DR. AMBEDKAR’S RECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHISM1

— Pradeep P. GokhaleResearch Professor,

Central University of Tibetan Studies,Sarnath, Varanasi

I. REUNDERSTANDING OR RECONSTRUCTION?Through upliftment of oppressed castes might have

been one of the immediate purposes behind Ambedkar’s abandonment of Hindu identity and embracement of Buddhism, his thoughts, decisions and actions in this regard were not governed by this narrow consideration. To consider this or similar consideration as his only consideration is to oversimplify the matter. There must have been various socio-political reasons which led him to prefer Religion to non-religious, mundane form of life and a few more reasons which led him to prefer Buddhism to other religions. One of the reasons why he chose Buddhism might have been that it had roots in India. But, it was certainly not the whole reason, because there were other religions of Indian origin such as Jainism and Sikhism which he did not finally go for. His description of Buddha’s Dhamma that he gives in his work, The Buddha and his Dhamma (hereafter, his Work) indicates additional

1 The paper published with the title, “Universal Consequentialism: A Note on B. R. Ambedkar’s Reconstruction of Buddhism with special reference to Religion, Morality and Spirituality” in Surendra Jondhale and Johannes Beltz (Eds.) Reconstructing the World: B. R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India, Oxford University Press, 2004

2

reasons for his acceptance of Buddhism. And those reasons, I believe, are far more important than the contingent reason of the geographical root of Buddhism. The following features of Buddhism seem to have attracted Ambedkar towards it:

(i) Buddhism emphasised the role of reason as against faith or superstitions.2

(ii) As a result, Buddhism rejected many objects of dogmatic beliefs like God and Soul, which were accepted by most of the other religions.3

(iii) Buddhism strongly opposed caste-system.4

(iv) Buddhism emphasised morality as an essence of good life. This morality according to Buddhism was essentially human-centric and had no reference to Soul or God.5

Ambedkar took the above features of Buddhism seriously. He not only took them seriously, he tried to stretch some of them to their logical limits and attempted a reconstruction of Buddhism in the light of them. While doing so, he did not think that he was going beyond the

2 In various passages of his Work, The Buddha and his Dhamma, Ambedkar underlines the rational, scientific and non-superstitious character of Buddhism.3 Ambedkar B.R., The Buddha and his Dhammā, Siddhartha Publication, Bombay, Second Edition 1974. Book IV, Part I.4 Ibid, Book III, Part V, Section IV.5 Ibid, Book IV, Part I, Section 5.

3

original Buddhism. He rather took a stand that he was bringing out the real essence of Buddhism. But what he actually did, did amount to a reformation within Buddhism. So, Ambedkar was performing a two-fold job. He was presenting new thoughts and ideals which were not accepted in the Buddhist tradition. On the other hand, he was interpreting the tenets of traditional Buddhism in such a way that it could express directly or indirectly the variant thoughts and ideas which he wanted to express.

A question can be asked here whether trying to reform Buddhism in this way was methodologically justified on the part of Ambedkar. The question could be answered affirmatively in the context of Indian philosophical tradition. What Ambedkar was doing goes very well with this tradition where philosophical innovations were introduced by authors mostly under the garb of discovering the hidden meanings of the original texts. In fact the Indian philosophical systems have developed through commentaries in this way. Buddhism is not an exception to this general trend. The propounders of various schools of Buddhism have rearranged and reinterpreted Buddha’s statements and derived the basic tenets of their own schools from them. So what was regarded as core of Buddha’s teaching according to one school of Buddhism was sometimes regarded as peripheral by another school. The statements regarded as literally meaningful and acceptable (nītārtha) by one school were regarded as derivatively or metaphorically meaningful or acceptable (neyārtha) by another school.6 6 The distinction between nītārtha and neyārtha has been referred to and used, for instance, by Candrakīrti in his commentary on

4

So, even the doctrine like that of four noble truths, which is generally regarded as the core of Buddhism, becomes the subject of critical examination and consequent dialectical negation in Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna.7 Śūnyatā is accepted as the framework and other Buddhist doctrines are adjusted in a deconstructed form within this framework. So, one need not be surprised to see Ambedkar questioning the originality and centrality of the doctrine of four noble truths.8 Only he is doing it in a very different framework, in the framework of secular rationality and sacred morality. So Ambedkar’s restatement and reinterpretation of Buddhism could be methodologically permissible from he point of Indian philosophical tradition in general and Buddhist one in particular.

