Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Failures to Imagine: Mental Imagery in Psychopathy and Emotional Regulation Difficulties
Although interest in the relationship between mental imagery and psychopathology has increased
greatly over the last decade, few publications to date have examined relationships between
personality-related psychopathology and mental imagery use, abilities, or both. However, we
have reason to expect that substantive relationships may exist. For example, studies have
consistently linked psychopathy and borderline personality disorder to problems in emotion
experience and emotion regulation, and a growing number of studies indicate that deficits in
visual mental imagery use and/or ability in particular may contribute to such problems. Using
correlational data from multiple self-report measures of normal and pathological personality
functioning and visual mental imagery, our study presents preliminary evidence for lower levels
of self-reported visual mental imagery use, abilities, or both among noncriminal individuals with
higher levels of self-reported psychopathy and individuals with greater emotional regulation
difficulties, a core feature of borderline personality disorder. We also found significant
relationships among self-reported visual mental imagery use, ability, or both and personality
variables shown to strongly predict psychopathy and emotional regulation difficulties.
Limitations of the study, especially its reliance on a correlational, cross-sectional design, are
discussed, and implications for future research are explored.
Keywords: psychopathy, mental imagery, emotion, borderline personality
disorder, emotion regulation
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Failures to Imagine: Mental Imagery in Psychopathy and Emotional Regulation Difficulties
Mental imagery is the simulation or representation of a simple or complex perceptual
experience (e.g., a taste; a musical score; a reunion with an old friend) across sensory modalities
within one’s imagination (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson; 2001; Pearson, 2007). Although visual
and auditory imagery are most frequent (Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005), imagery of taste, smell,
and touch also occur (Juttner & Rentschler, 2002; Stevenson & Case, 2005; Tiggemann &
Kemps, 2005). Prominent cognitive theories of mental imagery (e.g., Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, &
Von Gierke, 1988) posit four sequential stages of the imagery process: image generation, image
maintenance, image inspection, and image transformation. During image generation, an
individual voluntarily or involuntarily formulates a mental representation of a percept, either in
response to a present stimulus or from representations stored in memory (Pearson, 2007).
Maintenance requires continual reactivation of memory representations using attentional and
working memory resources to counter the otherwise rapid decay of the image (Kosslyn, 1994;
Pearson, Logie, & Green, 1996), and inspection involves interpreting properties of the generated
image (e.g., size, texture). Lastly, the generated image may be transformed in myriad ways,
including rotations (Shepard & Cooper, 1982), changes in scaling (Kosslyn, 1975), and
restructuring (e.g., reinterpretation of ambiguous figures; Mast & Kosslyn, 2002).
Researchers have studied each of these stages in the general population using numerous
tasks (see Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes, & Holmes, 2013, for a review), and each
stage has shown a relationship with neurophysiological markers (e.g., disruption of real-time
visual processing in the occipital cortex by visual imagery during image maintenance; Baddeley
& Andrade, 2000). Because research indicates that mental imagery shares processing
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
mechanisms with like-modality perception, contemporary researchers have characterized mental
imagery as “weak perception” (see Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015, for a review).
Beyond the cognitive processes of mental imagery, other studies have examined
phenomenological aspects of imagery content, including vividness, occurrence, and other
subjective qualities via self-report, whereas still others have examined the frequency of
individuals’ uses of visual imagery versus verbal processing style (e.g., Kirby, Moore, &
Schofield, 1988). Individual differences exist across all components of mental imagery, from
image generation (e.g., deficits among individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder;
Abraham, Windmann, Siefen, Daum, & Güntürkün, 2006) to subjective experience (Richardson,
1994), and researchers are only beginning to understand their implications for behavior and
experience.
Hitherto a largely unexamined construct in the clinical literature (Pearson et al., 2013),
mental imagery displays links with numerous psychological disorders. For example,
schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008), social phobia (Hackmann,
Clark, & McManus, 2000), major depressive disorder (Patel et al., 2007); and posttraumatic
stress disorder (Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005) are all characterized by deficits in mental
imagery not seen in non-clinical samples. In addition, treatments for these conditions have
yielded effects on mental imagery (Hackmann, 1998; Hackmann, Bennett-Levy, & Holmes,
2011; Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007; Holmes, Mathews, Dagleish, & Mackintosh, 2006).
Relatedly, greater mental imagery abilities have been associated with greater dispositional
optimism (Blackwell et al., 2013), and higher mental imagery ability, as measured by imagery
vividness and imagery controllability, has been positively associated with multiple components
of general wellbeing (Odou & Vella-Brodrick, 2013).
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Although mood- and anxiety-related conditions have shown considerable relationships
with mental imagery, no publications have directly examined the relationship between mental
imagery and personality-related psychopathology. Nevertheless, compelling reasons exist to
suspect that psychopathy and the Cluster B personality disorders, in particular, may be associated
with distinct and persistent differences in mental imagery processes and experiences. Across
psychopathy and these disorders (i.e., narcissistic personality disorder, histrionic personality
disorder, borderline personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder), individuals report
and/or demonstrate palpable problems related to the experience and regulation of self- and other-
focused emotions across contexts in daily life (e.g., Shedler & Westen, 2014), and a number of
frameworks have intimately linked mental imagery to emotion experience and regulation in
different ways. As Holmes and Mathews (2010) observed, three such links may include a direct
relationship between mental imagery and emotion systems in the brain (Lang, 1979; Miller et al.,
1987), similarities between the processing of emotional imagery and of real-time emotional
percepts (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007), and the
propensity of images to activate feeling states associated with emotional episodes from memory
(e.g., Conway, 2001). Each of these imagery-emotion frameworks may help to advance our
understanding of the etiologies of the problems in emotion experience and regulation that
characterize these personality disorders. Nevertheless, it is first important to establish that these
disorders are indeed marked by systematic deficits in mental imagery.
Most relevant to the present study, Holmes and colleagues (2005; 2006; 2008) found
consistent support for the often presumed-but inadequately studied hypothesis that visual
imagery in particular evokes more powerful affective responses than does verbal processing. In
this study, we will examine associations between visual mental imagery and key features of two
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
personality-related pathologies associated with profound disturbances in emotion experience:
psychopathy and borderline personality disorder (BPD). More specifically, we will examine the
relationship between self-reported aspects of visual mental imagery (e.g., vividness) and self-
reported individual differences in psychopathic characteristics and a hallmark feature of BPD,
namely, difficulties in emotion regulation. We will also examine self-reported differential use of
visual mental imagery versus verbal processing among individuals differing in these
characteristics.
