dprkmilitaryhandbook-marinesupdate1995

8/7/2019 DPRKMilitaryHandbook-MarinesUpdate1995

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No rth Ko re a:

The Founda tions fo r M ilita ry S treng th - Upda te 1995

Information Cutoff Date: 31 December 1995

. . ., .. .N O T I C E This mat .rprotected b .ena may be(Title 17 LJs~ccopynght law. .. ,ode}

COVER PHOTO:

On 10 October 1995, North Korea celebrated the 50th anniversary of the foundation oftheKorean Workers' Party. Kim Chong-il, Defense Minister, Marshal Choe Kwang andGuard Commander, Marshal Yi Ul-sol along with other senior military personnel viewcelebration activities.

PC151010196(Revised3 / 9 6 )


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NOTICE'Th'protected by 6 ~materialmay be(Title 17USC Pdynght l aw

.. 0 e)

No rth Ko re a:The Foundations fo r M ilita ry S treng th - Upda te

P r e f a c e In 1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency published the document North Korea: TheFoundations for Military Strength. That document noted that North Korea, despite anextremely closed, tightly controlled, and isolated government and economic system,fielded a very large, capable military with older but still lethal military equipment. Sincethat time, a number of new factors, along with the continuation of trends observed at thattime, have altered the larger political and economic context. These factors include thedeath of Kim Il-song, the end of the Cold War, increased international isolation, economic

decline, and the Agreed Framework with the United States.

The most significant event since the 1991 publication was the death of President KimII-song on 8 July 1994. While Kim Chong-il has not officially assumed the positions heldby his father-President of North Korea and Secretary General of the Korean Workers'Party-he in fact remains the supreme leader and ultimate decisionmaker in North Korea.

The October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea con-cerning the North's nuclear program focused on the looming nuclear threat; however,Pyongyang still possesses a large conventional military force and continues to pursue anambitious ballistic missile program. Questions remain about North Korea's develop-

ment of weapons of mass destruction, especially its past ability to acquire nuclearweapon capabilities. The more immediate threat to the region, however, remains itslarge conventional forces.

North Korea devotes a substantial amount of national resources to its formidable armedforces, while the underdeveloped and now deteriorating civilian sector bears the burden ofthis national emphasis on military strength. Internal hardship has not discouraged NorthKorean leaders from fielding and maintaining one of the 5 largest armies in the world,with approximately 1 million ground soldiers supported by an air force of approximately840 jet combat aircraft and a navy of approximately 675 naval vessels. This publicationwill address the North Korean military in the altered context represented by the trends and

developments noted above. The material presented is intended to update that contained inthe 1991 publication, substantial portions of which remain valid.

PC151 010196

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Co n t e n t s

Preface ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiChapter 1- A Post-Kim-Il-song North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

National Policy Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Regime Survival/Security , . 1Leadership Succession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Economic Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

National Structure .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Government Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Party Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Military Organization .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

President Kim II-song's Foreign Policy Legacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Chapter 2 - Increasing Internal Pressures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Economy................................ 7Foreign Trade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 3 - Strategic Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11ProliferationlN uc1ear Weapons Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Chemical Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Biological Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Technology Transfer and Acquisition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Chapter 4 - Military Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Ground Forces '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Organization and Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Weapons and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Organization and Disposition .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Weapons and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Air Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Organization and Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Weapons and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Air Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Ballistic Missile Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Special Operations Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Reserve Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Security Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Wartime Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Weapon Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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C o n te n ts (C o n t in u e d )

Command, Control, and Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Glossary of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

F i g u r e s

1. Five Largest Militaries in the World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii2. North Korean Government - Creation of the Korean Workers' Party. . . . . . . . 23. Korean Workers' Party - The Most Important Institution in North Korea. . . . 34. Military Forces Designed To Fulfill Both Defensive and Offensive Missions . . 45. Orientation Map of East Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66. North Korean 1994 Economic Sectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77. Producing and Exporting Arms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78. Main Trading Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 .9. North Korean Trade With Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

10. Orientation Map of North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011. North Korea's Heavy Artillery Is Capable of Targeting Areas as Far Southas Seoul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

12. North Korea Army Personnel and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1513. The Largest of the Three Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1714. Limited Navy Coastal Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1815. North Korea's Three Combat Air Commands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016. SCUD Surface-to-Surface Missile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2117. North Korea Ballistic Missile Threat Ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2218. SCUD Missile Attack on Airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2319. Rail Support for Most Long -Distance Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2620. Terrain Limitations to East-West Movements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

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C h a p te r 1A P o s t-K im - II-s o n g N o r th K o re a

Natio na l P olic y G oa ls

President Kim Il-song's sudden death in July 1994placed responsibility for continued political stabilityof the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in thehands of his son, Kim Chong-il. As successor, KimChong-il's immediate challenge has been to resolvecritical national policy issues, including balancing theneed for economic improvements against the demandof maintaining political stability and national security.

R e g im e S u r v iv a l/S e c u r ity

North Korea's immediate policy relies on protecting its"own form of socialism" from foreign influence or even-tual political collapse. Current leaders seem unwilling toundertake the extent of reform required to effectivelyaddress the mounting political, economic, and socialproblems or to open North Korea to the outside world.

The Korean Workers' Party (KWP) has launched anextensive campaign of political indoctrination in the

past several years. At the center of this campaign is theattempt to tighten political and social controls overantisocialist behavior.

L e a d e rs h ip S u c c e s s io n

Kim Chong-il was formally designated his father'ssuccessor at the Sixth Party Congress of the KWP inOctober 1980. Since then, he has participated in allaspects of the government based on the mentoring anddirect support of President Kim II-song until the lat-ter's death. Kim Chong-il was appointed SupremeCommander of the North Korean People's Army(KPA) in 1991 and Chairman of the National DefenseCommission in 1993. Kim Chong-il probably willavoid controversial decisions that might contradictKim Il-song's traditional policies until he has securedhis political power base.

Depending orrlhecontert, the polit ical termc h u c h eisused by Nor th Koreans to meannatonal identity ; selre liance , national pride , or national assertiveness.IntroducedihDf)cemQerj955,chuChe'is used to jusmajorpoHcy'in'itiatives,including" eliminating factioenemies, wideni ng '.diplomanc ,activities, neutralizinattemptsby China or Ru ssia to ex ert influ ence overKorea,questionihg th(3 legit imacy of the South Kore

govemment, and relentlessly attacking US imperialismIn'$hort,PresidentKim "~song created a Koreencounterpartto MEf~ist-Leninist ideology to suithis specfrealit ies. Iris applledtoal! aspects of North Korean li

. and . itS in tegra tion in to. the wider soc ia l fabric. ' o tthecountry approaches thato fa religion.