But western style of philosophising requires one to present one’s deviations from the received tradition in an independent fashion and not to present them in the garb of authentic interpretation of the original sources. So one could expect Ambedkar to have reconstructed Buddhism and presented it as his own contribution without claiming for its authenticity as an interpretation.

Ambedkar did not take such an independent stand either because he strongly believed, for the reasons he himself has given in the text, that his interpretation of Buddhism was correct and authentic or because he thought it practically wiser to re-interpret Buddhism but Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga (1960).7 Ibid, Chap. 24.8 Ambedkar, Op.cit., Introduction.

5

not to disown it as such so that dalits can become respectable members of the world Buddhism.

Whether his interpretation of Buddhism deviated from the original or was actually true to the original is an important controversial issue. But I am not going to discuss it here.9 Personally, I am inclined to presume that Ambedkar did deviate from the early Buddhism. He deviated from the early Buddhist conceptions of karma-doctrine, rebirth, and the relation between matter and consciousness. I believe that the Buddhist doctrine of Anattā raises a problem with regard to the doctrines of karma and rebirth as applicable to the same person, as Ambedkar has rightly pointed out. But I also feel that early Buddhism has tried to overcome this problem by introducing the notion of person as a casual series (Santāna) of five aggregates (Skandhas) and maintain the adherence to the doctrine of karma and rebirth as applicable to the same person, i.e. to the same person-series.10 Here, instead of saying that the Buddha went wrong here, Ambedkar holds that the Buddha did not mean what he is generally taken to mean.11 Similarly, I

9 Here I more or less agree with the views of Macy J.R. and Zelliot Eleanor which they present in “Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Indian Buddhism” in Studies in History of Buddhism, Narain, A.K. (Ed.), Delhi, 1980.

10 The position, that the person is not the same yet not different, has been held in the light of the notion of causal continuum, in Milindapañho 42-43. Vide Vaidya P.L. (Ed.), Bauddhāgamārtha-saṅgraha, Pune (1956), pp. 174-175.11 For Ambedkar, rationality was a criterion for calling something a word of the Buddha. See Ambedkar, Op.cit., Book IV, Part II, Sec. V.

6

believe that early Buddhists deny the position that consciousness arises from the four gross elements and disappears at the time of death - the position maintained by Ajita-Keśakambalī, a ‘nihilist’ as mentioned in Sāmaññaphalasutta. Ambedkar, on the contrary, seems to attribute this materialistic explanation of consciousness to the Buddha and the Buddhists12 possibly because he strongly felt that the doctrine of Anattā necessarily leads to materialism.

I would be most happy if my beliefs that I have expressed above prove to be wrong and if the Buddha meant exactly how Ambedkar interpreted him. But as I have already said, I am not interested in discussing this issue here. It suffices to say here that Ambedkar presents before us a reconstruction of Buddhism which is at least a 12 Compare (A) and (B):(A) “Consciousness is result of the combination of the four elements

Prithvi, Apa, Tej and Vayu”… “It is true that consciousness arises with birth and dies with death”, (Ibid., III.IV.4). “Question is when the human body dies, what happens to these four elements?... The Buddha said, no. They join the mass of similar elements floating in space…”(Ibid., IV.II.1-2)

(B) “(Ajita believed that a human being is made of four elements. When he dies, the earthy in him replaces to earth, the fluid to water, the heat to fire, the windy to air and his faculties(five senses and mind) to space… Nothing survives after death…”- Goyal S. R. , A History of Indian Buddhism, Kusumanjali Prakashan, Meerut (1987), p. 75

Of course Ambedkar presents Buddha’s materialism in a more sophisticated form than that of Ajitakeśakambalī, when for instance, when for instance he compares consciousness with magnetic field. (Ambedkar, Op. cit., III.IV.4). Secondly Ajita derives a kind of moral scepticism from his materialism. Ambedkar emphasises moralism.

7

deviation from traditional Buddhism (though it may or may not be a deviation from original Buddhism). What is more important is that this reconstruction opens a novel philosophical possibility according to which the moral upliftment of individual and social life goes in harmony with materialistic explanation of consciousness, and religion goes in harmony with scientific rationality. Four features of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism could be identified in this context.13

(i) Secular and Materialistic Approach:Ambedkar restricted the Buddhist beliefs and practices

to this word and this life. The belief in other worlds and past and future life was denied. The existence of consciousness independent of body was denied.(ii) Scientific Rationality:

Similarly scientific rationality was accepted as a core of Buddhist approach to the nature of the world and man. Whatever transgressed the authority of experience and reason was regarded as non-Buddhistic in essence.(iii) Anti-mysticism:

An attempt was made to eliminate mystical elements from Buddhism. Accordingly the elements like dhyāna and samādhi (meditation and meditative concentration) were denied the central status.(iv)Moral Basis :13 I am aware that the list is not exhaustive. The features like Anti-pessimism (the hope of removing material sufferings like poverty and inequality) may be added.

