dr. bhavani thuraisingham the university of texas at dallas (utd) july 2013

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Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013 Telecommunications and Network Security

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Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013. Telecommunications and Network Security. Domain Agenda. Networks Network Security Physical Data Link Network Transport Session Presentation Application Telephony Services. OSI Model. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Dr. Bhavani ThuraisinghamThe University of Texas at Dallas (UTD)

July 2013

Telecommunications and Network Security

Page 2: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Domain Agenda• Networks • Network Security• Physical• Data Link• Network• Transport• Session• Presentation• Application• Telephony• Services

Page 3: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

OSI Model

• The Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model) is a product of the Open Systems Interconnection effort at the International Organization for Standardization.

• It is a way of sub-dividing a communications system into smaller parts called layers. A layer is a collection of conceptually similar functions that provide services to the layer above it and receives services from the layer below it.

• On each layer an instance provides services to the instances at the layer above and requests service from the layer below.

Page 4: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

OSI Reference Model• Layer 7: Application• Layer 6: Presentation• Layer 5: Session• Layer 4: Transport• Layer 3: Network• Layer 2: Data Link• Layer 1: Physical

Page 5: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

TCP/IP• In the TCP/IP model of the Internet, protocols are not as rigidly designed into

strict layers as the OSI model.• TCP/IP does recognize four broad layers of functionality which are derived from

the operating scope of their contained protocols, namely the scope of the software application, the end-to-end transport connection, the internetworking range, and lastly the scope of the direct links to other nodes on the local network.

• The Internet Application Layer includes the OSI Application Layer, Presentation Layer, and most of the Session Layer. Its end-to-end Transport Layer includes the graceful close function of the OSI Session Layer as well as the OSI Transport Layer. The internetworking layer is a subset of the OSI Network Layer (see above), while the Link Layer includes the OSI Data Link and Physical Layers, as well as parts of OSI's Network Layer.

Page 6: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Security• Issues and Concerns

– Non-repudiation– Redundancy

• Risks– Network is the key asset in many organizations– Network Attacks

• Attacks– Network as a channel for attacks– Network as the target of attack

Page 7: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Security• Defense in Depth

– Series of hurdles– Collection of controls

• Security controls:– Are built around social, organizational, procedural and technical activities– Will be based on the organization’s security policy

• Security Objectives and Attacks– Business risk vs. Security solutions– Attack scenarios– Network entry point

• Inbound vs. Outbound attacks

• Methodology of Attack– Attack trees– Path of least resistance

Page 8: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Target Related Issues• Acquisition

– Attacks start by gathering intelligence– Controls

• Limit information on a network; Distract an attacker

• Analysis– Analyze target for security weaknesses

• Access – Obtain access to the system– Manage user privileges– Monitor access

• Target Appropriation– Escalation of privileges– Attacker may seek sustained control of the system– Controls against privilege escalation

Page 9: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Security Tools• Tools automate the attack processes• Network security is more than just technical implementations• Scanners

– Discovery scanning– Compliance scanning– Vulnerability scanning

Page 10: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 1: Physical Layer• Bits are converted into signals• All signal processing is handled here• Physical topologies

Page 11: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Communication Technology• Analog Communication

– Analog signals use frequency and amplitude– Transmitted on wires or with wireless devices

• Digital communications– Uses different electronic states– Can be transmitted over most media– Integrity of digital communication is easier– Digital communication brings quantitative and qualitative enhancements

Page 12: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Topology• Even small networks are complex• Network topology and layout affect scalability and security• Wireless networks also have a topology• Ring Topology

– Closed-loop topology– Advantages

• Deterministic

– Disadvantages• Single point of failure

Page 13: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Topology• Bus Topology

– LAN with a central cable to which all nodes connect– Advantages

• Scalable; Permits node failure

– Disadvantages• Bus failure

• Tree Topology– Devices connect to a branch on the network– Advantages

• Scalable; Permits node failure

– Disadvantages• Failures split the network

Page 14: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Topology• Mesh Topology

– Every node network is connected to every other node in the network – Advantages

• Redundancy

– Disadvantages• Expensive; Complex; Scalability

• Star Topology– All of the nodes connect to a central device– Advantages

• Permits node/cable failure; Scalable

– Disadvantages• Single point of failure

Page 15: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Cable Selection Considerations• Throughput• Distance between devices• Data sensitivity• Environment• Twisted Pair