E c o n om i c D e v e lo p m e n t

North Korea's economy has been hobbled by thecountry's heavy defense burden, low productivity, lackof managerial expertise, and inability to pay its inter-national debts. Economic performance turned down-ward in 1989 and continues in recession because ofthe dramatic reduction in support from China, theformer Soviet Union, and socialist-bloc countries inEastern Europe. Severe shortages of crude oil, food,raw materials, and electric power continue to impairindustrial productivity as well as the quality of life ofthe population.

National S t r u c t u r e

G o v e r n m e n t O r g a n iz a tio n

The government system has not changed - beingcomposed of the Supreme People's Assembly and an

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elected President. Kim Chong-il, in his capacity as theSupreme Commander of the KPA and Chairman of theNational Defense Commission, acts as "supremeleader" of the country, controlling the party, govern-ment, and armed forces. Kim Chong-il has not yetassumed the two most important positions - Presi-dent of North Korea and Secretary General of the KWP.

Par ty Organ iza tion

The highly centralized KWP continues to make policy,and the government executes and administers thosepolicies. As implied in the Constitution, the KWP and

the state are inseparable, but the party is superior tothe state. Party officials hold all important positions inthe government, the economy, and the military. TheParty Congress nominally is the highest deliberativeorganization. It is slated to convene about every 5years. However, only six Party Congresses have beenheld in the past 50 years, and none in the past 15 years.

Mi lita ry Organiz a tion

At the core of the North Korean military structure isthe Ministry of People's Armed Forces headquarters,which is responsible for overseeing the military. Since

Central......_ _. _ -_ ._..__.._ -_.._ - - - People's r--Committee

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Premier,Vice-Premiers,

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Ministry ofPublic Security

LocalAdmi nistrativeCommittee

Diplomaticand OtherForeignMinistries

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North K orean G overnment - Creation of the K orean Workers' P arty.The government exists to administer and monitor Communist Partydirectives.

................Election

--~.~Control..._ _ - Real Power Flow


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Party Central Committee

l Political Bureau (Politburo) 1Standing Committee

I Secretariat J

I II

Examples of the CentralVarious Departments Military Government -

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Commerce Army Party CommitteeHeavy Industry Committee

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- - - -- the People's ....__Armed Forces

Party Congress ~ - - - - - -

Control~ - - Nominal Accountability

Ko rea n Wo rk ers ' P a rty - The Most Impo rta nt In stitu tion in North Ko rea .The party regulates and directs all aspects of activity in the country.

1991, the KPA leadership has undergone significantorganizational and personnel changes. A number ofkey figures have died from old age, and hundreds ofgeneral officers were promoted after Kim Chong-irsappointment as Supreme Commander.

Kim Chong-il's appointment as Supreme Commanderin December 1991 may have been the catalyst forchange in the KPA, but the pace has increased sincethe death of President Kim Il-song, There are indica-tions that a generational shift within the military lead-ership is under way. From December 1991 through theend of May 1995, promotions and assignments ofnearly 800 general officers (many only in their 50s)were noted in a general officer corps of approximately1,200. On 20 April 1992, Kim became a marshal, and3 days later, eight generals were promoted to the rankof vice marshaL A year later, Kim Chong-il becameChairman of the National Defense Commission.

The deaths of President Kim Il-song (Chairman, KWPMilitary Affairs Committee) in 1994 and 0 Chin-u

(Ministry of the People's Armed Forces; Vice-Chairman,National Defense Commission) in 1995 created vacan-cies at the senior levels that were not immediately filled.In late 1995, Choe Kwang was promoted to marshal,with Yi Ul-sol, and named as 0 Chin-u's replacement.

The armed forces maintain a single command system.The Chief of the General Staff directly commands andcontrols ground force, navy, and air commands. AsSupreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces andChairman of the National Defense Commission, KimChong-il retains overall command of the militarysystem.

P re sid en t K im II-s on g 'sF ore ig n P o lic y le ga cy

North Korea's self-imposed isolation has been deep-ened by South Korea's successful Nordpolitik, whichachieved normalized relations with the former SovietUnion (30 September 1990) and China (24 August1992), two of the North's closest allies. Pyongyang

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Armored Corps Artlll~ry CorpsCapital

Defense CorpsNorth KoreanAir Force

North KoreanNavy

ReconnaissanceBureau

"TYpical Corps Includes:Infantry DivisionsArmored BrigadesArtillery BrigadesUght Infantry BrigadesRiver-Crossing Regiments

Mi lit ary Fo rc es Designed To Fu l fill Bo th De fens iv e and Offens iv e Mi ss ions .The organization resulted from blending concepts learned fromexperiences in anti-Japanese guerril la warfare, Soviet and Chinese influences during the Korean war, and the unique self-reliance policy ofchuche.

sees improving relations with Washington and mov-ing the United States to a more equidistant positionbetween the two Koreas as a key to broader diplo-matic and economic openings to Japan and elsewhere.The North's handling of its nuclear program had beenthe most serious stumbling block to its efforts. Theimmediate effect of the Agreed Framework was tomarkedly ease tensions between the internationalcommunity and Pyongyang,

Relations between China and North Korea haveeroded since 1991. Shared revolutionary wartimeexperiences and geopolitical desires form the basis ofNorth Korea's relationship with Beijing. Pyongyangstill receives a limited amount of military equipment

and support from China, but most Chinese militarysupport is symbolic.

Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,North Korea has maintained official ties with Russia,but at a much reduced level. North Korea still buys alimited amount of weaponry from Moscow. TheMutual Defense Treaty between the two countriesexists in name only; Russia has indicated a desire tochange it. Moscow has offered a draft of a newtreaty, but Pyongyang apparently has not officiallyresponded. North Korea's relationship with Russiawas already strained when Russia reaffirmed diplo-matic relations and economic ties with South Koreain 1992.

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,~ '..

Pres ident Kim II-so~g ari~( )u l1cedthe 10-Poin t Program in April1993.For him, the principle of "greatn~ t j6 h ~Lu n iembodied inthe program transcended differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. Kim's to-Point ProgramJs' into form ~nitedfronts between North and Sou th Korean nongovernmental organ izations, not tobu i'ldjntergoven~~~~~ . . .

.: ". ;::' .

The 10Points:

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RUSSIA

CHINA

@BEIJING

PhilippineS e a

NorthPacificOcean

Orienta tion Map o f Eas tAs ia .

Boundary represen ta t ions are not necessar ily au thori tat ive.

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C h ap te r 2In c re a s in g In te rn a l P r e s s u re s

E c o n o m y

North Korea's socialized command economy remainsbasically unchanged in structure and emphasis. Agri-culture is still labor intensive, and heavy industry,including arms production, is emphasized at theexpense of consumer goods. Never a very prosperouscountry, North Korea's shortages of fuels and electricpower have increased between 1991 and 1995, espe-

cially in the civil sector. A negative spiral of shortageshas led to idle factories, fewer exportable items, andless hard currency to buy food, fuels, and other criticalitems. North Korea's petroleum deliveries subse-quently have declined by over 50 percent from thepeak consumption years of the late 1980s. During1995, North Korean factories reportedly operated atless than 50 percent of capacity. The 1994 estimatedgross national product was between $20 billion and$21 billion, amounting to a relatively high per capitalincome of $925.

