CDS143 CDS 13 E rev. 1Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

COMMITTEE ONTHE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

THE WESTERN BALKANS:SECURING A STABLE FUTURE

SPECIAL REPORT

Witold WASZCZYKOWSKI (Poland) Special Rapporteur

www.nato-pa.int 12 October 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: OVERCOMING DEEP-SEATED DIVISIONS......................2A. BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................2B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL LANDSCAPE..........................................................................2C. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND

EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION................................................................................41. Office of the High Representative........................................................................42. EU integration.......................................................................................................43. Relations with NATO............................................................................................5

III. KOSOVO: NEW HOPES........................................................................................................6A. REACHING WORKABLE MODUS VIVENDI.................................................................7B. MULTI-ETHNICITY IN KOSOVO...................................................................................8

1. Political representation of minorities.....................................................................92. Physical safety of people and cultural and religious sites..................................103. Minority languages, education and religion........................................................10

C. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY................................................................11

IV. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA:CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION......................................................................................12A. EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS.............12B. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES.........................................................................................14C. BUILDING A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY.....................................................................15

V. CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………18

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The stabilisation of the Western Balkans and their gradual integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions remains an important prerequisite for European and transatlantic security. The region has undergone remarkable transformation during the last two decades, making enormous efforts to become an area of stability and prosperity. The probability of another outbreak of armed conflicts has been considerably reduced. Substantial progress has been made bringing war criminals to justice. The Balkans have also transformed the Euro-Atlantic institutions, serving as catalyst for NATO to enter the business of crisis management, and for the EU to launch its European Security and Defence Policy.

2. At the same time, the task of a full normalisation of the region has yet to be completed. The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still fragile and beset by internal squabbles that prevent the country from moving forward. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 is on the doorstep of NATO membership having been granted Membership Action Plan (MAP) 14 years ago, but is unable to cross it due to the unresolved name dispute with Greece. However, a wind of optimism and reform is re-emerging in the region following the landmark April 2013 agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. The political will and maturity of the choices local leaders made was rewarded with a decision to open negotiations on Serbia’s EU membership and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the EU. The actual implementation of the agreement has yet to be ensured fully, however.

3. While other parts of the Western Balkan region also face a range of domestic as well as foreign policy challenges, the Rapporteur chose to focus on these three countries/entities because the international community’s presence there is in particular demand. The Rapporteur will argue that the international community has to revisit its strategy and employ comprehensive, efficient and tailor made policies for each country in the region. The vague promise of EU and NATO membership may have stopped the regress, but it does not always provide a sufficient incentive for some countries to seek genuine reconciliation and to implement meaningful reforms. New approaches ought to be explored, taking into account, of course, the fragility of the region. The Rapporteur will emphasise that while the international community’s contribution is vital, the primary responsibility lies with local politicians who must demonstrate their political maturity and ability to overcome entrenched positions.

4. The report will build upon the findings of the Assembly’s previous reports, seminars and visits, including the excellent 2010 report The Western Balkans, 15 Years After Dayton: Achievements and Prospects by Marc Angel (Luxembourg), the visits of this Committee members to Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, 2011, to Belgrade and Pristina in October 2012, to Skopje in April 2013, the visit of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnership to Belgrade and Pristina in May 2013, and the Rose-Roth seminar in Sveti Stefan, Montenegro in October 2012.

1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

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II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: OVERCOMING DEEP-SEATED DIVISIONS

A. BACKGROUND

5. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement may have imposed an awkward and flawed state architecture2

on the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is nevertheless credited for ending the war and maintaining peace for nearly two decades now. The security situation has been satisfactory, and basic day-to-day needs of the people are being met. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has acquired single currency and built single armed forces (multi-ethnic on the larger unit level).

6. However, the Bosnian state appears to be ill-equipped to tackle the more ambitious goals. The inability of Bosnian elites to overcome domestic political stalemate, to advance the country’s European integration agenda, to address failing economy, human and drug trafficking, organised crime and corruption is a cause of growing frustration among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as international community.

7. Attempting to revise Dayton has long been resisted both internally, particularly by the Republika Srpska (RS), reluctant to reinforce central institutions in Sarajevo, as well as externally, due to the fear of the part of international community to undermine fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a series of recent crises indicate that without certain Constitutional modifications the erosion of stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina could accelerate dangerously. In addition, the so-called Sejdic-Finci3 ruling leaves Bosnian authorities no choice but to revisit the country’s Constitutional arrangement. Unfortunately, the current political landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina gives little hope that a breakthrough can be achieved. It is assumed that Bosniak politicians seek greater centralisation of the country; Serbs want greater sovereignty for or even secession of Republika Srpska, while Croats seek additional political protections, sometimes going as far as demanding a creation of a separate territorial entity. In reality, however, there are little attempts to change the status quo because the proportional division of power among ethnic groups ensures lucrative positions for politicians.

B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

8. The political party system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided along the ethnic lines and the national decision-making process is based on the interplay between the three main ethnic groups rather than political ideologies. The combination of the extremely complex and decentralised political system and the tendency of Bosnian politicians to cling to rigid ethnic positions make frequent political crises in this country almost inevitable. Bosnian politicians are hostages to the promises they made aiming to mobilise and retain their ethnic electorate.2 The present Constitution establishes a decentralised State under close international

supervision, in which two Entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska – and three constituent populations: ethnic Croats, ethnic Serbs and Bosniaks - coexist. Central State attributes are reduced to a minimum and a series of instruments, such as the right of veto when vital interests are affected, seek to prevent one community from dominating the others.

3 This 2009 European Court of Human Rights ruling requires Bosnia and Herzegovina to change its Constitution in order to allow ethnic minorities run for top governing posts that are currently reserved for the three ‘constituent peoples’, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

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Source: U.S. Department of State

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9. On the central government level, by the virtue of direct elections, the tripartite presidency should theoretically enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. However, due to the absence of a separate Croat entity, the Croat of the current presidency, Mr Komsic, had been elected largely by Bosniak votes, causing dissatisfaction within the Bosnian Croat community.4 This factor, coupled with internal frictions within the presidency, explain why this institution tends to refrain from difficult decision making (ICG, 2012).