– One of the simplest and cheapest cabling technologies– Unshielded (UTP) or shielded (STP)

Page 16: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Unshielded Twisted Pair (UTP)Category Transmission Rate Use

Category 1 < 1 Mbps Analog voice and basic interface rate (BRI) in Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)

Category 2 < 4 Mbps 4 Mpbs IBM Token Ring LAN

Category 3 16 Mbps 10 Base-T Ethernet

Category 4 20 Mbps 16 Mbps Token Ring

Category 5 100 Mbps 100 Base-TX and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)

Category 5e 1000 Mbps 1000 Base-T Ethernet

Category 6 1000 Mbps 1000 Base-T Ethernet

Page 17: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Coaxial Cable (Coax)• Conducting wire is thicker than twister pair

– Bandwidth– Length

• Expensive and physically stiff

Page 18: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Fiber Optics• Three components

– Light source– Optical fiber cable

• Two types

– Light detector

• Advantages• Disadvantages

Page 19: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Transmission Technologies• 802.11 – WLAN• 806.16 – WMAN, WiMAX• Satellite• Bluetooth• IrDA• Microwave• Optical

Page 20: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Multiplexing TechnologiesTechnology Principle Objective

Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)

Spread transmission over a wider-frequency band

Signal less susceptible to noise

Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)

Spread signal over rapidly changing frequencies

Interference

Orthogonal-Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)

Signal is subdivided into sub-frequency bands

Page 21: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Physical Layer: Equipment Agenda• Patch panel• Modem• Cable modem• Digital subscriber line• Hub and repeater• Wireless access points

Page 22: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

• Patch Panels– Provide a physical cross-connect point for devices– Alternative to directly connecting devices– Centralized management

• Modem– Convert a digital signal to analog– Provide little security

• War dialing

– Unauthorized modems

Physical Layer: Equipment Agenda

Page 23: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

• Cable Modem– PCF Ethernet NIC connects to a cable modem– Modem and head-end exchange cryptographic keys– Cable modems increase the need to observe good security practices

• Digital Subscriber Line– Use CAT-3 cables and the local loop

• Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL)• Rate-Adaptive DSL (RADSL)• Symmetric Digital Subscriber Line (SDSL)• Very high bit rate DSL (VDSL)

Physical Layer: Equipment Agenda

Page 24: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

• Hubs– Used to implement a physical star/logical bus topology– All devised can read and potentially modify the traffic of other devices

• Repeaters– Allow greater distances between devices

• Wireless Access Points (WAPS)– Access Point (AP)– Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)

Physical Layer: Equipment Agenda

Page 25: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Standard Connections• Types of connectors

– RJ-11– RJ-45– BNC– RS-232

• Cabling standards– TIA/EIA-568

Page 26: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Physical Layer Threats and Controls• Attacking

– Wire– Wireless– Equipment: Modems

• Controls– Wire

• Shielding• Conduit• Faraday cage

– Wireless• Encryption• Authentication

– Equipment• Locked doors and cabinets

Page 27: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 2: Data Link Layer• Connects layer 1 and 3• Converts data from a signal into a frame• Transmits frames to devices• Linker-Layer encryption• Determines network transmission format

Page 28: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Synchronous/Asynchronous Communications

• Synchronous– Timing mechanism synchronizes data transmission– Robust error checking– Practical for high-speed, high-volume data

• Asynchronous– Clocking mechanism is not used– Surrounds each byte with bits that mark the beginning and end of

transmission

Page 29: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Unicast, Multicast and Broadcast Transmissions

• Multicasts• Broadcasts

– Do not use reliable sessions

• Unicast

Page 30: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Unicast – Point-to-Point• ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network)• T’s (T Carriers)• E’s (E Carriers)• OC’s (Optical Carriers)

Page 31: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN)

B (Bearer) Channel 64kBit/s

D (Delta) Channel 16KBit/s

BRI (Basic Rate Interface) 2*B+I*D = 144kBit/s

PRI (Primary Rate Interface) North America

23*B+I*D = 1.55MBit/s (TI)

