driving automotive security forward

3
Another result that the test team identified is that the systems were highly sensitive to the number of fingers compared. For example, NEC falsely rejects 1 in 100 of the most difficult single fingers, but fewer than one in ten thousand of the easiest ten finger sets. At the other end of the scale, Antheus rejects 40% of the hardest single fingerprints and 1% of the easiest multi- finger sets. In fact the results suggest that for each doubling of the number of fingers produces a fixed factor reduction in false rejection. According to the report, for NEC the error rates are 1%, 0.2%, 0.05% and 0.01% for one, two, four and eight fingers respectively. Therefore, it seems that the errors decrease by a factor of five as the number of fingers is doubled. Other findings As well as the number of fingers and the quality of the images, the analysis report revealed a number of other interesting results. First, it was found that the accuracy of ‘controlled data’ was much higher than the accuracy achieved when using ‘operational data’. Meanwhile, some of the systems were found to be highly sensitive to the source or types of fingerprints – although not all. Another interesting result was that accuracy dropped as subject age at the time of capture increased. This was especially true for subjects over the age of 50. Meanwhile, the choice of finger was not found to have a meaningful effect on accuracy, except for segmented slap ‘little’ fingers, which performed poorly. Other factors that had little effect on accuracy included gender or whether or not the records were taken from criminal or civil databases. Fusion potential? One experiment the test team performed was to consider the results from a fused system. The report commented: “If the scores or ranks of two matchers are not strongly correlated, there might be a potential for a fused system that could have results better than either of the two separately.” When considering the correlation between the top three systems it was seen that the Cogent and Sagem systems showed a fairly high level of correlation, while the NEC system showed a surprisingly low correlation to the other two systems. In order to test whether a fused system could improve the accuracy, a simple fusion technique was used with the NEC and Cogent results. The results, while, only indicative, did show an impressive improvement, particularly when the false match rate was below 10 -3 . Future While FpVTE 2003 has undoubtedly answered many questions about the state of the art in fingerprint matching, the researchers say that there is an immense amount of data that has yet to be analysed. This includes projection of the results to the very large database sizes required by operational systems. It also believes that a variety of future work should be undertaken. Factors such as throughput (or the speed of the system) were not considered in FpVTE 2003, but are clearly an important consideration. Meanwhile, further investigation into the fusion of fingerprint systems is recommended, especially using more sophisticated fusion techniques to try and improve accuracy. Several of the FpVTE participants also expressed an interest in a follow on ‘minutiae exchange’ test, in which each system would create minutiae templates (using M1 and/or FBI standards) and search using the templates created by all the systems. Finally, further testing of the most accurate systems was also endorsed. NIST is currently conducting further testing on a variety of systems using participant- provided software development kits (SDKs) for additional analysis beyond the scope of FpVTE. This includes testing larger datasets for better discrimination among the systems and also to measure the accuracy at lower false match rate settings. SURVEY Biometric Technology Today • September 2004 9 Driving automotive security forward The development of vehicle security has reached a watershed. The quality of immobiliser technology fitted to new vehicles is now so good that thieves have had to change their approach. Recent statistics show that most stolen vehicles under six years old have been snatched using the original vehicle keys, rather than being started by by-passing the anti-theft systems. This is reflected in more instances of car-jacking, robbery and violence against car owners, particularly those driving prestige models. This article, provided by independent consultant group SBD, analyses how biometric technology could provide a new level of security for vehicle owners. Car thieves have responded to the effectiveness of immobiliser technology by becoming more aggressive in their methods. This survey analyses how biometrics could deliver a new and effective generation of vehicle protection systems.

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Another result that the test teamidentified is that the systems were highlysensitive to the number of fingerscompared. For example, NEC falselyrejects 1 in 100 of the most difficultsingle fingers, but fewer than one in tenthousand of the easiest ten finger sets. At the other end of the scale, Antheusrejects 40% of the hardest singlefingerprints and 1% of the easiest multi-finger sets.

