dswd

SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL Volume No. 2 Issue No. 2

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Dear Readers,

When the Social Welfare and Development (SWD) Journal began its publication in July 2007,

the Department envisioned it as a platform for promoting social development programs and

studies, not just of government agencies, but of NGOs, LGUs and similar organizations as

well. Interestingly, the launch of the SWD Journal also coincided with the jumpstart of the

National Sector Support for the Social Welfare and Development Reform Program (NSS-SWDRP):

a reform process that the DSWD has undertaken to maximize its capacity as a leader in the

field of social protection, especially in social welfare and social safety nets; a process that has

resulted in an assessment of DSWD’s capacities and identification of reforms that will improve

its service delivery and leadership capacity.

For the Journal’s first anniversary issue we are sharing with you some of the condensed

studies, which have provided direction for the NSS-SWDRP. These studies by our consultants,

Dr. Fernando T. Aldaba and Dr. Leonardo A. Lanzona, discuss the implications of the devolution

on the SWD sector (Aldaba); assess the country’s social risks and vulnerabilities (Aldaba); and

tackle the proposed monitoring and evaluation system for DSWD (Lanzona). We are also

featuring an article on the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Conditional Cash Transfer,

the Department’s latest anti-poverty strategy, which aims to capacitate the poorest to invest in

human development capital, specifically in education and health.

We hope these articles will not only enlighten our readers on the challenges that the DSWD is

facing as regards its reform process, but also reflect the Department’s determination to overcome

these hurdles and provide better service to the poor and vulnerable.

Happy reading!

Alicia R. Bala

Undersecretary and Editor-in-Chief

M E S S A G E

Volume No. 2 Issue No. 2

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SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL

he Philippine bureaucracy was highlycentralized prior to the Code. The DSWD was

formerly called the Social Welfare Administration,which was under the Office of the President. Thishighly centralized unit of government attended tothe social welfare needs of the country. In 1968,the SWA became a department, called theDepartment of Social Welfare, under formerPresident Ferdinand Marcos. When the countryshifted to parliamentarism in 1978, it became theMinistry of Social Services and Development. In1987, the office was re-named the Department ofSocial Welfare and Development under formerPresident Corazon Aquino.

I. The DSWD Prior to Decentralization1

The DSWD’s role in its early years under postwarPhilippines focused on the provision of social

A REVIEW OF THE DSWD DEVOLUTION*

By

Dr. Fernando T. Aldaba

ABSTRACT

T

Introduction

he Local Government Code of thePhilippines was enacted in 1991 to address

the problems associated with a highlycentralized Philippine bureaucracy. It wasenacted to by the state “to ensure the autonomyof local governments” as contained in thePhilippine constitution.

One of the major features of the Code was thetransfer of the responsibility for the delivery ofbasic services, including appropriate personnel,assets, equipment, programs, and projects, tothe local government units. The Department ofSocial Welfare and Development (DSWD) was

one of national government agencies that wasdevolved almost immediately after theenactment of the Code. Fifteen years afterdevolution, the DSWD continues to identify andresolve the institutional and financial challengesthat it faces to fulfill its mandate under a devolvedset-up. This paper seeks to present thedevolution process that the Department wentthrough in the past fifteen years and the issuesand challenges that it continues to face. Thisstudy was based on the review of existingstudies on the subject and does not present acomprehensive assessment of the Department’sperformance under a devolved set up.

T welfare services to those who were considered as“destitute, the unfortunate victims of calamities anddissidence, and others who are unable to fend forthemselves or to be taken care of by relatives andfriends. Under the Garcia administration itsservices to the destitute shifted to attaining self-sufficiency through income generating projects forthe needy, training of physically handicappedpersons, and gradual establishment of a socialsecurity system. Child welfare services wereexpanded to include probation and parole, childguidance clinics, Boy’s Town to house offenders,and child aid and placement.

Under the Marcos administration, a “holisticdevelopmental perspective” in social welfareservices was adopted with economic,psychological, physical and social programsresponding to potential or actual problems of the

* This review is based on existing literature on the DSWD devolution and internal documents of the Department


3A Review of the DSWD Devolution

marginalized. Instead of mere treatment andrehabilitation of individual victims, there was a shiftin focus on organized groups such as families andbarangays. In the 1978-1982 Five-Year Plan, socialservices were intentionally extended to the lowest30 percent of the population especially in depressedregions, along with the mobilization and developmentof human resources at the barangay level to increaseproductivity and instill self-reliance. The Departmentshifted its emphasis from the traditional, ofteninstitution-based, social welfare to community-oriented programs and services that increasedpeople’s own capacities for problem solving.

It was also during the Marcos regime when a policyof coordination between public and private socialservice organizations was adopted by the socialwelfare sector in order to expand clientele outreachand maximize the efficient use of resources However,the government applied a very utilitarian role to civilsociety, that of efficient user of resources. In spite ofcalls for better cooperation between these twosectors, “real coordination” still had to be maximizedand “clearly defined.”

Under the Corazon Aquino administration, genderand development programs were promoted in theDSWD. A Bureau of Women’s Welfare wasestablished to ensure the empowerment of women.Women’s productivity skills and capability buildingcenters were established for this purpose. Besideswomen, the disabled and rebel returnees were alsogiven priority. In addition, the role of non-governmentorganizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations(POs) became constitutionally mandated, pushingthe DSWD to forge collaborative efforts betweengovernment and civil society.

Toward the end of President Aquino’s term, Congresspassed the Local Government Code, whichintroduced significant modifications in the provisionof basic social services by transferring the provisionof social welfare services to local government units(LGUs). Thus began the transformation of the DSWDfrom a highly centralized department to one with adevolved set up.

II. The DSWD After Decentralization

The Local Government Code mandated thetransfer of the following social services to the LocalGovernment Units (LGUs): At the barangay level,

these services include the maintenance of daycarecenters. At the municipal and city levels, theseinclude children and youth, elderly and disabledpersons welfare projects and programs;community based rehabilitation programs, familyplanning and nutrition programs, livelihood projectsfor the poor and women projects and programs.At the provincial level, these include programs andprojects on rebel returnees and evacuees, disasterand relief operations and population development.However, by a legislative mandate the DSWDcontinues to implement national programs andprojects funded through its own budget or fromexternal sources. These are the Self EmploymentAssistance- Kaunlaran Project (SEA-K),Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of SocialServices (CIDSS), Productivity Skills CapacityBuilding for Disadvantaged Women and the EarlyChildhood Care and Development (ECCD).

Under the Code, devolution involved the transferof basic services and facilities including records,equipment and other assets and personnel ofnational agencies and offices to LGUs. The LGUswill fund these services from its internal revenueallotment or IRA share in national taxes and/or fromit locally sourced revenues. In addition, thefunctions of the DSWD’s regional offices shouldbe devolved to the provincial, city or towngovernment units within one year from the approvalof the Code. The DSWD may however establishfield units to monitor and provide technicalassistance to LGUs. Thus, the Code transformedthe DSWD from being the main, direct serviceprovider of basic services to an enabler or providerof technical assistance and augmenter of funds.

The “Master Plan (1993-1998) for the SustainedImplementation of the Local Government Code of1991” presents three major phases that guidedthe implementation of the Code:

Phase One: Change-over Phase (1992 to 1993),which involved the transfer to LGUs of devolvedfunctions, with the corresponding assets andpersonnel.

Phase Two: Transition Phase (1994 to 1996),wherein the national government agencies (NGAs)and the LGUs shall institutionalize theiradjustments to the decentralized schemesintroduced by the Code.


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Phase Three: Stabilization Phase (1997onwards), wherein the LGUs would have builtadequate capacities in managing local affairs, andthe NGAs would provide constant support andtechnical assistance to LGUs.

Thus, five years after its enactment, it is expectedthat the bureaucracy has already been fullyimplementing the Code and its units functioningunder a totally devolved set-up.

In this section, the evolution of the DSWD from ahighly centralized unit to a decentralized unit ofgovernment is presented in three major phases,the first five years since the enactment of the Code,the next five years or a decade after the enactmentof the Code and finally fifteen years afterdevolution.

1. The first five years after devolution(1991-1996)

Policy Support to Devolution2

Under Executive Order No. 503, the guidelines andimplementing rules on devolution, the devolutionof basic services was required to be finished byJune 30, 1992 consistent with the Code, andDecember 31, 1992 was placed as the finaldeadline for those services that cannot bedevolved by June 30, 1992. Memorandum No.27 of the President also mandated that nationaldepartments and agencies should improve theiroperations and guide the process streamliningcriteria. Implementing procedures were alsodetailed.

As a response, on 13 March 1992 the DSWDissued Department Order (D.O.) 005 Series of1992 that contained the Implementing Guidelinesfor the Department’s devolution process. Itidentified the particular programs of theDepartment that would be handed over to theLGUs as well as the programs that would beretained. It also contained the guidelines for thedevolving of personnel and assets as well as thetime frame. Shown below are the programs thatwere devolved to the LGUs in compliance with theDepartment Order and the provisions of the Code.According to the DSWD, the D.O. enabled themto comply more than what was required by theCode.

Barangay

qqqqq Day Care Center

Municipality/City

Programs and Projects on:

q Child and Youth Welfareq Family and Community

Welfareq Welfare of the Elderly and

Disabled Personsq Community-based Rehab,

programs for vagrants,beggars, street children,scavengers, juveniledelinquents and victims ofdrug abuse

q Nutrition servicesq Family Planning Services

Province

qqqqq Programs and Projects forRebel Returnees

qqqqq Relief Operationsqqqqq Population Development

Service

RA 7160 (Sec. 17)

Barangay

q Day Care Service

Municipality/City

A. Self Employment

Assistance (SEA)

B. Family and Community

Welfare Programs

qqqqq Parent Effectivenessqqqqq Marriage Counselingqqqqq Responsible Parenthoodqqqqq Family Casework /

Counselingqqqqq Social Preparation for

People’s Participationqqqqq Community Volunteer

Resource Devt.

C. Women Welfare Program

qqqqq Self-Enhancement SkillsDevt.

qqqqq Maternal and Child CareSkills Devt.

qqqqq Productivity Skills/Livelihood Devt.

qqqqq Community ParticipationSkills Devt.

D. Emergency Assistance

Program

qqqqq Supplemental Feedingqqqqq Food for Workqqqqq Emergency Shelter

Assistanceqqqqq Balik Probinsyaqqqqq Crisis Interventionqqqqq Disaster Mgt. Capability

Bldg.

E. Program for Disabled

Persons and Elderly

qqqqq Information Disseminationon Disability Prevention

qqqqq Assistance for PhysicalRestoration

qqqqq Self/Social Enhancementfor Disabled persons

qqqqq Social / VocationalPreparation forEmployment Services

qqqqq After Care and Follow-upservices

qqqqq Special Social Services forthe Elderly

qqqqq Social and VocationalPreparation for JobPlacement

Province

qqqqq Disaster Relief Assistance

D.O. 005 (Sec. III)

A Review of the DSWD DevoloutionA Review of the DSWD Devolution


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1992

1993

1995-96

q Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503:contained the rules and regulationsimplementing the Transfer of Assets,Liabilities and Records of NGAs whoseFunctions are to be Devolved to the LGUs

q Memorandum Order (M.O.) 27:Mandating All Heads of Departments,Agencies, Instrumentalities of NationalGovernments to Streamline and Improvetheir Operations and Organization

q An Ad Hoc Committee on Restructuring/Streamlining the DSWD as created withthen Undersecretary Milagros Llanes asChairman.

q Department Order (D.O.) 005:Implementing Guidelines of R.A. 7160 wasissued outlining the Devolution Process forthe Department.

q DSWD submitted to DBM its streamliningreport per M.O. 27 Guidelines

q Workshops and Consultations with DBMand AIM

TIME PERIODRELATED EVENTS

TO DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS

Trends in Implementing the Code3

Both local governments and field offices of NGAsview the implementation of the Code as a valuable,relevant and necessary step towards localautonomy. However, the enthusiasm for achievinglocal autonomy is seriously constrained by theproblems prevailing at the local level regarding theimplementation of the Code. In 1992, the LGUsand local level national government personnelwere confused, resistant and had a very cautious

A Review of the DSWD Devolution

In the last quarter of 1992, the Department beganthe turnover of manpower and budget asmandated by the Code. By the end of 1996,around 66% of the Department’s personnel weredevolved to the LGUs. Also in 1996, theDepartment issued D.O. 22 Series of 1996 thataimed to alleviate poverty in the poorest areas ofthe country through community organization andprovision of basic needs. It was here that theComprehensive and Integrated Delivery of SocialServices (CIDSS) Program was born. CIDSSbecame the flagship project of the Social ReformAgenda and later under E.O. 443 became thenational delivery mechanism for the minimum

basic needs approach.

wait-and-see attitude in implementing the Code. By1993, the LGUs started to seriously implement theCode moving beyond personnel devolution tohaving a positive effect on service delivery, politicalaccountability, local planning, private sector andNGO participation and a host of other areas. Bothlocal governments and NGA local offices are doingmuch to work out solutions to problems withoutfurther recourse to central offices. Generally,however, the devolved agencies at both the centraland local levels continue to be very slow to respondto the operational demands of decentralization. By1994 the process of devolving personnel and assetshas essentially been accomplished and a“transitional” phase in the decentralization processhas thus begun. Local governments turned to thesubstantive aspects of local control includingreorganization in the context of the newresponsibilities devolved to them such as learningthe essentials of delivering social welfare services.In 1995, there was widespread evidence ofincreased allocation for basic services. Innovativeplanning and delivery of social services took placethroughout the country with NGOs and POsparticipating in this delivery. By 1996, basic servicedelivery became more integrated with localoperations, more focused on local priorities, andmore efficient in terms of both services and costs.Both local executives and devolved personneldiscovered and developed more creative supportservice modes as a result of decentralization. Inmany instances, devolved personnel attested to theimprovements in their ability to develop and pursuemore relevant projects because they were closerto the decision making and could define activitiesin relation to local need. Where devolved personneloppose devolution, they do so because of concernsabout career security and advancement, notbecause they believe that LGUs are incapable ofdelivering services.

The devolution of social welfare services has beenin most respects the “success story” ofdecentralization. The DSWD willingly andaggressively managed the devolution of itspersonnel. DSWD personnel were typically wellrespected by local executives and readily absorbedinto local organizational structures. Overall in thefirst five years of devolution, the change-overprocess went well. Services continued to bedelivered without too many difficulties.


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The DSWD’s main concern in the first year ofimplementing the Code was how to reorganizeto deliver technical assistance to the LGUs andhow to reorient their own field operations tobetter serve locally-based service delivery. In1992, the DSWD devolved its personnel to thelocal level by entering into a Memorandum ofAgreement (MOA) with the LGUs. This MOAhelped both parties in the management ofdevolved assets and personnel as well asoperational issues. By 1993, DSWD personnelwho had been appointed to local plantillas andoperate under local guidance, continued todeliver services at least as consistently as whenNGAs had control. By 1994, service delivery hascontinued without major disruption and, in somecases, has improved as LGUs exercisedmanagement of devolved services. However,there has been minimal re-direction of the patternof service delivery inherited from NGAs and mostdevolved personnel are simply tasked tocontinue as they have been prior to devolution.By 1995, the DSWD acknowledged thatoperations have improved. Provincial andmunicipal social welfare personnel frequentlyreported that the transfer of DSWD functions toLGUs strengthened their operational capacity,especially in terms of access to resources, quickdecision-making and the ability to reorientservices where they are needed most. DSWDpersonnel were most frequently cited by localofficials as being the easiest to integrate intoLGU operations. In 1996, social welfare receivedincreased financial support from LGUs due togreater understanding of the needs ofbeneficiaries resulting from closer supervisoryand planning support from chief executives. Thecombination of more rapid access to funds andquick decision-making, coupled with moretargeted interventions had improved the impactof social welfare programs. LGUs expanded theirsocial service “nets” to add programs co-financedand supported by NGOs and private sectorinstitutions with particular capabil i t ies inaddressing sectoral or special needs. Thus, inaddition to the standard services for indigents,pre-school children, youth and the elderly, LGUsinnovated with programs co-funded andco-managed by the social welfare personnel andNGOs.

Issues and Concerns4

DSWD faced the following constraints in thedevolution process in the first five years ofimplementation:

1. Overlaps and gaps in the social servicessector which need to be rationalized bymeans of a development agenda, ratherthan by means of just responding tocircumstance.

2. Unfunded mandates and fundingconstraints especially for lower classmunicipalities that had greater numbers ofindigent clients as a portion of theirpopulation. Local executives observe thatNGA budgets were not as dramaticallyaffected by devolving personnel andfunctions to LGUs, as were LGU budgets(even with increased IRA shares) effectedby absorbing personnel and functions fromNGAs. Similarly, NGAs say they do nothave the funds to provide technicalassistance in their new “consultancy” rolewith respect to the LGUs.

3. Political considerations adversely intrudeon social welfare issues. The extension ofservices to one group is seen as partisanfavoritism and the rejection of ineligibleclients is sometimes countermanded byexecutives seeking to do political favors.

4. LGUs’ difficulty in adjusting administrativesystems to accommodate new functions

and responsibilities. Treasury, budgeting,accounting and general services hadcumbersome system and LGUs neededassistance in complying with requirements.

5. Absence of clearly defined complemen-tation of roles between NGAs and LGUs,particularly with respect to reorienting NGAregional offices toward prioritizing LGUtechnical assistance. NGA regionalpersonnel often tend to see their role asprimarily continuing to deliver and/ormonitor their own national programs, ratherthan undertaking the fundamental changesneeded to become providers of technicalassistance in response to locally definedneeds. The persistence to implement onlythe programs of the “mother agency,” while



7

helping with the continuity of service,crowds out local innovation—sinceimplementers’ attention is already takenwith these NGA-initiated programs. Locallevel executives and personnel felt that thenational government agencies often try tofocus on programs with high visibility likethe Social Reform Agenda, which leads toa tendency to bypass the LGUs. This waswhat DSWD did when it hired its ownpersonnel for the CIDSS (ComprehensiveIntegrated Delivery of Social Services)program.

6. No specific division or group was in chargewith coordinating and delivering servicesto LGUs. Most retain familiar functionalarrangements; there is no apparent designfor cross-coordinating functional activitieswith LGU needs, leaving the impressionthat regional offices continue to emphasizetheir own functional programs and willrespond to LGUs on an “as needed”, ratherthan pro-active basis. The Regional SWDpersonnel were most concerned with howto monitor activities which are no longerunder their authority.

2. Ten years after devolution (1997-2001)Policy support5

Three Department Orders (D.O.) were issuedwithin this period to transform the Department’sfunction from direct service deliverer to LGUenabler. The D.O. 20 Series of 1997 restructuredits organization and intensified capacity buildingefforts to strengthen the DSWD’s steering role.The Department then issued D.O. 26 Series of1997 to localize the DSWD’s centers andinstitutions. The Department was ordered totransfer these institutions to capable LGUs andassist them in meeting the financial requirementsof these centers and institutions. The D.O. 16Series of 1999 provided planning guidelines forthe integrated implementation of social services.The Corporate Plan 2001-2010 was later proposedto make the DSWD systemically andorganizationally attuned to its changed nature andtransformed environment.

Administrative Orders 140 and 157 Series of 1997further enhanced the DSWD Field Offices’ capacity

to perform their steering role capacity through aredefinition of Field Office-Central Office relationsand re-clarification of the Field Offices’ functionspost-devolution. The D.O. 01 Series of 1998 pilot-tested a program to grant full decentralizationpowers to selected DSWD Regional and FieldOffices. The D.O. 22 Series of 1997 provided theframework for Synchronized LGU-DSWD Planningvis-à-vis the CIDSS project and D.O. 21 Series of1998 was drafted to interface DSWD and LGUworkers at the Barangay-Municipal levels not justto integrate planning but also to prepare the wayfor the localization of CIDSS.


1997

1998

q D.O. 22: Guidelines for the Implementationof the Comprehensive and Integrated

Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS)

q E.O. 443: Adoption of CIDSS as NationalDelivery Mechanism for the Minimum BasicNeeds (MBN) Approach

q ACTION-TOPS constituted with SecretaryLaigo as Chair

q A.O. 57: Enhancing the DSWD FieldOffices to Perform their Steering Role

q Administrative Order (A.O.) 69 TaskForces for the DSWD Repositioning wereconstituted.

q D.O. 11: Development Agenda for 1997

q D.O. 20: Strengthening DSWD’s SteeringRole Capability and Improving Its Effectivityin Contributing to Poverty Alleviation Efforts

q D.O. 26: Localization of DSWD Centers ,Programs and Institutions

q D.O. 22: Strategy for Synchronized LGU-CIDSS Planning

q A.O. No. 157: Enhancing the DSWD’s FieldOffices to Perform Steering Roles

q Special Order No. 880: Assignments ofStaff in the Repositioned DSWD

q D.O. 01: Piloting of Full Decentralizationof Powers to Selected DSWD Regional andField Offices

q D.O. 21: Guidelines on the Interfacing ofDSWD and LGU Workers at the Barangay-Municipal Levels for the Localization ofCIDSS

TIME PERIODRELATED EVENTS

TO DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS


8


Implementation of the Code

The RFA 1997-2000 described DSWD and LGUcontinuing partnership as very productive in deliveringsocial services. Devolved personnel do not feel cutoff from the “mother agency,” as there is continuedcoordination in programming and prioritizing. The roleof non-government organizations (NGOs) in servicedelivery and coordination was less contentious in thearea of social services. Thus there was a strongeffective linkage among local governments, NGOs,and the Department during this period. The MinimumBasic Needs (MBN) approach and its data systemwere seriously utilized to direct social services; andthis tends to broaden service delivery from short-term crisis response to more wide-ranging help forclients. However, it could not be said that the MBNapproach has had an abiding impact on how planningis done. Finally, efforts towards the Social ReformAgenda have had an impact at the local level. Whilethere were problems with funding releases for thefirst year of the Poverty Alleviation Fund (whenguidelines were released late in the year), for thesecond year local respondents cited considerableimpact.