8

The relation between religion and morality underwent a radical change in Ambedkar’s reconstruction. Religious morality is generally supposed to be rooted in religious metaphysics of god and soul. For Ambedkar Buddhism as religion is rooted in morality.

It is this last feature which I would like to elaborate in the next section.II. BAUDDHA-DHAMMA AS THE RELIGION ROOTED

IN MORALITY :In other religions, belief in transcendent entities like

God, Ātman and other worlds becomes the basis of morality. In Ambedkar’s words, “Every religion preaches morality, but morality is not the root of religion.”14 What Ambedkar does in his work is that morality is made the root of religion. In his words, “In Dhamma morality takes place of God, although there is no God in Dhamma ..... Morality is the essence of Dhamma.15” To my understanding, this was a Copernican revolution in the relationship between Morality and Religion which Ambedkar tried to bring about. To put it crudely, religions have put religious beliefs at the center and morality is supposed to rotate around them. In Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism morality is put at the center and religious beliefs are supposed to rotate around it. Let me elaborate.

14 Ambedkar, Op.cit., IV.I.4.15 Ibid, IV.I.5.

9

Morality is justified in theistic religions in terms of reward and punishment given by God to the individual. The atheistic religions justify morality in terms of the doctrine of Karma according to which morally good and bad actions lead to consequences which are pleasant and painful (respectively) to the agent. In this way, the ethics in both theistic and atheistic religions leads to a kind of egoistic consequentialism. Moreover, the egoistic consequentialism of atheistic religions leads to the doctrines of Karma, rebirth and other worlds. Thus, the transcendental beliefs like God, soul, rebirth and other worlds become the grounds of religious morality. In Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism, morality is justified in terms of universalistic consequentialism. I quote him : “Do kusala kamma so that humanity may benefit by a good moral order which a Kusala Kamma helps to sustain; do not do akusala kamma for humanity will suffer from bad moral order which as akusala kamma will bring about.”16 Thus, Ambedkar tries to justify morality without reference to transcendental religious beliefs. Secondly, the considerations of universal well-being (or well-being of mankind) itself being a moral consideration, morality, in his scheme, does not depend upon considerations external to morality and hence becomes autonomous. Ambedkar makes such a morality the basis of religion which he construes as Dhamma.

Here, a remark on Ambedkar’s use of the word ‘religion’ is necessary. Ambedkar in his work uses sometimes the word ‘religion’ in a popular sense when he

16 Ibid, III, III.6.25.

10

wants to contradistinguish it from Dhamma. In this sense the word religion mainly stands for theistic religion in which, according to him, both morality and rationality are undermined. Religion emphasises the relation between individual and god and undermines social relations. Religion also falls prey to superstitions.17 Dhamma, on the other hand is essentially moral, social and rational. So, this is one way in which the word ‘religion’ is used by him. But Ambedkar does not always use the word ‘religion’ in a popular sense; he also uses it in the sense of Dhamma, when he says that the purpose of Religion (according to the Buddha) is to make the world a Kingdom of Righteousness.18 Here the word ‘religion’ is used in the sense of ideal form of religion. So, Ambedkar seems to be making a distinction between religions as they generally are and religion as it ought to be. Religions as understood by European theologians are the religions as they are generally accepted and practised by people and Dhamma is the religion as it ought to be.19

Of course the distinction between a religion as it is in practice and the religion as it ought to be, is the one which many religious thinkers and religious reformers have attempted in one way or the other. They criticise the current forms of religion for the elements like superstitious and/or unjust practices in them and present emphatically

17 Ibid, IV.I.2.18 Ibid, III.V.I.2.19 “What Buddha calls Dhamma is analogous to what European theologians call Religion. But, there is no greater affinity between the two ...” Ibid, IV.I.2.