In fact the results suggest that for eachdoubling of the number of fingers producesa fixed factor reduction in false rejection.According to the report, for NEC the errorrates are 1%, 0.2%, 0.05% and 0.01% forone, two, four and eight fingers respectively.Therefore, it seems that the errors decreaseby a factor of five as the number of fingers isdoubled.

Other findingsAs well as the number of fingers and thequality of the images, the analysis reportrevealed a number of other interestingresults. First, it was found that the accuracyof ‘controlled data’ was much higher thanthe accuracy achieved when using‘operational data’. Meanwhile, some of thesystems were found to be highly sensitive tothe source or types of fingerprints –although not all.

Another interesting result was thataccuracy dropped as subject age at the time

of capture increased. This was especiallytrue for subjects over the age of 50.

Meanwhile, the choice of finger was notfound to have a meaningful effect onaccuracy, except for segmented slap ‘little’fingers, which performed poorly. Otherfactors that had little effect on accuracyincluded gender or whether or not therecords were taken from criminal or civildatabases.

Fusion potential?One experiment the test team performedwas to consider the results from a fusedsystem. The report commented: “If thescores or ranks of two matchers are notstrongly correlated, there might be apotential for a fused system that could haveresults better than either of the twoseparately.”

When considering the correlationbetween the top three systems it was seenthat the Cogent and Sagem systemsshowed a fairly high level of correlation,while the NEC system showed asurprisingly low correlation to the othertwo systems.

In order to test whether a fused systemcould improve the accuracy, a simple fusiontechnique was used with the NEC andCogent results. The results, while, onlyindicative, did show an impressiveimprovement, particularly when the falsematch rate was below 10-3.

Future While FpVTE 2003 has undoubtedlyanswered many questions about the state ofthe art in fingerprint matching, the researcherssay that there is an immense amount of datathat has yet to be analysed. This includesprojection of the results to the very largedatabase sizes required by operational systems.

It also believes that a variety of futurework should be undertaken. Factors such asthroughput (or the speed of the system)were not considered in FpVTE 2003, butare clearly an important consideration.

Meanwhile, further investigation into thefusion of fingerprint systems isrecommended, especially using moresophisticated fusion techniques to try andimprove accuracy.

Several of the FpVTE participants alsoexpressed an interest in a follow on ‘minutiaeexchange’ test, in which each system wouldcreate minutiae templates (using M1 and/orFBI standards) and search using thetemplates created by all the systems.

Finally, further testing of the mostaccurate systems was also endorsed. NISTis currently conducting further testing ona variety of systems using participant-provided software development kits(SDKs) for additional analysis beyond thescope of FpVTE. This includes testinglarger datasets for better discriminationamong the systems and also to measurethe accuracy at lower false match ratesettings.

SURVEY

Biometric Technology Today • September 20049

Driving automotivesecurity forward

The development of vehicle security hasreached a watershed. The quality ofimmobiliser technology fitted to newvehicles is now so good that thieves have

had to change their approach. Recentstatistics show that most stolen vehiclesunder six years old have been snatchedusing the original vehicle keys, rather than

being started by by-passing the anti-theftsystems. This is reflected in more instancesof car-jacking, robbery and violence againstcar owners, particularly those drivingprestige models.

This article, provided by independentconsultant group SBD, analyses howbiometric technology could provide a newlevel of security for vehicle owners.

Car thieves have responded to the effectiveness of immobiliser technology bybecoming more aggressive in their methods. This survey analyses how biometricscould deliver a new and effective generation of vehicle protection systems.

Emergence of theimmobiliserDuring the early 1990s, vehicle theft inEurope began to rise sharply. At the time,vehicle manufacturers paid little attentionto car security devices. Alarms orimmobilisers were rare on new vehicles, andhot-wiring (bypassing the ignition key lock)was a common and relatively simpletechnique used by criminals to steal cars. Asthe problem became more severe, Germaninsurers introduced clauses in their policiesthat severely penalised customers if theircars were not fitted with approvedimmobilisers. If an owner made a theftclaim for a car without the approvedprotection, 10% of the vehicle’s valuewould not be compensated.