In 1997, a report entitled Delivery of Social Welfare

Services after Devolution and Factors Affecting This

was completed by Asia Development Consultants,Inc. (ADC). The study was an assessment of therole and performance of LGUs in SWD and covered101 municipalities from Luzon, Visayas, andMindanao. Respondents were DSWD Regional

Officers, senior LGU officials, NGO representatives,DSWD devolved personnel, and beneficiaries. Thefollowing were the findings of the study: 6

1. The MSWDO was made up of four staffmembers, such as the Municipal SocialWelfare and Development Officer(MSWDO), other social welfare staff, and autility staff. Day care workers provide staffsupport and are based in the different daycare centers. At the provincial level, anaverage of four to six staff membersmanages the Provincial Welfare andDevelopment Office (PSWDO). The officewas organized according to the programsand services devolved to LGUs, such asemergency assistance, family andcommunity welfare, relief and rehabilitation,and a special concerns unit. The PSWDOprovided the directions and program thrustsfor the MSWDOs, which was different fromthe previous process where planning andneeds assessment were done at the locallevel, with the national government settingoverall goals and targets.

2. The MSWDOs performed 76.3%responsibility in implementing social welfareservices at the municipal level. Only aboutone-third engage in both planning andsupervision while others engage in otheractivities such as networking andestablishing linkages; provision of technicalassistance; advocacy; and monitoring/evaluation. Planning activities are oftenpreceded by a needs assessment exercisewith some using the MBN information. Otheractivities such as population, nutrition, andserving as consultants to Local ChiefExecutives (LCEs) not stipulated in thefunction of the office are also performed bythe social welfare personnel.

3. At least 30% of PSWDO surveyrespondents said that the roles of theprovince were mainly that of implementingsocial welfare services and providingtechnical assistance to municipalities. Therewas very minimal involvement of theprovince in monitoring and evaluation,identification of basic needs, training andinformation dissemination.


RELATED EVENTS TODECENTRALIZATION PROCESS

1999

2001

TIME PERIOD

q E.O. 15 Redirects the Functions andOperations of DSD from Direct ServiceDeliverer to Technical Assistance providerdue to Devolution

q EO 221, s. 1998: amended E.O. 15Enabler of LGUs, NGOs and other NGAs,POs Implementer of statutory laws andspecialized programs and servicesDeveloper & monitor of standards in SWDLicensor & accreditor of SWD agencies andservice providers

q D.O. 16: Planning Guidelines for anIntegrated and Coordinated Implementationof Social Welfare and development Services

q D.O. 02: Planning Guidelines for CY 2000for Social Welfare and Development


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4. The type of training extended to MSWDOswas primarily on program requirements (i.e.,disaster management and relief operations;and trainers’ training on community disasterpreparedness). There were no trainings onhow to interface with LCEs, mobilizeresources, strengthen social welfaresectors, or how to manage social welfareservices at the municipal level. This partlyexplains why performance of these taskswas quite low among LGUs.

5. The MSWDOs implemented the followingprograms: Self-Employment AssistanceProgram; Family and Community WelfareProgram; Women Welfare Program; Childand Youth Welfare Program; EmergencyAssistance Program; Program for Disabledand Elderly; and Day Care Service. Serviceswere delivered in a sectoral way. Of the totalnumber of 30 services listed or devolved toLGUs, the following services are the onesmost commonly provided in the municipality:Day Care services, loan assistance, parenteffectiveness, marriage counseling,supplemental feeding, and informationdissemination for disability prevention.About 85% of LGUs engage in theseservices.

6. Services not adequately implemented wereentrepreneurship development andcapability building services; Child and YouthPrograms; community-based services forstreet children and delinquent youths; andservices for disabled persons and elderly.

7. In provincial offices, disaster managementwas the key program that is implementedin four of the six services prioritized, with40% or more of SWD staff working underthis program.

8. In terms of accomplishment of targets, mostof the MSWDOs had fulfilled 70%-100% oftheir targets. The study pointed out,however, that MSWDOs tend to lower theirtargets because of limited funds.

9. Social welfare clients surveyed by ADC saidthey were satisfied particularly with self-employment assistance, family welfare,women, and youth. Programs with lesssatisfaction ratings were emergencyassistance, day care services, and those for


the elderly and disabled. There were alsoduplication of services and targetbeneficiaries for the livelihood projects ofLGUs and regional offices.

10. MSWDOs and PSWDOs complaintsincluded: low prioritization given by LCEsto social welfare programs, politicalintervention especially in the appointmentor upgrading of positions, lack of regularityin monitoring social welfare programs, andlack of dialogue and consultation withdifferent stakeholders.

11. NGO contributions were mainly channeledto the provision of capital and materials,financial assistance, and technical support.These are often directed to self-employment assistance, emergencyassistance, and capability building ofclients. NGOs tend to implement their ownprograms and services instead of linkingup with the SWD office. Limited fundsprevented them from expanding thecoverage of their SWD projects.

12. POs mainly served as clients of the MSWDoffice especially in livelihood, health, andnutrition projects. Their leaders lackedmanagerial skills and their members lackedinvolvement in program development.

13. The DSWD National Office support wasmainly the provision of technical assistancein the form of training to improve SWDOstaff capabilities. This is in keeping with therole of DSWD to “steer” rather than “row”responsibility. There are few guidelines andpreparatory activities regarding monitoring,however, which could explain the poorsubmission of information on the status ofSWD services by LGUs.

The 1999 (9 th) RFA revealed that the localgovernments were struggling to implementdevelopmental initiatives within an environment oftraditional dole-out approaches to social serviceprovision. Local governments were receptive to thecollaborative focus of the minimum basic needs(MBN) approach to community-based planningand were increasingly incorporating it into theirplanning efforts at all levels. The 9th RFA showedthe Department’s considerable national attentionto issues of decentralization and partnership. The


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Department reorganized and created the Office forRegional Operations to better respond to thetechnical assistance requirements and needs of theDSWD regional offices and local governments. TheDepartment also designed its Human ResourceDevelopment and Capability Building activities toprepare regional offices for their new role intechnical assistance delivery. These importantorganizational developments were brought aboutby presidential executive order issued to redirectthe functions and operations of the department fromdirect service deliverer to technical assistanceprovider to local governments. At the same time,the CIDSS was also being expanded to cover morelocal governments. Local governments met theCIDSS initiatives of the department with awillingness to provide counterpart funding,especially absorbing CIDSS workers into theplantilla of local government personnel. Localgovernments also worked out strategies to sustainthe project, despite difficulties in financing due toresource constraints at the national and local levels.In the June 1999 SWS national survey, 56% ofrespondents were satisfied with the quality ofdevolved social services in their communities.


According to the ADC report, 79% of municipalSWD staff said they were hampered by limitedfinancial resources. Thirty-nine percent said theylacked administrative support, as exemplified bylimited travel allowance, slow release of funds, andfailure to provide benefits to staff. About 20% citedproblems of manpower lack, political interventionin the selection of beneficiaries, implementation ofservices for political purposes, low priority given toSWD programs by LGUs, dole-out mentality ofclients, and lack of technical assistance from regionsand/or the national office.

The RFA reports cited the following as majorconstraints in the delivery of services:

1. Preference of some local governments forconcrete, visible infrastructure, as thesewere perceived to be better means ofgetting votes.

2. The structure of projects under the SocialReform Agenda restricted localgovernments to selecting from a pre-identified list or menu, rather than being ableto design their own projects to meet the

goals of alleviating poverty and meetingminimum basic needs.

3. Since national government agencies servedas conduits for the Poverty Alleviation Fund,their internal procedures delayed therelease of moneys.

4. Local governments have found CIDSS tobe a very successful approach but wereworried about where to find the resourcesto sustain this project.

5. Low priority for LGU-initiated and fundedcapability-building programs for socialworkers.

3. Fifteen years after devolution (2002-2007)

Dr. Bautista described the current DSWD set-up inher section on the Philippine Governance Report(2002). At the national office and field offices in thedifferent regions, the DSWD maintains the followingtechnical bureaus: social technology; programoperations; standards; policy and programs; andsocial welfare and institutional development. It hasthese support services: external assistance;administrative; human resources and development;finance; legal; management information system;and social marketing. These offices enable theDepartment to carry out its retained servicefunctions and to perform its “steering role” for thedevolved responsibilities. The DSWD alsocontinues to maintain attached coordinating bodiesfor policy formulation and monitoring theimplementation of laws pertinent to particulargroups. Another is the National Council for theWelfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), whichserves as the central policymaking, coordinating,and advisory agency of government on all disability-related matters. The third attached agency is theInter-Country Adoption Board, which acts as thecentral authority in matters pertaining to the Inter-Country adoption of Filipino Children. An essentialstructural innovation is the move to set up a matrixorganization where different offices can beharnessed to contribute their talent and expertisefor particular strategic activities. For instance, aResearch Management Committee has been setup under the leadership of the Undersecretary forPolicy, Programs and Standards with all AssistantSecretaries as members (DSWD 2001). While theTechnical secretariat is headed by the BureauDirector for Policy, Plans and Information Systems,the members of the Research Matrix Group can be



11A Review of the DSWD Devolution

tapped from selected technical staff from otherbureaus, offices/units, field offices and attachedagencies. This structural arrangement enablesexperts from different offices to have a cross-fertilization of ideas. In the case of the nationalprogram for poverty alleviation like CIDSS,interagency bodies at the different levels ofgovernment are to be constituted. As the principleof convergence policy is being upheld, it harnessesthe participation of representatives fromgovernment, NGOs and POs, and lately, the basicsector representatives and other governmentrepresentatives from the economic developmentsector not included in earlier interagencycommittees. The current structure of DSWD isshown below. Currently, the national and localoffices set the directional and annual programthrusts; preparation of plans and targets are doneat the local level.

Figure 3. Emerging DSWD Organizational Structure

Inter-CountryAdoption Board

Nat’l. Council forthe Welfare of

Disabled Persons

Council for theWelfare of Children

HumanResource

DevelopmentService

AdministrativeService

ExternalAssistance

Service

ManagementInformation

SystemService

SocialMarketingService

FinanceService

LegalService

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY3 Under Secretaries and

4 Ass’t. Secretaries

StandardsTechnology

Bureau

ProgramOperations

Burea

StandardsBureau

Policy &PlansBurea

SocialWelfare &

InstitutionalDev’t Bureau

F i e l d O f f i c e s

In a 2002 study conducted by the Ateneo School ofGovernment on the devolution process that theDSWD undertook, the following achievements ofthe department were cited:

1. No dislocation of devolved personnel.

Through D.O. 005, the Department ensured thatthe devolution process would not infringe the rightsand benefits of its personnel. D.O. 005 ensured that:

1. There shall be no involuntary separation,termination or lay-off of DSWD personnelaffected by devolution; [Sec. III, C, 2 (d)];

2. Devolved permanent personnel shall enjoysecurity of tenure in accordance withexisting Civil Service laws, rules andregulations [Sec. III, C, 2(e)];

3. There shall be no diminution in pay orbenefits of DSWD devolved personnel.[Sec. III, C, 2 (j)];1

4. When the devolved DSWD personnel optfor voluntary separation or retirement fromthe service they shall be entitled, if qualifiedunder existing laws, to receive theretirement gratuities and other benefitsaccruing thereunder [Sec. III, C, 7 (a)].

Furthermore, the Department has also institutedseveral administrative mechanisms to act as “jobsecurity nets” for contentious cases:

1. Mandatory devolution of personnel to theLGU shall be formalized through aMemorandum of Agreement (MOA). TheLGU’s shall create the equivalent positionsof the affected personnel except when it isnot administratively viable.*

2. [Sec. III, C, 2 (a)];

3. The LGU’s commit that they will “completethe implementation of salary standardizationfor locally paid workers with plantillapositions similar to devolved DSWDpersonnel. [Sec. IV, 1, C), 2];

4. The DSWD personnel who are notabsorbed by the LGUs for reasons ofadministrative non-viability shall be retainedby DSWD subject to CSC law, rules andregulations (i.e., their security of tenure shallbe fully protected.) [Sec III, C, 2 (c)];

5. Casual emergency or daily-wage DSWDpersonnel assigned in the field units affectedby devolution who are performing duties andresponsibilities relative to the delivery ofbasic services shall be absorbed by theLGU’s concerned [Sec. III, C, 2 (g)];

* “Administrative non-viability” was strictly construed to help plug a loophole in implementation. Sec. III, C, 2 (b) stated that “absorption is not

administratively viable when there is duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned.”


12


A basic feature of the CIDSS is the deployment of aCIDSS worker, who performs the role of headmobilizer and fulfills the delicate task of organizingthe community, which includes:

1. Orienting the various stakeholders at themunicipal level;

2. Facilitating the identification of prioritybarangays;

3. Spotting leaders and organizingneighborhood cluster of about 25 families;

4. Validating and prioritizing problems;5. Facilitating preparation of development plan;6. Facilitating the conduct of the barangay

assembly to validate the barangay

development plan.10

The LGUs are integrated into the program throughvarious ways. The presidents of the Leagues ofthe LGUs are members of the Steering Committee.The LCEs of the provinces head the interagencycommittees (PIAC, MIAC, BIAC), together with thedevolved chief of offices (health, social welfare,agrarian reform, agriculture and environment).

The primary task of the LGUs is to organize theirrespective interagency bodies and make sure thatthe convergence approach gets applied in theirareas. Thus, CIDSS is primarily a system where theminimum basic needs of a given local population isidentified and addressed in the closest possible waywith the people. An interagency structure meets,operates and decides at the lowest LGU level. Thisis facilitated by the CIDSS worker. In Bautista’s 1999study, the LCE participation was perceived to be mostcrucial in the success of the program.11

The DSWD started implementing CIDSS in 1994 ina total of 150 barangays based in 5th and 6th classmunicipalities in 33 provinces based on the latestpoverty profile. By 1995, due to its success, 625barangays were added in 200 5th and 6th classmunicipalities in 49 provinces. By 1997, CIDSS wasexpanded to include even 3rd and 4 th classmunicipalities and covered 1,154 barangays in 432municipalities of 77 provinces.12 In 1999, the planwas to cover 2,402 barangays in 960 municipalitiesof 78 provinces.13

Two major studies have confirmed the success ofCIDSS as a technology in poverty alleviation.


6. Temporary personnel shall be absorbed bythe LGUs, subject to Civil ServiceCommission (CSC) rules and regulations[Sec. III, C, 2 (h)].

The presence of these clear rules to guide theprocess of personnel devolution helped calm theworries of DSWD personnel who were anxious thatthe process would strip them of their vital rightsunder CSC rules. The LGUs on the other handreadily accepted DSWD personnel because of theirexpertise. This was attributed to the fact that lawregulates the position of social welfare personnel.Thus, any person that occupies a social welfareposition in the LGUs must have the necessarycredentials. This also enabled the Department tohave a significant presence in all LGUs.

2. Successful Implementation of theComprehensive and Integrated Delivery of

Social Services (CIDSS)

The D.O. 54, Series of 1994, which was lateramended by D.O. 22, issued on May 15, 1996 citesthe objectives of the CIDSS program: (1) test astrategy on poverty alleviation through CIDSS; (2)monitor

Institutional Arrangement of the CIDSS

q The Location of the CIDSS OversightCommittee as a parallel structure of theSocial Reform Council (the structure whichoversees the implementation of SRA),instead of being located under the SocialReform Council.

q The creation of the National Inter-AgencyCommittee (NIAC) under the OversightCommittee. NIAC is directly responsible foroverseeing the corresponding IAC’s at theregional (RIAC), provincial (PIAC), municipal(MIAC) and barangay (BIAC) levels. Priorto this set-up, the NEDA Social DevelopmentCommittee had supervisory authority overthe regional, provincial, municipal andbarangay IACs.

q The restructuring of the Project MonitoringTeam (PMT) which incorporates CIDSSArea supervisors to oversee the work ofCIDSS workers.9


13

Bautista (1999) has documented the fact thatcommunity structures were spurred to emerge andthat perspectives of mayors shifted their prioritiesbecause of the program’s success.14 She reporteda significant reduction in the unmet MBN of CIDSSbarangays as compared to non-CIDSS barangays:“Overall, CIDSS areas have improved in 28 out ofthe 33 MBN indicators while non-CIDSS areasimproved in a total of 18 out of 33 indicators.”15

Balisacan (2000) has also pointed out that theprogram hastened service delivery and made “apositive impact” on the quality of life of thecommunity.16 These studies were validated by keyinformant interviews.

This program later on was later on “localized” in1999 and 2000 as prescribed by E.O. 443 of 1997.The localization of CIDSS was a policy responseto the desire of the LGUs to turn over to them themanagement of the CIDSS. An impact study onthe localization of CIDSS was conducted by OrientIntegrated Development Consultants, Inc. in 2004.The study concluded that overall the localizationof the program was successful and persistentlygenerated the benefits intended for the poor,namely the reduction of unmet needs. Thecommitment of the LGUs to reduce povertyincidence in their areas of jurisdiction continuedto be strong and operational. The range of servicesby the LGUs, DSWD and NGOs was wide andsubstantial. The benefits received were improvedphysical, financial and institutional access to socialservices. Self reliance and communityempowerment were cited as major outcomes ofthe localization.

Another program of similar nature wasimplemented on a massive scale—the Kapit Bisig

Laban sa Kahirapan (Linking Arms AgainstPoverty) or KALAHI-CIDSS. This is the flagshipprogram of the current administration enabling thelocal communities to own their respective projectsand find a way to sustain the program financially.As of 2005, 4,270 barangays in 177 municipalitiesin 42 provinces in 13 regions were covered by theKALAHI-CIDSS program. The CIDSS andKALAHI-CIDSS experiences show what can beachieved with planning from below. In thisparticular technology, “needs” were not identifiedfrom above but was generated from below. TheLGUs were heavily involved both in generating the


needs, drafting the approach and implementing itthrough the interagency committees. The CIDSSand KALAHI-CIDSS experiences showed that“convergence” can work and should be a corefeature of any government intervention, despitethe difficulties related to the fact that the statemachinery is a most difficulty entity to be made towork together.

3. Administrative powers transferred toregional offices.

The Department gave the regional directors (RD)the power to appoint personnel to positions withSalary Grade 24 and below. They were also giventhe authority to decide on the acceptance ofresignation and permission to transfer all regular/casual employees with Salary Grade 24 and below.More importantly, they now have the prerogativeto exercise disciplinary action over field officeemployees for the commission of less grave andlight offenses.

They were also given discretion on some areas ofmonetary concern, like the authorization ofdisbursement of funds chargeable againstreleases from Congressional Initiatives andCountrywide Development Fund and thenegotiation and entrance of contracts for serviceand furnishing of supplies, materials andequipment for the field offices with aPhP500,000.00 per transaction threshold. In fact,they have been empowered to sign transactionsregardless of the amount, provided that the sameis within the approved work and financial plan ofthe field office. These actions decongested theCentral Office and have given the Field Officesthe authority to promptly respond to issues ofdirect, immediate concern to them.

The DSWD pilot tested the above mentioned policyin selected regions: III, V, VI, X and XI. The DSWDtop management assessed the results throughempirical observation and through analysis of thedocuments submitted to them. The fulldecentralization of Regional Offices wasregularized by then DSWD Secretary GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo for Regions III, VI and XIbecause they have demonstrated “managementand staff competence in the exercise of theauthority delegated to them by D.O. 01 (Series of1998).”


14


4. Service Standards and EvaluationInstruments have been created and are beingenhanced to more effectively evaluate socialservice delivery under decentralization

The maintenance of a particular standard of socialservice delivery received greater importance afterR.A. 7160 mandated the devolution of key areas ofsocial service delivery to the LGUs. Whereas before,the DSWD was the direct service provider, now itwas “repositioned” to do the work of “servicing theservicers”: LGUs and NGOs to whom the powerhas been devolved. Now, one of the key tasks ofthe Department is to ensure that its direct consumersmaintain a particular standard of social delivery.

In the beginning of the decentralization process, theDepartment has lagged behind in standards creationbecause the Department’s energy was focused onthe critical issues of organizational restructuring andpersonnel devolution. The Department decided tocontract the Development Academy of the Philippinesto help in framing a Standards DevelopmentFramework. The Department is slowly but surelynarrowing the gap between the number of areas thatneeds accreditation, licensing and evaluation andtheir own empirical instruments.

The Department is now in the process of developingnew evaluative instruments for emerging services,the most important of which is the Quality SocialService Delivery by LGU instrument that is expectedby December 2001. The Department has alsostreamlined its Standards Development Process.Some LGUs are now offering hospice care services(for the terminally ill) and some are moving intocommunity-based program for autistic children.Since the Department has also committed to“localize” the centers and institutions that it hasretained, the Bureau is now even more hard-pressedto provide adequate standards. With a streamlinedprocess, expert papers, and common senseremedies, the DSWD has improved its standardsdevelopment.


The DSWD continues to face the followingconstraints fifteen years after devolution:

1. Budgetary Constraints

Lack of funds for social service delivery was cited asa constraint since 1992 up to the present. LGUs

consistently complained about the insufficiency ofthe IRA they are receiving as share in the nationalincome compared to the financial requirements ofthe responsibilities transferred to them. Some LGUshowever proactively raised their revenues byengaging themselves in enterprise developmentwhile some had sought local and international fundingsupport to LGU operations.

2. Low Priority for Social Services

Social services necessarily compete with otherprojects for allocation within the LGU budget. In therural areas, there is more concentration on theconstruction of public infrastructures because thesethings are readily noticeable and its beneficiaries arepotential voters. There is very low priority for socialservices (especially in taking responsibility over majorcenters) because these projects are expensive andsome do not “bring in the votes.” Almost all the currentmajor studies of devolution in the social servicedelivery from the LGU perspective has showncompelling evidentiary proof that social services hasreceived minimal allocation both in the nationalbudget and LGU budget.

3. Need for Competency and Capacity Building

Under E.O. 15, the DWD was tasked to undertakethe necessary organizational and personnel capability-building activities necessary to shift the departmentfrom a direct service provider to a purveyor of technicalassistance, The DSWD had been modestlysuccessful in moving towards the “enabler” role theDepartment basically lacks competence in technicalskills needed for some of the programs, especiallythose services that are highly technical, (i.e., crisisintervention, disaster management and relief). Someproblems of competence development were attributedto the insufficient technological facilities of the LGUsand the political structure of local governance. Socialwelfare officials associated with past administrationwere “frozen” and personnel “trusted” by the newadministration are installed. Thus, the DSWD needsto train them again. The “highly-qualified, technicallycompetent” personnel either go abroad or jump shipto richer government agencies. The recruitment andmovement pattern of its personnel revealed thattrainings are oftentimes used by people as “steppingstones” to other agencies (i.e., SSS, GSIS, BangkoSentral) or as a tool to be able to apply for jobs abroad.Thus, the DSWD trains people only to lose them.