F o re ig n T ra de

Foreign trade plays an important role in North Korea'seconomy despite Pyongyang's avowed philosophy ofstaunch self-reliance. North Korea relies heavily onimports for several critical needs, such as crude oil,coking coal, and food. Pyongyang is placing a higherpriority on earning foreign currency to purchaseneeded imports. North Korea's principal exportsremain military weapons, minerals, chemicals, and

metallurgical products.

Pyongyang realizes that it must tap world markets tosatisfy critical economic needs. However, this will entailrevamping North Korea's industries and giving greater

North Korean Economic Sectors:1994 Nominal GOP:$20-21 Billion

HeavyManu f ac tu r i n g

17%

7

North Korean 1994 Economic Sectors .

North Korea's Arms Exports

1~1~~~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~

Year

Producing and Expor ting Arms.Whether bartered for oil Of. earninghard currency, these exports are a significant portion of theeconomy.


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North Korea's Main Trading Partners

N o rth K o re an T ra de W i th C IS /R u ss ia

M i ll io n s U S $ s

E x p o rts III Impo r t s1 99 1 94 Is fo r R u s sia o n ly .

N o rth K o re an T ra de W i th J ap an

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

1988 1989

E x p o rt s Ill! Impo r t s

N o r th K o re an T ra de W i th C h in a

Mil l ion sUS$s7 0 0 ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

6 0 0 r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Ma in Tr ad in g Pa rt ne rs .

S o u rc e : N a t io n a l U n ilic a tio n B o a rd ( N U B )

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North Korean Trade With Japan: 1994

North Ko re an Expo rts To J apanTolal Export Value:$320.3million US

Mineral Products

2%

Machinery &Electrical Equipment

3% . Miscellaneous2";"

Food & Live

Animals48%

North Ko re an Impo rts F rom JapanTotallmportValue: $170. 3 m illio n US

Chemical, Plastics,& Rubber

4%

Misce lIaneous26%

Textiles & Fibers33%

North KoreanTrade WithJapan.

Worsening Food Situation

A d e te r io ra tin g fo od s itu a tio n in th e s p rin g o f 1 9 95fo rc ed P y on gy a ngto p u blid y r e qu e s t r ic e a id ,lo a n s,o r s a le s f ro m th e U n ite d S ta te s , J a pa ll, S ou th K o re a ,a nd o th e r c ou n tr ie s . W id es p re a d r e po rts ,o f rn a ln u tr l- .

. ' t io n ,in c re a se d ab se n te e is m ,a n d re d uc ed p ro d uc tio np re c e de d. th ere qu E ls ts . . T h e N o rth 's p u blic fo oda pp ea ls u nd er s co re . P yo ng ya ng 's re co gn itio r1 o f as ev er e fo od s ho rta ge . E v e n w ith r ic e c o m m itm e n tsfro m S eo u l a nd to ky o ,it m u s t s ee k a dd itio na l g r a in tom e ,e t ab ou t a th ird o f 1 99 5 's to ta l d em a n d. I t w iU p ro b-a b ly s ee k a dd itio n a l g ra in to m e et its n ee ds d u r in g th e1 99 6 c ro p y e a r . A s ho rta geof c as h ,c re d it , a n d a g r i-c u ltu r a l s u p p lie s a n d > th e r e la t iv e ly s m a l1 p e r ce n ta . ge o fa ~ a b le la n d ( 16 .6 p e r ce n t in 1 9 '9 0 ); a lo n g w ith u n p r e -d lc ta b le w e a t h e r ,wil llik ely le a d to c on H llu in gp o o r h a r-v e s ts . W i th o u t e x te rn a l a s sis ta n ce , in c lu d in g fo o d a idg iv en fo r fr e e o r o n v ery fa vo ra b le te rm s , N o rth K o re aw illc o n tin ue to fa ce se ve re s ho rta ge s; .

attention to quality of goods, financial responsibilities,and product warranties so that exports can attractforeign exchange. North Korean leaders appear to fearthat substantial foreign assistance, while alleviatingsome economic ills, could undermine the governmentHence, the new Najin-Sonbong Free Trade area isconstructed as a high-security area.

Until 1990, half of North Korea's trade had been con-ducted with the Soviet Union, China, and EasternEurope. With the breakup of the communist worldand the new emphasis on market economics, Pyongy-ang's foreign trade in 1994 plummeted to its lowestlevel since 1978. Exports to China, Pyongyang's maintrading partner, fell along with North Korean importsof Chinese goods. Exports to Japan, on the otherhand, increased 20 percent while imports fell 18 per-cent. Inter-Korean trade has steadily increased since1988 despite frigid political relations. Indirect tradeaccounts for over 95 percent of the volume and isdifficult to quantify.

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International Boundary _

Internal A dministrative _Boundary

Na t iona l Cap it a l

Internal Admlnistral iveCapilal

"I

Railroad

Expressway _

R oad _

25 50 Nautical

Mi l e s

EastSea

Korea

Bay

YellowSea

Boundary r"pf I'ItIl~'OI1 ~'Inot "1I'-(J~o8IlIlI-rily IIl1lhQra.li ... .,

O r ie n ta ti on Ma p o f No rt h Ko re a.

1 0


16/34

C hap te r 3S tra te g ic Is su e s

P r o life ra tio n /N u c le a r W e a p on s P r og ra m

North Korea significantly advanced its nuclear, chemi-cal, and ballistic missile programs )luring the past 10years. North Korea maintains its chemical warfare andballistic missile capabilities. Despite its isolation,North Korea uses several methods to acquire technol-ogy related to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)warfare and missiles.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, North Koreadeveloped a complete nuclear fuel cycle that includeda plutonium production capability at the YongbyonNuclear Research Center. This center, about 90 kilo-meters north of Pyongyang, comprises facilities tofabricate nuclear fuel, a 5-MW research reactor toproduce plutonium, and a reprocessing facility thatcould extract weapons-grade plutonium from irradi-ated fuel. Operations of the reprocessing facility, fuelfabrication facility, and 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon

have been frozen under the Agreed Framework.

N o r t h l ( o r~anReac t o r s 'Nor th . , . KOr f3a . >ha s . . . deYeI6ped . : g r a~h i t e .mode r a t ed ,

. .. . .. .g a s - coo l edreact9r~p~s~(ton~heBr i t i s hCe , l d e rH all ..... . reactors:;"the,N(irthK~ir4aH're~ctor$arereferredtdby .:i "


17/34

SCUD missile assembly/production site in Iran. In late1990, Iran agreed to buy North Korean (SOO-km)SCUD Cs as well. Pyongyang could also sell the NoDong missile to both Iran and Libya, but production ofthis medium-range missile is still stalled.