PRI Europe and Australia 30*B+I*D = 2MBit/s (EI

Page 32: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

“T” Carrier

Channel Multiplex Ratio Bandwidth

T1 1xT1 1.544 Mbps

T2 4xT1 6.312 Mbps

T3 7xT2 = 28xT1 44.736 Mbps

T4 6xT3 = 168xT2 274.176 Mbps

Page 33: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

“E” Carrier

Channel Multiplex Ratio Bandwidth

E1 1xE1 2.058 Mbps

E2 4xE1 8.848 Mbps

E3 4xE2 = 16xE1 34.304 Mbps

E4 4xE3 = 64xE2 139.264 Mbps

Page 34: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

“OC” Optical Carrier STS

Optical Level Bandwidth

OC1 51.84 Mbps

OC3 155.52 Mbps

OC12 622.08 Mbps

OC48 2488.32 Mbps

OC192 9953.28 Mbps

Page 35: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Circuit-switched vs.Packet-switched Networks

• Circuit-switched– Dedicated circuit between endpoints– Endpoints have exclusive use of the circuits and its bandwidth

• Packet-switched– Data is divided into packets and transmitted on a shared network– Each packet can be independently routed on the network

• Switched vs. Permanent Virtual Circuits– Permanent Virtual Circuits (PVC)– Switched Virtual Circuits (SVC)

Page 36: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Carrier Sense Multiple Access• Only one device may transmit at a time• There are two variations

– Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA)– Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)

Page 37: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Polling to Avoid Contention• Slave device needs permission from a master device• Used mostly in mainframe protocols• Optional function of the IEEE 802.1 1 standard

Page 38: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Token Passing• A token is a special frame that circulates through the ring• Device must possess the token to transmit• Token passing is used in Token Ring (IEEE 802.5) and FDDI

Page 39: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Bridges and Switches• Bridges

– Layer 2 devices that filter traffic between segments based on MAC addresses

– Can connect LANs with unlike media types– Simple bridges do not reformat frames

• Switches– Multi-port devices to connect LAN hosts– Forward frames only to the specified MAC address– Increasingly sophisticated– Also forward broadcasts

Page 40: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Multiplexer/Demultiplexer• Combining or splitting signals• Technologies

– TDM – Time– FDM – Frequency– WDM – Wave

Page 41: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Local Area Networks• Allow mobile users to remain connected• Extend LANs beyond physical boundaries

Page 42: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Standards : IEEE 802• 802.1 1b• 802.1 1a• 802.1 1g• 802.1 1n / Multiple Input Multiple Output• 802.1 1i / Security• 802.1 6 / WiMAX• 802.1 5 / Bluetooth• 802.1 x / Port security

Page 43: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Ethernet (IEEE 802.3)• Most popular LAN architecture• Support bus, star, and point-to-point topologies• Currently supports speed up to 10000 Mbps

Page 44: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Protocols• Address Resolution Protocols (ARP)

– ARP (RFC 826)– RARP (RFC 903)– ARP Cache Poisoning

• Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)– RFC 1331

• Encapsulation• Link Control Protocol (LCP)• Network Control Protocols

• Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)– Identification and authentication of remote entity– Uses a clear text, reusable (static) password– Supported by most network devices

Page 45: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol

• CHAP– Periodically re-validates users– Standard password database is unencrypted– Password is sent as a one-way hash– CHAP Process

• MSCHAP• The Nonce

Page 46: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

• Provides a pointer to authentication• EAP – Transport level security• Wireless needs EAP• PEAP - (Protected EAP)

Page 47: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Link Layer Threats• Confidentiality

– Sniffing for reconnaissance– Offline brute force– Unapproved wireless

• Integrity– Modify packets– Man-in-the-middle– Force weaker authentication

• Availability– Denial of service– War driving

• Transition from wireless to wired

Page 48: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wired and Wireless Link-Layer Controls

• Encryption– PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)

• Authentication– PAP– CHAP– EAP

• Tunneling– EAP-TTLS

• Radio frequency management

Page 49: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Encryption Summary802.1x

DynamicWEP

Wi-FiProtected

Access

Wi-FiProtected Access 2

Access Control 802.1X 8021X or pre-shared key

802.1X or pre-shared key

Authentication EAP methods EAP methods or pre-shared key

EAP methods or pre-shared key

Encryption WEP TKIP (RC4) CCMP (AES Counter Mode)

Integrity None Michael MIC CCMP (AES CBC-MAC)

Page 50: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)• Optimization for city• Use wireless infrastructure, fiber optics or ethernet to connect

sites together• Still needs security• Switched Multi-megabit Data Service (SMDS)• SONET/SDH

Page 51: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 3: Network Layer• Moves information between two hosts that are not physically

connected• Uses logical addressing

Page 52: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

LAN/WAN• Local Area Network (LAN)