15

3. Monitoring and Evaluation Constraints

With devolution, the Department has lost theadministrative clout to compel municipalities tosubmit progress and implementation reports, asnow supervisory powers were transferred to theLCEs. The Department is having difficultygetting feedback and vital inputs for planning(i.e., performance of devolved personnel). Theseinformation are also pivotal for mapping up theDepartment’s technical support and assistanceprograms. Devolved workers are also no longermaintaining informative and useful records ofclients. Instead they maintain records withminimal information, emaciating the casemanagement of devolved personnel.18 TheDSWD is now at a loss on how to frame a systemthat will enable them to effectively procure thosereports from LGUs.

Dr. Bautista (2002) said that a major problem inthe weak capability of the DSWD national officeto track the performance of LGUs is that LGUsfind it difficult to submit progress reportsbecause they are burdened by the number andcost of the many services devolved to them. Asignificant flaw in the system for determiningLGU accomplishments is the reliance onplanned targets by social welfare officers, whocould easily underestimate what they plan to do.The municipalities are expected to be realisticin the range of services (from the list of 30services) they choose deliver to the communityby matching services with prevailing localproblems. If LGUs choose not to use a problemanalysis mechanism like the CIDSS/MBN,however, they will find it difficult to determineand understand the actual problems existing inthe community. This considerably diminishestheir ability to prepare a rational SWD plan.

4. DSWD still responsible for some centersand institutions

Although service delivery has been transferredto LGUs, the DSWD retains more than 60centers and institutions under its jurisdiction. Theresistance of the personnel to be devolved mustbe carefully managed, as the pitch for “selectivedevolution” is getting stronger acceptanceamong the rank and file. The main argument isthat if no willing and able unit or group is willing

to take on the responsibi l i t ies of theDepartment’s various centers, then the topmanagement should not insist on localizing.

However, steering and rowing is a more accuratedescription, as for services are unlikely to beoperated by any organization other theDepartment, due to economic or other reasons.With regard to residential service delivery, the64 faci l i t ies direct ly managed by DSWDnationally serve clients in the following groups(Hoffman, 2002):

• Individuals (children and adults) with specialphysiological or mental developmental needs,who are unable to live independently orrequire a level of day-to-day care beyond thecapacity of families to provide;

• Victims (primarily if not exclusively, women)of abuse, neglect or illegal recruitment;

• Older persons with no families or who haveneeds mentioned above);

• Young children that are abused, neglectedor abandoned (including street-children);

• Transient disadvantaged individuals orfamilies;

• Young offenders or those committed to thecare of DSWD pending court sentencing (i.e.youth not yet convicted of an offence);

• Individuals with drug dependency.

The Department is also faced with the reality ofthe LGUs financial incapability: the absorptivecapacity of LGUs gets thinly spread as one goesfarther from the urban areas. Thus, theDepartment must carefully weigh the positivesand negatives of the following managementsystems that were proposed:19

[1] Co-management: the Department canpartner with a community-basedinstitution with an interest in one of itsservices (i.e., an NGO interested in DayCare). This option can further integratecivil society into social service delivery workbut the problem is whether NGOs have thefinancial and personnel stability to run acenter.



16


[2] Trust Committee system: In this system,the DSWD forms a group of LGUs tomanage or oversee its centers andprograms. For example, three financiallyendowed LGUs (Makati, Muntinlupa andMandaluyong) can fully take over theDSWD’s productivity centers.

[3] Sub-Contract: In this mode, the DSWDsub-contracts a private entity to do its work,for example, a private institution can beasked to run an adoption center e.g. NGOs.The main problem with this mode is theconsiderable resistance within theDepartment against any action that bearsany resemblance to “privatization.”20

(Interview with Usec. Clifford Burkley.)

5. Expansion of Basic Services.

The majority of LGUs (85%) tend to focus ondelivering only a handful of social welfare services.These include Day Care services, loan assistance,parent effectiveness, marriage counseling,supplemental feeding, and informationdissemination for disability prevention. While theCIDSS and KALAHI-CIDSS attempted to expandthese services to address other pressing needsof the people, the actual services delivered arestill limited.

III. Summary and Conclusions

The devolution of social services showed a generalpositive trend towards improvement despiteconstraints, such as inadequate resources, skilledpersonnel and funds, lack of technical assistancefrom the national government and inappropriaterules and regulations from oversight agencies.Studies reveal an increasing proactive responsetaken by LGUs in the area of delivery of basicsocial services. Innovations on planning anddelivery of services emerged as early as 1994,greater integration with local operations wereprogressing by 1997 and continuing to beobserved today. Particularly, studies revealedwidespread improvement in the delivery of serviceswith increasing local ownership of social welfareand development programs.

In summary, sixteen years after devolution, thesteering role of DSWD has been highlighted(especially in the last five years) in terms of:

• technical assistance and capability building forLGUs in the delivery of social welfare services

• setting of standards, accreditation andcompliance for the delivery of social welfareservices by LGUs, NGOs and the privatesector

• experimenting on “new” social technologiesand transferring them to partners in thedelivery of social services e.g. CIDSS, CCTand specific vulnerable sector programs,projects and methodologies

• advocating social protection and welfarepolicies based on the experience it gathersthrough its partners and networks

• “augmenting” and helping LGUs andstakeholders access resources especially indisaster relief and rehabilitation programs andspecial programs like KALAHI-CIDSS, ECCDand SEA-K

However, with regard to residential care andservices a combination of steering and rowing isstill the mode of operation. Because of variousconstraints as mentioned above, DSWDcontinues to operate several centers at variouslevels. Various modes of delivery can further beexplored e.g. NGO, private sector, LGU or acombination of these.

DSWD steering role has been evolving in the pastfive years but what it needs to do is to further

refine these by focusing on what it thinks as itsmajor roles in the promotion of social protectionand welfare in the country given the currentexternal environment it faces and its internalcapacities and strengths:

First, by identifying which major social risks it isready to focus on.

Second, prioritizing the vulnerable sectors interms of primary assistance (as other agenciesalso address needs of said sectors)

Third, specifying the roles and functions ofvarious government units and private partners inthe delivery of services of these selected priorityareas and sectors (from the national, regional,provincial, municipal, barangay levels).



17

REFERENCES

1 Derived from Victoria Bautista, Governing the

Social Welfare Sector in the PhilippineGovernance Report, Ateneo School ofGovernment and UNDP, 2002.

2 Borrows heavily from Rodelio Manacsa, A

Decade of Taking Root, Ateneo School ofGovernment, 2002

3 USAID, Highlights of Associates for RuralDevelopment, Rapid Field Appraisals 1992-1998(unpublished)

4 Rapid Field Appraisals 1992-1998 (unpublished)

5 Rodelio Manacsa, A Decade of Taking Root

2002

6 Victoria Bautista, Philippine Governance Report

2002

7 Victoria Bautista, Philippine Governance Report

2002

8 DSWD, D.O. 005, Series of 1992

9 Victoria Bautista, Combating Poverty through

CIDSS, QC: NCPAG, 1999: 30

10 Appendix VI-A: D.O. 22, Series of 1996

11 Victoria Bautista, Combating: 82

12 See Appendix IV-D. D.O. 22, Series of 1996

13 Arsenio Balisacan, et. al., Approaches to

Targeting the Poor (Phils: UP School ofEconomics, 2000): 55



16 Arsenio Balisacan, et. al., Approaches: 56

17 Rodelio Manacsa, A Decade of Taking Root,2002

18 Interview with Dir. Marina Tabamo; 1997 ADCStudy

19 Interview with Usec. Clifford Burkley.

20 Interview with Usec. Clifford Burkley.

OTHER WORKS CITED

Asian Development Consultants, Delivery of Social

Welfare Services After Devolution and Factors

Affecting This [1997] (unpublished document)

Ateneo School of Government, Rapid Field

Appraisal, 1999 (unpublished).

Hoffman, Joseph. Technical Assistance on DSWD

Institutions and Centers: Final Report, August2002

Orient Integrated Development Consultants, Inc.,Impact Study on the Localization of CIDSS,2004.

Rodriguez, Rufus. Local Government Code of

1991. Mla: Rex, 1991.

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991. Manila: Central1993.


Fourth, strengthening its capacity for datagathering, social risk assessment, povertytargeting and social protection and welfareplanning and assisting LGUs and partners onthese activities

Fifth, enhancing the mechanisms forcollaboration among these government units andpartners in the actual delivery of social welfareservices e.g. refining structures where national

and local units meet and converge and inadvocating for national policies and issues

Sixth, strengthening the mechanisms for sharingthe technologies it has developed over the yearsto partners which include community basedneeds assessments, facilitating convergence inthe delivery of services at the community leveland good practices in the serving the vulnerablesectors.


18


Introduction

n the first section of this study, a menu of

social risks is identified, with discussion on the

relevance of viewing social protection broadly to

cover vulnerabilities to both transient and chronic

poverty. The second section looks at the poverty

literature, mostly empirical to gather a set of factors

that affect poverty and vulnerability to poverty. The

third section tries to identify the major social risks in

the country today based on that set of factors.

1. Social Risks and Vulnerability and the

Objectives of Social Protection

The general objective of social protection is to assist

vulnerable sectors of society especially the poor in

managing various risks and hazards they face in their

every day lives. These include prevention, mitigation

and coping strategies (Holzmann and Jorgensen,

2001). Job preservation, facilitation and creation are

MAJOR SOCIAL RISKS AND VULNERABILITY

IN THE PHILIPPINES: A SURVEY

By

Dr. Fernando T. Aldaba

ABSTRACT

I

also important goals. Income and consumptionsmoothing are also regarded by some researchersas falling under the key objectives of social protection.

Poor people are more exposed and have lesscapability to manage risk and survive crisessituations. While they have developed copingmechanisms as asset accumulation during goodtimes, income diversification, networks and riskpooling arrangements (paluwagan), these are ofteninsufficient and expensive (World Bank 2000).Shocks reduce human capital of the poor becausethey either lose their jobs, incur greater costs forexpenditures or have less incomes. Thus, theirexpenditure for food, health and schooling arenegatively affected.

Table 1 shows all the possible risks individuals faceand the corresponding responses from threesectors (Aldaba, 2003):

dentifying major social risks will be inmost cases the first step in conducting a gap

analysis for social protection intervention in thecountry. Whether a risk should be consideredmajor depends on the characteristics of each risk.Risks may differ according to whether they arenatural (floods) or the result of human activity(conflict). Risks can also affect individuals in anunrelated manner (idiosyncratic). They can becorrelated among individuals (covariate), acrosstime (repeated) or with other risks (bunched). Risksdiffer by their frequency and welfare impact (e.g.catastrophic or non-catastrophic).1

This short paper hopes to identify the key social

risks confronted by households and communities

in the Philippines. The identification on this

paper will rely on secondary literature and data.

The World Bank Guide also suggests that

poverty profiles, census reports and household

survey reports can be supplemented with

information from commonly available sources of

information such as poverty maps or studies on

correlates and determinants of poverty.*

I

1 Johannes Hoogeveen, Emil Tesliuc, Renos Vakis, with Stefan Dercon, World Bank Guide to Risk and Vulnerability Analysis* A caveat though is that key informants, policy documents and seemingly relevant secondary data have a tendency to focus on large, covariate

shocks and to ignore smaller, but frequent risks. In the aggregate the latter may be more harmful however. Widespread idiosyncratic and seasonal

morbidity such as malaria or acute respiratory diseases could then be mistakenly be ignored.


19Major Social Risks and Vulnerability...

1.1 Social Protection, the Transient and theChronic Poor

The World Bank (2001) notes that analysis

available from other countries suggests that

a significant portion of poverty in any given year

in the Phi l ippines is l ike ly to represent

transient poverty - that is, households who are

interventions needed by the chronic poor may bedifferent from those needed by the transient poor.Different policies and programs are called for inaddressing these two types of poverty. Longer-term investments in the poor, such as increasingtheir human and physical assets or returns to thoseassets are likely to be more appropriate for chronic

poor in one year but have consumption levels

above the poverty line in “normal” years.

Understanding the sources of this variability

and designing mechanisms to reduce either

the variability or its impact would improve the

welfare of the poor.

Reyes (2002) confirms this through her estimatesand claims that only half of those who are classifiedas poor in the Philippines are chronically poor,while the other half are transient poor (meaningnon-poor before but poor now). The distinctionbetween chronic and transient poverty hasimportant policy implications because some of the

Table 1: Types of Risks/Vulnerability and Responses

Hunger andmalnutrition

Illness, Injury,Disease (incl.HIV-AIDS

Disability

Old Age

Death

Responses

Types of Risks/

Vulnerability

Household or

Informal

Mechanisms

GovernmentPrivate and

Civil Society

Sector

Assessment

Health andNutritionPolicy

Social andmicro-insurance

Socialassistance

Pension Plan

Provision ofhealthservices, soupkitchens, etc.

Privateinsuranceschemes

Micro-insurance

Old ageannuities

End of sourceof livelihood

Unemployment

Low andirregular income

Price instabilityof basiccommodities

Economic crisis

Diversifiedsources oflivelihood

Privatetransfers,child labor

Depletion ofassets/savings

Reducedconsumptionof basicgoods

Migration

Sound macroand sectorpolicies forjob generation

Regional andruraldevelopmentpolicies

Labor marketpolicies

Educationand training

Social funds

Private sectorinvestmentsthat are job-generating

Agriculturalinsurance

Bankingservices to thepoor,microfinance

Training

Women asfamily welfareproviders

Extendedfamily,communitysupport

Hygiene,preventivehealth

Asset/Savingsreduction

Debt

Responses

Types of Risks/

Vulnerability

Household or

Informal

Mechanisms

GovernmentPrivate and

Civil Society

Sector

Assessment

Drought

Rains andFloods

Earthquakes

Volcanoeruption andlandslides

Migration

CommunityAction

Privatetransfers/extendedfamily support

Asset/SavingsDepletion

Environmentalpolicy

Infrastructureinvestment/Relocation-temporary andpermanent

Disasterprevention andmitigationmeasures

Insuranceagainstdisasters

Environmentaladvocacy andprevention ofman-madedisasters

Disastermitigation andpreventionmeasures

Relief andRehabilitationprograms

Individual Lifecycle

Economic

Social exclusion

Corruption

Crime anddomesticviolence

Politicalinstability

Goodgovernance,transparencyandaccountability

Publicinformationcampaigns

Providingsecurity andequal accessto justice

Participationof citizensand civilsocietygroups

Goodcorporategovernance

Strengtheningparticipationof NGOs andCBOs

Peace andorderpromotion(e.g. anti-drugcampaigns)

Advocacy fordemocracyanddemocratictransitions

Communitynetworks

Communitypressure

Women’sgroups

Migration

Adopted mainly from the ADB Social Protection Strategy Paper, 2001

Environmental and Natural

Social/Governance


20


Major Social Risks and Vulnerability...

poverty. On the other hand, insurance and incomestabilization schemes which protect householdsagainst man-made or natural shocks would belikely to be more useful when responding totransient poverty. Social protection programscomprise the latter if viewed from a narrowerperspective.

However, Barrientos et al (2005) counters that thisnarrow perspective on social protection may resultinto a bifurcation of anti-poverty policy. They arguethat the grounds for this approach should becontested and that chronic poor face significantrisk and vulnerability have fewer buffers to protecttheir standards of living, and are commonly forcedto adopt behavioral responses that keep them inpoverty. Chronic and transient poverty have somecommon causal factors and that the chronic poorand the transient poor are not always easilydistinguished ‘crisp’ sets. Thus, in the context ofthe Philippines, we need first to identify thecorrelates of poverty and vulnerability in generalas it might be difficult to delineate between chronicand transient poverty. At the same time, policymakers need to respond urgently to the latter asresources are limited to devise separateapproaches immediately. More recently, thegovernment through the Social DevelopmentCommittee has agreed to use a common definitionof social protection programs which include labormarket programs, social insurance, social welfareassistance and social safety nets.

2.0 Correlates of Poverty, Vulnerability andLow Household Welfare2

What we set out to do in this section is to reviewsecondary empirical literature that points us tocorrelates and possibly factors affecting povertyand vulnerability to poverty.

There are few formal analyses of the extent ofvulnerability in the Philippines which typicallyrequires panel data to examine the frequency ofmovements into and out of poverty. These studiesinclude those of Alba (2001) for employment,

Chadhuri and Datt (2001) for consumption, Dattand Hoogeeven (2000) for consumption andincome, Tabunda (undated) for consumption, labormarket and income and Albert (undated) onincome.

A more recent empirical study commissioned bythe National Anti Poverty Commission (NAPC) in2005 and done by the National Statistical andCoordination Board (NSCB) looked at thecharacteristics that affect future poverty status ofPhilippine households. Yang and Choi (2006) onthe other hand examined remittances as a form ofinsurance and mitigating mechanism from shocksby Filipino households.

All these studies used data gathered from 1997 to1998, years when the financial crisis and El Niñooccurred in the country3. Some important generalconclusions from these studies include: a)vulnerability incidence is higher than povertyincidence i.e. percentage of population exposedto becoming poor is higher than those who areactually poor; b) distribution of poverty may differfrom distribution of vulnerability; c) vulnerability andfactors affecting them differ across time (e.g. byquarter); d) the need to account for measurementerrors in panel data estimation; e) consumptionas a better measure of welfare; and f) poverty andvulnerability are higher in rural areas relative tourban areas.

The World Bank (2001) notes that the mainsources of vulnerability are likely to be related toclimate and economic instability and certain partsof the country are also affected by political unrest.At the household level, the impact of these eventsis felt through lower real incomes due to loss ofcrops, reduced employment, lower pay or higherprices, especially for food. In addition, poorhouseholds face idiosyncratic risks that make themvulnerable to illness, spells of unemployment thatare not derived from systemic events, and old age.

Schaeffer (2001) identifies six main factorsaffecting household’s vulnerability to reduced

2 This section borrows heavily from Lanzona, Aldaba and Lopez (2007)3 The 1997 FIES and LFS and the 1998 APIS matched sample households were used in most of these studies (Yang and Choi, 2006,Chauduri and Datt, 2001)



income and consumption – illness, violence/conflict, natural disaster, harvest failure, terms oftrade deterioration and loss of employment. Headds that exposure to vulnerability is a function ofsize, frequency, earliness and bunching of thementioned factors as well as one’s spatial proximityto them. According to a previous study by Sinhaand Lipton (1999), the six factors account foralmost 90% of downward fluctuations in poorpeople’s income and consumption in a developingcountry context.

According to the results of the study done by NAPCand NSCB (2005), in 1997 the poverty incidencewas 27.9% but vulnerability incidence was muchhigher at 45.0%. Vulnerability incidence among thenon-poor was 27% while for the poor it was 91.6%.Majority of the vulnerable families were poor(56.7%) while only 4.3% of the non-vulnerablefamilies were actually poor. 72.2% of thevulnerable families were rural poor. Among theregions, ARMM (74%), Region VIII (66.0%) andRegion V (65.8%)4 have the highest vulnerabilityincidence. In terms of provinces, the top threeare Sulu (ARMM), Lanao del Sur (ARMM) andMasbate (V).

The following are the variables found in the samestudy to have significant impacts in predicting thepoverty status of households:

• ratio of food expenditure to basic expenditure• ratio of total expenditure to total income• ratio of per capita income to poverty threshold• ratio of HH members 0-14 years old to 15 and

over• family size• number of electrical devices• educational attainment of HH head (at least high

school level or at most elemetary graduate• HH head self-employed

Other studies that would help us identify majorsocial risks are empirical studies on the correlatesof poverty. Given these correlated variables, wecould deduce what kinds of hazards and riskshouseholds may encounter that will eventually lead

them to lower levels of welfare or situations ofpoverty. Table 2 shows a previous estimate byBalisacan (2003) of household consumption, usingfive Family Income and Expenditure Surveys(FIES) in the 1980s and 1990s. The studyhighlights the significance of environmentalconditions, schooling, infrastructure and per capitaincome among others. It also indicates thatdeprivation factor maybe as important incomevariables in affecting welfare as evidenced by thesignificance of initial conditions to the householdwelfare of the bottom 20% of the population.

In this Balisacan study, one notes that the numberof typhoons is a statistically significant variablecorrelated to the average welfare of the bottom20%. This means that natural disasters possiblyhave a negative effect on the households. Accessto water for livelihood i.e. irrigation is also animportant factor shown in the study.

4 Note that ARMM is experiencing armed conflict while regions V and VIII are disaster prone and also NPA areas.

Table 2: Determinants of Average Welfare(Consumption) of the Poor (bottom 20%)

Source: Balisacan, A. 2003. “Poverty and Inequality” in Balisacan,A. and H. Hill (eds.), The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies

and Challenges. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press

Explanatory

Notes: ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels ofsignificance, respectively.

Variable

Model 1 Model 2

Coefficient Coefficient StandardError

StandardError

Schooling -0.072 0.091 -0.010 0.094

Local dynasty -0.101 0.029 *** -0.104 0.030 ***

Political party 0.026 0.015 * 0.029 0.015 **

Landlocked -0.062 0.019 *** -0.067 0.019 ***

Typhoons -0.042 0.017 ** -0.064 0.019 ***

Irrigation 0.309 0.039 *** 0.233 0.046 ***

Farm size 0.008 0.018 0.010 0.019

Time-varying variables

Per capita income 0.602 0.044 *** 0.544 0.047 ***

Terms of trade 0.118 0.042 *** 0.140 0.043 ***

Roads -0.208 0.095 ** -0.212 0.096 **

Electricity 0.051 0.086 0.049 0.086

Agrarian Reform -0.005 0.010 0.041 0.017 **

Interactions

Schooling X Roads 0.109 0.051 ** 0.110 0.051 **

Schooling X Electricity 0.016 0.037 0.007 0.038

(x 100)

Intercept 2.865 0.385 *** 3.324 0.406 ***

R2 0.771 0.385 *** 0.758 0.406 ***


22



Another study using panel data from the FamilyIncome Expenditure Survey (FIES) where thesame households are surveyed across certaintime periods was done by Reyes (2004). Theobjective of this study was to determine thevariables that are associated with thepersistence of poverty. The analysis indicatesthat all independent variables as shown in Table 3are statistically significant. However, thevariables that are more likely to affect themovement in or out of poverty are education,credit , membership in agrarian reformcommunities and education. Note here thatirrigation is also significant factor.

