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JT8DStatic omonentReliability Stpidy

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'7 ~K" 1jII2 JUL 1 1992 1521,

March 1992

Final Report

This document is available to the U.S. ptublicthrough the National Technical InformnationSermie, Springfield, Virginia 22.161

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U.S. Department ofTaspeaio ~parument of the Air ForceFederal Aviation Administration Oklahoma Oty Air

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NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department ofTransportation and the Department of the Air Force in the interest ofinformation exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability forthe contents or use thereof.

The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers.Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are consideredessential to the objective of this report.

T.clicel Ropset Docuemt.ion Palo

.6 e.t No. . Gev.nmage Aesoosioe N. 3. Recipient's CateIeg Me.

DOT/FAA/CT-91 /104. Title end Subtitle S. Re 0..t r0

March 1992TURBINE AIRCRAFT ENGINE OPERATIONAL TRENDING 6arch 199C

AND JT8D STATIC COMPONENT RELIABILITY STUDY

7._ 8. Pewfennig Orgenizetien R.eOt No.7. Av~eoe s).

A.Bruce Richter, Margaret Ridenour-Bender, Mike Tsao DOT/FAA/CT-91/10

9. Peef0usng Ofloeniastiee ineo and Address 10. Wek Unit N. (TRAIS)Science Applications International Corp.Logistics Technology Division I1. Contrat G e. N.4335 Piedras Drive, West Suite #223 F04606-89-D-036San Antonio, Texas 78228 13. Type of Repe, end Period Covered

12. Spmn...., Agey M ~ wW Add... Final ReportU.S. Department of Transportation and * To 3e2or9Federal Aviation Administration 3 /28/90 To 3/28/91Technical Center 1d. Spseuine Agency CodeAtlantic City International Airport, NJ 08405

IS. s plm'ey olMe..*Department of the Air Force, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center

Technical Center Project Manager: David Galella

16. Ahstet.

The engine subpanel of the June 1988 International Conference on AgingAirplanes identified the need to study aircraft turbine engine staticcomponents for reliability problems resulting from aging effects. Thisstudy trended in-flight shutdowns and unscheduled removal rates of JT8D,CF6, and JT3D turbine aircraft engines for the two year period ofFebruary 1988 through January 1990. Specific engine components on theJT8D engines of air carriers frequently exceeding the industry normduring the trending period were identified. This review resulted in thefollowing types of component failures occurring: hard failures, wear andtear/inspection failures, structural failures, diagnostictroubleshooting, and maintenance errors. In addition to specific JT8Dengine components being identified, an ultrasonic inspection procedurewas developed for the JT8D engine outer combustor case boss.

17. Key wrd$ Actuarial Analysis 1. OD0tilifenm StteementCase Drain Boss Weld Document is available to the publicIn-flight Shutdowns through the National TechnicalService Difficulty Report (SDR) Data Base Information Service, SpringfieldUltrasonic Inspection Virginia 22161Unscheduled Engine Removals19. Securiy Clesaf. (So ti see*) 30. ser 7 Cleif. (of hi po ) 21. Me. of Peg- 22 Price

Unclassified I Unclassified 76

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Itepn6.e f 6 ompleted Pqe, euthfized

PREFACE

This report was prepared by Science Applications International Corporation under contractnumber F04606-89-D-036 Delivery Order Number SD06 with the Department of the Air Force,Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)Technical Center.

The JT8D, CF6. and JT3D engine trending analysis was conducted by the Logistics TechnologyDivision located in San Antonio, Texas. A. Bruce Richter and Margaret Ridenour-Benderperformed the actuarial data analysis. The development of the Nondestructive Inspection(NDI) technique for the JT8D engine outer combuster cases was accomplished by the UltraImage International Division located in New London, Connecticut, under the direction ofRobert H. Grills and Mike C. Tsao.

Accesion For

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vil

INTRODUCTION 1

Purpose 1Background 1

PROCEDURE I

Actuarial Data Sources 1Trending Methodology 2Component Performance Analysis 6

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 6

Actuarial Trending Results 6Component Failure Results 25Engine Case Failure Analysis 28Ultrasonic Scanner Design 29Scanner Demonstration Results 30

CONCLUSIONS 41

APPENDICES

A - Component Performance by Disguised Airline

B - Ultra Image IfI Specifications

C - NDI Procedure Description

III

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1 Sample Data Comparing Airline ABC To The Rest Of The Industry

For B-727 JT8D Unscheduled Engine Removal Rates 19

2 Sample Data Comparing Airline ABC To The Rest Of The Industry

For B-727 JT8D In-flight Engine Shutdown Rates 20

3 PWA Outer Combustor Case Inspection Design 29

4 Schematic Of JT8D Engine And Locations Of The Drain Boss Welds 31

5 Schematic Of Prototype JTD Motorized Boss Weld Scanner 32

6 Prototype Motorized JT8D Boss Weld Scanner 33

7 JT8D Boss Weld Specimen And Calibration Standard 34

8 Prototype Motorized JT8D Boss Weld Scanner On

Calibration Standard 35

9 Ultra Image IlTM With Prototype Scanner Testing On

Calibration Standard 36

10 Ultra Image IITM Inspection Of Calibration Standard 37

11 Ultrasonic Scanner Results Of Four Simulated Flaws In A

PWA Drain Boss Sample 38

12 Ultrasonic Scanner Results On A PWA Drain Boss With No Flaws 39

13 Calibration Test Standard Using New Software 40

V

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 B-727 / JTBD Engine In-flight Shutdowns 4

2 B-727 / JT8D Engine Removals 5

3 In-flight Shutdown Calculations, 7

4 Engine Removal Calculations 13

5 B-727 / JTD Airline Macro Scan 21

6 B-737 / JTSD Airline Macro Scan 21

7 DC-9 / JTD Airline Macro Scan 22

8 A-300/ CF6 Airline Macro Scan 22

9 B-767 / CF6 Airline Macro Scan 23

10 DC- 10/ CF6 Airline Macro Scan 23

11 B-707 / JT3D Airline Macro Scan 24

12 DC-8 / JT3D Airline Macro Scan 24

13 Masked Airlines Operating JT8D Engines With Various Airframes

Identified For Component Performance Analysis 25

14 JTSD Component Failure Trends 1983 To 1990 26

vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The engine subpanel of the June 1988 International Conference on Aging Airplanes identifiedthe need to study aircraft turbine engine static components for reliability problems due toaging effects and, where needed, to develop improved inspection techniques for these staticcomponents. Subsequently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Center andthe U.S. Department of the Air Force Jointly contracted Science Applications InternationalCorporation (SAIC) to carry out such an investigation.

The approach taken by SAIC was to trend the in-flight shutdowns and unscheduled removalrates of JT8D, CF6. and JT3D turbine aircraft engines for the two year period from February1988 to January 1990. These data are currently collected each month by the FAA andpublished in the Air Carrier Aircraft Utilization and Propulsion Reliability Reports. Usingactuarial data from these reports. monthly industry-wide averages of shutdown andunscheduled removal rates were calculated for each airframe and engine combination. Ratedata from individual U.S. operators of those engines were then compared to the monthlyindustry averages and the results were trended to determine which operators were experiencinghigher than normal engine shutdown and removal rates. Since the ultimate purpose of thisstudy was to identify possible reliability problems with engine static components. no airlinesor operators were identified. For this reason, all operator names throught this report havebeen masked to ensure anonymity.

Once the operators that frequently exceeded the industry normal rates for shutdowns andremovals were determined, the FAA's Service Difficulty Report (SDR) data base was queried foreach of those operators to determine which components may have caused the higher thannormal shutdowns and removals. Although trending was accomplished for the JT8D. CF6, andthe JT3D, the scope of this report was to perform the SDR component analysis for only theJT8D engine. The JT8D was chosen as the focus of this study because it has been in service forover twenty years, its application is on three separate airframes (B-727. B-737. and DC-9). andbecause there are currently over 10.000 such engines still in commercial service.