Psychopathy is a constellation of interpersonal and affective traits characterized by
callous exploitation of others, chronic deceit, narcissism, superficial affect, poor impulse control,
and profoundly blunted guilt and empathy (Hare, 1993). Considerable research (e.g., Harpur,
Hare, & Hakstian, 1989) has supported a two-factor model of psychopathy derived from the
Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1990) that effectively splits the construct into an
interpersonal/affective component and a behavioral component (i.e., a “socially deviant and
nomadic lifestyle”). The former often includes the construct’s hallmark absences of anxiety, fear,
and genuine regard for others’ emotions. The latter includes the spectrum of criminal and
broadly antisocial behavioral tendencies represented in the DSM-5 criteria for antisocial
personality disorder (ASPD; e.g., irresponsibility; impulsivity; risk-taking) and its juvenile
precursor, conduct disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Studies indicate the two
factors are moderately and positively correlated; as Hare (1996) observed, “Most
psychopaths . . . meet criteria for ASPD, but most individuals with ASPD are not psychopaths”
(pp. 2).
BPD is a debilitating disorder characterized by intense emotional upsets, including
affective instability, chronic feelings of emptiness, and angry outbursts (American Psychiatric
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Association, 2013). In severe cases, individuals with BPD may seek relief or distraction from
intense emotional pain through suicidal behavior or non-suicidal self-injury (Brown, Comtois, &
Linehan, 2002). Leading etiological and treatment models of BPD posit that deficits in
individuals’ abilities to regulate (i.e., modulate and manage) these negative emotions comprise a
crux of the disorder’s symptomatology (e.g., turbulent relationships with others and intense fears
of abandonment; intolerance of distress; Linehan, 1993; Lynch, Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo, &
Linehan, 2006).
Indirect evidence suggests that aberrations in visual mental imagery may be associated
with emotion-related problems in these disorders in systematic ways. With respect to the
psychopathy, one of the behavioral traits consistently associated with descriptions of
psychopathy is an aimless proclivity for rash decision-making that defies concerns for long- and
often short-term consequences affecting the self and others (Cleckley, 1941). Evidence suggests
that mental imagery processes and content may be associated with the machinations of
forethought thought to be atrophied among individuals with elevated psychopathy and
hypertrophied among individuals with elevated conscientiousness. More specifically, individuals
more apt or able to vividly imagine the outcomes of their behaviors and choices may be more
likely to behave in ways and make choices that show consideration for their consequences for
themselves and others.
In fact, many studies indicate that visual imagery facilitates judgment, planning, and the
regulation of related emotions. For example, individuals who are better able to mentally simulate
(i.e., generate a vivid mental representation of) some past, present, or future event or series of
events (e.g., studying for an exam, Pham & Taylor, 1999) may be more likely than other
individuals to access efficient/effective problem-solving to meet goals and regulate emotion in
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
times of stress and demand (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1999).
Furthermore, mental simulation of a goal- or other-focused behavior or outcome may increase its
value to the imaginer (Feather, 1982). Individuals with pronounced psychopathic tendencies
show well-documented deficits in judgment and planning (e.g., Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, &
Blair, 2002) and undervaluation of consequences consistent with underuse of or deficits in visual
mental imagery and simulation.
The remorselessness, broader disregard for others’ emotions, and global empathy deficits
associated with the affective/interpersonal component of the two-factor model of psychopathy
may also be related to individual differences in visual mental imagery use and/or ability. Studies
of empathy have indicated two factors comprising individuals’ capacities to both understand and
predict others’ mental states (i.e., cognitive empathy) and experience an emotion in response to
them (i.e., affective empathy, or sympathy; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David,
2004). Thought to underpin the former factor is an individual’s ability to imaginatively infer
accurate connections between others’ observable behaviors and their unseen mental states (i.e.,
theory of mind [ToM]; Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Simulation-based models of ToM posit that
individuals formulate a ToM by imaginatively projecting the self into another’s hypothetical
mental milieu and constructing simulations of the other’s potential behaviors (e.g., actions and
reactions) in accordance with the logic of that milieu as imagined by the projected self
(Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Provided these models are accurate, the
muted pangs of conscience and empathic concern observed among individuals with high levels
of affective/interpersonal psychopathy traits may in part depend on chronic failures to richly
imagine others’ experiences and generate a prerequisite theory or theories of mind for empathy.
Compellingly, Ali and colleagues observed that non-clinical individuals with elevated
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
psychopathy reported lower levels of affective and cognitive empathy (see also Ali, Amorim, &
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Brook & Kosson, 2013) and
demonstrated ToM deficits on a number of tasks requiring participants to infer mental states
from observable behaviors.
Nevertheless, although the aforementioned research provides circumstantial evidence for
links between psychopathy and mental imagery, studies directly examining these links are
exceedingly scant. To date, one study (Patrick, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1994) has examined
differences in mental imagery among incarcerated males with low, moderate, and high levels of
psychopathy as measured by the revised version of the PCL (PCL-R), and its authors reported no
significant differences in imagery ability among the three groups. However, this study used only
one measure of mental imagery vividness (i.e., the Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery;
Sheehan, 1967) and used small samples (i.e., 18 non-psychopaths; 15 moderate-psychopaths; 18
psychopaths) from a special population of incarcerated sexual offenders. Studies have indicated a
higher prevalence of psychiatric disorders among sexual offenders in prison (e.g., 63%; Harsch,
Bergk, Steinert, Keller, & Jockusch, 2006). Hence, ancillary personality-related psychopathology
or other unrecognized confounds may have contributed to a muddying of the relationship
between mental imagery and psychopathy. Furthermore, the QMI taps multiple domains of
mental imagery (e.g., taste; smell), but the proposed relationship between psychopathy and
mental imagery may pertain predominantly to visual imagery for the reasons described earlier.
By examining this relationship using multiple measures in context of a much larger, non-
institutionalized sample of men and women, we hope to contribute to a clearer understanding of
the link between imagery and psychopathy.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
With respect to BPD, as noted, a number of theoretical frameworks and studies (Lang,
1979; Holmes and Mathews, 2006) have indicated an intimate relationship between emotionality
and mental imagery. Of special interest to BPD, studies have suggested a link between successful
emotion regulation and mental imagery use. For example, Rivkin and Taylor (1999) reported that
individuals asked to mentally simulate an ongoing academic or interpersonal problem and
visualize “how the problem arose, what happened step-by-step, the actions they undertook, the
circumstances surrounding the event and the feelings they experienced” (pp. 1454) showed less
negative affect, more positive affect, and more use of emotion-focused coping skills (e.g.,
positive reinterpretations of the event and use of social supports). Furthermore, at least one well-
established model of BPD links emotion dysregulation and related interpersonal problems to an
underdeveloped or inadequate ability to effectively and accurately mentalize (i.e., imagine)
relationships between mental states and behavior (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). As Bateman and
Fonagy (2006) observed, “. . . we have to imagine what other people might be thinking or feeling
. . . each person’s history and capacity to imagine may lead them to different conclusions about
the mental states of others . . . We may sometimes need to make the same kind of imaginative
leap to understand our own experiences . . .” The authors’ model receives circumstantial support
from behavioral and neuropsychological studies reporting deficits in cognitive and affective
empathy and social cognition in BPD (Dziobek, Preißler, Grozdanovic, Heuser, Heekeren, &
Roepke, 2011; Haas & Miller, 2015; Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, and Levkovitz, 2010;
Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren, & Roepke, 2010). Because deficits in empathy and social
cognition have been indicated in both pathologies, it is perhaps not coincidental that at least three
studies have reported positive associations among BPD symptoms and the two psychopathy
factors, at least among women (Coid, 1993; Hicks, Vaidyanathan, and Patrick, 2010; Sprague,
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Javdani, Sadeh, Newman, & Verona, 2012). Hence, deficits in mental imagery may be associated
with deficits shared by both conditions.