INTERCPT 0.2644 0.154 2.948 0.086 . . Intercept

ARBYR 0.1117 0.0267 17.5275 0.0001 0.134076 1.118 Length

of years

being

ARB

V22 -0.3169 0.0256 153.2131 0.0001 -0.56433 0.728 House-

hold

Size

HHEDUC 0.2039 0.0346 34.7661 0.0001 0.192948 1.226 Educa-

tional

Attain-

ment of

HH Head

V16A 0.2231 0.133 2.817 0.0933 0.051955 1.25 Agrarian

Reform

Commu-

nity

IRRI 1.0836 0.1226 78.0672 0.0001 0.280109 2.955 Irrigated

Land

CREDIT 0.5433 0.1134 22.9498 0.0001 0.148538 1.722 Access

to

Credit

Variable Parameter

Estimate

Standard

Error

Wald Chi-

Square

Pr>Chi-

square

Standardized

Estimate

Odds

RatioVariable

Level

Table 3: Probability of Household BeingNon-poor: Persistence of Poverty

Source: Reyes, C. 2004. Movements In and Out of Poverty in

the Philippines. MIMAP Research Paper no. 53.

Sectoral data from the National StatisticalCoordination Board recently attest thatemployment and unemployment are alsoimportant contributory factors in the povertyincidence. Table 4 presents the contributionsto employment by key sectors and the

Another key element related to poverty andvulnerability is education. Table 6 shows thatlow levels of schooling are related to higherlevels of poverty and vulnerability,5 using allthree indicators of poverty. Households withheads who have lower levels of education aremore likely to experience poverty relative tothose households with heads who have highereducation.

5 NAPC and NSCB (2005) show that vulnerability incidence for elementary graduates is 65.8%.

relationship of being unemployed in the sectorto the poverty incidence. NAPC and NSCB(2005) meanwhile found that the top threesectors with high vulnerability incidence includeagriculture, fishery and forestry (71.9%),construction (42.7%) and mining and quarrying(46.3%).

Table 4: Poverty Measures by Sector ofEmployment of the Household Head, 2003

Sector PopulationShare

Contributionto Poverty

Incidence (%)

Incidence

Agriculture,Fishery and 35.8 44.8 65.6Forestry

Mining 0.4 39.3 0.6

Manufacturing 7.5 13.5 4.2

Utilities 0.4 3.7 0.1

Construction 6.9 23.2 6.6

Trade 11.5 12.1 5.7

Transport 9.7 14.2 5.6

Finance 0.6 1.1 0.0

Services 13.1 9.0 4.9 Unemployed

14.1 11.6 6.7Heads

Source: National Statistical Coordination Board (2003)



6 This multivariate statistical method examines the interrelationships among the poverty indicators in order to arrive at a few commonunderlying dimensions of these variables. The dimensions that are developed from the original variables are called factors. Factor analysisremoves redundancy or duplication from a set of correlated variables; it involves representing correlated variables with a smaller set of“derived” variables (or indices). Factors are formed that are relatively independent of one another. The methodology allows the identificationof indicators that should be retained in a factor through values called loadings. Each indicator has a loading on a particular factor whichmeasures the strength of association between the indicator and the factor. A high (magnitude in the) loading suggests that the indicator isimportant in the factor. The indicators that have low loadings on the factors can be removed from the set of indicators to be used in constructingthe index. (Templo, Tuano and Albert, 2006)7 Unlike the FIES, the APIS is a survey only of the bottom 20 percent of the population in terms of incomes. In effect, this is survey of thepoorest people in the country.

Table 5: Poverty Measures by Educational

Attainment of the Household Head, 2003

Educational Incidence Depth Severity

Attainment

ElementaryUndergraduate

42.2 13.0 5.6

ElementaryGraduate 30.5 8.7 3.5

High SchoolUndergraduate 26.4 6.9 2.6

High SchoolGraduate 15.5 3.8 1.4

CollegeUndergraduate 7.2 1.5 0.5

Degree Holders 1.6 0.3 0.1

Factor analysis6 of the FIES data and the AnnualPoverty Indicator Survey (APIS)7 can be usedto generate an overall index that combines andsummarizes different variables found in thesesurveys. Templo, Tuano and Albert (2006) usedthis technique to arrive at core determinants ofpoverty. The results of this analysis are shownin Box 1.

This study surfaces certain key points that arenot found in the previous study. First, poorhouseholds are characterized by the structureof their dwellings. In effect, their poverty makesthem vulnerable to disaster, both natural andman-made and to the “elements” in general.Second, the importance of quality water andsanitary toilets suggest the importance of healthconditions which have seldom been consideredin previous analysis. Third, the bottom 20percent of the population which was sampleused in the APIS is characterized by their inabilityto meet basic needs.

In summary, the previous studies on poverty andvulnerability to poverty gives us insight on themajor social risks confronted by households.Foremost among the important variables are theimportant role of social and human factors.These include functional literacy, schooling, aswell as shelter, access to sanitation and health,which are related to capabilities, and access toemployment opportunities and credit which areassociated with incomes. Second, there is alsothe crucial role of financial and infrastructuralfactors. These refer mainly to agricultural-basedstructures such as irrigation, and farm sizes, andalso to public goods, such as roads andcommunication, that make access to marketseasier. All of these factors are ultimately affectedby disasters, both man-made and natural.Significant human and financial losses thus canlead to a worsening poverty condition.

Box 1. Core Determinants of FactorAnalysis Results

2003 FIES/2004 APISo Type of roofo Type of wallo Tenure statuso Source of good quality water supplyo Type of Toilet Facilities—access to

sanitation toiletso Employment status of head

2004 APISo Children 6-12 not in elementaryo Children 13-16 not in High Schoolo No. of unemployed persons in house-

holds

Source: Templo, O., R. Tuano and J. R. Albert. 2006. Establishingan Integrated Database on Poverty for the National Statistical

Coordination Board


24



Risk and vulnerability assessments in otherdeveloping countries may also be insightful for thePhilippines. For example, the findings of anassessment done by the World Bank in Guatemalaseem very appropriate to the Philippine context.First, the study suggests that interventions, whetherdesigned to address poverty or protect againstshocks, should concentrate on building the assetsof the poor. Social protection can play an importantrole in this context. Second, the data suggest thata strategic emphasis on children – particularly child-focused interventions to reduce malnutrition andpromote early childhood development – is crucialto avoid inter-generational transmission of povertyand vulnerability. Third, since exposure to somenatural disasters seems largely determined bygeography, maps of regional vulnerability to naturaldisaster could be useful for risk managementplanning. Since natural disaster often damage ordestroy community infrastructure, in addition toreducing income and wealth at household level,social funds could be the institutional channel forrelief and infrastructure rehabilitation. Finally, thestudy noted that while poverty is more severe inrural part of the country, social protection policyshould not neglect urban areas, where the ratio ofvulnerable people to currently poor people washigher than in the rest of the country.

It is also useful to do a life cycle approach inidentifying vulnerable groups. The World Bank(2000) has done such a strategy for Argentinawhich is again useful for the Philippines as thefindings may be similar for the country. Table 6summarizes the findings:

3.0 Major Risks Confronted by FilipinoHouseholds

Given our menu of social risks in section 1.0 and thereview of literature for poverty and vulnerabilitycorrelates in Section 2.0, Table 7 summarizes thekey variables correlated to poverty and vulnerabilityin the country. The current literature has identifiedthese variables as important in terms ofcharacterizing households that are poor or will bepoor. From these variables, the author proposesthe following as the major risks confronted by theFilipino households8:

8 The author uses data on this section to construct a sample template which is part of Annex A in the original study.

Table 6: Argentina Life cycle vulnerabilityanalysis

0-5 years Stunted growth Malnutrition

12% very poor Pre-school

43% poor program

coverage (22%)

6-14 years Poor education Later entry (8%)

13% very poor quality (low Grade repetition

45% poor human capital (27%)

development)

15-25 years Low human capital Secondary

7% very poor development school

31% poor (education quality / repetition (62%)

attainment) Unemployment

Unemployment / (33%)

low wages Inactivity

(violence, substance

abuse etc.)

enrollment

25-64 years Low income Unemployment

5% very poor (23%) Below

23% poor poverty earnings

(under

employment)

Over 65 years Low income Low income

1.4% very poor Pension

13% poor coverage (55%)

General Poor health care Health insurance

population Poor housing / lack coverage (35%)

7% very poor of basic Running water

29% poor infrastructure (66%)

Sewerage (53%)

In flood-prone

area (28%)

Age group /Poverty rate

Main risks ofdeprivation

Leadingindicator (value

for lowestquintile)



Table 7: Identifying Major Social Risks in the Philippines in the Literature on Poverty and Vulnerability

Lack of Basic Services Exposure to negative effects – lower incomes Reyes (2004), NSCB (2003), NSCB and NAPCEducation of Household Head; and lower productivity (2005)Children not in School

Illness and health Exposure to diseases and morbidity Schaeffer (2001), Templo et al 2006), DOH andWHO website

Shelter Exposure to the elements; vulnerability to crimes

Lack of access to credit Lower prodictivity and incomes Templo et al (2006), Ballesteros (2002),HUDCC website

Reyes (2004)

Food Insecurity, Hunger and Exposure to diseases and death, National Nutrition Survey (2003), various SWSMalnutrition low productivity and incomes Surveys, Flores et al (2006), NAPC and

NSCB (2005)

Large Family size Exposure of children to disease, hunger, etc. Orbeta (2005), Alonzo et al (2005), NSCB andNAPC (2005), Reyes (2004)

3.1. Individual Life-cycle Risks: highpopulation growth rates leading to largefamily sizes

The total number of employed Filipinos has beengrowing by 2.6 percent annually since 1998, butthe country’s rapid population growth rate andthe loss of jobs in agriculture have keptunemployment rate high. Population growth inthe country has decreased only slowly over thelast three decades and remains rapid by Asian

standards. This has been mainly due to a lackof consensus on the critical importance on ofpublic policy to reduce population growth,according to Herrin and Pernia (2003).

Herrin (2002) reviewed various policy statementsfrom 1969-2002 and showed that shiftingobjectives of fertil ity reduction, upholdingreproductive rights and promoting maternalhealth have characterized even the familyplanning program. He adds that while the

Lack of Infrastructure Exposure to nega-tive effects – disease, food Balisacan (1999)Electricity Roads insecurity, lower productivity Balisacan (1999, 2003)

Lack of Access to Water Exposure to crop losses, diseases, death for Templo et al (2006)Irrigation persons Balisacan (1999, 2003)Lack of Access to Sanitary Templo et al (2006)toilets

Political Factors Unrest and Exposure to negative effects–displacement, World Bank (2001)instability disease, lower productivity, damage

to properties, etc.Political Dynasties Possibilities of rebellion and armed conflict; Balisacan (2001)

inequitable and inefficient allocation ofresources

Land Inequality

Armed Conflict –MILF and Skewed asset ownership Balisacan (1999, 2003)CPP-NPA-NDF Rido and Internal displacements PHDR (2007) Asia Foundation websiteclan conflicts

Variable correlated to Povertyand/or Vulnerability to Poverty

Social Risk Situation for the Household Literature Sources (poverty and non-povertyrelated)

Economic instability Lack of employment or low quality of jobs; World Bank(2001)fluctuating incomes

Unemployment and Low and irregular incomes, self-employment Templo et al (2006), Alba (2001), Canlas et alunderemployment (2006), NSCB and NAPC (2005)

Climate in General Exposure to negative effects of climate changes World Bank (2001)displacement, death, disability, disease, croplosses, damage to properties, etc.

Typhoons Drought Balisacan (2003) Datt and Hoogeeven (2001)


26



general public has favorable views on artificialfamily planning, i t is the persistent andconsistent opposition of the Catholic Churchhierarchy that has dominated policy-making inthis sector. The current administration is stillrelatively ambivalent with regard to its populationpolicy. Concretely the agency in charge ofpopulat ion management, the Populat ionCommission is given very limited resources andhas been shifted from one mother agency toanother.9

Orbeta (2005) adds two additional reasons: a)the equivocal support given by the governmentto the population program, and (b) the fact thatup to now virtually all of contraceptives suppliesin public facilities are supplied by donors asnational government has not appropriatedmoney for these commodities.

9 During the time of Ramos, it was under NEDA and then transferred to DOH at present.10 The design of the subsidies should, of course, consider their potential behavioral effects, i.e. encouraging families to have more children.

Considerations, such as giving subsidies to families with completed family sizes or to those who effectively promise to stop bearing any more

children, should be included in the design.

The issue of the role of population growth andfamily size in development, in general, and povertyand vulnerability, particular, is still unresolved.Orbeta (2005) notes that this persists despite thegrowing literature worldwide and also in the

Philippines providing evidence on the importanceof population growth and family size indevelopment. In his study, he empirically showedthe following negative consequences of largefamily sizes: a) that additional children, on average,cause a substantial decline in household savingsrates and levels, b) reduce the work participationand wage income of mothers and c) reduce theproportion of school-age children attending school;the regressiveness rises as one goes to higherschooling levels. He clearly showed that there isa strong and enduring link between povertyincidence and to poverty and family size. It hasshown that larger family size is associated withhigher poverty incidence, gap and severity. Thisassociation is also shown to be enduring over 25years for which family income and expendituredata is available. It has also shown that largerfamily size is associated with higher vulnerabilityto poverty.

Orbeta recommends the following: a) A strongpopulation program must accompany povertyalleviation efforts. Unless something can be donequickly to improve the lackluster performance andlimited coverage of the Philippine social securitysystem reduction in family size will be importantas an alternative to a formal safety net; b)Education subsidies directed at large families couldbe crafted as it is acknowledged as one of thepotent means for moving out of poverty and morerecently has also been found to be important inreducing vulnerability to poverty (e.g. Laigon andSchechter 2003)10; c) Targeting poor householdsalso means targeting large households andviceversa in poverty and social protectionprograms. In addition, considering theregressiveness of the impact of additional children,there will be bigger impacts by targeting poorer orlarger households.

Albert (undated) also show that the impact of thefinancial crisis and El Niño on household povertyappears to be largely related to family size and

Table 8: Population Growth Rates Over the Years

IntercensalPeriod

1903-1918

1918-1939

1939-1948

1948-1960

1960-1970

1970-1980

1980-1990

1990-2000

Average PopulationGrowth Rate (%)

1.90

2.22

1.91*

3.01

3.08

2.75

2.35

2.34

DoublingTime (Years)

36.5

31.2

36.5

23.0

22.5

25.2

29.5

29.6

* may have been 2.3% according to a UN StudySource: Concepcion, M. (2006), Philippine Population Program:Past, Present and Future



this impact appears to have lingered. Whilesome households with large family sizes mayhave had coping mechanisms, e.g., increasedworking hours and income transfers, or pullingtheir children out of school and putting them towork, it appears however that households withlarge family sizes were generally the ones mostvulnerable to shocks. Albert (undated) furthersuggests that government display resolve inempowering households to have the family sizesthey desire citing that at the national level, actualand desired fertility rates differ by one child. Heconcludes that attempts to alleviate poverty mayonly be continuously hampered by a populationsize whose growth exceeds the growth of thecountry’s resources.

3.2 Individual Life-cycle Risks: FoodInsecurity, Hunger and Malnutrition

Valientes et al. (2006) defines food insecuritywhen people do not, at all times, have physical,social, and economic access to sufficient, safeand nutritious foods which meet the dietaryneeds and food preferences for an active andhealthy life. An individual or household becomesvulnerable to food insecurity when one or moreof these conditions is not satisfied. Worse, if allconditions are not met, that individual orhousehold is food insecure.

Vulnerability, on the other hand, refers to thefull range of factors that place people at risk ofbecoming food insecure. The level ofvulnerability is determined by the exposure tothe risk factors of food insecurity and the abilityto cope or withstand stressful situations (CFS,FAO 2004). Hunger and malnutrition are thephysiological manifestations of food insecurity(SOFI, 2004). Food insecurity does not exist ina single dimension but involves a cross-sectionof dimensions that include socio-economic andpolitical environment; performance of foodeconomy; care practices; and health andsanitation (FAO, 2000).

In the Philippines, findings of the NationalNutrition Survey conducted in 2003 by the Foodand Nutrition Research Institute (FNRI) of the

Department of Science and Technology reportedthat 7 out of 10 households in the country arefood insecure using the Radimer/Cornellmeasure. The same survey revealed a 26.9%prevalence of underweight Filipino childrenunder 5 years old (FNRI, 2003). The latestnational nutrition survey conducted in 2003 bythe Food and Nutrition Research Instituteshowed that 27 out of every 100 preschoolchildren aged five and below were underweight.It also indicated that 30 out of every 100preschool children were stunted or short for theirage and six out of 100 were wasted or thin.

Among school-age children aged six to 10 yearsold, 27 in every 100, or about 2.5 million,nationwide were underweight for their age. Also,37 in every 100 children, or about 3.4 million,were stunted or short for their age. Even amongadolescents, or those in the 11-19 age bracket,about 18 in every 100 were mildly underweight,while 15 in every 100 were underweight. Forthose 20 years and older, about 12 in every 100adults were underweight and 20 in every 100were overweight.

In addition, an estimated 3.4 million households,or a record-high 19 percent, experiencedinvoluntary hunger at least once over the pastthree months according to the first quartersurvey of the Social Weather Stations (SWS)showed. The new survey was conductedFebruary 24 to 27, 2007 with 1,200 statisticallyrepresentative household heads. The surveyshowed that hunger worsened in Metro Manilaand the rest of Luzon, barely changed inMindanao and declined in the Visayas. Moderatehunger, defined as households experiencinghunger involuntarily “only once” or “a few times”in the last three months, was 15.1 percent inNovember and 15.0% in February. Severehunger, or households involuntarily hungry“often” or “always” in the last three months,hardly changed from 3.9 percent to 4.0 percent.The SWS placed the margins of error for thesurvey at ±3 percent for national percentagesand ±6 percent for regional percentages.

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)Country Representative Dr. Nicholas K. Alipui


28



also disclosed that major, irreversible damagescaused by malnutrition occur in the womb andduring the first two years of the child’s life.Molecular biology confirms this finding and thus,programs are needed to prevent and treatmalnutrition among pregnant and lactating women,and children aged zero to two years old.

Damages to children include lower intelligence,reduced physical capacity, and passing onmalnutrition to the next generation. These resultto reduction in productivity and sluggish economicgrowth, which perpetuate the cycle of poverty. Mostimportantly, every child has a right to be free ofmalnutrition. Breastfeeding during the first twoyears of life is the single best form of nutrition inthese vulnerable early years.

President Macapagal-Arroyo has ordered therelease of a billion pesos for “emergency hungermitigation” in depressed areas of Metro Manila andin some provinces found to have a high incidenceof hunger. The Department of Health throughSecretary Francisco Duque III will be the “pointman” to oversee the implementation of the“emergency hunger mitigation” program.

The emergency intervention will be largely donethrough three already existing programs: The food-for-school program under which rice and otherfoodstuffs are given to school children as anincentive for attending school; the food-for-workprogram where the poor and unemployed are hiredby government to sweep the streets and for othercommunity work; and the food-for-parishesprogram of the Catholic Church and other religiousgroups providing free meals to children or adultsin various parts of Metro Manila. The governmentmay also conduct its own survey to gauge hungerlevels in the country if it proves to be “necessary”to check the progress of its Accelerated Hunger

Mitigation Program according to Health SecretaryFrancisco Duque.

3.3 Individual Life-cycle Risks- Epidemicsand unmanaged diseases leading to Health andSickness

According to statistics compiled by the DOH fromthe Civil Registration System of the NSO, during

the period 1999-2002 diseases of the heart wereconsistently the number one killer, accountingfor 16 to18 cases for every 100 deaths in a year.From 1999-2001, there were only 78-81 deathsdue to diseases of the heart per 100,000population, the number rose to 88 in 2002. Nextare diseases of the vascular system causing 12to 14 out of 100 deaths; malignant neoplasm(cancer), about 10 deaths; and pneumonia,about 9 deaths. In fifth place are accidents, withup to 9 deaths. The top five leading causes ofdeath alone account for more than 50% of alldeath cases!

Tuberculosis, which the Mil lenniumDevelopment Goal or MDG addresses underGoal 6, Target 8, Indicator 23, is the 6th leadingcause of death , at 7 to 8 deaths per hundredcases. Next are chronic obstructive pulmonarydiseases and allied conditions, 4 to 5 deaths,followed by certain conditions originating in theperinatal period with about 4 deaths. The 9thand 10th leading causes of death are diabetesmellitus, about 3 deaths and nephritis, nephriticsyndrome and nephrosis, about 2 cases forevery 100 deaths. In 2002, there were about 18deaths from diabetes mellitus and 12 deathsfrom nephritis, nephritic syndrome and nephrosisper 100,000 population, significantly up afteronly three years from 13 and 10, respectively,in 2000.

Source: DOH website

Table 9: Top Ten Causes of Mortality

Type of Disease Number

1. Diseases of the Heart 79.12. Diseases pf the Vascular

System 63.23. Malignant Neoplasm 47.74. Pneumonia 42.75. Accidents and Injuries 42.26. Tuberculosis 36.17. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary

Diseases and Allied Conditions 20.88. Certain Conditions Originating in

the Perinatal Period 19.89. Diabetes Mellitus 14.110. Nephritis, Nephrotic Syndrome

and Nephrosis 10.4



The main consequences of these risks andvulnerabilities are losses in human capital. Somediseases hit individuals during peaks of theirlabor productivity e.g. heart diseases andcancer.

