8/8/2019 Dumlao, Capulong DIGESTS CM

1/3

Dumlao v. Comelec (Taxpayers Suit)Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin COMELEC from implementing certain provisionsof BP 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The petitioners: Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate ofcandidacy for said position. Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar.

Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.(Dumlaos contention will be skipped as his situation was not discussed in the discussion on taxpayerssuits)

Igots and Salapantanans contentions: Assail the ff:

Sec. 4. ...Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the officescovered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein.

ISSUE: Do the petitioners have standing to sue? NO.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury . In the case of petitioners Igot andSalapantan, it was only during the hearing, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, itcannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty, nor disqualifiedfrom being candidates. Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest atstake. They can claim no locusstandi.

2. It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that therule has been relaxed, thus:

... there are many decisions nullifying at the instance oftaxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of publicfunds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of publicfunds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of

administering an unconstitutional act constitutes amisapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined atthe request of a taxpayer.

3. However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, do not directly involve the disbursement ofpublic funds.While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in theirPetition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specificconstitutional protections against abuses of legislative power", or that there is a misapplication of suchfunds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement ofan invalid or unconstitutional law.

4. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by thisCourt in Tan vs.Macapagal, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suitshould be entertained.Holding: Petition denied.

8/8/2019 Dumlao, Capulong DIGESTS CM

2/3

8/8/2019 Dumlao, Capulong DIGESTS CM

3/3

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong

Facts: As a result of the initiation rights held by the Aquila Legis Fraternity on February 8-10, 1991, Leonardo Lennie

Villa died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital. A Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee

was tasked to investigate the circumstances resulting in Villas death within 72 hours. Respondent students Mendoza,

Abas, et al, were also required to submit written statements within 24 hours from receipt. Said respondents failed to

give a reply, while being placed on preventive suspension. On February 14, 1991, after receiving the written statements

and testimonies of several witnesses, the Committee found prima facie case against respondent students for violation of

Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue (Discipline). The students were required to file answers on or before February 18,

otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defense. On February 20, Dean del Castillo

created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against said respondent students. On the same day, the students were

informed of their violation, giving them until the 22nd

of February to respond. After several postponements and a letter

from petitioner Bernas, a resolution dated March 9 found respondents guilty of violation of Rule 3 of the Ateneo Law

School Rules of Discipline, for having participated in the initiation as auxiliaries, heightened by the fact that they made no

effect to prevent the infliction of further injury. The board, however, left the imposition of the penalty to the

Administration. Petitioner Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. On March 10, respondent

students filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and TRO with preliminary injunction, alleging lack of due

process. After the issuance of a TRO on April 7, a special civil action for certiorari was filed with the SC.

Issue: Were respondent students denied due process? NO.

Held: Contrary to respondents argument of denial of procedural due process, the Court finds no indication that such

right has been violated. Petitioners have meticulously respected respondents rights in a school disciplinary proceeding,

as stated in Guzman vs. NU, Alcuaz vs. PSBA-QC, etc. Further, the Guzman case, and not the ANG TIBAY case asserted by

respondents, provides the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary actions in academic

institutions:

1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature or cause of the accusations against them.

2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel.

3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.

4. They shall have the right to address evidence in their own behalf

5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by school authorities to

hear and decide the case.

The requisites as stated have been met adequately. Respondents cannot hide behind the argument that they were not

accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of the February 14 order.

Granting without admitting that they were denied such, disciplinary cases involving students do not necessarily need or

include the right to cross examination. It may be summary in nature.

Ruling: RESPONDENT STUDENTS, DISMISSED.