From the actuarial trending, ten operators of JT8D engines were selected to be furtheranalyzed using data from the SDR system. For these 10 operators, the SDR data base wasanalyzed for the period from January 1983 to May 1990 to identify components possiblyresponsible for the higher than normal shutdowns and removals. The following componentsand conditions were discovered:

Hard Failures

- #3 Bearing- #4.5 to #6 Oil Bearing Tube

Wear and Tear / Inspection Failures

- 13th Stage Bleed Air Duct- Turbine Blades

Structural Failures

- Case Cracking

Diagnostic Troubleshooting

Fuel Controls. Pumps

vii

Maintenance Practices

- Oil Cap Unsecured- Fuel / Oil Heater Valve Wired Open- 01 Screen Studs Pulled Loose- Oil Seals Pinched

Based upon discussions with Pratt and Whitney Aircraft (PWA) and the FAA. SAIC developedan improved technique to inspect the three outer combustor case drain boss welds forcracking. Although PWA had developed an on-wing ultrasonic inspection technique that couldInspect the weld near the bolt holes of the bosses for cracking, it was possible to miss cracksdeveloping near the weld but away from the bolt holes. To improve this Inspection, anautomated ultrasonic scanner system was designed by SAIC that could access the drain bossesthrough the exhaust duct of the engine and scan a larger area of the drain boss weldsand boltholes. The scanner was tested on several combustor cases at PWA and successfully detected thenotches specified in the PWA Alert Service Bulletin 5676. revision 6. Appendix B. The scannerwas designed so that with minor modification, It could be applicable to other commercialengines.

This study concluded that the FAA Air Carrier Aircraft Utization Propulsion ReliabilityReport contains valuable actuarial information that can be used to document reliability trendsof specific engines. The actuarial trending and component failure analysis using the SDRsystem were useful In determining which components may require modification and/ornondestructive Inspection procedures to ensure their integrity. Based upon data collected fromthe trending and SDR analysis, the outer combustor case on the JT8D engine was chosen anddemonstrated to be one static part that could be inspected more thoroughly by applying state ofthe art ultrasonics and automated scanning techniques.

Vili

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to conduct an actuarial trending analysis to review theoperational reliability of the JTSD engine, and also to develop a successful nondestructiveinspection (NDI) procedure for the JT8D engine outer combustor cases. Observations.conclusions, and recommendations on specific airline operational performance andmaintenance practices were not part of the purpose of this task. In that regard, no Identities ofspecific airlines performance and component failures have been made. Actuarial data werealso collected on the CF6 and JT3D engines. Preliminary reliability results were calculated onthe CF6 and JT3D, however, a more in-depth component failure analysis was not performedfor this phase of the work. The objectives of the NDI program were to design and construct aprototype automatic scanner and to develop an inspection procedure for on-aircraft inspectionof JTMD combustor case drain boss welds using an ultrasonic imaging method. The NDIprocedure was developed so that with minor modifications, the procedure could be applicableto other engines such as the CF6. JT3D. and JM9D.

BAC EROUND

The aerospace industry's attention toward aging aircraft has generally been focused uponaircraft fuselage structures. The thought about aircraft engines has historically been thatengines were periodically "regenerated" through scheduled maintenance and modificationprograms. For many of the dynamic components, like blades, disks, and spacers, this isbasically true and applies equally to some static parts like vanes and combustors. However,other static parts such as fan, compressor. combustor, diffuser, turbine, and exhaust cases arenot life limited and therefore not subject to periodic replacement.

The engine subpanel of the June 1988 International Conference on Aging Airplanes identifiedthe need for improved nondestructive inspection (NDI) procedures for aircraft turbine enginecases and frames. The composite maintenance concept for airline engines emphasizesmaximum use of on-aircraft maintenance and phased maintenance of rotors and static partsbased upon life limits. However, since engine cases and frames provide the skeleton to whichother components are attached, these cases and frames are rarely removed and inspected.Some cases now have in excess of 30.000 hours of operating time. Without specific life limitsassigned to cases, there is no requirement for scheduled shop removals and an in-depthinspection cycle.

The JT8D was chosen for this study because of its proven operational service. The JTSD s usedon three separate airframes: the B-727. B-737, and DC-9. Over 10,000 of these engines are inservice and many have been in operation for over 20 years. This engine has delivered excellentservice, although several air carriers have reported higher than normal in-flight shutdownsand engine removal rates.

PROCEDURE

ACTUARWAL DATA SOURCES

This study included an actuarial scan of the JTD, CF6, and JT3D engine inventories todetermine which air carriers reported higher than normal engine in-flight shutdowns andengine removal rates. The data analysis went one step further for the JTSD engine since theobjective was to identify those JT8D engine components recorded as causing the high rates ofin-flight shutdowns and engine removals. The following sources of information were used forthis actuarial study:

* 1

1. The FAA Air Carrier Aircraft Utilization & Propulsion Reliability Report, as publishedun a monthly basis by the Aviation Standards National Field Office at Oklahoma City, OKThis report provides the following monthly information, by aircraft engine type, and aircarrier:

- Number of aircraft by aircraft model and engine series- Engine shutdowns & shutdowns/ 1000 hours- Engine removals & removals/ 1000 hours for prematureunscheduled removals- 3-month history of engine shutdowns per 1000 hours

2. FAA Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) as published by the Aviation Standards NationalField Office with each issue covering a one week period. The engine section of this reportprovides:

- Information on a specific engine incident, identifying the air carrier involved, aircraftmodel, aircraft serial number, description of the problem, and often the investigation resultsand corrective action taken.

3. Printouts from the FAA Operational Systems Branch, AVN- 120 on JTSD-I, -7,-15, -17, engine component failures from January 1983 through May 1990 that provide:

- Information on specific engine incidents, identifying the air carrier involved, aircraft andengine dash model, date of component failure, take-off aborts, engine shutdowns, flightsdiverted, description of failure. teardown results, and corrective actions taken.

TmNDG THODOL0GY

The actuarial data initially analyzed in this study came from the monthly FAA Air CarrierAircraft Utilization and Propulsion Reliability Reports. For the 24-month period fromFebruary 1988 through January 1990. all US operated JT8D. JT3D, and CF6 engine in-flightshutdowns and unscheduled engine removal rates, by month and airline, were trended. Fromthese data, monthly, industry-wide average rates of in-flight shutdowns and engine removalswere calculated for each of the following airframe/engine combinations:B-727/JrD, B-737/JT8D. DC-9/JT8D, A-300/CF6. B-767/CF6. DC-IO/CF6, B-707/JT3D andDC-8/JT3D.

Along with the average or normal rates, first and second standard deviations were alsocalculated per month, for each airframe/engine combination. For each month, an operator'sreported rates of in-flight shutdowns and engine removals were compared with the norm for aparticular airframe/engine combination. When the operator's rate was between one and twostandard deviations of the norm, the condition was coded "Y" for yellow. A yellow conditionwas considered by SAIC to be a possible indicator of a reliability problem at that airline. Whenan operator's rate was greater than two standard deviations from the norm, the condition forthat month was coded 'R' for red. Red conditions were considered by SAIC to be a definiteindicator of a reliability problem. The following equations were used in this standarddeviation analysis:

- number of datum entries (e.g. number of airlines); N- summation of datum entries (e.g. monthly shutdown removal rates) EX- average of data entries; DX/N- standard deviation; SD:

2

112 The yellow range was calculated as:ND= 2 NX-(zX) ) (Average X+1 SD) > (Average X+2SD)

SD= -The red range was calculated as:N(-t) > (Average X+2S D)

'NORM Range

Yellow Range

Red Range

- al a2x

Tables 1 and 2 are samples of the yellow and red trending performed for each US airlineoperating either the JT8D. CF6 or JT3D engines. Again, this type of trending was performedseparately for both in-flight shutdown data and engine removal data. It should be noted thatmonths containing a "-" correspond to a condition when the rate was equal to or below thenormal rate value for that airframe/engine combination. Also, some months may contain two'Y's or two "R"s which corresponds to an airline that exceeded the normal range whileoperating two different aircraft model series, (for example the 727-100 and 727-200 aircraftmodel operating with a JT8D-7B engine). When either the aircraft model series number or theengine model series number was not specified, the FAA Air Carrier Aircraft Utilization &Propulsion Reliability Report identifies this lack of information by placing an asterisk (Nadjacent to the aircraft model or the engine model. This same identification was used in theactuarial trending throughout this report.

