dudley sets hegel within some account i full vers

8/12/2019 Dudley Sets Hegel Within Some Account I Full Vers

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Will Dudley sets Hegel’s Philosophy of Right within a larger systematicaccount and innovatively deploys the Logic to interpret it. The authorshows that freedom involves not only the establishment of certain socialand political institutions but also the practice of philosophy itself. n thesecond half! Dudley reveals how "iet#sche’s discussions of decadence!nobility! and tragedy map onto an analysis of freedom that criti$uesheteronomous choice and %antian autonomy! and ultimately issues in apositive conception of liberation. n a provocative conclusion! Hegel and"iet#sche are portrayed as complementary! emphasi#ing different aspectsof freedom and modes of philosophical thought! but concurring in the viewthat freedom is in part attained through philosophical thin&ing. n boldlybringing Hegel and "iet#sche together into a conversation! something thatis rarely attempted! Dudley has developed a set of original interpretationsthat will be of considerable importance to students of these philosophers!and more generally to political theorists and historians of ideas.

'("T)"T* +c&nowledgments List of Te,ts! Translations! and+bbreviations ntroduction- reedom and Philosophy /. The *ignificance of reedom- rom Politics to Philosophy0. 'ompeting 'onceptions of reedom Liberal reedom %antian reedom1. Hegel and "iet#sche2. 3oals and *tructure of the 4oo& page ,iii ,v / / 1 1 2 5 6 part i. freedom in and through hegel’s philosophy / The Place of reedom inHegel’s Philosophy /. The Parts of Hegel’s *ystem- Logic! "ature! *pirit 0. The Logical 'oncept of reedom

1. The Philosophy of *pirit as an +ccount of reedom

4. Structure and Method of Part 1 The reedom of Willing- Hegel’s Philosophy of Right/. The Logical 'oncept of 7udgment 0. The nitial 'onception of the Willand ts Development1. The 8oral 'onception of the Will 2. The ncomplete reedom of the8oral Will

5. The Institutions of Ethical Freedom: Family, Ci il Society,

State Freedom !eyond "illin#: From the Philoso$hy of %i#htto &!solute S$irit/. The Place of Willing in the Philosophy of *pirit 0. The Logical 'oncept of Purposiveness i,. The ncomplete reedom of Willing 2. rom Willing to+rt! Religion! and Philosophy

4 Freedom throu#h 'e#el(s Philoso$hy/. +rt! Religion! and Philosophy- (vercoming the *ub9ectivity of Willing 0.Philosophy as 'onceptual *ystemati#ation 1. reedom through *ystematicPhilosophy 2. )pilogue- Reconciliation! Resignation! Theory and Practice



part ii. freedom in and through nietzsche’s philosophy

5 The Place of Freedom in )iet*sche(s Philoso$hy/. "iet#sche’s Lac& of *ystem 0. "iet#sche’s :nsystematic +ccount ofreedom The reedom of Willing- Decadence and "obility/. The Decadent ailures to Will reely- Two Types of *ic&nessDisgregation- The :nfreedom of "ot Willing

The Morality of Selflessness: The Incom$lete Freedom of"illin# )othin#

The 'ontagious 'ircle of Decadence0. rom Decadence to "obility- 'onvalescence Destruction of the 8oralWill

The +an#ers of +estruction )o!le 'ealth: The Esta!lishment

of a Free "ill Freedom !eyond "illin#: From )o!ility toTra#edy

/. The ncomplete reedom of "obility Destruction of the "oble Will-Healthy ReinfectionThe Dangers of Destruction Redu, 4eyond "obility and Decadence- The)ndless 'ycle of *ic&ness and 'onvalescence0. Tragic 3reat Health +ffirmation out of (verfullness +mor ati and)ternal Return The 3lad Tidings of Worldly *elf;Redemption

reedom through "iet#sche’s Philosophy /. The Language of Tragedyas a 'ondition of reedom 0. Philosophy as a *ource of Tragic

)3 < =ol. />! Hegel’s Philosophy of 8ind!)L < =ol. 6! The )ncyclopaedia Logic! tr. T. . 3eraets! W. +. *uchting! and

H. *. Harris ? ndianapolis! nd.- Hac&ett! /@@/A.

)" < =ol. @! Hegel’s Philosophy of "ature! tr. +. =. 8iller ?(,ford-

'larendon! /@5>A.

3P < =ols. /6B0>! Lectures on the History of Philosophy! tr. ). *. Haldane

and rances H. *imson! vols. /B1 ?+tlantic Highlands! ".7.- Humanities

Press! /@52A.

P3 < =ol. /0! ntroduction to the Philosophy of History! tr. Leo Rauch

? ndianapolis! nd.- Hac&ett! /@66A.

Ph3 < =ol. 1! Hegel’s Phenomenology of *pirit! tr. +. =. 8iller ?(,ford-

(,ford :niversity Press! /@55A.

PR < =ol. 5! )lements of the Philosophy of Right! ed. +llen W. Wood! tr. H.

4. "isbet ?'ambridge- 'ambridge :niversity Press! /@@/A.

R < =ol. /C! Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion! tr. ). 4. *peirs and 7.

4urdon *anderson! vol. / ?of 1A ?+tlantic Highlands! ". 7.- Humanities



Press! /@52A. WL ?vols. / and 0A < =ols. and C! Hegel’s *cience of Logic!

tr. +. =. 8iller ?+tlantic! Highlands! ".7.- Humanities Press! /@C@

"TR(D:'T ("- R))D(8 +"D PH L(*(PHE "o idea is so generallyrecogni#ed as indefinite! ambiguous! and open to the greatest

misconceptions ?to which therefore it actually falls a victimA as the idea offreedom - none in common currency with so little appreciation of itsmeaning. Hegel/ /. The *ignificance of reedom- rom Politics toPhilosophy Hegel’s remar& is as true today as it was /5> years ago-freedom! one of our most common and powerful concepts! is used ?andmisusedA with e,traordinarily little appreciation of its significance. Worse!Hegel is wrong to say that freedom’s openness to misconception is

Fgenerally recogni#ed.G "ot only is freedom poorly understood! but we arefalsely confident that we do understand it. This doubly unfortunatecondition dissuades people from underta&ing needed investigations into

the meaning of freedom. *uch investigations are needed because! acrossmuch of the world! the concept of freedom plays an important role in theorgani#ation of people’s lives. People strongly desire freedom! andtherefore support governments! programs! policies! and candidates thatthey perceive to advance its cause. 4ut what people perceive to advancethe cause of freedom depends upon what they understand freedom to be.+nd thus what people understand freedom to be! even if theirunderstanding is not e,plicitly articulated! matters a great deal to the waythey live. +s Robert Pippin has put it- 8odern agents can be said to be byand large committed to the right! truly authoritative modern norm!

freedom! and so an e$ual entitlement to a free life! but suffer from theindeterminacy that the mere notion of freedom leaves us with. ?+s thetwentieth century has made clear! libertarian! welfarist! socialist andtotalitarian pro9ects all claim a commitment to the supreme principle offreedom.A0 /0 ntroduction- freedom and philosophy Philosophers who thin& about freedom therefore have an opportunity toma&e a contribution not only to! but also beyond! their discipline. 8ost ofthe time! the analysis of abstract concepts is far removed from theconcerns of anyone but professional academics. With freedom it isotherwise. 4ecause developments in the understanding of the concept offreedom have an impact not only on the discipline of philosophy! but alsoon the ways in which individuals and communities structure their lives!freedom is a topic on which philosophers may do professionallyrespectable wor& while also entertaining the hope that their labor may beof some relevance to the wider world. f philosophers thin& about themeaning of freedom! and if such thin&ing improves our understanding ofthe conditions of our social and political liberation! then we all have abetter chance of living more freely. (f course! philosophers do not have amonopoly on thin&ing about freedom. reedom is at issue across thehumanities and the social sciences. To ta&e but two preeminent e,amplesfrom recent scholarship- the sociologist (rlando Patterson ?in his two;volume study! reedom in the 8a&ing of Western 'ulture and reedom in



the 8odern WorldA and the historian )ric oner ?in The *tory of +mericanreedomA have both e,plored the importance of the concept of freedom inthe lives of nonacademics.1 4ut whereas such sociological and historicalstudies tend to focus on how freedom has in fact been understood! and onhow such understandings have in fact shaped the world! a distinctlyphilosophical investigation must determine how freedom ought to beunderstood! and how the world must be shaped if freedom is to bereali#ed in it. The concept of freedom is thus one of the most importantpoints of intersection between the traditional branches of theoretical andpractical philosophy. reedom is of theoretical interest because we canwonder what freedom is! and whether or not we are capable of being free.+nd it is of practical interest because! given that we are capable of beingfree! and that being free is desirable! we can wonder how to live in such away that this capability is most fully reali#ed. f philosophers thin& aboutthe meaning of freedom! however! they will discover an even deeper

connection between freedom and philosophy. Thin&ing about freedomreveals that its conditions of reali#ation include not only certain social andpolitical developments but also the practice of philosophy itself. n otherwords! philosophy is directly as well as indirectly liberating- philosophycontributes indirectly to freedom by articulating the social and politicalconditions of its reali#ation but philosophy also contributes directly tofreedom because freedom is not only something about which philosophersthin&! but also something that is produced through philosophical thin&ing.introduction- freedom and philosophy1 0. 'ompeting 'onceptions of reedom The claim that philosophy is a

liberating activity is li&ely to be met with s&epticism! if not outrightderision. (ne of my main goals in this boo&! therefore! is to e,plain anddefend it. n order to do so! will have to argue that freedom ought to beunderstood or conceived in a certain way! and that other conceptions offreedom are deficient by comparison. 8a&ing such an argument re$uires astandard by which to 9udge competing conceptions of freedom. Thestandard will use is that of comprehensiveness. (ne conception offreedom ?+A is more comprehensive than another ?4A if! and only if! twocriteria are met- first! + must include and e,pand upon the freedomsincluded in 4 and second! the newfound freedoms included in + must

rectify a specific limitation or dependence from which the supposedly freesub9ect can be shown to suffer in 4! and thus serve as the condition of thefreedoms included in 4! without which the latter would prove to beillusory. n moving from one conception of freedom to another that ismore comprehensive! nothing is lost and something is gained. "othing islost because the more comprehensive conception retains the freedomsincluded in the less comprehensive conception. *omething is gainedbecause the more comprehensive conception e,pands and improves uponthe less comprehensive conception by recogni#ing that the freedomsincluded in the latter are necessary but not sufficient conditions offreedom. We therefore ought to understand freedom as comprehensivelyas we can. t is my contention that we are able to do so by drawing on



and bringing together the wor& of Hegel and "iet#sche. Theinterpretations of their wor& that form the bul& of this boo& will show thatfreedom! most comprehensively understood! re$uires not only thedevelopment of certain social and political structures! but also the activityof philosophy itself. n preparation for these interpretations! want toconsider very briefly the two most important conceptions of freedom onwhich Hegel and "iet#sche build! but which they also critici#e for beinginsufficiently comprehensive. The first and less comprehensive of thesetwo is that of liberalism. The second! which is more comprehensive thanthat of liberalism but still less comprehensive than those of Hegel and"iet#sche! is that of %ant.2 liberal freedom + free;man is he! that in thosethings! which by his strength and wit he is able to do! is not hindered todo what he has a will to. Hobbes2 introduction- freedom and philosophy Liberalism understands freedomas the ability of a person to do what she chooses to do! with as few

e,ternal impediments as possible. *uch freedom has come to be called FnegativeG liberty- it is freedom from the interference of others! a lac& ofe,ternal constraint.C "egative liberty is represented in the commone,pression! Ffree as a bird.G +nimals are ta&en to en9oy an enviabledegree of negative liberty because they are unconstrained by the socialties! conventions! and laws to which humans are sub9ect. +mong animals!birds represent the paradigm of negative liberation because they can fly!and so are less constrained by geography and even gravity than otheranimals. Thus animals in general! and birds in particular! are thought to befree in this sense because they can do what they choose to do! with fewer

constraints than humans e,perience. The liberal conception of freedom isremar&ably simple and! not coincidentally! remar&ably powerful. t is li&elythe response most people would give if as&ed for a definition of freedom.+nd! therefore! it has enormous political significance. This significance wasrecently demonstrated in +merican politics by the dramatic ascent of theRepublican Party to its first congressional ma9ority in nearly half a century!a development that was e,plicitly billed by its leaders and proponents as

