceptual structures on that object, they do not have concepts about it. And without having concepts, they do not produce the host of afflictive mental states, whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi, from the imagined determination of “I” and “My.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states beginning with satkāyadṛṣṭi, they do not engage in karmic actions. And not engaging in karmic actions, they do not experience saṃsāra, which is called “birth, decay and death.” Hence, from resorting to emptiness, 15 which is defined as the peace that is the quieting of all conceptual structuring, there comes the elimination of all conceptual structuring, the web of concepts. And due to the elimination of conceptual structuring, concepts cease. And through the cessation of concepts, all karma and afflictive mental states cease. And through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states, birth ceases. Therefore, since it is defined by the cessation of all conceptual structuring, emptiness itself is called, 20 “Nirvāṇa.” As it says in the Four Hundred Verses:

The Transcendent Ones have said that the Dharma is, in short, non-harm, and that emptiness itself is nirvāṇa. In our view, there are only these two. (CŚ 12.23)

In contrast, Master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness as explained above. Instead, he says: 25

The aggregates are a mere collection of conditioned entities that arise in one moment and cease in the next; they are neither the Self nor the Self-owned. Scrutinizing that collection of entities in that fashion, a saintly śrāvaka has the realization, “Since there is no entity that is called a “Self,” what is born and dies is merely elements (dharma).” That is to say, the Self is the object of I-making, and when the Self is [known to be] 30 nonexistent, then I-making will not occur. And just by virtue of the absence of that, My-making does not make any sense with regard to any internal or external thing. Hence, except for a conventional designation, [on the part of the saintly śrāvaka] there is no determination of something in its real nature that is an “I” devoid of I-making and My-making. How much more so is the case for the great bodhisattvas who, seeing that all 35 conditioned things are unarisen, dwell in the practice of nonconceptual wisdom? And hence, Nāgārjuna says, “One who is my-less and lacks I-making does not exist.”

In Encountering Madhyamaka, I have already explained how it is that this master is not following Master Nāgārjuna in regard to this issue. I presented my critique in the passage beginning, “And at the

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stage called ‘Far Advanced,’ he will surpass them in intelligence as well.”7 Hence, I will not go to the effort of critiquing him again now.

On the same issue in the Eight Thousand Lines on the Perfection of Wisdom, the Blessed One said:

Subhūti, one who wishes to awaken to a śrāvaka’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom. Subhūti, one who wishes to awaken to a pratyekabuddha’s 5 awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom And Subhūti, the great bodhisattva who wishes to awaken to complete and perfect awakening should practice this Perfection of Wisdom.

And he also said:

“I will become a Sugata’s śrāvaka!”; or “I will become a pratyekabuddha!”; or “I will 10 be a Dharma King!”: one who wishes to do such things cannot succeed,

If he does not resort to this tolerance, just as one cannot cross the river if one fails to see the ford.

At this point, someone objects, «Suppose it has been established that suchness (tattva) is the nonoccurrence of conceptual webs concerning the internal or external as “I” and “My,” and that this 15 nonoccurrence comes about due to the nonperception of external and internal things. If that is the case, then how does it not contradict this statement by the Blessed One:

The Self is the Self’s savior; what other protector could there be? For it is through a well tamed Self that the wise reach heaven.

The Self is the Self’s savior; what other protector could there be? For the Self is the 20 witness to one’s deeds, good and bad.

And in the King of Samādhi, he said:

Positive and negative karma does not just disappear. Having been done by one’s Self, it will be experienced by one’s Self. One does not transfer the karmic result to someone else, nor does it occur causelessly. 25

How are the above statements, which go on at length, not contradicted by your position?» We respond as follows. Is it not so that the Blessed One also said this:

There is neither a being nor a Self here, but there are elemental things with their causes.

And did he not likewise say:

7 MAV 1.8cd. Translation by Huntington (1989:150). The gist of the argument in Candrakīrti’s commentary on this verse is that if it takes until the seventh stage for a bodhisattva to exceed a śrāvaka in intelligence, and if a bodhisattva at the first stage (where emptiness has been directly realized) is already superior to the śrāvakas in some other regard, then the distinction between bodhisattvas and śrāvakas cannot be that the former has a more extensive realization (i.e., they realize the essencelessness of things), whereas the śrāvakas have a less extensive realization (i.e., they realize only the essencelessness of persons, but not of things).

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The Self is not material form, and the Self is not that which possesses material form. The Self is not in material form, nor is material form in the Self. …The Self is not consciousness, nor is the Self that which possesses consciousness. The Self is not in consciousness, nor is consciousness in the Self.

And did he not also say that all things are Selfless? But how then could there be no contradiction 5 between these passages and the preceding passages? Hence, we should seek the intention of the Blessed One’s teaching in these contexts.

The blessed buddhas are like never-setting suns intent on making the host of lotuses that are the disciples’ minds bloom with the extensive sunbeams that are their great compassion, methods and awareness. In general in their sayings, which are divided into the definitive and the interpretable, 10

18.6.1 . the buddhas have used the label, “Self,” and they have also taught, “the Selfless.”

The intention here is as follows. In some persons, the eye of the intellect is entirely covered by the thick cataracts of inferior theories that are mistaken about the unreality of the Self and the Selfless. Hence, they do not see the various things of the world, even though those things are not beyond the 15 scope of pure worldly vision. While established within just conventional reality, they are intent on describing the names, elements and measures of “earth,” “water,” “fire,” and “wind.” They thus say that minds have just arisen from the mere ripening of the elements in the embryo and so on, like the perceptions that come from an intoxicant with a special intoxicating and stupefying capacity that is caused by its production from the mere ripening of certain substances, such as roots, grain mush, a 20 leavening agent, and so on. Doing so, they deny what has come before and what will come next, and denying that, they reject the next world and the Self by saying things such as, “This world does not exist, nor does the next. There is no such thing as the maturation of the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds. There is no such thing as spontaneously born beings.” Through these denials, they reject what leads to a certain kind of result, namely, the distinctive and desired result that is heaven or 25 emancipation. As such, they are always and constantly engaged in conditioning themselves with nonvirtuous karmic acts. Thus, they are headed for a fall into the great chasm of hell and so on.

In order to eliminate those beings’ false view, the buddhas conform to the mindset (āśaya) of each world of beings which are of eighty-four thousand different kinds in terms of beings’ minds and behavior. Doing so, the buddhas are intent upon fulfilling their promise to uplift every world of beings, 30 and they do so fully equipped with wisdom, method and great compassion. The peerless friends of many worlds (jagad), the great kings among healers, they entirely cure the enormous sickness that is the negative mental states. These buddhas desire to care for disciples of inferior, middling and great capacities. Hence, for the inferior disciples who are engaged in nonvirtuous karmic deeds, the blessed buddhas in some cases make it known in the world, “It is so—there is a Self”; they do this so as to turn 35 those disciples away from nonvirtue and so on. There is also an argument to refute those who reject causality, and this can be learned in detail from the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (i.e., Chapter 8, above) and also from the Encountering Madhyamaka. Hence, I will not make any further effort here for the sake of refuting that view.

Some disciples, however, are like birds bound with a cord that is tough—due to the difficulty of 40 the belief in a real Self—and very long—due the love of “I” and “My.” Even though they fly far, and even though they engage in positive karmic acts and shun negative ones, being bound with that cord

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they are still unable to pass beyond the Three Dimensions and obtain peaceful nirvāṇa, where there is neither decay nor death. For these middling disciples—so as to cool their attachment to the belief that the transient collection of mind and body is a real Self, and so as to engender within them a yearning for nirvāṇa—the blessed buddhas, wishing to take care of those disciples, taught, “There is no Self.”

There is, however, a seed that is an intense aspiration for the profound dharma—an interest 5 obtained through the distinctive qualities that come from previous habituation. In some disciples, that seed has ripened and they have drawn close to nirvāṇa. These excellent disciples are devoid of Self-love, and they have the capacity to plumb the depths of the actual meaning of the king of sage’s highest, deep words. Having determined that these disciples have that distinctive aspiration,

18.6.2. so too, the buddhas have taught, “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at 10 all.”

Just as the view that there is a Self is not ultimately true (atattva), so too its opposite—the view that there is no Self—is also not ultimately true. In this way, they taught that there is neither any Self, nor any non-Self whatsoever. This is as it says in the Āryaratnakūṭa:

Kāśyapa, “Self” is one extreme, and “Selflessness” is a second extreme. The middle that 15 is between these two extremes is cannot be indicated (arūpya), it cannot be shown. It has neither location nor appearance. It cannot be represented, it cannot be marked. Kāśyapa, it is called the middle way, the true discernment of things.

And in the Ratnāvalī it says,

In this way, neither Self nor non-Self is ultimately perceived just as it is. Therefore, the 20 Great Sage refuted both the belief in Self and in non-Self.