A reasonableness test was applied to the calculated standard deviation with considerationgiven to fleet size, daily utilization hours, and engine shutdown and removal rates. Fleet sizeamong the air carriers varied by aircraft type, but the utilization rate was comparable amongthe carriers. The use of rates for engine shutdowns and removals minimized any skewing ofthe trending data from carriers with large and/or small inventories corresponding with largeand/or small numbers of incidents.

In order to normalize these data and to calculate a more accurate and true standard deviation,two screening criteria were established. If an airline's number of aircraft was less than 8(which correlates to 24 engines on the B-727. 16 engines on the B-737. 16 engines on the DC-9,16 engines on the A-300, 16 engines on the B-767, 24 engines on the DC- 10, 32 engines on theB-707, and 32 engines on the DC-8), and the rate (number of incidences per 1000 fleet operatinghours) was greater than 0.75 for in-flight shutdowns and engine removals, these data were notincluded in the calculation. However, the entry was included for the overall trending analysis.

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If the entry was included In the calculation for an airline with a small engine population andan excessive rate, these data would be skewed to the right (high). Therefore, this screeningcriteria allowed for a more accurate trending analysis.

The final aspect of this actuarial trending was to determine which airlines consistentlyexceeded the industry norm of In-flight shutdowns and engine removal rates. The purpose ofthis macro analysis was to determine which airlines may be having engine reliabilityproblems and to review those engine components causing the service difficulties. Note, thatthis macro analysis was performed only for the JTBD engine and not for the CF6 or JT3D.

COMPONENT PERFORMCE ANALYSIS

Once the macro scan ranking was completed. a detailed analysis of JT8D component failureswas conducted. A printout was requested on JTr8D engine component failures as recorded in theSDRs. This printout covered the timeframe of 1983 through April 1990. Specific informationprovided included the following: operating condition that occurred, which engine incurred thedamage, aircraft model and serial number, engine model and serial number, airlineexperiencing the incident, and date of the incident A brief narrative was included in thisInformation describing the incident and corrective action taken. This narrative woulddocument whether a take-off was aborted, a flight turn-back occurred. if the flight wasdiverted, and whether or not an engine flameout occurred. Each of these flight occurrences wasconsidered significant in determining the severity of the specific JT8D engine componentfailure.

The information from this printout was used to develop the JTSD engine component failuretrend. The trend identifies the component failures and the number of failure occurrences. Thisin-depth component failure analysis was conducted on those air carriers identified as havingconsistently higher than normal in-flight shutdown and engine removal rates for the24-month trending period.

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

ACURIAL TRENDING RESULTS

Data for the 24 month period from February 1988 to January 1990 were collected for thefollowing airframe/engine configurations: B-727/JT8D, B-737/JT8D. DC-9/JT8D,A-300/CF6, B-767/CF6, DC- 10/CF6, B707/JT3D and DC-8/JT'3D. For each airframe/enginecombination, the industry average and standard deviation for in-flight shutdowns andunscheduled engine removal rates per 1000 hours of operating time were calculated. For thisstudy the Industry normal range is the monthly average plus one standard deviation. Theyellow range Is greater than one standard deviation but less than two standard deviations fromthe industry average. The red range is greater than tw3 standard deviations form the industryaverage. Summary data of the in-flight shutdown calculations by month are listed in table 3and data concerning engine removal calculations are listed in table 4.

With the monthly industry norms calculated, bar charts comparing individual airlines to themonthly norms for the respective airframe/engine combinations were developed. Figures 1and 2 are examples of such charts. The percentage of months that each airline operated overthe industry's normal rate of in-flight shutdown and engine removals was determined Theairlines which most often exceeded the monthly normal rates were identified for eachairframe/engine combination. A masked listing of these airlines is contained in tables 5through 12. The airlines using JT8D engines that most frequently exceeded the norms werethen analyzed by SAIC via the FAA's SDR system. Again, it should be noted that the ranking ofairlines by percent of monthly exceedances was necessary to facilitate the identification ofJT8D components causing the exceedances and not to target individual airlines in any way.

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20

TABLE 5: B-727/JT8D AIRLINE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating B-727 and JTD which experienced higher thannormal in-flight shutdowns and engine removals

AIR INE % in-Fught Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal

Exceedance Exceedance Exceedance Exceedance

OPO 62.50% 1 100.00% 1ABC 58.30% 2 29.00% 11GGA 25.00% 4 22.80% 14RAB 20.80% 8 25.00% 9DDA 20.70% 10 27.80% 7BKB 20.60% 11 24.90% 12FFF 18.50% 12 37.50% 4GI 18.50% 13 23.80% 13XYZ 16.60% 14 19.30% 19CTA 12.50% 17 26.90% 8PPP 12.50% 18 16.60% 21FPC 20.80% 9 4.00% 26


Ranking of masked airlines operating B-737/JT8D which experienced higher thannormal In-flight shutdowns and engine removals

AIRLINE % In-FUght Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal


CTA 25.00% 1 51.90% 1RAB 22.80% 3 26.30% 3NNN 24.90% 2 18.60% 5ABC 20.80% 4 16.60% 7MNO 20.80% 5 16.60% 8GGA 16.60% 6 20.80% 4FPC 16.60% 7 10.30% 12WWW 14.50% 8 13.80% 11GHI 12.50% 9 15.20% 10PVK 12.50% 11 29.00% 2

21

TABLE 7: DC-9/JT8D AIRUNE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating DC-9/JT8D which experienced higher thannormal in-flight shutdowns and engine removals

AIRLM % In-FUglht Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal

Ezceedance Exceedance Ezceedance Ezceedanee

CTA 33.30% 1 45.80% 2BKB 14.50% 3 16.60% 8GGA 14.40% 4 17.90% 7DDD 12.30% 7 43.60% 3XYZ 15.20% 2 6.00% 15FPC 12.40% 5 12.506 11LWZ 12.40% 6 20.70% 6

TABLE 8: A-3001CF6 AIRLINE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating A-300/CF6 which experienced higher thannormal in-flight shutdowns and engine removals

Am= % In-FUght Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Remova

Ezceedance Ezceedance Exceedance Ezceedance

ABC 17.00% 1 17.00% 2XYZ 13.00% 4 21.00% 1DDA 17.00% 2 13.00% 3CTA 13.00% 3 8.00% 4

22

TABLE 9: B-767/CF6 AIRLINE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating B-767/CF6 which experienced higher thannormal In-flight shutdowns and engine removals

..... % In-FU_t Rankin of % Engine Rai ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal


FPC 13.00% 1 29.00% 1DDA 8.00% 2 25.00% 2SSS 4.00% 3 4.00% 3

TABLE 10: DC-1O/CF6 AIRUNE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating DC- 10/CF6 which experienced higher thannormal in-flight shutdowns and engine removals

AIRIE % In-Flight Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Remov

Exceedance Ezceedance Ezceedance Exceedance

DEF 23.00% 1 29.00% 2RAB 23.00% 2 13.00% 5CTA 14.50% 4 38.00% 1DDA 15.70% 3 15.30% 4TMR 10.50% 5 29.00% 3XYZ 4.00% 6 13.00% 6

23


Ranking of masked airlines operating B-707/JT3D which experienced higher thannormal In-flight shutdowns and engine removals

ARLINE % In-Flight Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal


UNS 50.00% 1 54.00% 1MMM 46.00% 2 50.00% 2ZZZ 8.00% 3 21.00% 3VOl 4.00% 4 4.00% 5TIT 4.00% 5 4.00% 6

TABLE 12: DC-8/JT3D AIRLINE MACRO SCAN

Ranking of masked airlines operating DC-8/JT3D which experienced higher thannormal In-flight shutdowns and engine removals

AERLE % in-Flight Ranking of % Engine Ranking ofShutdown Shutdown Removal Engine Removal

Exceedance Ezceedance Exceedance Exceedance

JJJ 50.00% 1 46.00% 2RCW 29.00% 3 58.00% 1XCU 31.00% 2 27.00% 3YTA 25.00% 4 23.00% 5YYY 25.00% 5 25.00% 4ZOG 21.00% 6 17.00% 8ANO 17.00% 7 21.00% 6HHH 10.50% 9 15.00% 9

24

COMIPONENr FAILURE RESULTS

Based on the results from the actuarial analysis, 10 airlines operating JT8D engines werefurther analyzed to identify which engine components caused the higher than normalshutdown and removal rates. The operators, analyzed by airframe, included eight operators ofB-727, five operators of B-737 and five DC-9 operators. Note, that four operators wereidentified as having high exceedances while operating two of these airframes and twooperators had high exceedances while operating JT8Ds on all three airframe models. Table 13lists the masked airlines and their airframe models.