Expenditures for health services continue to bebelow par of World Health Organization (WHO)standards, but DOH officials claim the amountis sufficient to respond the nation’s currentneeds. Health Secretary Francisco Duque IIIadmitted that the spending rate for health at3.2% of the country’s gross domestic product(GDP), or the sum of goods and servicesproduced in a given year, is still below the worldstandard of 5% of GDP. The total amount for2007 of P1.2 billion was higher than 2006’s2.2%-2.7% of GDP. This additional amountwould be spent on services and surveillancesystems to keep up with information on emergingand reemerging diseases, backlogs ininfrastructure, local health developments anddisease-free initiatives such as additionalimmunization for Hepatit is B. The HealthDepartment will also intensify cooperation withthe international sector through continuoussimulation of information on old and emergingdiseases the avian influenza. In terms ofinsurance coverage, 28 percent of Filipinos havePhilhealth cards as claimed by President GloriaMacapagal Arroyo.

3.4 Economic Risks and Instability (Crisis;Boom and Bust Cycles; Jobless growth)leading to high unemployment andunderemployment (especially of the youth)11

Labor is the most important productive asset ofthe poor making their ability to participate in thelabor market a critical factor in poverty reductionor risk mitigation. Labor income is the resultantof time devoted to productive employment andthe price of that time (wage and possibly othernon-wage compensation). For a given supply,the quantity of labor hired depends upon thedemand for labor of profit-maximizing producers,

which is in turn a function of output demand.The wage, on the other hand, is determined bythe productivity of labor, and the state (slacknessor tightness) of the labor market. At the individuallevel, the wage ref lects the worker ’scharacterist ics (e.g. education, ski l ls,occupation, gender, union membership), theemployer ’s characteristics (e.g. competitiveposition of firm, industry affiliation, location), andother external factors, say, government policy.In the absence of income from any other source,one’s position relative to the poverty thresholdis determined by labor market status (employed,unemployed, and underemployed) and thereturns from one’s labor.

The working age population in the Philippineswas growing by 2.6% annually from 1981-2000.This translates to an average of 761,000 newentrants and reentrants into the labor force eachyear in the 1980s, rising to 738,000 in the 1990s.Thus the labor force, which numbered 17.3million in 1980, had nearly doubled to 32.2million by 2000. It was 33.7 million in 2003 and37.05 million in 2006. The rapid increase in thesize of the labor force is attributed not only tohigh population growth but also to the steadyincrease in the participation of women in theworkforce. The total labor force participation raterose from 49% in 1970 to 60% in 1980, and thento 65% in 2000.

Because of the boom and bust cycles of thePhilippine economy in the last three decades andonly moderate economic growth performance inrecent years, employment opportunities havefailed to keep up with the rapid growth in thelabor force. The consequence has beenunemployment and underemployment rates thatare persistently high by East Asian standards.Open unemployment rates have hovered justbelow the double-digit mark, typically hittingdouble digits during period of low or negativeeconomic growth. Unemployment stood atabout 8% in 1980, peaked at 12.6% in 1985—the trough of the 1980s economic recession—

11 This section borrows from Canlas et al (2005)


30



and rose above 10% again in 1991 and 1998(which were also recession years). The totalnumber of unemployed persons rose from 1.3million in 1980 to 3.6 million in 2000—or 11.2% ofthe workforce. It was 4.2 million in 2004 anddecreased slightly to 4.1 million in 2006.Unemployment has typically been higher in urbanthan in rural areas reflecting rural to urbanmigration. For most of the 1980s and 1990s urbanunemployment rates were above 10%, with thetypical peaks during the recession years.

Underemployment has always been much greaterthan unemployment, remaining above 20% duringthe 1980s and 1990s and peaking at about 33%in 1983-84. The total number of underemployedexperience, younger members of the work forcehave a higher probability of being unemployed andstaying unemployed for longer periods comparedwith their older counterparts. The pressure to findjobs is also probably less for younger people whoare not household heads or primary breadwinners.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, most unemployedwere in the 15-24 year age group and had beeneducated to the primary or secondary level.However, an increasing proportion of theunemployed now possess a tertiary education. Thepercentage total unemployed with at least somecollege education increased from 27.4% in 1980to 33% in 2000. Even more telling was theproportion with a college degree, which rose from8.5% in 1980 to 14.8% in 2000. The trend couldreflect the “choosy youth” phenomenon (Manning2000) or the overseas worker phenomenon, whichtends to raise the reservation wage. Nevertheless,it implies a serious waste of resources.

Alba (2001) in a study of panel data from 1997-1998 identifies the industries which wereassociated with persistent vulnerability toemployment shocks of male headed households(i.e., shocks of two or three quarters). Theseincluded the agriculture sector, the wholesale andretail trade sector, the transport, storage and

communication sector, and the financing,insurance, real estate, and business servicessectors. For female headed households theseincluded manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade,and community, social, and personal services.

The negative consequences of unemployment andunderemployment include: economic inefficiency;underutilization of labor; decreased humandevelopment; income and asset poverty for thehousehold and individuals.

3.5 Environmental risks - natural disasters-typhoons, floods and drought

From the Manila Observatory’s12 climate andweather-related risk maps i.e. the Risk to Typhoonsmap and the Risk to Projected Rainfall Changemap pinpoint areas of Central Luzon and the Bicolregion in common as high to very high risk areasfor typhoons and rains. On the other hand, thearea that ranks high to very high in risk in both theRisk to El Niño and Risk to Projected TemperatureIncrease maps is Western Mindanao.

The Combined Risk to Climate Disasters maprepresents the sum of the normalized,provincialized risks to typhoon (super typhoons,typhoons, tropical storms and tropicaldepressions), drought caused by El Niño,projected rainfal l change and projectedtemperature increase. The top ten provinces inthis combines risk maps are: Albay, Pampanga,Ifugao, Sorsogon, Biliran, Rizal, NorthernSamar, Cavite, Masbate, and Laguna. Ingeneral, Central Luzon and the Bicol regionsrank high to very-high on the risk scale. Thisindicates that it is the risk to typhoon scores andrisk to projected rainfall change scores thatdominate the summation of risks. In the case ofthe risk to El Niño scores and risk to projectedtemperature increase scores, the gap in thescores is between the highly-ranked provincesand the rest of the country as not as great aswith the other two maps.

2

12 A private non-stock, non-profit research institution serving the science apostolate of the Society of Jesus in the Philippines; it was thepioneer weather bureau in the Philippines; currently is into conducting scientific researches on the weather, climate changea and otherenvironmental concerns



The maps of areas at risk to earthquakes andearthquake-induced landslides have certain areasof Central to Northern Luzon and EasternMindanao in common. However, there are areaslike Bukidnon and Lanao that have a high risk tolandslides but a low risk to earthquakes, indicatingthat there must be other factors contributing to theoccurrence of landslides in these areas. Areas atrisk to both tsunamis and volcanic eruptionsinclude the northwest to southeast diagonal acrossRP. The Geophysical Disaster Risk Maprepresents the sum of the normalized,provincialized risks to earthquakes, earthquake-induced shallow landslides, tsunamis andvolcanoes. The top ten provinces include: Sulu,Camiguin, Ifugao, Davao Oriental, Sarangani,Benguet, Surigao del Sur, La Union, Lanao delSur, and Zambales. In general, Central Luzon andEastern Mindanao are the high-ranking areas.

More recently, a study by Greenpeace, aninternational environmental NGO claimed thatsome 700 million square meters of land in thePhilippines may be submerged gradually as theglobal average temperature rises and causes sealevels to rise. The briefing paper entitled The

Philippines: A Climate Hotspot, presents anoverview of how extreme weather conditionsthreaten people, the economy, the different speciesand ecosystems. The Greenpeace study alsoprovides maps that illustrate the extent of theimpact of climate change in the Philippines. Basedon such maps, climate change can “irrevocablyalter” the country’s coastline. Conservativeestimates from Greenpeace predict that a one-meter rise in sea level may affect 64 of thecountry’s 81 provinces, which cover at least 703of the 1,610 municipalities. Portions of the land inthe 703 municipalities may be submerged in waterby 2095 to 2100.

The study also identified the top 20 provinces inthe country, which are vulnerable to a one-meterrise in sea level. These are Sulu, Palawan,Zamboanga del Sur, Northern Samar, ZamboangaSibugay, Basilan, Cebu, Davao del Norte, Bohol,Camarines Sur, Quezon, Tawi-Tawi, Masbate,Negros Occidental, Camarines Norte, Capiz,Catanduanes, Samar, Zamboanga del Norte, and

Maguindanao. Greenpeace said that Sulu has thehighest land area that is vulnerable to a one-metereustatic rise in sea level at 79.7 million squaremeters.

The consequences of natural disaster include lossof lives and livelihoods, and losses in terms ofphysical capital and infrastructure.

3.6 Environmental Risks – Lack of Shelterand Housing

Inadequate housing and related infrastructurefacilities create direct threats to people’s physicalsafety and security. Poor people often live inprovisional homes constructed with whateverimpermanent, basic materials are available. Theyfrequently have limited choice but to live onmarginal land (flood plains or steep slopes forexample), with the consequence that they are thefirst to suffer the effects of earthquakes, landslides,cyclones and floods. In addition, a combination ofovercrowding especially in slum areas, the use ofopen fires or kerosene stoves and flammablematerials leads to danger and injuries fromaccidents and fires. Inevitably in all theseconditions, children are especially vulnerable.

According to the Medium Term PhilippineDevelopment Plan (MTPDP) 2004-2010, housingneed in the country is estimated to reach a total of3.75 million units by 2010. Demand for newhouses, for the said period, is 2.6 million of thetotal while housing backlog accounts for almost amillion. Estimates of an NGO network, thePhilippine Urban Forum (PUF) is higher - 2.5million in 2004, of which 44% of the need will be inthe NCR; if slum housing is included in the backlog,the need becomes 4.5 million houses. Accordingto the PUF quoting the World Bank, more thanone-third of the urban population lives in slumareas and half of the 1.4 million urban poorhouseholds reside in Metro Manila. It also claimsthat the problem of housing is more a problem ofsupply than affordability. Based on the 2003 FamilyIncome and Expenditure Survey (FIES), housingexpenditures are the biggest non-food expenseof a family. Housing-related expenses (rent,amortizations, and repairs) account for 14.3percent of a family’s expenditure.


32



Table 10: Proportion of HH with Access totenure (owned and rented)

Years 1990 2000

Proportion (%) 91.0 81.2

Source: NSO, 1990 and 2000 Census

3.7 Environmental Risks: Lack of Water andSanitation for Households

The crisis in water and sanitation is — aboveall — a crisis for the poor. Almost two in threepeople lacking access to clean water surviveon less than $2 a day, with one in three livingon less than $1 a day. More than 660 millionpeople without sanitation live on less than $2 aday, and more than 385 million on less than $1a day,” the UNDP said.

In her Earth Day message on April 22, 2003,President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo revealedthat almost 10 million Filipinos are yet to havea sustainable source of potable drinking waterand 13 million do not have access to anysanitation facilities. Aside from this water is animportant factor for the source of livelihood inthe rural and agricultural areas. Further, of thecountry’s total water demand, only 72% is beingmet. For this reason, she called on the citizenryto use wisely and conserve the country’s waterresource, and at the same time, emphasizedthe need to take care of the forests.

Despi te the high economic costs ofenvironmental pollution, particularly fromuntreated domestic wastewater discharge,investment in the sector is not a priority. In thePhi l ippines, for every P1 invested bygovernment in sanitation, P40 is invested inwater supply. This is despite the fact that thecost of sewerage and sanitation is 35 times asmuch per capita than water supply and despitethe high toll to our tourism and fisheries assets.Because of this, sewerage service coveragecannot catch up with population growth. It hasremained at 5% of total population from 1985to 2000. Access to water supply and sanitation

is recognized as key to promoting health,reducing poverty and facilitating economicdevelopment.

At the forefront in the country’s war againstwater pol lut ion is the EnvironmentalManagement Bureau (EMB) of the Departmentof Environment and Natural Resources(DENR). Upgraded into a line agency by virtueof Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as thePhilippine Clean Air Act, the bureau is in thethick of things, from formulating policies andimplementing water-related programs, tomonitoring wastewater from industries, andclassification of the country’s water bodies toensure their proper management andutilization, among others.

Based on EMB reports, the major sources ofwater pollution in the country are industries,households, commercial establ ishments,tourism sites and farms. Industries, considereda major source of water pollutants, use a widerange of chemicals and chemical substances,many of which are highly toxic. These toxicsubstances find their way to our natural watersystems when discharged as industr ia leffluents. Others are emitted in the atmosphere,where they mix with rain or settle down bythemselves and are carried by runoff to naturalwater channels.

There have been numerous large epidemics ofwaterborne diseases throughout the country,particularly of cholera and typhoid fever duringthe 1990’s. While diarrhea remains the numberone cause of illness in all age groups, thedecl ine in the incidence of cases isaccompanied by reports to the Nat ionalEpidemiology Centre (DOH) of significantreduction in the number of food-borne andwater-borne infection outbreaks in the pastyears. Invest igat ions of these diseaseoutbreaks have ident i f ied contaminatedsources of drinking water, improper disposal ofhuman waste and unsanitary food handlingpractices as the main causes.

Outbreaks of cholera have averaged less thanone per year during the period 2000-2003



compared to 12 outbreaks a year in 1998. In2000, a total of 303 cholera cases (0.4 casesper 100,000 population) were reported in nineof the 17 regions in the country: NCR (131cases), Western Mindanao (80 cases), Caraga(32 cases), Western Visayas (18 cases),Central Luzon (15 cases), Central Mindanao (11cases), CAR (5 cases) and Cagayan Valley andNorthern Mindanao (one case each). The morbiditytrends for typhoid and paratyphoid fever havedecreased from 33 cases per 100,000 populationin 1995 to 17.1 per 100,000 in 2000 while themortality trend has remained consistently low from1980 to 2000.

The WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programmein its Country, Regional and Global Estimateson Water & Sanitation gave a 2002 estimate forthe Philippines as shown below:

3.8 Political and Governance Risks- Conflictand Peace and Order

The most comprehensive analysis of this typeof risk comes from the Philippine HumanDevelopment Report (PHDR) of 2005:

The Philippines is home to two of the longest-running armed conflicts in the world: against thecommunist insurgency (CPP-NPA-NDF) and

against the Bangsa Moro rebellion (MNLF andMILF); both having run for almost four decades.Both conflicts have resulted in numerous deaths.According to the government, more than 4,700combatants - including soldiers and police aswell as NPA, MNLF and MILF fighters - havebeen killed from 1984 to 2002. The losses thathave been suffered by innocent civilians (socalled ‘collateral damage’) paint a darker picture.

Most of the victims are children. Weak andyoung, they fall prey to the violence thataccompanies war. Sadly, in some cases they areeven directly involved in the fighting. The militaryestimates that as many as 25 percent of theNPA’s recruits are children - tasked to serve assoldiers, to murder enemies, guard camps, carrymessages between war zones, and providesupport to adult combatants. Many of them arerecruited from barangay high schools as well asstate universities and colleges. The long, drawn-out wars that have been raging in our backyardshave not only affected people living in the mainareas of conflict, but also every Filipino citizen.

These have frightened away investment andplanted insecurity, holding economic and socialdevelopment hostage. The NPA’s well-knownpractice of collecting ‘revolutionary’ taxes, whichtargets large-scale companies as well as smalland medium entrepreneurs, is one of thedeterrents in doing business in country -especially in the provinces that most needeconomic investment. The NPA’s destabilizingpractice of routinely bombing telecommunicationand power plant facilities in the CALABARZONarea not only disrupts day-to-day business,community and social activities, but also resultsin hundreds of millions of pesos in rebuildingcosts.

In just seven years, from 1969 to 1976 - thebeginnings of the Moro conflict - the provincesof Cotabato, Lanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,Zamboanga and Basilan suffered 60,000 dead,54,000 injured, and 350,000 driven away fromtheir own homes and barangays. The loss ofproperty is estimated to have cost between P300million to P500 million. Of the tribesfolk residing

Source: National Statistics Office - 1990-2000 data fromcensus of Popn and Housing; 1999, 2002 and 2004 data

from Annual Poverty Indicators Survey

Table 12: Proportion of Households withSanitary Toilet Facility (%)

1990 1999 2000 2002 2004

67.6 85.8 79.3 86.1 86.2

1990 1998 1999 2000 2002 2004

73 78.1 81.4 79.05 80 80.2

Table 11: Proportion of HH with Access to SafeWater Supply (%)

Source: National Statistics Office - 1990-2000 data from census ofPopn and Housing; 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2004 data from AnnualPoverty Indicators Survey


34


in Mindanao, between one-fifth to one-third havebeen uprooted from their tradit ionalcommunities.

Six out of every ten people in Muslim Mindanaolive in poverty-twice more than the rest of thecountry. A person in a province in MuslimMindanao would earn P11,000 less than hiscounterpart somewhere else in the country. Theinfant mortality rate in the region is 15 percenthigher than in Manila. The conflict in Mindanaohas hampered access to medical facilities and isone of the root causes of the malnutrition, povertyand high incidence of disease in the region. Thisis why, at 72 years old, a person in Cebu wouldlive 20 years longer, on average, than a personin Maguindanao or Tawi-Tawi. It is estimated thatthe Moro insurgency has cost the country P10billion per year since 1975 in damaged propertiesand foregone investments. Conflict costs.

Between 2000 and 2006, armed conflict in thePhilippines caused the displacement of nearlytwo mi l l i on peop le . The major i t y weredisplaced in Mindanao by two major militaryoperations launched by the government in2000 and 2003. A ceasefire agreed in July2003 put an end to the fighting and allowedfor the return of most of the displaced, despiteconditions that were often not conducive tosus ta inab le re in tegra t ion . S ince then ,improved dialogue and confidence-buildingmeasures es tab l i shed be tween thegovernment and the MILF have preventedsporad ic a rmed sk i rmishes and armyoperat ions against cr iminal gangs f romturning into larger armed confrontations. Also,a Malaysian-led international monitoring teamhas been dep loyed in Mindanao s inceOctober 2004 and has helped to maintain theceasefire.

The PHDR also estimates that during theperiods of acute conflict, 1970-1982 and 1997-2001, the Moro insurgency resulted in lostannual output valued at $150 million, with atotal loss of $2-3 billion over the entire period.The World Bank, according to the Report cites

a figure of a total of 120,000 deaths (civilians

and combatants) from the Mindanao conflict

from the 1970s to the present.

3.8.1 Community Risks – Rido (Clan wars)

Recent studies have shown that Rido or clanwars in Mindanao is more rampant thanpreviously thought. For example, from 1970to 2004, 214 cases of rido were recorded inMaguindanao alone. Rido is multi-dimensionalmeaning conflicts may not be limited to twogroups or clans but could involve severalclans forming temporary alliances and theactors involved in rido often hold multiplepositions. Some of those involved are clanmembers in control of various fields of power,such as traditional leadership structures, localgovernments, military or police, paramilitaryforces or insurgents. Such overlapping roles,particularly where members of opposing clansare members of the military and separatistgroups, have often caused rido to escalatefrom clan disputes to clashes between theGovernment of the Philippines and separatistgroups like the MILF.

The causes of rido range from land boundarydisputes, petty fights, theft, elopement or thenon-payment o f debts to more ser iousoffenses like murder and rape. Many of theseoffenses when perceived to be affronts to afamily’s l ineage or dignity (known amongMaranaos as “maratabat”) trigger rido. Rido

can only be eradicated or at least minimizedthrough the concerted efforts of varioussectors of society using a mult i-prongedapproach.

3.9 Summary of the Major Risks and their

Impact

The table on page 35 summarizes the impact

of the major social risks identified above.



35

Table 12: Summary of Major Social Risks and Their Impacts

Major Social Risk Number of People CurrentlyAffected

Quantitative and QualitativeLosses

Labor market related: 11.5 million persons (2006 – 4.1 GDP/worker x unemployed; aUnemployment and unemployed, 7.4 underemployed) factor x underemployedunderemployment (estimate in 2002 using lowest

labor productivity value –120 billion pesos pesos peryear)

Lifecycle risk: large 3.95 million poor households Social service expenditure/family size with > 5 members; 46.5% capita decreases with higher

poverty incidence for all population growth rate (givenhouseholds with > 5 members fixed resources); lower labor(2000) participation rate for mothers,

lower school attendance forchildren

Lifecycle risk: diseases 13 million have hypertension; Permanent or partial productivityaffecting health 70,138 deaths per 100,000 due losses of those who die or get

to heart diseases (2002); IMR 29 disabled during active workingper 1000 live births years, 18-65

Lifecycyle risk:Food 29-34% food poverty incidence Lower productivity due to lowerinsecurity, hunger and (2003); 3.4 million households energy levels from lower caloricmalnutrition (SWS, 2007) 7 of 10 households intake

food insecure (National NutritionSurvey, 2003)

Political Risk: Armed 212,000/yr for GOP-NPA and; 5-7.5 billion pesos annuallyconflicts 127,000/yr for GOP-MILF direct costs; with foregone

investments of P 10 billionpesos/year (PHDR 2007quoting Barandarian; Judd andSchampo)

Environmental risk: 7.9 million people affected; US$ 1.614 billion in terms ofNatural disasters 1792 persons dead or missing damages– total;

(NDCC, 2006) US$ 300 million annually(.5% GNP)US$ 1.175 billion ofdamages – typhoons; losses inproductivity incurred due to deathsand to damages in physical capital

Environmental risk:Shelter 1 million housing backlog Lack of property rights and secureand Housing (2005-2010); 1.4 million households tenure leads to lower productivity

squatters and slums (Alonzo, 2001); (de Soto)only 66.5 % of HH with secure tenure

Environmental risk 20% of population no access to Morbidity and mortality leading toAccess to clean water and improved water source; 14% without lower production; lower agriculturalsanitation access to improved sanitation (2004) productivity from lack of irrigation



36


HOW TO MEASURE SUCCESS IN THE PROPOSED WELFARE

REFORM AGENDA? A PROPOSED M&E SYSTEM

By

Dr. Leonardo A. Lanzona and Harvey S. Buena

ABSTRACT

his paper attempts to provide a framework

to evaluate the proposed welfare reform

agenda (PWRA) that is present ly being

formulated in the Department of Social Welfare

and Development (DSWD). The goal is to shift

the debate from the current preoccupation with

increasing caseloads or outputs in the central

off ice to one focused on the social and

economic well-being of fragile families, single

mothers, and children. An effective welfare

reform program is expected to reduce poverty

rates, lower out-of-wedlock childbearing,

encourage greater family stability, and lead to

little indication of more spouse abuse or child

neglect.

