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U.S. Marines at the Punchbowlby Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR (Ret)

he rumble of Ame-rican field artillerythrough the morningmists in the valley ofthe Soyang River

gave a sense of urgency to thechange-of-command ceremonyinside the headquarters tent of the1st Marine Division. Four days ofhard fighting in the withdrawalfrom the Hwachon Reservoir hadbrought the division safely to theriver on 25 April 1951. The trekaway from the Chinese 39th and40th Armies had not yet, however,brought the division to the NoName Line, the final defensiveposition 15 miles south of the riverdesignated by Lieutenant GeneralJames A. Van Fleet, commandingthe U.S. Eighth Army. In a simplerite that included only the readingof the change-of-command ordersand the passing of the division col-ors, Major General Gerald C.

Thomas relieved Major GeneralOliver P. "0. P." Smith and tookcommand of a division locked in abattle to stop the Chinese FifthOffensive.

The ceremony dramatized theuncertainty of the Marines in thesecond year of the Korean War.Understandably, General Smith did

ON THE CovER: Two Marine machinegunners "keep the gun hot" in theirpursuit offleeing Communist troops.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A8866AT LEFT: Marines quickly demolishenemy bunkers with grenades andplanted charges before moving north,Department of Defense Photo (USMC)A8504

not want to turn over command inthe middle of a battle. On the otherhand, General Van Fleet wantedThomas to take command of thedivision as soon as possible, some-thing Thomas had not planned todo since his formal orders from theCommandant, General Clifton B.Cates, designated 1 May 1951 asturn-over day. Thomas hadplanned to spend the interveningweek on a familiarization tour ofKorea and the major elements ofthe Eighth Army. He had thoughthis call on Van Fleet the day beforehad been simply a courtesy visit,but instead he found himselfcaught in a delicate matter of com-mand relations.

General Thomas arrived inKorea to face an entirely new war.The October 1950 dream of unify-ing Korea under the sponsorshipof the United Nations (U.N.) hadswirled away with the Chinesewinter intervention. The war stillhung in the balance as the UnitedNations Command attempted todrive the Communist inizaders outof the Republic of Korea (ROK) forthe second time in less than a year.The U.S. Eighth Army and itsKorean counterpart, the HangukGun (South Korean Armed Forces)had rallied in January and February1951, under the forceful leadershipof Lieutenant General Matthew B.Ridgway, USA. United Nations

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, right, meets with MajGen Oliver P. Smith prior to thespartan change-of-command ceremony witnessed by a handful of participantsdrawn from the 1st Marine Division's staff

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

1

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KOREA

Korea

'HINA

Fusen Reservoir

Cbosin Reservoir

Sea ofJapan

Asan Bay

Yellow Sea

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Command had then driven backthe Chinese Communist Forces(CCF) and the North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA). The allieshad advanced well north of the38th Parallel in central and easternKorea. Goaded by Mao Zedong,General Peng Dehuai ordered hisjoint expeditionary force of693,000 Chinese and North Koreansoldiers to mount one more grand

offensive. Eleven Chinese armiesand two North Korean corps (40divisions) would smash south justwest of Hwachon Reservoir in thesectors held by the U.S. I and IXCorps. At a minimum the Com-munist forces, about half of Peng'stotal army, would drive UnitedNations forces below the 38thParallel. The maximum objectivewould be to threaten the Han River

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valley and the corridors to Seoulwhile at the same time recapturingthe territory south of the SoyangRiver, which opened an alternativecorridor south to Hongchon.

When General Thomas calledon General Van Fleet on 24 April,the Eighth Army commander, acombative 59-year-old Floridianwith a World War II record of suc-cessful command from regiment tocorps in Europe, felt confident thathis forces had blunted the four-day-old Communist offensive.However, he had an organizationalproblem, which was that the 1stMarine Division should be shiftedback to X Corps and redeployed tothe No Name Line under the com-mand of Lieutenant GeneralEdward M. Almond, USA, the divi-sion's corps commander through-Out 1950. The relationship be-tween 0. P. Smith and Almond,however, had become so ven-omous that Ridgway assigned theMarine division to IX Corps inJanuary 1951 and promised Smiththat he would not have to copewith Almond, whose style and sub-stance of command angered Smithand his staff. Van Fleet had hon-ored Ridgway's commitment, butthe operational situation dictatedthat the Almond-Smith feud couldnot take precedence.

Van Fleet explained the plan toshift the 1st Marine Division backto X Corps to Thomas withoutgoing into the Almond-Smith prob-lem. Van Fleet did not give Thomasa direct order to proceed immedi-ately to the 1st Marine Divisionheadquarters near Churichon.Thomas believed, however, thatVan Fleet had sound reasons towant a change of command now,so he caught a light plane fur-nished by the 1st Marine AircraftWing and flew to the primitiveairstrip that served the division.Escorted by the new assistant divi-sion commander, Brigadier

'41)4%j f\

General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller,Thomas went directly to Smith'svan and told him of Van Fleet'srequest and future plans. Smithrefused to relinquish command.Without mounting an argument,Thomas left the van and went tothe operations center to conferwith Colonel Edward W. Snedeker,

the chief of staff, and ColonelAlpha L. Bowser, the G-3, both ofwhom sympathized with Thomasbut ,thought Smith should remainin command. Thomas thought thedivision was well positioned torefuse the open left flank of XCorps, but he also felt the tensionin the command post.

Thomas decided that the issueof command could not be post-poned—and now at least Smithknew he faced the prospect ofagain serving under Almond.Thomas returned to Smith's vanwithin the hour and stated simply:"0. P., the table of organizationcalls for only one major general in

Major General Gerald C.Thomaserald Carthrae Thomas spent a lifetime dealingwith challenging command relationships andoperational problems inside and outside the

Marine Corps. Born on 29 October 1894 on a farm nearSlater, a western Missouri railroad town, Thomas grewup as a working boy in a working family. He was also agood student and versatile high school athlete. Living inBloomington, Illinois, he attended Illinois WesleyanUniversity (1915-1917) before enlisting in the MarineCorps in May 1917 to fight the Germans. Thomas, age22, mustered in at five feet, nine inches and 160 pounds,strong of wind and limb from athletics and labor. Darkhair and heavy eyebrows set off his piercing blue eyesand strong jaw. He would need every bit of his emo-tional balance and physical stamina—lifelong traits—forthe Marine Corps placed him in the Germans' sights formost of 1918. As a sergeant and lieutenant in the 1stBattalion, 6th Marines, Thomas learned about war atBelleau Wood, Soissons, and the Meuse-Argonne. Whenthe Silver Star and Purple Heart medals were authorizedin 1932, Captain Thomas, professional officer of Marines,pinned on one award for gallantry and another for beinggassed.

In the interwar years, Thomas had already foughtagainst Haitian guerrillas, served a second tour in Haitias a staff officer, and commanded a Marine detachmenton a Navy gunboat in the Caribbean and CentralAmerica. He also lost one wife to disease, married again(Lottie Capers Johnson of Charleston, South Carolina)and started a family of two sons and two daughters. TheMarine Corps recognized his potential value in wartimeby sending him to five different Army schools (includingthe prestigious U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth) and assigning him twice asan instructor in Marine Corps schools.

Between 1940 and 1950, Thomas proved that theMarine Corps had not wasted a minute or a dollar on hisprofessional education. In a decade that saw himadvance in rank from major to major general, Thomasprepared the Fleet Marine Force for war as an instructorat Quantico, military observer abroad, and a staff officerin the 1st Marine Division as the division conducted itslast pre-Pearl Harbor amphibious exercises. When the

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132593

division deployed to the South Pacific, LieutenantColonel Thomas went to war as Major GeneralAlexander A. Vandegrift's operations officer (G-3), anassignment that made him one of the architects of victo-ry on Guadalcanal. A trusted intimate of Vandegrift's,

Thomas served as the general's chief of staff during thefinal months of the Guadalcanal campaign and thenplayed the same role in the I Marine Amphibious corps'landing on Bougainville. He returned to Washingtonwith Vandegrift when the general became Commandantin 1944. As a brigadier general, his second "spot" pro-motion in a row, Thomas fought the battles of demobi-lization and postwar defense reorganization, 1944-1947,as the Director of Plans and Policies on theHeadquarters staff and played a critical role in winninglegislative protection for the Fleet Marine Force in theNational Security Act, 1947. He then spent two years ascommanding general, Fleet Marine Force, WesternPacific, a brigade-sized force that garrisoned theShantung peninsula and the city of Tsingtao until theChinese Communist military victories in North China in1948 made the American enclave irrelevant. Thomassuccessfully withdrew his force without incident, inFebruary 1949 and returned to educational and devel-opmental billets at Marine Corps Base, Quantico.