To summarize, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that: (a) deficits in visual mental
imagery use or ability contribute not only to the development and maintenance of psychopathy,
but also to the development and maintenance of BPD symptomatology; and (b) deficits in
imagery use, ability, or both may be associated with deficits in emotion processes common to
both disorders. Because empirical evidence and prominent theoretical models of BPD implicate
emotion dysregulation as the etiological crux of the disorder (Linehan, 1993; Selby & Joiner,
2009), and because we are expressly interested in links between mental imagery deficits and
deficits in emotion experience among our disorders of interest, we have elected to examine
emotion dysregulation specifically in lieu of other BPD symptoms as measured by general
measures of BPD symptomatology (e.g., the Borderline Symptom List; Bohus, Limberger,
Frank, Chapman, Kühler, & Stieglitz, 2007). With respect to an empirical justification for this
choice, Glenn and Klonsky (2009) examined the relationship between emotion dysregulation and
BPD symptomatology using the widely used Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS;
Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and found that emotion dysregulation accounted for unique variance in
borderline symptomatology after controlling statistically for other indicators of distress (e.g.,
depression). Bornovalova and colleagues (2008) reported a concurrent finding in a sample of
inner-city substance users in residential treatment. In another study comparing clinical
presentations of dysthymic disorder (DD) to presentations of BPD, Conklin, Bradley, and
Westen (2006) reported that clinical presentations of BPD were uniquely associated with
emotion dysregulation symptoms in tandem with negative affect, whereas clinical presentations
of DD were associated with negative affect only. Moreover, the theoretical centrality of emotion
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
dysregulation to the etiology of BPD symptomatology is evidenced by its place in the recently
proposed emotional cascade model of BPD (Selby & Joiner, 2009) as the core dysfunction from
which other behavioral features of BPD emerge. In sum, empirical evidence in tandem with
theoretical modeling supports our conceptualization of enduring emotion dysregulation as a valid
marker of core borderline psychopathology. Finally, as noted, our study aims to contribute to the
literature regarding Cluster B-related psychopathology more broadly, as research suggests that
emotion regulation deficits are common to most and perhaps all Cluster B personality disorders
(e.g., Newhill, Mulvey, & Pilkonis, 2004). Thus, an examination of the relation between a well-
validated measure of emotion regulation difficulties (i.e., DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) in our
examination of the relationship between core BPD symptomatology and visual mental imagery
appears warranted in this context.
Lastly, because both psychopathy and BPD have been successfully conceptualized within
the framework of the five-factor model (FFM) of personality organization and functioning (Costa
& Widiger, 1994; Miller, Lynam, Widiger, & Leukefeld, 2001; Morey et al., 2002; Saulsman &
Page, 2004), it will be also be important to examine the relationship of visual mental imagery to
these five factors and explore how differences in visual mental imagery map onto FFM
configurations reflecting psychopathy and BPD.
Method
Participants
Participants were 275 undergraduate students enrolled at Binghamton University (n
women = 172, n men = 102, n other = 1), with a mean age of 19.36 years (SD = 1.54, range = 18
to 31) for participation. Sixty-three percent (n = 172) identified as white, 16% (n = 43) as Asian
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
American, and 10% (n = 26) as African American. All other self-reported ethnicities accounted
for the remaining 11%. Thirteen percent (n = 37) endorsed English as a second language. Written
informed consent was obtained online from each participant at the start of each session.
Measures of Emotion and Emotion Regulation
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The 36-item DERS
assesses difficulties across the following dimensions of emotion regulation: (a) awareness and
understanding of emotions, (b) acceptance of emotions, (c) the ability to engage in goal-directed
behavior and refrain from impulsive behavior when experiencing negative emotions, (d) access
to emotion regulation strategies perceived as effective, and (e) the ability to use contextually-
appropriate emotion regulation strategies flexibly to modulate emotions to meet individual goals
and situational demands. Six subscales comprise the DERS: Nonacceptance of emotional
responses (NONACCPETANCE), difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior (GOALS),
impulse control difficulties (IMPULSE), lack of emotional awareness (AWARENESS), limited
access to emotion regulation strategies (STRATEGIES), and lack of emotional clarity
(CLARITY). Participants are asked to indicate how often the items apply to themselves, with
response options ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 is almost never (0–10%), 2 is sometimes (11–
35%), 3 is about half the time (36–65%), 4 is most of the time (66–90%), and 5 is almost always
(91–100%). Higher scores indicate greater emotion dysregulation. The DERS has demonstrated
excellent overall internal consistency reliability (α = .93), high subscale internal consistencies
(i.e., for each subscale, α > .80), and construct validity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Internal
consistency in the present sample was high, α = .93. The DERS is highly correlated with
measures of BPD, including the McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Disorder (r = .54; Glenn & Klonsky, 2009) and the Borderline Symptom List (r = .56; Salsman
& Linehan, 2012).
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The
PANAS consists of 20 words (e.g., “happy;” “sad”) that capture positive and negative emotions
in two 10-item scales. Participants rate their experience of each emotion word on a scale from 1
(“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). Respondents are asked to rate their experience
of each emotion within a specified time period. As such, the measure may be modified to capture
state affect (e.g., “rate your experience of each emotion right now”) and trait affect (e.g., “rate
your experience of each emotion in general”). The PANAS positive and negative scales have
demonstrated excellent internal consistency reliability (e.g., Cronbach’s alphas of .89 and .85 for
positive and negative scales, respectively) and validity (Crawford & Henry, 2004). For the
present study, internal consistencies of positive and negative trait affect scales were .86 and .89,
respectively. Alphas for positive and negative state affect scales were .88 and .87.
Measures of Psychopathy and Empathy
Psychopathic Personality Inventory, Short-form, Revised (PPI-SF-R; Lilienfeld &
Widows, 2005). The PPI-SF-R consists of 56 items developed to detect core affective and
interpersonal features of psychopathy. The PPI-SF-R consists of eight subscales that often
coalesce into two largely orthogonal higher-order dimensions. Participants rate all items on 4-
point Likert-type scales. The PPI-SF-R subscales of Social Influence, Fearlessness, and Stress
Immunity load on a higher-order Fearless Dominance dimension that reflects a “bold and
dominant interpersonal style;” the subscales of Machiavellian Egocentricity, Carefree
Nonplanfulness, Rebellious Nonconformity, and Blame Externalization load onto a higher-order
Self-Centered Impulsivity dimension that reflects a “disinhibited, self-centered, ruthless”
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
disposition (Kastner, Sellborn, & Lilienfeld, 2012, p. 262). Coldheartedness does not load highly
on either higher-order dimension and is typically treated as a standalone dimension in analyses.