– LANs service a relatively small area– Most LANs have connectivity to other networks– VLANs are software-based LAN segments implemented by switching

technology

• Wide Area Network (WAN)– A WAN is a network connecting local networks or access points– Connections are often shared and tunneled through other connections

Page 53: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Storage Area Network (SAN)• Hard drive space problem• Server of servers• Fiber backbone• Switched

Page 54: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs)

• PSTNs are circuit-switched networks• PSTNs are subject to attacks

Page 55: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

X.25• Suite of protocols for unreliable networks• Has a strong focus on error correction• Users and host connect through a packet-switched network• Most organizations now opt for frame relay and ATM instead of

X.25 for packet switching

Page 56: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Frame Relay• Network cloud of switches• Customers share resources in the cloud• The cloud is assumed to be reliable• Customers are charged only for bandwidth used

Page 57: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)• ATM is connection-oriented

– Uses virtual circuits– Guarantees QoS but not the delivery of cells– Types of virtual circuits

Page 58: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)• Bandwidth management and scalability• Permits traffic-engineering• Provides QoS and defense against network attacks• Operates at Layer 2 and 3• Operates over most other packet switching technologies such as

Frame Relay and ATM

Page 59: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Comparing Broadband Wireless802.11

WiFi802.16WiMAX

802.20Mobile-Fi

UMTS3G

Bandwith 11-54 Mbps shared Share up to 70 Mbps

Up to 1.5 Mbps each 384 Kbps – 2 Mbps

Range (LOS)Range (NLOS)

100 meters30 meters

30 – 50 km2 – 5 km (‘07)

3 – 8 km Coverage is overlaid on wireless infrastructure

Mobility Portable Fixed (Mobile – 16e)

Full mobility Full mobility

Frequency/ Spectrum 2.4 GHz for 802.1 1b/g5.2 GHz for 802.11a

2 - 11 GHz for 802.16a11-60 GHz for 802.16

< 3.5 GHz Existing wireless

Licensing Unlicensed Both Licensed Licensed

Standardization 802.11a,b and g standardized

802.16, 802.16a and 802.16 REVd standardized, other under development

802.20 in development

Part of GSM standard

Availability On the market today Products available today

Standards coming Currently being deployed

Page 60: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Wireless Optics• Two laser transceivers communicate at speeds comparable to

SONET• Wireless optics transmissions are hard to intercept• Wireless optics can be unreliable during inclement weather• Avoids the licensing requirements of Microwave in most regions

Page 61: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Usage: Definitions• Intranet• Extranet

– Granting access to external organizations

• Internet

Page 62: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Other Aspects

• Virtual Private Network– Remote access through VPN– LAN to LAN configuration

• Secure Remote Access– Remote access through modems, ISPs, WAN connections

• Traffic Shaping– Quality of Service (QoS)– Depends on all carriers agreeing on priority handling rules

• Routers– Network routing

Page 63: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Firewalls• Filtering

– Filtering by address– Filtering by service

• Static Packet Filtering• Stateful inspection or dynamic packet filtering• Personal firewalls• Enforce administrative security policies• Separate trusted networks from untrusted networks

– Firewalls should be placed between security domains

• Proxy Firewalls– Circuit-level policy– Application-level policy

Page 64: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

FirewallsFirewall Type OSI Model Layer Characteristics

Packet filtering Network layer Routers using ACLs dictate acceptable access to a network

Looks at destination and source addresses, ports and services requested

Application-level proxy

Application layer Deconstructs packets and makes granular access control decisions

Requires one proxy per service

Page 65: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Firewalls (cont.)Firewall Type OSI Model Layer Characteristics

Circuit- level proxy Session layer Deconstructs packets

Protects wider range of protocols and services than app-level proxies, but are not as detailed as a level of control

Stateful Network layer Keeps track of each conversation using a state table

Looks at state and context of packets

Page 66: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Network Partitioning• Boundary routers• Dual-homed host• Bastion Host• Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)• Three-legged firewall

Page 67: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

End Systems• Servers and mainframes• Operating systems• Notebooks• Workstations• Smart phones• Personal digital assistants• Network Attached Storage (NAS)

Page 68: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Internet Protocol (IP)• Internet Protocol (IP) is responsible for routing packets over a

network• Unreliable protocol• IP will subdivide packets• IPv4 address structure

Page 69: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Internet Protocol (cont.)