Thomas' rich and exciting career had not, however,been without professional risks and cost. His aggressivepersonality, the force with which he defended his con-victions, and his unwillingness to tolerate leadershiplapses that endangered Marines had made him anathe-ma to some of his peers, two of whom stopped his firstpromotion to major general. Others thought him toodemanding a colleague. In 1951 only two opinionscounted, those of Commandant Clifton B. Cates andLieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, andCates' likely successor as Commandant. Although nei-ther Cates nor Shepherd were part of Vandegrift's"Guadalcanal gang," they knew Thomas well and rec-

ognized his special qualifications to go to Korea. Inaddition to his recent service as Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, Thomas had done apre-war China tour in the Peiping legation guard. Anddespite his dogged defense of the Marine Corps in theBattle of the Potomac, 1945-1947, he got along well withthe U.S. Army. As head of research and development,Thomas also understood the 1st Division's importanceas test bed for future techniques like vertical envelop-ment.

After his successful command of the 1st MarineDivision in Korea, April 1951-February 1952, Thomasreturned to Headquarters Marine Corps as a lieutenantgeneral and Assistant Commandant/Chief of Staff forGeneral Shepherd. For the next two years, Thomasfocused on reorganizing the Headquarters staff on func-tional general staff lines, on improving Marine Corpsrelations and representation within the Department ofthe Navy, and planning the postwar Fleet Marine Forceof three divisions and three aircraft wings, a force morethan twice as large as the Fleet Marine Force in June1950.

For his "twilight cruise" Thomas becameCommandant, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico (1954-1955), his favorite post and role as officer-instructor.Upon retirement he remained in government service asthe first executive director, Net Evaluation Committee,National Security Council staff from 1956 to 1958. Hethen entered private business in real estate and insur-ance in the Washington, D.C. area. He regularly attend-ed 1st Marine Division Association functions and eventsrelated to Marine Corps history; his four sons and sons-in-laws all served as Marines, two retiring as colonels.General Thomas died on 7 April 1984 at the age of 89.

a division. Either you turn over tome, or I'm going to leave." Smithdid not respond, and Thomasagain left the van. After severalminutes of more tension, Smithemerged from his van and toldThomas that the change-of-com-mand ceremony would be held at0800 the next morning. The 1stMarine Division had a new com-manding general as it entered anew era in its service in Korea.

Although the last veterans of thecampaigns of 1950 did not leaveKorea until the autumn of 1951,the 1st Marine Division had starteda process of transformation in April

1951 that did not depend solely onCommunist bullets. HeadquartersMarine Corps now sent outreplacement drafts not just to fillholes in the ranks from casualties,but also to allow the surviving vet-erans of longest service to return tonew assignments in the UnitedStates or for release from activeduty. The 9th Replacement Draftreached Korea in early June, bring-ing 2,608 Marine officers andenlisted men to the division and 55officers and 334 men to the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. New navalpersonnel for both Marine organi-zations totaled six officers and 66sailors, mostly medical personnel.The incoming Marines had a

departing counterpart, the 3d

4

Rotation Draft, composed of 62Marine officers, 1,196 enlistedmen, and 73 sailors; the draftincluded 103 convalescing wound-ed. The 10th Replacement Draftarrived late in June, adding 74more officers and 1,946 men to thedivision and 12 officers and 335men to the aircraft wing. Onenaval officer and 107 sailors joinedthe division and wing.

Nevertheless, Thomas thoughtthat the manpower planners hadcut their estimates too close andrequested that subsequent draftsbe increased by a 1,000 officersand men. Despite the personneldemands of forming the new 3dMarine Brigade at CampPendleton, Fleet Marine Force,

I

Pacific, honored Thomas' request.The 11th Replacement Draft (14July 1951) brought 3,436 Marinesand 230 naval personnel to thedivision and 344 Marines to the air-craft wing, accompanied by 22sailors. Nevertheless, the divisionremained short of majors, compa-ny grade artillery officers, and offi-cers and enlisted men in almostevery technical specialization,especially communications andlogistics.

General Thomas had no com-plaint about the quality of theMarines he had inherited from 0.P. Smith or those sent to him byLieutenant General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Gen-eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.The senior officers and companycommanders were proven WorldWar II veterans, and the lieutenantswere an elite of Naval Academygraduates, NROTC graduates, andofficer candidate school productsthat more than matched the com-

pany grade officers of World WarII. The enlisted Marines were asolid mix of career noncommis-sioned officers and eager enlistees.Thomas recognized that the divi-sion he now commanded was "insplendid shape" and prepared tofight and win in terrain and weath-er "never designed for polite war-fare." He wrote retired MajorGeneral Merritt A. Edson that the1st Marine Division was "the bestdamn division that ever wore anAmerican uniform."

Thomas went ahead with plans,coordinated with Shepherd, toform his own team as the divisionstaff and to appoint new regimen-tal commanders. Thomas arrangedfor Brigadier General William J.Whaling, an old friend who hadbeen Thomas' alter ego onGuadalcanal, to become the assis-tant division commander on 20May. Whaling became his eyes andears on tactical issues with hissuperb knowledge of men,

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weapons, and fieldcraft. ColonelSnedeker remained chief of staffuntil he gave way on 23 May toColonel Francis M. McAlister,whose command of the 1stMarines was cut short by woundson the 18th. Since he had come toKorea in 1950 as the division G-4,McAlister rotated home, to bereplaced temporarily by ColonelRichard G. Weede, who had takenColonel Bowser's place as G-3 on8 May. Shepherd and Thomas hadsomeone else in mind for the divi-sion chief of staffs post, ColonelVictor H. Krulak, the G-3 of FleetMarine Force, Pacific, and a trustedcolleague of both generals throughWorld War II and the postwaryears. Krulak became divisionchief of staff on 29 June with aspecial charge to begin experi-ments with the Marine Corps' oneoperational helicopter squadron.

The rest of the division staffbrought enough character andexpertise to their jobs to pleaseThomas. The G-1, Colonel WesleyM. Platt, had spent World War II asa Japanese prisoner of war; hisleadership among the prisonershad won him the admiration of hispeers and great influence on thestaff. Thomas' two G-2s, LieutenantColonels Joseph P. Sayers andJames H. Tinsley, did a workman-like job. Like Weede, ColonelBruce T. Hemphill, and LieutenantColonel Gordon D. Gayle servedas Thomas' G-3s under the closeand critical scrutiny of ColonelsKrulak and Weede, who alsoserved as division chief of staff.Colonels Frank P. Hager and CustisBurton, Jr., performed the thank-less task of G-4 until they rotatedto the command of the 5th and11th Marines, respectively, al-though Burton later returned aschief of staff in February 1952 toreplace Weede.

The commanders of the infantryregiments were all tested veterans

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A156022

The command team of the 1st Marine Division stands outside a briefing tent atthe division headquarters. Pictured from left are BGen WilliamJ. Whaling, assis-tant division commander, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, division commander, andC'ol Victor H. Krulak, division chief of staff

of the Fleet Marine Force, and theirstyles varied more than their com-petence. After Francis McAlister fellin a precision Chinese mortar bar-rage on his command group,Thomas assigned his regiment tothe legendary Colonel Wilburt S."Big Foot" Brown, an artillery offi-cer sent Out to command the 11thMarines. The irrepressible "BigFoot" Brown (whose homeric 14Fsized-feet required special supplyarrangements, including the air-drop of field brogans into thewilds of Nicaragua) took commandonly to issue an order to withdraw.As the 1st Marines trooped by hisjeep on the way south to the NoName Line, the files of men brokeinto chicken-like cackles, showingthat their "red leg" colonel looked"yellow" to them. Colonel Brownsoon showed that their judgmentwas a short round by a mile. Whenthe veteran of World War I,

Nicaragua, and World War II sur-

rendered command to anotherWorld War I veteran, ColonelThomas A. Wornham, Brown hadwon the affection of the 1stMarines, "Chesty Puller's Own," avery tough bunch of Marines toimpress.

The other two infantry regi-ments went to colonels of highability. Colonel Richard W. Hay-ward brought intelligence and per-sonal elegance (too much some ofhis troops thought) to the 5thMarines, succeeded by Weede on 7August whose energy and forceexceeded Hayward's. Almondliked them both, a dubious recom-mendation. Weede then turnedover command to Frank Hager on19 November. The 7th Marines bidfarewell to Colonel Homer L.Litzenberg, Jr., on 15 April andwelcomed Colonel Herman Nick-erson, Jr., no stranger to theKorean War since he had been inthe combat zone since the Inchon

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landing as the senior Marine liai-son officer from Fleet MarineForce, Pacific to Far EastCommand and Eighth Army. Noless professional than the otherregimental commanders, Nick-erson brought a driving, no-non-sense command style to the 7thMarines that made the regiment, inThomas' opinion, the best in thedivision. Nickerson appreciatedthe contributions of his two execu-tive officers, the incomparableLieutenant Colonel Raymond G.Davis, Jr., and Lieutenant ColonelJohn J. Wermuth. Promoted tocolonel, Wermuth assumed regi-mental command on 20 Septemberwhen Nickerson's extended over-seas tour ended.