Cronbach’s alphas for each subscale have ranged from .59 (Rebellious Nonconformity) to .80
(Machiavellian Egocentricity; Kastner et al., 2012). Internal consistencies for the Fearless
Dominance factor and Self-centered Impulsivity factors were .81 and .84, respectively.
Levenson Self-report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al., 1995). The LSRP is a
26-item self-report questionnaire designed for the general population that evaluates behavioral
and personality traits commonly associated with psychopathy. Factor analysis of the measure
(Levenson et al., 1995) revealed two distinct but intercorrelated factors. The primary
psychopathy factor appears to measure a callous/manipulative interpersonal style, and the
secondary psychopathy factor includes items related to behavioral problems and impulsivity
(e.g., failure to learn from mistakes). Falkenbach, Poythress, Falki, and Manchak (2007) reported
acceptable-to-high internal consistencies for LSRP total, primary, and secondary psychopathy
scales (.82, .83, and .71, respectively) and mixed findings for validity. More specifically, the
authors observed that greater convergent validity (i.e., stronger positive correlations with
concordant PPI scales) for the LSRP secondary psychopathy factor than for the LPS primary
psychopathy. Cronbach’s alphas for LSRP primary and secondary psychopathy scores in the
present study were .84 and .68, respectively.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980; 1983). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is
a measure of dispositional empathy. The measure contains four seven-item subscales; each
assesses a separate cognitive and affective facet of empathy. The perspective-taking (PT) scale
measures tendencies to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others in
everyday life ("I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
from their perspective"). The empathic concern (EC) scale assesses’ tendencies to experience
sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others ("I often have tender, concerned feelings for
people less fortunate than me"). The personal distress (PD) scale assesses the tendency to
experience distress and discomfort in response to distress in others ("Being in a tense emotional
situation scares me"). The fantasy (FS) scale measures the tendency to imaginatively transpose
oneself into fictional situations ("When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how
I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me"). The perspective-taking and
fantasy scales are believed to measure largely cognitive components of empathy, whereas the
empathic concern and personal distress scales are believed to measure largely affective
components. Cronbach’s alphas for the four subscales have ranged from .67 to .87 (Hawk,
Keijsers, Branje, Van der Graaff, de Wied, & Meeus, 2013). Overall internal consistency of the
IRI for the present study was high, α = .82.
Measures of Imagery
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). The
SUIS consists of 12 items (e.g., “When I first hear a friend’s voice, a visual image of him or her
almost always comes to mind”) that measure participants’ tendencies toward general imagery
use. Participants rate each item on a 5-point scale, and higher scores indicate greater use of
imagery. Reisberg et al. (2003) reported good internal consistency and convergent validity with
the Vividness of Mental Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). Cronbach’s alphas for the
SUIS have ranged from .72 to .76 (Nelis, Holmes, Griffith, & Raes, 2014). Internal consistency
for the present study was acceptable, α = .70.
Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). This 34-true-false item
self-report measure of absorption assesses the propensity for high involvement in sensory and
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
imaginative experiences. The TAS has a test-retest reliability of .91 and an internal consistency
of .88 (Tellegen, 1982). In the present sample, the TAS exhibited an internal consistency of .89.
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire – Revised (Kirby, Moore, & Schofield, 1988). In this
revised version of the VVQ (Richardson, 1977), 10 items assess visual processing preference
(e.g., “My thinking often consists of mental pictures or images”), 10 items assess verbal
processing preference (e.g., “I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words”), and 10 items
assess dream vividness (e.g., “My dreams are so vivid I feel as though I actually experience the
scene”). Participants select either “true” or “false” for each item. Alphas for the Verbalizer,
Visualizer, and Dreamer scales for the present sample were adequate, although not high: .52, .60,
and .70, respectively.
Vividness of Mental Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973). This 16-item questionnaire
asks participants to generate four visual mental images (e.g., “Visualise the rising sun. Consider
carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s eye”). For each image, participants respond
to four items about that image (e.g., “The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness”).
Participants select a rating on a scale from 1 (i.e., “perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision”)
to 5 (i.e., “no image at all, you only ‘know’ you are thinking of an object”). For the present
study, VVIQ responses were reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated more vivid mental
imagery. Nelis et al. (2014) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 for the VVIQ. Internal
consistency for the present study was excellent, α = .87.
Measures of Normal-Range Personality
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1989). The 60-item NEO-FFI
was developed to provide a concise measure of the basic personality factors of the five factor
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
model (FFM; i.e., neuroticism, extroversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness).
Twelve items measure each factor, and each item asks participants to rate the extent to which
they agree with the statement on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Schwartz, Chapman, Duberstein,
Weinstock-Guttman, and Benedict (2011) reported internal consistencies for each factor ranging
from .79 to .89. Cronbach’s alphas for extraversion, openness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and
conscientiousness were .79, .73, .62, .86, and .82, respectively.
Procedure
The present study was approved by the Human Subjects Research Review Committee at
Binghamton University. Measures were randomized, and students completed all measures online
using the Survey Monkey data collection program. Informed consent was obtained from students
at outset of the battery of measures, and students were informed that they were taking part in a
study examining their thoughts, feelings, and attitudes about life. Students received experiment
course credits in exchange for their participation. Data were analyzed using SPSS (Version 21.0;
IBM Corp., 2012). Outliers were identified by examining box plots of individual measures’ data.
Scores approximately 1.5 interquartile ranges above and below each box plot’s upper and lower
fences, respectively, were considered outliers. Effects of outliers were minimized and
distributions were approximately normalized using square root and logarithmic data
transformations when appropriate. Item-level missing data for measures were imputed using the
expectation maximization technique. Although statistically significant results across analyses are
reported in tables at alpha levels of p < .05, .01, and .001, more conservative Bonferroni alpha
corrections would allow for statistical significance at the following alpha levels for the following
measures: PPI-SF-R, p < .017; NEO-FFI-3, p < .01; VVQ, p < .017; IRI, p < .013. Results at
the .05 level of significance for these measures must be interpreted with caution.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Results2
Intercorrelations among Measures of Psychopathy, Empathy, Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation, and Big 5 Personality Factors
Correlations among measures of psychopathy, empathy, difficulties in emotion
regulation, and trait and state affect are presented in Table 1. As expected and consistent with
previous studies, scores on measures of psychopathy (i.e., PPI-SF-R and LSRP) were generally
positively correlated and negatively correlated with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
Also consistent with previous research, scores on measures of secondary psychopathy were
positively correlated with scores on the DERS and ratings of higher negative affect (i.e., trait and
state PANAS). Difficulties in emotion regulation showed mixed correlations with IRI total and
subscale scores.
Correlations between factors of the NEO-FFI and measures of psychopathy, empathy,
and difficulties in emotion regulation are presented in Table 2. Various measure total and
subscale scores showed significant positive and negative correlations with the five NEO-FFI
factors. These correlations were consistent with those reported in previous studies linking FFM
factors to features of borderline personality disorder and psychopathy (e.g., negative correlations
between extraversion and secondary psychopathy; positive correlations between neuroticism and
secondary psychopathy).