Fthe freedom revolution.G5 ntellectually! this revolution turned on twoideas that are at the core of liberalism- first! that government e,ists tosecure the freedom of its people and second! that freedom consists of

individuals’ ability to act on their choices with a minimum of e,ternalconstraint. These ideas were con9oined with a belief that the governmentof the :nited *tates! by e,panding the public sphere to encompassmatters that should have been left to private choice! had itself become ahindrance to! rather than the protector of! the freedom of its citi#ens.3iven this belief! and their commitment to and particular understanding of freedom! Republican leaders drew the logical conclusion that thegovernment of the :nited *tates should be scaled bac& B its budget cutand its programs reduced B and then redirected to what they understoodto be its core functions- the protection of freedom from internationalthreats through the provision of a national defense! and the protection offreedom from domestic threats through the provision of police and



prisons. Running on this platform! the Republican Party en9oyed aspectacular electoral triumph in /@@2! one that illustrates the importanceof freedom to voters! the connection between a theoretical conception offreedom and a practical political program! and the intuitive appeal of theliberal conception of freedom. &antian freedom Will is a &ind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational! and freedom would be thatproperty of such causality that it can be efficient introduction- freedomand philosophy independently of alien causes determining it . . . What!then! can freedom of the will be other than autonomy! that is! the will’sproperty of being a law to itself I . . . Hence a free will and a will undermoral laws are one and the same. %ant6 %ant critici#es liberalism on theground that the ability to act on one’s choices with minimal e,ternalconstraint is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of freedom.reedom! %ant argues! re$uires not only that individuals be allowed to actin accordance with their choices ?which is all that liberalism’s

understanding of freedom involvesA! but also that they be genuinelyresponsible for those choices themselves. +nd the capacity for suchresponsibility re$uires that individuals be endowed with free will- at leastsome choices must be determined not by causes e,ternal to the will?which include! for %ant! an individual’s own desiresA! but rather by thewill’s respect for the universal moral law that it gives to itself. n short!whereas liberalism understands freedom as the person’s unfettered abilityto do what she chooses! %ant insists that freedom must be understood asthe will’s ability to determine autonomously what the person chooses todo. (n %ant’s view! then! animals are not free at all. +nimals! and most

especially birds! may well e,perience fewer constraints on the e,ecution of their chosen actions than humans do. 4ut to call their actions Fchosen!G%ant argues! is seriously misleading. +nimals lac& rationality! andconse$uently lac& autonomy. The causes of all of their actions are e,ternalto them! originating not in choices determined by autonomous willing butrather in heteronomous instincts. There is nothing for humans to envy!therefore! in the negative liberty en9oyed by animals! for without rationaland autonomous willing! such negative liberty fails to be freedom. %ant’sview might seem to have several obvious disadvantages in comparison tothat of liberalism. irst! it is notoriously complicated- the liberal

understanding of freedom can be presented in a few pages! but a goode,plication of %antian freedom re$uires a boo&;length study.@ *econd! itconfounds common sense- liberal freedom involves doing what onechooses! but %antian freedom involves sub9ecting oneself to moral lawseven in the absence of any desire to do so! and thus doing what isre$uired simply because it is re$uired. To ordinary ears this sounds notli&e freedom! but rather its opposite. Third! it is metaphysical- the sub9ectof liberal freedom is the person! but the sub9ect of %antian freedom is thewill! a mysterious &ind of noumenal causality that can never bee,perienced but that must be effective if moral agency is to be possible./>ourth! and finally! the lin& between this metaphysical freedom of the willand the social and political freedom of the person is deeply problematic. n



particular! for %ant a rational agent’s freedom! since it resides in thenoumenal will! is independent of the agent’s physical and C introduction-freedom and philosophy political situation though he would grant thatstarvation or slavery ma&es it harder to ignore heteronomous motives!there is still no phenomenal situation that a noumenally free agent is notobligated! and therefore able! to overcome. The most %ant might say ?andnot without difficultyA is that some political systems and cultures are moreconducive than others to their citi#ens’ being able to ignore phenomenalmotives but social and political arrangements can never be essential tohuman freedom for him. "onetheless! the %antian conception of freedom is superior to that ofliberalism! and for the reason %ant himself provides- one may meet theliberal standard and yet fail to be free. +lthough independence fromconstraint or interference is an indispensable element of freedom! uponreflection it is shown to be incomplete- may! li&e an animal! be free to do

what choose while it is still the case that my choices! and so my actions!are not truly my own. may choose to smo&e because am addicted! may choose to attend college because have been raised in a particularway! or may choose to eat because am hungry. n each of these cases!even if my ability to act is unconstrained! my FchoiceG is driven by factorsover which have little or no control! and therefore remain dependent ina significant sense. %ant thus shows that the acting and choosing ofpersons is truly free only if such actions and choices are determined byautonomous willing. n other words! the %antian conception of freedom ismore comprehensive than the liberal conception.

irst! %antian freedom includes liberal freedom! because the a#enthose choices are determined !y autonomous illin# is not consideredfree unless it is also the case that his attem$ts to act on those choicesare su!-ect to minimal e ternal constraint.

*econd! the %antian conception e,pands upon that of liberalism byproviding for freedom of the will! which the liberal conception does notinclude. +nd

Third! such freedom of the will is the condition of genuine freedomof choice- even if the li!eral su!-ect is free to act u$on her choicesithout constraint, her choosin# itself remains e ternally determined, alimitation that is rectified only if she is ca$a!le of autonomous illin#. Thus nothing is lost and something is gained in moving from conceiving offreedom as the person’s unfettered action to conceiving of freedom as thewill’s autonomy or self;determination. "othing is lost because the ideathat freedom re$uires negative liberty is preserved. 4ut something isgained because the conception of freedom as the autonomy of the willrecogni#es and responds to the fact that negative liberty is a necessarybut not a sufficient condition of freedom. reedom re$uires autonomouswilling and unconstrained acting the latter fails to be free without theformer! and both are contained in the %antian conception.

1. Hegel and "iet#sche +lthough the %antian conception of freedomis more comprehensive than that of liberalism! it is still not comprehensiveenough. n the same way that reflection upon freedom of action reveals its



limitations and its reliance on freedom of the will! reflection upon freedomof the will shows that it too is limited and depends upon yet another &indof freedom. *uch reflection! and the development of a sufficientlycomprehensive conception of freedom that rectifies the limitations ofwilling! are the wor& of this boo&. 8ore accurately! the wor& of this boo& isto e,amine the reflections of Hegel and "iet#sche upon freedom of thewill! and to show that they independently produce complementary results!which can be brought together to yield a conception of freedom morecomprehensive than that of %ant.

2 Hegel and "iet#sche! will argue! both adopt %ant’s strategic move against liberalism!

whereby he shows that its particular understanding of freedom dependsupon a further &ind of freedom for which it is unable to account. 4ut theythen turn this move against %ant himself. n the same way that %antshows that acting persons are truly free only if their choices are

determined by a free will! Hegel and "iet#sche show that willing can betruly free only in virtue of an activity other than itself. That is! althoughself;determination of the will is a more comprehensive conception offreedom than unfettered action! it rests on yet another &ind of freedom!without which willing fails to be genuinely self;determining. t is thisconclusion that produces the deep connection between freedom andphilosophy! for the liberating activity that Hegel and "iet#sche identify asthe condition of free willing is the practice of philosophy itself. Thus Hegeland "iet#sche ultimately show us not only that freedom is a central topicof consideration in philosophy! but also that the most comprehensive

freedom is achieved through philosophical practice. Philoso$hy isli!eratin# in / two distinct senses.

First ! it is indirectly li!eratin# because it is !y means of $hiloso$hy that e are a!le to determine hat it is to !e free ! and thus todetermine the conditions of li in# freely .

n other words! philosophical thin&ing is a condition of genuinelyfree willing! because freedom cannot be willed in the absence of aphilosophical determination of what freedom is philosophy yieldstheoretical results that must be applied practically in e,tra;philosophicalspheres! the social and political spheres in which we live and act.

Second ! $hiloso$hy is also directly li!eratin#, !ecause one of thetheoretical results it yields is the idea that an im$ortant $art of !ein#free is li in# $hiloso$hically . n other words! it is not only the social andpolitical applications of philosophy’s theoretical results that are liberating!but the practice of philosophy itself.

This much! will argue! 'e#el and )iet*sche a#ree u$on . 4ut they also disa#ree in several important respects. irst!

although they share the view that %antian autonomy is not a sufficientlycomprehensive conception of freedom! their reflections e,pose

0limit ill different limitations to hich illin# is su!-ect .different ways in which the %antian conception of freedom must bemodified and enlarged



*econd! because they e,pose different limitations of willing! Hegeland "iet#sche identify different ways in which the %antian conception offreedom must be modified and enlarged.

J $hiloso$hical practice! inK Third and finally! although thesemodifications and enlargements result! in both cases! in an understandingthat freedom involves philosophy! Hegel and "iet#sche do not understandphilosophical practice in the same way! and so have differentunderstandings of the ways in which this practice is liberating. ;K8y conclusion will be that the different responses of Hegel and"iet#sche to %ant prove to be complementary. Their central point ofagreement B that %antian autonomy is an insufficiently comprehensiveconception of freedom B teaches us that freedom involves not only actingand willing! but also practicing philosophy. 4ut the different ways in whichthey arrive at this result! and the different interpretations that they give toit! teach us that our conception of freedom as philosophical practice must

be still more comprehensive than that provided by either Hegel or"iet#sche alone. We need a theoretical understanding of freedom thatincorporates the insights of both Hegel and "iet#sche into what theactivity of philosophy involves! and a philosophical practice thatincorporates the complementary models of philosophical activity that thete,ts of Hegel and "iet#sche e,emplify.2. 3oals and *tructure of the 4oo& With this boo& hope to ma&e acontribution both to the pro9ect of understanding freedom! and to thepro9ect of understanding the te,ts of Hegel and "iet#sche. f am right!the two tas&s are interrelated- our understanding of Hegel and "iet#sche

is helpfully guided by attending to their attention to the problem offreedom! and our understanding of freedom is furthered by the insightsgained from that e,egetical wor&. To the e,tent that am successful! thisboo& should contribute to philosophical scholarship in several ways. irstand foremost! it should draw attention to the fact that a comprehensivetreatment of the problem of freedom cannot be provided by liberal politicaltheory or by %antian moral philosophy. nstead! hope to show! thefreedoms these discourses treat are dependent upon the morecomprehensive freedom of philosophical thin&ing. The primaryconse$uence of this is that FpracticalG discussions of politics and morality

must be connected to FtheoreticalG wor& on the nature of thought.*econd! since this more comprehensive conception of freedom and myconclusions about its conse$uences will be produced by bringing Hegelintroduction- freedom and philosophy @ and "iet#sche together! this boo&should also contribute to the history of philosophy. +lthough interest inboth Hegel and "iet#sche continues to increase in the )nglish;spea&ingworld! there is still relatively little wor& that relates the two./1 Third! myinterpretation of Hegel’s conception of freedom is importantly differentfrom other treatments of the topic. do not confine myself to thePhilosophy of Right! but instead argue that Hegel’s account of ob9ectivespirit needs to be read within the conte,t of his philosophy of spirit as awhole B in particular! we must understand the limitations to the freedom