C h em ic a l We ap o n sNorth Korea continues to have a chemical warfareprogram. Today, it can produce nerve, blister, andblood chemical warfare agents, and it maintains anumber of facilities involved in producing or storingchemical precursors, agents, and weapons. In anyattack on the South, Pyongyang could use chemicalweapons to attack forces deployed near the DMZ, sup-press allied airpower, and isolate the peninsula fromstrategic reinforcement.

North Korean military units conduct regular NBCdefensive training exercises in preparation for opera-tions in a chemical environment. North Korea haschemical defense units at all levels of its force struc-ture. These units are equipped with decontaminationand detection equipment. North Korean military per-sonnel have access to individual protective masks andprotective suits.

Since 1990, Pyongyang has placed high priority onmilitary and civilian chemical defense readiness. It has

mandated operational training in chemical environ-ments as an integral part of armed forces training and istrying to equip all military forces, including reserves,with full protective gear. In addition, the leadership hasrequired broad segments of the population to engage

periodically in simulated chemical warfare drills.Pyongyang has emphasized building and installing col-lective protection equipment at military production andcivilian alternate wartime relocation sites, directingthat the entire population be issued protective masks.

B i o l o g i c a lWe a p o n s

North Korea continues to have the scientists and facil-ities for producing biological products and microor-ganisms. The North has the ability to producetraditional infectious biological warfare agents or tox-ins and biological weapons.

Te c h n o l o g yTr a n s f e ra n d A c q u is it io n

Apart from its nuclear and ballistic missile researchprograms, North Korea is not known to be engaged insignificant research efforts in advanced technologyprograms with military applications. North Korea isconcentrating on acquiring technology from foreignsuppliers and is especially interested in obtainingnuclear-related equipment and advanced missile,chemical warfare, and biological warfare technologies.

Dual-use items, such as spectrum analyzers, comput-ers, oscilloscopes, machine tools, telecommunications

equipment, and fiber optics, are being imported. Theseitems purportedly are imported for consumer applica-tions, but many probably are employed in militaryprograms, including those involved with weapons ofmass destruction.

12


18/34

C ha p te r 4M i lita ry F o rc e s

North Korea's military force structure and doctrinereflect aspects of both Soviet operational art andChinese People's Liberation Army light infantry doc-trine. However, the primary influences have alwaysbeen Pyongyang's operational experience in theKorean war, the peninsular environment, and NorthKorea's military culture and martial philosophy.

North Korea's military strategy is primarily concernedwith an offensive against South Korea and defenseagainst a counterattack. Pyongyang has created themost militarized peacetime society in the world today,diverting tremendous investment resources away fromproductive sectors of the economy. The North KoreanArmy remains largely an infantry army adapted topeninsular conditions and employs infantry tacticsdeveloped during the Korean war. North Korean Armytactical doctrine has always emphasized surprise, fire-power, mobility, and strong armor and artillery com-ponents to meet these needs.

, "" , ,< ."FOcusqll,EnlJanCingMtlitaryCClpabHiti~s

DU r in g , ,': th e a ~ r 1V> 1 9 9 0 S , " ,N Q r th , K o r e a , '$ ig n iff pa n t ly' , . , e nb anc~d t h eo f f e n s i v e c apa~ i l i t i e s o f I t s f 6 r c~ , t h rO l , J gh'a n "in t~ ns iv e '5 ~y ea rc a m pa ig n. , J he C a m p a ig ~e m p h a - '

""~ized 'produoing'arid ,s~oringammu nitionarid. fue l . ,', in c re ~ s i9 g ' t ra in in g th r@ ~ h o u t th e 'fo rc e ,.andf ie ld ing

. . ' , . , .n eW a rt tU ~ rY lm i ts ne a .r th e DM Z ,T b e c a m pa ig n , W h ic h

. , ' 'was, de s rg n e a 'to ' fm p r 6 \le N 6 r th iK o r e a 's . rn ilit~ r yo p fio r is ; w a s 't i~ d 'tb a 1 9 9 5 c o n lp J e tio n .d a te , . A l th o u g h '. th e c a m pa ig n a pp e a rs to h av e.e n d e d , m a ny . .o {its

aspects,in91uging. p r e f e r en f i a l . t r e a tmen to f the r r i i l i t a rya n d improve rnen ts in ,a rtille ry fo rce s, continue ...P yo ng ya ngn ow fa ce s th ed ifflc u lt ta s k o f m a in ta in in g . '8 .cred ib le ,s tro llg mi lit ary fo rceirlan increas ing lyd e te r io ra t in g illte r r ia le n v iro nm en t. . .

G ro un d F orc es

With roughly 923,000 active-duty troops, the groundforces are by far the largest and most formidable ofNorth Korea's military forces. The size, organization,and combat capabilities of the Army provide Pyong-yang with both an offensive military option and theability to protect its homeland.

O rg a n iz a t io n a n d D is p o s it io n

The ground forces have eight conventional infantrycorps, four mechanized corps, an armored corps, anartillery corps, and the Pyongyang Defense Com-mand's Capital Defense Corps dedicated to wartimeoperations. The geographic dispersal of groundforces reflects the varied terrain of the nation and theconsideration given to both defensive and offensiveoperations. The most capable ground forces are nearthe DMZ, where they defend the border or could berapidly committed to a cross-border assault. Behindthis zone, a layered disposition of mechanizedexploitation forces provides for a speedy offensive oractive defense of Pyongyang as needed. Koreanreserve forces are positioned to defend against a seainvasion along either coast and can quickly assumeterritorial defense roles to allow for forward commit-ment of active-duty forces .

The most significant development in the ground forceshas been the continued deployment of long-rangeartillery systems (240-mm multiple rocket launchers

and 170-mm self-propelled guns) near the DMZ.Although these deployments are not yet complete, theNorth is continuing production of these long-rangesystems. The increasing number of long-range artil-lery systems gives North Korea the ability to providedevastating indirect firepower in support of ground

13


19/34

. . . .~

EastS e a

Ko r e a

Bay

YellowS e a

NORTH KOREAN HEAVY ARTILLERY

H eavy A rtillery R ange _

North Korea's Heavy Ar tille ry I s Capable o f Targeting Area s a s Fa rSou th a s Seou l.

force operations. Pyongyang has deployed over10,000 artillery systems, an increase of almost 10 per-cent over the past 15 years, in addition to over 2,300multiple rocket launchers. Most of the artillery is self-propelled and can support a rapidly moving operation.