The high level of competence atthe regimental level did not dropoff in the division's separate battal-ions. With an officer corps createdby service in six divisions in thePacific War, the Marine Corps

In the soft spring of his senior year (June 1950) atHilisboro High School, Nashville, Tennessee,Clarence Jackson Davis, called "Jack" by his family

and friends, discovered several reasons to join theMarine Corps Reserve. Going to war was not one ofthem. Jack Davis planned instead to go to VanderbiltUniversity, where his older brother Virice was already asophomore and a keen midshipman in the Naval ROTCunit. Jack admired Vince, but he did not fancy himselfa naval aviator like his older brother. On the otherhand, the local Marine Corps Reserve infantry companyhad some openings, and he and some high school foot-ball and baseball teammates liked the idea—advancedby some sweet-talking Marine sergeants—of keepingtheir baseball team together under the sponsorship ofthe Marine Corps. Marine training seemed little morethan another athletic challenge; the recruiters mentionedthat weekly drill often included a basketball game. Thenew recruits had no active duty requirement and thetwo weeks summer training sounded like a Boy Scoutcamp with guns. Besides, the recruiters insisted, partici-pating in reserve training made a young man draft-prooffrom the U.S. Army.

Jack also saw his enlistment as a potential way tohelp pay for his college education and, if all went well,become a Marine officer. More farsighted than many ofhis friends and counseled continuously by Vince, Jackhad already talked with the Marine major on theVanderbilt NROTC staff, who advised him that enlistedservice would strengthen his chances for selection forthe next summer's Platoon Leaders Class. Serving as anenlisted officer-candidate in the Marine Corps Reserveseemed a less-demanding way of helping pay for hiseducation than attempting to win a football grant-in-aidplaying for the hapless Commodores. The Davis broth-ers calculated that their military commitments wouldallow them to attend school without facing a demandingworking schedule, a financial relief they could stretch byliving at home to study and avoiding the temptations ofcampus social life.

Jack enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve at the ageof 17 in March 1950. If not quite a youthful lark, hisdecision did not seem very momentous, but a combina-tion of good planning, reasonable sense, and anticipat-ed adventure. He would try the life of a Marine, and hewould be paid to camp Out and play sports for theMarine Corps. His life after high school, however, "didnot work out as planned." One night in June 1950, aftergraduation, Jack watched a newsreel at a local movietheater and learned about some distant war in Korea.His first reaction: "I was thrilled I was not there."

Lieutenant General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps and a fellow Tennessean, made surethat Jack Davis learned the true meaning of being a vol-

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unteer Marine from the Volunteer State. After the Fourthof July the ground units of the Marine Corps Reservereceived a warning order that they would soon be mobi-lized, and on 20 July the Commandant made it official:Marine reservists in ground units would be called toactive duty "for the duration." Certainly most (if not all)of them would go to Korea as part of the 1st MarineDivision. After the confusion of in-processing, medicalexaminations, and additional issues of 782 gear, theNashville Marines of Company C, 14th Battalion, MarineCorps Reserve, marched off to war from their reservecenter at Shelby Park down Broad Street until theyreached the 11th Street railroad siding off old UnionDepot. Curious spectators watched the young menmarch off, their parade dominated by the blaring of highschool bands at the front and rear of the column. WithM-ls and dressed in green utilities the Marines did notlook like their predecessors of the 11th TennesseeVolunteer Infantry, Confederate States of America, butthe spirit of those young Nashvillians, equally perplexedand determined in 1861, stiffened the backs of their1950 successors.

Whatever his expectations, Private Clarence JacksonDavis, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, did not go off to waruntrained—as did his Confederate ancestors and goodlypart of the U.S. Eighth Army in 1950. At CampPendleton, his "station of initial assignment," Jack'sCompany C received the triage of personnel mobiliza-tion: true veterans of active duty were culled out forimmediate assignment to the Fleet Marine Force, proba-bly directly to the 1st Marine Division; Marine reservistswhose drills and summer camp more or less approxi-mated boot camp went on to eight more weeks of pre-deployment field training and physical conditioning; andthe untrained true "boots" like Jack Davis went south tothe Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, to begintheir life as real Marines.

The temporary mission of the Marine Corps Recruit

Depot was not turning young men into Marines but intoday laborers and stevedores. All hands spent much ofevery day mobilizing the depot for the expected wavesof new recruits; the reservists set up bunks, hauled mat-tresses out of storage, and carried footlockers into thereopened barracks. Every night for two weeks thereservists went to the North Island docks to load ammu-nition and mount-out boxes for the 1st Marine Division.Not until the division cleared the harbor for Japan didthe reservists start their formal boot camp schedule,which now seemed like welcome relief from the role ofslave laborers. Jack Davis found boot camp no specialchallenge.

The follow-on field training, eight weeks and manda-tory for every Marine regardless of assignment, provedmore and less fun. Jack enjoyed the long days on theranges of Camp Elliott. He qualified with ease with theM-1 and fired the entire range of individual and crew-served weapons found in a Marine infantry battalion.Jack liked them all except the M-1 carbine, which rifle-men did not carry anyway. The last phase of the train-ing focused on cold weather, mountain training at PickelMeadow, which was neither meadow-like nor cold.Temperatures that December reached the 70s, and the

Marines trudged around in the mud and slush in theirlayers of cold-weather clothing issue, all of them per-ilously close to heat exhaustion and dehydration.Apparently the Marine Corps had found a way to trainthe replacements for Korea's winters and summers at thesame time.

In January 1951, Jack Davis and his comrades of the6th Replacement Draft boarded the Army transportRandolph for the trip to Korea. The Randolph had comedirectly from Pusan where it had disembarked a part ofthe 1st Marine Division, recently evacuated fromHungnam. When Jack and his messmates reached theirtroop compartment, they found the canvas bunks deco-rated with messages from the survivors of the ChosinReservoir campaign. Jack did not find the words of wis-dom very comforting. A few were clever and humorous,but most of the collected battlefield folk wisdom struckJack as sad, depressing, bewildered, stunned, and evensuicidal. As the messages from the veterans attested, thewar had almost been lost, had almost been won, andthen almost lost again. As General Douglas MacArthurhad just reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jack Davisand his comrades now faced the Chinese army and anentirely new war.

could usually find the right combi-nation of leadership and technicalskill to give the separate battalionsa strong commander. Among thecommanders General Thomasinherited in these battalions wereMarines whose accomplishmentshad made them legends: LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge of the 1stEngineers, who had opened theroute out of the Chosin Reservoir;Major Lloyd 0. Williams, the mastermarksman, who commanded the1st Ordnance Battalion; andLieutenant Colonel Henry J. "Jim"Crowe of the 1st Shore PartyBattalion, a heroic battalion com-mander at Tarawa and Saipan aswell as another team shooter.

As the commander of a greatdivision, whose management heshared with an able staff, GeneralThomas could focus on his rela-tions with Generals Van Fleet andAlmond. Although Van Fleet took apractical, unpretentious approachto commanding Eighth Army,General Almond had become notone whit more subdued by the

twin blows of surrendering theindependent status of X Corps andthe abrupt removal of his patron,General of the Army DouglasMacArthur. Almond retained theimperiousness and elegant field lifestyle that characterized many Armygenerals of his generation and,especially, his two models,MacArthur and General Mark W.Clark, his army commander inWorld War II. Surrounded by staffofficers from central casting—albeitvery talented—Almond favoredhigh-fashion field uniforms, opu-lent vans and messes, and imperialgestures worthy of Napoleon him-self, including the haphazardawarding of medals. Almond's airydisregard for time-space factorsand enemy capabilities, as well ashis habit of ignoring the chain-of-command, had driven GeneralSmith into tight-lipped rebellion.Thomas had dealt with some diffi-cult Marine generals, but Almondwould be a challenge.