As for what one sees, hears, and so on, the Sage did not call them either real or unreal, because from a thesis comes its antithesis. Thus, neither is real. (RV2.3-4)

In this way, due to the various intentions of lesser, middling and excellent disciples, the teaching of the blessed buddhas’ dharma occurred in such a way as to negate the Self, or to negate non-Self, or 25 to negate both. Therefore, there Mādhyamikas do not contradict the scriptures.

It is for this reason that Āryadeva said,

At first, one refutes the absence of virtue. Next one refutes the Self. Last one refutes all. The one who knows this is wise. (CŚ8.15)

Likewise, the Master said, 30

A grammarian will make some students recite even the alphabet. Likewise, the Buddha taught the Dharma in accord with his disciples’ abilities.

The Dharma he taught to some is for the purpose of stopping negativity. To some, it is aimed at the practice of virtue. And to some, he taught one that is based upon duality.

He taught to some a Dharma not based on duality. And to some, he taught a profound 35 Dharma that terrifies the timid; its essence is wisdom and compassion, and it is the

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means to attain awakening. (RV4.94-96)

Alternatively, another meaning [of MMK18.6] is as follows. Some thinkers such as the Sāṃkhyas perceive that, in the case that karmic imprints (saṃskāra) go out of existence every moment, there is no relation between karmic acts and their results. Perceiving this, these thinkers posit a Self [so as to provide some basis for that relation]. The Lokāyatas, on the other hand, through their reasoning see no 5 Self that would be an agent of continuity [from one life to the next]. Hence, they assert that there is no Self. They do so with statements such as,

There is a person just to the extent that there is an object of the senses. Oh Bhadrā, this is what the learned say, and it is a jackal’s foot.

But just as those without cataracts do not at all see the hairs, flies and so on that are perceived by 10 those with cataracts, so too the buddhas do not at all see any real entity (vastusvarūpa) such as a “self,” or a “non-self” that is imagined by childish persons. Not seeing such things,

[18.6.2] so too, the buddhas have taught, “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all.”

As it says in the Tathāgataguhyasūtra, 15

And so, the bodhisattva Śāntamati said this to the Blessed One. “Oh Blessed One, it has been said, ‘pacification, pacification.’ But what is this

‘pacification’? And from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One answered, “Good sir, the term ‘pacification’ is a synonym for the

pacification of the negative mental states. The ‘pacification of the negative mental 20 states’ is a synonym for the pacification of ideas, concepts, and conceptual constructions. The ‘pacification of ideas, concepts, and conceptual constructions’ is a synonym for the pacification of recognition and mentation (manasikāra). The ‘pacification of recognition and mentation’ is a synonym for the pacification of error. The ‘pacification of error’ is a synonym for the pacification of causes and perceptual 25 conditions. The ‘pacification of causes and perceptual conditions’ is a synonym for the pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence. The ‘pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence’ is a synonym for the pacification of I-making and My-making. The ‘pacification of I-making and My-making’ is a synonym for the pacification of eternalism and annihilationism. The ‘pacification of eternalism and annihilationism’ is a 30 synonym for the pacification of the belief that the transient constituents of mind and body constitute an essential Self. Therefore, Śāntamati, some negative mental states occur in a way that is connected to the belief in perceptual conditions and causes; all those negative mental states arise from the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Through pacifying the belief in the transient constituents as 35 the Self, all beliefs are pacified. Through the pacification of all beliefs, all wishing (praṇidhāna) is pacified. And through the pacification of all wishing, all negative mental states are pacified. For example, Śāntamati, when a tree’s root is cut, all of its branches, leaves and fruit wither. So too, Śāntamati, by pacifying the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self, all negative mental states are pacified. 40

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Śāntamati, if the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is not recognized, all appropriation and affliction arises. But when the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is recognized, then all appropriation and affliction do not arise, they do not cause harm.”

Śāntamati asked, “But Blessed One, what is the recognition of the belief that the 5 transient constituents constitute an essential Self?”

The Blessed One answered, “Śāntamati, the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is the non-occurrence (asamutthāna) of the Self; it is the non-occurrence of beings, it is the non-occurrence of a living thing, it is the non-occurrence of a person, it is the non-occurrence of views. Such is the 10 recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Moreover, Śāntamati, that belief is not located internally, nor is it located externally. That belief is not located at all. Śāntamati, to recognize the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is to know that this unlocated view has no location. Śāntamati, the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents 15 constitute an essential Self is a synonym for emptiness. Śāntamati, the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is also the fact that, through the tolerance conducive to emptiness, one does not apprehend that belief. Śāntamati, as for “transient constituents,” through the view of emptiness, of signlessness, of wishlessness, of non-conditioning, of the unknown, of non-20 occurrence—through this view, one does not apprehend that belief. This too, Śāntamati, is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Śāntamati, the “transient constituents” are not constituents. They do not come together, they do not adhere; they do not come apart; they do not accumulate, they do not conglomerate. From the very beginning, they are unreal, they are imagined. And what 25 is unreal and imagined, that is not imagined, it is not conceptualized. What is not imagined and not conceptualized, that is not made, it is not put together, it is not made to occur, it is not determinately known. That is what is called “peace.”

Śāntamati said, “Oh Blessed One, it has been said, ‘pacified, pacified.’ But from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” 30

The Blessed One said, “Through perceptual objects (ārambana), the mind burns. The one that does not repeatedly take perceptual objects does not burn. Not burning it is said to be pacified. For example, Śāntamati, fire burns in dependence on its fuel, but without depending on its fuel, it stops. So too, due to perceptual objects, the mind burns, but without perceptual objects, it stops. In this regard, Śāntamati, the bodhisattva with 35 skill in means, the one who is purified by the perfection of wisdom, that bodhisattva knows the pacification of all perceptual objects, yet he does not pacify the perception of the root of virtue.

At this point, someone says, «If the blessed buddhas taught neither ‘Self’ nor ‘not-Self,’ then what did they teach?» 40

We respond:

18.7. When the mental object has ceased, that which is to be named has ceased. Like nirvāṇa, the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen, unceased.

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Here, if there were some real thing to be named, then that would be taught. But when that which is to be named has ceased—that is, when there is no object of words—then the buddhas do not teach anything at all. Why has that which is to be named ceased? Nāgārjuna says, “when the mental object has ceased….” Mental object (cittagocara) means an object of the mind (cittasya gocaraḥ). An object (gocara) is an object (viṣaya); in other words, it is a perceptual object (ārambaṇa). If there were some 5 object of the mind, then through the attribution of some semantic sign (nimitta) to it, words would apply to it. But when it makes no sense for there to be an object of the mind, then to what would a semantic sign be attributed such that words would refer to it?

Demonstrating why it is that there is no mental object, Nāgārjuna says, “Like nirvāṇa, the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen, unceased.” Like nirvāṇa, the dharmatā—that is, the essence of things 10 (dharmasvabhāva), the nature of things (dharmaprakṛti)—is established to be unarisen, unceased. That being the case, the mind does not engage with it. And when the mind is not engaged, how can there be the attribution of a semantic sign? And since there is no semantic sign, how could words refer? Therefore, it remains entirely the case that the buddhas did not teach anything at all. For this very reason, Nāgārjuna will say [at 25.4], 15

Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama), the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere.

Such is indeed the case. There might be, however, another objection: «It has been said [at 18.5], “Conceptual structuring,

however, ceases in emptiness.” But how is there the cessation of conceptual structuring in emptiness?» 20 Our response is as in the one given just above, namely, “When the mental object has ceased, that

which is to be named has ceased,” and so on. And there is yet another interpretation of the verse (atha vā). Someone objects, «Previously, it was

said that, in this context, the ultimate (tattva) is the complete elimination of I-making and My-making, both internally and externally, through the nonperception of any external or internal real thing. But 25 what kind of thing is this ultimate? Can it be expressed or known?»

Therefore, Nāgārjuna says, “When the mental object has ceased, that which is to be named has ceased.” In this phrase, what must be supplied is “in the ultimate” (tattve). But in this regard, why is it that what is to be named has ceased in the ultimate? Why is it that the mental object has ceased in the ultimate? Nāgārjuna says, “Like nirvāṇa, the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen, unceased.” The 30 explanation of this line as given before should be added here.

For this reason, the Tathāgataguhyasūtra says,

Śāntamati, one night the Tathāgata awoke to complete awakening, and one night the Tathāgata, no longer appropriating [the aggregates], will pass into final nirvāṇa. Between these two nights, the Tathāgata never uttered even a single syllable. The 35 Tathāgata never spoke a single syllable, nor will the Tathāgata do so. How, then, did the Blessed One give various kinds of dharma-teachings to all gods, demigods, humans, humanoids (kinnara), adepts, sorcerers (vidyādhara), and so on. Through uttering just an instant of speech, there arises a great light like the autumn sun. That light banishes the mental darkness of this and that being; it makes blossom a forest of many different 40 kinds of lotus-minds; it dries up the ocean of decay and death; and it embarrassingly outshines the mass of rays that come from the seven suns which cause the fire in the eon

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of destruction.

Likewise, the sūtra says,

Moved by the wind, mechanical chimes are caused to make a sound. There is no speaker here, and yet sounds still come forth.

