dr john rynne phd, griffith university - management impacts on australian prison reform
DESCRIPTION
Dr John Rynne PhD, Senior Lecturer: School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University delivered this presentation at the 5th Prison Planning, Design, Construction and Maintenance conference. This conference follows the production of existing, developing and future correctional facilities across Australia. For more information, go to http://www.informa.com.au/prisonplanning2013TRANSCRIPT
1 Prison Construction Conference, 2013
Prisons & Public Private Partnerships: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going.
John Rynne, B.App.Sc., BSc(Hon), MPhil, PhD, MAPS
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice, and Governance
2 Prison Construction Conference, 2013 Photographs courtesy Brisbane City Council, 2013
3 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
4 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
5 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
6 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
7 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
8 Prison Construction Conference, 2013
• Inappropriate infrastructure
•Closed to external scrutiny and often
brutal, punitive regimes
•Highly unionised inflexible workforces
•Retribution focus limited rehabilitation
• Inefficient and ineffective
(AIC, 1989; Kennedy, 1988)
Prison systems in Australia pre 1990
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Post 1990 Prison Construction Drivers • 1984+: Government reengineering
» NPM » Smaller Government » Outsourcing & Competition
• 1990–1995: Prison Reform Agenda
» Innovation » Human Rights agenda » Organisational development » Service Delivery innovation
• 1998–Ongoing: Penal Populism & Reform
(Harding, 1997,2001; Rynne,2004; Wanna, 2013).
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(ABS, 2013) Prison Construction Conference, 2013
Prisoners In Australia 1990-2012
14,305
29,106
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
32,000
Prisoner population 104% Australian population 33%
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0
0.5
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834
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958
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962
1964-1
966
1968-1
970
1972-1
974
1976-1
978
1980-1
982
1984-1
986
1988-1
990
1992-1
994
1996-1
998
2000-2
002
2004-2
006
2008-2
010
2012-2
014
Prisons opened
20 year moving average
Prison Construction Australia 1820-2014
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Prison Reform Drivers – International Differences • Depends on where you are in the world
– Australia/New Zealand/United Kingdom • Service delivery reform
• Value for money
• Innovation
–USA
• Exploding incarceration rates
• Court orders
13
Change Agent
• Innovation to destabilize and challenge an entrenched dysfunctional system
–Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)
• Innovation
• Competition
• Performance standard development (Feeley, forthcoming;
Harding, 1997)
Prison Construction Conference, 2013
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• PPP
– Two primary forms
• Concession
• PFI: Private Finance Initiative
– PFI Styles
• Finance/Construct/Ownership
– Variance: (DCFM/DBFO), DBM, DB,OM, BO1OT, BO1O
– Francophile Model
PPP/PFI Models
D-Design; C-Construct; F-Finance; M-Manage; B-Build; O-Operate; O1-Own; T-Transfer
(Hall, de la Motte, Davies, 2003)
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Consequences of PPP/PFI – What have they Delivered:
• Construction (UK, National Audit Office, 1997)
– Construction costs fell 45% under PFI
– On-time completion (overrun savings of 13% compared with traditional construction)
– On-budget completion (overrun saving of 18% compared with public sector comparator)
– Note: No Australian data available.
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Consequences of PPP/PFI – What have they Delivered:
• Operating costs – DCFM contracts (UK)
• Private bids 17% lower than public sector
• Operational costs reduced by 38% in three years due to competition.
• 2005, Home Office estimated PFI process savings 8.5% in public sector bidders and 6% in private contractors (Sturgess, 2007).
– Australia: Estimates of up to 30% on individual prisons – estimated average 10% • However – savings are accepted but the extent and
actual amount unclear.