Thomas first made sure that noone would mistake him for the

8

Almond model of a modern majorgeneral. He truly preferred the lookof the Old Corps of World War II,not a U.S. Army that had remadeitself in the image of its flamboyantarmor and airborne generals likeWalton H. Walker and Ridgway.Thomas wore a uniform that wasstrictly issue from his battered utili-ty cap and standard helmet to hiscanvas leggings and worn, brownfield shoes. Instead of the "gener-als" version of the Colt .45-caliberautomatic worn the Army-way witha fancy leather belt, he carried anissue pistol in a black shoulder-hol-ster. None of his regular fieldwear—jacket, sweaters, shirts, andtrousers—would be mistaken fortailors' work. His only personalaffectation (a very useful one atthat) was his old Haitian coco-maca que walking stick, whoseonly local counterpart was carriedby General Shepherd. On specialoccasions General Thomas and hisregimental commanders mightsport white scarves and the divi-sion staff red scarves, but the idea

was Van Fleet's, who thought thescarves would show the troopsthat senior officers were not aller-gic to frontline visits.

Still a part of IX Corps—onewonders now about the urgency inthe change of command—the 1stMarine Division disengaged fromthe Chinese 39th and 40th Armiesand fell back unmolested 15 milesto the No Name Line, a belt of pre-pared positions dug by Koreanlaborers and Army engineers. The1st Marines, reinforced by a battal-ion of the 7th Marines, protectedthe bridges and passes while therest of the division withdrew ingood order over the Pukhan andSoyang Rivers, both in flood fromrain and melting snow. By 29 Aprilthe division had put the rivers at itsback and filed into the No NameLine positions with the 5thMarines, the 1st Regiment of theKorean Marine Corps (KMC), andthe 7th Marines on line from westto east. The 1st Marines went intodivision reserve. Colonel Bowserthought that the retrograde move-ment—which he and Thomas did

not think necessary—proved thatthe division had lost nothing of its1950 ability to march and fightsuperior numbers of Chinesetroops without prohibitive losses.Meanwhile General Van Fleet metwith his corps commanders on 30April to discuss Eighth Army's nextmove: an active defense of the NoName Line and maximum readi-ness to meet another Chinese-North Korean offensive, predictedfor mid-May by Van Fleet's intelli-gence staff. In the reorganizationof the front, the 1st MarineDivision would rejoin X Corps,effective 1 May.

General Thomas first had tofight off General Almond before hecould focus on killing Chinese.The two generals met every dayfor three days (1-3 May), andThomas emerged victorious inestablishing new ground rules forthe Marines' dealing with X Corps.Thomas had already told his staffthat it would take a hard-line with"suggestions" from any corps staffmember; one of his assistant oper-ations officers tested the guidance

by telling his Army counterpartsfrom Almond's headquarters thathe could "go to hell" for givingorders in Almond's name.

Thomas took a disgruntledAlmond head on. He could becharming in his own way—hepointed out his own Virginian andConfederate roots to VirginiaMilitary Institute "Old Grad"Almond—but he insisted thatAlmond stop bypassing the chain-of-command or allowing his staffto run roughshod over the properchannels in the 1st MarineDivision. Almond insisted he wasan active corps commander.(Meddlesome was the word theMarines chose.) Thomas told himthat he was an active division com-mander and that he intended tomake as many visits to regimentsand battalions as Almond made.Thomas added that he would "exe-cute any order proper for a soldierto receive." Almond pressedThomas to go on, but Thomas nowremained silent as if expecting afurther elaboration of policy.Almond said he would make manyvisits. "Is that all right with you?"Almond continued. More silence.Almond went on: "But I can assureyou that I will never issue an orderaffecting one of your units exceptthrough you." Now Thomasresponded: "On that basis . . . youare always welcome." The twogenerals remained true to their

Thomas tested the era of goodfeeling with X Corps almost imme-diately and to positive effect. VanFleet had the notion that each divi-sion should establish a battalion-sized outpost from which it couldpatrol northwards to make contactwith the Chinese. For the 1stMarine Division the best place toestablish such a base—whichThomas and Bowser thought was amiserable idea—was south ofChunchon but north of the critical

The 1st Marines regimental headquarters occupies a tent-camp along the road toHongchon, just south of the No Name Line. United Nations Command air supe-riority allowed such administrative arrangements.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8728

9

word.

dMorae Kagae Pass, the only routeof escape to the No Name Line.The position would be outside theartillery fan of the 11th Marines,and close air support alone (nowcomplicated by Air Force schedul-ing practices) would be no substi-tute. Thomas argued with VanFleet and Almond that he wouldperform the mission, but that heshould dictate the size of the forceand its rules of engagement—anddisengagement. When Thomas puthis "patrol base" in place on 5-7May, he sent the entire 7th Marines(artillery and tank reinforced)north toward Chunchon, and headded the 1st KMC Regiment toNickerson's task force. In addition,he had the 5th Marines put ascreening company in front ofeach of its frontline battalions, butkept the companies well withinartillery support.

Thomas continued to press XCorps for more artillery since VanFleet's intelligence staff insistedthat the next Chinese offensivemight focus on the 1st MarineDivision. Thomas' own groundand aerial patrols found ample evi-dence of Chinese troop move-ments between the Pukhan Riverand the No Name Line. The com-manding general had also heardVan Fleet insist that no EighthArmy unit, a company or larger,should be isolated and cut-off; VanFleet told his generals that nightwithdrawals and counterattacksshould be abandoned as opera-tional options. He also insisted thatevery division artillery groupment(the 11th Marines for Thomas)should use its daily allowance ofshells (the "Van Fleet unit of fire"or five times the normal allotmentof shells) to fire upon suspectedenemy concentrations and trans-portation routes. Thomas persuad-ed Almond that the 1st MarineDivision could not meet Van Fleet'sexpectations without some Army

much as possible.

help, and Almond committed twoX Corps general support artillerybattalions to reinforce the fires ofthe 11th Marines. Thomas alsonegotiated a shortening of hisfrontage since he had to put twobattalions of the 1st Marines intothe line to replace the 7th Marines,which left only one infantry battal-ion as division reserve. Eventhough he had come to concludethat the Chinese were massing tothe east instead of to his front,Thomas had no intention of allow-ing any part of the 7th Marines tobe cut off between the MoraeKagae Pass and the No Name Line.He approved a Nickerson-Davisplan to garrison the pass with areinforced battalion (less one riflecompany) and simply announcedthe change to Almond, who didnot object to the fait accompli.Thomas also planned to extract the7th Marines from its advancedposition as soon as he though hecould justify such an action toAlmond. He anticipated that trou-ble would develop along the

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boundary of the 1st Marines andthe U.S. 2d Infantry Division, notto his front. The 7th Marines wouldbe his new division reserve, readyto attack to the northeast. The planproved to be prescient.

Changing their operational styleof nighttime infiltration attacks,characterized by surprise and thelimited use of artillery, the ChineseNinth and Third Army Groups,augmented by the North Korean IIand V Corps, opened the FifthOffensive (Second Phase). On themorning of 16 May 1951, the offen-sive began with a Soviet-stylepreparatory artillery bombardment.Frustrated in his April offensive,Peng Dehuai decided that the lim-ited road network and sharp,rugged mountains of eastern Koreaoffered a better area of operationsfor a renewed offensive. Van Fleetand his corps commanders wouldfind it more difficult to shift rein-forcements against the shoulders

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A8898

A Marine patrol secures a hill and moves forward. Its mission was to maintaincontact with the enemy, warn of an impending attack, and delay its progress as

of any breakthrough, and the steepmountains made it difficult to massUnited Nations artillery fire. Thebroken, forested terrain wouldprovide welcome cover and con-cealment from United NationsCommand air strikes. The weightof the Chinese offensive (27 divi-sions with three artillery divisionsin support) fell on (from west toeast) the U.S. 2d Infantry Division,the 5th ROK Division, and the 7thROK Division of X Corps withadditional attacks upon the neigh-boring 9th ROK Division of the

Republic's III Corps. The Chinesedid not ignore the western-mostdivision of X Corps, the 1st MarineDivision, which would be pinnedin its part of the No Name Line byattacks from the Chinese 60thArmy. The minimal operationalgoal was to destroy one or moreU.N. divisions; a major victorywould be the fragmentation ofeither X Corps or the ROK IIICorps and a return to a campaignof movement that would dislodgethe Eighth Army from the TaebaekMountains to the Han River valley.

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Eventually described by X Corpsas the battle of the Soyang River,16-21 May 1951, the Chinese offen-sive overran various parts of thefrontline positions and the patrolbases of the hard-luck 2d InfantryDivision and the three ROK divi-sions to its right. Despite somedogged defensive action byAmerican and South Korean sol-diers, the Chinese advanced 30miles, forcing the three ROK divi-sions to the south and threateningto roll-up the right flank of the 2dDivision, which lost the better partof the 38th Infantry and itsattached Dutch battalion in slow-ing the Chinese attack. GeneralAlmond decided he needed toinsure that the western side of theChinese salient was secure first; herequested reinforcements from VanFleet, who sent the 187th AirborneInfantry Regiment and U.S. 3dInfantry Division to blocking posi-tions behind X Corps. In the mean-time, Almond wanted the 2dInfantry Division to refuse its rightflank. Such a redeploymentrequired the 1st Marine Division toextend its sector of the No NameLine to the east and to do so whilein contact with the enemy.