TABLE 13: MASKED AIRLINES OPERATING JT8D ENGINES WITH VARIOUSAIRFRAMES IDENTIFIED FOR COMPONENT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Configuration of Performance Summary

B-727 / JT8D B-737 / JT8D DC-9 / JTSD

BKB CTA CTADDA MNO DDDCTA RAB GGAXYZ GGA XYZOPO DDD BKBGGAABCRAB

25

TABLE 14: JTSD COMPONENT FAILURE TRENDS 1983 TO 1990

Data Obtained From Air Carriers Consistently Exceeding Engine Fleet Norm Ofin-flight Shutdowns And Engine Removals

TO-TAL FAILURES FAILING COMPONENTS NUMBEOCCURRENCES

39 BLEED AIR DUCTS AND VALVES

• 8th Stage Duct Cracking 4• 13th Stage Duct Cracking 14• Stuck Valve/Wired Open. Etc. 2* Other 19

64 MAIN BEARING

• #3 Main Bearing 32* #4 Main Bearing 7• Gearbox Bearings 10* Other 15

107 OIL SYSTEM FAILURES

0 O-Ring Packing Cracked/Pinched 6• Bypass Switch/Line 80 Oil Pump 9* #6 Bearing Oil Tube Leak 16* Oil Line Leaks 1* Carbon Plugging of Oil Screen 5• Oil Screen Studs Stripped/

Pulled Loose 5• Oil Cap Unsecured 9* Oil Pressure Relief Valve 5• Other 43

13 ENGINE CASE FAILURE

* Fan 4* Intermediate 3" Diffuser 3* Other 3

26

TABLE 14. JT8D COMPONENT FAILURE TRENDS 1983 TO 1990 (CONTINUED)

128 FUEL SYSTEM FAILURES

" Fuel Control/Pump 54" Fuel Nozzle Coking 17* Fuel/Ofl Heater 27

- Housing 1- Gasket 2- Valve Wired Open 10

" Other 17

189 FAN/COMPRESSOR/TURBINE BLADE/VANE FAILURES

" Fan Blades 14* Compressor Blades 34* Compressor Stators 8* Turbine Vanes 6

- lst Stage- Other Stages

" Turbine Blades 85- Ist Stage- 2nd Stage- 3rd Stage- 4th Stage

* Other 42

The SDR data base was searched for any engine component difficulties reported for these 10airlines over the time period from 1983 through April 1990. Table 14 summarizes thesefailures by general engine components.

Actual failures as submitted to the SDR data base by the 10 masked airlines are shown inappendix A.

The JT8D engine has an excellent reliability record and this actuarial review did not documentany serious, safety-of-flight component failure patterns. However, this actuarial analysis diddocument some reliability problems, some of which are being worked by the prime enginemanufacturer, requiring prompt installation of improved reliability configurations.

The JT8D engine SDR review identified two hard failure items in the #3 main bearing and the#4.5 to #6 bearing oil tube. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (PWA) has been redesigning the #3bearing for some time and testing improved configurations. An enhanced bearing should beavailable soon for airline installation. The #4.5 to #6 bearing oil tube cracking problem hassome serious operational impacts. Typically, cracking in this tube permits vast oil leaks withresultant drop in oil pressure and rise in oil temperature. The engine is shut down during theseoccurrences and the flight diverted or returned to its originating station. A summary review ofthe failure history of this item shows the #4.5 to #6 bearing oil supply tube experiencedcracking in the tube area as it fits through the engine exhaust case. The PWA initial responseto this problem resulted in the use of a helical tube to stiffen the oil tube area and this fix wasincorporated by Service Bulletin 4711. Unfortunately, the stiffened tube vibrated severelywithin the operating resonance of the engine itself and the incidents of cracking increased.Service Bulletin 5465 was released and it identified a different method of tube stiffening. ThisSB is available for incorporation. However, the SB 4711 configured oil tubes are still installedin the majority of the JT8D engine fleet and require some form of inspection to assure safeoperation.

27

Several wear and tear failure patterns were observed during this actuarial review. The twomost notable observations involved turbine blade failures and the failure of the 13th stagebleed air duct. The turbine blade failures were all reported as being contained failures and therandom failure pattern among the four stages of the turbine appear to be the result of wear andtear of this rotating hot section component. The 13th stage bleed air duct failures were anotherone of those failures causing dramatic operational Impacts. The hot bleed air exiting throughthe cracked duct walls or broken mounting flanges inevitably causes fire warning lightsand/or bells to respond. The flight crew reaction to fire warning lights is to retard the throttleand check other engine parameters to verify the nature of the problem. Even if the analysis ofengine performance data shows an engine fire has probably not occurred, the engine isnormally shut down as a safety/economical precaution. The shut down logic is more prevalenton the three engine B-727 than It Is on the twin engine DC-9 or B-737. No specific crackingpattern was discernable, although cracking in the mounting flange and holding bracket areawas the dominant location. This Item was not considered part of the engine and therefore thecracking problem is not being addressed by the prime engine manufacturer. The continuedcracking in this bleed air duct requires an inspection procedure to be developed for follow-onoperating assurance.

The SDR review also identified some diagnostic troubleshooting problems and somemaintenance practices problems experienced by certain carriers. The most prevalentdiagnostic troubleshooting observation involved engine fuel control and fuel pump removalsfor suspected malfunctions. However, the description of the maintenance actions taken asrecorded in the SDR's indicated that two possible problems existed: (1) current instructionswere vague in regard to diagnostic troubleshooting of these two fuel system items, or (2)existing diagnostic procedures were not being followed by maintenance personnel. There isalso the possibility that a combination of the two causes exists.

The analysis also identified maintenance practices as contributing to in-flight shutdowns.Typical maintenance practices problems included: engine oil cap unsecured, fuel/oil heatervalve wired open, oil screen studs pulled loose, and oil seals pinched. These practices oftenresulted in loss of power or loss of oil with the resultant engine shutdown and unscheduledengine removal. However, diagnostic troubleshooting problems and maintenance practiceswere not within the scope of this study effort and no further conclusions are offered on thesesubjects.

ENGINE CASE FAiLURE ANALYSIS

Due to the concern of engine cases lacking assigned service lives, an increased emphasis toidentify all engine case failures was pursued. To this effect. 24 JT8D engine case failures wereidentified from the period of 1983 to 1990. Note that this number includes the 13 engine casefailures previously identified for the 10 airlines in table 13 plus all other US airlines operatingJT8D engines for that same period.

A complete review, conducted with engineers at PWA, summarized and prioritized thecriticality of these case failures. Discussion included background information on enginecases, case thicknesses, the manufacturing and welding processes, material properties, casefailure modes, and current inspection methods. The two components of greatest concern in the24 engine case failures were the weld seams along the flanges, and the drain boss welds. Bothareas are currently inspected ultrasonically in the field.

For the weld seam inspection, a special carriage scanner was designed by PWA. The carriagescanner has rollers on each end of it and is used to hold the ultrasonic probe as It travels alongthe seam welds of the case. Water is gravity-fed from a bottle to the transducer as a couplant.The carriage scanner inspects the engine case flange a full 360 degrees. The test is calibratedusing a specimen with an electrical discharge machined (EDM) notch in order to establishproper ultrasonic settings.

28

Prior to the test, calibration Is performed on a known location on the engine case, ensuringproper placement and the use of sufficient couplant. Signal amplitude and locations arerecorded by hand on a data sheet when crack Indications are detected. Data are recorded alongone line of scanning. The PWA engineers indicated that future engine case designs willeliminate the need for the weld along the flange.