Moreover, according to recent pronouncements

of the National Statistical Coordinating Board

(NSCB), poverty has increased in 2006.

Poverty affects more adversely the single

mothers and their children, welfare recipients

exper iencing ser ious barr iers to stable

employment, and poor women and children

facing an uncertain economic and social future

as welfare eligibility is exhausted and the

economy wanes. With the welfare debate

shifting to family and child well-being, sociology

has an important pol icy ro le to play as

economics in the evaluation.

However, the PWRA is primarily an institutional

reform agenda aimed at improving the existing

del ivery and maintenance system of the

Department. The challenge is how to link these

institutional and organizational changes to the

function of the DSWD which is social protection.

The purpose of th is paper is to offer a

methodology by which one can l ink the

elements of the reform agenda, especially the

M&E component, to the ultimate aims of the

DSWD, specifically the protection of the poor

and vulnerable.

Furthermore, in a recent assessment of the

existing M&E system (Lanzona and Buena,

2008), the lack of a Department-wide M&E

system was cited as one of the weaknesses in

establishing a comprehensive (not a project-

based) assessment of the performance of the

DSWD. The goals of the Department as

regards the M&E system are then clarified: to

shift the focus from measuring welfare inputs

and outputs, to other less visible and easily

measured social outcomes. In the process, the

current preoccupation with the devolution of the

central office functions should be balanced with

a broader discussion of whether or not welfare

reform has achieved “success” in other

important social policy domains. Specifically,

the proper monitoring and evaluation system

must be able to evaluate how the present

reform agenda addresses and pursues

emerging welfare considerations focused on

material deprivation and poverty, fertility and

fami ly format ion (e.g. , out-of-wedlock

childbearing), marriage and cohabitation,

maternal well-being (e.g., mental health), and

child development. The question of whether

welfare reform has led to more geographic

social exclusion among low-income families will

also be taken into consideration.

T


37

Introduction

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2discusses the role of the M&E system, in relationto the over-all objectives and work of the DSWD.Section 3 presents the elements and guidingprinciples of the Reform Agenda. Section 4features the components and goals proposed M&Esystem. Section 5 provides the key indicatorsneeded for the evaluation of the reform agendabased on the guiding principles. Section 6 offerssome remarks on how data should be collected.

I. The Role of an M&E System

Following the argument of Lanzona and Buena(2008), the value of M&E does not come simplyfrom conducting M&E or from having suchinformation available; rather, the value comes fromusing the information to help improve governmentperformance. Many governments systematicallyuse M&E information to improve their performance(see McKay, 2007). For the DSWD, ways in whichM&E information can be highly useful include thefollowing:

1. To support policy making—especiallybudget decision-making—performancebudgeting, and national planning. Theseprocesses focus on government prioritiesamong competing demands from citizens andgroups in society. M&E information can supportgovernment’s deliberations by providingevidence about the most cost-effective typesof government activity, such as different typesof income programs, health interventions, orconditional cash transfer payments. Terms thatdescribe the use of M&E information in thismanner include evidence-based policy making,results-based budgeting, and performanceinformed budgeting.

2. To help the DSWD in its policy developmentand policy analysis work and in programdevelopment.

3. To help the DSWD manage activities at thesector, program, and project levels. Thisincludes government service delivery and themanagement of staff. M&E identifies the mostefficient use of available resources; it can beused to identify implementation difficulties, forexample. Performance indicators can be used

to make cost and performance comparisons—performance benchmarking—among differentadministrative units, regions, and districts.Comparisons can also be made over time thathelp identify good, bad, and promisingpractices, and this can prompt a search forthe reasons for this performance. Projectsand programs can be terminated on the basisof this analysis. Evaluations or reviews areused to identify these reasons (see, forexample, Wholey, Hatry, and Newcomer2004). This is the learning function of M&E,and it is often termed results-based or results-oriented management.

4. To enhance transparency and supportaccountability relationships by revealing theextent to which department has attained itsdesired objectives. M&E provides the essentialevidence necessary to underpin strongaccountability relationships, such as ofgovernment to the Congress, to civil society,and to donors. M&E also supports theaccountability relationships within government,such as between local government units andcentral agencies, among bureaus and sectordivisions, and among officers and staff. Strongaccountability, in turn, can provide theincentives necessary to improve performance.

These uses of M&E place it at the center of soundgovernance arrangements as a necessarycondition for the effective management of publicexpenditures for poverty reduction and socialprotection. In this framework, the M&E system isnecessary to achieve evidence-based policymaking, evidence-based management, andevidence based accountability. An emphasis onM&E is one approach to achieve a results-orientedand accountable public sector, including aperformance culture in the DSWD. For this reasonM&E should not be viewed as a narrow,technocratic activity.

Lanzona and Buena (2007) proposed anorganizational set-up that is centered on an M&Esystem (see Figure 1). It is argued that the M&Ecan serve as basis for policy decisions, and at thesame as a mechanism by which various bureausand regional offices can interact with another atarriving at sound policies.

How to Measure Success in the Proposed Welfare...


38



In this system, it is necessary to prop up anddevote resources towards the reorganization ofthe Program Review Evaluation Workshops(PREWs) and the establishment of an internalresearch institute (RI) for the Department. ThePREWs can be designed more substantially toaddress the four main tasks or roles cited abovethat an M&E system should produce. The mostcrucial element of the reform agenda is the RIwhich is intended to strengthen the technical abilityof the Department to conduct technicalevaluations, and also to use these to examine itsstrategic positions over the long term. Thesestrategies will serve as “buffer” to moderate thepolitical pressures that the Department oftenencounters.

II. The Reform Agenda: Elements and GuidingPrinciples

The M&E system being proposed here is part ofthe reform agenda that the Department isundertaking. This reform agenda can be arrangedas follows:

Reform Area 1: Engaging the sector inestablishing strategic and results-orientedpolicies in social protection

Figure1: Proposed Organizational Structure for the M&E

SB, SWIDB

and Field Offices

PMB PDPB

PREWs

NMDC EXECOM Research Agenda

Policy Decisions

SOCTECH

MANCOM and Equivalent

Field Office

Proposed Research Institute

Source: Lanzona and Buena (2007)

• Consolidate the sector and stakeholdersefforts through shared goals and delineatedroles by coming up with a national policyframework for social protection.

• Address the needs of the poor andvulnerable by establishing an objective andtransparent targeting system for socialprotection programs.

• Continue DSWD’s advocacy work for thepromotion and protection of the rights of thevulnerable sectors such as children, youth,women, persons with disabilities, olderpersons, families and communities in crisesthrough the introduction of social legislations

Reform Area 2. Providing faster and bettersocial protection programs

A. Through Improved and Appropriate Modelsand Programs

• Develop, improve, build on and scale-upservice delivery models: family/household-based, community-based, center-based,disaster management and risk mitigationmodel.


39How to Measure Success in the Proposed Welfare...

• Create a “think tank” that will assist intheorizing and continuing discourse on socialprotection

B. Through Improved Governance

• Empower the LGUs through capacity-building, technical assistance and resourceaugmentation. This will include capacitatingthem to analyze, design, implement, monitor,evaluate social protection programs andmobilize resources for these. Particularlystrengthen the role of provincial governmentsin the performance of social protectionfunctions in order to assist its poorermunicipalities.

• Undertake a systematic diagnosis of thedifferent LGUs to assess their capacities,come up with a classification system that canbe a basis for program interventions.

• Scale-up convergence approach amongstakeholders through joint projects includingco-financing.

• Design a performance-based system fordevolving programs and resources. Anincentive system will be introduced toencourage a performance-based approachto the “devolution” and management ofresources.

C. Through Improved Standards and Regulations

• Codify all existing policies and ensure easyaccess by partners and intermediaries

• Strengthen regulatory functions of DSWD forthe sector to ensure standards and qualityassurance through the formulation of clearstandards for quality implementation for socialprotection programs and services. Aharmonized system of accreditation/certification/ registration and system forexchange and sharing of monitoring findingswill also be developed.

• Design an incentive system (“seal ofexcellence”) for good LGUs/NGOs Thegranting of a “seal of excellence” (“SentrongGGILASS” or Good Governance in LocalArea Social Services) can be used as positivereinforcement for compliance and fordetermining LGUs deserving incentive forgood performance.

Reform Area 3: Introducing Financial Reformsto Sustain the Reform Process

• Secure more predictable funding for coreDSWD function

• Rationalize resource augmentation of LGUsand other partners

• Allocate DSWD budgetary and extra-budgetary resources in a strategic manner

o Rationalize funding support to center-based service delivery

o Re-allocate resource from less effective tomore effective programs

• Realize “savings” in the use of DSWDresource by identifying and implementingefficiency enhancing initiatives

Reform Area 4: Improving Delivery Systems andCapacities

• Improve Knowledge management system:M&E and MIS

o Key to the continuing improvement ofsocial protection models and technologiesis the knowledge management system ofDSWD, including managementinformation, monitoring, evaluation andresearch. Thus, these areas need to bestrengthened by way of capacity buildingof its human resources and improvementof its technology.

o Improve the information andcommunication system so that itspartners, reform workers, social protectionbeneficiaries including policymakers andthe general public are made aware of itsroles, priorities and services.

o Social protection models and technologiesare to be promoted through easy accessby partners and other developmentworkers to information and materials onthese (e.g., project planning andmanagement manuals or kits of templates,tools, reference materials, cases).

o For the MIS, it is envisioned that the presentmulti-platform system whereby eachprogram has its own dedicated programwill graduate into a single platform system


40



• Improve organizational capacities andcompetencies through CB Human resourcedevelopment has to be addressed. Revisit thelearning circles initially conceived but has notsuccessfully taken off the ground. Assess howthis can be made operational.

• Implement rationalization and strengtheningplans and performance management system

• Organize resource and expert pools Organizepools of experts and reform workers from theacademic community, NGOs, professionalassociations on various levels—international,regional, local—for access to social protectiontheories, discourses and innovations. This willdovetail with DSWD’s long envisioned plansof organizing a core group of internalspecialists and external experts.

As already stated, the PWRA is fundamentally aninstitutional reform that is focused on straighteningup its activities that will generate greater impact inprotecting the poor. To our mind, in order to succeedthe PWRA should be guided by the followingprinciples:

1. Social inclusion of all vulnerable sectorsimplies an operational targeting system: (a) insocial protection, to decrease avoidable andunjust differences to the minimum possible; and(b) in social services, for beneficiaries to receivecare in relation to need (equity of coverage,access, and use) and to contribute according tothe ability to pay (financing equity), indicating areduction of leakages and exclusion.

2. Effectiveness and technical quality mean thatusers of the services receive effective,guaranteed, and timely assistance; perceivedquality means that they receive this care underproper physical and ethical conditions (perceivedquality).

3. Efficiency implies a positive relationshipbetween the results achieved and the cost of theresources used. It has two dimensions: resourceallocation and the productivity of the services.Resources are allocated efficiently if theygenerate the maximum possible gain in termsof social protection per unit of cost; and they areused efficiently when a unit of product is obtainedat minimum cost, or when more units of productare obtained with a given cost.

4. Sustainability involves both the social andfinancing dimensions and is defined as thecapacity of the system to solve its currentlegitimacy and financing problems, as well asthe challenges of future maintenance anddevelopment. Consequently, it includes socialacceptance and support and the availability ofthe necessary resources.

5. Convergence and collaboration indicatessome measure of devolution in the delivery ofservices by giving local government unitsflexibility to design and implement their ownprograms. At the same time, these programsshould be attuned to the general directions ofthe Department in order to avoid spatialinequalities in the delivery of services.

All of these principles should make it possible tojudge the direction of the programmed or ongoingreforms from the standpoint of the stated finalobjective. Thus, no reform should be opposed tothese criteria, and the “ideal reform” would be onein which the five aspects had promoted by the endof the process. They, in turn, can be subdividedinto a series of variables to which quantitative orqualitative indicators can be added when they areadapted to the conditions of each bureau anddivision and can help to evaluate the degree towhich the general objectives of the reform havebeen achieved.

III. Proposed M&E System

The proposed M&E system is based the followingresults chain diagram that views the reform agendaand the M&E component within the context of alogical framework. Figure 2 provides a simplifiedrepresentation of how an action plan would beexpected to lead to various kinds of output, suchas the number of officials trained in M&E, thenumber of evaluations conducted, and so on. Theseoutputs in turn would be expected to lead tointermediate outcomes such as strengthenedgovernment demand for M&E, and to finaloutcomes, including the utilization of monitoringinformation and evaluation findings by governmentand others. It would be hoped that these outcomeswould help lead to final impacts, including improvedgovernment performance, improved developmenteffectiveness, improved service provision, andpoverty reduction.



In light of this framework, given its variedprograms, the evaluation and monitoringcomponent of the reform agenda will include thefollowing components. First, because each ofprograms and projects is unique, and will requirethe use of varied methodologies, all programs andprojects before its initial phase should require aformal program or project evaluation plan/proposal(PEP) that is consistent with the above resultschain. This involves the submission of an M&Eproposal to Project Management Bureau for reviewand later to the Executive Committee for approval.

The PEP should first explain how the program orproject is intended to ease vulnerability andpoverty. This formal proposal must then indicate

the methodology for the monitoring and evaluationthat will be conducted for the program or project,and more importantly, the key institutional

commitments in achieving its goals.

Figure 2. Results Chain of the Proposed M&E System

Note: This framework is adapted from McKay (2007).

At the minimum, major programs and projectsshould be evaluated every year for three years.

The PEP should then reflect the methodology tobe used every year. If the program were to exceedthree years, then a new PEP should be formulated.

Smaller and short-term projects should also berequired to submit an appropriate PEP. The keyissues for these PEPs are the choice of programs

to be evaluated and the specific questions eachevaluation would address; thus, the ToRs for eachevaluation are crucial. These issues can be

decided through negotiations between the linedepartments as well as through the Departmentof Finance budget sections.

For the weaker departments, the priorities of theDoF would largely prevail. However, for morepowerful line departments, the balance of power

was more even. Unresolved disputes concerningevaluation priorities would be escalated to the

DSWD Bureaus and Division Executive Civil Society

Improvements in DSWD Performance

Improved Development Effectiveness

Improved Service Provision, Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction

M&E used for: government decision making on policies, plans, and budget resource allocation; implementation and management of government activities; monitoring of activities, accounting of expenditures, evaluation of programs and projects; government analysis and policy review; government accountability.

M&E information directly supports budget balancing, national planning, and policy formulation.

M&E information directly supports ongoing management of government activities, including regional offices

Executive Committee assesses and debates performance

Civil society assesses government performance and inputs freely to policy debates

Formal M&E framework or system is established by the DSWD, leading to the systematic planning, conduct, reporting, and use of monitoring information and evaluation findings

Increased demand for M&E in government

Greater supply and funds for M&E and enhanced M&E skills

Improved M&E organizational structure

Reinforced demand for M&E in local government staff

Increased demand and supply for M&E in civil society

The action plan leads to the production of a range of outputs, such as number of officials trained in M&E; harmonized data systems; improved quality and focus of available monitoring indicators; improved quality and range of evaluations completed; strengthened incentives for bureaus to conduct and use M&E.

A package of reform activities to strengthen social protection functions is undertaken by the DSWD, such as national seminars on M&E systems; diagnoses of national/sectoral M&E functions; audits of data systems; provision of M&E trainingincluding trainer trainingor scholarships to officials, NGOs, universities/research institutes, local government staff; various types of evaluation are conducted on pilot/demonstration basis


42



level of Department Secretary or even to thecabinet if agreement could not be reached.

Second, the results chain revolves around the

establishment of quantitative measurements ofsocial protection. The second component of theproposed M&E system wil l then be the

identification of key indicators especially foroutcomes and impacts. It is important for eachof the sectors to be given individual indicators.

However, these should be consistent with thegeneral guiding principles of the reform agenda,especially that of social inclusion, in order to limit

the chance of redundancies and evencontradictions.

In establishing a common set of indicators, the

DSWD should consider the following definitionof social protection (Secretary Cabral’s speechin 2007 PDF):

“Social protection constitutes policies andprograms that seek to reduce poverty andvulnerability to risks and enhance thesocial status and rights of the marginalizedby promoting and protecting livelihood andemployment, protecting against hazardsand sudden loss of income, and improvingpeoples’ capacity to manage risks.”

Introducing risk and vulnerability in policydiscussions via quantitative means may help toput these issues higher on the policy agenda.The M&E system should present ways ofmeasuring and analyzing risk and vulnerabilityusing non-contextual and quanti tat iveapproaches, some building on contextual andqualitative approaches. If the aim is to informand influence policy beyond specific contexts,quantitative approaches cannot be ignored.Note that this is by no means an argument foronly money-metr ic approaches: otherdimensions and quantification of qualitativefactors is high on the agenda. In general, theaim is to stimulate more empirically based policymaking in developing countries, also on issuesrelated to risk and vulnerability.

The third component will include the compositionof comprehensive management reports and the

production of rigorous impact evaluations.Management reports are intended to be the mainpublic disclosure document. They reportspending, use of funds, and performance; thereports thus draw heavily on the performanceinformation that entities are required to produceand on the evaluations commissioned by theDSWD. The reports also describe the progressmade by the entity in achieving the formalinstitutional commitments it has agreed to in thePEP; these comprise specific actions the entityhas promised to implement to improve itsperformance. The draft reports are to bereviewed by the PMB and the specific bureausentities should make any necessary revisions.The final versions of the reports are sent to theExecutive Committee.

The rigorous impact evaluations involve primarydata collection, sophisticated data analysis, andoften the use of control groups. These may alsoinclude “institutional” evaluations that focus onthe process of the project and its ultimate impacton social welfare. These evaluations should beseen as collaborative exercises involving thePMB, the project development and planningbureau, and other bureaus responsible for theprogram being evaluated, as well as donors.External evaluators should often be contractedto conduct the rigorous impact evaluation, butDSWD should assess and discuss the results ofthese evaluations, as well as the managementreports, in the Project Review and EvaluationWorkshops, where all bureaus responsible to theproject should be invited.

The fourth component is the comprehensivereview of the monitoring and evaluation reportsthat had been completed. These reviews assessall programs within the DSWD, seen as wholeand not its individual parts. These will engagethe MANCOM (and its equivalence in the regionaloffices), the NMDC, and ultimately the ExecutiveCommittee. Each of the bodies should examinethe issues of inefficiency and duplication ofprograms. The final output of this process is adecision to continue (either within the centraloffice or regional offices implementing the project)or terminate the program. If the project orprogram is continued, the committees involved



in the comprehensive review should indicate:whether the project should have minor adjustmentsof program (for example, improved processes orinformation systems), major adjustment ofmanagement processes, (for example, changedtargeting criteria, or new information systems) orsubstantial redesign of program or organizationalstructure. In cases where the objectives are notmet, the committees involve should determine ifinstitutional relocations of the project will benecessary in the continuation of the project.

The fifth and last component should incorporatethe concerns of the civil society, particularly theNGO, and the POs, in order to ensure socialacceptability. Moreover, the conditions of the LGUsshould also be noted in the M&E system. Thiscomponent will ensure the full support of the localcommunity to the project, leading to its long-termsustainability.

Key Indicators of PWRA

What follows is list of impact indicators that mayserve as benchmark to DSWD programs andprojects based on the above M&E system. Thecritical idea is to establish indicators that will satisfythe guiding principles of the reform. This is notintended to be a complete list, but may be usedas a trigger for discussion.

1. Social Inclusion

Is there any evidence that the reform has led to areduction in the geographical gap in some or all ofthe following indicators? If possible, show dataaccording to gender, age, race, socioeconomiclevel, and coverage plan.

On Coverage

• The percentage of the population regularlycovered by a basic package of benefits

• Percentage of children under 1 year whowere given immunization

• On coverage of prenatal check-upsperformed by trained personnel

• On the percentage of women who usecontraceptives

On Distribution of Resources

• On all or some of the following indicators:

- Total per capita expenditure for socialprotection programs (which varydepending on the sector concerned)

- Per capita public spending on health percapital

- Social Workers (including NGOs) per10,000 population

On Access

• Percentage of households of interest withoutsocial protection service or program

• Percentage of rural population more thanone hour away from a health and schoolfacility and poor urban population more than30 minutes away from such facilities.

• Probability of obtaining social protectionservices on the day of request at the DSWDfacilities

• Percentage of health facilities that havereduced the functional barriers to access (forexample, schedule, language, or others).

On Resource Utilization

• On the following indicators:

- Social protection services delivered per1,000 population of interest

- Social Protection Expenditures per 1,000population of interest

- Percentage of deliveries attended bytrained personnel

2. Effectiveness and Quality

Is there some evidence that the reform hasreduced the geographical gap in some or all ofthe following indicators (and, if available, the gapbetween the target populations of the sectoralreform activities)?

• Infant mortality

• Maternal mortality

• Percentage of newborns with low birthweight


44


• Mortality

• Incidence of:

- Vaccine-preventable diseases

- Lack of nutrition/nourishment

Is there some evidence that sectoral reform hasinfluenced some or all of the following indicators,through some provider network(s), by territorialunit? If available, to whom is it directed, bypopulation group?

On Technical Quality

• Percentage of primary social welfareprojects with established and functioningquality control committees

• Percentage of social welfare projects withestablished and functioning quality controlcommittees

• Availability of services at the different levelsof the welfare program

• Percentage of population of interest whograduated from the program

On Perceived Quality

• Possibility of the user’s selecting a welfareservice provider, regardless of his ability topay.

• Percentage of facilities with established andfunctioning programs for improvingcommunication with the user and theservices provided

• Percentage of facilities with specific userorientation procedures.

3. Efficiency

On Resource Allocation

• Are more efficient resource allocationmechanisms being introduced? If so, whatare they and what are the results?

• Is there evidence that reform has influencedsome or all of the following indicatorsnationally, by territorial unit? If available bypopulation group, to whom is the reformdirected?