The immobiliser works by preventing thevehicle engine from starting or runningunless the correct transponder code isdetected when the ignition is activated. Theimmobiliser itself is protected and thetransponder is integrated into the vehicleignition key. Such immobiliser systemsprevent thieves from re-wiring or modifyingwiring connections in order to start up anddrive off.

Germany is one of the largest markets inEurope for new vehicles, so manufacturerswere effectively forced to develop systemsthat conformed to these requirements.Insurance bodies in other countries quicklyfollowed suit and in 1995 official steps weretaken with a new European directive95/56/EC that made immobilisersmandatory for all passenger cars with fewerthan nine seats (M1 class cars). Thedirective proved to be a successful stepforward, and data for theft of new vehiclesin Europe over the following years showed asignificant reduction.

In Finland, no car equipped with animmobiliser has been reported stolen to

date, according to Finnish newspaperHelsingin Sanomat. And data from Dutchinsurers shows that in Holland, close to80% of thefts of cars under six years oldinvolved the theft of the car keys. TheBritish Crime Survey 2001 puts this figureat 53% in the UK.

The authorisation of the electronicimmobiliser security is limited to verificationthat the correct key is being used. Thieves aretherefore employing methods to obtainvehicle keys by deception, fraud, burglary, orby direct force.

The challenge facing the vehicle securityindustry is how to prevent this theftmethod from being effective. Someadditional user verification method isrequired to ensure that it is the genuinevehicle owner who is using the vehicle key.

Biometric solution?One possible solution to this verificationproblem is the use of biometrictechnologies. SBD’s latest analysis looks atif and when vehicle manufacturers maylook to integrating biometrics with vehiclesecurity systems, and what the mostpractical and effective options may be.

Four technologies have been identified asmost feasible for automotive application:

• Fingerprint recognition – this is ready nowfor integration into an automotiveenvironment and would offer an adequatelevel of security;

• Iris and face recognition – these are bothcurrently too complex and expensive to beconsidered viable for automotiveapplications within the next five years;

• Voice recognition – this could be integratedinto an automotive environment withoutdifficulty, but voice recognition does notcurrently offer a high enough level ofsecurity to be viable.

The automotive environment presentsvery harsh operating conditions, both froman environmental point of view(temperature, vibration, etc.) and from anease of use perspective. Motorists will notaccept long and complicated verificationprocedures every time they want to unlockor start their vehicles and would not put upwith false rejection by a security system,because they would effectively be leftstranded without transport.

Biometric systems are sensitive; they aresusceptible to damage from moisture orrough treatment and are typically onlydesigned to work within a certaintemperature range. It is unlikely a biometricsystem could be used on a vehicle externally,as dirt, damage and variable lightingconditions would be likely to affectperformance. Integrating biometrictechnology inside the vehicle is a muchmore practical proposition.

A third option would be to build inbiometric protection, most likelyfingerprint recognition, into a portablecontrol device that can be carried aroundby the user. This could take the form of aradio frequency keyfob or a separatemodule.

Two possible applications are envisaged:immobiliser unset command verificationand vehicle unlock command verification

Immobiliser unset command verificationCurrently immobilisers are set and unsetusing a transponder that is interrogated byradio frequency communication. Thetransponder is contained within theignition key, or a smart device (keylessremote control). Possession of a validtransponder is sufficient to allow theimmobiliser to be unset and the vehicleengine to be started.By adding a second layer of biometricauthorisation/verification, the vehicle coulddetermine that, not only is a validtransponder being used, but also that avalid user is present.

This verification can take place inside thevehicle cabin, avoiding manyenvironmental issues, but should be asmuch like the normal process of starting thevehicle as possible to avoid inconvenienceor confusion for the motorist.

Vehicle unlock command verificationAt present most new vehicles are locked andunlocked using radio frequency remotecontrols (keyfobs). The external mechanicalkey cylinder is today more often regarded as

SURVEY

Biometric Technology Today • September 200410

MANUFACTURER SYSTEM

Type Detail

Jaguar Voice Recognition JagVoice system recognising basiccommands for comfort features

Mercedes Voice Recognition Linguatronic system recognising basiccommands for comfort features

Audi Fingerprint Recognition Fingerprint activated comfort features on A8.