Correlations between Measures of Mental Imagery and Measures of Psychopathy,
Empathy, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation, and Big 5 Personality Factors
2 Effects of gender were omitted from results because effects were non-significant in analyses of interest. Although gender differences occurred for some personality variables (e.g., psychopathy), gender differences did not significantly impact relationships among these personality variables and measures of mental imagery.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Correlations among measures of mental imagery and measures of psychopathy, empathy,
difficulties in emotion regulation, and trait and state affect are presented in Table 3. VVQ visual
processing preference scores correlated negatively with LSRP Primary Psychopathy scores.
Regarding indices of psychopathy as measured by the PPI-SF-R factors, SUIS scores correlated
negatively with PPI-SF-R Coldheartedness scores, PPI-SF-R Fearless Dominance factor scores
correlated positively with verbal processing preference scores as measured by the VVQ, and
TAS scores, which measures absorption, correlated positively with PPI-SF-R Self-centered
Impulsivity factor scores. In contrast, Self-centered Impulsivity scores correlated negatively with
visual processing preference scores as measured by the VVQ.
Conversely, measures of imagery correlated positively with IRI total and
cognitive/empathy subscale scores. In particular, both SUIS scores and VVQ visual processing
preference scores correlated positively with IRI total and subscale scores, p < .001, except for
IRI Perspective Taking scores, which correlated positively with SUIS scores, p < .01, and IRI
Personal Distress scores, which did not correlate significantly with either the SUIS or the VVQ
visual processing preference scores. The VVQ Verbalizer scores correlated positively with IRI
Fantasy subscale scores. TAS scores also correlated positively with IRI total, Fantasy, and
Empathic Concern scores.
In general, DERS total and subscale scores correlated negatively with measures of
imagery3. For example, VVIQ scores correlated negatively with DERS total scores, and SUIS
scores correlated negatively with DERS AWARENESS subscale scores. In contrast, DERS
IMPULSE subscale scores and DERS total scores correlated positively with TAS scores. DERS
3 Because DERS subscale scores correlated with measures across analyses in ways that were largely similar to those of DERS total score, we chose to omit individual subscale analyses from results in the interest of efficiency.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
total and subscale scores showed in general negative correlations with verbal processing
preference as measured by the VVQ.
Correlations between measures of mental imagery and NEO-FFI factors are presented in
Table 4. The SUIS, VVQ visual processing preference, and VVIQ scores correlated positively
with extraversion. All three VVQ scales (i.e., Verbalizer, Dreamer, and Visualizer) correlated
positively with openness. Openness also correlated positively with TAS scores. VVQ visual
processing preference and verbal processing preference scores correlated positively with
agreeableness. Neuroticism correlated positively with TAS scores and self-reported tendency to
think in pictures. Finally, conscientiousness correlated positively with SUIS scores, VVIQ
scores, and VVQ visual processing preference scores.
Predicting Measures of Psychopathy, Empathy, and Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
from Measures of Mental Imagery
To determine if scores on measures of mental imagery statistically predicted scores on
measures of psychopathy, empathy, and difficulties in emotion regulation above and beyond
scores on measures of other personality variables (e.g., neuroticism), a series of hierarchical
regression analyses were conducted. In these regressions, an initial block of imagery measures
and a subsequent block of personality measures predicted measures of psychopathy, difficulties
in emotion regulation, and empathy. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. For
some total and subscale scores, measures of imagery continued to significantly predict scores on
measures of empathy, psychopathy, and difficulties in emotion regulation after controlling for
predictive effects of additional personality measures in the second block. In general, initial
blocks of mental imagery measures yielded significant regression equations; however, after
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
addition of the second block of personality factors, measures of mental imagery often no longer
significantly predicted scores on these measures.
Discussion
We hypothesized that problems in emotion experience and regulation associated with
psychopathy and the Cluster B personality disorders, broadly, and BPD, specifically, would
show systematic relationships with self-reported levels of visual mental imagery use and ability.
In light of visual mental imagery’s facilitative relationship with emotion experiences and
processes (e.g., Holmes et al., 2008; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999), we hypothesized that lower levels
of visual mental imagery use and ability would be linked to hallmark emotion-related deficits
observed in psychopathy and borderline personality disorder.
Intercorrelations among measures of psychopathy, empathy, and difficulties in emotion
regulation were in line with predictions. As expected, individuals who reported higher levels of
empathy reported lower levels of psychopathy, a finding consistent with contemporary
conceptualizations of psychopathy (e.g., Hare, 1990). More specifically, we found support for
previous findings linking deficits in both cognitive and affective empathy to higher levels of
psychopathy. Greater difficulties in emotion regulation as measured by the DERS were
associated with higher scores on almost every measure of psychopathy except for Cold-
heartedness and Fearless Dominance as measured by the PPI-SF-R. Surprisingly,
Coldheartedness showed no systematic relationship with difficulties in emotion regulation, and
difficulties in emotion regulation appeared to decrease as Fearless Dominance increased.
The relationship between emotion regulation difficulties and empathy was more mixed.
Individuals who reported greater difficulties in awareness of emotions reported less empathy,
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
whereas individuals who reported greater difficulties maintaining goal-directed behavior
reported more empathy. The former finding may indicate that individuals who struggle with
awareness of their own emotions are more likely to struggle with awareness of others’ emotions,
an interpretation consistent with most ToM conceptualizations of cognitive empathy (e.g.,
Carruthers & Smith, 1996). The latter of these two findings suggests that individuals with higher
levels of empathy are more likely to experience emotional distractions or disruptions while
pursuing their goals. Perhaps empathetic individuals are frequently distracted by the plights and
concerns of others. Of the four IRI empathy subscales, the Personal Distress subscale (i.e., which
measures individuals’ tendencies to experience distress and discomfort in response to extreme
distress in others) evidenced the clearest relationship to difficulties in emotion regulation.
Specifically, individuals who reported more distress in response to others’ discomfort reported
greater emotion regulation difficulties. This finding may indicate that individuals who experience
greater levels of vicarious distress in response to others’ problems are more likely to experience
emotional upsets that prove difficult to regulate. Alternatively, individuals who have difficulties
regulating emotional responses to their own stressors may also have difficulties regulating
emotional responses to others’ stressors.
We predicted that individuals with more psychopathic characteristics would score lower
on measures of visual mental imagery use and vividness. We reasoned that the well-documented
deficits in planning/judgment, empathy, and theory of mind observed in individuals with
elevated psychopathic tendencies would be linked to deficits in visual imagery use or ability in
light of evidence that visual mental imagery may facilitate each of these abilities (Taylor, Pham,
Rivkin, & Armor, 1999; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Our findings on the whole showed that
lower levels of visual mental imagery use and vividness correlated with elevations in both
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
primary and secondary psychopathic characteristics across two measures (i.e., the LSRP and the
PPI-SF-R). The predictive utility of some imagery measures fell below statistical significance
after controlling for personality variables with which imagery use/ability is also associated (e.g.,
openness), and one imagery measure (i.e., a measure of absorption) showed a positive
relationship with some indices of psychopathy. Though mixed, our findings diverged from those
of Patrick and colleagues (1994) who reported no meaningful relationship between mental
imagery and psychopathy. However, as noted, those authors investigated this relationship using
small samples of psychopathic and non-psychopathic participants from a specialized population
marked by potential confounds (i.e., sexual offenders in prison; Harsch, Bergk, Steinert, Keller,
& Jockusch, 2006). Regarding the absence of predictive effects for mental imagery after
controlling for personality variables, mental imagery ability may be strongly linked to the
broader patterns of personality functioning that characterize these disorders, so that controlling
for personality variables eliminates these associations.