On the first day of the Chineseoffensive, General Thomas visitedAlmond's command post atHoengsong and saw the crisisbuild in X Corps' eastern sectors.Thomas and Almond discussedwhat situations the 1st MarineDivision might face, but Thomaswould make no commitments untilhe was sure he could withdraw the7th Marines (Reinforced) from theill-conceived "patrol base" north ofthe No Name Line. Closer to theanticipated Chinese attack, ColonelNickerson reinforced the outpostat Morae Kagae Pass, bringing thedefenders to battalion strength andincluding the regimental headquar-ters and a tank platoon. Havingjust joined the 7th Marines—his

regiment in World War Il—SecondLieutenant Earl F. Roth wonderedwho had placed the regiment sofar from the rest of the division. Hereached the Morae Kagae Pass andthe 7th Marines rear defenses onlyafter a long and lonely jeep rideacross an empty countryside, buthe felt eyes watching him fromevery hill. When he later saw thepiles of Chinese bodies at the pass,he remembered similar scenesfrom Peleliu. On the evening of 16May, a Chinese regiment attackedthe pass in force and lost 112 deadand 82 captured before breakingoff the action. Nickerson's forcelost two tanks, seven dead, and 19wounded. The attack gave Thomasplenty of reason to pull backNickerson's entire regiment, or-dered that night with Almond'sapproval. Colonel Frank T.

Mildren, X Corps' operations offi-cer, correctly assumed that theChinese wanted no part of the 1stMarine Division: "The Marines [are]

just wrapped up in their usualball." Mildren's assessment did notaccurately picture the 1st MarineDivision's skillful redeployment to

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A155692

Marines of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, gather the bodies of the Chinese 179thDivision, which attacked the regiment's patrol base at Morae Kagae Pass on thenight of l6May. As part of the Chinese F/th Offensive (Second Phase), the attackdid not pin the 1st Marine Division to the No Name Line, which allowed its rede-ployment to the east to aid the US. 2d Infantry Division.

Gen Edward M. Almond Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute

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release the U.s. 9th InfantryRegiment for a new mission, sav-ing the rest of its parent division.

After artillery and air strikesinsured that the Chinese 60thArmy marched east to the sound ofsomebody else's guns, Thomasordered the 1st Marines to shiftright and take the 9th Infantry'spositions while the 7th Marinesmarched back to the No NameLine and took over the 1st Marinessector. In the meantime, two bat-talions of the 5th Marines movedeastwards behind the No NameLine to refuse the division rightflank north of the crucial roadjunction of Hongchon. The 7thMarines and the 1st KIVIC Regimentslipped to the left to take over partof the 5th Marines' former sector.General Thomas reported at 1730on 18 May to Almond that therealignment had been accom-plished, but that he also wantedmore corps artillery ready to firedefensive fires along his thinly-manned front. He requested andreceived more aerial reconnais-sance from the Cessna light patrolaircraft (L-19 "Bird Dogs") assignedto X Corps. Thomas had alreadyimproved his defensive posture byplacing the 1st Marines in positionsalmost four miles south of the orig-inal No Name Line. The only con-tact occurred on 20 May when ele-ments of the Chinese 44th Divisionmarched unawares into the defens-es of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,and left behind almost 170 deadand prisoners when the Marinesshattered the lead regiment withtheir battalion weapons, artillery,and air strikes. The 1st MarineDivision awaited more orders. Itdid not expect Almond to remainon the defensive since X Corpsnow had fresh troops and the twoChinese army groups had placedthemselves inside a vulnerablesalient.

Although he had won the

respect of Almond and his staff inhis first month of division com-mand, General Thomas had nointention of becoming a compliantsubordinate commander when hethought Army generals paid too lit-tle attention to tactical realities.Thomas and Almond conferredtwice on 19 May and again on 20May at the 1st Marine Divisioncommand post. The issue was acounteroffensive order from VanFleet to I and IX Corps, a move-ment that began on 20 May for the7th Infantry Division, the IX Corpselement on Thomas' left flank.Almond wanted the 1st KMCRegiment to advance beyond theNo Name Line to conform to IXCorps' advance, but Thomas"expressed reluctance" to send aregiment on an axis of advancethat took it away from the rest ofthe division and opened a gap inthe division's defensive alignment.Thomas won a concession fromAlmond immediately: he couldmake his own arrangements tosecure X Corps' left flank and coor-dinate the movement directly withIX Corps.

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As Peng Dehuai acknowledged,the collapse of the Fifth Offensive(Second Phase) gave UnitedNations Command an unprece-dented opportunity to mount acounteroffensive of potential stra-tegic consequences. Even thoughhis army group commandersprotested his withdrawal orders,Peng called off the offensive onthe afternoon of 21 May and issuedorders that the eastern armiesshould withdraw during the nightof 23-24 May to a defensive linethat would run from the ImjinRiver to Hwachon to Kansong,roughly the line occupied byUnited Nations Command whenthe Fifth Offensive began in April.Five Chinese armies and threeNorth Korean corps would defendthe line.

Prodded by General Ridgway,who flew to Korea to inject someof his special bellicosity into a flag-ging Eighth Army, Van Fleet hadstolen half a march on his Chinesecounterpart by ordering I and IXCorps to start a drive to the TopekaLine, a phase line on the groundabout halfway to the contemplated

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A8875

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas checks the frontline situation map with the 5thMarines' commanding officer, Col Richard W. Hayward, center, and the regi-ment's operations officer, Maj Robert E. Baldwin.

'1"44

Chinese defenses. Van Fleet andthe corps commanders of I and IXCorps, however, could not createmuch urgency in their divisions.Neither Ridgway nor Van Fleetthought I and IX Corps had seized

the moment. They were thuspleasantly surprised when Al-mond, who seized momentswhether they were there or not,proposed that he could shift to theoffensive as soon as noon on 23

May as long as he retained controlof the 187th Airborne and the 3dInfantry Division and gained theuse of the brand-new 8th ROKDivision as well. Instead of drivingalmost directly north like I and IXCorps, however, Almond plannedto use his South Korean divisionsto keep the Chinese and NorthKoreans engaged at the forwardedges of the salient. His Americandivisions would cut across the baseof the salient from southwest tonortheast, roughly on an axis thatfollowed Route 24 through Chaun-ni—Inje—Kansong where X Corpswould link up with ROK I Corps.The counteroffensive, supportedby massive aerial bombardmentand Van Fleet-directed artillery bar-rages of World War I profligacy,would bag the survivors of theChinese Third and Ninth ArmyGroups. Van Fleet approvedAlmond's plan, and X Corps issuedits attack order on 21 May.

For the 1st Marine Division thedevelopment of two Eighth Armycounteroffensives with different

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8867

A .30-caliber machine gun team and a Marine with a Browning Automatic Rfleoccupy recently abandoned enemy foxholes, using them for cover while pursu-ing Chinese and North Korean forces.

Elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, hit thedirt after taking heavy enemy mortar and machine gunfirefrom Chinese forces occupying Hill 1051. Air and artillery

forced the enemy to retire northward and the regimentsecured the commanding high ground.

National Archives Photo (USA) 11 I-SC368657

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axis of advance provided GeneralThomas and his staff with newchallenges. A shift of corps bound-aries as far east as a lineHongchon-Hwachon Reservoirhelped some, but not much. As hehimself later admitted, Almond hadonce again promised too much,too soon in the way of decisiveaction. For once he had not under-estimated the enemy; the Chinesearmy groups in his zone of actionwere indeed wounded, but not asseriously as Eighth Army estimat-ed. (United Nations Command esti-mated total Chinese casualties forthe Fifth Offensive at 180,000, butthe Chinese put their own losses athalf this total.) The difficulty wasthe time and effort necessary to getthe offensive moving with taskforces drawn from the 2d InfantryDivision, the 3d Infantry Division,

the 187th Airborne, and the divi-sional and corps tank battalions.The result was that the attacks atthe tip of the salient jumped off ontime (mid-23 May), but the bigdrive across the base of the salientdid not begin until 24 May and theserious, organized advance upRoute 24 did not begin until thenext day, In the meantime theChinese, attacked 12 hours beforethey began their own withdrawal,fought back sluggishly as theymoved up their withdrawal sched-ule, a euphemism for—in somecases—a Chinese "bug out."