of willing that Hegel identifies! and the role that he envisions for art!religion! and philosophy in overcoming them./2 8oreover! in reading thePhilosophy of Right and the other parts of the philosophy of spirit ma&euse of the Logic! and try to show how the introduction of logicalconsiderations leads to an improved understanding of Hegel’s conceptionof freedom./ ourth and finally! my interpretation of "iet#sche ascontinuing the efforts of %ant and Hegel to determine the conditions offreedom brings him into direct engagement with 3erman dealism. arguethat "iet#sche’s discussions of decadence! nobility! and tragedy can bemapped onto an analysis of the conditions of freedom that offers criti$uesof both heteronomous choice and %antian autonomy! and that ultimatelyissues in a positive conception of liberation. The structure of the boo& hasbeen determined by its goals. ollowing this introduction! the body of thewor& is divided into two parts! the first devoted to an interpretation ofHegel! the second to an interpretation of "iet#sche. These interpretations

are followed by a conclusion! in which attempt to show how the insightsof the two parts can and must be thought together. The structures of thetwo parts are $uite similar. )ach is composed of four chapters. Theopening chapters of both Part and Part locate the concept of freedomin the te,ts of Hegel and "iet#sche! respectively! and present myapproach to reading those te,ts. Hegel’s wor&s! of course! comprise asystem! so 'hapter / identifies the places where freedom appears in thatsystem! and e,plains both how those occurrences relate to each other!and how their systematic interrelation bears on my interpretation ofthem./C "iet#sche’s wor&s! of course! are unsystematic! so 'hapter ?the

opening chapter of Part A e,plains both how have reconstructed anaccount of freedom from them! and how their lac& of systematicity bearson that account. The second chapters of both parts are concerned withfreedom of the will- 'hapter 0 presents Hegel’s analysis 'hapter Cpresents "iet#sche’s. 4oth of these analyses produce positive results bynegative means- they determine the conditions of freedom of the will byidentifying the limitations of various types of willing that fail to achieve it.n Hegel! this /> introduction- freedom and philosophy analysis ta&es theshape of a criti$ue of what he calls the moral will! and results in theconclusion that a truly free will is an ethical one! one belonging to a citi#en

of a rational political state. n "iet#sche! the sub9ect of criti$ue is what hecalls the decadent will! and the conclusion drawn is that the possessor of afree will is one who is a member of a noble community. Whereas thesecond chapters of the two parts determine the conditions of freedom ofthe will by identifying the limitations that incompletely free types of willingcannot overcome! the third chapters determine the limits to which even afree will is sub9ect. This negative wor& again provides positive rewards!this time in the form of a determination of the re$uirements of freedomthat willing cannot meet. 'hapter 1! which presents Hegel’s analysis!demonstrates that although ethical citi#enship in a rational state is themost complete freedom that willing can provide! this political activity haslimitations that only the activities Hegel discusses in absolute spirit B art!



religion! and philosophy B can overcome. 'hapter 5! which presents"iet#sche’s analysis of the limits of free willing! demonstrates thatfreedom re$uires the transformation of noble individuals and communitiesinto what he calls tragic ones! in which liberation is increased by forsa&ingnoble autonomy in favor of an openness to being affected by that which ise,ternal and alien. The concluding chapters of Parts and e,amine theroles that philosophy! as Hegel and "iet#sche understand and practice it!has to play in overcoming the limitations of willing and leading us towardthe most comprehensive possible freedom. 'hapter 2 presents Hegel’sunderstanding of philosophy as conceptual systemati#ation! illuminates itby reflecting on the systematic conceptual development that we have seenHegel perform in 'hapters 0 and 1! and considers the senses in which thissystematic practice may be said to be liberating. 'hapter 6 presents"iet#sche’s understanding of philosophy as the genealogical destabili#ationand transformation of established conceptual systems! illuminates it by

reflecting on the philosophical genealogy that we have seen "iet#scheperform in 'hapters C and 5! and considers the senses in which thisgenealogical practice may be said to be liberating. These concludingchapters thus attend not only to the differences between Hegel’s and"iet#sche’s understandings of philosophy! but also to the differencesbetween the ways in which their own philosophical practices e,emplifythese understandings. 4ecause what Hegel and "iet#sche say is that thepractice of philosophy is liberating! how each of them practices philosophyis revealing of what they understand freedom to be. n other words! thedifferent philosophical styles of Hegel and "iet#sche amount to differences

of philosophical substance as well! and an e,plication of their substantiveviews cannot ignore the styles in which those views are e,pressed./5introduction- freedom and philosophy // The stylistic differences betweenHegel and "iet#sche bear not only on the substance of the $uestion offreedom! but also on the styles in which the two parts of this boo& havebeen composed. +lthough my discussions of Hegel and "iet#sche arestructured $uite similarly! they are noticeably different in style. Thesedifferences are mandated by the e,egetical goal of producing ade$uateinterpretations of both Hegel and "iet#sche. 3iven that Hegel and"iet#sche differ so mar&edly in style! and given that these differences are

not merely stylistic! there is no single interpretive style ade$uate to thewor& of both thin&ers. Rather than force one style onto bothinterpretations! then! have tried instead to find for each interpretationthe style best suited to it. +s a result! my interpretation of Hegel isrecogni#ably Hegelian! with respect to both its conceptual vocabulary andits internal organi#ation and subdivision. 4y contrast! my interpretation of"iet#sche is! if not recogni#ably "iet#schean ?for such a style is notparticularly well suited to the &ind of careful e,egesis and analysis that aim to produceA! at least not Hegelian. have provided it with anorgani#ation that is intended to be faithful to "iet#sche’s te,ts andvocabulary while also illuminating the $uestion of freedom! which is one of the things thin& those te,ts and that vocabulary are best able to do. The



boo&’s conclusion brings together the complementary results of Parts and to produce a conception of freedom that is more comprehensivethan either Hegel or "iet#sche! when read without reference to the other!is able to provide. This conception! li&e those of Hegel and "iet#sche!retains the understanding that freedom involves free willing andunfettered acting! but recogni#es that the possibility of both of theseactivities ultimately depends upon the practice of philosophy. Thisliberating practice is now understood! however! to encompass bothHegelian conceptual systemati#ation and "iet#schean genealogicaldestabili#ation of established conceptual systems. The conclusion! and theboo&! ends by suggesting briefly how the liberation afforded by suchphilosophical practices relates bac& to the liberation of the social andpolitical sphere with which our interest in freedom begins. R))D(8 "+"D THR(:3H H)3)L’* PH L(*(PHE / TH) PL+') ( R))D(8 "H)3)L’* PH L(*(PHE Hegel thin&s that there is nothing more important

for us to understand! and nothing that we understand more poorly! thanfreedom. n fact! his whole philosophical system! in all its incrediblebreadth and detail! can be understood as a single e,tended demonstrationof the importance and meaning of freedom. 8oreover! Hegel’s philosophyis not only about freedom! but also claims to be productive of it- in thecourse of his philosophical investigation of what it means to be free! Hegelarrives at the view that freedom depends upon the practice of philosophy.:nderstanding this view! which is the central aim of Part of this boo&!re$uires us to e,amine what Hegel has to say about freedom! philosophy!and their interconnection. This chapter prepares for that e,amination by

locating freedom within Hegel’s system. *ection / provides a briefoverview of the three main parts of Hegel’s system- logic! the philosophyof nature! and the philosophy of spirit. *ection 0 e,plicates the concept offreedom developed in the Logic. *ection 1 then draws on that logicalconcept to e,plain why the entirety of the philosophy of spirit should beunderstood as an account of freedom. t also briefly discusses the parts of the philosophy of spirit! and the place of the Philosophy of Right within it.*ection 2 concludes the chapter with some remar&s on the structure andmethod of the rest of Part ! which interprets Hegel’s account of freedom!both within and beyond the Philosophy of Right! in order ultimately to

understand why and how Hegel considers the practice of philosophy to beliberating. /. The Parts of Hegel’s *ystem- Logic! "ature! *pirit reedomma&es its first appearance in Hegel’s philosophy before his system propereven begins- the Phenomenology of *pirit! which serves as an introductionto the system! is an account of the elevation of consciousness to astandpoint that Hegel characteri#es as free! the standpoint of thespeculative philosopher. The speculative philosopher engages in / /C parti- hegel’s philosophy conceptual thin&ing! and Hegel claims that in virtueof such thin&ing she is free./ The attainment of the standpoint of thespeculative philosopher mar&s the transition from the introduction to thesystem proper the Phenomenology prepares the way for the freeconceptual thin&ing that transpires in the logic! the philosophy of nature!



and the philosophy of spirit. These three main parts of Hegel’s system aredistinguished from each other by the &ind of thing they endeavor to thin&or comprehend. Logic see&s the conceptual comprehension of thoughtitself- it studies the pure concepts with which thin&ing beings thin&.0 ncontrast to logic! the philosophies of nature and spirit see& the conceptualcomprehension of beings that have an e,istence e,ternal to thought! areal e,istence in space and time. Together they thus comprise what Hegelcalls Realphilosophie. The philosophy of nature attempts to comprehendthose beings that can 9ustifiably be called natural! and the philosophy ofspirit attempts to comprehend those beings that can 9ustifiably be calledspiritual. reedom not only describes the condition of the speculativephilosopher! but is also one of the concepts that she comes to thin& as shemoves through philosophy. reedom first arises in the Logic! where itmar&s the important transition from the logic of essence to the logic of theconcept.1 This logical concept of freedom is then assumed by the

speculative philosopher throughout the Realphilosophie! in the course ofher attempts to comprehend natural and spiritual beings. n virtue of thevery meanings of FnatureG and Ffreedom!G natural beings prove to bethose that are incapable of being free the purview of the philosophy ofnature is limited to that which Fe,hibits no freedom in its e,istence! butonly necessity and contingency.G2 +nd in virtue of FspiritG being defined asthat which is not merely natural! spiritual beings and free beings thenprove to be one and the same the philosophy of spirit proclaims at itsoutset that Fthe essential . . . feature of spirit is freedom.G reedom thusen9oys e,traordinary prominence in Hegel’s system- it is the condition

attained by the speculative philosopher at the end of the Phenomenologyit is one of the crucial concepts that such a philosopher thin&s in theLogic it defines the philosophy of nature! as that which is conceptuallye,cluded from it and it defines the philosophy of spirit! as that which it isconcerned to comprehend. 4ut identifying the prominence of freedom inHegel’s system is not the same thing as understanding it. To do so! wehave to turn to the Logic! which provides the concept of freedom that isassumed throughout the Realphilosophie. The Logic is relevant to thephilosophy of spirit ?and to the philosophy of natureA because Hegelunderstands the concepts it studies to be the conditions of all thin&ing

whatsoever- we cannot help using them whenever we thin& aboutanything at all. This means that Hegel’s attempt to thin& about orconceptually comprehend spiritual beings in the place of freedom inhegel’s philosophy /5 the philosophy of spirit employs concepts developedin his Logic. n particular! Hegel’s attempt to comprehend the freedom ofspiritual beings employs the concept of freedom developed in the Logic.*o to understand his account of what it is to be a free being with a reale,istence B that is! a spiritual being B we must first understand hisaccount! found in the Logic! of what it is to be free simpliciter. +lthoughthis discussion may seem abstract and difficult to readers unfamiliar withHegel’s Logic! it is indispensable to Hegel’s entire account of freedom! andso to my entire interpretation of that account! and therefore cannot be



avoided. have endeavored! however! to ma&e it as brief and clear aspossible! and to provide e,amples that illuminate the conceptualdistinctions at issue. 0. The Logical 'oncept of reedom reedom isdetermined in the Logic as the overcoming of necessity. "ecessity itself isdetermined as Fthe merely internal! and for that reason merely e,ternal!connection of mutually independent e,istences.GC That the connectionbetween two things is merely internal means that although beingconnected to the other is constitutive of what each thing is! this fact is notevident- FThe identity of the two things that appear bound in necessity!and which! for that reason! lose their independence! is at first only aninner identity that is not yet present to those who are sub9ect tonecessity.G5 This ma&es the connection merely e,ternal in the sense that itis not understood to be an intrinsic feature of the things it connects.6Rather! the connection is understood to be an accidental relation obtainingbetween Fmutually independent e,istences.G Plainly put! a thing is unfree!