Our findings offer preliminary support for further investigations of visual mental imagery
use and ability among individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies. For example, our
findings raise the possibility – but by no means demonstrate - that mentalization-based therapy
for individuals with elevated psychopathic characteristics may facilitate better regulation of
behavior (e.g., improve forethought; maintain goals) and better understanding of their own and
others’ mental states. Furthermore, our findings showed that higher levels of visual mental
imagery use and ability both correlated with and predicted greater levels of empathy in our non-
clinical sample. This result offers compelling circumstantial support for the hypothesized link
between visual mental imagery deficits and key affective/interpersonal deficits observed among
individuals with elevated psychopathy levels. Nevertheless, if mentalization ability is merely a
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
downstream indicator of cognitive empathy and not a causal agent in generating empathic
experiences, improvements in mental imagery use/ability may exert few or no effects on
psychopathy.
With respect to the relationship between difficulties in emotion regulation and mental
imagery, our findings provided limited support for the hypothesis that deficits in emotion
regulation associated with Cluster B psychopathology, broadly, and BPD, in particular, are
associated with deficits in mental imagery ability or vividness. Correlational findings indicated
that difficulties in emotion regulation were associated with less self-reported imagery use,
ability, or both. Although measures of mental imagery often failed to predict difficulties in
emotion regulation after inclusion of personality variable predictors, mental imagery may be
linked to broader patterns of personality functioning that characterize individuals with enduring
emotion regulation difficulties. Furthermore, because personality disorders have been
successfully conceptualized using FFM personality traits (e.g., Lynam & Widiger, 2001), it is
likely that controlling for these traits in the second iterations of our regression models removed
some of the variance in psychopathology associated with emotion dysregulation indices. If either
explanation is or both are true, then the failure of mental imagery measures to predict difficulties
in emotion regulation after controlling for personality variables does not reflect an absence of
valid relations between difficulties in emotion regulation and mental imagery abilities. Rather,
this finding may indicate a more complex interplay of personality, mental imagery, and emotion
dysregulation amenable to parsing in future studies (e.g., models of mediation, moderation, or
both). Our study’s inability to resolve the ambiguity of this finding constitutes a limitation of our
design. Provided that deficits in mental imagery abilities are in fact associated with difficulties in
emotion, then these preliminary findings may bear implications for BPD and other Cluster B
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
personality disorders characterized by poorly regulated emotions, including histrionic and
antisocial personality disorders. For example, although some empirically-supported treatments
for BPD have included salient imagery components (e.g., mentalization-based psychotherapy;
Bateman & Fonagy, 2004), studies examining differences in imagery use and ability between
samples of individuals with BPD and non-clinical samples have yet to appear in the literature.
Such studies might examine the relationship between visual mental imagery ability, use, or both
and interpersonal difficulties in BPD as well. For example, individuals with profound difficulties
in emotion regulation may also have difficulties forming rich, lasting, and emotionally impactful
mental images of loved ones and valued relationships. If so, this deficit may be related to
sufferers’ acute abandonment fears.
Nonetheless, our study’s conclusions with respect to BPD specifically are limited by our
decision to omit a measure of general BPD symptomatology in favor of a measure of enduring
difficulties in emotion regulation applicable to both BPD and Cluster B psychopathology more
broadly. A future study should include one or more measures of BPD symptomatology and/or of
other specific BPD symptoms (e.g., identity disturbances) to reveal more fine grained
relationships between the whole and/or parts of the disorder and mental imagery. For example,
the cognitive/affective symptom of recurring identity disturbances observed in BPD may be
associated with deficits in visual mental imagery. Janis, Veague, and Driver-Linn (2006)
reported that individuals with BPD tended to endorse a broad and internally inconsistent range of
simultaneous positive and negative present, future, important, and desired possible selves (i.e.,
mental representations of ideal selves and feared selves) compared with individuals without
BPD. The authors concluded that their finding supports theoretical models of BPD that attribute
distress to fluctuations in self-concept. Their finding may indicate another pathway indirectly
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
associated with emotion regulation through which deficits in visual mental imagery affect BPD.
Namely, individuals with deficits in mental imagery may experience more difficulty forming,
updating, and/or maintaining stable and content-rich mental representations of the self within
working memory, and such underdeveloped mental representations may contribute to subjective
distress and behavioral volatility.
Our conclusions are also limited by the correlational and cross-sectional design of our
study. For example, our findings cannot speak to the directionality of the relationships among the
variables of interest (e.g., the direction of the relationship between interpersonal/affective
psychopathy and mental imagery vividness). Individuals with elevated interpersonal/affective
psychopathy may not possess functional deficits in mental imagery’ instead, their levels of
psychopathy may have led them to be less likely to exercise their mental imagery abilities.
Future studies would do well to directly compare the imagery of abilities of the clinical groups of
this study with those of non-clinical comparison groups using task incentives that may be
differentially compelling to individuals with these conditions (e.g., a monetary reward task for
populations with elevated psychopathy; a social interaction task for populations with elevated
BPD and/or Cluster B psychopathology).
Finally, studies have routinely indicated that the so-called “dramatic” personality
disorders frequently co-occur and covary, and are often difficult to distinguish in practice (e.g.,
Zanarini et al., 1998). We contend that this diagnostic blurring may bear implications for visual
imagery deficits seen across Cluster B personality pathology. As noted earlier, the deficits in
mentalization ability treated by mentalization-based therapy for BPD may be similar to the
deficits in theory of mind observed among individuals with elevated psychopathy. Compellingly,
recent research has suggested that some individuals with BPD evidence lower levels of empathy
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
than non-clinical populations (Haas & Miller, 2015). A core cluster of deficits in visual mental
imagery use, ability, or both may underpin these and other similar emotion-related deficits across
the Cluster B personality disorders. Nevertheless, the present study cannot account for potential
confounds that may have inflated the relationship between visual mental imagery and Cluster B
pathology. For example, for some measures of psychopathy (e.g., LSRP Primary, and Secondary
Psychopathy scores), lower preferences for both visual and verbal processing predicted greater
psychopathic characteristics. A general deficit in a broader construct related to internal
awareness or introspection rather than visual mental imagery per se may be associated with the
emotion-related deficits in these personality pathologies.