The second inspection is of the outer combustor case drain boss weld areas. PWA's currentinspection for cracks in these areas employs a transducer holder plate with two angle beamtransducers in fixed positions to Inspect an arc of about 80 degrees of the boss weld (shown inFigure 3). A calibration standard with two EDM notches is used to perform the pre-testcalibration. The transducer plate, mounted on the end of a pole, enables the Inspector to accessthe boss welds through the engine exhaust nozzle. Couplant is applied using a hypodermictube. With the transducer in place, a trained inspector performs the inspection and interpretsthe test results from a portable ultrasonic instrument The ultrasonic instrument is set so thata 0.5 inch crack in the weld area will produce a signal indication of 50 percent of the verticalscreen height. It should be noted, however, that flaws or cracks existing in the weld away fromthe bolt holes may not be detected. Although PWA has recently redesigned the outer combustorcase and eliminated the welds In the boss areas, it is believed that cases employing the weldeddrain bosses could be in use for the next decade. For this reason, the major thrust of the SAICNDI effort concentrated on improving the outer combustor case drain boss weld Inspectiontechnique.

FIGURE 3 - PWA OUTER COMBUSTOR CASE INSPECTION DESIGN

Figure 4 shows the JTSD engine and the locations of the three drain bosses. A drain tube Isattached to the forward drain boss at a slanted angle. The drain tube will cause restrictedclearance in an approximately 20 degree region where no ultrasonic data can be taken.

UTASONIC fANRDSG

Preliminary laboratory work demonstrated the feasibility of developing an automatedultrasonic probe capable of surveying 240 degrees of the circumferential area around the drainwelds. Close coordination was maintained during the development effort with the PWAengineers.

Although defects often occur in the weld near the rear bolt hole, defects can also exist at otherareas in the weld. Several designs were considered by SAIC to inspect defects around the drainboss weld. One design used multiple angle-beam transducers, adjacent to each other. Bymultiplex pulsing each transducer, an ultrasonic signal would probe the weld area from eachtransducer location. This method is adequate for boss weld Inspection, but for components of

29

different shapes, multiple transducers would not be applicable. Since a new scanner was to bedesigned, applicability of the scanner to other engine case components was considered duringthe preliminary design stage.

The concept of the new scanner was to use a single transducer, carried by a motorizedmechanism with remote control, to scan around the weld area. The transducer would increasestep-wise radially, and move circumferentally around the center of the boss weld for acomplete Inspection. The transducer would have an appropriate beam angle, beam size, andfrequency to provide best detectability and highest resolution.

The motorized boss weld scanner is driven by two 4-watt small DC motors and maintainsposition via an encoder system. A drawing of the scanner is shown in figure 5. The smallmotors are products of Maxon Precision Motors. The length of the rotating arm assembly ofthe scanner is 9.917 inches diameter of the boss plate. 9.042 inches and height of the scanner.1.337 inches. Figure 6 illustrates the prototype JTSD boss weld scanner. For on-winginspection, the scanner needs a pole to deliver the scanner from outside the engine, through theexhaust nozzle, to the boss welds inside.

A major component of the motorized scanner is a base plate containing a slot to position thescanner on the boss weld. A track chain is attached to the base plate which guides the armassembly to rotate around the boss weld 240 degrees for circumferential scanning. The gearratio for driving the ann assembly is 500:1 and the speed along the track is approximately 3inches per second. The transducer holder, mounted on the arm, can move rapidly toward andaway from the boss weld center, at increments of 0.020 inches per step. The scanning willoccur once each radial increment, with the transducer moving around the boss weld along thetrack. The angle beam will inspect the entire thickness of the welded case when the transducertravels r idially around the circumference of the weld.

Figure 7 shows a JT8D boss weld specimen and a calibration standard in which two EDMnotches were placed. The EDM notches are 0.5 inches long and 20 mils deep. Figure 8 showsthe prototype scanners installed for calibration in the laboratory. The prototype scanner, themotion control box, and the Ultra Image 111MT equipment are presented in figure 9. Figure 10shows Ultra Image results of the calibration standard inspected with the prototype scanner.The two EDM notches are clearly imaged. Appendix B contains the Ultra Image 1IITMspecifications.

SCANNER DEMONSTRATION RESULTS

On March 22, 199 1, a final demonstration of the prototype scanner was performed at PWA'slaboratory in East Hartford. Figure 11 presents results on a sample containing four simulatedflaws in a welded region. The locations of the four flaws are identified by the lower slice in thefigure. Figure 12 shows the result of a sample with no flaws in the weld. There is no signalexceeding detectable level in this scan. It should be noted that If a flaw were to exist in the bossweld, distinctive signals would serve as indications similar to those in the calibrationstandard. Using the new Ultra Image IVTM software, figure 13 shows the results of thecalibration standard test (figure 10) in the display. Appendix C contains a sample procedure ofhow the prototype scanner may be used in the field for drain boss inspection.

30

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32

FIGURE 7 - JT8D BOSS WELD SPECIMEN (LEFT) AND CALIBRATION STANDARD (RIGHT)

34

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FIGURE 9 - UlITRA IMAGE ill N WIT11 PROTOTYPE SCANNER

TESTING ON CALIBRA-TION STANDARD

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CONCLUSIONS

The approach to determining JTSD engine component reliability problems by conducting anactuarial analysis of JT8D engine performance was successful. This analysis approachprovided a comprehensive reliability overview of all JT8D engine operators, permittedidentification of abnormal trends, and resulted In the isolation of specific JT8D enginecomponents.

The Ultra Image IIITM system provided an enhanced inspection procedure for JT8D engineouter combustor case boss welds. This inspection procedure provided a more comprehensiveinspection and produced a permanent record of the weld condition. This enhanced capabilitywould permit a damage tolerance assessment to be made of JTSD engine outer combustor casewelds.

The following conclusions were developed from this study effort:

1. The FAA Air Carrier Aircraft Utilization & Propulsion Reliability Report containscomprehensive actuarial historical information on commercial aircraft engines.

2. Trending of FAA actuarial information regarding in-flight shutdowns and unscheduledengine removals can document specific aircraft engine reliability for an air carrier.

3. Review of component failures for a specific engine exhibiting a trend of excessivein-flight shutdowns and unscheduled engine removals can identify requiredmodifications, non-destructive inspection procedure enhancements, and poormaintenance practices.

4. Enhanced ultrasonic inspection procedures can document cracking around the drainboss weld area of outer combustor cases on JTBD engines.

5. A successful ultrasonic inspection technique was developed and demonstrated for theJT8D engine outer combustor case drain boss area.

41

APPIMIX A

COMPONENT PERFORMANCE BY DISGUISED AIRLINE

Appendix A includes information gathered by FAA's Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) database. It covers the timeframe of 1983 through April 1990 and specific information obtainedincluded the following: operating condition that occurred, which engine Incurred the damage.aircraft model and serial number, engine model and serial number, airline that experiencedthe incident, and date of the incident. A brief narrative was included in this informationdescribing the incident and corrective action taken. The narrative documents if the take-offwas aborted, if a flight turn-back occurred, or if the flight was diverted. This narrative alsodocuments if an engine flameout occurred or if the engine was shut down by the flight crew.This Information is useful in determining the safety-of-flight severity of each failure. Someminor failures might produce engife f1ameouts. but after a restart and normal operatingparameters were established on the engine the flight would continue to its scheduleddestination. Other failures produced severe vibration, massive oil pressure and quantityleaks, or resulted in the Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) exceeding the prescribed limits. Thesetypes of failures typically resulted In engine shutdown and flight turnback or diversion.

This information was used to trend JTSD performance by airline, aircraft model and year.The performance summary presented the following information:

- Incident occurrence, whether the component failure caused an aborted take-off, flight

turn back, flight diversion, engine flameout / shutdown, or a combination thereof.

- Total number of incident occurrences per year.

- Identification of the component failure that caused the incident occurre.-ce.

This in-depth component failure analysis was conducted on those masked airlines listed intable 13.

