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DRAFT
George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and
International Affairs
PUBP 504: Grand Strategy
Wednesdays 7:20-10:00 PM
Founders’ Hall (Arlington)
Spring 2018
Professor John Gordon
Office Hours: Wednesdays, 6:300-7:00 PM (Adjunct office, 6th floor) -
also available by appointment
Email: [email protected] (preferred)
Telephone: (703) 303-6616
Grand strategy represents a nation’s high-level, long-term goals. It
normally includes the application of all aspects of national power,
including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. In the case
of the U.S., grand strategy is often supplemented with more detailed,
subordinate regional strategies.
This course is intended to provide students with a thorough
understanding of the concept of grand strategy, how it is developed,
examples of how this process takes place, and the tools that are
available to national leaders to accomplish high-level strategic
objectives. The goal is to gain an in-depth understanding of past
effective and ineffective grand strategies so as to inform U.S. policy, or
the policies of other countries, in the future. The course will consist of
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a mixture of theory and historical case studies.
Readings:
The following books are required for the course:
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)
Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford University Press,
2009)
Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: Free Press, 2002)
Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 1986)
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of
American National Security, Oxford, 2005
Tosi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Strategy in the Second Nuclear
Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, Georgetown
University Press, 2012
Required for all SPGIA courses: Diane Hacker, A Pocket Manual of
Style (New York: Bedford-St.Martin’s, 2000, 3rd edition).
Class Format
The course will be conducted in both lecture and in class discussion. It
is important that students read each week’s assignments prior to
arriving in class. Active class participation is strongly encouraged.
Objectives:
This course will help to prepare students for professional positions in
public service, including in the executive or legislative branches of U.S.
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government at the federal (both military and civilian), state or local
levels; private sector businesses dealing with public policy; non-profit
organizations concerned with public policy; non-US governments; and
international organizations. This advanced seminar tackles the
challenging task of building an effective grand strategy in both theory
and practice. It will prepare students for positions that involve the
development of effective national strategy and policy.
Learning Outcomes:
Students who complete this course will have a good understanding of
the concept of grand strategy, how strategies have been developed in
the past, good and bad examples of grand strategy, and
Course Evaluation
This course will rely heavily upon extensive reading, active class
participation, one take-home quiz, and a final paper (14-15 pages; 12
point font; 1.5 spacing; tables, photos, maps, footnotes, and
bibliography will not count against the page limit).
Final Paper
The final paper will be a case study of why and how a strategy was
developed. Students will evaluate the case in terms of the historical
context when the strategy was developed, the key players involved, the
strategic choices that were available, what decisions were reached and
why, and how effective (or not) the strategy was in actual execution.
Grading will be done according to the following criteria:
Class participation 20 %
Mid-term quiz 35 %
Final paper 45 %
Unless there is prior approval by the instructor, late papers are subject
to a reduction of one grade level for each day that they are delayed.
For example, a paper due on Monday that is not turned in until
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Wednesday could be reduced from an A to a B+.
Mobile Phones must be turned off during class. Taking notes on your
laptop is allowed, but please refrain from using a laptop for non-class-
related purposes while in the classroom.
Students who need to miss class must let the instructor know prior to
class. In general, students should plan on missing no more than two
classes during the semester.
Students with Special Needs
If you are a student with a disability and need academic
accommodations, please inform the instructor and contact the Disability
Resource Center at 703-993-2474. All academic accommodations must
be arranged through the DRC.
Weekly Schedule:
Class 1: Course Introduction
This class will be an overview of the course objectives and content,
and will include a review of military terminology and basic
concepts. The value (or lack thereof) of strategy will be discussed.