Lastly, because both psychopathy and borderline personality disorder have been
successfully conceptualized within the framework of the five-factor model (FFM) of personality
organization and functioning (Costa & Widiger, 1994; Miller, Lynam, Widiger, & Leukefeld,
2001; Morey et al., 2002; Saulsman & Page, 2004), we examined the relationship of visual
mental imagery to these five factors and explored how differences in visual mental imagery
mapped onto FFM configurations representative of psychopathy and BPD. Our findings
indicated that visual mental imagery use, ability, or both, were linked to one component of the
five factors in ways consistent with those disorders’ FFM configurations. For example, in a
meta-analysis of FFM studies linking BPD and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), both
disorders showed negative correlations with agreeableness and conscientiousness. Similar
negative correlations between psychopathy and both agreeableness and conscientiousness have
also been reported (Derefinko & Lynam, 2006; Lilienfeld, Watts, Smith, Berg, & Latzman,
2015). Our findings indicated that general visual imagery use as measured by the SUIS and
visual processing preference as measured by the VVQ correlated positively with
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
conscientiousness and agreeableness, respectively, as measured by the NEO-FFI. These results
were consistent with our hypothesized link between greater visual imagery use and greater
conscientiousness in particular (i.e., better judgment/planning and forethought) as well as our
hypothesis that mental imagery ability scores would map onto FFM factors in ways consistent
with FFM configurations of the aforementioned disorders.
In conclusion, our study found significant relationships among measures of mental
imagery ability and measures of difficulties in emotion regulation (i.e., a hallmark feature of
BPD), psychopathy, and empathy. In general, visual mental imagery ability showed a positive
relationship with cognitive and affective components of empathy and negative relationships with
factors of psychopathy (i.e., primary and secondary) and factors of emotion dysregulation,
although the relationship between visual mental imagery ability and emotion dysregulation in
particular requires further clarification. Only absorption showed a positive relationship with all
three (i.e., psychopathy, difficulties in emotion regulation, and empathy). Except for absorption,
visual mental imagery generally did not predict either psychopathy or difficulties in emotion
regulation after controlling for the FFM personality factors. This finding may be due to a strong
link between visual mental imagery and the broader patterns of personality functioning that are
associated with the features of these disorders. This interpretation is consistent with our finding
that mental imagery ability scores generally mapped onto FFM factors in ways consistent with
FFM configurations of BPD and psychopathy. As noted, future studies should use experimental
protocols to test for deficits in mental imagery ability among individuals with higher level of
psychopathy and greater difficulties in emotion regulation. Conversely, future studies may also
use laboratory protocols to examine the possibility of enhanced mental imagery ability among
individuals with greater levels of empathy. For example, the performances of highly-
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
psychopathic participants and matched highly-empathetic participants during an image
generation task could be compared with each other as well as with the performance of matched
comparison participants.
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Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY 42
Table 1. Intercorrelations Among Measures Psychopathy, Empathy, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation, and Trait and State Affectivity
LP LS PC PFD PSCI IT IP IF IE ID DT PTN PTP PSN PSP
LP 1
LS .450*** 1
PC .585*** .170** 1
PFD .123* -.120* .104 1
PSCI .505*** .583*** .302*** .253*** 1
IT -.488*** -.197** -.614*** -.217*** -.252*** 1
IP -.488*** -.319*** -.525*** .053 -.290*** .694*** 1
IF -.267*** -.190** -.316*** -.039 -.119* .637*** .285*** 1
IE -.549*** -.269*** -.680*** -.047 -.279*** .809*** .603*** .408*** 1
ID .006 .279*** -.133* -512*** .050 .402*** -.032 -.031 .090 1
DT .246*** .503*** .002 -.354*** .366*** .054 -.179** -.045 -.066 .397*** 1
PTN .235*** .458*** .105 -.296*** .350*** .001 -.165** -.049 -.114 .351*** .569*** 1
PTP -.077 -.321*** -.065 .315*** -.150* .008 .126* .103 .080 -.254*** -.353*** -.160** 1
PSN .215*** .355*** .121* -.205** .295*** -.020 -.171** -.110 -.125* .340*** .504*** .691*** -.100 1
PSP .019 -.197** .039 .261*** .001 -.082 .008 -.009 -.007 -.212*** -.193** -.045 .613*** .075 1
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Note. N = 275. DT = DERS – Total Score; IT = IRI – Total Score; IP = IRI – Perspective Taking Subscale Score; IF = IRI – Fantasy Subscale Score; IE = IRI – Empathic Concern Subscale Score; ID = IRI – Personal Distress Subscale Score; PC = PPI-SF-R – Coldheartedness Score; PFD = PPI-SF-R – Fearless Dominance Factor Score; PSCI = PPI-SF-R – Self-Centered Impulsivity Factor Score; PTN = PANAS Trait Negative Affect; PTP = PANAS Trait Positive Affect; PSN = PANAS State Negative Affect; PSP = PANAS State Positive Affect.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Table 2. Correlations among Measures of Psychopathy, Empathy, and Difficulties in Emotion Regulation and FFM Factors.
NEOE NEOO NEOA NEON NEOC
LP -.130* -.225*** -.565*** .067 -.185**
LS -.300*** -.039 -.495*** .435*** -.504***
PC -.212*** -.206*** -.413*** -.098 -.187**
PFD .364*** .119* .043 -.510*** .184**
PSCI -.154* .110 -.499*** .233*** -.362***
IT .184** .260*** .438*** .277*** .079
IP .199** .229*** .508*** -.029 .190**
IF .180** .321*** .204** .119* .114
IE .220*** .277*** .494*** .098 .147*
ID -.111 -.143* -.044 .518*** -.250***
DT -.340*** -.008 -.336*** .646*** -.312***
PTN -.285*** -.010 -.297*** .572*** -.372***
PTP .482*** -.025 .215*** -.363*** .400***
PSN -.193** -.006 -.301*** .479*** -.268***
PSP .266*** -.040 .152* -.346*** .220***
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Note. N = 275. DT = DERS – Total Score; IT = IRI – Total Score; IP = IRI – Perspective Taking Subscale Score; IF = IRI – Fantasy Subscale Score; IE = IRI – Empathic Concern Subscale Score; ID = IRI – Personal Distress Subscale Score; PC = PPI-SF-R – Coldheartedness Score; PFD = PPI-SF-R – Fearless Dominance Factor Score; PSCI = PPI-SF-R – Self-Centered Impulsivity Factor Score; PTN = PANAS Trait Negative Affect; PTP = PANAS Trait Positive Affect; PSN = PANAS State Negative Affect; PSP = PANAS State Positive Affect; NEOE = NEO-FFI Extraversion Factor Score; NEOO – NEO-FFI Openness Factor Score; NEOA = NEO-FFI Agreeableness Factor Score; NEON = NEO-FFI Neuroticism Factor Score; NEOC = NEO-FFI Conscientiousness Factor Score.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Table 3. Correlations Among Measures of Imagery Style and Measures of Psychopathy, Empathy,
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation, and Trait and State Affectivity
SUIS VVIQ VVER VVIS DRM TAS PIC
LP -.088 -.106 -.154* -.215*** -.055 .000 .060
LS -.121* -.169** -.206** -.181** -.061 .075 .116
PC -.294*** -.125* -.108 -.206** -.085 -.180** -.082
PFD -.029 .105 .154* -.021 .038 .049 -.051
PSCI -.050 -.094 -.047 -.158** .025 .236*** .075
DT .025 -.147* -.173** -.094 -.037 .154* .142*
IT .327*** .065 .177** .310*** .148* .295*** .151*
IP .205** .024 .204** .274*** .056 .153* .040
IF .364*** .170** .254*** .243*** .295*** .296*** .065
IE .261*** .174** .178* .233*** .122* .264*** .110
ID .036 -.182** -.156** .072 -.081 .071 .157**
PTN -.053 -.109 -.130 -.110 .009 .258*** .135*
PTP .186** .247*** .080 .097 .128* .103 .077
PSN -.033 -.087 -.131* -.126* .014 .202** .136*
PSP .104 .175** .054 -.082 .036 .080 .037
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Note. N = 275. DT = DERS – Total Score; IT = IRI – Total Score; IP = IRI – Perspective Taking Subscale Score; IF = IRI – Fantasy Subscale Score; IE = IRI – Empathic Concern Subscale Score; ID = IRI – Personal Distress Subscale Score; PC = PPI-SF-R – Coldheartedness Score; PFD = PPI-SF-R – Fearless Dominance Factor Score; PSCI = PPI-SF-R – Self-Centered Impulsivity Factor Score; PTN = PANAS Trait Negative Affect; PTP = PANAS Trait Positive Affect; PSN = PANAS State Negative Affect; PSP = PANAS State Positive Affect; SUIS = SUIS Score; VVIQ = VVIQ Score; VVER = VVQ Verbal Processing Preference Score; VVIS = VVQ Visual Processing Preference Score; DRM = VVQ Dreamer Score; TAS = TAS Score; PIC = Self-Reported Tendency to Think in Pictures.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Table 4. Correlations Among Mental Imagery Measures and FFM Factors.