A-1

ALT.UW M 9-727 BEB 11-AN(2 SD7an ,

INC DMZT O----LmmfCZS

Take-Off Aborted.FIt Turn Back. - - 2 2 3 5 1Diverted

Erion Flameout/ 4 6 3 2 1 6 3 3Shutdown

Both occurrences 4 3 3 9 8 11 1

Total Occulrences 4 10 6 7 12 17 19 5

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAILURES

201816

14

12Total 10

Failures8

4

20

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILUSM nUB

# 3 & 4 Bearlngs - 4 1 5# 6 Bearing OilTube 1 2 1 - - 4

Other OliTube - 1 1 2 3 7OilSys Malntr -Eros3 3 1 7Fuel Control/Pump - - 2 - 3Fan Blades 1- - 1 2Compressor Blades -- 2 2 1 4 - 9Turbine Blades 1 3 1 3 4 1 13Fuel/Ol Heater

Valve/Manifold - - I

Other Failures 2 5 4 1 5 7 6 1 314 10 7 6 14 17 19 5 82

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-2

A1 DDA B-727 M~tFgRMhIIf SUWARY

Take-Off Abortcd.Flt Turn Back.- - -

Diverted

E-ntnFlameout/ 4 - 1 2 - 1 2 -

Shutdown

Both occurrnes I 1 1 2 1

TotalOccurrences r4- 1 2 2 1 2 4 1

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMFONEIIT FAILURES

4.5-4.

3.5-31

Total 2.5Falues

21.5

10 .

0 l t,0 .11983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990COAMONENT FAIURES 4 2 2 2 1 2 5 1

FALLZSE rIus

Bleed AirDuct/Valve 1I - - - 1 1 3# 3Bearing 2 - - - - 2Gearbox Bearings 1 - 1 - - 2Fuel Control/Pump 1 - 1 1 12 - 6Turbine Blades - I

Seal Failures - 1 - 1Other Failures - 1 1 - 2 4

4 2 2 2 1 2 5 1 19

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-3

AMLTNE- OTA I-727 PERFORBMA=( StUWARY

Take-Off Aborted.Flt Turn BacJk. - 2

Diverted

Engne Flameout/ 1 - 2 2 1Shutdown

Both Occurrences - 1 1 2 3 2

Total Occurrenes 0 0 0 2 1 4 7 3

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAILURES

12

10

8

Total 6Failures

4

2

0-1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAUzR lIU

Bleed Air Manifold - -- - 4 - 5# 6 Bearing Oil Tube - 1 - - 12nd Stg Turbine Disk - - 2 2

Fan Disk - - 1 - - 1Oil System Seals - - - 1 1 - 2

Turbine Blades - - - 1 1 - 2

Fuel System Items - - - 2 - 2

Compressor Blades - - - 1 - 1FOD - - - 2 - - 2

Other - - - 2 1 3

0 0 0 2 1 4 11 3 21

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-4

Afl..TE2 XYZ B-727 PERFOSMANCE UNMEARY

nfcmmT OccuMZ S

Take-Off Aborted.

Fit Turn Back. - 6 6 11 5 - 3 5Diverted

Engine Flameout/ 1 2 13 8 - 2 2 2

Shutdown

Both Occurrences 1 4 13 11 3 5 2 1

Total Occurrences 2 12 32 30 8 7 7 8

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAILURES

40

35

30

25TotalFailures 2

101

5

01983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAHZJRU riu

Bleed Air Ducts/Valve - 2 - - 1 - 1 1 5# 3 & #4 Bearings - 3 3 3 - - - 9# 6 Bearing Oil Tube - - - 2 - - - 2Oil Sys Maint Errors - 2 - - - - 2Fuel Control/Pump 2 3 2 5 1 - 13Fan Blades 1 - - 1 - - - 2Compressor Blades - 2 1 2 - - - 5Turbine Blades - 2 4 2 - - 8Combustion Chamber - - 3 - I - 5Te Rod Bolt - 2 1 - 2Fuel/Oil Heater/

Valve Maiffold - - - I I - - - 2Other Failures 1 6 21 19 5 6 2 7 67

2 15 40 31 10 12 4 8 122

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-5

AMTM. OPO R-727 gPyROrAMCE SUnur

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. 2Diverted

En in Flaeout/ NO DATA ON OPO UNTIL 1989. 3Shutdown

Both Occurrences - 1

Total Occurrences - - - 0 6

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

(Note: No Data on OPO Until 1989)

4

3.5

3

2.5Total 2

Failures21.5

1

0.5

1983 1984 1965 1986 1967 1988 1969 1990

FAIIXE irXAWTM1

Bleed Air Duct/Valve - I

Fuel Pump - 3 3Other Failures ... . 1

- - - 1 4 5

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-6

A~N~GGA 3-727 PMWORMMNE ST

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. - 3 1 2Diverted

Eng n Flameout/ 3 2 2 2 1 -

Shutdown

Both Occurraces 1 2 1 - 3

Total Occurrence r 4 2 2 2 5 3 2 4

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAW S

54.5

43.5

3TotalFailures 2.5

21.5

0.510-

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

PAMlIN riTEM

Bleed Air Duct/Valve 1 1 1 - 1 5# /#4 Bearngs 4 2 1 . 7# 6 Bearing Oil Tube -1 - 1 2Ol Sys Mant Errors - - 1Compressor Blades 1 - 1Turbine Blades - - 1Fuel/Oil Heater

Valve ManifoldOther Failures 2 1 1 - 4 9

4 2 3 4 5 3 2 4 27

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-7

.AumrE. ABC U-'27 1B-72u7A(c STWlY

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. 4 5 3 6 7Diverted

Engin Flameout/ 6 7 7 3 8 7Shutdown

Both Occurrnce - 4 5 3 5 5


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COAPONENT FAILLRES

9

8

76I

Total 5Fa'n es 4

3

21

0.1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAMUZU rlUE

Bleed Air Duct/Valve - - 1 1 1 3

# 3/#4 Bear n - I

# 6 Bearng Oil Tube 3 - - - 3

Oil Sys Mant Errors 2 -1 - 3

Fuel Control/Pump 1 1 2 - 2 2 8

Compressor Blades 1 1 - 1 - 3

Turbine Blades 1 31 1 3

Fuel/Oil HeaterValve Manfold - 1 - 1 1 - - 3

Other Failures 1 5 4 1 3 5 19

9 7 8 0 4 9 9 0 46

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-8

A ~~RA B-727 PERPORMANCE SUahRY

EC~IT OCCRJRUW(Z

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. 3 1 2Diverted

EnoneFlameout/ 3 2 2 2 1 1Shutdown

Both Occurrences 1 - - 2 1 - 3


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FWAU

54.5

4

3.53Total 2.5,

Fallur-es2-1.5.I

0.50 .-

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Bleed Air Duct/Valve - 1 1 2 - 1 5# 3 & #4 Bearings 4 2 - 1 7# 6 Bearing Oil Tube -1 - 1 2Oil Sys Maint Errors 1 - - - 1Compressor Blades - 1 - 1Turbine Blades - - 1Fuel/Oil Heater

Valve/Manifold 1 - - 1Other Failures - 2 - 1 1 1 - .4 9

4 2 3 4 5 3 2 4 27

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-9

AMLNR: =TA B-737 PZrzORxANC~zSUARY

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. 1 1Diverted

Emne Flameout/Shutdown

Both Occurrnces -3 1


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COPWONENT FAILUnEs

4-

3.5

3

2.5Total

Faures 2

0.5

0.