We ap o ns a n d E qu ip m en t

North Korea has some 4,000 medium and light tanksand assault guns, including over 2,000 T-54/55main

14


20/34

North Korea South KoreaSouth Korea North Korea

Armored Personnel CarriersTotal Active Armed Forces1,054,000 815,000

f ~2,500..

Ground Force Personnel923,000 700,000***

~ f,

, '.

North and Sou th Korea Army Pe rsonne l and Equ ipment.


21/34

battle tanks of Soviet 1950s-era design. In addition,North Korea has indigenously produced about 700T-62 tanks - a more capable version of the T-55that was the Soviet Union's main battle tank in the1960s. Light tanks are also fielded in large numbersand include variants of the former Soviet PT-76 andChinese Type 62/63. An additional tank (T-34) andassault guns (ASU-85/100) reside with the reserveinfantry divisions.

Although most of the Army is light infantry, it con-tains about 2,300 armored personnel carriers. NorthKorea has made a dedicated effort to expand motor-ized transportation available to its infantry forces. Thisprovides Pyongyang with a flexible, mobile exploita-tion force that would be called on to exploit break-throughs in defensive lines during wartime.

Navy

The 46,OOO-member North Korean Navy is primarilya coastal defense force. Most naval vessels are small,patrol-sized craft unable to operate over 50 nauticalmiles from the coast but capable of policing NorthKorea's territorial waters. The Navy's numerousamphibious craft and midget submarines also canclandestinely insert special operations forces intoSouth Korea.

O r ga n iz a t io n a n d D is p o s it io n

The Navy is organized into 13 naval commands underseparate East and West Coast Fleets directly subordi-nate to the Supreme Navy Command. The two fleetsdo not share vessels. The East Coast Fleet is headquar-tered at Toejo Dong, with major bases at Najin andWonsan. The West Coast Fleet is headquartered atNampo, with major bases at Pipa Got and Sagon Ni.Numerous smaller bases line both coasts.

We ap o n s a n d E qu ip m e n tSince 1980, North Korean naval expansion has largelysupported special operations and submarine missions.North Korea's 26 diesel attack submarines includeWHISKEY and ROMEO Class vessels that can bearmed with mines or torpedoes. In addition, the Navy

also maintains over 48 North Korean-built YUGOminisubmarines, 3 SANGO coastal submarines, and 3missile frigates. The North continues to emphasizeproduction of the multirole SANGOs for minelayingand inserting special operations forces.

The Navy's 39 guided-missile patrol boats are anothercapable weapon system. North Korea possessesseveral versions of the Soviet OSA-l, called -theSOJU, each equipped with four SSN-2A1STYX anti-ship missile launchers. The Soviet KOMAR Classguided-missile patrol boat and its North Koreancounterpart, the SOHUNG, are smaller and carry onlytwo STYX launchers.

The largest portion of the North Korean Navy consistsof small combatants: torpedo boats, patrol craft, sub-

marine chasers, and fast attack craft. Of the 320 tor-pedo boats, at least 250 are North Korean-built.Pyongyang also has at least 60 CHAHO patrol boatsequipped with either 30- or 40-tube i22-mm multiplerocket launchers in the center of the deck to providefire support to ground troops or to disable large, slow-moving ships near the coast.

North Korea possesses approximately 130 NAMPaamphibious landing craft, based on a Soviet P-6 tor-pedo boat hull, with a maximum range of 325 nautical

miles and a capacity of up to 60 troops. In 1988, pro-duction of the KONG BANG II and KONG BANG IIIair-cushion personnel landing craft began. Unlike theNAMPO, which requires special operations forces todisembark onto rubber rafts, the KONG BANG hover-craft can offload troops directly onto nearly all ofSouth Korea's beaches. This program has resulted infielding over 130 KONG BANGs to support numerousamphibious landings during wartime.

A ir F orc eThe North Korean Air Force has four primary mis-sions: air defense, transport of special operationsforces, strategic bombing, and air support to groundforces.

16


22/34

N O RT H K O REA NG RO U N D F O RC ES

Corps _ V I

Corps Bou ndary' _

Capital D efense Corps __ _ _ _

A rtillery Corps _ Chongjin

C o rp s b ou n de r y a re n otnecessaruyau tho r i t a t i ve .

25 VI

East Sea

DemarcationLlne

,

Kangnung

Co r p s Wonju

TaejonYellowSea

Taegu

Tsushima

KwangjuPusan

Bounda ry r ep re se n ta ti on s o rono t necessa ri ly au thorl ta t lve , Korea Strait

T he A rm y is th e L arg es t o f th e T hr ee S er vic es .The majority of the ground forces are infantry.

17


23/34

Personnel

North K orea Sou th K orea

46,000 60,000

Includes Marine Forces forSouth Korea.

Attack Submarines

I.2 6

t

Destroyers

10

M,LJL

Frigates

Corvettes

Missile Attack Boats

Coastal Patrol Craft

140

L .c

Mine Warfare Craft

2 3 10

Amphibious Craft

34

S up re me C omma nd _ _

Fleet Command *.$Nava l Command s __

KoreaBay

YellowS e a

.Boundary representat ions arenot nacassarjy authoritative.

Puarn-Donq

LImitedNavyCoastalDefense.No rth Ko re a's N avy i s sma ll a nd s pl it b etwe en th e e as t a nd wes t c oa sts , mak in g mu tu al s up po rt n ea rl y im

Chaho

Mayangdo

ToejoDong

E as t C oa stF!eet Command

EastSea

[ J@PYONGYANG

Changjon O$m.reattonUn oI

.,,----- .. . ';,

;,Kangnung

Wonju

Taejon

Taegu

18


24/34

O r ga n iz a t io n a n d D is p o s it io n

Approximately 840 jet aircraft, 300 transport aircraft,300 helicopters, and 85,000 people form the AirForce's fighter, bomber, helicopter, and transport regi-ments. Most aircraft traditionally have been deployedin the central and northern regions of the country. Theregiments are well organized for command and controlof forces in wartime.

Numerous operational, alternate, and secondary air-fields throughout North Korea provide more than ade-quate runways for the large Air Force. Hardenedshelters at operational airfields provide increased pro-tection for aircraft. Unoccupied airfields in southernregions near the DMZ can support flight operationsduring war, extending the range of fighter aircraft wellinto the South.

We ap o n s a n d E qu ip m e n t

About two-thirds of the Air Force's 1,100 combat air-craft are older generation Soviet- or Chinese-madedesigns incorporating 1950s and 1960s technology.

Older fighter aircraft include 160 MiG-21IFISHBEDs,20 Su-7IFITTERs, 160 MiG-19IFARMERs, 120MiG-17IFRESCOs, and 190 MiG-15/FAGOTs. Mostof these aircraft are daylight, clear-weather-capableonly, and carry limited weapon loads. Three regimentstotaling 80 medium-range Il-28/BEAGLEs are theonly bombers in the Air Force inventory.