Likewise, due to previous purification, the Buddha’s speech comes forth when moved 5 by the aspirations of all beings, but in doing so, the Buddha has no conceptuality.

Echoed sounds are not located either internally or externally; so too, the speech of the Lord of Men is not located internally or externally.

It also says,

For instructing the gods there is a divine drum; it is made by the ripening of the gods’ 10 karma. A god having known that he was in a state of heedlesness, the sound of the drum descends from the sky:

“All desirable things are impermanent, not eternal! They are unstable, perishable; by nature they are but froth. They alike illusions and mirages; they are the moon’s reflection in water! All things have the nature of a dream!” 15

The drum that has resounded proceeds with Śakra and the gods to the dharma-gathering, and for the gods it gives a dharma-talk that leads to peace and freedom from lust.

Likewise, the Āryasamādhirāja also says:

When the Buddha has become the Dharma-King, the sage who elucidates all dharmas, then in the grasses and the thickets, in the trees and among the herbs, in the peaks and 20 the crags there will be the sound, “Things do not exist.”

Then each of the world’s sounds, every one of them, is unreal; not one is real. To that same extent flows forth the melodious sound of the Transcendent One, he who disciplines the world.

And so on and so forth. Likewise, it is said: 25

From a single of your sounds flows forth, for the sake of the world, a sound for beings of various inclinations. To each the Victor has said something different. But he has spoken with a smile for the sake of what is relevant.

At this point, some raise the following objection. «The Mādhyamikas are nothing but nihilists because they say that all virtuous and non-virtuous karmic actions, the agent of those actions, the result 30 and also the entire world—all these are empty of nature. Nihilists also say, “This does not exist!” Therefore, Mādhyamikas are none other than nihilists.»

This is not so. Why? Because Mādhyamikas hold the theory of interdependence. They describe this entire world and all future ones as essenceless because those worlds come into being relying upon—depending upon—causes and conditions. The nihilists do not realize in this way that the next 35 world and so on do not exist in the sense that the next world and such are empty of real essence

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because they are interdependent. Instead, they perceive the various things of this world as essentially [real], and they do not see those things as having come from another world or as proceeding to the next world. Seeing things in this way, they incorrectly deny (apavāda) those other things which are similar to the things that they have perceived in this world.

«Nevertheless, their philosophy is similar to yours because they realize the nonexistence of that 5 which does not exist with the essence of a real thing.» This is not so. How so? Mādhyamikas accept that things exist in conventional terms, but the nihilists do not. Therefore, there is no similarity.

«They are the same in terms of the notion that things are not really established.» Although the position that things are not established really is the same, the philosophies are not the

same because of the difference in the one who is knowing things as not really established. For example, 10 consider the case in which one person does not actually know that another person has committed a robbery, but spurred on by his enmity toward that person, he falsely says, “He committed the robbery!” Another person, however, being a direct witness, accuses him. In this case, there is no difference in reality concerning whether or not a robbery was committed. Nevertheless, there is a difference in terms of the ones who are knowing whether that is the case; therefore, one is called a liar, while the other is 15 said to be speaking the truth. When properly investigated, one person will be besmirched by calumny and nonvirtue, but the other will not. Likewise, in the present context, the nature of things is properly (yathāvad) known by Mādhyamikas, who speak about it and understand it. As such, even though there is no difference in terms of the nature of things, there is no similarity—in terms of knowing and speaking—between them and the nihilists, who do not properly know the nature of things. The masters 20 of old (pūrvācārya) maintain that, even though the deliberate equanimity and non-deliberate equanimity of the Arhat and the ordinary person are similar in that they are both equanimity, there is nevertheless a great difference between them, just as there is a great difference between a person born blind and sighted person, even though they are similarly restricted to being in a particular place such as a treacherous precipice. In this same way, there will also be a difference between Mādhyamikas and 25 nihilists.

But enough with this excursus! Now I will discuss just the topic at hand. At this point, someone says, «It may be that Like nirvāṇa, the essence of things (dharmatā) is

unarisen, unceased, and that neither words nor thought engages with the essence of things. Nevertheless, if it is not taught, people will not be able to know it. Therefore, in order to introduce the 30 disciples to the essence of things, there must be some sequential teaching of it in dependence on conventional reality. So, say what that teaching is!»

We respond: behold and know the blessed buddhas’ sequential teaching for introducing disciples to the deathless nectar of the ultimate:

18.8. The sequential teaching (anuśāsana) of the Buddha is this: “Everything is real in 35 itself” (tathya); and also “Everything is unreal in itself” (atathya); “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself”; “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself.”

Concerning this verse, the following verses merit mentioning:

One should first engage with whatever is pleasant for the [audience], because one who has been harmed cannot at all be an appropriate vessel for the holy dharma. 40

[And]:

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The barbarian (mleccha) cannot understand when addressed in another language; likewise, the world cannot understand without what is worldly.

In the same vein, in a scripture the Blessed One said, “The world argues with me, but I do not argue with the world. Whatever is considered to be existent in the world is, for me, also considered to be existent. Whatever is considered to be not existent in the world is, for me, also considered to be not 5 existent.” Thus, there are beings to be disciplined who have desires that come from hearing about the analysis of different kinds of things that are well known to them—things such as the “aggregates,” the “spheres,” the “extensions” and so on that are imagined to be real by those who have the cataracts of ignorance. For those beings, at the very outset the Blessed One, in relation to their philosophy, taught that those things that they have perceived are real in themselves. He did so in order to make the world 10 respect him, as when they think, “The Blessed One, who knows the entire history of the world, is omniscient, he is all-seeing. He has unerringly taught the arisal, abiding, dissolution and so on of both the vessel-like world and the beings within it—everything up through the peak of existence, beginning with the wind-sphere all the way out to the elemental realm of space. He has taught them along with their widely varied varieties, their causes and results, their enjoyments and miseries.” 15

In this way, in beings to be disciplined there arises the belief (buddhi) that the Blessed One is omniscient. Later, he teaches those beings, “And also everything is unreal itself.” In this regard, that which is real in itself does not undergo change. And conditioned things do undergo change because they perish every instant. Therefore, since change occurs, they are unreal in themselves. Here, one should see that the word vā (“or”) occurs with the meaning of ca (“and”) in the sense of a 20 demonstrative conjunction (deśanāsamuccaya). Thus, the verse means, “Everything is real in itself;” and also “Everything is unreal in itself.”

To some disciples, he taught, “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself.” That is, in relation to childish beings, everything is real in itself. But in relation to the Āryas, everything is false (mṛṣā) because they do not perceive anything in that way [i.e., as real in itself]. 25

Some disciples, however, have for a long time studied and practiced the philosophy of the ultimate (tattvadarśana), and in their case only some small amount of the root of the tree that is the obscurations has not yet been uprooted. To them he taught, “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself.” In order to eliminate that small degree of obscuration, both of these possibilities are rejected, just as one would reject the question of whether the son of a barren woman has a light or dark 30 complexion.

Such is the sequential teaching of the Buddha. It is a “teaching” (śāsana) in that it leads one away from the wrong path and sets one on the right path. A teaching that proceeds step by step is a “sequential teaching” (anuśāsana). Or, a “sequential teaching” is one that proceeds in accord with the disciple’s nature. 35

The Blessed Ones have great compassion, and they know the methods to use; all of their teachings are designed as means to introduce beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate (tattva). Indeed, the Transcendent Ones do not utter any statement that is not a method for introducing beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate. Like a doctor who treats an illness with the medicine that is appropriate to it, they teach a Dharma that is appropriate to the disciples out of a desire to care for the 40 disciples.

As it says in the Four Hundred Verses:

They said: “Real”; “Unreal”; “Real and Unreal”; and “Neither.”

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In relation to an illness, is everything medicine?

«The Blessed Ones give a teaching of the ultimate in order to introduce beings to it, but what is the definition of this ultimate?»

We have already said:

When the mental object has ceased, that which is to be named has ceased. [18.7ab] 5

If this is the case, then what more is there to ask? «That may be so, but just as with the acceptance of worldly reality (laukikatathya) in accord with

conventional reality, you should also state a definition of it through the use of imputations (samāropataḥ).»

Nāgārjuna says: 10

18.9. Not known through another, quieted, unstructured through conceptual structuring, nonconceptual, non-plural—this is the definition of the ultimate (tattva).