- Rural and urban drinking water supply

- Rural and urban sewerage and excretadisposal services

- Percentage of the social protection budgetspent on public social services (inclusiveof health and education)

- Spending on health care and educationas a percentage of total expenditure.

• Is there any evidence that reform has led toa reallocation of resources for theimplementation of

- intersectoral activities (for example,self-care in health, daycare services,disaster prevention, etc.)

On Resources Management

• Is there any evidence that sectoral reformhas helped to increase

- the percentage of social welfare projectswith standardized and functioningmeasures of activity and performance

- the number of programs that haveimproved at least the performanceindicators? (if possible, break down bypublic and private sectors).

- the percentage of projects that havenegotiated management agreements

- the percentage of social welfare projectsthat can expand the framework ofexpenditures utilizing new revenues forthis purpose

- the percentage of projects with budgetsbased on activity criteria

4. Sustainability

• Is there any evidence that sectoral reformhas increased

- the legitimacy and/or acceptability of thesocial welfare programs

- the availability of disaggregated data onprogram expenditure by territorial unit andto construct trends (comment in a fewlines)



45

- the sustainability over the middle term ofthe efforts to increase coverage of theprograms

- the capacity to modify the revenue andexpenditures of the principal DSWDinstitutions or bureaus (Comment in a fewlines)

- the percentage of social welfare programsable to collect from third parties

- the capacity for obtaining external loansand, if appropriate, their replacement bynational resources at maturity?

5. Social Convergence and Collaboration

• Is there any evidence that reform hashelped to increase the degree of socialparticipation and control at the differentlevels and functions of the social welfareprograms? If so, in general and/or withrespect to certain groups? Comment in afew lines.

IV. Data Requirements of a Successful M&ESystem

Among the issues presented by Lanzona andBuena (2007) is the importance of determining thepopulation of interest. In this case, it is necessaryto define clearly and measure the changes in thekey sectors that the PWRA is supposed to benefit.Welfare services, poverty and maternalemployment, and several key family and childindicators (e.g., unwed childbearing and batteredwomen) are key factors that the reform mustconsider. And, equally important, there is littleevidence of how much child poverty, spouseabuse, or child neglect have become morecommonplace. The public and policy makers mustalso assess their view of “hard to serve” mothersand children who remain on welfare. Welfarerecipients should become much less stereotypical(i.e., fewer references to the “poorest of the poor”)and fewer attributions must given to individualfailings. As such, there may be greater willingnessto help low-income mothers who “play by the rules”and “follow conditionalities” by working andbehaving responsibly.

The lack of longitudinal or panel data on familiesand children – both before and after PWRA —prevents a ful l assessment of potentialconsequences of welfare policy. As of now,because of the unavailability of data, we do notyet understand the short- and long-termconsequences for women and children who havebeen able to access of social services. We knowlittle of the consequences if families have beendenied of valuable services. Indeed, as better-off households migrate for work, the workingpoor have become a growing segment of thecountry’s low-income population, but we do notknow whether work – even at low pay –translates into positive outcomes in the longerterm (e.g., better maternal mental health,satisfying and stable marriages, or positive rolemodeling for children) or leads to additionalsuffering. We do not know whether welfareservices wil l ul t imately attenuate theintergenerational transmission of poverty andwelfare dependence by promoting work valuesand tradit ional famil ies as a context forchildbearing and child rearing. We do not knowwhether tough conditionalities will encouragesingle women to marry or cohabit unwisely or togive up custody of their children. More important,we do not know whether increased exposure toalternative welfare programs will help or hurtchildren of low-income working mothers.Because data are largely missing, we cannot yetdiscern whether more generous or morecontingent welfare programs have translatedinto healthier outcomes among poor children,now and when they grow into adulthood.

To be sure, policy research has its limitations,including its potential for political bias and itspenchant for misplaced policy assumptions(e.g., “culture of poverty”). But our admonitionto engage in research-based policy research andsolutions reflects our positive view of theempirically-based decisions – one focused oninter-related family and economic systems,structural constraints and opportunities, andchanging cultural values, while at the same timegrounded on actual data. The research agendaof the RI proposed in Lanzona and Buena (2007)should be able to tackle these issues.



46


A

Introduction

group of theorists called the New Growth

School1 have attributed the remarkable

economic growth of East Asian countries such as

Japan and South Korea to the emergence of a

highly-educated workforce, which strengthens the

research and development (R&D) arm of its

industries. The R&D, also known as the brains

behind big corporations, is responsible for making

system innovations, which increase efficiency and

productivity. This improvement in workforce caliber

would not have been possible if investments in

human capital were not made early on. In fact,

economist Michael Todaro noted that investing in

human development, particularly in education and

health significantly improves a country’s chances

of achieving long-term progress.2

But developing human capital, as with long-term

solutions to poverty, is a chicken and egg question.

This is because human capital relies on significant

investments in human development, particularly

in education and health, which the poor have

difficulty making as they struggle to put three

P

THE PANTAWID PAMILYANG PILIPINO PROGRAM (4PS):

INVESTING IN FILIPINO HUMAN CAPITAL TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY

By

Cyril Wendy V. Maaño

ABSTRACT

* This section borrows heavily from the World Bank’s Aide Memoire (2007) and PAD (2008) for the NSS-SWDRP

square meals on the table.

At a national scale, overall efforts to develop

human capital are also hindered by a third-world

country’s scarce financial resources, which render

spending for health and education insufficient

despite receiving the lion’s share of government

budget. Thus, the inadequacy of investments in

Filipino human capital has created a poverty trap.

The poor are unable to finish schooling and fail to

get higher-paid employment. The decreasing

trend in education and health indicators also affects

overall workforce productivity, resulting in

repercussions to the country’s economy that is felt

even by the well-to-do.

Statistical Trends*

••••• Worsening poverty prevalence rates

amidst improvements in the economy.

Although poverty prevalence rate was halvedfrom 45% in 1991 to 24.4% in 2003, the disparities

overty is exacerbated by lack of investment inhuman development as much as socio-

economic shocks. This situation necessitates theadoption of innovative programs that directinvestment in developing human capital,especially for the poorest in society who sacrificetheir health and education while striving to putthree square meals on the table. An example ofsuch programs is the DSWD’s Pantawid

Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), a conditionalcash transfer that capacitates the poorest tospend for health and education. Aside frombuilding human capital, this program alsoimproves geographic distribution of economicgains, reduces leakage rates of pro-poorprograms, and facilitates the convergence ofsocial protection efforts from various governmentagencies.


47

in sectoral and regional distribution of economicgains, which is heavily skewed in favor of urbanareas, resulted in the worsening of poverty to

26.9% in 2006. This figure translates to one inevery three Filipinos living on less than a dollarper day. The disparity in government investment

across regions is made worse by high inequalityin income distribution, as shown by a GiniCoefficient rating of 0.46 in 2003.3 Compounded

by a sluggish decrease in population growth rate,the Philippines has fallen behind its SoutheastAsian neighbors in reducing poverty prevalence

rates.

••••• Decreasing trend for education and

health indicators.

Based on the Philippine Midterm Report on the

MDGs, the country lags behind its targets forhuman capital, particularly in education andhealth. School enrollment rate for the elementary

level dropped from 99.1% in 1990 to 84.4% in2005. National statistics indicate that one in fivechildren aged 6-11 are not in school, while only

70% of Grade 1 students have reached Grade6, indicating low completion rates.4 Further, 28-34% of the population was already considerededucation-poor, that is, have failed to finish

elementary schooling in 2003.5 Althoughfunctional literacy rate remains high at 84%(2003), outcomes of the National Achievement

Test (2006) reveal poor pupil performance inEnglish (54%), Math (53.68%) and Science(37.98%).6

Health statistics, on the other hand, reveal thatuniversal immunization for children under age 5

has yet to be achieved, and that only 64% ofFi l ipino chi ldren meet the World HealthOrganization’s normal weight-for-age standard.7

Although maternal mortality rate has decreasedfrom 209/100,000 livebirths in 1993, to 172 in1998 and 162 in 2006, its decrease has been

sluggish indicating the need to improve pre-andpost-natal care. Population growth rate has beencurbed from 2.36% in the 1990s to 2.04% in

20068 but has also been quite slow, indicating aneed for more aggressive implementation of

natural family planning and similar reproductivehealth methods.

••••• Lack of capacity to manage socio-economic shocks.

A National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) andNational Statics Coordination Board (NSCB) studyshows that 45% of Filipinos are at-risk of fallinginto poverty as a result of natural and man-madeshocks or disasters (2005). Examples of such arethe rising prices of basic commodities, as well asloss of properties and livelihood due to devastatingtyphoons and displacement of families caused byarmed conflict. To cope with socio-economicshocks, poor families usually forgo expenses foreducation and health in favor of food and basiccommodities. This coping strategy has deprivedpoor children of sufficient education and healthcare. In the long-run, this situation not only placesthe future of poor children at peril, it also erodesoverall development of human capital in thecountry.

Improvements Needed in Government

Response

The government has already been implementingmeasures to curb poverty. Pro-poor programssuch as the Food for School, which provides dailyrice ration as incentive for poor families tocontinue sending their children to school; and theKapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Linking Arms toFight Poverty) - Comprehensive and Integrated

Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS),which uses the community-driven developmentapproach to facilitate delivery of social servicesthrough construction of roads, water sanitationprojects and others, are only some examples ofgovernment interventions in place. But while suchpoverty alleviation projects are in full swing,several implementation-related concerns requiregovernment’s immediate attention:

• Low overall spending for the socialsector. Latest data shows that overallgovernment spending for the social sectoris only 4.9% of GDP, which is way belowthe proportion spent by other countries

The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) ...


48


in the Southeast Asian region. In fact, thebudget of DSWD, which is government’sarm for social services, is only 0.34% ofthe national budget and .06% of the GDPin 2006.9

• Fragmented and uncoordinated socialprotection initiatives. Although severalgovernment agencies have embarked onprojects aimed at protecting the poorestfamilies from economic shocks and socialrisks, these programs are not well-coordinated, causing overlaps inimplementation.

• Challenges in decentralizing servicedelivery. As a result of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, there is anurgent need to capacitate LGUs in handlingtheir new responsibilities. This is to ensureappropriate implementation andsustainability of social services devolvedto LGUs.

• Lack of a unified, legitimate targetingsystem. A negative effect ofgovernment’s uncoordinated socialprotection programs is the crafting ofvarious targeting mechanisms that havedifferent criteria and methodologies toidentify the poor. This is why programleakage rates to the non-poor tend to behigh. The Food for School Program, forexample, registered a 62% leakage rate.10

These are just some issues hindering efficientimplementation of government’s pro-poorprograms. And these are issues, which theConditional Cash Transfer Program (CCT), acomponent of the DSWD’s National SectorSupport for the Social Welfare andDevelopment Reform Project (NSS-SWDRP),aims to address.

Statement of the Problem

Implementing the CCT program will help addressthe gaps noted in government’s anti-povertyprograms.

Objectives

The objectives of this paper are to (1) give anoverview of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino

Program (4Ps) conditional cash transfer – itsconditionalities and institutional arrangements; and(2) describe benefits that can be gained fromimplementing a CCT program in the Philippinecontext by citing examples of achievements fromother countries.

Methodology

Aside from the DSWD’s 4Ps project documents,various studies on poverty and the documentationof CCT’s implementation in Latin Americancountries like Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, wereused as main references.

Scope and Limitation

This paper provides an overview of the 4Ps,specifically its health and education conditionalitiesand institutional arrangements. The contributionof the 4Ps in addressing current gaps ingovernment’s anti-poverty programs (i.e., lowspending for the social sector, high leakage rates,and uncoordinated social protection programs) arealso highlighted.

Since the Program is still in its germinal stage,this paper doesn’t discuss in-depth the project’ssub-components, such as the household targetingsystem which is crucial in selecting the 4Psbeneficiaries, and the monitoring and evaluation(M&E) system that will assess project impact.Separate researches on these components maybe done midway through the Program. However,this paper highlights the gains already achievedthis early in Program implementation.

I. The Rationale for a Conditional CashTransfer Program

The urgency of implementing a CCT program inthe Philippines stems from observed disparities ingeographic and sectoral distribution of economicgains, as well as the country’s slow progresstowards achieving its human development targets,as stipulated in the MDGs. This is a problem thathas been encountered in other developing



49

countries as well. It showed that inadequacy ingovernment budget per se is not the deterrent toprogress. Perhaps even more than emaciatedgovernment coffers, it is the inability to invest in

human development, especially of the poor andvulnerable, that hinders long-term economicgrowth. This is the rationale behind the CCT.

What is the CCT?

The CCT, by definition, is an anti-povertystrategy that gives cash grants to poorest

families in exchange of their commitment toinvest in human development, specifically ineducation and health. In the process,

government capacitates the poorest families tospend for education and health— crucial aspectsof human development that are least prioritized

by the poor in times of socio-economic crisis. Itshould be noted that this anti-poverty strategyhas already been applied in Latin American

countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, andMexico.12

To appreciate gains that can be achievedthrough the CCT, it is best to look at its impact

in Latin American countries. According to LauraB. Rawlings (2005), the CCTs in Latin Americahave increased enrollment rates, improved

preventive health care and raised householdconsumption. Other studies conducted reflectedthat CCTs were successful in redistributing

income to the poor. Gains in education andhealth are particularly notable. In Nicaragua, forexample, average primary school enrollment

rate increased by 22 percentage points from alow baseline of 68.5%. Enrollment rates forsecondary education in Colombia have also

increased from 64% to 77%. In Mexico, keepingchildren in school has significantly decreasedthe probability of child labor by 10-14%. The

same has been experienced by Bahia, Brazil,which noted a reduction of nearly 26 percentagepoints in the incidence of child labor.13

As regards health and nutr i t ion, Mexicoregistered significant increase in nutritionmonitoring of infants from 30% to 60%.

Colombia increased the proportion of children

under six years of age enrolled in growthmonitoring by as much as 37 percentage points.In Nicaragua, more than 90% of children in its

beneficiary provinces have participated innutrition monitoring compared with only 67% incontrol areas. Timely immunization rates for

children 12-23 months of age also increased by18 percentage points. Prioritizing health in poorhouseholds has also increased consumption

levels in Mexico by as much as 14%, and caloricintake by as much as 7%. It is believed that thisincrease in caloric intake was driven by higher

expenditures on fruits and vegetables.14

Such gains attributed to the implementation ofCCT in Latin America ref lect that CCT

significantly improves human development of thepoor. It is also notable that the main beneficiariesof these investments are children from poorest

famil ies. By keeping chi ldren in school,increasing their caloric intake, and providingimmunization against disabling sicknesses, the

CCT addresses the intergenerational nature ofpoverty i tself . I t gives poor chi ldren thenecessary tools to improve their (and theirfamilies) status in life.

Why is DSWD implementing the CCT?

The DSWD is government’s arm for providingsocial services to the poor and vulnerable. Aside

from services in its centers and institutions, theDSWD is also tasked to create and promotepolicies that will protect the poorest and most

vulnerable sectors of society from socio-economic shocks they face day in and day out.Thus, embarking on innovative poverty

alleviation programs such as the CCT is inkeeping with the agency’s mandate.

Following the devolution of its services to LGUs

in 1991, the DSWD has also shifted its focusfrom provision of social welfare (rowing) tostrengthening its capacity as leader of the social

protection sector, specifically in the areas ofsocial welfare and social safety nets (steering).This is why the DSWD embarked on the National

Sector Support for the Social Welfare andDevelopment Reform Project (NSS-SWDRP).



50


The NSS-SWDRP is similar to the Basic

Education Sector Reform Agenda (BESRA) andthe Health Sector Reform Agenda (FOURmulaOne) already undertaken by the DepEd and

DOH respectively. The overarching goal ofDSWD’s reform agenda is to improve its capacityto lead in the social development sector. As a

leader, DSWD supports innovations that willimprove its service delivery to the poor.

Cognizant of the gaps in achieving the MDGs,

the DSWD is adopting the CCT as a laboratoryfor the Reform Agenda that i t wants toimplement. It is regarded as a key building block

that will actualize DSWD’s aim to establish itselfas a leader in the social development sectorthrough establishing strategic and results-

oriented policies (Reform Area 1); providingfaster and better social protection programsthrough improved models and programs,

governance standards and regulations (Reform

Area 2); introducing Financial Reforms to sustainthe reform process (Reform Area 3) ; and

improving delivery systems and capacities(Reform Area 4).

Since education and health improvements are

crucial to overall social development, the DSWDdesigned the CCT to complement the BESRAand FOURmula One reforms. In fact, the DepEd

and DoH, along with the NAPC, Department ofInterior and Local Government (DILG) and theNational Economic and Development Authority

(NEDA) formed the 4Ps National AdvisoryCommittee (NAC). This committee wasconsulted in f inalizing the 4Ps structure,

objectives and conditionalities. Further, the NACcommits to closely coordinate and cooperatewith DSWD in ensuring timely delivery and

quality of services, which are essential forprogram impact.

II. Overview of the Pantawid Pamilyang

Pilipino Program (4Ps) CCT Implementation

The 4Ps conditionalit ies and institutionalarrangements were crafted to help address gaps

in government’s poverty alleviation response.

Selection of Beneficiaries

One o f the p rob lems encountered inimplementing pro-poor programs was thedifficulty in targeting those who are truly poorand lowering the leakage rate of programbenefits to the non-poor. The Proxy MeansTest (PMT) Household Targeting System, thesame model proven successful in targetingthe poor and reducing exclusion error in LatinAmerican countries, was adopted by the 4Psto address this concern.

First, the provinces were ranked based on theFamily Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES2006). Afterwards, the 20 poorest provincesper reg ion were se lec ted . To ensurenationwide implementation of the program,the poorest provinces in regions which arenot included in the 20 poorest were alsocons idered fo r the 4Ps. Wi th in theseprovinces, the poorest municipalities werethen identified using the Small Area Estimates(SAE) of the NSCB. Finally, the PMT formulawas used to iden t i f y how many poorhousehold beneficiaries will be selected perarea.15

In 2007, the DSWD piloted the 4Ps in NCR(Pasay City and Caloocan City) and Mindanao(Agusan del Sur and Misamis Occidental) toassess the feasibility of its PMT and programstructure in rural and urban settings. Positiveresults of its pilot phase, as well as stronggovernment support, compelled the DSWD toscale up its program from a pilot of 6,000househo lds to as many as 321,000households nationwide in 2008.

Aside from reducing leakage rates, the PMTis also regarded as key to establishing a datarepository of the poor. In the long run, thistargeting system can be shared by DSWDwith other government agencies and LGUsto decrease exclusion error and leakage rateof poverty alleviation programs.



51

The 4Ps Program Conditionalities

The goal of the 4Ps is to promote humancapi ta l among poor fami l ies, especia l lychildren, to break the intergenerational cycleof poverty. Its objectives are as follows:16

(i) To improve preventive healthcare ofpregnant women and young children;

(ii) To increase enrollment/attendance ofchildren at the elementary level;

(iii) To reduce incidence of child labor;

(iv) To raise consumption of poorhouseholds on nutrient dense foods;

(v) To encourage parents to invest in theirchildren’s (and their own) future; and

(vi) To encourage parents’ participation inthe growth and development of youngchildren, as well as involvement in thecommunity.

To achieve these objectives, the followingconditionalities on health and education wereidentified:+

••••• Health Transfer Conditionalities

Poor households with children under 5 years ofage and/or pregnant women are eligible toreceive health transfers worth PhP500 permonth (for a period of 12 months/year)regardless of the number of children, providedthat the household adheres to the followingconditionalities:18

••••• all children under age 5 are fullyimmunized under the established healthprotocols and get regular preventivehealth check-ups;

••••• children aged 5 years must attend day

care program/pre-school;

••••• pregnant mothers must get prenatal carestarting from the 1st trimester, and postnatal care thereafter;

••••• they must attend counseling sessions onreproductive health, breastfeeding andfamily planning. For the first year of theprogram, all pregnant women must havemother-baby books with fully filled-up birthplans prepared with the health team. Thesame conditionality will apply for thesecond to fifth year as in the first year,with the added requirement of delivery ina health facility attended by a skilledhealth professional.

••••• Education Transfer

Eligibility for the education grant is open to poorhouseholds living in selected areas with childrenfrom ages 6 to 14. The education transfer iscurrently at PhP300 per month for a period of10 months annually, and can only be given to amaximum of three children per household.Beneficiary households wi l l receive theeducation transfer for as long as its school-agechildren are enrolled in school, and maintain aclass attendance rate of 85 %.

Poor households with children meeting bothhealth and education conditionalities will receiveboth transfers in one payment, provided thatconditions are met. Households will receiveeach transfer for up to five years (2008-2013) ifthey comply with the said conditionalities.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

An efficient M&E system is crucial in assessingprogram impact and identifying areas forimprovement. The NAC, specifically the DepEdand DoH will work with DSWD to ensure propermonitoring of beneficiary compliance withconditionalities. For example, the School Headtakes full accountability for the accuracy of dataon pupil attendance and performance. The

+ This section borrows heavily from the 4Ps Operations Manual (as of February 2008) and the World Bank’s PAD (2008) for the NSS-SWDRP.



52


Health Center Office, on the other hand, reportson the compliance of beneficiaries to healthconditionalities.

Institutional Arrangements

Aside from the NAC, a Project ImplementationOffice (PIO) was also established to manage the4Ps. The main functions of the PIO include“ensuring implementation of activities accordingto what is stated in the operational manual of theCCT program and according to the annual projectimplementation plans; ensuring that technicalspecifications and terms of reference forprocurement of works, goods and services areprepared by respective divisions in time andadhering to technical standards; announcingbids and organizing their valuation; and planningproject implementation schedules, review plansand issue reports.”19

Other prospects for institutional linkages includethe tie-up of 4Ps with poverty alleviationprograms such as the KALAHI-CIDSS 2 (KC-2),which is slated for implementation in 2010. TheKC-2 and 4Ps tie-up is envisioned to help LGUsfacilitate the creation of schools, health centers,water sanitation projects, and roads which arecritical inputs for the 4Ps supply side.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

The project description of the 4Ps reflects howit can respond to gaps noted in current povertyalleviation programs.