The Air Force received a limited number of newer, all-weather, air defense and ground-attack aircraft fromthe Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1985, North Koreaacquired 45 MiG-23IFLOGGERs, with increasedrange and payload over other older, less capable NorthKorean fighters. This aircraft can carry the olderAA-2/ATOLL and the more sophisticated AA-7/APEX air-to-air missiles in an air intercept role. It canalso be armed with general purpose bombs and rocketsfor ground-attack missions.

In 1985, North Korea also acquired 15 Soviet MiG-29/FULCRUM fighters. The MiG-29 carries the AA-lO/ALAMO beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. These

FULCRUMs provide Pyongyang with a limited butmuch improved air defense capability.

In the late 1980s, the Air Force improved its ground-attack capabilities when it acquired 35 Su-25/FROGFOOT aircraft from the Soviet Union. All-

weather capable and well armored, the FROGFOOThas a combat radius of 300 nautical miles and carriesup to 5,000 kilograms of bombs and rockets. How-ever, North Korea has yet to show it has mastered thefull potential of this highly capable fighter bomber.

The bulk of North Korea's transport inventory con-sists of nearly 300 1948-vintage An-2/COLTs. Thissingle-engine biplane can cruise at 160 kilometers perhour. Capable of carrying up to 10 combat troopswhile flying at low altitude and slow speeds to avoid

radar detection, the An-2 is uniquely suited for deliv-ering special operations forces behind enemy lines.

A ir D e fe ns e

North Korea has historically put a high emphasis onair defense, placing military Industries, aircraft han-gars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel, and even airdefense missiles underground or in hardened shelters.Pyongyang's interpretation of the lessons of DESERT

STORM reinforces this strategy.

Ground-based assets bear primary responsibility forhomeland air defense. The North deploys roughly11,000 antiaircraft artillery guns and has over 50 sur-face-to-air missile (SAM) sites to provide one of theworld's most dense air defense networks. Most ofthese sites are equipped with SA-2/GUIDELINEmedium-range missile launchers, but North Korea alsohas some SA-3/GOA short-range and SA-S/GAM-MON long-range SAMs.

In addition, North Korean ground force units areequipped with over 15,000 SA-7/GRAIL and SA-16/GIMLET man-portable air defense systems. Deployedin massive numbers, these shoulder-fired systemspresent a major threat to opposing tactical aircraft.

19


25/34

Personnel

North Korea South Korea

85,000 55,000

Bombers80 o

Fighters

760 480

Transports

30 0 25

Helicop1ers

300 ' 530"

. . . . . .?- III 7

" Including Army Aviation

." Includes Army, Navy, andAir Force

Air Defense Sec tor

25 50 Miles

++ ++++ PYONGYANG+

Ta egu

Boundary representat io~s arenot necessa ri ly au thor it a tive .

Tsushima

Kw an gju

aKorea Strait

North Korea's Three Combat A i r Commands . Eachsector is responsible fo r the air defense in its area.About 50 airfields, in various stages of use, are scattered throughout the country. Most military aircraftcan be placed in underground shelters.

20


26/34

North Korea has also recently emphasized selectedtechnological improvements in developing and testingunmanned aerial vehicles and drones. These vehiclesmay be equipped with cameras for surveillance ortarget acquisition or launched as decoys to fool enemyradars.

Ballis tic M is sile F o rc es

Despite economic problems, since the early 1980sNorth Korea has spent millions of dollars annually inan aggressive ballistic missile development program.Pyongyang has progressed from producing short-range SCUD missiles to the developmental testing of amedium-range missile, the No Dong, to early-stagedevelopment of longer range two-stage missiles, theTaepo Dong I (TD 1) and Taepo Dong II (TD 2).

North Korea has a brigade-sized SCUD B/C surface-to-surface missile (SSM) unit about 50 kilometersnorth of the DMZ. Several SCUD B/C facilities havealso been noted in development near the DMZ. Thesefacilities would provide North Korea with additionalhardened sites that could double or triple the numbersof SSM launchers and support equipment in the for-ward area.

North Korea produces an indigenous variant of the

former Soviet Union's SCUD B, known as the SCUDC. The C model has a 700-kg warhead with animproved range of 500 kilometers over the B model's300 kilometers. It also has an improved inertial guid-ance system for better accuracy. The North Koreanscan produce four to eight SCUDs a month for theirown armed forces or for export. For nearly a decade,North Korea has deployed SCUD-type, mobile SSMscapable of reaching all of South Korea. The countrycontinues to emphasize its ballistic missile develop-ment program, which eventually could providePyongyang with a system capable of threatening other

countries in Northeast Asia.

The No Dong is a medium-range missile based onSCUD technology. It has a range of about 1,000 kilo-meters with a 1,000-kg warhead. The No Dong wasoriginally designed for export, but it still has not been

SCUDSurface-to-Surface M issile. Asignificant threat to USresupply efforts for the peninsula.

produced in numbers suitable either for export or foroperational deployment in North Korea.

North Korea's two long-range ballistic missile systemsunderdevelopment are the Taepo Dong I and TaepoDong II. Both are two-stage systems. The estimatedrange for the TD 1 is more than 1,500 kilometers,

while that of the TD 2 is more than 4,000 kilometers.At present, both systems are in the design stage. Beforethey reach flyable prototype form, Pyongyang mustsurmount difficulties in developing multistaging andengine clustering. North Korea has no experience withthese significant technologies.

S p ec ia l O p era tio n s F o rc es

North Korea maintains a large, highly trained specialoperations force with 100,000 troops assigned to 24

brigades and 28 reconnaissance battalions. Theseforces have four basic missions: establishing a secondfront in the enemy's rear area, conducting reconnais-sance, performing combat operations in concert withconventional operations, and countering the South'sspecial operations in North Korean rear areas. Like all

21


27/34

Arctic Ocean

3

SCUDB IC NODONG

3 00 km /5 00 km 10 00 km

TAEPO TAEPODONG I DONG II> 1 50 0 k m > 4 0 0 0 k m

Nor th Ko rea Ball is tic Mi ss il e Thre at Ranges .

other North Korean troops, special operations forcescan be tasked with maintaining internal security if theneed arises.

political, or economic targets. Sniper operations aresimilar to those of the light infantry, but on a smallerscale, employing team-sized units.

North Korea classifies its special operations forces asreconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper. Team-sizedelements conduct reconnaissance to collect intelli-gence or targeting information. Light infantry forcesin company- or battalion-sized units attack military,

The North Korean Air Force supports special opera-tions missions with airborne infiltration and resupplyusing its An-2/COLTs. Almost one-fifth of the Navy'sassets also support special operations with hovercraftand minisubmarines.