Concerning this verse, “not known through another” means that there is no realization of it through another; that is, it is not to be understood through another’s teaching. In other words, it is to be known (√adhigam) only on one’s own. For example, persons with cataracts see unreal (vitatha) things 15 that have the form of hairs, mosquitoes, flies, and so on. They are unable to know—in the way that persons without cataracts are able to know—the properly construed essential reality (svarūpa) of the hairs by using the procedure (nyāya) of not seeing it. They cannot do so even with the instructions of a person without cataracts. Instead, from the instructions of the person without cataracts all that they understand is, “This is false.” But when their eyes have been treated with the ointment that removes 20 cataracts and they no longer have cataracts, they know the essential reality of the hairs and such through the practice (yogena) of not seeing it. Likewise, even though the Āryas teach the ultimate (tattva) through the use of imputations, persons who are not Āryas do not thereby know its essential reality. But the eyes of those persons’ intellects can be treated with the ointment that is the view of emptiness—an ointment that eliminates the cataracts of ignorance. When their intellects’ eyes have 25 been thus treated and the awareness of the ultimate (tattva) has arisen, then they know the ultimate (tattva) on their own through the practice of not knowing it. Thus, the essential reality (svarūpa) of things which is not known through another is their ultimate reality (tattva). And it is of a quieted nature. In other words, it is devoid of an essential nature as when a person without cataracts does not see hairs.

For this same reason, it is “unstructured through conceptual structuring.” Here, “conceptual 30 structuring” is speech because it is what conceptually structures and multiplies the objects to which it refers (prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā). Thus, “unstructured through conceptual structuring” means “not articulated through words.”

And it is also “nonconceptual.” Conceptuality is mental activity (cittapracāra). Since it is devoid of that, the ultimate (tattva) is nonconceptual. As it says in a sūtra, “Which is the ultimate reality? It is 35 the one in terms of which there is no activation even of awareness (jñānasyapy apracāra). What need, then, to mention words?” In this way, it is nonconceptual.

That which has a diverse referent (artha) is plural; its referent is divided into multiple things. That which is not plural is non-plural. In other words, its referent is not differentiated. As it says in the Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra: 40

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Then Devaputra said, “Mañjuśrī, which one is true application (saṃyakprayoga)?”

Mañjuśrī answered, “Devaputra, reality in itself (tathatā), the Dharmadhātu and utter non-production are ultimately the same in some way; the five heinous crimes are ultimately the same in that way. The five heinous crimes are the same in some way; the theoretical constructs are the same in that way. The theoretical constructs are the same 5 in some way; the qualities of ordinary persons are the same in that way. The qualities of ordinary persons are the same in some way; the qualities of the learners (śaikṣadharma) are the same in that way. The qualities of the learners are the same in some way; the qualities of those beyond learning are the same in that way. The qualities of those beyond learning are the same in some way; the qualities of a fully awakened buddha are 10 the same in that way. The qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in some way; nirvāṇa is the same in that way. Nirvāṇa is the same in some way; saṃsāra is the same in that way. Saṃsāra is the same in some way; mental affliction is ultimately the same in that way. Mental affliction is ultimately the same in some way; purification is ultimately the same in that way. Purification is ultimately the same in some way; all 15 things are ultimately the same in that way. The monk (bhikṣu) who has applied himself in this way to the equality of all things is said to be ‘truly applied.’

Devaputra said, “It is in terms of which equality that all things are ultimately the same in that way that purification is ultimately the same.”

Mañjuśrī said: “All things are ultimately the same in not being produced; all things are 20 ultimately the same in being utterly unproduced; ultimately all things are the same in being nonexistent; thus, Devaputra, in terms of these equalities, all things are ultimately the same. Why is that? Because, on the basis of them being utterly unproduced, all things are without pluralization. For example, Devaputra, the space inside of an earthen vessel and the space inside of a jewel vessel are just the space element. Ultimately, the 25 space should not be pluralized. Likewise, Devaputra, affliction is ultimately utter non-production. Also, purification is ultimately utter non-production. Saṃsāra is also ultimately utter non-production. [And the pattern continues] on up to nirvāṇa, which is also ultimately utter non-production. Here, there is ultimately no plurality at all. Why? Because ultimately all things are utterly unproduced.” 30

One should realize that this non-plurality is a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the ultimate (tattva) because in terms of emptiness it is of one flavor. Successive later explanations should be understood to apply here.

For the Āryas who have done what needs to be done so as to eliminate the saṃsāric cycle of birth decay and death, such is the character of the ultimate (tattvalakṣaṇa). However, in terms of a worldly 35 definition of the ultimate (tattva), the following is said:

18.10. That (x) which exists depending on this (y) is not itself this (y), nor is that (x) something other than this (y). Therefore, this (y) is neither annihilated nor eternal.

That effect arises depending on this cause—for example, a sprout of rice arises in dependence on a rice-seed and the causal complex consisting of soil and so on. Concerning that effect, it is not possible 40

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to say, “That is itself this.” That which is the seed is not itself the sprout because one would unacceptably conclude that the productive cause and the produced effect were identical. And as a result, a father and his son would also be identical. And since they would not be different, one would apprehend a seed even in the state of being a sprout, just as one apprehends a sprout in that case. Or else, just as one does not apprehend a seed in that context, one would also not apprehend the sprout. 5 And the seed would likewise be permanent because one would have accepted that it is not destroyed when the sprout comes into being. Therefore, one would be forced into eternalism, and a whole host of great problems would ensue because one would be forced to accept the nonexistence of karmic cause and effect, and so on. Hence, first of all, it does not make sense to say, “That which is the seed is itself the sprout.” 10

Nor is that (x) something other than this (y). That is, the sprout is not other than the seed because one would have to conclude that the sprout could arise even without the seed. This is so for the reason expressed in: “If the one were other than the other, then the one would exist even without the other.” One would be forced to accept that the seed was not annihilated even in the context of the sprout being already produced. Therefore, one would incur the faults of pre-existent causality (satkāryavāda). 15 Hence, for these reasons, the cause in dependence on which an effect arises is not itself the effect. Nor is the effect something other than the cause. Therefore, one can establish that the cause is not annihilated, and also that it is not eternal.

As Āryadeva said:

Since a thing occurs, it is not born annihilated. Since a thing ceases, it is not born 20 eternal. (CŚ 10.25)

And in the Lalitavistarasūtra, it says:

For example, a sprout comes from an existent seed, but the seed is not itself the sprout. Nor is it something other than that. In this way, the nature of things (dharmatā) is neither annihilated nor eternal. 25

Thus, in the manner that has been explained:

18.11. Not singular, not plural; not annihilated, not eternal—such is the deathless nectar that is the teaching of the buddhas, the world’s saviors.

The perfectly awakened ones are intent upon relieving the intense, burning suffering of birth, decay and death that beats down upon the world from the intensely blazing sun that is involvement in 30 the host of negative mental states such as desire. They thus entirely cover every single region throughout all space with the great cloud that is the method of their great compassion. They constantly and tirelessly send forth streams of the nectar that is the teaching of the true dharma that appropriately counteracts being’s behavior. With those streams of the teaching’s nectar, they wish to nurture in appropriate ways the rapid growth arisen in the grain, fruits and blossoming vines that are the crop 35 from the disciples’ root of virtue. They thus rain down great rains of the deathless nectar that is the true dharma, and as such, these perfect buddhas are great Nāgas who grant worldly protection to the unprotected and provide shelter to those who are homeless. These lords of the whole world have a deathless nectar that is the true dharma; it is by nature the extinction of all the suffering of existence

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(bhava) in the three worlds. One should realize that, in the manner described, it is devoid of either singularity or differentiation; it is devoid of either eternalism or nihilism

The śrāvakas who have practiced that deathless nectar—the Dharma’s quintessence—and who proceed through the sequence of learning, contemplating and meditating, have experienced the taste of the nectar that is the three collections of morality (śīla), meditation and wisdom. Hence, they definitely 5 have the realization (adhigama) of that nirvāṇa whose nature is the extinction of decay and death. If even though they have listened to this dharma-nectar, they somehow do not obtain liberation in a way visible in this life (dṛṣta eva dharme) because their root of virtue is not matured, they nevertheless will certainly achieve the definite accomplishment of liberation in another life due to the previous causes that they have established in this life. 10

As it says in the Hundred,

Even if the one who knows reality does not attain nirvāṇa in this life, He will certainly obtain effortlessly in a future life, like karma.

And somehow,

18.12.1. Even if the awakened ones have not arisen in the world and the śrāvakas have 15 disappeared,

then there would be no realization of the nectar that is the Dharma’s quintessence because the conditions would be lacking, that is, there would be no Spiritual Friends who teach the saintly path of the truths. Nevertheless, caused by their study of the Dharma’s quintessence in another, previous life, the self arisen 20

18.12.2. knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas continues without social contact.

And this is so even though they do not resort to a teacher in this life or world, and rely on the causal condition that is just their devotion to isolation. To be “without contact” is to be isolated in body and mind, or it means that one does not seek out a Spiritual Friend. Thus, by reason of not being in social contact, the pratyekabuddhas have the realization of the Dharma’s quintessence even when there is no 25 Buddha [whose teaching is active in the world]. Hence, one should realize that it is not pointless to employ this medicine—the nectar which is the true Dharma’s quintessence—that has been taught by the perfectly awakened one, the great king of healers.

Since that is the case, it is proper for the wise to seek out the true Dharma’s quintessence, even at the risk of their lives. Along these lines, the Blessed One recounted the following in the blessed and 30 holy Eight Thousand Lines:

Subhūti asked, “How, Blessed One, did that great being, the bodhisattva called Ever Weeping (Sadāprarudita), seek out the Perfection of Wisdom?”