Internet Protocol Address StructureClass Range of First

OctetNumber of Octets

for Network Number

Number of Hosts in Network

A 1 – 127 1 16,777,216

B 128 – 191 2 65,536

C 192 – 223 3 256

D 224 – 239 Multicast

E 240 - 255 Reserved

Page 70: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Subnetting and Valid Subnets• Subnetting• Supernetting• Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)

Page 71: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)

• Dynamically assigns IP addresses to hosts• Client does not have to request a new lease every time it boots

Page 72: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

IPv6• A larger IP address field• Improved security• A more concise IP packet header• Improved quality of service (QoS)

Page 73: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX)• Vendor specific• Retired

Page 74: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Internet Control Message Protocols (ICMP)

• ICMP redirect attacks• Traceroute exploitation• Ping scanning

Page 75: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP)

• Used for multicast messages• Sets up multicast groups

Page 76: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Virtual Private Network (VPN)• Secure shell (SSH)• SSL/TLS• SOCKS• High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE)• IP Security (IPSEC) – see next slide

Page 77: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

IPSEC Authentication and Confidentiality for VPNs

• Authentication Header (AH)• Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)• Security Parameter Index (SPI)• Security Associations• Transport Mode / Tunnel Mode• Internet Key Exchange ((IKE)

Page 78: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Tunneling Protocols• Tunneling Protocols

– Point-to-point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)– Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)

• Routing Protocols– Routing Information Protocol (RIP)– Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)– Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)– Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)– Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)– Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System (ISIS)– Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (IGRP)– Enhanced IGRP (EIGRP)

Page 79: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Risks and Attacks• Key shortcoming in IP is its lack of authentication• Shortcomings in implementation• IP Fragmentation Attacks

– Teardrop attack– Overlapping fragment attacks

• IP Address Spoofing– Overlapping fragment attacks– Packets are sent with a bogus source address– Takes advantage of a protocol flaw

• Encryption as a Threat– External attackers– Internal attackers

Page 80: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Risks and Attacks• Network Eavesdropping• Sniffing the wire• Encryption• IP allows the sender to specify the path

– Attackers can abuse source routing, thereby gaining access to an internal network

Page 81: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Risks and Attacks

• Source-routing Exploitation– IP allows the sender to specify the path

• Attackers can abuse source routing, thereby gaining access to an internal network

• Smurf and Fraggle attacks– Smurf attack mis-uses the ICMP Echo Request– Fraggle attack used UDP instead of ICMP– Ping of death

Page 82: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Controls• Policy• Inbound and outbound traffic controls• Network partitioning

Page 83: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 4: Transport Layer• End-to-end transport between peer hosts• Connection oriented and connectionless protocols

Page 84: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Protocols

• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)– Well-known ports– Registered ports– Dynamic and/or private ports

• User Datagram Protocol (UDP)– Fast – Low overhead– No error correction/replay protection

• Sequenced Packet Exchange (SPX)– Novell’s protocol– Replaced by TCP

Page 85: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Transport Layer Security (TLS)• Mutual authentication• Encryption• Integrity

Page 86: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Attacks• SYN Flood• Port Scanning

– FIN, NULL and XMAS Scanning– SYN Scanning– TCP Sequence Number Attacks– Session Hijacking

• Denial of Service

Page 87: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Controls• SYN proxies• Honeypots and honeynets• Tarpits• Continuous or periodic authentication

Page 88: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 5: Session Layer• Client server model• Middleware and three-tiered architecture• Mainframe• Centralized systems

Page 89: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Protocols• Real-time protocol – RTP• RTP control protocol – RTCP • Remote procedure calls - RPC

Page 90: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

RPC Threats and Controls• Threats

– Unauthorized sessions– Invalid RPC exchanges

• Controls– Secure RPC

Page 91: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 6: Presentation Layer

• Ensures a common format for data• Services for encryption and compression

Page 92: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Standards• Mainframe to PC Translation

– Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC)– American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)– Gateway

• Video and Audio Compression– Codec

• Compression / decompression

– Conserves bandwidth and storage

Page 93: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Compression ProtocolsAudio Compression

ISO/IECMPEG – I Layer III (MP3)MPEG-I Layer I & IIAAC: HE_ACC v2aacPlus v2

ITU-TG.711 G.722 G.723G.726 G.728 G.729

Video CompressionISO/IEC

MJPEGMPEG-I & IIMPEG-4 ASP & AVC

ITU-TH.261 – H.264

Page 94: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Threats and Controls• Availability Threat