2 2


28/34

Chemical2.5 Miles Long.3Mite Wide

TNT400 Feet

CLUSTER BOMB1,200 feet

SCUD Missile At tack on Airf ie ld .Diagram depicts potential weaponseffects of high explosive (TNT), cluster munitions and chemicalwarheads.

R e se rv e F o rc e s

Lessons of the Korean war shape the North's militaryplanning to a large degree, and Pyongyang determinedthat an inadequate reserve force for homeland defensewas a critical deficiency during the Korean war.Therefore, North Korea's current Army reserve forcetotals nearly 700,000. In addition, the Red Guard Mili-tia, composed of mobilization units with the primarymission of ensuring production at facilities anddefending them from attack, numbers over 3 million.This large manpower pool can mobilize in a shorttime, and mobilization is exercised in all aspects -from resource callups to evacuations of key industrialresources to alternate sites.

All Army reserve and Red Guard Militia personnelreceive annual training. North Koreans usually servein the Red Youth Guards (15 to 17) until their con-scnption into the Army (l8 to 25). Upon discharge, aformer soldier is employed at a North Korean factory,enterprise, or collective farm. He will also serve in thereserve unit headquartered at his job location until theage of 40. At that time, most are reassigned to the RedGuard Militia. The quality of military training and thesoldiers' endurance, military discipline, and party ded-ication support the government's conviction that thecountry is indeed a military fortress.

S e cu rity F o rc e s

The security forces, including the Department of StateSecurity and the Ministry of Public Security, areresponsible for protecting the country, its leaders,important visitors, borders, facilities, and operations.The forces number about 200,000 people, of which afraction have a military mission.

Wa rt im e E m p lo ym e n t

The wartime offensive strategy of North Korean forcesis to move southward as quickly as possible to gaincontrol of strategic areas and prevent reinforcement ofthe peninsula by allied forces. The significance of theallied logistic buildup during the Gulf War was not lost

on North Korean operational planners. For this reason,North Korea continues to concentrate troops, tanks,self-propelled artillery, and logistics near the DMZ.

At the onset of hostilities, ground artillery units wouldlaunch massive preparatory fire at defensive linesalong major routes of advance in South Korea. NorthKorean infantry and armored elements of the forwarddivisions would attempt to penetrate allied forwarddefenses to provide areas for the exploitation forces tomaneuver through. The exploitation forces are respon-sible for penetrating deep into South Korea, bypassingand isolating allied units to maintain their operationaltempo.

The North Korean Navy's primary wartime rolesinclude inserting special operations forces, inhibitingUS reinforcement of the peninsula, and defendingNorth Korea's coasts from attacking amphibiousforces. The Navy would use its expanding inventoryof hovercraft and its fleet of minisubmarines to insertspecial operations forces into South Korea prior tohostilities.

The North Korean Air Force would launch time-sequenced attacks against fixed or preplanned targets inconjunction with artillery, SSMs, and special operationsforces. Since North Korea recognizes that South Koreaand the United States will quickly gain air superiority, it

2 3


29/34

would concentrate much of its initial effort at degradingair force assets in the South.

Special operations forces perform at the strategic,operational, and tactical levels to establish a secondfront in the enemy's rear during wartime. Current

force structure and deployment of North Koreanspecial operations forces support an easy transition towar; sniper, light infantry, and reconnaissance unitsare fully integrated into all operational North KoreanArmy corps. Consequently, a shift to wartime opera-tions would be difficult to detect before hostilitiesbegan.

W e ap on P ro d u c tio n

President Kim Il-song left a legacy based on chucheideology, which promoted a self-sufficient, closedsociety. Military forces that can operate for anextended period without outside support reflect thisideology. Increasingly, however, questions have beenraised about Pyongyang's ability to indefinitely makemilitary improvements. Similarly, its efforts to stock-pile sufficient ammunition, food, and oil in hardenedunderground facilities to sustain combat for severalmonths without outside aid entail major costs to aneconomy that is buffeted by growing pressures.

The North remains capable of producing some higherquality weaponry and military equipment for use by itsown forces and for export to other countries. Severalhundred factories produce military materiel, so NorthKorea can manufacture most of the basic weapons andequipment it requires. A continuing priority forPyongyang in recent years has been increased produc-tion of ammunition for the offensive weapons it hasproduced.

The North has either hardened many of its productionfacilities or put them underground, so significant pro-duction output could continue during conflict. Indige-nous production of weapons and parts, stemming fromPresident Kim Il-song's chuche doctrine, makes NorthKorea much less dependent on foreign support in caseof conflict.

North Korea indigenously produces a number ofweapon systems for each of the armed services. Theycontinue to produce a variety of artillery systems, self-propelled guns ranging from I22-mm to l70-mm, andmultiple rocket launchers ranging from 107-mm to240-mm. The North has also indigenously produced

armored personnel carriers, antitank guns, mortars,handheld rocket-propelled grenade launchers, andAT-IISNAPPER and AT-3/SAGGER wire-gu~dedantitank missiles.

The SANGO submarine and hovercraft continue to bepriority projects for the Navy.

The North possesses a small-scale aircraft productionand assembly capability limited to tactical transportsand helicopters.

C om m a n d , C o n tro l, a nd C o m m u n ic a

North Korea currently is modernizing its aged tele-communications infrastructure to improve the speedand quality and expand the capacity of both domesticand international communications.

A fiber-optic cable linking Pyongyang and Hamhungwas complete by early 1995, with construction fromPyongyang to Kangwon, North Hamgyong, and South

Pyongan Provinces almost complete by midyear. In1995, North Korea acquired digital Chinese switchingequipment for Chongjin, Najin, and Hamhung. Largequantities of new and used telephones from a numberof countries increased the number of telephones to 3.7per 100 persons by 1993.

The current emphasis in the modernization program ison upgrading communications supporting the Najin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone in northeast North Korea. Alarge communications center at Najin will be the focalpoint; it will be equipped with digital switching andother modern equipment and will offer modem com-munication services to businesses operating in thezone. Vastly improved communications between theFree Trade Zone and other countries will include fiber-optic cable and a digital microwave relay link betweenPyongyang, Najin, and Vladivostok, with a shorter

24


30/34

link between Najin and Hunchun, China. Additionalplans for the Free Trade Zone include construction ofa satellite earth station, as well as communication cen-ter branches, in the zone.

North Korea's military command, control, and com-munications system consists of extensive hardenedwartime command facilities, supported by redundantcommunication systems, which are believed to belargely separate from systems supporting other sec-tors. A modernized telecommunications infrastructurewill greatly increase the regime's ability to perform \both peacetime and wartime management tasks, and as 1in any country, could provide critical backup for mili- /

I

tary communication systems if necessary. ..