Thus addressed, the Blessed One answered the elder, Subhūti. “Previously, Subhūti, that great being, the bodhisattva Ever Weeping sought out the Perfection of 35 Wisdom without any interest in his body, without regard for his life, without concern for gain, favor or fame. Seeking out the Perfection of Wisdom, he entered a forest and he heard sound come from the sky. Go to the east, good child! There will you here the Perfection of Wisdom! Go in such a way that you do not think of physical exhaustion.

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Go such that you do not think of fatigue and drowsiness. Go such that you do not think of food.”

The passage continues to the point where it says:

Go such that you do not direct your mind to anything at all, whether internal or external. Go without looking to your left, good child, and go without looking to the right. Go 5 without looking south, east, west; north, up or down. Look not also in the intermediate directions [such as southeast and so on]. Good child, go in such a way that you are not thrown off balance by your self, nor lose your balance and leave this transient assemblage. Go such that you do not lose your balance and leave physical matter, nor sensation, nor recognition, nor conditioning, nor consciousness. One who loses his 10 balance and leaves these behind is one who distances himself. Distances himself away from what? Distances himself from a buddha’s qualities. And one who distances himself from a buddha’s qualities is engaged in saṃsāra. And he who is engaged in saṃsāra does not engage with the Perfection of Wisdom, nor will he obtain it.

The tale continues up to the point where [Ever Weeping wishes to keep sprinkling the ground with 15 water for the sake of lessening the dust where a bodhisattva named Dharmodgata is to teach the Perfection of Wisdom. Māra, the evil one, decided to obstruct Ever Weeping by making all the water in that area disappear. Then, at this point, we rejoin the tale] at the point where Māra has made the water disappear:

Ever Weeping thought, “Well, I will just pierce my body and sprinkle this area of 20 the ground with my blood. Why? Because this place is very dusty, and particles of dust from this area should not land on the body of that great being, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. What, in any case, will I do with this body, which by nature necessarily disintegrates? It is better that my body be destroyed through engaging in this kind of activity, rather than through some type of useless activity. And in life after life in 25 saṃsāra, many thousands of my past bodies have disintegrated as a result of desire or due to desire, but not in these kinds of circumstances.” … Thereupon, the great being, the bodhisattva Ever Weeping grasped a sharp weapon and pierced his body all around, and he sprinkled the ground all around with his own blood.

Then, upon seeing the great being, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata, that great being, 30 the bodhisattva Ever Weeping experienced the kind of pleasure that, for example, is experienced by a Mendicant (bhikṣu) who is absorbed in the first meditative absorption, one who is absorbed in one-pointed concentration. And this was the teaching on the Perfection of Wisdom given by the great being, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: one should realize that the equality (samatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the 35 equality of all things; the freedom (viviktatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due the freedom of all things. The Perfection of Wisdom is unshakeable because all things are unshakeable. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of presumptions because all things are devoid of presumptions. The Perfection of Wisdom is not inflexible because all things are not inflexible. The Perfection of Wisdom has a single flavor because all 40 things have a single flavor. The Perfection of Wisdom is limitless because all things are limitless. The Perfection of Wisdom is unproduced because all things are unproduced.

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The Perfection of Wisdom is without cessation because all things are without cessation. The Perfection of Wisdom is boundless in that space is boundless. And so on to this point: one should realize that the Perfection of Wisdom is not conflated because all things are not conflated. The Perfection of Wisdom is imperceptible because all things are imperceptible. The Perfection of Wisdom is equal in its dissolution because all 5 things are equal in their dissolution. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of motion (niśceṣṭa) because all things are devoid of motion. The inconceivability of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the inconceivability of all things.

19 Analysis of Time

At this point, someone objects, “Things do have an essential existence (svabhāva) because it is the warrant (hetu) for the identification (vijñapti) of the three times. That is, the Blessed One has taught three times: past, present and future; they are based upon what exists (bhāva) for the following reason. 5 A thing’s essential existence (bhāvasvabhāva) that has arisen and then ceased is called, “past.” If having arisen, it has not ceased but still exists, then it is called “present.” And that which has not yet come into existence (alabdhātmabhāva) is “future.” In this way, it is taught that the three times are based upon things’ essential existence. Moreover, those three times exist. Therefore, their foundation, things’ essential existence, also exists.” 10

In response, we say the following. Things’ essential existence would be the warrant for identifying (prajñapti) the three times if the three times that you have theorized (bhavadabhimata) were to exist. But they do not exist, and demonstrating the way that they do not exist, Nāgārjuna says:

19.1. If the present and the future were dependent (apekṣya) on the past, then the present and the future would exist in the past. 15

19.2. If, however, the present and the future do not exist in the past, then would the present and the future be dependent on the past?

19.3. Moreover, without depending on the past, there is no establishment of those two. Therefore, the present and the future do not exist.

19.4. Through this procedure (krama), the remaining two permutations should point out 20 [the nature of triads] such as ‘superior, inferior and middling’ and also the singularity and such [of these ordered triads, etc.].

At this point, someone objects, “Time does exist because it has length [i.e., duration]. That which does not exist has no length, like the horns of a rabbit. And time does have length in terms of measurements such as instant (kṣaṇa), second (lava), hour (muhūrta), daytime, nighttime, complete 25 day (ahorātra), fortnight (pakṣa), month, and year. Therefore, since it has a length, time does exist.”

We respond as follows. If time were to exist, then it would have length, but it does not exist. Since:

19.5 . Nonstatic time is not apprehended, and a static time, which would be apprehended, does not exist. And without being apprehended, how is time identified (prajñapyate)? 30

… Here, someone objects, “It is true that there is no such thing as permanent time that, being distinct

from material form and such, is established by its own essential existence. Instead, time—the referent of the words “instant” and such—is identified in reliance on (upādāya) conditioned entities, such as material form and so on. Therefore, there is no problem [with claiming that time truly exists].” 35

We respond as follows. If this were so, that is,

19.6.1. if time were to depend on an existent thing (bhāva), then how could there be

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time without an existent thing?

You assert, “Time exists in dependence on an existent thing.” If you do so, then if there were no existent thing, time—which is warranted by existent things—would necessarily not exist. Demonstrating this [Nāgārjuna] says:

19.6.2. And there are no existent things at all 5

for reasons that have already been extensively demonstrated and because of refutations that will be stated [later in this text]. So there is not any existent thing. That being the case, for you

19.6.3. How could time exist?

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20 Analysis of Causal Collocation (sāmagrī)

20.1. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect exists in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation?

20.2. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and 5 the effect does not exist in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation?

20.3. If the effect exists in the causal collocation of the cause and conditions, then it would be apprehended there, and it is not apprehended in the causal collocation.

20.4. If the effect does not exist in the collocation of the cause and the conditions, then 10 causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions.

20.5 . If the cause, having contributed its causal [functionality] (hetukaṃ…dattvā), ceases, then the cause has two essences—that which has been contributed, and that which has ceased.

20.6. If the cause were to cease without having contributed its causal [functionality] for 15 the effect, and if the effect has then arisen when the cause has ceased, then the effect is causeless.

20.7. If the effect were to become manifest along with the causal collocation, then it would absurdly follow that the producer and that which is produced are simultaneous.

20.8. If the effect were to become manifest prior to the causal collocation, then the 20 effect, being devoid (nirmukta) of causes and conditions, would be causeless.

Others, however, say, “Only the cause produces the effect; the collocation does not. And since it is not the case that the cause is one thing and the effect another, it does not follow that there would be an absurd consequence whereby one would inquire, ‘Does the cause cease having contributed its causality to the effect or without having done so?’ Rather, the ceased cause itself is established as in essence the 25 effect (phalātmanā).”

We respond as follows. If this were so, that is:

20.9. If, when the cause has ceased, the cause transforms (saṃkramaṇa) into the effect, then one would absurdly conclude that the cause, which has already been produced previously, would be re-produced. 30

20.10. How can a cause that has ceased and disappeared produce an effect that has arisen? And even if the cause remains, how can it produce [anything] without the effect?

20.11.1. If the cause were not involved with the effect, then which effect would it produce? 35

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20.11.2. Neither a cause that is observable produces an effect, nor does one that is unobservable.

20.12. A past effect never meets a past cause, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has arisen.

20.13. An effect that has arisen never does not meet a cause that has not arisen, nor does 5 it meet a cause that is past or one that has arisen.

20.14. An effect that has not arisen never meets a cause that has arisen, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has ceased.

20.15.1. If they never meet, how does the cause produce the effect?

20.15.2. If they do meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 10

20.16. If the cause is empty of the effect, then how does it produce the effect? If cause is not empty of the effect, how does it produce the effect?

20.17. A non-empty effect would not arise, a non-empty effect would not cease. A non-empty effect would be unarisen and unceasing.