or sub9ect to necessity! when it is bound to something that is e,ternal toitself and thus irrelevant to ma&ing it what it is. *uch an e,ternal bondprevents the thing from being self;determining! and so from being free.(ne of Hegel’s e,amples is the planets- all are connected in a system oforbits! but at the same time this connection does not ma&e them whatthey are each planet is the planet that it is! all by itself! and itsparticipation in a system with other planets is an additional feature!e,ternal to that which ma&es it what it is.@ 8ars would still be 8ars! inother words! even if =enus did not e,ist! and thus the bond between theirorbits involves the two in a relationship of necessity and e,ternal

determination that restricts the independence of both. f necessity is arelationship in which mutually independent or e,ternal things are bound toand determined by each other! and freedom is the overcoming ofnecessity! then freedom would seem to be achievable in one of two ways-either the bonds between the mutually e,ternal things could be cut! sothat the things no longer restrict each other or the /6 part i- hegel’sphilosophy e,ternality could be overcome ?internali#edA! so that the thingsremain bound but understand that being bound to each other isconstitutive of what they are. n the latter case! freedom would beachieved because a thing’s independence cannot be threatened by that

which ma&es it what it is in fact! if a thing can be what it is only in virtueof being bound in a particular way! then that bond actually ma&es possibleits independent e,istence as the thing that it is. 4ut the former option Bthe cutting of the bonds – which might appear to be the more intuitive!fails to solve the problem. +s long as the relata continue to e,ist! theymust remain related! even if their relation is only that of things trying toescape! or unwilling to ac&nowledge! any relation between themselves.Thus the attempt to sever all connection fails! leaving the two things bothbound and e,ternal to each other! and so unfree. Whereas the planets arebound together in necessity! which they can never overcome! an e,ampleof the failed attempt to achieve such overcoming through the cutting ofbonds can be found in the inveterate bachelor who avoids all long;term



relationships. *uch a person understands his identity to be what it isindependent of other people! and thus views long;term relationships asrestrictive and limiting. +lthough he may enter into them for variousreasons B out of loneliness or se,ual desire! perhaps B he can nevere,perience them as constitutive of a union that creates and sustains hisidentity and thus ma&es possible his liberation. (n the contrary! henecessarily e,periences long;term relationships as diminishing hisfreedom! which he therefore believes he can find only through theirdissolution. 4ut such dissolution is always imperfect- it transforms thebachelor’s relationship to his former partner but cannot eradicate it. +sHegel puts it- Fthe person who flees is not yet free! for in fleeing! he is stilldetermined by the very thing from which he is fleeing.G/> *ince thecutting of the bonds fails to liberate! freedom can be produced onlythrough a demonstration that the bound elements are not truly e,ternal toeach other! through ma&ing manifest the fact that their identities are

reciprocally constitutive. "ecessity becomes freedom not by severingbonds! but by developing a different understanding of the character of thethings bound. They must come to be seen not as entities independent ofone another! e,ternal to and restrictive of one another! but as distinctparts internal to a larger! self;determining whole that encompasses themand their interconnections. n this new understanding! both the whole andits parts are seen to be free. The whole is free because in being bound toits parts it is bound only to itself. The parts are free because! even thoughthey are bound to other parts and to the whole! these bonds are nowunderstood to be internal to the nature of the parts themselves it is

understood that each part is what it is only in virtue of being a part of thewhole. This means that the parts could not even be themselves withoutbeing bound to the other the place of freedom in hegel’s philosophy /@parts of the whole! which means that! instead of constituting e,ternalrestrictions on each other! the parts actually constitute the other partsthemselves.// The ultimate difference! then! between a necessary relationand a free one is that in the latter the bonds of the former have beencomprehended as internal to the very nature of the things bound! whichmeans that the things bound have been comprehended as internal to eachother./0 Thus Hegel writes that the process of necessity is the overcoming

of what is present at first as rigid e,ternality! so that its inwardness isrevealed. What this process shows is that the terms that appear initially tobe bound together are not in fact alien to one another instead! they areonly moments of one whole! each of which! being related to the other! isat home with itself ?bei sich selbstA! and goes together with itself ?mit sichselbstA. This is the transfiguration of necessity into freedom./1 Whereasthe planets and inveterate bachelors are bound in necessity ?no matterhow desperately the latter try to escape it or how loudly they proclaimthat they haveA! Hegel considers the entry into a loving marriage to be ane,ample of the transformation of a necessary bond into a free one.Partners who enter into such a marriage! according to Hegel! change theirself;understanding- they come to understand themselves not as



individuals with preestablished and separate identities who areaccidentally connected to each other! but as members of a union in whichtheir very identity as individuals is constituted. 8arriage gives one Fself;consciousness of one’s individuality within this unity . . . so that one ispresent in it not as an independent person but as a member.G/2 Thistransformation of self;consciousness internali#es the bond between thepartners! by ma&ing e,plicit the fact that their bond is intrinsic to whatthey are- Fthe union of the natural se,es! which was merely inward priorto marriageM. . . and whose e,istence was for this very reason merelye,ternal! is transformed into a spiritual union! into self;conscious love.G/4ecause this internali#ation of an e,ternal bond is the logical criterion forthe transformation of necessity into freedom! the entry into a lovingmarital union allows partners to e,perience themselves as freely boundtogether. The internali#ation of the e,ternal that mar&s the movementfrom necessity to freedom also amounts! for Hegel! to the transfiguration

of the finite into the infinite. He defines the finite as Fwhatever comes toan end! what is! but ceases to be where it connects with its other! and isthus restricted by it. Hence the finite subsists in its relation to its other!which is its negation and presents itself as its limit.G/C 3iven thisdefinition! it is immediately apparent that any two finite things aremutually e,ternal in the sense already discussed. The fact 0> part i-hegel’s philosophy that each serves as the other’s limit means that thecharacter of each is understood to be fundamentally independent of thatof the other. 'onse$uently! the connection between the two can onlyfunction as a restriction on both. inite things are bound to and

determined by each other in necessity! not in freedom. *ince finite thingsare bound in necessity through being connected to other finite things thatlie beyond their limits! the transfiguration from finitude to infinity could besought in two ways. These alternatives correspond precisely to thosepreviously considered as ways of overcoming necessity- either theconnection could be severed or it could be internali#ed! through therecognition that it constitutes the things that it connects in virtue ofconstituting the limits that ma&e them what they are. +s before! the firstoption fails to solve the problem. Disconnecting two finite things may shiftthe limits of each! but it cannot help but leave both limited. +nd! Hegel

points out! this is true no matter how often the operation is performed atbest! the repetition of disconnection can produce an infinite series ofaltered relations between things that remain perpetually finite. amously!Hegel writes that Fthis infinity is spurious or negative infinity! since it isnothing but the negation of the finite! but the finite arises again in thesame way! so that it is no more sublated than not. n other words! thisinfinity e,presses only the re$uirement that the finite ought to besublated.G/5 t is therefore only the second option! a finite thing’sinternali#ation of its connection to its other! and thereby its recognitionthat it and its other are reciprocally constitutive! that produces genuine!rather than spurious! infinity. n a genuine infinity there are no longer anystrictly finite elements that limit and restrict each other! but only elements



that are moments of the whole! and therefore are what they are only inthat self;determining whole and in their relations to its other moments.:sing phraseology identical to that which mar&s the passage fromnecessity to freedom! Hegel says that Fthe genuine infinite . . . consists inremaining at home with itself ?bei sich selbstA in its other! or! when it ise,pressed as a process! in coming to itself ?#u sich selbstA in its other.G/6Returning to our e,amples! we can see that the mutually e,ternal planetsare irredeemably finite! the inveterate bachelor achieves only negative orspurious infinity! and the marriage partners achieve a genuine infinity. Theinfinitude of the bachelor is negative or spurious because even if he wereto abandon or deny his connection to an infinite number of partners! hewould never alter the fundamental finitude of his situation. :nable to findhimself at home in a union with another person! he clings to hisindependent identity and thus continues to e,perience humanrelationships as the imposition of necessity rather than as the condition of

freedom. 4ut the marriage partners! in transforming their understandingof their relationship! from that of an arrangement in which they happenthe place of freedom in hegel’s philosophy 0/ to have 9oined theirindependent identities to that of a union within which their sharedidentities as members are created and sustained! cease to e,perienceeach other as restrictive or limiting. nstead! they e,perience themselvesas mutually constitutive of the whole that ma&es them who they are! andwithin which they are thus at home. The conclusion to draw from this brief investigation of the Logic is this- for Hegel! freedom results from thetransfiguration of the finite into the infinite! and this transfiguration ta&es

place through an internali#ation of the e,ternal. 4y means of this process!one being discovers that its identity lies in being a member of a union withanother being that it once e,perienced as alien and restrictive. + being isliberated! that is! not by fleeing from what seems to be foreign to it! butthrough a reconciliation with its other that demonstrates that their mutualestrangement is not insuperable. reedom thus re$uires attaining self;determining individuality by renouncing independence- in Hegel’s terms! itre$uires achieving identity;in;difference! the contradiction embodied ingenuine love that the bachelor’s understanding cannot grasp./@ 1. ThePhilosophy of *pirit as an +ccount of reedom Hegel’s logical discussion of

freedom! and the e,amples used to illustrate it! show that freedom isavailable only to certain &inds of beings. (nly a being capable ofinternali#ing its e,ternal limitations! of achieving a genuine infinity byovercoming the apparent finitude of both itself and its other through ademonstration that the two are members of a larger! self;determiningunity! can be free. or Hegel! this means that no merely natural being iscapable of freedom. "atural beings! on his account! Fare more or lessmutually independent e,istences true! through their original unity theystand in mutual connection! so that none can be comprehended withoutthe others but this connection is in a greater or less degree e,ternal tothem.G0> Hegel’s contention is that Fin a greater or less degreeG all merelynatural beings are li&e the planets- interconnected and bound together as



elements of a whole ?the universe! and various smaller wholes within itA!yet mutually e,ternal at the same time. He e,presses this contention inthe claim that Feven in the most perfect form to which nature raisesitself . . . itM does not attain. . . to complete victory over the e,ternalityand finitude of its e,istence.G0/ This claim that natural beings areperpetually finite and sub9ect to e,ternality! together with his analysis ofthese concepts in the logic! allows Hegel to conclude that Fnot freedombut necessity reigns in nature.G00 f e,ternality! finitude! and thereforenecessity are the definitive characteristics of natural beings! then freedomis available only to those beings that are not merely natural. Hegel callssuch beings spiritual! 00 part i- hegel’s philosophy and his account ofthem in the philosophy of spirit begins! as we have already seen! with theclaim that Fthe essential . . . feature of spirit is freedom.G This claimshould not be ta&en to mean that Hegel believes in the e,istence of amysterious and free being! which he calls Fspirit.G Rather! his claim is that

of the perfectly ordinary beings with which we are familiar! all and onlythose that can 9ustifiably be called FspiritualG can 9ustifiably be called

Ffree.G (f course! this does not tell us when we are 9ustified in calling anordinary being Fspiritual.G 4ut it does at least indicate that the pro9ect ofunderstanding Hegel’s account of freedom coincides with the pro9ect ofunderstanding his account of spirit- the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy ofspirit is an attempt to develop an ade$uate understanding of theconditions under which a being can 9ustifiably be called spiritual! and thusfree. The philosophy of spirit begins by conceiving of spiritual beings assimply as possible- spiritual beings are those that are not merely

natural.01 This should not be ta&en to mean that spiritual beings aresupernatural! for on Hegel’s account everything spiritual is also natural.or e,ample! human beings ?who are spiritual in Hegel’s senseA are alsoanimals ?which are naturalA. 4ut our animality cannot account for ourfreedom. (n the contrary! in Hegel’s view it is the fact that humans arenot merely natural! but also spiritual! that gives us the freedom thatanimals lac&. *ince the definitive characteristic of natural beings is theinsuperability of their mutual e,ternality! the implication of understandingspiritual beings as not merely natural is that spiritual beings are those thatare capable of internali#ing their connections to everything that initially

seems to be alien to them! and therefore those for which nothing isirreducibly e,ternal- We must designate as the distinctive determinatenessof the concept of spirit! ideality! that is . . . the process of turning bac&?NurO c&&ehrenA B and u the accomplished turning bac& ?Nuruc&ge&ehrtseinA B into itself from its O other . . . What we have called theideality of spirit isM this triumph ?+ufhebungA over e,ternality. . . )veryactivity of spirit is nothing but a distinct mode of leading bac& ?NurOc&fuhrungA what is e,ternal to the inwardness u which spirit itself is! and itis only by this leading bac&! by this ideali#ation or assimilation! of what ise,ternal that it becomes and is spirit.02 Thus Hegel claims that! although