– Lack of interoperability

• Controls– Organizational standards

Page 95: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Layer 7: Application Layer• The application layer is NOT the Graphical User Interface (GUI)• Performs communications between peer applications

Page 96: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Implementations• Client/Server

– Telephony/voice– Video– Instant messaging– Email– World wide web– File transfer

• Peer-to-peer– Sharing

• Multi-tier– Web front-end– Database back-end– Web 2.0

Page 97: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Protocols Examples

FTP File Transfer Protocol

HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol

IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol

IRC Internet Relay Chat

MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions

POP3 Post Office Protocol (version 3)

Rlogin Remote Login in UNIX Systems

SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol

SSH Secure Shell

TELNET Terminal Emulation Protocol

Page 98: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Threats and Controls• Vulnerabilities as of September 2007

– 35,000

• Verified exploits– +10,000

• Controls– STOP IT!

• Don’t use application-layer protocols that are too risky?

– Update / patch

Page 99: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Telephony• Voice Over IP

– Reduced cost– Converged technology security

• Mobile Telephony – Cellular service– Analog

• Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS)

– Digital• Global Service for Mobile Communications (GSM)• General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)• Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)

– Data

Page 100: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Mobile Multiplexing Technologies

Technology Principle Objective

Frequency Division Multiple Access

(FDMA)

Divide frequency into sub bands

Open several low bandwidth channels

Time Division Multiple Access

(TDMA)

Split transmission by time slices

Multiplexing between participants

Code Division Multiple Access

(CDMA)

Multiplex several signals into one

signal

Multiplexing is performed on a

digital level

Page 101: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Protocols• VoIP Protocols

– H.323

• SIP• Mobile Telephony Protocols

– Proprietary Applications and Services– Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)

• Mobile internet browsing

Page 102: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Telephony Threats and Controls• Threats

– IP Telephony Network Issues– IP Telephony Vulnerabilities

• Controls– Authentication– Firewalls– Modem control

• Good practices for VoIP telephony– Encryption– Hardening– Patches– Authentication– Physical protection

Page 103: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

General Threats• Authenticity• Eavesdropping• Social engineering• Tunneling firewalls

Page 104: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Services• Authentication• Directory• Configuration• Communication• Storage• Printing

Page 105: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Authentication

• Centralized Remote User Authentication– Network Access Server send authentication requests to the Centralized

Authentication Server.

• Kerberos Authentication– RFC 1510– Principals (client and server) are treated as equals– Key Distribution Server (KDC)

• Authentication server (AS)

– Ticket granting server (TGS)

Page 106: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Directory Services• Domain Name Service (DNS)• Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)• Network Basic Input Output System (NetBios)• Network Information Service (NIS/NIS+)

Page 107: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Configuration Services• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)• Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)• Network Time Protocol (NTP)• Finger User Information Protocol

Page 108: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Communication Services• Synchronous Messaging

– Instant Messaging (IM)– Internet Relay Chat (IRC)

• Asynchronous Messaging– Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)– Post Office Protocol (POP)– Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)– Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)

Page 109: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Remote Communication Services• TCP/IP Terminal Emulation Protocol (TELNET)• Remote Login (RLOGIN), Remote Shell (RSH), Remote Copy (RCP)• X Window System (XII)• Video and multimedia

Page 110: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Storage Server Services• Common Internet File System (CIFS ) /Server Message Block

(SMB)• Network File System (NFS)• Secure NFS (SNFS)

Page 111: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Storage Data Services• File Transfer Protocol (FTP)• Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)• Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)• HTTP over TLS (HTTPS)• Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP)• Proxies

Page 112: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Printing Services• Internet Printer Protocol (IPP)• Line Printer Daemon (LPD) and Line Printer Remote (LPR)• Common UNIX Printing System (CUPS)

Page 113: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

DNS Threats• Spoofing• Query manipulation

– Hosts file manipulation– Social engineering

• Information disclosure• Domain litigation• Cyber squatting

Page 114: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Other Threats• Email Threats

– Spoofing– Open Mail Relay Servers– Spam and Filtering

• Instant messaging Threats• File sharing• SPIM• Service Message Block (SMB) Threats

– Buffer overflows

Page 115: Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham The University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) July 2013

Controls• DNS security extensions (DNSSEC)• Mail filtering• IM policy• Turn off SMB