10. In terms of the Council of Ministers, there is an unwritten agreement that the position of chairman should rotate between the constituent peoples. However, since these ethnic communities do not always speak with one voice, the process of government formation is far from smooth. Following the 2010 elections, it took 15 months of complicated negotiations to finally reach a compromise. Vjekoslav Bevanda, a Croat, was appointed as Bosnia and Herzegovina's new Prime minister. He promised to turn 2012 into a “European year”, making progress on the EU’s 2012 “Roadmap” for Bosnia and Herzegovina and getting the economy back on track.

11. Unfortunately, the new government failed to fulfil this promise. Much of its energy was directed to reshuffling of the ruling coalition. In October 2012, the EU Progress Report found that virtually none of the main conditions identified in the “Roadmap” had been met. According to the IMF, economic activity slowed down in 2012 (Jukic, 2012), and the World Bank expects Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic growth in 2013 to be the lowest in the region – merely 0.5% growth (World Bank).

12. The legislative branch suffers from efficiency issues as well. Within the two-chamber parliament, several mechanisms – such as the ‘entity voting’ instrument – are in place to protect the interests of all three constituent peoples. In practice this means that qualified voting applies to virtually every parliamentary decision, which makes the legislative process slow and difficult. The inefficiency of this process recently surfaced as the failure to agree on ID legislation, essential for birth certificates and passports, prevented a sick baby from being issued the necessary documents and receive life-saving treatment out of the country. This caused wide spread rallies in Sarajevo, with thousands of people demanding the political elites to assume responsibility and set aside short-term ethnic or party interests.

1. Serious tensions exist not only between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and RS, but also within the Federation itself. Following a breakup of a coalition of several Bosniak and Croat parties and the formation of a new one at the end of 2012, the government was supposed to be rearranged accordingly. However, the president of the entity, himself a member of a Croat party that was removed from the coalition, refused to replace the ministers in question, leading to a protracted political crisis. The Federation was further disturbed by the arrest of the president on corruption charges, who after spending a month in legally questionable detention returned to his presidential duties.

2. It is quite clear that there is urgent need of a new Constitutional reform dialogue, in light of the elections in 2014. Council of Europe secretary-general Thorbjorn Jagland and the EU Enlargement commissioner Stefan Füle warned Bosnia and Herzegovina that failure to implement the Sejdic-Finci ruling would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the country’s parliament and presidency to be elected in 2014. Yet, due to the highly polarised political atmosphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the chances of politicians reaching an agreement are not high. The Constitution reform process should be inclusive and transparent and involve all the stakeholders, including academia and civil society. This path towards reconciliation could be more promising than negotiations among politicians. In this context and with the facilitation of the US embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in late June 2013, the Federation’s parliament adopted a conclusion on the reform of the entity's Constitution, based on recommendations of a special group of experts. This group, which involve legal experts and civil society representatives, presented almost 200 4 Allowing Croats to elect their member of the Presidency separately would be problematic in the

context of the Sejdic-Finci ruling which disapproves ethnicity-based voting.

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recommendations, including scrapping the entity’s presidency and ensuring the rights of those who do not declare themselves members of the ‘constituent peoples’. These efforts are to be commended and supported, as they are based on a ‘bottom up’ approach to the constitutional reform (Jukic, 2012).

C. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

1. Office of the High Representative

3. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), a UN appointed body, created by the Dayton accords, and present in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 is overseeing the civilian peace implementation efforts. This supervision role has been strengthened in 1997 by the so-called “Bonn powers” which have mandated the OHR to dismiss local leaders as well as to impose legislation in order to bring unity and reform to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In respect for the country’s sovereignty, these special powers are very rarely used.

4. There is no clear consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the precise role that the OHR should play in fostering reconciliation and reform. Some see it as essential in a system where compromise remains elusive and want the international community to play a more proactive role as the OHR has done over the last decade. Others argue that it only provides an excuse for the political class to evade responsibility. Officials in Republika Srpska are in particular in favour of stripping OHR of its special powers (European Forum). OHR will eventually have to transfer its functions to Bosnian institutions, but the recent political crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and failure to agree on a Constitutional reform show that, for the time being, relinquishing these powers would be premature and may destabilise the situation in this country.

2. EU integration

5. As the OHR is keeping low profile, the EU has significantly reinforced its presence and effectively emerged as the leading international organisation operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As noted, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU jointly devised a roadmap on EU integration which included the priority reform areas and specific obligations to be fulfilled. In order to get closer to the EU membership, the country needs first and foremost to address three key issues: 1) making changes in the Constitution to comply with the Sejdic-Finci ruling; 2) adopting legislation on state aid; and 3) adopting the Population Census law at state level5.

6. Regrettably, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress towards meeting the political criteria for the EU membership. The deadlines outlined in the EU’s “Roadmap” for Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been met. Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to adopt a law on state aid at the central government level and a law on holding a census in 2013. However, it failed to fulfil a pressing task: the consensual adoption of amendments to the Constitution which will ensure compliance with the Sejdic-Finci case. This failure has practically frozen the EU integration process. In July 2013, the Council of the European Union expressed disappointment over the lack of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted that “as other countries of the region make progress, Bosnia and Herzegovina is lagging behind”. It is not unrealistic to expect, however, that the landmark Belgrade–Pristina agreement and the Croatian membership in the EU, will provide a new stimulus for reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. In the context of the EU’s role, it is also worth remembering that in 2004 EUFOR (Operation EUFOR - ALTHEA) took over the mission to ensure safe and secure environment in 5 Popular census is a key priority for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reliable and up-to-date statistics

are needed for serious and sound economic planning, for the delivery of public services and for the general development of the country.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO’s SFOR. The size of EUFOR has been shrinking constantly from its original size of just under 7,000 troops. After the reconfiguration of EUFOR-ALTHEA in October 2011, the Force is reduced to approximately 600 people, mainly focusing on capacity building and training of the Bosnian army. However, in case of an emergency, an out -of-country Intermediate Reserve Force can be called upon on short notice to intervene in support of Bosnian authorities in order to restore peace and order.