Tr an s po r t a t i o n

North Korea has taken major steps to upgrade itstransportation system in support of its industrial andmilitary needs. Infrastructure improvements are ongo-ing, with rail and highway construction projects pro-gressing rapidly during the past few years. Despiteconcentrated improvements throughout the transporta-tion network, it has not kept pace with the growth ofthe industrial base; the network is barely adequate tosupport increased demands for transporting raw mate-rials and finished products. Conversely, the transporta-tion system can support initial combat operations

during wartime. However, the infrastructure wouldexperience numerous difficulties supporting sustainedoperations. Rugged terrain, limited east-west routes;numerous bridges, tunnels, and other chokepoints; andinferior road surface types would be factors duringsustained operations. .

Rail and road networks continue to follow' a generalnorth-south axis with limited east-west routes, espe-cially in northern areas. Rugged mountainous terrainrestricts or channels supply movement to a few routes.Rails carry 90 percent of North Korea's freight and

also would be the principal means of moving militaryequipment and supplies from northern sectors to com-bat forces in the staging areas. The 5,000-km networkis mostly single track. As a part of a network upgrade,North Korea is constructing several rail lines and elec-trifying additional routes. The network is 70-percent

electrified, which has resulted in increased capacityand faster service. A major logistic goal is to electrifyall primary rail lines. However, equipment shortagesand reprioritization of assets create transport ineffi-ciencies. North Korea has tried to circumvent thisthrough tighter controls and improved management of

equipment.

Insufficient roads, poor surfaces, and inadequate main-tenance hinder the 30,OOO-km highway system.Although only 15 percent of the highways are paved,North Korea is reducing its dependency on rails. Threemajor multilane expressways and other highway con-struction are among the completed projects. Theexpressways connect Pyongyang with key militaryand industrial areas of the country and include a

~

OO-km highway between Pyongyang and Wonsan, a3-km highway between Pyongyang and the port city

f Nampo, and a lOO-km highway connectingPyongyang with Panmunjom. A fourth expresswaybetween Pyongyang and Huichon is nearly completeand will serve key military and POL facilities in thecentral sectors of the country. Highways are usedprimarily for short-haul operations; however, duringwartime, they would become a strategic asset in theforward area and would supplement rails in the rearareas. Fuel constraints and the lack of private automo-biles limit civilian use of highways.

North Korean economic plans include upgrading andexpanding several primary maritime ports and openingsome to noncommunist shipping. Development of theNajin-Sonbong free economic and trade zone isanother upgrade that will promote international trade.The zone is in the northeast, on the borders withRussia and China. It includes the ice-free ports ofSonbong, Najin, and Chongjin, which are scheduledfor modernization.

North Korea's 32 ports are not considered critical toshort-term military operations. They are used prima-

rily to supplement the inland system and to supportdomestic production and the fishing industry. Themajor ports of Chongjin, Najin, Hamhung, Wonsan,and Nampa serve large commercial areas and are nearmilitary installations or militarily significant facilities.Should the lines of communication become saturated

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NORTH KOREA

Maior Rai l L in es a nd Por t F ac il it ie s

Electrical Lines _

Steam or Oi65el _

Major New Constructlon _

Primary Ports _

Secondary Parts _

25

EastSea

Korea

YellowSea

R a il S u p p or t fo r M o s t L o n g" D is ta n ce T r aff ic .Railroads provide strategic connections with China and Russia. North Korea has spentsubstantial effort upgrading the rail net, including electrifying 75 percent of the lines, building new lines, double tracking, andconstructing additional yards and stations.

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NORTH KOREA

Major Road Lines of Communication

Major Roads _

New Construction _

Expressways _

25

EastSea

Korea

Bay

YellowSea

Road Network Limitat ions to Eas t-Wes t Movements.The North uses highways primarily for short hauls between rail nodes and villages orfactories . The road network is concentrated in the forward area south of Pyongyang, and 15 percent is paved. Many roads are not trafficableduring adverse weather.

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in wartime, unimpaired ports would be viable forresupply operations.

Civil aviation in North Korea is limited. Regularlyscheduled international connections are restricted toflights from Sunan International Airport, north of

Pyongyang, to Russia and China. An agreement tobegin service with Japan was signed in 1990, estab-lishing irregular flights between Sunan and Tokyo.Domestic flights are limited to a few routes fromSunan to Chongjin, Hamhung, and Wonsan. Althoughpersonnel and equipment assigned to civilian flightsdo not have a direct military function, they could offerlimited support during wartime.

North Korea has 24 permanent-surfaced, jet-capableairfields; 27 transport/utility airfields; and at least 16highway landing strips. The landing strips generallyare near military airbases. Improvements, includingcompletion of new forward dispersal airfields andexpansion of taxiways and parking aprons, haveincreased the North's capacity to sustain combatoperations.

Log i s t i c s

During the Korean war, lack of adequate logisticshampered North Korea's military forces and kept themfrom completely controlling the peninsula. After thewar, sustainability of its military forces became a pri-mary requirement of the North's military doctrine.Pyongyang continues to implement military doctrinethat calls for maintaining war reserves for all classesof supply for 6 months of sustainability for regularforces and 3 months for reserve units and paramilitaryforces. A major increase in the number of active forcesand the deployment of many new types of weapons inthe past 15 years complicate this doctrine. However,

North Korea's massive war reserve stockpiles con-tinue to expand despite tremendous cost to its eco-nomic structure and hardship to its people. The overallmilitary sustainability required to support its extensivefirepower continues to increase.

North Korea is expanding its ammunition, POL, andequipment storage capacities by building additionalhardened and underground facilities and enlargingexisting facilities. Major national-level storage instal-lations have been built, and construction of unit-levelstorage depots continues - especially near the DMZ.Current ammunition stockpiles are estimated at over 1million tons. A million tons of military POL exist,despite the severe shortage of fuel supplies for thecivil economy. This amount would be sufficient to runPyongyang's economy for a substantial part of a year.Substantial food and combat ration war reserves exist,despite major malnourishment in.the North.

North Korea has over 200,000 vehicles, 1,000 loco-motives, and over 20,000 railcars that are mostly non-military but would be mobilized to support a conflict.Much of this normally nonmilitary transport is tied toreserve force units that would provide a substantialpart of the logistic support required by military forcesand would move personnel, ammunition, and suppliesinto the Republic of Korea during a conflict. Truck

transportation units would provide a full range of sup-port. Rail assets would provide heavy-lift capacity tomove armor, self-propelled artillery, and resupplyfrom national depots. Merchant and fishery vesselswould support naval forces and ground troops alongthe peninsula'S coastal waters, and the civil air trans-port fleet would be mobilized to carry troops andhigh-value cargo and possibly for aerial delivery ofchemical and biological warfare agents.

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G lo ss a ry o f A c ro nym s

DMZ - Demilitarized Zone

KPA - North Korean People's Army

KWP - Korean Workers' Party

MW - Megawatt

NBC - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

dprkmilitaryhandbook-marinesupdate1995

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