20.18. How would an empty [effect] arise, how would an empty [effect] cease? One 15 must absurdly conclude that an empty [effect] is unarisen and unceasing.

20.19. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be identical. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be different.

20.20. If the effect and the cause were identical, then the producer and the produced would be the same. If the effect and the cause were different, then a cause would be the 20 same as a non-cause.

20.21. How would a cause produce an effect that essentially exists? How would a cause produce an effect that does not essentially exist?

20.22.1. [If something] is not producing anything, that it does not make sense for it to be a cause. 25

20.22.2. And if it does not make sense for [the cause] to be a cause, then [the effect] would be the effect of what?

20.23. And the collocation of the cause and conditions does not produce itself by itself. How then would it produce the effect?

20.24. The effect is not made by the causal collocation, nor is the effect not made by the 30 causal collocation. How is there a causal collocation without an effect?

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21 Analysis of Origination and Disintegration

At this point, someone objects, “Time essentially exists because it is a factor (nimitta) in origination and disintegration. That is, it is in terms of some specific time that things such as sprouts originate—i.e., are produced. And it is in terms of some specific time that they disintegrate—i.e., are destroyed. [Origination and destruction do not happen] all the time, even while a collocation of causes 5 and conditions is present. Therefore, time does exist because it is a factor in origination and destruction.”

We respond as follows. Time would be a factor in origination and destruction if origination and destruction existed. However, they do not exist, and demonstrating how this is the case, Nāgārjuna says: 10

21.1. Destruction does not exist either with origination or without it. Origination does not exist either with destruction or without it.

21.2. How could destruction exist without origination? There would be death without birth. There is no destruction without origination.

21.3. How could there be destruction with origination? [We ask] because birth and 15 death are not simultaneous in this way.

21.4. How could there be origination without disintegration? It is never the case that impermanence is not present in things.

21.5. How could there be origination with disintegration? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. 20

21.6. How could there be any establishment of two [things] that are not established as either in mutual relation (anyonya) or not in mutual relation?

21.7. There is no origination of a destructible entity (kṣaya). There is no origination of an indestructible entity. There is no disintegration of a destructible entity; there is no destruction of an indestructible entity. 25

21.8. There is neither origination nor disintegration without a real thing (bhāva); there is no real thing without origination and destruction.

21.9.1. The origination and disintegration of that which is empty does not make sense.

21.9.2. The origination and the disintegration of that which is not empty do not make sense. 30

21.10.1. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are the same.

21.10.2. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are different (nānā).

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21.11.1. It might occur to you that origination and disintegration are experienced [as happening].

21.11.2 . But origination is experienced because of confusion (moha), and so is disintegration.

21.12. Existence (bhāva) does not arise from existence, nor does existence come from 5 nonexistence. Nonexistence does not come from nonexistence, nor does nonexistence come from existence.

21.13. An existent thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from something else. [If] it does not come from either itself or something else, how does it arise? 10

21.14.1. For one who has accepted the existent (bhāva), the beliefs in eternalism and nihilism will absurdly follow.

Since

21.14.2. Since the existent must be either permanent or impermanent.

21.15.1. “For one who accepts the existent, it is neither annihilated nor eternal. 15

“Why? Because

21.15.2. “Samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation.”

21.16.1. If samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation— 20

that is, if such is the case—

21.16.2. Then since that which has ceased does not arise again, the annihilation of the cause would absurdly ensue.

21.17.1. It is not reasonable (na…yujyate) for essentially existent to nonexistent.

21.17.2. Moreover, when nirvāṇa [is obtained], there would be annihilation because the 25 continuum of samsaric existence is extinguished.

21.18. If the last (carama) samsaric existence has ceased, the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible (na…yujyate). If the last samsaric existence has not ceased, the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible.

21.19. If the initial existence [in the next life] arises while the last is ceasing, then the 30 cease [samsaric existence] would be one thing, and the arising one would be another.

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21.20. If ceasing and arising, and [ceasing and arising] together [all] do not make sense, then how is it that [a being] is born in [or as] those very aggregates in [or as] which it died.

21.21.1. Thus, the continuum of samsaric existence

theorized by you 5

21.21.2. is not possible in the three times.

21.21.3. How can there be a continuum of samsaric existence that does not exist in the three times?

10

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22 Analysis of the Tathāgata

…

22.1. The Tathāgata is not the aggregates, nor is he different from the aggregates. The aggregates are not in the Tathāgata, and he is not in the aggregates. The Tathāgata is also not possessed of the aggregates. So what Tathāgata is there here? 5

22.2. If a buddha is [a buddha] in reliance (upādāya) on the aggregates, then [a buddha] is not essentially [a buddha]. How can that which does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvataḥ) exist as essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)?

22.3. It is correct (upapadyate) to think that [something] which depends on [something] essentially other (parabhāva) is essenceless, and how could that which is essenceless be 10 the Tathāgata?

22.4.1. If [a thing] has no existence as essentially itself (svabhāva), how can [it] have an existence as essentially [something] else (parabhāva)?

And if there is neither the existence [of a thing] as essentially itself nor [its] existence as essentially [something] else, then 15

22.4.2 . Without existing as essentially itself [i.e., a Tathāgata] or as essentially something else [i.e., the aggregates], what or who would be a Tathāgata?

22.5. If some Tathāgata were to exist [previously] without relying (anupādāya) on the aggregates, then he now would rely on them; therefore, he would reliant (upādāya) [on the aggregates]. 20

22.6.1. And without relying on the aggregates, there is no Tathāgata at all

because one would absurdly conclude that [the Tathāgata] is causeless.

22.6.2. And [if an entity] does not exist without relying [on some substratum], how would it rely on [that substratum]?

22.7.1. And there is no such thing as a substratum (upādāna) without [anything] reliant 25 (upādatta) on it.

22.7.2. And in no way at all is there a Tathāgata without a substratum (upādāna) [on which it relies].

22.8. That which is sought through the fivefold [analysis] does not exist as either the same or different [than the aggregates]—how could it be reliantly designated, 30 “Tathāgata?”

22.9.1. This substratum also does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvāt).

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22.9.2. And how can that which is not essentially itself be essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)?

22.10.1. In this way, the substratum is empty in every way, as is that which relies on it.

22.10.2. And how can an empty Tathāgata be emptily designated?

22.11.1. On should not say, “[It is] empty”; nor should one think, “It is not empty.” Nor, 5 “[It is] both”; nor, “[It is] neither.”

22.11.2. However, for the sake of designation & communication (prajñapti), these statements are made.

22.12. “[The Tathāgata is] eternal,” “He is not eternal,” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one (śānta)? “[The Tathāgata is] finite,” “He is not finite,” and 10 so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one?

22.13 . Having grasped onto heavy grasping, one thinks, “The Tathāgata exists!” Concerning [the Tathāgata] who has obtained cessation (nivṛtta), [that person] believes, “The Tathāgata does not exist.”

22.14 . “The Buddha exists after cessation”; “The Buddha does not exist after 15 cessation”—[this thinking (cintā) does not make sense if the [Buddha] is essentially empty.

22.15 . Those who conceptually structure the Buddha, who is beyond conceptual structuring (prapañca) and imperishable, are overwhelmed with conceptual structuring; none of them see the Tathāgata. 20

22.16. That which is the essence of the Tathāgata is the essence of the world.

22.17. The Tathāgata is essenceless; the world is essenceless.

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23 Analysis of Error

23.1. It is said that attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and confusion (moha) come from conceptual thought (saṃkalpa) because [they] arise in dependence (pratītya) on the beautiful, the ugly, and error.

23.2. Those [entities] that arise in dependence on the beautiful, the ugly and error do not 5 exist as essentially themselves (svabhāvāt). Therefore, the afflictive mental states do not [exist] ultimately (na tattvataḥ).

23.3. The Self’s existence or nonexistence is not at all established. Without it, how can the existence or nonexistence of the afflictive mental states be established?

23.4 . The afflictive mental states belong to something, and no such something is 10 established. Without that something, there are no afflictive mental states belonging to anything.

23.5. As in the belief that one’s own body [belongs to the Self], in five ways these afflictive mental states do not exist in relation to the afflictive [Self or mind]. As in the belief that one’s own body [is a locus of the Self], in five ways the afflictive [Self or 15 mind] does not exist in relation to the afflictive mental states.

23.6.1. The beautiful, the ugly and error do not exist essentially as themselves.

23.6.2. So what beauty, ugliness and error do the afflictive mental states depend upon?

23.7. It is theorized (vikalpyate) that attachment, aversion and confusion have six kinds of real things (vastu) [as their objects]: material forms, sound, tactile objects, scents and 20 elemental things (dharmas).

23.8.1. Mere material forms, sounds, tactile objects, scents and elemental things

The word mere (kevala) means that they are merely conceptuality constructed; they are essenceless. If they are essenceless, then how are they perceived? We say,

23.8.2. They are like (-ākāra) the city of Gandharvas; they are like illusions or dreams. 25

23.9. How could beauty or ugliness exist in those [things], which are like (kalpa) a person [created through] magical illusion, like reflections.