The result of the gelatinousattack by Major General Clark L.Ruffner's 2d Division and itsattached task forces was that the1st Marine Division advance, alsodutifully begun on 23 May, had toconform to the Army units on its

right. The Marine advance of 24-3 1May developed into a two-axisattack with the 1st Marines and the1st KMC Regiment moving throughthe hills south of Soyang, crossingthe river on 28 May, and reachingthe heights above the HwachonReservoir on 31 May. The 5th and7th Marines started the marchnorth in a column of regiments,but the 7th Marines pulled aheadwhile the 5th Marines took thecommanding heights of Kari-san(Hill 1051). The 7th Marines thenturned northeast away from Route24 to take the shortest route to thetown of Yanggu, just east of theeastern end of the HwachonReservoir. The 7th Marines assault-ed and captured the Yangguheights, but watched the Chineseflee through the open zone of thetardy U.S. 2d Infantry Division. The

Gen Edward M. Almond Collection, U.S.

DECISIVE RESULTSICO*ONGt Ill'

15

-V

C

5th Marines shifted right to the hillseast of the road to Yanggu anddrew abreast of the 7th Marines on29-30 May. The next day all ofThomas' four regiments occupiedtheir portion of Line Topeka.

For the rifle companies at thehead of each pursuing battalion,the war did not look much like thereassuring blue arrows on anacetate-covered 1:25,000 map. Thelast two weeks of May 1951 provedto be hot and very dry during theday, but cold and wet at night asunusual spring rains kept the hillsslick and the valleys a slough.Water to drink, however, provedharder to find than water for dis-comfort. Few Marines were willingto chance the ground water orlocal streams, but potable waterseemed to take second place to

National Archives Photo (usN) 8o-G-429689 ammunition in the columns ofAfter securing Kari-san (Hill 1051), Marines search two Chineseprisoners of war Korean bearers. In an era whenfor weapons and documents. "water discipline" made "exces-

Hugging the crest of a ridgeline, the 7th Ma rifles prepare to eral assault by other Marine units.'pour hot lead" into enemy positions as a prelude to a gen- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A8888

16

----I-— • -.b.— -' — -

,1* I_k.

N J'

defensive positions.

sive" drinking a sin in the MarineCorps, dehydration stalked thestruggling columns of ladentroops. The columns not onlyfought groups of Chinese, butmarched through the EighthArmy's dying fields of Februaryand May, passing the bodies of sol-diers from the 2d Infantry Division.

Despite the profligate use ofartillery and air strikes, the Marinerifle companies found their shareof close combat in the last week ofMay. Moving along a steep hillsideonly by hanging from the trunks ofshattered trees, Second LieutenantEarl Roth's platoon saw enemymortar rounds fly by them andexplode in the gully below. Rothsuppressed a strong urge to reachout and catch a mortar round as itpassed by, a vestige of his footballplaying days at the University ofMaryland. Although the firefightsseldom involved even a wholecompany, they were a world ofwar for the engaged Marines. Oneplatoon of Company C, 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, stormed aChinese ambush position only to

have the defenders charge rightback at them in the most intimateof meeting engagements, a brawlwon by the Marines with grenades,clubbed rifles, bayonets, and fists.Urged on by the company'sBeowulf, Second Lieutenant PaulN. "Pete" McCloskey, the Marinesleft few survivors, but their post-fury victory celebration was cutshort by a deluge of 120mm mor-tar rounds pre-registered on top ofthe position. The company lost iscommanding officer and otherMarines in the swift reversal of for-tune.

The six days of offensive actionin the last week of May 1951demonstrated to friend and foealike that the 1st Marine Divisionremained a fearsome killingmachine. Using artillery and tankfire, supplemented with battalionmortars and machine guns, theinfantry regiments methodicallytook their objectives with minimalcasualties and no operationalcrises. The Marines continued torun into scattered battalion-sizedremnants of Chinese divisions,

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none willing to hold any positionagainst the deluge of fire pouredupon them. On 28 May, however,the Marines started to discoverorganized, company-sized defen-sive positions manned by NorthKoreans and ringed with mines, By31 May, the day of the division'sheaviest casualties for the week(126 killed and wounded), theChinese had disappeared from thebattlefield. During the week thedivision intelligence staff estimatedthat the division had inflicted10,000 casualties; what it knew forcertain was that the regiments hadcounted 1,870 enemy bodies andtaken 593 prisoners. The 1stMarine Division's losses for theentire month of May were 83 killedin action or died of wounds and731 wounded. The "exchangeratio" against an enemy still con-sidered dangerous and willing tofight was about as good as couldbe expected.

The week of divisional attackbrought its share of surprises. Theenemy provided some of them.The Chinese, aided by the slowadvance of the 2d InfantryDivision, refused to wait for theirentrappers and poured out of thesalient after the first attacks of 23May. Chinese soldiers from fivedifferent divisions of the ThirdArmy Group crossed the path ofthe Marines on their way to rallypoints at Yanggu and Hwachon;the chaotic pattern of the Chinesewithdrawal meant that enemybands might appear at any timefrom the east and south, whichlead Almond and Thomas to con-fer daily on flank security issues.When the Marines met the better-armed and trained infantry of theNorth Korean 12th Division, theyalso came under fire from Soviet-made artillery and mortars. TheChinese withdrawal, however,gave Marine artillery a field day;between 10 May and 7 June the 1st

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A155279

Marines of Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, prepare their 155mm howitzerfor afire mission in support of Marine units around Yanggu. Observed, adjust-ed artillery fire provided the Marines with essential support against North Korean

Private First Class Whitt L. Moreland

Born in 1930 in Waco, Texas, he enlisted in theMarine Corps in 1948, following graduationfrom Junction City High School. After serving

out his active duty, he reverted to Reserve status. InNovember 1950, he was recalled to active duty andsent to Korea. While serving as an intelligence scoutwhile attached to Company C, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, he was killed at Kwagchi-dong on 29 May1951. The citation of his posthumous Medal of Honoraward reads, in part:

Voluntarily accompanying a rifle platoon in a daringassault against a strongly defended enemy hill posi-tion, Private First Class Moreland delivered accuraterifle fire on the hostile emplacement and therebyaided materially in seizing the objective. After theposition had been secured, he unhesitatingly led aparty forward to neutralize an enemy bunker whichhe had observed some 400 meters beyond and,moving boldly through a fire swept area, almostreached the hostile emplacement when the enemylaunched a volley of hand grenades on his group.Quick to act despite the personal danger involved,he kicked several of the grenades off the ridgelinewhere they exploded harmlessly and, while attempt-ing to kick away another, slipped and fell near thedeadly missile. Aware that the sputtering grenadewould explode before he could regain his feet anddispose of it, he shouted a warning to his comrades,covered the missile with his body and absorbed thefull blast of the explosion, but in saving his com-panions from possible injury or death, was mortallywounded—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret) Department of Defense ynoto JSMC&,4t9,(

Marine Division artillery fired13,157 tons of shells, second onlyto the 2d Infantry Division (15,307tons). The corps artillery groupkept pace, especially since its firessupported the South Korean divi-sions. All X Corps divisions surren-dered their trucks to keep X Corpsguns supplied with shells. By theend of May ammunition shortageshad become an operational con-cern. The artillery expendituresand the stiffening Communistdefenses suggested that the "happytime" of X Corps exploitation oper-ations had come to an end.

General Thomas had every rea-son to be proud of his division, for

Generals Ridgway, Van Fleet, andAlmond all visited his commandpost and praised the division's per-formance. General Shepherd andhis senior staff visited the divisionon 28-29 May, and Shepherdadded his congratulations not onlyfor the operational successes, butalso for the good relations with theArmy. And Almond went out of hisway to tell the other generals howmuch he valued Thomas' wisecounsel. (Thomas was not so surethat Almond listened to anyone,but at least the corps commandernow observed the chain-of-com-mand.) Finding another way tocelebrate a victory, the commander

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of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,sent one of his lieutenants out on adesperate mission: find ice some-where around Yanggu to cool thebattalion's beer ration. SecondLieutenant Harold Arutunian'spatrol returned with ice—stolenfrom the body bags of an Armygraves registration unit. For at leastone week the 1st Marine Divisionhad fought by its book, and it suf-fered negligible casualties bypounding every objective withpreparatory air strikes and artilleryconcentrations. For once Almonddid not exaggerate when, on 31May, he characterized the Marinesas "fatigued, but spirits high."