••••• Improves spending for the social sector.The 4Ps improves government’sspending for human capital by directinginvestment towards education and healthcare of the poor. To this end, the Programhas prepared an initial amount of aboutPhP2B to support 321,000 householdbeneficiar ies within the year. Bychanneling investments to the poorestareas of the country, it is hoped that the4Ps wil l lead to a more equitabledistribution of economic gains acrossregions, particularly in rural areas of

war-torn Mindanao, as well as pocketsof poverty in urban areas.

••••• Enhances coordination of socialprotect ion ini t iat ives. Through i tsinstitutional arrangements, the 4Ps willenhance linkages of national reforminitiatives such as the DSWD’s NSS-SWDRP Reform Agenda with theDepEd’s BESRA and the DoH’sFOURmula One. The support of NAC willalso provide an opportunity for i tsmember agencies to work with DSWDtowards al leviat ing poverty andcoordinate their social protect ionprograms.

••••• Facilitates decentralization of socialserv ice del ivery. Relat ive to theirsigned MOA for the 4Ps, the LGUshave committed to provide for theProgram’s supply side. This includes theconstruction of school buildings andhealth centers, as well as the provisionof textbooks to students. In this process,the 4Ps encourages LGUs to directspending for human development andimprove their delivery of social servicesto the poor.

••••• Implements an efficient poverty targetingsystem. The 4Ps PMT is regarded as vitalin improving poverty targeting andreducing leakage rates to the non-poor.In the long-term, it can also provide thebasis for creating a standardized nationaltargeting system for the poor. This willreduce leakage and exclusion rates ofpoverty programs, not just of DSWD, butof other government agencies as well.

The internal and external shocks faced by theFilipinos today, especially the poor, indicate thatinnovative programs to fight poverty are needednow more than ever. The prospective gains fromimplementing the 4Ps already show its promisefor enhancing long-term human development.However, as with any poverty alleviationprogram, the 4Ps needs the support of the public



53

it serves. It also requires vigilant implementationof program processes and convergentresponses from the NAC and LGUs.

Anthropologists say that the Filipino has closecultural and socio-economic affinity with LatinAmerican countries. As such, poverty alleviationprograms that are effective in Latin America have

REFERENCES

1 Michael Todaro, Economic Development, 9th

Edition, NY City: Addison Wesley, 2006,page 20

2 Michael Todaro, Economic Development, 9th

Edition

4 DSWD, Presentation of Sec. Esperanza Cabralto the Philippines Development Forum (PDF),26 March 2008

5 NSO 2003 data cited in the World Bank PADReport, 2008

6 DSWD, Presentation of Sec. Esperanza Cabralto the PDF, 26 March 2008

7 DepEd-TEEP Data 2005, cited in Sec.Esperanza Cabral’s PDF presentation, 26March 2008

8 NDHS 2003 data cited in the World Bank Report2008

9 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s 8th SONAJuly 2008 full text < http://www.sunstar.com.ph/blogs/citizenwatch/?p=1217 >

high probabi l i ty of working in Phi l ippineconditions. If this is so, then there is reason tohope that the 4Ps can do for the Philippines whatthe CCTs have successfully done for the poor inNicaragua, Colombia, and Mexico: sustainimprovements in overall education and health,and provide the poorest with reason to hope fora brighter future.

10 Data cited in World Bank’s Study, 2008

11 Manasan and Cuenca in SWD Journal VolumeNo. 2 Issue No. 1

12 World Bank, CCT Power Point Presentations,Compiled on 21 April 2008

13 Laura B. Rawlings, A New Approach to Social

Assistance: Latin America’s Experience with

CCT Programmes, International Social SecurityReview, Vol. 58, 2/3/2005, page 133-151

14 Laura B. Rawlings, A New Approach to Social

Assistance, page 151

15 DSWD, Administrative Order No. 16, S. 2008:Guidelines on the Implementation of the 4Ps,

16 July 200816 Taken from the World Bank PAD 2008

18 World Bank’s PAD 2008

19 The 4Ps Operations Manual, as of February2008



54


I. RATIONALE

In the Philippines, occurrences of major disasters

usually create an atmosphere of chaos and crisis

which demands prolonged conduct of relief

operations together with rehabilitation efforts to

support the affected families and communities.

The Local Government Units (LGUs) thru Republic

Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, are mandated to

undertake the functions of providing immediate

basic relief assistance to the affected families such

as food, clothing, temporary shelter, emotional

support as well as their rehabilitation needs.

Despite the devolution of disaster relief services,

however, disaster management remains to be a

major concern of the national government

agencies like the DSWD as some of the LGUs

especially those in the 5th to 6th class municipalities

have limited local calamity funds and are

dependent on the support of higher levels of

government. Further, other localities considered

as disaster prone areas, may have exhausted all

their resources due to continuous calamity and

prolonged disaster operations.

The Department, as a member of the National

Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), leads in

the provision of emergency response and relief

assistance and support to rehabilitation services

to the affected families. Section 5.g of PD 1566,

entitled as “Strengthening the Philippine Disaster

Control, Capability and Establishing the National

Administrative Order No. 15

Series of 2008

SUBJECT : GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE CASH-FOR-WORK PROJECT

Program on Community Disaster Preparedness”,mandates the Department to extend emergencyrelief assistance and social services to the victimswhich will immediately restore them torehabilitation and a life of normalcy.

To discourage continuous dependency and doleout, the interventions and services of theDepartment for disaster victims must be carried ina developmental manner in order to preservehuman worth and dignity. This can be done bydirectly involving them in community endeavorsand maximizing their contributions to rehabilitationefforts. Thus, the Department recognized thenecessity to adopt the Cash for Work (CFW)project not only as alternative or subsequentstrategy to Food for Work but as a developmentalapproach to welfare. The CFW gives flexibility torecipients of relief assistance to decide where tospend the cash assistance, beyond food, to meettheir daily basic needs. Moreover, it helps in pump-priming the economy in disaster affected areas.

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Cash-for-Work is a short-term intervention toprovide temporary employment to distressed/displaced individuals by participating in orundertaking preparedness, mitigation, relief,rehabilitation or risk reduction projects andactivities in their communities or in evacuationcenters. Work areas/programs are identified bythe community under the leadership of localleaders. In exchange for the work rendered,


55

program recipients are provided with cash to meettheir requirement for food and other basicnecessities. Cash-for-Work may be undertakenbefore, during or after the occurrence of anydisaster whether natural or man-made.Implementation of the Cash-for-Work shall bemanaged by the LGUs’ social welfare anddevelopment offices in coordination with theDSWD field offices.

Rate of Assistance

The daily rate of Cash-For-Work (CFW) shallgenerally be seventy five percent (75%) of theprevailing daily wage rate set by the NationalWages and Productivity Commission (See AnnexA). The CFW shall on the average be not morethan (ten) 10 days. However, if in the assessmentof the local social welfare and development officethere is a need to extend such for valid andjustifiable reasons, this can be extended by theDSWD Field Office. The extension, howevershould not be more than three (3) months.

The reasons behind this rate of assistance areto minimize market distortion, target the mosteconomically disadvantaged individuals, ensurethat the cash-for-work projects will not enticepeople away from their regular l ivelihoodactivities, and capture wage variations in the area.The DSWD shall use the minimum wage rate setby the Department of Labor and Employment inevery locality, which may change from time totime, as reference in computing the actual rateof assistance.

III. OBJECTIVES

1. To encourage community participation inimplementing a community-defined projectrelated to disaster preparedness, mitigation,response, reconstruction and rehabilitation,including hunger mitigation and food securityprojects.

2. To generate temporary employment andprovide income augmentation to affectedfamilies or individuals and keep them frommigrating or abandoning their communities insearch of new sources of income.

3. To help the affected families and localgovernment units in restoring damagedshelters, infrastructure and communityprojects as a result of disaster within theirlocality.

IV. TARGET AREAS/BENEFICIARIES

The Cash-for-Work Project shall be availablenationwide whenever possible and feasible andshall be provided to the following types of clients:1) individuals/famil ies who are wil l ing toparticipate in a livelihood and productivitysupport projects, developmental and collectivecommunity or group undertaking related todisaster mitigation, r isk reduction and/orrehabilitation and 2) individuals/ families who arevulnerable at risks or victims of any form ofdisasters and 3) are able and capable toundertake the projects. The beneficiaries shouldbe at least 18 years old. However, parentalconsent shall be sought if beneficiaries are ofminor age i.e. between 15 to 17 years and havebeen assessed to be capable of work. In casethe participating individual is attending school,it must be ensured that the activity does notaffect his/her school attendance.

V. TYPES OF PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES

The projects and activities that are covered underthe Cash-for Work program are as follows: 1)livelihood and productivity support projectssuch as construction or repair of smallinfrastructure facilities supportive to start-up oroperationalize the SEA-K, Tindahan Natin or othermodalities of livelihood and income generatingprojects; 2) reconstruction and rehabilitationprojects and activities such as shelter repair orconstruction of new shelter units and socialservices infrastructure such as health stations, daycare centers and schools; 3) disasterpreparedness, mitigation activities andenvironment related projects such as riverdredging and embankment, digging and dredgingof canals and drainage, tree planting orreforestation projects; 4) hunger mitigation andfood security projects such as communal farmpreparation and planting, repair or construction ofpost harvest facilities and farm to market roads.

A.O. No. 15 S. 2008: Guidelines For The Implementation ...


56


VI. COMPONENT

1. Assessment and Identification ofProposed Projects/Activities

The P/C/MSWDO shall conduct an assessmentof the potential beneficiaries with technicalassistance from the DSWD-Field Office andin consultation with the LGU to establish theviability and appropriateness of CFW. Areasfor assessment shall include the following:a) capability of the beneficiaries to providetheir counterparts (e.g. time and labor); b) socio-economic benefits to be derived from theproject/activity; c) environmental consideration;d) acceptabil i ty of the project/activity bythe community; and e) length and cost ofimplementation.

2. Preparation of Project Proposal

After doing the assessment and projectidentification, the P/C/MSWDO shall prepare aproject proposal providing the rationale anddetails of the project/activity. Such proposal willcontain the project description, objectives,implementation mechanics, work program,budgetary requirements, and the LGUcommitments and responsibilities which mayinclude, but not limited to, human, physicalinfrastructure and financial resources.

3. Provision of Financial Assistance/ProjectFunding

For the project proposal to be funded, the LGUthrough the P/C/MSWDO shall submit this to theDSWD-Field Office for review and subsequentapproval. Proposals costing not more than OneMillion (P1M) Pesos shall be approved by theDSWD Field Office. The Field Office shallimmediately provide PMB copy of the approvedproposals. Proposals for more than One Millionshall be forwarded to the Program ManagementBureau (PMB) for further review, evaluation andsubsequent endorsement to the Office of theUndersecretary for Operations and CapacityBuilding (OCBG) for approval. Upon approval,funding for the Cash-For-Work shall be sub-allotted to the Field Office for release to theconcerned LGUs.

Certification as to availability/unavailability of LGU

counterpart shall be attached to the project

proposal and should be signed by the local chief

executive. The certification shall indicate whether

or not the LGU could allot counterpart resources,

which may be in cash or in the form of equipment,

construction materials, lot or sites, etc.

4. Implementation of CFW Project/Activity

The LGU shall implement the approved CFW

project/activity immediately after receipt of the

fund from the DSWD-Field Office. Each CFW

participant shall be issued a Cash-for-Work

voucher (Annex B) that will reflect his/her length

of involvement in particular projects. During the

implementation stage, the LGU thru the P/C/

MSWDO shall maintain a logbook to record the

daily attendance of the beneficiaries who have

reported for work. Each beneficiary shall enter

in the logbook the actual time they arrive and

leave at the work site and sign the logbook.

The P/C/MSWDO shall act as the disbursing

officer and the sole authority to draw a cash

advance for CFW. He/She shall prepare a daily

cash assistance payroll to provide payment to

the CFW beneficiaries for the work they

rendered. The CFW voucher and attendance

logbook shall be the basis of the P/C/MSWDO

in preparing the cash assistance payroll.

Copy of the CFW voucher and cash assistance

payroll shall serve as supporting documents to

liquidation reports. Likewise, the LGU should

keep a copy of these records and ensure that it

would be available during the monitoring visit

either by the DSWD Field Office or Central Office

staff.

When the project/activity is done or completed,

the P/C/MSWDO shall prepare a completion

report with highlight on both cash disbursement

and work completed with pictures of completed

project and shall be noted by the Local Chief

Executive. The emphasis of this report shall be

the result of the project/activity in relation to what

has been stipulated in the approved project



57

proposal. Copy of this report shall be submitted

to the DSWD Field Office for review and

appropriate action. The Field Office shall furnish

a copy of the report to the Central Office thru

the Operations and Capacity Building Group

(OCBG).

5. Monitoring and Evaluation

There shall be three levels of monitoring for the

Cash-for Work: 1) the LGU Level, 2) the DSWD

Field Office Level, and 3) the DSWD Central

Office Level. Monitoring by the LGU shall be

conducted on a daily basis until the project is

completed. LGU monitoring shall be conducted

primarily by the P/C/MSWDO in coordination

with appropriate offices such as the public works,

engineering, general services etc. and shall

cover the following:

a. Program of Work – tracking the

progress of the project or activity based

on the approved program of work.

b. Project/Activity - verifying whether the

actual project or act ivi ty being

undertaken including its location site is

exactly consistent with the approved

project proposal.

c. Beneficiaries - determining i f the

beneficiaries involved in the actual

project or activity are the intended

recipients of the Cash-for-Work and

if number is in accordance with the

proposed manpower or labor

requirement.

In the case of the Field Office, on-site monitoring

of the implementation of the Cash-for-Work shall

be conducted on a periodic basis using random

sampling. Validation of the progress report

submitted by the LGU shall be the primary

purpose of the FO monitoring e.g. like checking

if wage payments were made on t ime, if

participants received the amount of money, etc.

The Central Office shall be provided with the

results of the FO on-site monitoring.

The monitoring visit of the DSWD Central Officeshall take place at least once during the projectlife or when necessary to provide technicalassistance to the Field Office or LGU when thereis a compelling need to do so.

Evaluation of the Cash-for-Work shall beundertaken by the Field Off ice after thecompletion of the project/activity. Copy of theevaluation report must be submitted to theCentral Office and the LGU.

The major intention of the evaluation is toestablish the effectiveness, efficiency and whenpossible, the impact of the Cash-for-Work. Partof gauging the effectiveness of the CFW shallbe determining if the stated objectives are metand whether the process of beneficiary selectionand participation are effective and benefited themost qualified and vulnerable segments of thepopulation. In terms of efficiency, aside fromevaluating the project cost and the projectoperation, i t would also be necessary todetermine if payments to beneficiaries weremade on time.

In evaluating the impact of CFW, the followinginformation must be highlighted: a) how thecash-for-work influenced and benefited theparticipating individuals/families and community;b) how the cash assistance was used and whatchanges took place in the coping strategies andbehavior of the individuals/families; and c) howthe community accepted and benefited from theproject.

This Order shall take effect immediately andrevokes issuances inconsistent with it.

(Sgd) ESPERANZA I. CABRAL, M.D. Secretary



58


Original Communications

The Social Welfare and Development (SWD)Journal accepts original and preferablyunpublished articles on SWD-related programs,such as an assessment of DSWD’s communityand center-based programs, DSWD Projects, andother SWD-related initiatives from NGOs and otherdevelopment agencies/workers. The copyright ofpublished articles shall be owned by the Journal.

The SWD Journal Editorial Board composed ofthe Editor-in-Chief, Associate Editors, ManagingEditor, and Assistant Managing Editor will reviewall submitted articles based on clarity of languageand validity of supporting evidence. The articlesshall also be subjected to peer review. The SWDJournal Editorial Board reserves the right to rejectarticles, as well as the right to edit articles toconform to editorial policy.

Manuscripts

Clear manuscripts, tables and illustrations mustbe encoded in Times New Roman font size 12double-spaced on A4-sized bond paper with one(1) inch margin on all sides. Articles should be amaximum of 50 pages long including tables,charts, annexes, and title page.

The title page should contain the manuscript’scomplete title as well as the author’s full name,degrees obtained, organization, academicaffiliations, address and contact numbers. Pagenumbering should begin with the title page,followed by the disclosure of conflicts of interestas page 2, abstract as page 3, etc. Abbreviationsmust be spelled-out or defined at first appearancein the text, tables, figures, or summary. Americanspelling, as indicated in the Webster’s InternationalDictionary, is preferred. Mathematical equations/formula, if any, should be written in a single line.For example:

a+b=c; dy/dx=B; [(a-b) (c+d)] / (m+n) = r

Manuscripts must be printed on one side of thepage only and submitted in triplicate along with asoft copy (diskette or CD-RW).

Conflicts of Interest

Submitted manuscripts should contain the author’sfull disclosure of all potential conflicts of interest.Conflicts of interest arise when an author and/orthe institutions he/she is affiliated with havefinancial or personal relationships that mayinappropriately influence the author’s opinions.These relationships are also known as dualcommitments, competing interests, or competingloyalties. As such, financial relationships such asemployment, consultancies and the like should bedisclosed.

Authors should also state explicitly whetherpotential conflicts do or do not exist and providepertinent details in a separate page following thetitle page. Journal editors reserve the right topublish this information if deemed necessary.

Summary (Abstract)

Abstracts with a maximum of 500 words shouldaccompany all submitted articles. They shouldcontain the salient points of the paper and followthe format prescribed for manuscripts.

References

The Modern Language Association (MLA) Styleshould be used for text format and reference notes.

1. Book and journal titles should be italicized (i.e.People’s Journal). Title of journal articles,working papers, and other referencedocuments, however, should not be italicizednor set in quotation marks but written in all caps(i.e. AN ANALYSIS OF DSWD PROGRAMSAND PROJECTS).

2. Reference notes or references are indicatedin superscript after the quotation, paraphrasedsentence, or summarized material from books,journals and other sources.

References should be numbered consecutively.There should be no space between thepunctuation and the references. Only ArabicNumbers (1, 2, 3...) should be used and not

Roman Numeral Numbers (I, II, III...).

Guidelines for Contributors


59

3. Indicate references at the end of the article

using the following formats:

Books

nName of Author/s, Title of the Book (City of

Publication: Name of Publishing Company,

Date of Publication), Page Number/s.

* n = the number of the reference note (i.e.,

1, 2, 3...)

For example:

1 Martin V. Kingsley and Christine N. Brown,

Madame Curie: A Biography (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1995), 12.

For books with three or more authors, use “et

al.” For example:

1 Martin V. Kingsley, et al., Madame Curie: A

Biography (New York: Oxford University Press,

1995), 12.

Books edited or compiled should be cited, as

follows:

nName of Author/s, “Title of Article,” in Title of

the Book, ed. Name of Editor (City of

Publication: Name of Publishing Company,

Date of Publication), Page Number/s.

For example:

1 Martin V. Kingsley, “Madame Curie: A

Biography” in Biographies of Women

Scientists, ed. Harris C. Johnston (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1995), 12.

Books with no author or editor stated should

be cited as follows:

nTitle of the Book (City of Publication: Name

of Publishing Company, Date of Publication),

Page Number/s.

For example:

1 Madame Curie: A Biography (New York:Oxford University Press, 1995), 12.

Reference Books

n“Name of Article,” Name of Encyclopedia, Yearof Publication ed.

For example:

3 “Philippines,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007 ed.

Government Documents

nName of Country, Name of Government Office,Title of the Article (Place of Publication: Publisher,Year of Publication), Page Number/s.

For example:

6 Philippines, Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment, Annual Report 2006 (Philippines:DSWD, 2006), 10-15.

References Authored by Companies/

Organizations

nName of Organization, Title of the Article (Placeof Publication: Publisher, Year of Publication),Page Number/s.

For example:

7 Philippine Development Organization,Development Report 2006 (Philippines: PDO,2006), 15-20.

Journals

nName of author, “Title of the Article,” Title of theJournal, Magazine or Newspaper Volume Number,Issue Number (Date): Page/s.



60


For example:

8Wilbur M. Mason, “Rice Farming in thePhilippines,” The Agriculture Review vol. 6, issueno. 2 (June 2007): 25.

Online sources

nName of author, “Title of the Article,” Cite Link(last accessed: date)

For example:

9 Hanna G. Folger, “What is Color Therapy?”h t t p : / / w w w . c o l o r t h e r a p y . c o m /hannah_g_folger.htm (last accessed: June 20,2007)

If sources will be used repeatedly, the shortenedform for citations may be used, as follows:

nLast name of author, “First Words of ArticleTitle,” Page Number.

For example:

10 Kingsley and Brown, “Madame Curie,” 62.

Illustrations

Clear original drawings/pictures may also besubmitted along with the manuscript. Drawings/pictures should be properly identified at the backor on a separate sheet, properly numbered, withthe name of artist/s, a short caption, as well asthe title of the manuscript where the drawing/picture wi l l be used. Clear and sharpphotographic prints should be submitted in sizesthat complement the width of the journal (8 ýinches).

Drawings and photographs may also bescanned, saved in jpeg format, and included asa separate file attachment in the CD-RW ordiskette containing the manuscript/s to besubmitted.

The SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENTJOURNAL is the official journal of the Departmentof Social Welfare and Development. It is publishedfour times a year (quarterly).

All communications, including submission ofarticles, as well as those concerning editorialmatters, subscriptions and change of addressshould be forwarded to:

The Editor-in-ChiefSocial Welfare and Development JournalOffice of the Undersecretary for Policy and Programs,3rd Floor, DSWD Central Office, IBP Road,Batasan Pambansa Complex,Constitution Hills, QC 1117email: [email protected] .

Authors will be notified by mail or email if theirmanuscripts have been accepted.


Tables

Tables should have a brief informative title anda Roman number separately from the figures.Each table should be encoded on a separate sheetof paper. Likewise, tables with content that can befully incorporated in the text should be removedto minimize the number of tables.

Brief Reviews

In addition to original research, the SWD Journalwill also publish brief reviews that summarize andanalyze SWD-related articles or major papers.

Reprints

Each principal author will be furnished with two(2) copies of the Journal free of charge. Additionalreprints will be furnished at cost when ordered inadvance of publication with senior author’spermission.


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