3. Relations with NATO

8. NATO initial presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was focused on the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton accords. The NATO–Bosnia and Herzegovina relationship has acquired a different dimension since 2006, when Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace program. The Alliance supports Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path towards NATO membership through a number of instruments, including Planning and Review Process, Individual Partnership Action Plan and Intensified Dialogue.

9. In 2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina was conditionally granted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, this step was conditional on the registration of defense installations as the property of the central, rather than entity, government. The first Annual National Programme under MAP will take place only once this condition is met. This issue is highly politicised and is a part of a broader dispute between the Republika Srpska and Sarajevo over the division of immovable property. The implementation of an agreement on this issue is effectively blocked, causing disappointment within NATO. The problem of immovable property is seen by NATO not only as a practical issue for the armed forces, but also as a test for the country’s politicians – failure to agree on this relatively minor problem raises questions on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to make decisions on more important issues of Euro-Atlantic security.

10. On the other hand, the Alliance highly values the progress in the destruction of surplus stocks of arms and the decision to increase the Bosnian contribution to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).6 The defence sector reform represents the most significant achievement of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reform created a unified military structure, and the multi-ethic model of the armed forces (at least among larger military units) has been a force for integration in the country. The reform stands in sharp contrast to the lack of progress in other areas.

11. NATO membership enjoys relatively high support among the Bosnian people, but it varies greatly among its ethnic communities. The overwhelming majority of Bosniaks and Croats support membership. However, in Republika Srpska public opinion has yet to be won over on this point. The leadership of Republika Srpska champions the idea of holding a referendum in this Serb-dominated entity on NATO membership.

12. The international community must remain strongly engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly as mounting political, economic and social tensions could have appalling humanitarian and security consequences for the country and for the region as a whole. Yet, no amount of international support can substitute for the political will of Bosnian politicians. If politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina are serious about their stated goal of joining the Euro-Atlantic community, they must be prepared to revisit their entrenched positions.

6 Currently 53 Bosnians serve in the ISAF Regional Command North. Bosnia and Herzegovina also recently decided to deploy a unit of the Military Police to Afghanistan.

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III. KOSOVO: NEW HOPES

25. As Pristina celebrates the fifth anniversary of the independence declaration, the international community seems to have come to terms with the status quo, at least for the time being. “Normalisation” of relations between Belgrade and Pristina rather than achieving an ultimate agreement on Kosovo’s status has been the focus of diplomatic efforts of the last few years. The perceptiveness of this pragmatic approach has been highlighted by the EU-brokered 19 April 2013 agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. It was rightfully described as an historic and ground breaking moment for both Serbia and Kosovo, a pathway to stabilisation of the region and a key for unlocking the Euro–Atlantic door. The agreement, however, does not resolve all issues both Kosovo and Serbia face. In terms of local and regional challenges, the implementation of the agreement will have to be wisely arranged and in a manner that will not create feelings of betrayal and animosity, neither among the Serbian nor the Kosovo people.

1. The agreement did not address the issue of final status of Kosovo. The majority of NATO (24 out of 28)7 and the EU (23 out of 28)8 member states have recognised Kosovo’s independence. Except for Serbia and BiH, the remaining four former Yugoslav Republics have also done so. With its independent institutions being increasingly entrenched, and having been recognised by most European countries as well as by global powers such as the United States, Japan and Australia, Pristina is understandably reluctant to accept any limitations on its sovereignty. Pristina’s determination is also strengthened by the July 2010 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion announcing that “the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law”.9

2. That said, around half of the UN 193 member states have not recognised Kosovo’s independence, including important global powers such as Russia, China and India. There is a consensus among the overwhelming majority of mainstream Serbian politicians that Kosovo’s secession would never be accepted, as stipulated in the Serbian Constitution. Serbian diplomacy did a good job convincing the EU that even the promise of membership was not a sufficient incentive to induce Belgrade to relinquish its claim to Kosovo. About 62% of Serbian population said that Kosovo’s independence should not be recognized at any cost (while another poll suggests 63% of Serbs admit that Kosovo de facto functions as an independent state).

3. Other proposals on the status issue – such as secession of northern Kosovo Serb municipalities or land swap (North Kosovo for the Albanian-speaking region in south Serbia) – occasionally float around, but they do not seem to be seriously entertained neither by Belgrade nor Pristina and have become somewhat obsolete following the signing of 19 April 2013 agreement. The idea is very unpopular among international community representatives due to the fear of creating a precedent and opening a Pandora’s box again in this fragile region. Even representatives of the Serb communities north of Ibar river, whom the NATO PA CDS delegation met in October 2012, did not support the idea of partitioning – nor secession of – Kosovo.

7 The non-recognisers are Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.8 The same four countries plus Cyprus.9 It must be noted, however, that the ICJ has adopted a very narrow legalistic approach to the question

put to them and did not examine the more general issue of Kosovo’s – or any other entity’s – right to secession.

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Kosovo Serb enclaves south of Ibar are particularly against the idea which would significantly reduce the share of the Serb population in Kosovo.

4. In this context, the Rapporteur is convinced that the international community’s strategy towards Kosovo – at least in a foreseeable future – should be based on three key elements: 1) comfortable legal and political formulas must be found enabling the Kosovo institutions, the Serbian authorities and the international community as well as the people of the region to interact efficiently, while leaving aside the issue of status; 2) the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo institutions and society must be meticulously preserved; and 3) the international community must remain committed to assisting the reform process and to maintaining peace and stability in Kosovo.

A. REACHING WORKABLE MODUS VIVENDI

5. The direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina that culminated in 19 April 2013 agreement has been a difficult process and seemed to have reached an impasse on more than one occasion. They began in March 2011 under the auspices of the EU and within a period of two years yielded some important results. Agreements have been reached on integrated management of border/boundary crossings, freedom of movement, mutual recognition of university diplomas, registration documents, customs and trade. The record of implementing these agreements is, however, mixed.10

6. A notable agreement was reached on Kosovo's representation at regional meetings. It was agreed that the entity will be referred to as “Kosovo” and the following footnote will be added: "This label [i.e. "Kosovo"] does not prejudge the status of Kosovo and is in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo's declaration of independence."11 The agreement facilitates significantly Serbia’s and the international community’s ability to interact with Kosovo without making a statement on its status. The ‘Footnote agreement’ (coupled with Serbia’s actions to capture war crimes suspects) also prompted the EU to grant Serbia candidate status in March 2012. As for Kosovo, the Commission had adopted a Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo, which confirmed that an agreement could be concluded between the EU and Kosovo in a situation where EU member states maintained different views on its status.