• Remains highly contentious (Archambeault & Geis, 1996; General Accounting Office, 1996 Ringrose, 2002; Pratt & Maahs, 1999; Segal & Moore, 2002; Thomas, 1997; Woodbridge, 1999)
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• UK House of Commons, 2011 PFI report* – Capital costs typical PFI currently over 8%; double the
long term government gilt rate of approximately 4%. – The majority of PFI debt is not detailed in government
debt or deficit figures; – Government departments use PFI to leverage up
budgets without using allocated capital budget • The investment is additional and not budgeted for.
– Conclusion: Why continue with PPP/PFI
• USA – Some states - prisons are closing: DCFM/’SPEC’/Out of
State.
New Areas of Contention
*http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/114603.htm
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• PPP/PFI Contracting involves – Production Costs – Transaction Costs
• Corrections purchasers’ in Australia – Emphasis on production costs
• Bring the build (time to construct) and maintenance costs down. • Defer/extend debt
– Acknowledgement of transaction costs but minimal costing.
• The distraction Transaction Costs can have on Outcomes – United Kingdom Electronic Bracelets fiasco. – G4S recently apologized and issued credit notes to £23.3m for
incorrect invoices between 2005 and May 2013 plus £800,000 for June 2013 to date and £2m of professional fees.
– SERCO ‘lost’ three prison contracts. – Why did the Monitors not pick this up?
New Areas of Contention - Australia
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• Increased need to understand and cost transactions in service/prison delivery. – That is, “the external production option that
minimizes production costs also maximizes transaction costs” (Ferris & Graddy, 1991, pp.545).
• For example, costs associated with – Monitoring,
– Audit and Inspection,
– Prisoner Services and Programme,
– Usefulness of ‘innovation bonuses’ and penalties in service delivery improvement.
PPP/PFI Implications
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Consequences of PPP/PFI – Did It Deliver: Australia
• Despite limited external independent evaluation on efficiency and effectiveness gains
• From its very low base pre 1990 - significant prison reform has been achieved(Feeley, forthcoming; Harding, 2000; WA Inspector of
Custodial Corrections various). – PPP have been central in driving that innovation. – Hindrances
• Despite contract sophistication in performance measures public and private sectors performance evaluated against different criteria,
• Performance measures continue to be input/output. • Difficulties in implementing Prison Rating Score (UK) or Prison
Performance Table (NZ).
21 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice
The ‘big’ question for any prison system is: Is the model effective and efficient in keeping the community safe and reducing crime?
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• Recidivism – The Ultimate Outcome measure
– Australia:
• 40% of prisoners released 2008-09 returned by 30 June 2011;
• 46% returned to corrective services. Likely underestimate as performance indicators change to reflect decrease.
– Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander recidivism rates are as high as 92% in some jurisdictions.
– Prison is not a good specific or general crime deterrent
• It is not currently possible to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of prison on recidivism.
What’s Changed in Outcomes since 1990?
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What Next • Real OUTCOME measures to determine what the
implications of PPP/PFI and Pubic Sector prison services are in recidivism.
• Use the PFI development of Inputs and Output measures of structure/service delivery to assess recidivism. – That is, what impact does ‘this’ prison have on
recidivism?
• Contract maturation – Sophistication without suffocation.
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How • System Wide Contestability
– Genuine contestability across the whole system: • Custodial • Community • PbR/Social Impact Bonds/Public Sector Mutuals
• Through-the-gate innovation – Innovation in combining service delivery between
custodial and community/NGO re-entry.
• Open and Independent Inspection. • Cultural resilience in Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander prisoners: • Justice reinvestment tied to Elders and Respected delivering
specific programmes and non-custodial/deterrence approaches on a commercial/payment by results approach.
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• Mandated cross sector pathways for transfer of ‘what works’.
• Unified data on actual system performance: • Privatisation indicates performance measures can be
designed for more than ‘input/output’ effectiveness and efficiency measures: – Measures of behavioral and qualitative change
– Knowledge shared across all relevant agencies
» Police
» Juveniles
» Mental Health
How
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Thank You
John Rynne, B.App.Sc., BSc(Hon), MPhil, PhD, MAPS
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice, and Governance [email protected]