Fnot freedom but necessity reigns in nature!G Fthe substance of spirit isfreedom! that is! the absence of dependence on an other! the relating of



self to self.G0 This initial understanding of the spiritual! however!immediately issues in a conceptual contradiction- spiritual beings areconceived as free in virtue of being not merely natural! but as long asspiritual beings are conceived as merely not;natural they cannot be free.To be not;natural is the place of freedom in hegel’s philosophy 01 to berelated to what is natural as to something e,ternal and independent!which is to be finite and connected to nature in necessity rather than infreedom. +s Hegel puts it- F+t first! spirit stands in relationship to natureas to something e,ternal! and in this mode it is finite consciousness it&nows the finite and stands over against nature as an other B for! to beginwith! spirit e,ists as finite spirit. 4ut . . . as finite spiritM is conceived incontradiction with itself. *pirit is free.G0C *piritual beings must thereforebe reconceived in a way ade$uate to their freedom. (n the one hand!spiritual beings must continue to be conceived as not merely natural! sothat their difference from natural beings! in virtue of which they are

capable of overcoming necessity! is preserved. 4ut on the other hand!spiritual beings must not be conceived as merely not;natural! in virtue ofwhich they would be finite and sub9ect to necessity. Ta&en together! thesetwo re$uirements entail that spiritual beings must be conceived in such away that they internali#e their connection to the natural world and thuscome to be at home within it! but without lapsing bac& into a merelynatural e,istence. *piritual beings must be conceived in such a way thatthey achieve freedom through a positive reconciliation with the merelynatural world from which they differ! rather than through a negative flightfrom it.05 The process of revising the conception of the spiritual until

spiritual beings are understood to be reconciled with the natural worldwhile preserving their difference from it comprises the entire philosophy of spirit.06 +t each stage in this process! spiritual beings are conceived in away that is thought to be ade$uate to their freedom. 4ut reflection showseach of these conceptions! e,cept for the last! to be contradictory-spiritual beings are thought both to be free! and to be sub9ect toe,ternalities that limit their freedom. *uch contradictions force furtherrevisions that overcome the specific e,ternalities to which spiritual beingshave been thought to be sub9ect. This process! and with it the philosophyof spirit! ends only when a conception of spirit has been developed in

which spiritual beings are no longer sub9ect to e,ternality! and so are trulyselfdetermining and free- FThe entire development of the concept of spiritpresents only spirit’s freeing of itself from all its e,istential forms that donot accord with its concept! a liberation which is brought about by thetransformation of these forms into an actuality perfectly ade$uate to theconcept of spirit.G0@ The conceptual development that comprises thephilosophy of spirit ta&es place in three parts! which Hegel callssub9ective! ob9ective! and absolute spirit. +ll three are presented incondensed form in the final third of the )ncyclopedia. 8ore detailede,positions of the last two are also available. (b9ective spirit is presentedin the Philosophy of Right and the lectures on the philosophy of history.+bsolute spirit is presented in the lectures on aesthetics! religion! and the



history of philosophy. 02 part i- hegel’s philosophy *ub9ective! ob9ective!and absolute spirit thus present a series of attempts to conceive spiritualbeings in a way that is ade$uate to their freedom.1> *ub9ective! ob9ective!and absolute spirit appear in a determinate order because the conceptioneach presents internali#es the e,ternality to which spiritual beings aresub9ect in the preceding conception. This se$uence of conceptions is thusa se$uence of progressive internali#ations! through which spiritual beingsare ultimately conceived in a way that is ade$uate to their freedom.4ecause the freedom of spiritual beings is ade$uately conceived only atthe end of the philosophy of spirit! and because the philosophy of spiritends with absolute spirit! we can conclude that Hegel understands spiritualbeings to be most fully free in the activities that absolute spirit considers-the activities of art! religion! and philosophy. 8oreover! becausephilosophy is the last of these activities to be considered! we can concludethat it is through the practice of philosophy that Hegel considers the

liberation of spiritual beings to be complete. Hegel thus claims thatphilosophy is Fthe highest! the freest! and the wisest configuration ofspirit.G1/ 4ut &nowing that Hegel believes the practice of philosophy tocomplete the liberation of spiritual beings is not the same thing asunderstanding why he holds this belief. Part of this boo& provides aninterpretation of Hegel’s account of the freedom of spiritual beings thatultimately e,plains why and how Hegel believes the practice of philosophyto contribute to and complete our liberation. The final section of thischapter e,plains how that interpretation will be carried out. 2. *tructureand 8ethod of Part We can now see that to understand Hegel’s account

of freedom we need to understand his account of absolute spirit and theactivities it presents. 4ut in order to understand how spiritual beings areliberated by art! religion! and especially by philosophy! we need todetermine the specific &inds of e,ternality that these activities overcome.This amounts to determining the e,ternalities to which spiritual beingsremain sub9ect at the highest stage of ob9ective spirit. (b9ective spirit!which considers spiritual beings as willing beings! itself has three mainparts- abstract right! morality! and ethical life. To determine thee,ternalities that remain at the end of ethical life! we need to understandthe liberation that ethical life does in fact afford. +nd finally! in order to

understand this! we need to determine the specific &inds of e,ternalitythat ethical life overcomes! which amounts to determining thee,ternalities that remain at the end of morality and the reasons that thewilling sub9ect as conceived in morality! or the moral will! necessarily failsto overcome them.10 the place of freedom in hegel’s philosophy 0 Part addresses these problems in the order in which they arise in the course ofthe development of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. 'hapter 0 analy#esHegel’s account of the freedom of willing in the Philosophy of Right. Thisanalysis centers on morality! and shows that the moral will is internallycontradictory- the very features in virtue of which the will is supposed tobe free in morality prevent it from being so by ensuring that it remainsplagued by e,ternality. *pecifically! it shows that the content of the moral



will is inevitably e,ternal to its form. + by;product of this analysis is thusan understanding of Hegel’s famous criticism that the %antian conceptionof the autonomous will! which Hegel ta&es to be a moral one! is FemptyGor FformalG and therefore provides an insufficiently comprehensiveconception of freedom. 4y negative implication! this analysis alsodemonstrates how the will must be reconceived in ethical life if it is toliberate itself by internali#ing the limitations to which it is sub9ect inmorality. 'hapter 1 pic&s up where 'hapter 0 leaves off! with theassumption that at the highest stage of ethical life! that of the rationalstate! the spiritual sub9ect is conceived in such a way that it is as free asthe activity of willing can possibly ma&e it. t then analy#es the limitationsof willing! to show that even at the highest stage of ob9ective spirit thespiritual sub9ect is conceived in a way that remains internallycontradictory- the activity of willing! through which the spiritual sub9ect issupposed to overcome the e,ternality of nature! actually ensures that this

e,ternality persists. +gain negatively! this analysis indicates how thespiritual sub9ect must be reconceived in absolute spirit if it is to beliberated from the e,ternality endemic to all willing. 'hapter 2! with whichPart concludes! e,plores the ways in which the activities of absolutespirit! and especially philosophy! overcome the e,ternalities that remain atthe end of ob9ective spirit. This e,ploration finally shows us how Hegelunderstands the most comprehensive freedom of spiritual beings! and howhe understands the practice of philosophy to contribute to and completethis liberation. +t this point readers might benefit from referring to theaccompanying figure! which provides a s&eletal drawing of Hegel’s system.

The figure identifies both the location of Hegel’s account of freedom withinhis system! and the elements of that account on which Part focuses. Theanalyses in Part ma&e sense of the sections of the philosophy of spiritwith which they are concerned by employing the conceptualdeterminations found in Hegel’s Logic. +lthough this approach re$uiresengaging in a number of abstract and difficult logical discussions! suchengagement is both necessary and rewarding. t is necessary because!whether or not Hegel is right that the concepts developed in his Logicmust be used to comprehend spiritual beings! he does in fact so usethem and it is rewarding because! given that Hegel’s philosophy of spirit

0C part i- hegel’s philosophy Philosophy ?conceptual comprehension ofALogic Realphilosophie ?beingsA ?pure conceptsA "ature ?unfree beingsA*pirit ?free beingsA inite nfinite *ub9ective (b9ective ?willingA ?'hapter1A +bsolute +bstract Right 8orality ?'hapter 0A )thical Life +rt ReligionPhilosophy ?'hapter 2A ncreasingly comprehensive conceptions of thefreedom of spiritual beings reedom in Hegel’s system does use thoselogical concepts! our grasp of the philosophy of spirit is improved when weattend to that use. The first step in such analyses is to identify the logicalconcepts most relevant to understanding the section of the philosophy ofspirit being analy#ed. This identification cannot be made by see&ing ?orimposingA a formal pattern of correspondence ?one;to;one! or otherwiseAbetween the developments in the Logic and those in the philosophy of



spirit. Rather! one must attend $uite carefully to the details of Hegel’ste,ts- in the passages of the philosophy of spirit with which one isconcerned! it is often possible to find pointers ?both e,plicit and implicitAto relevant sections of the Logic and in passages of the Logic! it ispossible to find clues to the interpretation of various parts of thephilosophy of spirit. the place of freedom in hegel’s philosophy 05 (ncethis wor& is done! the second step is to use the identified logical conceptsto understand both the e,ternalities to which spiritual beings remainsub9ect in the conception under consideration! and the reconceptions thatare necessary to overcome those e,ternalities and increase theirfreedom.11 have tried to ma&e my discussions of the Logic as clear andconcise as possible! and to illustrate them with helpful e,amples. Where have not provided e,amples in the course of these logical discussions it isbecause ta&e the subse$uent discussions of the relevant portions of thephilosophy of spirit to serve as the most helpful illustrations. 0 TH)

R))D(8 ( W LL "3- H)3)L’* PH L(*(PHE ( R 3HT The goal of thischapter is to understand Hegel’s conception of the freedom of willing.:nderstanding this conception re$uires understanding its development outof Hegel’s criticisms of two other conceptions of the freedom of willing!that of liberalism and that of %ant! which he deems insufficientlycomprehensive. Hegel’s criticisms of liberal choice and %antian autonomy!and his own more comprehensive conception of the freedom of willing! arepresented most fully in his Philosophy of Right. The ntroduction developsand critici#es the liberal conception of freedom as choice the second mainsection! on morality! develops and critici#es the %antian conception of

autonomy and the third and final main section! on ethical life!incorporates choice and morality into Hegel’s own conception of thefreedom of willing as participatory citi#enship in a rational state. The heartof this chapter therefore consists of an analysis of these crucial sections of the Philosophy of Right. 8orality is the particular focus! because it is thepenultimate stage of ob9ective spirit. or this reason! understanding thee,ternalities that limit the freedom of willing sub9ects in morality is the&ey to understanding the liberation of those sub9ects in ethical life. )thicallife! as the final stage of ob9ective spirit! provides the most comprehensiveconception of the freedom available to the willing sub9ect. :nderstanding

the finitude or incomplete freedom of the moral will! and its liberatingreconception in ethical life! re$uires understanding parts of Hegel’sdiscussion of the concept of 9udgment in the Logic. *ection / thereforeprovides a brief account of the logical concept of 9udgment. *ection 0turns to the Philosophy of Right to consider the development of the moralconception of the will out of the conceptions presented in the ntroductionand abstract right. *ection 1 identifies the defining features of the moralwill and compares them to those of 9udgment. *ection 2 shows how thefinitude of the moral will is related to the finitude of 9udgment! and thene,amines three separate attempts of the 06 the freedom of willing-hegel’s philosophy of right 0@ moral will to overcome its finitude! againusing relevant sections of the Logic to help understand their failures. This



allows us to conclude that the moral will is insuperably finite specifically!as long as the willing sub9ect is conceived as having the featuresdistinctive to 9udgment! its content is necessarily e,ternal to itself. Thesection ends with a brief loo& at how the concept of 9udgment developsinto that of syllogism! and how this development illuminates the one thatta&es place in the transition from morality to ethical life. *ection concludes the chapter by e,amining the institutions of ethical life B thefamily! civil society! and the state B that complete the liberation of thewilling sub9ect./ /. The Logical 'oncept of 7udgment 7udgment appears inthe last of the three main sections of Hegel’s Logic! the sub9ective logic! orthe doctrine of the concept. The sub9ective logic is itself divided into threesections B sub9ectivity! ob9ectivity! and the idea B each of which is furthersubdivided. (ur concern is with sub9ectivity! of which the 9udgment ?das:rteil A is the second moment. The first moment of sub9ectivity is theconcept ?der 4egriff A! and the third moment is the syllogism ?der