J. Boone Bartholomees , Jr., ed. US Army War College Guide to
National Security Issues, June 2008., pp. 3 – 49. (Blackboard)
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (The Macmillan Company,
1973), pp. 433-496. (Blackboard)
Colin Gray, “Why Strategy is Difficult,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Summer 1999, pp. 6-12. (Blackboard)
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Class 2: The Nature of Grand Strategy
Early thinking about strategy will be described, primarily using
two classic 19th Century theorists, the German Carl von Clausewitz
and Antoine-Henri Jomini. The elements of grand strategy and
national power will be discussed including diplomacy,
information, military power, and economics. The relationship of
grand strategy to military strategy, operations, and tactics will be
reviewed.
Clausewitz, On War, Books 1 & 2, pp. 75 – 182 and Book 8, pp.
577 – 610.
John Shy, “Jomini”, in Peter Paret, Editor, Makers of Modern
Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.
143-185.
Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Peter Paret, Editor, Makers of
Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986), pp. 186-213.
National Security Strategy of the United States,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_natio
nal_security_strategy.pdf
Class 3: Early Examples of Strategy and Grand Strategy
Historical examples from the 17th to 19th Centuries will be
examined. European and American cases will be reviewed.
Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 38-93
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Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 11-142, 408-443
Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S.
Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1-21.
(Blackboard)
Class 4: The American Civil War
This class session will review the strategy developed by both the
North and South during the Civil War, reviewing how both sides
attempted to craft a course of action that would lead to success.
Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 1-51
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 409-443
Class 5: The First World War
The development of national grand strategies before and during the
First World War will be the focus of this class. The assumptions
various nations made about their strategic situations, and the
understanding key nations had of the military potential of their
own forces and those of their opponents will be reviewed. How
grand strategies evolved over time as the war progressed will be
evaluated.
Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 52-94.
Holger H. Herwig, “Total Rhetoric, Limited War: Germany’s
U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918,” Journal of Military and
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Strategic Studies, Vol 1, No 1 (1998) at
http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/19/18
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 281-325, 510-554
Class 6: Development of Strategy in the Interwar Period, the
1920s and 1930s
Following the carnage of World War I, many nations found
themselves in very different strategic situations compared to the
pre-1914 period. New strategies were needed. Additionally,
military technology was evolving rapidly, which had an effect on
strategic thinking.
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 481-509, 598-647
Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 116-136
Steven Pedler, “Institutional Politics and the US Military’s War
Plan Orange”,
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/document/get/bgsu1182351613
/inline
Class 7: Grand Strategy in World War II – Part 1
World War II was the largest, most devastating conflict in human
history. Waged for nearly six years by the most advanced
industrial nations of that era, the war saw the bringing together of
various military concepts, new technologies, and the different
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strategic goals of the participants. This class will focus on the
European theater.
Maurice Matloff, “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 677-702.
Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine
Warfare, 1914-1945,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 572-
597.
Eliot A. Cohen, “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World
War II,” in Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and
Peace, (New Haven, CT: Yale), pp.43-67 (blackboard)
Class 8: Grand Strategy in World War II – Part 2
As a continuation of the WW II discussion, this class will
concentrate on the Pacific theater.
D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the
Pacific War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.703-732.
US Strategy the Pacific War,
https://www.kokodatreks.com/history/thepacificwar1942/unit
edstatesstrategy.cfm
Class 9: The Cold War – Conventional and Nuclear
Following the end of World War II a new strategic reality was in
place, with the US and USSR having emerged as the dominant
global powers. The end of the Second World War also included
the emergence of nuclear weapons, which had a major influence on
strategic thinking.
Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 735-814
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John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of American National Security, Chapters 2-10.
Class 10: Revolutionary Warfare
The end of World War II also saw much greater importance
attached to what has become known as “irregular” or
“revolutionary” warfare. The threat of nuclear devastation often
led the major powers, particularly the USSR and Communist
China, to use this approach, which was also favored by Third
World nationalists seeking to overthrow European colonial
regimes in the years after 1945. The move toward this form of
conflict had a major influence on strategic thinking.
John Shy and Thomas Collier, Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.