11

what they regard as the essence of true or ideal religion. The essence of true religion is conceived by them, broadly speaking, in two ways. One, by reviving and emphasising moral-social element and two, by reviving and emphasising spiritual-individual element in it.20 Ambedkar takes the former root and tries to develop it to its logical limit. Ambedkar, by doing this, develops the model of morality based religion in its radical form. Since, morality is essentially social according to him, he has not emphasised individualistic, spiritualistic aspect of Buddhism, especially the aspect of meditation, in his model.MORALITY AND SPIRITUALITY:

It may be asked whether Ambedkar’s approach of not emphasising the spiritual aspect of Buddhism was right. It is true that the spiritual practices like meditation and devotion are generally associated with transcendent objects like God, Brahman, soul and deities and Ambedkar’s approach must have been influenced by this fact. But, every spiritual practice, especially meditation, need not necessarily be associated with such transcendental beliefs. Meditation can be looked upon as a step towards self-realisation and the way of disciplining

20 The remarkable examples of religious thinkers who go by the second root are J. Krishnamurthi and Osho Rajaneesh. They emphasised spiritual and individualistic element of religion and de-emphasised its moral, social and institutional aspect. It is noteworthy that the religious thoughts of both are said to be influenced by Buddhism.

12

oneself. In the context of Buddhism it can lead to realisation of impermanence and soul-lessness and reduction of craving. Moral-social aspect of religion, on the other hand, can be looked upon as the way of disciplining one’s relationship with others. Both these disciplines, of oneself and of one’s relationship with others, can support each other. Hence, spirituality and morality can be mutually complementary aspects of religion. I would like to suggest here that the scope of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism can be extended so as to include Buddhist meditation. While doing so, however, one has to take two-fold care:(i) Buddhist meditation has to be re-understood and

reconstructed in such a way that it does not lead to mysticism or the belief in transcendental metaphysics.

(ii) Emphasis on meditation should not harm the moral core of Buddhism, rather it should support and strengthen it.

Meditation practised in this way should facilitate moral perfection, but should not try to postulate something beyond morality.21

21 Among the modern formulation of Buddhism, Satyanarayan Goenka’s formulation seems to be largely compatible with Ambedkar’s formulation due to its emphasis on morality and non-insistence on after-life. Goenka tries to de-religionise Buddhism through his distinction between Dhamma and Sampradāya (sect.). Ambedkar tries to do the same by distinguishing between Dhamma and Religion. Secondly, the Vipassanā meditation which Goenka teaches, centres on bodily sensations and hence is compatible with materialism. So meditational element can be introduced in

13

In the first section of this paper, I identified four salient features of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism. They were (a) secular and materialistic approach, (b) scientific rationality, (c) anti-mysticism and (d) moral basis. Now I am suggesting that if these can be said to constitute the core of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism, then the scope of this reconstruction can be widened so as to include meditational element without harming the core. I would like to add that extending the scope of Ambedkar’s Buddhism in this way need not amount to transcending it.SACRED MORALITY AND PROF. M. P. REGE:

Welcoming Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism in this way (and extending the scope of it without trying to harm its core) may not be acceptable to many scholars of Buddhism. Many neo-Hindu (and even Buddhist) scholars are sympathetic to Buddhism but not to the same extent to Buddhism as reconstructed by Ambedkar. Here I would like to consider the views of Late Prof. M. P. Rege, a renowned philosopher of contemporary Maharashtra, as a representative of this tendency. M. P. Rege has recently stressed the need of transcending the limits of Ambedkar’s Buddhism in the light of the latter’s adherence of ‘sacred morality.’

Prof. Rege’s statement runs as follows:

Ambedkar’s formulation via the latter’s synthesis with Goenka’s formulation. The two formulations are close to each other; also because both take their inspiration from Pali Buddhism.

14

“.... Bauddha-dhama has established itself in Maharashtra. Although Dalits accepted Bauddha-dhamma in the beginning in a formal way, there are signs of their assimilating gradually the whole of Buddhist philosophical and spiritual tradition, especially that of Mahāyāna School of Buddhism and of becoming Buddhists wholeheartedly. If this materialises, then they would go beyond the position which Ambedkar has presented in his The Buddha and his Dhamma, because Ambedkar’s position in this book has stationed itself a little behind the traditional Buddhism. According to Ambedkar Dhamma means morality and morality means Dhamma. But, morality, which is Dhamma, should be sacred. In this context ‘sacred’ can mean only transcendent. Morality springs towards this transcendent and it is rooted in the transcendent.”22

I have a feeling that Prof. Rege in this passage has not only misrepresented Ambedkar but has tried to dilute and defeat the revolutionary turn which Ambedkar has tried to give to traditional Buddhism in his work. Let me substantiate.