*chlussA. The most basic form of 9udgment! with which we are all familiar!is the 9udgment of identity- F* is P.G Hegel points out that such a 9udgmenthas two essential! and mutually contradictory! features. irst! it is dividedinto two parts! the sub9ect and the predicate! which are held to beindependent of and therefore e,ternal to each other second! and at thesame time! those parts are asserted by the 9udgment to be implicitlyidentical or mutually internal. n addition to being a two;part relation ofsub9ect and predicate! the 9udgment is also! Hegel suggests! a three;partrelation of universality! particularity! and individuality. This is what itshares with the concept and the syllogism! which are also composed of

these three moments. The concept! the 9udgment! and the syllogism aredifferentiated by the distinct ways in which these three moments areinterrelated in each of them.0 n the concept! universality! particularity!and individuality are understood as being immediately identical to eachother. +s immediately identical! these Fmoments of the concept cannot beseparated.G1 This means that they must be thought as a single unity! thatnone of the three can be understood apart from the others- Fsince in theconcept their identity is posited! each of its moments can only be graspedimmediately on the basis of and together with the others.G2 Theinterrelation of universality! particularity! and individuality is otherwise in

9udgment. Hegel calls 9udgment the particular moment of sub9ectivity! bywhich he means two things. irst! in 9udgment universality! 1> part i-hegel’s philosophy particularity! and individuality are understood to beseparate from each other. )ach of the three is now understood to be whatit is independent of the character of the others they are not understoodto be immediately identical. *econd! and at the same time! the threemoments are understood to be related to each other in 9udgment in sucha way that they are inseparable they are understood to be implicitlyidentical.C The lin& between thin&ing of 9udgment in terms of sub9ect andpredicate! and thin&ing of it in terms of universality! particularity! andindividuality! lies in the fact that the sub9ect of a 9udgment is an individual!and the predicate is a universal. 8ore specifically! the sub9ect is a concrete



ma&ing good on the promise of 9udgment- the claim that its elements areimplicitly identical. The development of the concept of 9udgment in theLogic therefore amounts to a se$uence of attempts to overcome thiscontradiction in the initial conception of 9udgment by replacing thee,ternal and indeterminate copula with a particular bond internal to boththe universal and the individual moment- FTo restore theM identity of theconcept! or rather to posit it! is the goal of the movement of 9udgment.G@With this basic understanding of the relations between universal!particular! and individual that define the initial conception of 9udgment!and of the process of transforming these relations that defines thedevelopment of this conception! we can now turn our attention to theconcept of the will and its development in the Philosophy of Right. 0. Thenitial 'onception of the Will and ts Development The Philosophy of Rightpresents a series of conceptions of the will that develops in the course ofHegel’s attempt to thin& the will as truly free. The series contains four

main conceptions of the will! which are presented and developed in thefour main sections of the boo&- the introduction! abstract right! morality!and ethical life. )ach conception of the will is initially thought to beade$uate to the concept of the free will! but upon e,amination is shown tosuffer from limitations built into the very features that define it. Thissituation! which Hegel calls a contradiction ?since what the thing iscontradicts what it is supposed to beA! forces a reconception of the will.*pecifically! the will must be reconceived in a way that preserves thefreedom of the prior conception while overcoming its limitations. The newconception is then defined by those features that allow it to overcome the

limitations of the preceding conception ?and that ultimately determine itsown limitationsA./> 10 part i- hegel’s philosophy The moral will is thusdefined by the features that allow it to overcome the limitations of theconception of the will presented in abstract right. dentifying its definingfeatures therefore re$uires understanding the limitations inherent inabstract right! and the features of abstract right that produce thoselimitations. Those features of abstract right! however! develop specificallyin response to the limitations built into the features of the concept of thewill presented in the ntroduction. :nderstanding abstract right in order tounderstand morality thus re$uires understanding the ntroduction as well.

ortunately! our study of the ntroduction and abstract right need not becomprehensive. 8ost important is to pay attention to the shifting relationsamong the universal! particular! and individual moments of the will in thecourse of its development. This is because 9udgment! as we have 9ustseen! is defined by a specific &ind of relation of universality! particularity!and individuality. We will therefore identify the connection between

9udgment and the moral will by recogni#ing this specific relation ofuniversality! particularity! and individuality as constitutive of the moralwill. n the following discussion of the ntroduction and abstract right!then! we will emphasi#e the evolving relations between the universal!particular! and individual moments of the will that define its ongoingdevelopment! and that ultimately issue in the conception of the will that



defines morality. n the ntroduction to the Philosophy of Right! the will isconceived as the faculty of choice. +s such! it is understood to have threebasic moments or aspects. irst! there is the moment of abstraction! orindeterminacy- the will is free because it can abstract from any particularchoice! because it is not bound to pursue any particular interest. *econd!there is the moment of determination- the will is free because it candetermine itself to a particular choice! because it can choose to pursue aparticular interest. Third! there is the moment of remaining abstract indetermination- the will is free because even when it has determined itselfto a particular choice it can again abstract from it. This last momentmeans that even though every determination or choice that the will ma&esbelongs to it! the will is never defined by any particular choice that itma&es an important part of this freedom is the reali#ation that the willhas an identity that persists through an ongoing temporal process ofdetermining itself to! and abstracting itself from! particular choices and

interests. Thus freedom of the will! understood here as freedom of choice!is essentially freedom as possibility- the will is free because it is possiblefor it to pursue! or not to pursue! any of its chosen interests. Hegel alsodescribes these three moments of the choosing will in terms ofuniversality! particularity! and individuality.// The first moment is themoment of universality! because in it the will is understood as a persistententity that remains the same as it distinguishes itself from a variety of thefreedom of willing- hegel’s philosophy of right 11 particular contents byabstracting from them./0 The second moment is that of particularity! inwhich the will renounces its empty universality by identifying itself with a

particular content. The third moment is that of individuality! which Hegelunderstands as the unity of universality and particularity. The will is anindividual precisely because it is both particular and universal! bothcapable of identifying with a particular content ?which is essential toindividuality because it distinguishes this will from other willsA and awarethat it has a universal identity that is independent of any particularcontent with which it happens to identify ?without which it would bepermanently defined as the particular content it happened to have! andwould fail to achieve an individuality independent of itA./1 n theconception of the will as the faculty of choice! the universal and particular

moments are immediately identified with each other to yield the will’sindividuality. That is! the universality of the individual choosing will isdefined as the sum of its particular contents! and each of those particularcontents is defined as belonging to the individual in virtue of its beingincluded in the universal sum. 'onse$uently! it is impossible for thecontents of the universal and individual moments of the choosing will todiverge. *uch divergence could occur if the individual will attempted todetermine the particular contents that should belong to the universal! onthe basis of some nontrivial criteria! and then compared those contents tothe particular contents it actually had chosen to place within it. 4ut in thechoosing will! the only criterion for determining that a particular contentshould belong to the universal is that it actually does! that it actually has



been chosen for inclusion. This trivial criterion produces the immediateand undivorceable identity of universality! particularity! and individualitythat defines the choosing will./2 The immediacy of the connectionbetween the universal will and its particular contents! which defines andma&es possible freedom of choice! also e,plains one of the two significantlimitations of this form of the will- the choosing will is formal! in one of thetwo senses in which Hegel uses the term. This sense of FformalityGsignifies that there is no particular content intrinsic to the will! whichfollows from the fact that the universal will is merely immediatelyconnected to the particulars it subsumes rather than specifying whichparticulars necessarily belong to it! the universal will must simply acceptparticular contents that come to it e,ternally. n other words! even thoughthe will is free to pursue its chosen interests! it is not responsible for whatthose interests are. +t this level! its interests are merely Fthe drives!desires! and inclinations by which the will finds itself naturally

determined.G/ Thus freedom of choice consists in the will’s ability toresolve itself to satisfy a particular drive in a particular way! but does notentail that it satisfy one drive rather than another. +s a result! the FfreeGchoices of the will are actually determined by the relative strengths ofnatural inclinations! over which the will has no 12 part i- hegel’sphilosophy control. reedom re$uires that the content of the choice! aswell as the formal ability to choose! be a product of the will. +s long as thewill’s content is e,ternal to its form! the will is dependent on somethingother than itself! not fully independent! and not fully free. The secondlimitation of freedom of choice! which Hegel also calls formality! is its

dependence upon the ob9ects from which it is given to choose. n otherwords! the will that e,ercises freedom of choice has no control overwhether or not the e,ternal ob9ects necessary to satisfy its particulardrives are available to it. The choosing will is thus formal in the secondsense that it is merely sub9ective./C These two limitations ma&e thefaculty of choice an inade$uate and self;contradictory conception of thewill! which is supposed to be unlimited and free. The will must thereforebe reconceived in a way that overcomes its dual formality or duale,ternality! its limitation by given! e,ternal content and by given ?or notgivenA e,ternal ob9ects. The will’s freedom depends upon internali#ing!

ma&ing a part of itself! anything upon which it is dependent./5 n abstractright! therefore! the will is conceived as being committed to willing its ownfreedom it &nows that it must have its own freedom for its content orob9ect if it is to overcome its formality./6 t also &nows that the first stepin willing its own freedom and overcoming its formality is the overcomingof its sub9ectivity! its dependence on a world of natural ob9ects that ite,periences as e,ternal and limiting. The will of abstract right thus see&sits freedom by trying to claim some aspect of the e,ternal world as itsown. The first stage of its effort is the ownership of property! in which thewill identifies itself not only with its ability to choose! but also with anob9ect of its choice! with a small piece of the natural world./@ This locationof its freedom in an e,ternal ob9ect! which overcomes the mere



sub9ectivity of the choosing will! is the primary feature that characteri#esthe will in abstract right.0> That is! in all stages of abstract right! theindividual will identifies its freedom with something e,ternal to itself. Thedevelopment from stage to stage within abstract right represents theprogressive reconception of the will as it tries to overcome the limitationsthat arise from its initial identification of its freedom with a particular pieceof property. This development toward freedom in abstract right! as we willsee! leads to a reconception of the relationship among the universal!particular! and individual moments of the will. *pecifically! the universaland individual moments! which are immediately identified in the choosingwill! become separated and mutually e,ternal in abstract right. 8orality! aswe will also see! ultimately arises because although the will of abstractright overcomes the sub9ectivity of freedom as choice! its logical structureprevents it from ever overcoming its formality. The separation of universaland individual means that in none of its stages is the will of abstract right

able to develop a the freedom of willing- hegel’s philosophy of right 1content intrinsic to itself abstract right is never able to overcome thee,ternality of the individual will’s particular content from its universalform. The first stage of abstract right! freedom as the right to ownproperty! clearly remains formal in this sense of being without intrinsiccontent. Property does represent a development beyond choice in that itob9ectifies the will by subordinating a concrete thing in the world to thepurposes of the willing sub9ect. 4ut property remains an inade$uatee,istence for freedom! because the choice to own this piece of property isstill not a product of the will. t is essential to the free will that it own