815-862
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The
Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics Vol. 27, #2
(January 1975). (Blackboard)
Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), pp. 164-214. (Blackboard)
Class 11: Post-Cold War Challenges – Nation States
The end of the generally bi-polar Cold War brought significant
changes to the strategic environment. The grand strategic
implications of regional powers in the aftermath of the fall of the
Soviet Union will be examined.
Tosi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Strategy in the Second
Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon,
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Georgetown University Press, 2012
Class 12: Post-Cold War Challenges – Non-State Entities
The rise of non-state actors who have local, regional, or global
influence is a new grand strategic reality that US policy makers
have to contend with.
Steven Van Evera, Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on
Terror: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/vanevera/Annals%20-
%20Assessing%20US%20Strategy%20in%20War%20on%2
0Terror.pdf
National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism,
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-
terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf
The Strategic Blunder Behind the War on Terror,
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/23/paris-massacre-was-
declaration-new-kind-war-298810.html
Class 13: Future U.S. Grand Strategy
Near and mid-term challenges to US interest will be reviewed
including the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the
reemergence of Russian power. How the U.S. might cope with
these and other challenges will be discussed.
China’s Military Rise,
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212
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China’s Rising Military Might, a Grand Strategic Surprise?,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-rising-military-
might-grand-strategy-surprise-10640
China’s Plan to Challenge US as a Rising Global Power,
http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/06/chinas-plan-to-challenge-
us-as-a-rising-global-power/
Resurgent Russia is Already Starting to Show Worrying Signs
of Decline,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2015/10/13/resur
gent-russia-is-actually-starting-to-show-worrying-signs-of-
decline/#758bc6d7b634
Resurgent Russia Poses Threat to NATO, New Commander
Says, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-
View/Article/751800/resurgent-russia-poses-threat-to-nato-
new-commander-says
Class 14: Final Class
The final class will be a review of the key points from the course.
Final papers are due the day the Exam is scheduled for this course.
GMU Plagiarism Statement
Plagiarism means using the exact words, opinions, or factual
information from another person without giving that person credit.
Writers give credit through accepted documentation styles, such as
parenthetical citation, footnotes, or endnotes; a simple listing of
books and articles is not sufficient. Plagiarism is the equivalent of
intellectual robbery and cannot be tolerated in an academic setting.
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Student writers are often confused as to what should be cited.
Some think that only direct quotations need to be credited. While
direct quotations do need citations, so do paraphrases and
summaries of opinions or factual information formerly unknown to
the writers or which the writers did not discover themselves.
Exceptions for this include factual information which can be
obtained from a variety of sources, the writers' own insights or
findings from their own field research, and what has been termed
common knowledge. What constitutes common knowledge can
sometimes be precarious; what is common knowledge for one
audience may not be so for another. In such situations, it is helpful,
to keep the reader in mind and to think of citations as being "reader
friendly." In other words, writers provide a citation for any piece of
information that they think their readers might want to investigate
further. Not only is this attitude considerate of readers, it will
almost certainly ensure that writers will never be guilty of
plagiarism. (statement of English Department at George Mason
University.
Plagiarism and the Internet
Copyright rules also apply to users of the Internet who cite from
Internet sources. Information and graphics accessed electronically
must also be cited, giving credit to the sources. This material
includes but is not limited to e-mail (don't cite or forward someone
else's e-mail without permission), newsgroup material, information
from Web sites, including graphics. Even if you give credit, you
must get permission from the original source to put any graphic
that you did not create on your web page. Shareware graphics are
not free. Freeware clipart is available for you to freely use. If the
material does not say "free," assume it is not. Putting someone
else's Internet material on your web page is stealing intellectual
property. Making links to a site is, at this time, okay, but getting
permission is strongly advised, since many Web sites have their
own requirements for linking to their material.
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Source:
http://mason.gmu.edu/~montecin/plagiarism.htm#plagiarism