7. Following the presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia, the talks resumed in late 2012 on the level of Prime ministers. Mr Dacic’s and Mr Thaci’s historic handshake at the first meeting in Brussels elevated hopes for significant progress in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. In January 2013, Belgrade adopted a comprehensive resolution and a ‘platform’, outlining its principal positions in the context of talks with Pristina. While Serbia remains firmly committed to never recognizing Kosovo’s independence, Belgrade’s expressed readiness to discuss practical issues – particularly those aimed at improving lives of the Serb population in Kosovo – bodes well for the process of “normalisation”. Several rounds of talks took place in Brussels since, reportedly focusing on the implementation of previous agreements, the situation in the northern regions of Kosovo, protection of Serb cultural and religious sites and transportation infrastructure. Belgrade and Pristina agreed to exchange liaison officers between

10 In particular the implementation of border/boundary management agreement must be stepped up. In the past, Serb communities north of the Ibar river attempted to obstruct the takeover of the border check points by the Pristina authorities. In December 2012, the agreement on integrated management started to be implemented in all major crossing points. However, to this day the situation remains fragile. Clear procedures allowing officials to travel across the border/boundary have yet to be established.

11 Inclusion of the reference to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), authorising international civil and military presence in Kosovo, was insisted upon by Belgrade, which considers it to be supportive of Serbia’s sovereignty claim over Kosovo.

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them, which is expected to improve the monitoring of the implementation of bilateral technical agreements.

8. However, the “normalisation” of relations between Belgrade and Pristina depended crucially on their ability to find a compromise on the predominantly Serbian northern regions of Kosovo that were effectively outside of Pristina’s control. As noted, on 19 April 2013, Serbian and Kosovo Prime ministers signed a breakthrough agreement on this issue. Centred on the creation of an “Association of Serb Municipalities”, the 15-point agreement (ratified by the Assembly of Kosovo on 21 April, and approved by the Serbian Parliament on 26 April) gives considerable autonomy to Serb-majority municipalities, including in sensitive areas such as policing and judiciary. The agreement envisages dismantling “parallel” structures in northern regions of Kosovo, and commits both sides to reaching agreements on energy and telecoms and not blocking each other’s European integration.

9. The agreement has been praised widely by the international community and prompted the European Commission to suggest awarding Serbia with an EU accession start date and signing SAA with Kosovo. Both suggestions were endorsed by the Council of the EU in June. The EU’s swift and positive reaction must be commended as it adds credibility to the incentives it offers to the region.

10. That said, the actual implementation of the agreement remains a serious challenge. Authorities in Belgrade and Pristina have to convince – with concrete actions – their European colleagues that they are genuinely committed to implementing the agreement, and that signing it was not a mere tool to get closer to the EU membership. In this context, statements such as calls from top Serbian officials to the ethnic Serb population in Kosovo urging them to participate in Pristina-run Kosovo local elections in November 2013 are highly creditable.

B. MULTI-ETHNICITY IN KOSOVO

11. Protecting and strengthening the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo society should be a mutual interest of both Belgrade and Pristina, and Kosovo authorities are making considerable efforts to that end. This objective constituted a major element of the 2007 Ahtisaari Plan, a UN-mandated roadmap towards a sovereign, democratic, multi-ethnic and decentralised Kosovo. The Plan was rejected by Serbia (and not accepted by the UN Security Council) due to its indirect references to Kosovo’s sovereignty and statehood, but many of premises remain sound. The international community widely welcomes the inclusion of these premises – such as making Serbian one of the official languages, ensuring adequate representation of minorities in state institutions and granting substantial powers to local government – into Kosovo’s Constitution and laws.

12. One has to take into account that Kosovo is becoming increasingly mono-ethnic. According to 2011 census, Kosovo Albanians constitute about 92% of population, up from 82% in 1991. That being said, the political situation at both times impacted on the number of citizens included in the census, thereby skewing the results (albeit to a limited degree). Nevertheless, the population changes of Kosovo should be monitored, to ensure that the constitutionally envisioned political representation in central and local government, use of languages, budget allocation and access to education for ethnic minorities is fulfilled.

13. The concerns of the Kosovo Serb population, finding itself under pressure to change their identity from being the citizens of Serbia to being citizens of Kosovo, are understandable. Links between Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade cannot be completely cut off. However, the situation is unhealthy when education, health care and other public services in Kosovo Serb enclaves – including, to a lesser degree, in Serb municipalities south of the Ibar river – are funded and run by Belgrade is unhealthy. The 19 April agreement included the removal of some of the “parallel” structures in the north. These structures should be phased out in a sensitive manner. Replacement structures should, in keeping with the EU’s General Affairs Council December 2012

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conclusions, “meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a transparent and co-operative manner, and in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up within Kosovo”.

1. Political representation of minorities

14. Taken at face value, Kosovo’s institutional structure is very generous towards ethnic minorities. The Constitution guaranties 20 seats (out of 120) for representatives of minority communities. These communities are represented in the government with three ministerial positions including one Deputy prime minister.

15. However, despite the solid Constitutional base, the reality is more complicated. The deputies from the minority communities lack the capacity for substantial legislative input (PACE, 2013). Also, many positions reserved for members of the communities are not filled, partly because Kosovo Serbs refuse to participate and thus legitimise the institutions of independent Kosovo as well as because the pool of young, well-educated and qualified people living in Serb enclaves south of the Ibar river has been significantly depleted.

16. The Serbian community south of the Ibar river - the majority of Kosovo Serb population – is increasingly aging, rural and passive (ICG, 2012). However, these people are relatively more integrated into the Kosovo society, and a number of their representatives participate in Kosovo institutions and political life. The Serb minority town of Gracanica, enjoying relative stability and ability to provide basic services to its citizens, is a model that Pristina would like to see applied in all Serbian communities in Kosovo. Yet, even in Serbian municipalities south of the Ibar river, structures that are funded and controlled by Belgrade (referred to as “parallel” structures by Pristina) still exist, particularly in the fields of education and health care.