23.10. The ugliness in dependence on which we identify beauty does not exist without beauty. Therefore, beauty makes no sense.

23.11. The beauty in dependence on which we identify ugliness does not exist without 30 ugliness. Therefore, ugliness just does not exist.

23.12. And if beauty does not exist, how could there be attachment? And if ugliness does not exist, how could there be aversion?

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23.13. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error, [and if] the impermanent does not exist in the empty, then why would [this] apprehension be an error?

23.14. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error, then why would the apprehension of the empty as “the impermanent” not be an error? 5

23.15. That by which one apprehends, the apprehension, the apprehender, and that which is apprehended—all of these are extinguished (upaśānta). Therefore, there is no apprehension (grāha).

23.16. If apprehension does not exist, whether correct or false, then who is making an error? Who is not making an error? 10

23.17. Errors are not possible for one who has made errors. Errors are not possible for one who has not made errors.

23.18. Errors are not possible for one who is making an error. Ask yourself this question: for whom are errors possible?

23.19. How indeed could errors be unarisen? If errors are unarisen, who is in error? 15

23.20. “A real thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from something else; nor does it arise from itself and something else.” How could this be erroneous?

23.21. If the Self, the pure, the permanent and the pleasant exist, then [apprehending] the Self, the pure, the permanent and the pleasurable is not erroneous.

23.22. If the Self, the pure, the permanent and the pleasurable do not exist, then non-20 Self, the impure, the impermanent and the unpleasant (duḥkha) do not exist.

23.23. In this way, ignorance ceases through the cessation of error. And when ignorance has ceased, conditioning and the other [phases in the wheel of existence] also cease.

23.24. If there were some essentially real afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something, then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates an essence? 25

23.25 . If there were some essentially unreal afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something, then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates the unreal?

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24 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths

At this point, someone objects:

24.1. If everything is empty, there is no occurrence and no cessation. You would be forced to conclude that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. 5

24.2. If the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist, then understanding the nature of suffering, eliminating the causes of suffering, developing oneself in meditation on the path, and attaining cessation are all impossible.

24.3. If they do not exist, then the four states that result from practice do not exist. And 10 if those four resulting states do not exist, the persons who are in those states do not exist, nor do the persons who are about to attain those states.

24.4. And if those eight kinds of holy people do not exist, then the Saṅgha [i.e., the Community] does not exist. And since the four holy truths do not exist, the Dharma does not exist. 15

24.5. And if the Dharma and the Saṅgha do not exist, how could there be a Buddha? In speaking of emptiness, you spurn the Three Jewels, [Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha].

24.6. In speaking of emptiness, you deny that things have a real effect; you reject the good and the bad; and you refute all worldly conventions.

... all world conventions means [cognitive and linguistic interaction with the world, as when one 20 says things such as], “Do this!” “Cook that!” “Eat!” “Wait!” “Go!” “Come!” ...

24.7. In response we say that you do not know the purpose of emptiness; you do not know the meaning of emptiness nor emptiness itself. Thus, you are only refuting yourself.

24.8. The buddhas teach the Dharma by relying on the two realities. One is the reality of 25 worldly conventions; the other is ultimate reality.

24.9. One who does not know how to distinguish between these two realities does not discern the profound tattva within the buddhas’ teaching.

24.10 . Ultimate reality is not taught without relying on conventions. Without understanding ultimate reality, nirvāṇa is not obtained. 30

24.11. Like a poisonous snake when held incorrectly or a magic spell when improperly used, emptiness, when incorrectly understood, devastates the simple minded.

24.12. Hence, the Sage, deciding that unintelligent people would find it difficult to

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penetrate his Dharma, hesitated to teach the Dharma.

24.13. The objection that you raise against emptiness does not force us into a conclusion that contradicts our position. Your objection does not apply to emptiness.

24.14. To a person for whom emptiness makes sense, everything makes sense. To a person for whom emptiness does not make sense, nothing makes sense. 5

[”makes sense” can be replaced with “is reasonable,” “is possible,” or “is coherent.”]

24.15. You object to what we say, but those objections actually apply to your own position; you are like a person who, having mounted her own horse, has forgotten where her horse is.

24.16. If you experience things to be truly existent by virtue of their essences, then you 10 are experiencing causeless things.

24.17. You deny cause and effect; you reject agent, instrument and action; you refute production and cessation, and you refute results.

... But for us who maintain that all things are empty of essences, all these things [mentioned in the last two verses] are possible. Why? Because: 15

24.18. We call that which is interdependent origination ‘emptiness.’ That [emptiness] is reliant designation; it is the middle way.

Interdependent origination means the coming into being of things like sprouts or sensory awareness in dependence on causes and conditions; that [kind of coming into being] is not a case of production by virtue of an essence. The non-production of things by virtue of their essences is 20 emptiness. As the Buddha said:

That which is produced through by causal conditions is not produced. There is no production of it by virtue of its essence. I call `empty’ anything that depends on conditions. He who knows emptiness is heedful.

… 25

24.19. There is no thing whatsoever which has arisen independently. Therefore, there is no thing whatsoever which is not empty.

24.20. If everything were not empty, there would be neither production nor cessation. You would be forced to accept that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist.

24.21. How could there be suffering that has arisen independently? Indeed, [the Blessed 30 One] said that suffering is impermanent; [and] that [which is impermanent] does not exist if [things] have an essence.

24.22. Why would [suffering] that exists essentially arise again? Therefore, for one who

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denies emptiness, there would be no origin [of suffering].

24.23 . There is no cessation of suffering that exists essentially. Through positing (paryavasthāna) essence, you refute cessation.

24.24. If [things] had essence, then the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path would be impossible. On the other hand, if according to you the path is cultivated, then [it] does 5 not have an essence.

24.25. If suffering, [its] origin and [its] cessation do not exist, then what path would be obtained through the cessation of suffering?

Now, to demonstrate how it is that full knowledge of suffering and such is not possible for the other [who denies emptiness], Nāgārjuna says: 10

24.26 . If it is essentially unknown, how will it be known? Indeed, its essence is supposedly (kila) established.

If you imagine that suffering, which previously had an unknown nature, is later known, then [this belief] is wrong. Why? Because its essence is allegedly established. That is, an essence is allegedly established in the world, [and] it cannot undergo change, as in the case of fire’s [essence], which is to 15 be hot. And if an essence does not change, then it does not make sense that suffering, whose essence was previously unknown, would later be known. Therefore, the knowledge of suffering is also not possible.

24.27 . For you, elimination [of suffering], the realization [of cessation], and the cultivation [of the path] are likewise not possible (na…yujyante); so too, the four results 20 [along the path] are impossible.

24.28. For one who clings to essence, how is it possible to obtain a result that is essentially unrealized?

24.29. If there is no result, those who abide in the result do not exist, nor do those who are entering the result. If these either [types of] persons do not exist, then the Saṅgha 25 does not exist.

24.30. Since the Saints’ Truths do not exist, the true Dharma (saddharma) does not exist. And if neither the Dharma nor the Saṃgha exists, how could there be a buddha?

24.31. Also, for you it would absurdly follow that [there is] an awakened one (buddha) without any relation (apratītya) to awakening. Likewise, for you it would absurdly 30 follow that there is awakening without any relation to the awakened one.

24.32. One who is essentially unawakened would never obtain awakening, even though he applies himself to the bodhisattva’s practices for the sake of awakening.

24.33. Nor would one ever do the proper (dharma) or improper (adharma). How can

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the non-empty be done? Indeed, an essence is not made or done.

24.34. For you a result, even without the proper and improper [actions], exists. And for you, a result caused by proper or improper [actions] does not exist.

24.35. Of if, according to you, a result caused by proper and improper [actions] exists, then how is it that, according to you, a result arisen from proper and improper [actions] 5 is non-empty?

24.36. You contradict all worldly (laukika) interactions (saṃvyavahāra) in that you deny the emptiness [of/which is] interdependent origination.

24.37. For one who denies emptiness, there would be no object of action; no action would be underway; and the agent would not be acting. 10

24.38. If it has an essence, the world, devoid of its various states and shapes (avasthā), would be unproduced and unceasing; it would be static.

24.39. If [things] are not empty, then there is no obtainment (prāpti) of the not yet obtained (asamprāpta); that which puts an end to suffering does not exist; and there is no elimination of all afflictive mental states. 15

24.40. One who sees this interdependent origination sees suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path.

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25 Analysis of Nirvāṇa

Here, someone objects,

25.1. «If all this is empty, then there is neither origination nor destruction. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained], whether through elimination or cessation?» 5

To this we respond as follows. If [you] accept in this way that things have essence, then:

25.2. If all this is not empty, then there is neither origination nor destruction. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained], whether through elimination or cessation?

25.3 . The uneliminated, the unobtained; the not annihilated, the not eternal; the 10 unceased, the unarisen—this is called “nirvāṇa.”

25.4. First of all, nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva) because decay and death would absurdly become its characteristics, since no existent thing (bhāva) exists without decay and death.