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAELURM hUB

13th Stage Manifold - - 1 -

Turbine Blades - - 2 2

Diffuser Case - - 1 1

Control Cable - 1 1

FOD - - 1 1

Other Failures - - - - 1- 2 4 1 7

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-10

AmLJN'. MNO 3-737 ORUMANC SWunARY

Take-Off Aborted.FU Turn Back. - 1Diverted

Emgn Flameout/ 1 - 1 2 1Shutdown

Both Occurrences - - - I -

Total Occurrenes 0 1 0 3 2 1 0 0

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FALUIRES

9,

8

7

6

Tol 5FaIhue 4,

32

0 =4" I-#1-

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990FAIWURZ ZTZ31S

# 3 Bearings - 3 2 1 - - 6Other Bearings - 3 - 3Of Sys Components 1 1 - - 2Gearbox 1 1 - - 2Case Failure 1 - 1 1 3Fan Blades 1 - - - - 1Turbine Blades - 1 - 1 2 4

Compressor Blades 1 - - - 1 2Compressor Spacer - - 3 - 1 4

Air Seal - - 1 1 - 2Turbine Dlsk - - 1 - - I

Fan/Comp/Turbine 2 1 - - 3

Fuel Control/Pump - 1 1 1 - 3Fuel Manifold 1 - - 1FOD 1 - - - 2 - 3

5 6 2 8 9 4 3 4 41

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-1I

AW M 3-737 P&EFORMAMCE SMARY

mCMENT OCCUIENCES

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. - 1 1 2Diverted

Engine Flameout/ I - 1 1 2 1Shutdown

Both occurrences - - -


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAIMS

4

3.5

3

2.5Total 2

Failures

1.5.

0.50

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILUE rrms

TTLBearings 1 1 - 2Ol Sys Components - - 1Main Oil Screen - - - 1 1Turbine Blades 1- - 2 - 3Compressor - - 1 1Intermediate Case 1- - -Fuel Systems - 1 - 2FOD 1 1 - 2Other Failures - 1 - 2 - 1 2 - 6

3 2 1 2 2 4 4 1 19

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-12

A - l G" B-G737 PERFORMANCE ISUnwARY

m~' occuuurc 8

Take-Off Aborted.Flt Turn Back. - 1 1 1Diverted

Emne Flameout/ -

Shutdown

BothOcr e I - 1 1 1 1

Total OccunIes 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 2

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FALURES

9

8

7

6

Total 5Fahues 4

3

2

0 L1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILURE 172MTrL

Bleed Air Ducts/Valve - - 1 - 2 8

# 6 Bearing Ol Tube -1 1 3Compressor Blades - - - 1 - 1 4

Other Failures - - - 2 - 2 5 2

- - 1 2 1 2 9 43

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-13

Am~m DDD B-737 P2RORMANCZ SflWARY

IKCIIMM OCCURFAZNCZS

Take-Off Aborted.Ft Turn Back. - 1 1Diverted

PriOn Flameout/ 3 1 1Shutdown

Both Occurres - 1 2 1 3 -


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAILURES

7

6

5,

TotalFailures 3

2

1

01983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

TTL

# 3 & #4 Beazngs - - 2OI Sys Maint Errors 1- 1Fuel ConA/Pump - 1 1Turbine Blades - 2 2 - 4FOD Damage to Eng 2 - 3 1 7Other Failures 1 11 1 1 6

3 2 4 1 2 7 2 21

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-14

AUMM CTA DC-9 PERFORMANCE SUNMARY

I~Im r occuuml1s

Take-Off Aborted.Flt Turn Back. 1 6 4Diverted

Engine Flameout/ 2Shutdown

Both Occurrences 2

Total Occurrences - 1 10 4

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAILURES

14

12

10.

Total 8Failures 6

4.

2

01983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILURE rTES

Bleed Air Duct/Valve - 4 1 5# 3 Bearing - 3 3Other Bearings 1 I 1Fuel Oil Cooler 1- 1Oil System - 2 2Fire Warning System - 1 1Turbine Blades - 2 2 4Other - - - 2 - 1 3

3 13 4 20

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-15

A OU2M DDD DC-9 43PRlORANCE SIlwkaur

INCEIMM -- (---CZ

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back, 1 6 2 1 2Diverted

Engl nFlameout/ - 2 1 2Shutdown

Both Occurrces - 2 1 2 1 1

Total Ocurrenes 0 2 2 7 6 3 4 1

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FALURES

8

7

6

5Total

Faihlues

3.

2

1

0-1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILURE rmTTL

Oi Sys Maint Errors - 1 1Fuel Control/Pump - 1 - 1 1 - 3Turbine Blades 2 3 1 2 - 8Other Failures 2 2 3 5 5 4 1 22

4 6 4 8 6 5 1 34

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-16

AMLMM GGA DC-9 PMPWORMMCE SUMRY

IC T oCCUumCZs

Take-Off Aborted.Fit Turn Back. 2 - 5 3 2 2 2

Diverted

Engine Flameout/ 1 2 1

Shutdown

Both Occurrences - 3 3 2 -

TotalOccurrences 2 3 5 9 5 2 2 2

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAHJIRES

9

8

7

6

Total 5

Failures 4

321

011983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAflM rrTMSTML

Bleed Air Ducts/Valve - - - 1 1 - 3

# 3 & #4 Bearlngs - 1 - - 1

# 6 Bearing Oil Tube - I I - 2

Ofi Sys Maint Errors - - 1 1 - - 2

Fan Blades - - 1 - - 1

Compressor Blades - - I

Turbine Blades 5 2 2 2 1 1 13

Combustion Chamber - - 1 - - - 1

Cases 1 1 - - -- 2

Other Failures 3 5 3 3 3 1 1 2 21

9 9 8 9 5 4 1 2 47

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-17

A.,LyM XYI DC-9I I I I

INcxc m'r OCCURIMCES

Take-Off Aborted.Flt Turn Back. 2 4 13 2 2

Diverted

Engine Flameout/ 1 2 3 3

Shutdown

Both Occurfence$ - 2 6 1 1 1


CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAIIURS

25

20

15Total

Failtus10.

5.

01983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAUZjR riIU

Bleed Air Ducts/Valve - 1 - 2#3&#4earigs 1 - 1O Sys Maint Errors 1 3 - - 4Fuel Control/Pump 1 - 2 - 3Compressor Blades 1 - - o 1TurbineBlades 1 1 3 1 -71 7

Combustion Chamber 1 - 1 - 2Fuel/Oil Heater

Valve/Manifold 5 5 1 - 7

Fuel Noccle Coking/

Heat Shield - 2 3

Case Failures 1 1 2 - 4

Other Failures 9 6 9 1 2 1 28

13 12 23 4 6 3 1 62

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-18

ARLINE: 3BE DCW-9 PERFORMANCE SUMARY

IwCMZDu C R CES

Take-Off Aborted.FI Turn Back. 6 7 7Diverted

Engine Flameout/ - 3 2 1Shutdown

BothOccurrences - 1 2 9 3 -

Total Occurences 0 0 0 1 2 18 12 8

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

COMPONENT FAIA E

2018

16

14

12Total 10

Failures864

2

01983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

FAILURE EMSTn-

Bleed Air Ducts/Valve - - - - - 3 3 2 8

# 3 & #4 Bearings - - - - 1 2 3

Ofi Sys Maint Errors - - - - - 2 - 2 4

Fuel Control/Pump - - - - 2 - 2Compressor Blades - 1 - - 1 2

Fan Blades - - 1 - 1

Turbine Blades - - 1 2 3

Fuel/Oil Heater

Valve/Manifold - - - - 2 1 3

# 6 Oil Tube - - - - - 1Combustors - - - I 1 2

Other Failures - - - - 6 5 3 14

0 0 0 1 2 19 13 8 43

CY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

A-19

APPEMIX B

ULTRA IMAGE IUTM SPECIFICATIONS

B-i

iiz

Ift

;# 00 1

B-2 ~ .wj

UL7RA MAGLIIIUr SYSTEM SPECIICATIONS'.2-we# qecuirgo: 90Oto 250 VAC. 44 to '40 HLZ.5 antos ULtrTEC-'*xcoot Ul-3300 ill0/220 ?IA1. 50-40 HZ .5 amo?. -lramtower draw is lees than a00 volit-amos.

SAooan of Coaaton: Straighiot 041Or anle ain contact

*Scan Size. v/antafle from r x V to 20' x 41r.*Scant Meowunon: Vacilate trom 020' to 2W0 in 0.001'nasmni n a,.00 point x 200 oomnt gnid.

*Scan Data Recorced - Header ama and 20.000 points ofomotf anm 20.000 amplitude. 1*m Iaximum Scanning Speed - ISO scan pointse per second.Osa Storage - 51/4 inch ouble sided. 96 tracks. per ncn7soit-secturso floppy dislk.00Dcumnentation - Header data conasing Of adrministr-twe. scan seo. ealibralmo and instrument parameteirs.