Perched in their most recent fox-holes above the Hwachon Res-ervoir and the blackened ruins ofYanggu—so flattened and inciner-ated that only the charred bankvault gave the town a skyline—theforward infantry battalions of the1st Marine Division could see onlymore sharp hills to the north, risingever higher into the smoky dusk ofthe last day of May. They did notknow that conferences elsewherewere already deciding their fate inthe month ahead.

The Chinese Fifth Offensive andits crushing defeat had opened theway for a second "entirely newwar," but not one that made any ofthe belligerents very happy. TheCommunist coalition shared acommon problem with UnitedNations Command: was there anyoperational option that offeredadvantage worthy of the risks ofstrategic escalation? What if theSoviet air forces, for example,mounted attacks on the Americanairbases in Korea? What if theSoviet navy mounted submarine ormaritime aviation attacks upon theU.N. naval forces that roamed theeast and west seas with impunity?

Relatively certain that JosephStalin would not authorize anyattacks that might bring Americanretaliation on Soviet bases in theFar East, Mao Zedong sought someemployment of the ChineseCommunist Forces that wouldeventually destroy the will of theUnited Nations and the Republic ofKorea to continue the war. On 27May 1951, Mao Zedong openeddiscussions on strategy with hisprincipal commanders in Korea.Within a week Mao conferred witheight senior officers of the CCF,especially First Deputy Comman-der Deng Hua and Chief of StaffXie Fang. Mao told his field com-manders that the CCF would con-

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC382822

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed theCommander in Chief UN. Command,Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, tocontinue the offensive but only byadvancing to the Wyoming-KansasLine, a phase line in the mountainsnorth of the 38th Parallel. The under-lying objective of these operations wasdesigned to support a negotiated endto hostilities.

duct niupitang attritional warfareof position until United NationsCommand casualties reachedunbearable proportions.

Mao's use of the word niupi-tang could not have been moreapt since niupitang was a deli-cious but very sticky candy fromhis native Hunan Province, an irre-sistible sweet that took a very longtime to eat and usually made amess. The niupitang strategywould work well with a policy ofbiantan bianda or simultaneousnegotiating and fighting. Withintwo months Mao replaced three ofthe four army group commanders,retaining only Yang Dezhi, a mod-ern commander and a protégé ofDeng and Xie, and promoting himto second deputy commander andde facto director of operations forthe Communist field forces. PengDehuai remained the titular com-

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mander of the CCF, but Deng Hua,Xie Fang, and Yang Dezhi directedthe new strategy, "On theProtracted War in Korea," an-nounced in July 1951.

The other Communist co-bel-ligerents reacted to niupitang inmuch different ways, but neitherthe Soviets nor the North Koreanshad much leverage on MaoZedong. If they wanted the war tocontinue—and they did—theydepended upon the Chinese armyto bear the brunt of the fighting.Now that the war had not pro-duced a great Communist victory,Stalin (beset with political prob-lems at home) saw no reason to gobeyond his commitment of Sovietair defense forces to "MiG Alley"along the Korean-Manchurian bor-der and to rearm the Chinesearmy. The Soviets, in fact, sawtruce negotiations as a way toincrease their influence in theUnited Nations as well as to buytime to rebuild and rearm theChinese forces. The North Kor-eans—represented by the pestifer-ous Kim Ii Sung—wanted onlymore war and no talks, unless atruce brought an end to Americanair strikes. Kim and his inner circleagreed, however, that the 38thParallel should be restored as aninternational border and that allforeign troops (including theChinese) should leave Korea—after the South Korean army hadbeen fatally weakened and theNorth Korean People's Armyrestored to fighting trim and much-enlarged. Kim ordered his generalsto fight to the death for everyrocky foot of North Korean soil.

The process of political-strategicreassessment, which had begunwith the Chinese intervention inNovember 1950, blossomed in May1951 like the cherry-blossoms inWashington, D.C. and Koreancoastal resort town of Chinhae.Hints of peace negotiations sprout-

Close Air Support Controversyy the spring of 1951, the question of close airsupport for United Nations Command groundforces had become a serious inter-service contro-

versy that pitted the Marine Corps and some of thesenior commanders of the Eighth Army against theUnited States Air Force and General Matthew B.Ridgway, the United Nations and American theater com-mander. To some degree the controversy involved theemployment of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and sever-al lesser and often false issues, e.g. jets versus propelleraircraft, but the heart of the problem was simply that theAir Force did not want to perform the mission. It regard-ed close air support as a wasteful and dangerous mis-use of offensive tactical air power. Marine Corps avia-tion and Navy carrier-based aviation regarded close airsupport as an essential contribution to the ground cam-paign. The victim in all this inter-service wrangling wasthe Eighth Army and the 1st Marine Division.

From the Air Force perspective, the close air supportmission belonged at the bottom of its offensive air mis-sions, although the leaders of the Army Air Forces asearly as 1943 insisted that air power was the equal ofground combat power in the conduct of war. The samesenior officers donned new uniforms in 1947, but didnot drop their old ideas about close air support, despitethe relatively effective use of ground-directed air strikesagainst the German army in 1944-1945. The Air Forceposition was rooted in negative experiences: the bomb-ing and strafing of friendly troops; the extraordinarylosses to ground fire in making front-line, low-levelbombing runs; and the conviction that Army groundcommanders knew nothing of fighter-bomber capabili-ties and would scream for close air support whenartillery was a more rapid and appropriate response totheir indirect fire support requirements. The guidance ineffect for Air Force-Army close air support operations in1950 was the "Joint Training Directive for Air-GroundOperations," an agreement only between Tactical AirCommand and Army Field Forces, not the Service head-quarters.

In theory and application in Korea in 1950 the doc-trine of the "Joint Training Directive," which the AirForce embraced as authoritative, made close air supportdifficult for a ground command to obtain. Basically, theAir-Ground Operations System (AGOS) required that aground commander request air support prior to anoperation and be very specific about his needs.Requests had to be processed through an Army opera-tions officer (G-3 Air) from regiment through field armyand reviewed by an Air Force officer at each echelon ofcommand (the air liaison officer) until the requestreached the Joint Operations Center (JOG), run by anAir Force general, which would allocate the available airstrikes. The request system insured that close air sup-

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port strikes were not likely to be tactically relevant, butthe air direction system the Air Force preferred alsoadded to the problem. The definition of close air sup-port was that air strikes should be coordinated with thefire and maneuver of the ground forces through the pos-itive direction by a forward air controller (FAG) who wasfully knowledgeable about the ground combat situation.There was no fundamental disagreement that a TacticalAir Control Party (TACP) with reliable air-ground com-munications (vehicle- or ground-mounted) should beavailable so the FAG could direct air strikes by sight, justlike an artillery forward observer. The Air Force, how-ever, did not want to use its own personnel for suchmissions, and it did not trust the Army to provide a com-petent FAG. The Air Force might provide an Air LiaisonParty down to the regimental level to do air strike plan-ning, but it was not going to send Air Force officers(presumably pilots) out to the front to direct air strikes.In some fairness, the Fifth Air Force did provide suchTactical Air Control Parties to the Eighth Army in 1950,and they were shot to pieces—radio-jeeps and peoplealike.

The Fifth Air Force in 1950 created an air strike direc-tion system that depended on airborne air controllers,basically the World War II system. During the course ofthe fighting in 1950 the Fifth Air Force and Eighth Armycommitted people and equipment to form the 6147thTactical Control Squadron, later expanded to wing sta-tus. The "Mosquitoes," as the forward air controllers (air-borne) came to be known, did yeoman work through-out the war, directing air strikes from their two-seat,propeller-driven North American AT-6 "Texan" aircraft, aWorld War II pilot trainer. The "Mosquitoes" lackednothing in courage and skill, but they were still hostagesto the JOC system. Either the air strikes had to be pre-planned or they had to be requested as a matter of dire

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131261

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130146

emergency or diverted from other missions.The Navy-Marine Corps system, developed for

amphibious operations in World War II, offered a differ-ent approach. The Air Force tried to brand the systemas driven by amphibious operations, which it was tosome degree, but the system had proved itself in landcampaigns on Saipan, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, thePhilippines, and Okinawa. The Navy and the MarineCorps brought the same system to Korea, and it worked.It worked so well that Army generals, especially MajorGeneral Edward M. Almond, embraced it without reser-vation. His successor as commander of X Corps, MajorGeneral Clovis E. Byers, also became a convert, and itcost him his command. Other Army commanders at thedivision level envied the system and wondered whythey could not receive adequate support, but they weretoo intimidated by Lieutenant General Matthew B.Ridgway to push the issue.