SUIS VVIQ VVER VVIS DRM TAS PIC
NEOE .187** .146* .026 .204** .086 .046 .089
NEOO .111 .066 .415*** .177** .327*** .363*** -.032
NEOA .073 .066 .157** .173** -.001 .042 -.052
NEON .047 -.076 -.023 .052 .100 .191** .156**
NEOC .253*** .215*** .067 .170** -.016 .011 -.027
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Note. N = 275. SUIS = SUIS Score; VVIQ = VVIQ Score; VVER = VVQ Verbal Processing Preference Score; VVIS = VVQ Visual Processing Preference Score; DRM = VVQ Dreamer Score; TAS = TAS Score; PIC = Self-Reported Tendency to Think in Pictures; NEOE = NEO-FFI Extraversion Factor Score; NEOO – NEO-FFI Openness Factor Score; NEOA = NEO-FFI Agreeableness Factor Score; NEON = NEO-FFI Neuroticism Factor Score; NEOC = NEO-FFI Conscientiousness Factor Score.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Statistically Predicting Psychopathy, Empathy, and Difficulties in Emotion Regulation from Measures of Mental Imagery and FFM Factors
Step 1 Step 2Variable β p R2 β p R2 ∆ R2
Outcome: LSRP Primary Psychopathy
.06 .36 .30
SUIS -.005 .472 -.002 .678 VVIQ -.058 .280 -.045 .315 VVQ Visualizer -.263 .001 -.124 .058 VVQ Verbalizer -.048 .015 .001 .937 VVQ Dreamer .058 .429 .015 .813 TAS .008 .170 .012 .015 Extraversion .009 .109 Openness -.021 .001 Agreeableness -.068 .000 Neuroticism -.006 .169 Conscientiousness -.012 .025Outcome: LSRP Secondary Psychopathy
.10 .47 .37
SUIS -.069 .105 -.017 .623 VVIQ -.712 .043 -.158 .564 VVQ Visualizer -1.44 .005 -.541 .177 VVQ Verbalizer -.460 .000 -.251 .020 VVQ Dreamer .305 .530 -.550 .153 TAS .122 .002 .073 .018 Extraversion .052 .140 Openness ***4 .999 Agreeableness -.311 .000 Neuroticism .119 .000 Conscientiousness -.219 .000Outcome: PPI-SF-R Coldheartedness
.10 .28 .18
SUIS -.018 .000 -.015 .002 VVIQ -.013 .755 -.011 .778 VVQ Visualizer -.145 .016 -.035 .525 VVQ Verbalizer -.108 .246 .007 .619 VVQ Dreamer .053 .359 .038 .471 TAS -.004 .384 .000 .954 Extraversion -.007 .149
4 A possible suppressor effect rendered this predictor’s effect uninterpretable.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
Openness -.012 .025 Agreeableness -.038 .000 Neuroticism -.015 .000 Conscientiousness -.009 .052Outcome: PPI-SF-R Fearless Dominance
.02 .47 .45
SUIS -.124 .187 -.140 .074 VVIQ 1.39 .072 .701 .270 VVQ Visualizer -.688 .534 -.871 .349 VVQ Verbalizer .660 .021 .453 .069 VVQ Dreamer .187 .861 -.318 .721 TAS .058 .493 .145 .044 Extraversion .397 .000 Openness .211 .022 Agreeableness -.298 .002 Neuroticism -.543 .000 Conscientiousness -.096 .212Outcome: PPI-SF-R Self-centered Impulsivity
.11 .40 .29
SUIS -.157 .126 -.051 .553 VVIQ -1.28 .127 -.381 .587 VVQ Visualizer -4.11 .001 -2.02 .050 VVQ Verbalizer -.440 .155 -.105 .701 VVQ Dreamer 1.01 .385 -1.09 .269 TAS .477 .000 .398 .000 Extraversion .231 .011 Openness .178 .079 Agreeableness -.980 .000 Neuroticism .010 .885 Conscientiousness -.441 .000Outcome: DERS Total .08 .48 .40 SUIS .108 .619 .169 .317 VVIQ -4.48 .012 -2.02 .140 VVQ Visualizer -4.61 .073 -2.94 .143 VVQ Verbalizer -2.11 .001 -1.36 .012 VVQ Dreamer .365 .882 -2.18 .257 TAS .680 .001 .342 .027 Extraversion -.198 .259 Openness -.062 .753 Agreeableness -.652 .001 Neuroticism 1.46 .000 Conscientiousness -.080 .626Outcome: IRI Total .19 .45 .26 SUIS .044 .000 .038 .000 VVIQ -.134 .158 -.099 .215 VVQ Visualizer .547 .000 .284 .015
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY
VVQ Verbalizer .073 .037 .027 .387 VVQ Dreamer -.078 .556 -.067 .548 TAS .026 .014 .011 .203 Extraversion .023 .024 Openness .020 .089 Agreeableness .102 .000 Neuroticism .060 .000 Conscientiousness .007 .489Note. N = 275.
Running Head: MENTAL IMAGERY