*Scan Capsalltlee - Reel tWme disply with continuousmaintaining of adl instrumnent mentiesmAnalvelas aild Oteply Caabilitiee

erSe leve gray- A or 8 level color- Oeecaole X and YSie

Zoom ____________um a$49e- 4 adee set u0 in Hee than 5SCub=eMa 111 pluane. 'MzTC -~ctlEalainCne

12010t NO0.ve an cifice-based worktatilon for advanced

Sal Up Time- 15 munuma. anlis5 apebilitie

A STATE-OF-THE-ART NOT SYSTEM..DESIGNED TO ACCOMMOD3ATE9 NEWf DEVIELOPMENTSThe consoble Ultr Image fit on-line ultasoni Insoctioet syatem developed to make critical measuremenlts on nuclelar Submarinee.grive you a fluqf-resolutloa ciewaled C-an and 8-scan image wftl it has oince been used from a"lt to the Anabilan oeeert in oil andis reoeatatile franm teaoo teats A cowo display gies you the third gas applicationa. to aicraft IftionI a in Australia. It has povendimension - for depth and/or amlitlude detemrrllinuan and clarity ot highly effictiv in the nondlestructive detection of corrosion. cracks.n~teraretsion. The built-in software allows you to analyz all the hydrogen olistei. cmprtosite delmination, andl debionoinq in metal-aailole ..nft.nfion undker precise control and enlese sumulation at to-meta and mtlo-n mtlinrfaces, indcluing face sleto-Wa too view regardless of transducer angle. The reaul is a sucistiantal honeycomb bonds.niofoverrient in accuracy over hand-heed ultrasonic inIspection uiits. The Ultra Image Ill flield team can now receive additional Support viaA oermantent record lees you repea any prevICua test Under identical me now UltrarECA oninical Evasluation Cantler - an offlcie-baedecondtons and recall an image at any tuine for comparaive anals in waa amti cam amncate with thse Ultra Image Ill an locationboth death and aniolitude. The ability to back integralte and crniuni-cooe with peripheral devices not ony brings ultmat cofdec and via ordinaryr telephone lines or vie date disk. Engineers in the offcreeilolity to today's no aletrclve inpection ned wit 5taW-of- or laoratory can then diplay and analyze san information, modify

the-rt ecnoloy. brn llos yu t tak a antge f ~headers. and cooy data as with thei Ultra Image Ill. Or they can pro-dthea tenolg btalosyut tk d.nag fftr vide extoer interpretation of datal gUackly to the field team or providdowelol 101 is.them wtith such information as newly criesed headers or previouslyOver the last Several years. the Ultra Image Ill has been field-proven taken scan data. Anyone trained on the Ultr Image Ill syste willin a variet of trmote and hostile envionments around the wand. First also be saile to operate trio UIlraTEC.

ULTRA IMAGE7N Ill EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONSModule 3100 DISPLAY 0-999 U sec by I U sac

S5 Black & White Monitor (Color output available) Range - 0.5. 1.0. 2.5. 12.5. 25.0. 50 inches3W/2 A-Scan CRT Depth Resolution - 0.002. 0.004. 0.010. 0.050.

Module 3200 ULTRASONIC 0.100. 0.200 inchesModel 3201 Pulsar - maximum output 400 volts Threshold, set through microprocesslor -

Damping - 10. 25.50.100 150 ohms 1-100% in 1% staePulse Amplitude - 20. 40. 60. $o. 100 percent Threshold Exceeided IndicatorPulse Width - LOW. HIGH Module 3300 FL.OPPY DISK

Model 3202 Receiver 2 51/6' Floppy Diskc Drives - Formatted capac-Attenuation - 0-42 dS in I dl Steps ity 828K Bytes eachFilter - Broad land. 1-8 MHz. 2-8 MHz. 448 MHz Module 3400 MICROPROCESSORFunction - Pitch-Catich. Pulse-Echo ZSOA*-CPU (8 bit microprocessor)Detector - RIF, Video Operates at 4 Mt-z

Model 3203 Digital Thickness Gate Memory 576K bytes expandable to 1 M bytesGate Delay - 0-99.9u sec: by 0.1 U sec. 0-Bg9u USec 7-Slot Chassisby 1 U sec Memory ManagementGate Width - 0-99 u sec by 0.u USec. 0-999U sac Floppy Disk Controllerby I U sec W4 x 480. 16 level graphics controllerScope Trigger Delay - 0-99. 9 u sec by 0. 1 u sec. Calendlarilcocc

(All soeciffcations subject to change without notice)

B-3 Contact Ultra Image InternationalDivision ot SAIC for

consultatIlcn on your testing probleim. *Trademarc Zilog

APPENDIX C

NDI PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION

Ultrasonic Imaging On-Wing Inspection of JTSD Engine Case Boss Weld by Motorized Scanner.

1. Objective:Use of ultrasonic imaging method to inspect JT8D engine case boss weld

2. Reference:(a) PWA Ultrasonic Inspection of JT8D Combustion Chamber Outer Case, Video Tape.Part No. 804137, 10/30/86.

3. Equipment and Materials

3.1 UI-ITM -- ultrasonic imaging system

3.2 Transducer -- 5MHz, angle beam, 45 degrees, 3/8"

3.3 Transducer Cable -- 25 feet

3.4 PWA calibration block with EDM notches

3.5 Power Cable -- 25 feet

3.6 Couplant -- soap water

3.7 Scanner -- UII/SAIC JTMD motorized scanner

3.8 Disketter -- 5 1/4" double density, soft sector. 96 TPI

3.9 Light, Mirror. Coveralls (clothing). Rags

3.10 Notebook

4. Safety PrecautionThe engine must be in the POWER OFF position and in LOCK POSITION.All personnel performing the inspection shall wear safety goggles.

5. Calibration

5.1 Preparation(a) Set up UI IIITM system according to the Operations Manual(b) Load Program Disk -- Input Date and Time(c) Load Data Disk - (Preprogrammed Header Information asfollows:)

GROUP A- ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

1 PROJECT = JT8D-CAL-MOTOR2 TASK = 5M-45DEG B20133 SCAN = MOTOR SCAN 14 INSPECTOR = MCT/BED5 PREV. SCAN REF = 16 TRANSDUCER = 5M B20137 CAL BLOCK = 2-HOLE8 CREATED TIME = 03/20/91 20:359 ACCESSED TIME = 03/20/91 20.20

C-1

(c) Press the X button in clockwise direction. Thetransducer will activate scanning (clockwise) In acircumferential direction, stopping at the end of thetrack (Note 1). One line of information is obtained.Reverse the switch to counterclockwise direction. Pressthe X button to return the transducer to the startingpoint.(d) Jog the Y Button to advance the transducer inincrements of one grid.(e) Repeat process 5.2 (c) above for 10 lines ofInformation.(M Save the data on diskette.(g) perform preliminary analysis on these data. Comparedata with previous data. Calibration data must berepeatable before the on-wing test can begin.

6. InspectionCAUTION! SAFETY RULES MUST BE FOLLOWED THROUGHOUT INSPECTION(See Section 4).(a) Install and fasten JT8D motorized scanner on boss weld to be tested. Use mirror andlight to assist in positioning scanner.(b) Use sequence scan to modify header information of boss weld to be inspected.(c) Perform the scan. as stated in Sections 5.2 (b) - 5.2 (g).(d) For additional boss weld inspections, proceed as stated in 6 (b) - 6 1c).

7. Take notes on the test as applicable. At this point, the inspection iscomplete.

Note: 1: The END of the track for the AFT and PS4 drain boss welds is the end of the 240 degreerange. Le.. from 0-240 degree. The END of the track for the FORWARD drain boss weld isperformed in two separate parts to avoid interference from the slanted drain tubing nearby (0-110 degrees and 130-240 degrees range).

C-3 *U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OMCE: I,1Z. 604- 4I/6,O

dtic · 2011. 5. 14. · the jt8d, cf6. and jt3d engine trending analysis was conducted by the...

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