17. The reintegration of four Serb-majority municipalities located north of the Ibar river following the 19 April agreement will be a daunting challenge. The region has an estimated population of between 57-60,000. It was under the effective control of Serb local institutions that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence and were, in turn, themselves not recognised officially by Pristina. These structures depended heavily on Belgrade financial support. The standoff that existed since 1999 hampered considerably the economic development of the region and fuelled the activity of criminal groups.

18. The local Serb population in these four municipalities is overwhelmingly against the idea of independent Kosovo, as shown by the results of their local plebiscite in February 2012. Many of them protested against the signing of the 19 April agreement and felt betrayed by Belgrade. Nevertheless, when the NATO PA delegation met with representatives of these communities in May 2013, they did not reject outright the 19 April agreement and did not threaten to sabotage it. They did, however, have a number of concerns about the future of their communities and sought additional reassurances that their rights would be respected. Pristina, Belgrade and the international community must redouble their efforts to dispel these concerns, whether real or imagined, if the 19 April agreement is to be implemented fully.

19. The municipal elections scheduled for 3 November 2013 will be serious test for the new administrative framework of Kosovo as envisaged by the 19 April agreement. Unfortunately, they are likely to take place under old electoral code that was criticised for its loopholes. Amendments were submitted rectifying some of them, including scrapping provisional voting and limiting the number of political party observers at polling stations, but the Assembly of Kosovo failed to adopt them. Nevertheless, it is imperative that Kosovo institutions, supported by the international community, ensure that these crucial elections are conducted as smoothly and transparently as possible.

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20. Kosovo police (KP), on the other hand, has been able to achieve a considerable progress in terms of professionalism and ethnic diversity; 13% of positions are occupied by the minorities. KP has a key role to play in maintaining law and order in the service of the population and also by acting as a vehicle for integrating the various communities. In July 2013, Kosovo Prime minister Thaci announced that all “parallel” police structures in Serb-majority northern municipalities have been dismantled and promised that local people willing to joining KP would have an opportunity to do so (Peci, 2013).

2. Physical safety of people and cultural and religious sites

21. The transfer of responsibility for protecting Serb religious and cultural sites in Kosovo from KFOR to Kosovo law enforcement institutions is an important test for the latter. The objective information on the actual threats faced by national minorities in Kosovo is very difficult to acquire. During its October 2012 visit to Belgrade and Pristina, the NATO PA delegation was told by the Serbian officials that since June 1999, about 1,000 Serbs and non-Albanians were killed in Kosovo, and none of these murders were fully investigated. During the same period, nearly 300,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians became refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs). According to 2013 UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency) report, there were some 210,000 displaced persons in Serbia from Kosovo, of whom 97,000 were in need of assistance. According to the Serbian sources, since June 1999 about 30,000 Serbian houses were destroyed and more than 150 Serbian Christian Orthodox sites have been damaged or destroyed.

22. On the other hand in Pristina, Hajredin Kuci, Deputy prime minister and minister of Justice, told the delegation that “from 2008, not a single ethnic-related incident occurred south of Ibar”. Kosovo government officials also stated that the figures provided by Belgrade on human and material losses of the non-Albanian population in Kosovo were not realistic and grossly inflated.

23. While the actual situation is certainly somewhere between the two extremes, it is evident that additional efforts are necessary to address crimes affecting minority communities, including low-level harassment, intimidation, simple assaults, and property-related crime as well as acts of vandalism and religious intolerance (PACE, 2013). Pristina’s efforts to protect non-Albanian population, property and cultural heritage in Kosovo are critical in order to ensure the safe and sustainable returns of IDPs and refugees. Significant sums of money have been spent to rebuild their houses or build new ones as well as to build schools and infrastructure objects for the returnees. The Implementation and Monitoring Council in Prizren and Rahovec has recently been established, which should be recognised as a positive step towards cultural heritage preservation. However, the number of returns remains low (OSCE, 2012).

3. Minority languages, education and religion

24. Albanian and Serbian are the two official languages of Kosovo; they can both be used equally in all Kosovo institutions. With the establishment of the language Commission, protection and complaint mechanisms were put in place. However, this mechanism is barely used, and breaches of the right to use a language occur both on central and local levels (OSCE, 2012). Official signs in Serbian – such as street names – are also frequently painted over by vandals and not restored.

25. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that younger generations educated in either the Kosovo or the Serbian education system operating in Kosovo do not have sufficient opportunities to learn both official languages. Furthermore, the interaction between both teachers and students from different communities in most municipalities is non-existent.

26. Ensuring the freedom of religion is another pre-condition for preserving heterogeneity of the Kosovo society. Currently, the degree of “Islamisation” of Kosovo is very low. Kosovo’s political leaders are sending strong messages that Kosovo will remain a secular European state. The secular nature of Kosovo is enshrined in its Constitution and laws; restrictions are in place on

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religious symbols – such as headscarves – in state schools. Most Albanians in Kosovo follow a moderate form of Islam. Albanian ethnicity and European geopolitical orientation seem to be more important elements of their identity than the Muslim faith. However, the role of religion has increased in Kosovo since the break-up of Yugoslavia (as has, in fact, the role of the Christian churches in other parts of former Yugoslavia as well). Followers of more rigid forms of Islam have become a visible, albeit still very tiny, group in Kosovo society. Occasionally, religious hardliners protest against what they perceive as excessive secularism of Kosovo authorities. Several minor incidents, allegedly caused by fanatics, have been reported (Xharra). However, at this stage, religious extremism does not pose a tangible threat, and the overwhelming majority of Kosovo people share the European view of the role of religion in a modern society.

C. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

52. International presence in Kosovo has been winding down in recent years. Since 2008, the size of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was reduced almost three times. The role of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in 1999 by the Resolution 1244, and authorised to provide day-to-day administration for Kosovo, has been substantially reduced since the declaration of independence in 2008. The decision by the International Steering Group (ISG)12 to end the so-called Supervised Independence of Kosovo in September 2012 was an indication that Western powers appreciate Kosovo’s progress in building a modern state. Nevertheless, some international presence – particularly that of KFOR, the EU and EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) – remains critically important and is, in fact, supported by all major local and regional actors and communities (with some reservations towards EULEX by a part of Kosovo Serb population).

27. NATO has made a significant contribution to the conclusion of the 19 April agreement. The Alliance’s secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen has pledged that “KFOR will stand ready to support the implementation of this latest agreement to the best of our ability within our current mandate.”

28. KFOR’s presence had been decisive in maintaining safety and security for all individuals and communities in Kosovo for the last 13 years. Today, some 5,000 troops from 30 countries (22 NATO member states and 8 KFOR partners), continue to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. KFOR’s future presence in Kosovo is closely related to the political progress, the slow pace of which requires a solid force posture for the months to come. The Rapporteur is convinced that the KFOR presence will be required in the foreseeable future to ensure the implementation of the 19 April agreement and strongly supports the continuation of the mission, whether in its current form or if it were to be handed over to the EU.

29. The historic agreement on normalising relations has revived the EU membership dreams and reinforced the EU’s leverages in the region. The EU had developed an ambitious agenda since the end of 2011 and had significantly reinforced its presence in Kosovo. The decision on the opening of negotiations on the SAA is reaffirming the EU’s commitment to Kosovo and the region. However, the EU commissioner Füle warned Pristina that the negotiations will not be easy. Kosovo needs to embody the spirit of the EU, if it wants to join it: the necessary laws introducing the European standards are adopted, but Kosovo institutions need to redouble their efforts to implement them. While the EU membership is not feasible in the short term, the promise of visa liberalisation alone is a very powerful incentive for Kosovo authorities: the fact that the people of Kosovo, unlike all of their neighbours, cannot travel freely to other European countries, is an enormous impediment. The European integration remains the strongest lever for encouraging

12 The ISG is made up of 23 EU members, the United States, and Turkey. It has overseen Kosovo since its 2008 declaration of independence.

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Kosovo to drive forward priority reforms in areas such as rule of law and fight against crime and corruption.

30. Due to the weakness of the rule of law culture and fragility of administrative structures, Kosovo will require international assistance in this area for years to come. In this context, the role of EULEX is critical. EULEX, which has the right to assume limited executive powers over specific criminal cases and is occasionally criticised, especially for its limited ability to function in the northern part of Kosovo, did, nevertheless, succeed in bringing cases against some corrupt politicians, mayors and police officers. EULEX is also leading a high-profile investigation of allegations of a human organ harvesting by some former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters. Five men related to the Medicus clinic outside Pristina have been found guilty and sentenced and further investigations are ongoing. The European Court of Auditors found, in October 2012, that “EU assistance to Kosovo in the field of the rule of law has not been sufficiently effective”, due to “specific circumstances of Kosovo”, but also to the EULEX’s “staffing constraints” (ECA). However, recently EULEX Kosovo was reconfigured to make the mission stronger, leaner, and more efficient. It also recently signed an important agreement with KP to facilitate the sharing of information with the aim of preventing, detecting and reducing serious crime.

IV. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION

57. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made remarkable progress since it became independent in 1991. It stands out among other countries of the former Yugoslavia as a country that managed to avoid armed conflicts, although in 2001 it was on the brink of an inter-ethnic conflict. By accommodating demands of the ethnic Albanian community, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) prevented the disintegration of a country and a spillover of instability to the region. The international community, mainly through the OSCE and the EU, has been the guarantor of the OFA. The EU’s large presence in the country, supporting the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire, plays a crucial role in stabilising the country.

31. That said, the country faces a number of serious challenges, including the “name issue”, the consolidation of its multi-ethnic character, democratic institutions, media freedom and civil society. Skopje’s progress in these areas is the essential pre-condition for fulfillment of its Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

A. EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS

32. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia received MAP in 1999 and public opinion still shows strong support for NATO membership. In its 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Allies agreed that the country will be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is going through the 14th cycle of the Membership Action Plan, and is co-operating with NATO in the framework of the Planning and Review Process (PARP). The country is also contributing substantially to NATO, EU and UN operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Kosovo. The country contributes significantly to NATO-led operations: it currently deploys 158 troops to the ISAF Regional Command Capital. In his meeting with the visiting NATO PA delegation, Defence minister Talat Xhaferi stressed that Skopje was prepared to continue contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

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33. The country had completed the professionalisation of the armed forces in 2006, the first one to do so in the region. The current challenge was to maintain these standards in difficult economic times. As a result of global economic context, the country’s defence budget had been decreasing over the years and currently stood at just over 1% of GDP, and the bulk of it was spent on salaries.

34. Prior to the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO membership was considered an essential strategic goal and was supported by an overwhelming majority of the citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or political sympathies. However, a large share of the ethnic majority community believes that agreeing to concessions over the name, identity and language of the country in exchange for the unblocking by Greece of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, is too high a price to pay. It is noteworthy that ethnic Albanians stand firmly behind Euro-Atlantic integration and are more prone to compromises on the “name issue”.

35. Lingering disputes with neighbors include disputes over the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation, controversies about historical events and the denial of the Macedonian language. These are deep-rooted issues and the reconciliation process will be long. Both the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party and the social-democrats shared the view that any agreement with Athens would have to be confirmed by the people of their country in a referendum.

36. Under the auspices of the United Nations, bilateral talks have been held since 1991 with the mediation of US diplomat Matthew Nimetz. A comprehensive solution should also tackle the problem of the use of the adjective “Macedonian”. In recent months, the talks on the name issue have been intensified. The mediator Nimetz visited both Athens and Skopje in in the first half of 2013, presented new proposals, the details of which were not officially disclosed. Media and some local politicians speculated that these proposals included the words “Northern” or “Upper” preceding either the word “Republic” or the word “Macedonia” in “Republic of Macedonia”. Leader of the Albanian junior government partner DUI were quoted as saying that they were prepared to accept the name “Upper Macedonia”. These statements prompted criticism from Prime minister Nikola Gruevski and his VMRO-DPMNE party and resulted in increased tensions within the ruling coalition. Up until now, the Albanian coalition partner was not intensively included in neither the UN talks or in a wider public debate since it considered the name of the country a sensitive issue which needs to be resolved by the political representatives of the Macedonian majority. However, Mr Ahmeti was clear that the Albanian interests in the negotiations must be preserved and that a name that does not reflect the multi-ethnic character of the country is not acceptable.