Ambedkar devotes one full section to the explanation of sacred and universal character of Dhamma-morality23. It seems clear from that section that Ambedkar does not

22 Vide Navabhārata, Vol. 51, No. 9 (June, 1998), (Wai, Dist. Satara), Editorial, p-six. (Translation mine.)“mātra mahārāṣṭrāta bauddhadharma sthirāvalā .....

nītī hyā atītākaḍe-jhepāvata asate āṇi atītāta rujalelī asate.”

23 Ambedkar, Op.cit., III.V.IV.6.

15

relate the notion of sacred with anything transcendent. Rather he seems to avoid such a connection deliberately. For him ‘sacred’ means something which cannot be violated.24 ‘Profane’ as against this means something which may be violated. He does not draw there any metaphysical conclusions from the sacred character of Dhamma, but immediately goes to the pragmatic question as to why morality should have been made sacred.25 His answer to this question too is pragmatic and social.

I have a feeling that since Ambedkar uses the terms ‘sacred’ and ‘universal’ together and does not seem to distinguish the two concepts sharply from each other, he might be having in his mind a logical connection between the two. One can develop an argument, though Ambedkar has not developed it, by which sacred (i.e. inviolable) character of Dhamma-morality can be derived from its universal character. I have already referred to ‘universal consequentialism’ in terms of which Ambedkar justifies morality. There are two more aspects of the universality of morality. The rules of moral conduct are binding upon all human agents. This is one aspect. Secondly, these rules are to be followed with respect to all recipients of actions, unconditionally and indiscriminately. This three-fold universality, I think makes morality inviolable, and in this sense, sacred.

24 Ibid, Statements 3,4.

25 Ibid, Statement 6.

16

But, unfortunately, Prof. Rege has tried to read transcendentalism - rather a raw one - in Ambedkar’s concept of sacred morality. He has also induced Ambedkarites to transcend this raw transcendentalism and become full-blooded metaphysical transcendentalist Buddhist. Here Prof. Rege’s own philosophical conviction seems to supersede his sympathies for Ambedkar.

It is not clear what Prof. Rege meant by the term traditional Buddhism when he said that Ambedkar’s position has stationed itself behind traditional Buddhism. Either he meant Hīnayāna tradition or Mahāyāna tradition or something which consists of both. But it seems to be clear that for him Ambedkar’s Buddhism falls behind even Hīnayāna tradition because the latter is supposed to have a conception of transcendence which the former does not have. Prof. Rege seems to believe that Mahāyāna tradition, as a religious tradition has greater persuasive force than Hīnayāna tradition. So Ambedkarites according to him can become better Buddhists if they assimilate Mahāyāna tradition.

In his argument, Prof. Rege has also said that Ambedkarites, while accepting transcendent Reality of Mahāyāna Buddhism, need not accept it as something like God or Brahman.26 Prof. Rege, I think, has played a trick here, because in the same essay, he has said that there isn’t much difference between Brahman of Śaṁkara and Śūnyatā of Mahāyāna Buddhists27. So in a way Prof. Rege has tried to bring Ambedkarities to the level of 26 “he atītātatva mhaṇaje īśvara kiṁvā brahma ase mānāyace

kāraṇa nāhī.” Navabhārata, Op.cit., p. six.

17

assimilating Advaita-Vedānta, which Ambedkar himself had vehemently criticised in his work.28 So, Prof. Rege’s proposal seems to aim at diluting and defeating the very spirit of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism.

Here, I have discussed Prof. Rege’s proposal in order to underline the need for understanding and re-vitalising the core of Ambedkar’s reconstruction of Buddhism. The distinct importance of Ambedkar’s reconstruction lies in the fact that it places Buddhism on the frontiers of Religion from where it can have critical and constructive dialogue not only with other religions and other sects of Buddhism but also with non-religious social approaches like liberalism, Marxism and scienticism.

For accomplishment of this task, however, Ambedkar’s reconstruction has to be worked out with greater details and greater clarity and its scope has to be widened wherever necessary and possible, without, of course, harming its core.

*

27 “Jara āpaṇa mādhyamika bauddhāṁce śūnya āṇi śaṁkarācāryāṁnī svīkāralele mana āṇi vācā hyāṁcyā palikaḍe asalele brahma yāmcyāta phārasā bheda nāhī ase disūna yete.” Ibid., p. five.

28 Ambedkar, Op.cit., III.IV.3.