property! but it is not essential that it own any particular piece of property!so the preference for one piece of property oer another cannot come from the will itself! and therefore no piece ofproperty that the will happens to identify with can be a truly sufficientob9ectification of its freedom. That is! although the will’s identification witha piece of property internali#es an ob9ect that was e,ternal to the will! thedecision to ma&e this particular identification remains e,ternal. *tillplagued with e,ternal dependence! the property;owning will remainsunfree. This is why the third moment of property is alienation ?)ntOusserungA- a 9ust as in the third moment of freedom as choice the will has

to be able to abstract itself from any determination it ma&es! in the thirdmoment of freedom as the right to own property it has to be able toabstract itself from any property it owns. Thus! Fit is not only possible forme to dispose of an item of property as an e,ternal thing B am alsocompelled by the concept to dispose of it as property in order that my will!as e,istent! may become ob9ective to me.G0/ This is not to say that mustrenounce all of my property! but rather that must renounce some of it if am to become conscious of the persistent identity of my will. reedomre$uires that be able to! and sometimes do! alienate my property failingto do so! would become permanently identified with a decision that didnot stem from my will! and could not conceive of myself as free.00 There$uirement that be able to alienate my property leads to the



re$uirement that my e,istence and rights as a free being be recogni#ed byanother being! and that reciprocally recogni#e this being as freelye,isting and bearing whatever rights freedom re$uires. This is because inorder to alienate property! to give up my ownership! must implicitlyrecogni#e that the ob9ect is now available to be claimed as property byany other free being who so desires to alienate my property involves therecognition of the property rights of others! even if there are no othersaround to claim ownership immediately. Li&ewise! for another free beingto ma&e an ownership claim on an ob9ect that once owned re$uires herto recogni#e me as the &ind of being who could have both legitimateownership of the ob9ect and the right to renounce that ownership to claimalienated property involves the recognition of 1C part i- hegel’s philosophythe property rights of others 9ust as much as the alienation of propertydoes. The result is a further ob9ectification of my freedom. 8y freedom isno longer ob9ectified solely in the ob9ects that own! but is now also

ob9ectified in another free being- FThis relation of will to will is the truedistinctive ground in which freedom has its e,istence.G01 n one sense!this is an advance! for shifting the ob9ectification of my freedom from theob9ects that own to other free property owners represents a small butimportant step on the path to finding my freedom in an ob9ect or contentthat is truly mine. This is because other free beings are less alien to methan unfree ob9ects are. +t the same time! however! this deepenedob9ectification also amounts to an increased interdependence. or the firsttime! my freedom is dependent upon the freedom of another! and herfreedom is dependent on mine. This is true not 9ust in the sense in which

it is true in the liberal conception of freedom B where the freedom of eachdepends on others’ not interfering with it B but in the more significantsense that without other free beings cannot be free at all. n the liberalconception can be a free individual! and in fact it will be easiest for me tobe free! if no other people even e,ist to encroach upon my freedomchoice is something that can e,ercise all by myself. Hegel’sdemonstration of the limitations inherent in understanding freedom aschoice! and his further development of the concept of freedom asre$uiring the ability to alienate property! show that without other freebeings who recogni#e my freedom myself cannot be free. He thus shows

that! parado,ically! increased freedom re$uires increasedinterdependence.02 'ontract! the structure that arises out of this mutualrecognition of free property owners! is the second main stage of abstractright. n contractual relationships Fthe contracting parties recogni#e eachother as persons and owners of property!G and they underta&e to e,ercisetheir rights by e,changing property with each other.0 +t this stage! thefreedom of a person resides not only in the property she chooses to own!but also in the contracts she enters into! and in her respect for andperformance of the obligations contained in those contracts. 'ontractsunite the will not only with the ob9ects being e,changed! but also with thewill of the other party. Whereas in owning property raise a particularob9ect to the universal! by e,ternali#ing my will in it and ma&ing it one



means among many of serving my ends! in contractual relationships alsoraise my particular will to the universal. This is done by positing acommon will that the two contracting! particular wills share. )ach willremains distinct! yet also enters into community with the other! by meansof this universal will.0C n this way! contract furthers freedom- it dissolvesnot only the e,ternality between myself and particular ob9ects! but alsothe e,ternality between my particular will and other particular wills.05 thefreedom of willing- hegel’s philosophy of right 15 4ut thisreconceptuali#ation of the will that ta&es place in contract also gives riseto the limiting structure that can ultimately be overcome only by movinginto morality. The interdependence involved in freedom as contracteffectively doubles the conception of the will. )ach individual will is nowunderstood to be composed of two distinct parts- a particular will of itsown! and a universal will that it shares with the other wills involved in thecontract. +s Hegel puts it! Fin any relationship of immediate persons to

one another! their wills are not only identical in themselves and! in acontract! posited by them as common! but also particular.G06 The greatsignificance of this development is that for the first time the particular anduniversal moments of the individual will are divided. n fact! the universalmoment is now understood not to reside within the individual will itself!but to be a creation that it shares with one or more other wills! whiche,ists only in the contracts negotiated between them. Thus the universalmoment! upon which the freedom of the individual will depends! is nowitself e,ternal to the individual will and its particular contents. This meansit is now possible for an individual’s pursuit of her chosen interests ?the

particular contents of her willA to diverge from the re$uirements of herfreedom ?the particular contents of the universal willA whereas theparticular contents of the choosing will are immediately identified with itsuniversality ?because its universality is simply defined as the sum of itsparticular contentsA! their identification is now uncertain or contingent.This can be seen more clearly with the help of a simple e,ample. enterinto any contractual relationship for two reasons- to satisfy my particularinterest in some property or another ? prefer your piece of land in lorida!for instance! to the one have in +las&aA! and to satisfy my universalinterest! shared by all free beings! in ob9ectifying my freedom by

participating in and respecting contractual arrangements. f all goes well!one and the same relationship will satisfy both of my interests- thecontract will enable me to get the particular property want! and toob9ectify my freedom with another free being. 4ut all may not go well- Fitis purely contingent whether . . . particular wills are in conformity with thewill which has being in itself! and which has its e,istence solely throughthe former.G0@ n some cases! my universal interest will be satisfied ?avalid contract is e,ecuted and respectedA! while my particular one is not ?am disappointed with the e,change have madeA. n other cases! myparticular interest will be satisfied ? get what wantA! while my universalone is not ? may violate the mutual respect of rights that contractsre$uire B for e,ample! by defrauding my counterpartA. n this latter case



satisfy my chosen interest! yet violate the re$uirements of my ownfreedom in the process in defrauding someone elevate my particularinterest over my universal one! which prevents me from being a freeindividual-F f the particular will for itself is different from the universal! itsattitude and volition are characteri#ed by arbitrariness and 16 part i-hegel’s philosophy contingency! and it enters into opposition to that whichis right in itself this is wrong.G1> f this occurs! if the particular will doesnot conform to the universal! right is merely a *chein ?a semblance ofwhat it should be! having an e,istence inappropriate to its essenceA! andit! as well as freedom! must be restored by repairing the wrong havecommitted.1/ t is important to emphasi#e that in failing to respectfreedom as contract wrong not only the victim of the fraud or crime! butalso myself. violate the victim’s rights as a free property owner and partyto a contract! but in doing so also violate the sphere of contractual rightsin general. *ince respect for these rights is essential to my own freedom!

wrong myself as a free will that fails to respect freedom! fail to respector to be ade$uate to my own essence. This is why it is my freedom thatmust be restored! and not only that of the victim. There is no guarantee!however! that will recogni#e the harm that have done or! even if dorecogni#e the harm! that will ta&e steps to repair it. +fter all! to commita crime is to place my particular interests ahead of the universal! andthere is no reason to thin& that will alter my priorities if left to my owndevices. The only solution is that society must punish me if commit acrime. This punishment is for the sa&e of both 9ustice and freedom. tserves the former by restoring right! and the latter by restoring my

respect for right! which is essential to my freedom. +s Hegel puts it! Fthein9ury which is infiicted on the criminal is not only 9ust in itself . . . it isalso a right for the criminal himself.G10 Punishment! for Hegel! protects usfrom destroying our own freedom by pursuing our particular interestswithout respect for right punishment is a means by which society protectsa person from herself for the sa&e of her own freedom. t does so byturning her will from the particular ?her own contingent drives and needsAto the universal ?the re$uirements that stem from her own nature as afree beingA. However! punishment can only restore respect for right! andthereby protect freedom! if it is 9ust. :n9ust punishment again gives

precedence to a particular interest over the universal! and is thereforeonly another wrong! which restores neither right nor respect for right. 4utat this stage there is no guarantee that punishment will be 9ust B for thewill that e,acts punishment has the same basic features as the will thatcommitted the wrong! and is therefore e$ually capable of placing itsparticular and sub9ective interests ahead of the universal. To ensure that

9ustice is done! the punishing will must be “ a will which! as a particularand sub9ective will! also wills the universal as such.G11 4ut this can onlyhappen if the will is reconceived in such a way that the universal willresides within the individual! if the ob9ect in which the freedom of the willresides is again ?as it was in the case of freedom as choiceA ta&en to bethe individual will itself. Without this reconception! the freedom of willing-



hegel’s philosophy of right 1@ the universal confronts the individual will assomething e,ternal! to which the conformity of its particular contents istherefore contingent.12 n this reconception! however! the relationship ofparticular and universal cannot merely revert to what it was in thechoosing will without also reinstating the limitations inherent in choice.This must be avoided! while simultaneously overcoming the limitationsproduced by the separation of universal and particular in abstract right.The latter re$uires reuniting the particular and universal moments of thewill within the individual! and the former re$uires that their identificationno longer be immediate and abstract the internali#ed universal will mustnot identify with whatever particular contents it happens to find! butinstead must determine out of itself the particular contents necessary tothe free individual. We can now recapitulate the development of the will inabstract right. n abstract right! the will tries to give itself internal contentand ob9ective e,istence! which it lac&s when conceived as the faculty of

choice. t achieves ob9ectivity in property! thus internali#ing one of thee,ternal factors upon which the choosing will is dependent! but remainsformal. The formality of the will! the fact that no particular property isnecessary to it! gives rise to its need to be able to alienate its property!which gives rise to the need to engage in contractual relations with otherfree wills. This deepens the will’s ob9ectification! but also separates theparticular will and the universal will! and forces the e,ternali#ation of thelatter from the individual. +s a result! the will is still formal- the drives ofthe particular will continue to be given to it e,ternally as naturalinclinations! and there is no guarantee that they will coincide with the

universal will! which is now a re$uirement of its freedom. This! finally! isthe death of the will of abstract right. +s long as the will locates itsfreedom in an ob9ect e,ternal to itself! which is what characteri#esabstract right! there is always the possibility that the content of the will!its own particular drives! may be at odds with its own freedom! its ownuniversality. +lthough it is also possible for the will’s particular drives toaccord with its freedom! if this is in fact the case it is only accidentally orcontingently so! not owing to any feature of the will itself.1 This ma&esthe will of abstract right an inade$uate conception of the will and results inthe need to reconceive the will in such a way that it determines its own

particular contents out of its newly reinternali#ed universal moment. 1.The 8oral 'onception of the Will The needed reconception ta&es place inthe transition from abstract right to morality- The will of abstract rightMfirst posits itself in the opposition between the universal will which hasbeing in itself and the particularM will which has being for itself then! bysuperseding this opposition B the negation of 2> part i- hegel’s philosophythe negation B the moral willM determines itself as will in its e,istence! sothat it is not only a free will in itself! but also for itself! as self;relatednegativity . . . The infinite sub9ectivity of freedom! which now has beingfor itself! constitutes the principle of the moral point of view.1C This saysthat in abstract right! as we have 9ust seen! the individual will ta&es itsfreedom ?the universal will that has being in itself A to e,ist independent