37. A compromise on the “name issue” will require stable governing coalitions and full support from both countries’ parliaments. Both sides had already made some concessions (Skopje agreed for their country to be temporary referred to as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, while Greece abandoned its earlier opposition to the very use of the word “Macedonia”, insisting only on a geographic qualifier preceding it), but further progress and compromises were needed. Besides the “name issue”, there are no other major problems between Athens and Skopje, and co-operation in various fields between the two countries is very active, including cross border programmes, police and customs co-operation as well as military co-operation. In terms of economic relations, imports from Greece considerably increased in 2012 thus making Greece the second largest trade partner and fourth largest source of investment (10% of total inward investment) (European Commission, 2013).

38. The status quo on the “name issue” is not tenable and it bears risks for stability in the country and the region. The unresolved issue feeds into state-sponsored nationalist and divisive rhetoric and progressively marginalises compromising views within society.

39. Relations between Skopje and neighboring Bulgaria have been strained in 2012. Bulgaria is notably wary of the growing nationalist discourse in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the treatment of what it considers Bulgarians living in the former Yugoslav Republic of

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Macedonia. However, following the December 2012 European Council, when serious concerns about tensions between Skopje and Sofia, both countries agreed to sign a bilateral agreement on good neighbourly relations, to create working groups on sensitive issues, and to hold annual intergovernmental meetings. Numerous co-operation initiatives took place in 2013, such as high profile meetings, increased trade and co-operation on security and defence issues (European Commission, 2013). Although recognising the country with its Constitutional name, Bulgaria has strong stakes in the solution to the “name issue” as the term “Northern Macedonia” might also encompass a region within Bulgaria (Marusic, 2012).

40. In terms of EU integration, in 2012, the European Commission (EC) launched the High Level Accession Dialogue to stimulate domestic reforms in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The EU’s annual support to the country amounted to roughly 100 million euro. In its 2013 spring Progress Report, the EC recommended for the fifth time that Member States open EU accession negotiations. However, unlike the previous one, the latest Progress Report did not use the adjective “Macedonian”.

41. However, despite the continuous recommendations from the Commission, the Council of the EU has yet refused so far to give the green light to the accession talks. At the June European Council Summit, the issue was not even included in the agenda. The reluctance to even discuss it can be interpreted as a message from the EU leaders to the government in Skopje to redouble efforts to resolve the “name dispute” and fully implement the 1 March agreement (mentioned below in this report). However, the European leaders should be aware of the frustration that is building up in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over the “name issue” and growing disbelief of the country in the Euro-Atlantic prospects. Both the EU and NATO should maintain consistent, positive and supportive relations with the country, demonstrating that the desired membership is an achievable and realistic option rather than an overused empty phrase.

B. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

42. Addressing domestic challenges is currently the major obstacle on the path of the country’s European integration. The domestic political landscape in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was affected considerably by the events of 24 December 2012, when the opposition MPs as well as attending journalists were expelled from the parliament’s plenary hall, having been accused of obstructing the process of adoption of the state budget.13 In response, the social-democrat-led opposition accused the ruling centre-right government of authoritarianism, initiated a civil disobedience campaign and decided to boycott the parliament’s work as well as the municipal elections in the spring of 2013. The crisis attracted wide international attention, and the EU said it could endanger the country's bid to start accession talks with the EU.

43. The deadlock was ended with the EU-mediated 1 March 2013 agreement between the ruling coalition and the opposition. According to the agreement, an ad hoc commission was to be set up to investigate objectively the 24 December events. The agreement also refers to a possibility of holding early parliamentary elections, albeit no time-frame was specified. Normal political life had resumed and the municipal elections, which were judged by OSCE/ODIHR to have been broadly free and fair14, took place as scheduled. However, the actual implementation of the agreement remained a point of contention between the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party and the social-democrats. The commission of inquiry has been set up (after lengthy negotiations) but it has yet to produce the results of the investigation. At the time of finalizing this report, it was 13 According to the ruling party representatives, the opposition MPs had abused the parliamentary

process in the committees in order to thwart the adoption of the state budget. Therefore, the ruling party claims extraordinary measures had needed to be taken if the budget for the following year was to be adopted on time.

14 Some issues of concern were raised, however, such as the use of media in the run up to the elections.

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announced that the commission of inquiry had concluded its investigation and had produced a set of recommendations to improve the functioning of the parliament.

44. In addition to the political turmoil, the EC issued criticisms on the rule of law, the judiciary, freedom of expression and the fight against corruption. Freedom of the media remains a key area where reforms are needed, including media pluralism, independence of the public service broadcaster, transparency of media ownership and self-censorship among others. According to Reporters Without Borders, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia occupies the last place in the Balkans in terms of media freedom, ranking in the 116 th place out of 179 countries surveyed (Reporters Without Borders). On the positive note, in November 2012, the parliament adopted a law on the decriminalisation of defamation and insult which was welcomed by the OSCE media representative (OSCE, 2012). Nevertheless, fines for defamation could be very high and discourage journalists from criticising the government officials.

45. In economic terms, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is directly affected by the economic slowdown in Europe and in particular in Greece and Serbia. According to the May 2012 IMF report, the country needs to focus on maintenance of macroeconomic stability; institutional capacity and legal certainty; attracting FDI by creating linkages between industry and research institutes; closing educational gaps and addressing the considerable emigration of highly educated citizens. About 30% of the population lives under the poverty line. The chronic high unemployment (31.4% for 2011) is another factor that can indirectly provide ground for social and political tensions in the medium term.