25.5. If nirvāṇa were an existent thing, then nirvāṇa would be conditioned (saṃskṛta), 15 since no unconditioned thing of any kind exists anywhere.

25.6. If nirvāṇa were an existent, then how would nirvāṇa [occur] without relying [on something] (anupādāya), since no there is no existent thing that is not reliant [on something]?

25.7. If nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva), how could nirvāṇa be nonexistent (abhāva)? 20 How could there be a nonexistent thing where there is no existent thing?

25.8. If nirvāṇa is a nonexistent thing, then how would it [occur] without reliance, since there is no nonexistent thing that occurs without reliance?

25.9. A reliant or dependent entity that comes and goes is, without dependence or reliance, nirvāṇa. 25

25.10. The teacher said that [one should] abandon samsaric being (bhava) and nonbeing (vibhava). Therefore, it is correct to think, “Nirvāṇa is not existent, nor is it nonexistent.”

25.11. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent, then liberation would be both existent and nonexistent, and that makes no sense (na yujyate). 30

25.12. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent, it would not be unreliant, since both of these are reliant.

25.13. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent? Nirvāṇa is unconditioned,

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and the existent and nonexistent are conditioned.

25.14. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent, since those two [qualities] are not present in a single [locus], just like light and darkness.

25.15. The clarification, “Nirvāṇa is not existent; it is not nonexistent,” would be established if the existent and nonexistent were established. 5

25.16. If there were nirvāṇa that is neither existent nor nonexistent, who would make the clarification, “It is neither existent nor not existent?”

25.17. This is not apprehended: “The Blessed One exists after cessation.” Nor are these: “He does not exist after cessation” “He both exists and does not exist after cessation”; “He neither exists nor does not exist after cessation.” 10

25.18. This is not apprehended: “While remaining [in this world], the Blessed One exists.” Nor are these: “While remaining [in this world], the Blessed One does not exist”; “While remaining, he both exists and does not exist”; “While remaining, he neither exists nor does not exist.”

25.19. Saṃsāra is not at all distinct from nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is not at all distinct from 15 saṃsāra.

25.20. That which is nirvāṇa’s limit (koṭi) is saṃsāra’s limit. There is not the slightest difference between them.

25.21 . The extreme positions (anta) [concerning the state of the Tathāgata] after cessation and the views of eternalism and such are based upon nirvāṇa, a finite end 20 (aparānta), and a finite beginning (pūrvānta).

25.22. If all things are empty, then what is infinite? What is finite? What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite?

25.23. What is identical (tad eva)? What is different? What is eternal? What is not eternal? What is both eternal and not eternal? And what then is neither of these? 25

25.24 . Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama), the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere.

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26 Analysis of the Twelve Links

26.1. One obscured with ignorance goes to a realm of rebirth (gati) through the karmas that are the karmic conditionings (saṃskāra) for rebirth which he develops in three ways.

26.2.1. Consciousness, whose causal condition is conditioning (saṃskāra), enters into a 5 realm of rebirth.

26.2.2. And when consciousness has entered [the rebirth], name and material form are moistened.

26.3.1 . When name and material form have been moistened, the six sense-media originate. 10

26.3.2. The six media having developed, contact occurs.

What is contact, and how does it occur? Explaining this, [Nāgārjuna] says:

26.4.-26.5.1. [Contact arises] in dependence on the eye, material form, and attention (samanvāhāra). Consciousness thus occurs in dependence on name and material form. Contact is the conjunction (saṃnipāta) of three [things], namely, material form, 15 consciousness and the eye.

26.5.2. Sensation (vedanā) occurs from contact.

26.6.1. Thirst is causally conditioned by sensation

26.6.2. because one thirsts for the purpose of [having or avoiding] sensations.

26.6.3. The one who has thirst appropriates & relies on the substratum (upādāna) in 20 four ways.

26.7.-26.8.1. When there is appropriation & reliance (upādāna), the samsaric existence (bhava) of the appropriator occurs. If there were non-appropriation, then [the being] would be liberated, and there would be no samsaric existence. That samsaric existence, moreover, is the five aggregates. 25

26.8.2. Due to samsaric existence, birth occurs.

26.8.3.-26.9.1. From birth comes the grievous experiences of aging, death and such, along with their sensations; from birth also come mental agitation and anxiety.

26.9.2. Such is the origin of this mere heap (skandha) of suffering.

26.10. The root of saṃsāra is karmic conditionings (saṃskāra), [and] the unwise create 30 karmic conditionings. Thus, the unwise are karmic agents (kāraka). Therefore, the wise are not, since they see ultimate reality (tattva).

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26.11. When ignorance has ceased, karmic conditionings do not originate. The cessation of ignorance comes from the meditation on that very [interdependent origination] with knowledge (jñāna).

26.12. Through the cessation of this and that, this and that do not occur. Thus, this mere heap of suffering is correctly stopped. 5

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27 Analysis of View & Belief

27.1. “In the past I existed”; “In the past I did not exist.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) is eternal, etc.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite beginning (pūrvānta).

27.2. “I will not be in the future” “I will be something else in the future.” These 5 beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) has an [absolute] end, etc.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite end.

27.3. “I existed in the past.” This does not make sense because this [Self in the present] is not the one in past lives.

27.4.1. You might think, “That one [in the past] is the Self [of the present].” But the 10 [appropriated] substratum is distinguished.

27.4.2. Moreover, what Self would you have without the substratum?

27.5. If it is determined that there is no Self without the substratum, then the Self is [identical to] the substratum. And [thus], for you, the Self does not exist.

27.6. A Self that is the substratum does not cease and arise. Indeed, how could that 15 which appropriates & relies on the substratum be itself the substratum?

27.7. It does not make sense for the Self to be different from the substratum. If it were different, then it would be apprehended without the substratum, and it is not apprehended [in that way].

27.8.1. In this way, the Self is not different from the substratum, nor is it [identical 20 with] the substratum. Without the substratum, the Self does not exist.

27.8.2. Nor is there this certain determination, namely, “[The Self] does not exist.”

27.9. “I did not exist in the past”—this does not make sense because this [Self in the present life] is not different from the one in past lives.

27.10. If this [present Self] were different [from the past Self], then it would exist even 25 without that [past Self]. And that [past Self] might still exist, or an immortal would be born.

27.11. Various other consequences would absurdly follow: the annihilation [of the past Self]; the dissipation of karmic acts; and likewise, the experience by one person of [the results of] karmic acts committed by another. 30

27.12. It is not the case that the Self, being previously nonexistent, arises. If it were, then in that case a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed, or else the Self would have arisen causelessly.

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27.13. In this way, the following views make no sense: “”I existed in the past”; “I did not exist in the past”; “I both existed and did not exist”; “I neither existed nor did not exist.”

27.14. “I will exist in the future”; “I will not exist in the future.” These views are the same as [the views about the past. 5

27.15. “That [person] is a god, and that [same person] was a human.” In this way, the [human] is eternal, and the god would be unborn, since an eternal [person] is not born.

27.16. “The human is different from the god.” This would be the belief in the non-eternality [of the Self]. If the human were different from the god, then a continuum [across lives] would not make sense. 10

27.17. If [the being] is partially a god and partially human, then it would be both eternal and noneternal, and this is not possible.

27.18. It would be established that [the Self is] both eternal and non-eternal if it were established, “It is not eternal” and also, “It is not noneternal.”

27.19. If someone or something, having come from somewhere, were to go some place, 15 then beginningless saṃsāra would therefore exist. That [someone or something] does not exist.

27.20. If there is no eternal [thing], how could there be a noneternal one? How then could there be [something both] eternal and noneternal? And how could there be [something] devoid of both these two? 20

27.21 . If [one’s] lifeworld (loka) has an end, then how could there be the next lifeworld? If [one’s] lifeworld has no end, then how could there be the next lifeworld?

27.22. The continuum of the aggregates occurs like the flame of a lamp; therefore, it is not possible for it to have and end or be endless.

27.23. If the aggregates in the past were to disintegrate, and if these aggregates [of the 25 new lifeworld] did not arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates, then the lifeworld would have an end.

27.24. On the other hand (atha), if the aggregates in the past were not to disintegrate, and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not to arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates, then the lifeworld would be endless. 30

27.25. If it partially had an end and partially were endless, then the lifeworld would [both] have an end and not have an end; this is not possible.

27.26. First of all (tāvad), how could part of the appropriator be destroyed and part not be destroyed? In this way, this makes no sense.

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27.27. And how could part of the substratum be destroyed and part not destroyed? In this way, this makes no sense.

27.28. It would be established that [the Self] both had an end and was endless if these were established: “It does not have an end”; and also, “It is not endless.”

27.29. To put it another way (atha vā), due to the emptiness of all things, what views of 5 eternalism and such would there be for whom for what reason about what?

27.30. Relying on compassion, he taught the true Dharma so as to eliminate all views. He is Gautama, and to him I pay homage.