of ?that is! in opposition toA itself and its particular contents. Thisconstitutes a negation! because the individual will is understood not to bethe e,istence of the universal will. Rather! the universal will is thought toe,ist outside any individual will! in the contracts that bind a number ofproperty;owning wills together! and in the punishments that enforcebreaches of those contracts. The moral will arises when! for the reasonswe saw earlier! this negation has to be negated the individual moral willunderstands that it is the e,istence of the universal will! which is thereforeinternal to it. The moral will’s location of its universal moment within itselfma&es it not only a free will in;itself ?that is! it not only implicitly is thee,istence of freedomA! but also a free will for;itself ?that is! it also ta&esitself to be the e,istence of freedomA. This is e$uivalent to its being self;related! or an infinite sub9ect! both of which signify that the moral will&nows itself to be determined only by itself! since it &nows itself to be thee,istence of the concept that determines it.15 The moral will is not only

self;related! but is a self;related negativity because it understands itself tobe internally divided! to have parts that FnegateG each other in theirmutual differentiation! yet are held together within a single self.*pecifically! the individual moral will understands itself to contain both itsparticular contents and its universal concept! and understands that thetwo are not yet identical but must be made so! if the moral will is toensure! as the will of abstract right cannot! that it wills its own freedom.We can now recogni#e that in the transition from abstract right to moralitythe will has become particulari#ed! and this recognition allows us to beginto connect the moral will to the logical concept of 9udgment- the moral will

is the particular moment of the will! 9ust as 9udgment is the particularmoment of sub9ectivity generally. n the moral will! as in 9udgment!universality! particularity! and individuality are both divided and heldtogether! &nown to be different and assumed to be implicitly identical.16ts particulari#ation differentiates the moral will from the choosing will! inthe same way that 9udgment is differentiated from the concept- althoughthe moral will and the choosing will are similar ?and differentiated fromthe will of abstract rightA in locating their universal moment withinthemselves! they differ in the sense that the moral will is aware of the thefreedom of willing- hegel’s philosophy of right 2/ distinction between itself

as individual and universal! and is resolved to overcome this difference! toma&e e,plicit the implicit identity of these two moments by demonstratingthat their particular contents are the same. The choosing will! on the otherhand! immediately identifies its universal moment with whateverparticular contents it happens to have. +s we have seen! this ma&es itformal! because it is determined by ends and purposes not intrinsic to itsuniversal form! particular ends that are simply given to it as naturalinstincts. n order to overcome this formality and become free! theindividual moral will must determine out of its own universal concept theparticular ends and purposes to which it applies itself! transforming itse,istence from a natural form into a form that it prescribes. 7ust as thewill of abstract right &nows that it must own and use property! the moral



will &nows that it must ta&e genuine ownership of itself or! as Hegel says!have its personhood as its ob9ect.1@ The fact that the individual will’sparticular contents and universal form are still distinct at the outset ofmorality ?even though the will now understands its universal moment tobe internal to itself A means that the contingent identification of the two!which was the undoing of abstract right! has been internali#ed but not yetovercome.2> Li&e 9udgment! the moral will implicitly assumes the identityof its universal and individual moments! but without initially providing anydeterminate! particular basis for this implicit assumption.2/ +nd thisleaves open the possibility that the particular contents of universalfreedom and the particular contents of the individual moral will may be atodds. The need to overcome this opposition between the individual willand its universal concept ma&es morality Fthe point of view of relationship!obligation! or re$uirement.G20 The course of morality thus presents theattempt to thin& the moral will in a way that fulfills its obligation by

overcoming the internal opposition that &eeps its particular contentse,ternal to its universal form- The process within this sphere is such thatthe will which at first has being only for itself! and which is immediatelyidentical only in itself with the will which has being in itself ?i.e.! with theuniversal willA is superseded and leaving behind it this difference in whichit has immersed itself in itself! it is posited for itself as identical with thewill which has being in itself.21 dentification of the process of morality asthe positing of the determinate identity of its universal and individualmoments! which are initially separate and connected only e,ternally!completes the connection between 9udgment and the moral will! for this is

the same process that is re$uired of 9udgment itself. 7udgment! we saw!must unite its individual sub9ect with its universal predicate not throughan empty copula! but with a determinate and particular content thatbelongs to both sides of the 20 part i- hegel’s philosophy 9udgment. Theindividual moral will! li&ewise! must secure its freedom by ensuring theconformity of its particular contents to its universal form! which it can doonly if it can determine the particulars that genuinely belong to itsuniversal side. We can thus conclude that 9udgment and the moral will areali&e in both conceptual structure and process. nitially! they are definedby having a structure that presupposes the mutual e,ternality of their

universal! particular! and individual moments! at the same time that itassumes and asserts their identity. 4ecause this structure is self;contradictory! both 9udgment and the moral will are then defined by theattempt to demonstrate the mutual internality of their moments! bydetermining the particular contents inherent in the universal that theindividual must adopt as its own. n the case of the moral will! theinternali#ation of its own moments is necessary to its internali#ation of thee,ternal dependencies that plague the choosing will and the will ofabstract right- the dependency on e,ternal content and an e,ternal world.The moral will’s internali#ation of its own moments is thus essential to thespiritual sub9ect’s process of selfliberation through coming to &now itselfas being without insuperable e,ternality. n the ne,t section we will



consider the finitude of 9udgment! and the re$uirements that must be metif this finitude is to be overcome. We will then e,amine in detail how thisfinitude is connected to the finitude of the moral will! and how the moralwill see&s to overcome it. We will identify three distinct stages of themoral will’s effort! each of which is connected to its own specific logicalstructure! and will see that precisely because of their connections to theselogical structures all of the moral will’s efforts must fail. n the last ofthese efforts! the moral will see&s to use the power of the highest form of

9udgment to overcome the finitude built into its structure of 9udgment. nunderstanding the failure of this effort! then! we will understand not onlythe ultimate finitude of the moral will! but also that of 9udgment itself inthe failure of the moral will we will discover that 9udgment is unable tointernali#e the individual and the universal without losing its form of

9udgment and becoming syllogism. This will show us that a conception ofthe truly free will must shed the structure of 9udgment! cease being a

moral will! and adopt the structure of syllogism! becoming an ethical will.2. The ncomplete reedom of the 8oral Will Recalling our previousdiscussions of finitude and 9udgment! it is easy to see that 9udgment isfinite in the sense that it fails to be what it claims to be! and is therefore alimited e,pression of! or inade$uate to! its own concept. 7udgment’s claim!we have seen! is that its sub9ect and predicate! the freedom of willing-hegel’s philosophy of right 21 its individual and universal moments! areimplicitly identical even though they appear to be separate andindependent. This claim is sta&ed in the copula! which asserts that theindividual sub9ect is identical to the universal predicate. 7udgment fails to

ma&e good this claim! we have also seen! because the copula’s assertionof identity is merely immediate. The identity claim can be 9ustified only onthe basis of a demonstration that the particular contents of the individualsub9ect truly are those of the universal determinacy attributed to it! butthe empty copula is devoid of particularity. n failing to ma&e good its ownclaim! 9udgment fails to be what it ought to be! and is therefore finite. Thefact that 9udgment is finite in this sense means that its sub9ect andpredicate are finite in the other sense discussed earlier- the individualsub9ect and the universal predicate are mutually e,ternal. This is a directconse$uence of 9udgment’s failure to demonstrate their identity in virtue

of shared particulars. *uch particulars! if shown to be contained in boththe sub9ect and the predicate they unite! would provide proof of theinternal identity of the two! proof that the individual truly is the universal.n the absence of such particulars! however! they are lin&ed only by theempty copula! which is e,ternal to the sub9ect and predicate! and whichtherefore leaves them e,ternal to each other.22 +s a result! the individualsub9ect! which is supposed to be infinite in virtue of containing within itself the universal determinacies that define its own nature! e,periences thosedeterminacies and that nature as independent of itself! and is thereforefinite.2 (vercoming the finitude of 9udgment! and thereby overcomingthe finitude of its sub9ect and predicate! re$uires the development of alogical form in which the connection between the individual sub9ect and



the universal moment is not immediate! and therefore e,ternal andcontingent! but mediated through particulars belonging to both! andtherefore internal and necessary. (nly in such a form could the individualfind its freedom in being bound to a universal that is truly its own. Thedevelopment of the various stages of 9udgment in the Logic chronicles theattempts of 9udgment to become such a form! to become ade$uate to itsown concept. n Hegel’s terms! the development of 9udgment amounts toa process of raising the individual to the universal! or of ma&ing theuniversal not only an sich but also fO r sich! by giving the universal ue,istence in an individual sub9ect that &nows itself to be the e,istence ofthe universal.2C This is done by gradually forging a determinate identitybetween the sub9ect and predicate of the 9udgment. This determination oftheir identity amounts to what Hegel calls a fulfillment of the copula! atransformation of the implicit and therefore e,ternal identity provided bythe empty is into an e,plicit and therefore internal identity provided by

concrete particulari#ation of the universal.25 The successive stages of 9udgment increasingly appro,imate this final copulation. 22 part i- hegel’sphilosophy However! as the Logic ultimately shows! the successfulfulfillment of the copula cannot be accomplished by 9udgment! becausethat fulfillment amounts to the overcoming of 9udgment the fulfilledcopula internali#es the universal and individual so thoroughly that itdestroys one of 9udgment’s defining features B namely! the essentialdifference of its moments. The development of 9udgment thusdemonstrates that in all of its stages 9udgment is a self;contradictorylogical concept- what 9udgment is ?the particulari#ation of its universal!

particular! and individual momentsA is always at odds with what 9udgmentclaims to be ?the identification of universality and individuality throughparticularityA.26 7udgment thus remains finite! even in its highest forms.The internali#ation of individuality and universality necessary for infinitudeis found not in 9udgment! but in syllogism! the concept that follows it inthe development of Hegel’s Logic.2@ +fter considering the connection ofthe finitude of 9udgment to that of the moral will! and the moral will’sfailed attempts to overcome its finitude! we will conclude this section byconsidering the development from 9udgment to syllogism! and the paralleldevelopment from morality to ethical life. The first sense in which the

moral will is finite is a direct result of its having the structure of 9udgment!and therefore correlates directly to the first sense in which 9udgment itself is finite- the moral will asserts the identity of its individual and universalmoments but! at least initially! provides no proof of its assertion! and thusfails to be what it claims to be. The individual moral will! that is! insiststhat it can ensure its conformity to its universal concept! but leaves theuniversal indeterminate and thus leaves its conformity to it contingent.The conse$uence of the moral will being finite in this sense is! 9ust as it isin 9udgment! the finitude of its moments- as long as the particularcontents of its universal moment remain undetermined! the individualmoral will and its universal concept are mutually e,ternal. n other words!the FinfiniteG moral sub9ect is not truly infinite! because the concept that



cannot be conceived merely as potentiality! spontaneity! or possibilityrather! the moral will must give its freedom e,istence in action! since it isaction that translates internal ends or purposes into the e,ternal world. 2The moral will must therefore identify itself with its actions! much as inabstract right the will had to identify itself with its property. 4ut an actionis the proper e,pression of freedom only if it 2C part i- hegel’s philosophymeets the criteria described earlier! and so the moral will identifies itselfonly with actions that meet those criteria. irst! the moral will identifieswith an action only if it recogni#es it as sub9ective! or its own. 8ostbasically! the will must recogni#e the action as something it did onpurpose! a $uality that Hegel calls being formally its own. He discussesthis demand in Purpose and Responsibility! the first main section ofmorality. n addition! the will must recogni#e the content of the action asits own! which occurs only if the action is described in accordance with theintention under which the will claims to have performed it. Hegel discusses

this in morality’s second main section! ntention and Welfare. 4ut even ifthe moral will finds satisfaction in an action performed on purpose andunder an intentional description that it recogni#es as its own! it is stillfinite! still not completely free. The moral will here is limited in much thesame way that the choosing will was- it is able to determine itself tosatisfy particular ends with particular means! but the particular ends ithappens to have are still given to it- Fthe as yet abstract and formalfreedom of sub9ectivity has a more determinate content only in its naturalsub9ective e,istence B its needs! inclinations! passions! opinions! fancies!etc.

dudley sets hegel within some account i full vers

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