Table 1. Biometric systems already in use by vehicle manufacturers

Source: SBD Ltd 2004

a means of unlocking a vehicle in anemergency, such as when there is a powerfailure in the remote control or vehicleitself. Possession of a valid remote control isall that is needed to gain access.

By inhibiting the operation of the remotecontrol until the user has been biometricallyidentified would add a simple extra layer ofsecurity to the unlocking process.

This approach requires little change tovehicle systems, as the remote control canuse on-board verification and the outputcan be aligned with current communicationprotocols (the vehicle receives the samerolling code commands based on thetransponder identity). Developers would,however, need to address the potentialrestrictions of size of the portable unit andlimited battery life.

Luxury itemBasic biometric systems are beginning toappear on luxury cars, such as Jaguars,Mercedes and Audis (see Table 1).Currently applications are confined toactivation and control of comfort features,such as seat settings, audio and airconditioning preferences. Biometrictechnology is not being used for securityapplications, with the exception of somespecialist systems, such as Securicor’s “cashin transit” vehicles where the immobiliser iscontrolled by a fingerprint recognitionsystem. Other vehicle manufacturers areinterested in the technology but are still atthe investigative stage.

There are however, some fundamentalissues that could inhibit theimplementation of biometric technology inpassenger cars, regardless of their technicaladvantages and disadvantages:

• Registration of users – a secure processwould need to be implemented for enrollingnew or temporary users, enabling a singlevehicle to be driven a number of authorisedpeople, such as the owner’s family, servicetechnicians and vehicle delivery teams.Certain vehicle applications would also notbe suitable, such as rental and pool cars, andalso other shared use situations where a largeor unknown number of drivers requireaccess;

• Customer acceptance – ultimately thesuccessful implementation of biometrictechnology will depend on the response ofthe public. At present, biometrics is not acommon or well-understood technology andis unlikely to be well received in an

automotive application, especially as manypeople may be unaware of the problems thetechnology is being introduced to combat.This is likely to change over the next five toeight years as the public is exposed toincreasing non-automotive applications forsuch technology, such as biometricpassports.

The main weakness of current biometrictechnology is the rejection rate (reliabilityand security). Basically false rejectioncompromises vehicle reliability while falseacceptance compromises vehicle security.Although it is always necessary to trade offthe two factors, a low Equal Error Ratewill be necessary to secure automotivebusiness.

Market potentialAlthough the automotive industry throws upsome unique challenges, the potentialmarket is vast. Alternative solutions to thekey theft problems include expensive vehiclelocation systems, secondary after-theft

immobilisers (these raise issues concerningliability of activation) and the potentiallycontroversial mandatory electronic taggingof vehicles as a deterrent.

SBD believes that over the next five yearsthere will be sufficient advances infingerprint recognition to make it apotentially viable solution to engineimmobilisation security (see Figure 1). Thissystem also has the potential to be appliedto door locking security, if the technologycan be reliably integrated into a remotecontrol.

Voice recognition also has potential forautomotive applications, due to the easewith which it can be integrated into anautomotive environment. However, furtherdevelopment will be required to allaysecurity fears before it can be considered aworkable solution.

This survey was provided by SBD. Itslatest technical analysis can be obtainedby contacting the company on Tel: +441908 305 101 or by email:[email protected]

SURVEY

Biometric Technology Today • September 200411

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Voice Finger Iris Face

Security application

Automotive application

Ready for automotive

First general application

Prototype

Concept

1

2

3

4

5

6

Milestones:1 Voice operation systems launched by Jaguar and Mercedes.2 Fingerprint access control systems become widespread.3 Audi A8 is launched with fingerprint reader to control comfort features.4 Low cost 12v computer access application products such as mouse and keyboard based fingerprint readers.5 Iris scanning introduced at Schipol airport to provide fast track passport control for registered travellers.6 Crowd recognition systems employed at Superbowl XXXV in Florida.

Figure 1. Adoption Curves for Biometric Technologies in the Automotive Industry