The Air Force consistently misrepresented theessence of the Navy-Marine Corps system. The navalservices never challenged the important of air superior-ity or interdiction operations. The naval services simplyargued—and placed in their own doctrine—that if closeair support missions were to be flown at all, they shouldbe rapid, responsive, appropriate, and effective. The 1stMarine Aircraft Wing might be best trained to performsuch missions, but it was the system that counted, not

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the uniforms of the pilots or the type of planes theyflew. The senior Marine ground commander did notcommand aviation units, as the Air Force charged.Either X Corps or 1st Marine Division did not commandthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The Navy-Marine Corps system accommodatedplanned requests, but its strength was its tactical flexi-bility. Each infantry battalion in the 1st Marine Divisionhad a Tactical Air Control Party of two elements. Onegroup served as the Air Liaison Party, part of the battal-ion operations staff. The other group was the ForwardAir Control Party, an officer and communicators whocould process requests for air support and direct airstrikes from the ground, usually well forward with aninfantry company. In practical terms, this system meantthat each Marine infantry battalion had two Marine offi-cers (naval aviators) as part of the battalion staff toinsure that air strikes hit the enemy and did so soonenough to affect the tactical situation. The systemworked, and the Marine Corps saw no reason to aban-don it.

As X Corps commander, General Almond liked theNavy-Marine Corps system, which he saw at close quar-ters during the Inchon-Seoul campaign and again dur-ing the withdrawal to the Hungnam enclave. In fact, heordered his Army divisions to form their own TACPs orhe arranged for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to send

TACPs to Army units (American and Korean) within hiscorps. The ability of the TACPs to direct strikes natural-ly drew most of the sorties flown in December 1950 bythe Marine squadrons and the naval aviators flying fromthe decks of Task Force 77.

The operational conditions and requirements of 1950made it appear that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing hadcome to Korea to be General Almond's corps aviationcomponent. In fact, X Corps functioned much like amodern Marine air-ground task force, even if Almondhad no direct authority over any of his supporting tacti-cal aviation squadrons. Fifth Air Force, however,thought this ad hoc arrangement should not continue.In early 1951, General Ridgway and Lieutenant GeneralGeorge E. Stratemeyer, Commander General, Far EastAir Forces, insured that General Douglas MacArthurplaced X Corps in the Eighth Army and the 1st MarineAircraft Wing under the operational control of the FifthAir Force and the Joint Operations Center. The Marinescould perform their close air support magic for all ofEighth Army, not just X Corps. Ridgway, however,demanded that Fifth Air Force study the whole close airsupport question and find ways to make the JOC systemmore responsive to unplanned ground requests for airstrikes.

While Fifth Air Force and Eighth Army both conduct-ed reviews of the Air-Ground Operations System, thewar went on, The 1st Marine Division returned to thefray in February 1951 without its usual customary airsupport, either in quality or quantity. Marine fighter-bomber squadrons (F4U Corsairs or F9F Panthers) flewmissions for all of Eighth Army with results that depend-ed entirely upon the ability of either the airborne"Mosquitoes" or ground spotters (if any) to identify thetargets and communicate with the aircraft. In the mean-time, Task Force 77 sailed north to attack Communistrailroads and highways ("the bridges of Toko-ri"), andAir Force fighter-bombers of varying nationalities (pre-dominately American or Australian) showed up to con-duct missions for the 1st Marine Division with mixedresults. Major General Oliver P. Smith asked Ridgway touse his influence with Fifth Air Force to give Smith oper-ational control of just one Corsair squadron. Ridgwayrefused to raise the issue and breach the "single man-

agement" doctrine. "Smith, I'm sorry, but I don't com-mand the Air Force!"

Even though Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force madeserious efforts to establish all the personnel and com-munications elements of the AGOS request and direc-tion organization, the Air Force's lack of interest andability in close air support still discouraged groundcommanders from making pre-attack requests. The sys-tem virtually guaranteed that emergency requests wouldbe answered late, if at all. With their own TACPs at thebattalion level, the Marines could and did short circuitthe system by making emergency requests to an air-borne Mosquito, who would then divert either out-going or returning interdiction strikes to the Marines andrelease direction of the strikes to the forward air con-trollers. If the attacking aircraft happened to be flown bytrained Marines, so much the better. The 1st MarineDivision FACs, however, reported that in April 1951 theJOC had answered 95 percent of their requests, but only40 percent of the missions were flown by adequatenumbers of aircraft, properly armed, and arrived in timeto make some difference in the battle. In the meantimelosses of aircraft and pilots soared in the 1st MarineAircraft Wing, in part because non-Marine controllersprovided poor information about the terrain and enemysituation. In April 1951, the Marines lost 16 aircraft and10 pilots (one captured, nine killed) to enemy groundfire.

Although X Corps received ample close air supportduring the Fifth Offensive (Second Phase), Almond stillcriticized the AGOS practices. Major General Gerald C.Thomas entered the fray when he learned that his divi-sion had received only two-thirds of its requested airstrikes in late May. Only about half of the delivered sor-ties were effective, and almost all were over an hour ormore late. The only concession Almond and Thomasreceived was the stationing of one mixed Corsairsquadron from Marine Aircraft Group 12 at K-46 a prim-itive strip near Hoengsong, but the JOC (Kimpo Airfield)still had to approve the missions. With the AGOS still inplace—albeit somewhat more efficient and flexible—thewar against the niupitan,g Chinese and North Koreandefenders would go on—and the 1st Marine Divisionwould indeed get stuck.

ed everywhere—most planted byshadowy Soviet sowers in theworlds' capitals and at the UnitedNations. The Joint Chiefs of Staffkept General Matthew B. Ridgwayinformed on the flood of specula-tion and hope. Until the last weekof May, however, Ridgway had noreason to link his sense of thestrategic shifts underway with thecontinuing operations in Korea.

Then Van Fleet, pressed byAlmond, proposed a significantchange in the exploitation cam-paign that followed the defeat ofthe Fifth Offensive. When the bulkof the Chinese forces had alreadyescaped the bag between X Corpsand ROK I Corps, Van Fleet pro-posed a series of amphibiousenvelopments up the east coastthat would conclude with the cre-

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ation of an enclave at Tongchon,still short of Wonsan, but wellnorth of the "Iron Triangle," thecentral Korean network of trans-portation connections and moun-tain corridors bounded byChorwon-Pyonggang-Kumhwafrom west to east. Ridgway andVan Fleet agreed with Almond thatcontrol of the "Iron Triangle," evenfrom Tongchon, would give either

side an advantage in ending orcontinuing the war.

General Ridgway, however, didnot agree that Van Fleet's proposedOperation Overwhelming could bemounted because of resistance inWashington and sheer operationalfeasibility. Even a modest shore-to-shore movement would requiredisengaging the 1st Marine Divi-sion and (probably) the 3d InfantryDivision and transporting them toa port for embarkation. FromRidgway's perspective, time was ofthe essence, and the requirementsof Overwhelming were too over-

whelming with truce talks in thewind. Ridgway's greatest fear wasthat someone would give away theterritorial gains already made inMay and the additional ground hewanted to control in June afterOperation Piledriver, a straight-ahead push by all four of VanFleet's corps. The Eighth Army'sgoal would be the seizure anddefense of a cross-peninsula line(Wyoming-Kansas) that wouldretake Kaesong, hold the mountainranges and passes northwest of theImjin River, secure at least part ofthe "Iron Triangle," and hold the

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mountains north of the HwachonReservoir all the way to the coastat Tongchon. Anticipating that aceasefire would entail the creationof some sort of territorial bufferzone, Ridgway wanted to reach aline (Kansas) well north of theWyoming Line, his non-negotiableposition for ensuring the grounddefense of the expanded Republicof Korea.

Two other considerationsshaped Ridgway's thinking aboutthe conduct of the war. Some ofthe general's critics and championslater suggested that he hadbecome too interested in his per-sonal goal of becoming Army chiefof staff or faint-hearted at theprospect of excessive Americancasualties in Korea. Ridgway'sambition was well-known to hisArmy peers, but he realized thattrying to please Washington was afool's errand, Nor had Ridgway,notoriously ruthless in relievingnon-fighters, suddenly becomecasualty-shy. He simply saw nopurpose in risking lives in adven-tures that probably would not pro-duce the promised results.Moreover, Ridgway had becomeconvinced that air power couldgive him an offensive option topunish the Communist armiesbeyond bearing, his own highexplosive, high altitude version ofniupitang. Recent changes in theAir Force high command in thewar zone placed very aggressiveand persuasive air generals inRidgway's inner council. GeneralOtto P. Weyland, the Far East AirForces director of operations sinceearly in the war, became the com-mander, and Lieutenant GeneralFrank F. Everest assumed com-mand of the Fifth Air Force. BothWeyland and Everest, tactical avia-tion commanders in World War II,championed aerial interdiction asthe most decisive way to use airpower in a war like the Korean