C. BUILDING A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY

46. According to the 2002 census15, the country has a complex ethnic composition with 64.2% ethnic Macedonians, 25.2% ethnic Albanians, 3.9% ethnic Turks, 2.7% Roma and 1.8% ethnic Serbs. Significant progress achieved in key areas of the OFA, such as equitable representation in public administration, the use of the Albanian language, the use of symbols, education and decentralisation. The new decision-making processes allowed for all communities to not only be involved but to take actual ownership of decisions. Despite certain setbacks and occasional increases in tension, overall the country seemed to have found a workable modus vivendi among its ethnic groups.

47. Nevertheless, relations between the ethnic majority community and other ethnic and religious communities lie on fragile foundations. Despite power-sharing arrangements, and the current governmental coalition between the centre-right pro-European VMRO-DPMNE and the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, a party which originates from the 2001 rebellion, political processes often suffer from interethnic mistrust.

48. Domestically, the most recent examples of divisive policies include the several instances of ethnic voting by the two largest ethnic communities during the recent municipal elections. The “Skopje 2014” Project has also strengthened mistrust among the Albanian community in the country, but also among neighbours in the region who perceive it as a form of provocation. Apart from its costs, the project is controversial because it reshapes the urban space with symbolic marks in favor of one community (The Economist).

49. Unlike in the previous year, in 2013, aside from the nationalistic political discourse, the country did not face serious inter-ethnic disturbances. Protests and minor inter-ethnic clashes took place at the appointment of a former member of the National Liberation Army as Defence minister. The European Commission 2013 Report notes that the authorities and community leaders took rapid and effective action to prevent escalation (European Commission, 2013).

15 No national census has been held since 2002 as this is highly politicised and divisive issue.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

77. As a result of enormous domestic and international efforts, the Western Balkans region is essentially peaceful since the turn of the century. However, numerous problems still exist, and, in recent years, progress has been very uneven or in some cases even reversed. Ethnic divisions in the region are still exploited for political purposes. There is no agreement on the most important political questions such as the constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the status of Kosovo and its ethnic groups, or the name/identity dispute in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There are problems in fulfilling the EU integration conditions in fields of anti-corruption, fighting organised crime, reforming administration and the judiciary system, strengthening independent media and NGO’s. Also, while beyond the scope of this report, it is important to remember that economy, unemployment and social security are the most urgent and relevant issues for the majority of the region’s population. Progress in the field of political dialogue and ethnic reconciliation will not endure as long as these essential socio-economic problems are not addressed properly.

50. The Euro-Atlantic integration of the region is rightly seen as the main vehicle to ensure stability and development in the Western Balkans. Despite the “enlargement fatigue” and the impact of the global financial and economic downturn, the EU must remain the lead actor in the Western Balkans and reward these countries whenever they achieve tangible progress, as it did when Prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached the “footnote” and “normalisation” agreements. The milestone 19 April agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, if implemented fully and genuinely, significantly improves the European prospects of the entire region and sends a signal that its policy of incentives is credible.

51. However, membership in the EU and (with the exception of Serbia) in NATO as a stand-alone policy towards the region is not sufficient when vital national/ethnic interests are at stake. Particularly when the perception of these interests has been exacerbated by local politicians playing ethnic cards. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic Serb, Croat and Bosniak politicians have been unable or unwilling to act on two – definitely resolvable – issues that stall their progress towards membership in NATO and the EU: the issue of immovable defence property and the need to make changes in the Constitution to comply with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights ruling.

52. In case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it was reasonable for its people to expect more tangible rewards for the progress it has been making in terms of domestic reforms, contribution to regional and global security and particularly its impressive efforts to build a multi-ethnic society. The country might not yet be ready for the EU membership, it could have been judged to be ready to start accession talks. The beginning of such talks would have given important leverage to the EU and the country would plausibly start to make rapid progress. The continuous negative responses from the EU due to the unresolved “name issue” are causing understandable frustration within the country, stirring nationalist sentiments and threatening to undo the stability that has been achieved in recent years. That said, local politicians should not use the unresolved “name issue” as an explanation for all the problems the country is facing. The logjam on the EU and NATO integration cannot justify, for instance, shortcomings in the field of media freedom or independent judiciary. A combination of resolute and responsible domestic efforts and adequate international assistance and encouragement are needed.

53. When it comes to Kosovo, the EU – and to some extent NATO – get the credit for facilitating the milestone 19 April agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. However, one has to remember that it would not have been possible without personal courage and resolve of Mr Dacic and Mr Thaci. The agreement is important as it gives much needed breathing space and addresses the most urgent concerns of the people in Kosovo. It provides basis for signing the SAA between

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Pristina and Brussels and, possibly, for lifting the visa regime for the people of Kosovo traveling to the EU. Nevertheless, it is only a mid-term solution: the promise of the ultimate membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions is unrealistic unless the issue of the status of Kosovo is addressed – the issue over which there is no unity among the EU and NATO members and Belgrade and Pristina are highly unlikely to make any concessions.

54. Membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions is not the only option available to the region and there are other important external stakeholders: Russia, for instance, has strong interests in the Balkans. The establishment of the joint Serbian-Russian crisis management centre in the Serbian town of Nis is a manifestation of that. Russia continues to oppose further enlargement of the Alliance to include Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Russia also actively advances its economic presence in the region through acquisition of energy infrastructure assets by its energy giant Gazprom.

55. The Euro-Atlantic community must explore ways to augment its overarching enlargement strategy with policies that would be tailor-made to the specific challenges faced by each country. Depending on a country, all options must be explored, including extreme ones, such as a) greater use of “sticks”, such as aid conditionality, visa bans and asset seizures, or b) reducing mechanisms of international supervision to a minimum in order to promote local ownership of reforms and to encourage local politicians to take full responsibility, rather than giving them an easy way out by “hiding behind” international decisions.

56. The international community has certain leverages to influence political processes, but ultimately it is the responsibility of local politicians to agree on the fundamental principles upon which the country ought to be constructed. Membership in NATO and the EU is first and foremost a political decision and the Euro-Atlantic community policy-makers have to be convinced that the newcomers are reliable partners and genuine democracies whose membership will not be regretted later. Unless Western Balkan politicians are prepared to make concessions and seek compromise, their countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration would remain a pipe dream.

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